缓解全球压力的计划

In the world’s financial markets, the tendency toward equilibrium that one reads about in textbooks is a myth. The tendency in the real world is toward excesses that, left unattended, would eventually lead to a breakdown of the international trade and payments system. The system would have broken down in 1982, for instance, if the monetary authorities had not banded together to prevent the wholesale default of over-indebted countries.

There are a number of disequilibria today that threaten the survival of the system: the chronic trade and budget deficits of the United States, the chronic trade and savings surpluses of Japan, the continuing debt crises of less-developed countries and the continuing instability of exchange rates. Tensions between the United States and Japan are approaching the breaking point.

Unfortunately, the problems are too complex to be patched up piecemeal and must be tackled as part of a larger scheme. A grand agreement between the United States and Japan that would lay the groundwork for a more stable system of both international trade and finance is needed. It could not, obviously, be a purely bilateral arrangement but would require international cooperation as well as changes in national priorities.

On the trade front, the United States would eschew protectionism and Japan would make firm and specific commitments to open up its domestic market to foreign goods and services, with special emphasis on agricultural products. Needless to say, this will be a hard row to hoe.

On the financial front, the arrangement would have two key ingredients. First, the United States would put teeth into the agreement to stabilize exchange rates, reached by the major industrial nations at the Plaza Hotel in September 1985, by financing a significant portion of its budget deficit through yen-denominated bonds.

Second, Japan would agree to devote a significant portion of its surplus savings to a solution of the international debt problem. The vehicle used for the purpose would be the World Bank, which would replace commercial banks as the primary source of capital for heavily indebted countries. The World Bank could lend at concessionary rates, keeping the burden of servicing the debt within tolerable limits; it could insist, in return, that the debtor countries pursue appropriate economic policies.

The prime beneficiaries of this plan would be the commercial banks, whose currently doubtful loans would be greatly enhanced in quality. The banks could be required to make a contribution to the World Bank to compensate for their benefits they would receive.

But the plan also has broader benefits.

The participating debtor countries would be encouraged to pursue balanced growth and to attract industrial investment instead of relying on bank loans. The United States, as a result, would see its balance of payments improve not only from higher exports to a stronger South America but also from higher debt repayments to its commercial banks. And Japan, for the small price of investing a portion of its pension funds in World Bank loans at concessionary rates, would continue to enjoy access to its largest export market and the strategic military protection of the United States.

For such an agreement to be truly successful, the newly industrialized countries of the Pacific Rim would also have to take steps to reduce their trade surpluses, partly by adjusting foreign-exchange rates and partly by opening up their domestic markets.

Together, these steps should significantly alleviate the trade imbalances of the world in a constructive fashion.

Most of the improvement in the American balance of trade would come from increased exports not only to Japan but also to the newly industrialized countries of Asia and to South America, which was such an important market in the 1970’s.

The dollar value of imports could also be expected to fall once the dollar’s international value has stabilized. (The quantity of imports has already been falling.) The beneficial effect on domestic economic activity ought to be enough to stave off protectionist pressures.

Neither the trade deficit of the United States nor the savings surplus of Japan can be expected to disappear altogether.

The fact is that Japan is willing to produce more than it consumes, while the United States is intent upon consuming more than it produces. As long as these trends prevail, the economic power of Japan is bound to grow and that of the United States to decline. Such shifts in economic leadership have occurred in the past. In the interwar period, for instance, the gradual transfer of economic leadership from Britain to the United States produced turmoil in currency markets, and disruption of the world economy.

By taking active steps to reform the system and inducing Japan to accept some of the burdens as well as privileges of leadership, we may be able to avoid a similar fate. Giving the yen an increased role both in financing the United States budget deficit and in refinancing third- world debt are steps in the right direction.