推迟波斯尼亚选举

I am deeply committed to making the Dayton peace process work. My foundation, among its many projects, has prepared a $15 million plan for providing pluralistic TV broadcasting to most of Bosnia prior to the elections, and the U.S. and European governments have pledged substantial funds to turn the plan into reality. Yet I feel compelled to voice a protest against the impending decision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to certify that conditions are suitable for holding “free and fair” elections in Bosnia by Sept. 14.

Immense Pressure

The OSCE head of mission in Bosnia, career U.S. diplomat Robert Frowick, has been under immense pressure from the U.S. government to issue the certification required under the Dayton agreement; two of his top aides have resigned in protest. The International Helsinki Federation issued a report on May 23 documenting that virtually none of the conditions spelled out in the Dayton agreement has been met:

Indicted war criminals have not been arrested. Gen. Ratko Mladic is in charge of the Bosnian Serb army, issues all orders and communicates with the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) commander through an interpreter. Radovan Karadzic continues to dominate the political scene, sacking the prime minister of Republika Srpska, Rajko Kasagic, who was willing to cooperate with U.N. representative Carl Bildt, but as a sop to Mr. Bildt, Mr. Karadzic has now promised not to make any further public appearances.

Freedom of movement remains severely restricted. Although official boundary checkpoints have been turned over to IFOR, they have been effectively replaced by mobile checkpoints, where the authorities representing all three ethnic factions routinely refuse to accept documents issued by the others. Signatures required to register political parties cannot be gathered across ethnic lines, hindering opposition parties seeking to attract a multiethnic constituency. For instance, the Liberal Democratic Party based in Sarajevo and the Social Liberal Party based in Banja Luka, which were united before the war and which are trying to form a common platform, cannot meet or even speak by telephone because of a lack of phone lines.

Freedom of expression and independent broadcast and print media are virtually nonexistent in so-called Herzeg Bosna (a Croatian ethnic enclave within the Bosnian-Croatian Federation) and in Republika Srpska. The situation is somewhat better in Bosnian territory, with an independent press in cities such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica and with some independent local TV and radio stations. Under present conditions the three nationalist parties that rule their separate entities control the relevant media, giving them an unfair advantage. The media under their control continue to foment ethnic and religious hatred, in contradiction of the Dayton agreement.

Freedom of association is severely repressed, leaving little chance for opposition parties to solidify support. The Helsinki Federation report cites specific instances.

The failure of the international community to secure the return of refugees (only about 60,000 out of the estimated 2.4 million have returned), coupled with election rules that allow people to vote where they now live, will legitimize the results of ethnic cleansing.

It is easy to understand what drives U.S. policy, but it is less easy to condone it. The timetable for the Bosnian elections is determined by the timetable for the withdrawal of IFOR troops, which is governed by the U.S. presidential election. President Clinton has of course made a commitment that U.S. troops would begin returning home by the end of the year. U.S. voters, who are so far removed from the problems of Bosnia and not well informed about the issues at stake, are primarily interested in whether the president will keep his word.

To conduct early elections in Bosnia, it would have been necessary to arrest the indicted war criminals before the momentum of Dayton dissipated. But the military has been traumatized by its experience in Somalia, and the Pentagon refused to accept the mission. The Clinton administration put its faith in Slobodan Milosevic, but he could not or would not deliver. To order IFOR into action against the advice of the military would expose President Clinton to a pre-election risk that he is determined to avoid.

Bigger Risks

But to persevere in the present course entails even bigger risks. Bosnia will set a precedent for the post-Cold War world. By insisting on going through with the elections we would breech the conditions of the Dayton peace plan we engineered, provide a blueprint for legitimating ethnic cleansing and undermine the principles of international law we sought to establish by creating the War Crimes Tribunal.

Bosnia cannot be split into separate ethnic entities without further conflict. The Serbs have carved out a contiguous territory for themselves (although the area around Brcko remains contested), and the Croat nationalists of Herzeg Bosna aim at no less. Even the military concedes that it would be easier to maintain its presence than to reintroduce troops after fighting has erupted again.

The failure of the international community in Bosnia is already affecting the behavior of neighboring Yugoslavia and Croatia, and it will be a source of never-ending recrimination between the U.S. and Europe. President Clinton may be able to avoid Bosnia becoming an election issue, but it would surely haunt his second term in office.