金融动荡核心的虚假信念
美国财长汉克·保尔森(Hank Paulson)提出的金融机构监管重组方案未能切中要害。我们需要的不是监管机构的重新洗牌,而是全新思维。美联储长期以来被授权为抵押贷款行业制定规则,却从未行使过这一权力。过去大约 25 年间,金融当局及其监管的机构一直受到市场原教旨主义的指导:即认为市场趋向均衡,偏离均衡只是随机发生。所有的创新——风险管理、交易技术、衍生品和合成金融工具那堆字母汤——都建立在这一信念之上。这些创新始终未受监管,因为当局相信市场能够自我纠正。
The proposal from Hank Paulson, US Treasury secretary, for reorganising government regulation of financial institutions misses the point. We need new thinking, not a reshuffling of regulatory agencies. The Federal Reserve has long had authority to issue rules for the mortgage industry but failed to exercise it. For the past 25 years or so the financial authorities and institutions they regulate have been guided by market fundamentalism: the belief that markets tend towards equilibrium and that deviations from it occur in a random manner. All the innovations – risk management, trading techniques, the alphabet soup of derivatives and synthetic financial instruments – were based on that belief. The innovations remained unregulated because authorities believe markets are self-correcting.
监管者本该更清醒,因为正是他们的干预,才多次阻止了金融体系的崩溃。但他们的成功反而强化了一个错误观念:市场能够自我修正。这一观念又让过度的信贷泡沫得以滋生,并蔓延至整个金融体系。当次贷危机爆发时,所有薄弱环节便暴露无遗。当局措手不及,只能对每一次新冲击做出事后应对。他们之所以缺乏预见能力,是因为陷入了市场原教旨主义的谬误。他们需要一套新范式。市场参与者无法基于知识——也就是经济学家所说的理性预期——来做决策。参与者的偏见、误解与真实状况之间,存在着一种双向反馈的互动关系。反身性不会产生随机偏差,而是会引发初始自我强化、最终自我毁灭的繁荣—萧条序列,也就是泡沫。
Regulators ought to have known better because it was their intervention that prevented the financial system from unraveling on several occasions. Their success has reinforced the misconception that markets are self-correcting. That in turn allowed a bubble of excessive credit to develop, which extended through the entire financial system. When the subprime mortgage crisis erupted it revealed all the weak points. Authorities, caught unawares, responded to each new disruption only after it occurred. They lacked the ability to foresee them because they were in the thrall of the market fundamentalist fallacy. They need a new paradigm. Market participants cannot base their decisions on knowledge, or what economists call rational expectations. There is a two-way, reflexive interaction between the participants’ biased views and misconceptions and the real state of affairs. Instead of random deviations, reflexivity may give rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating boom-bust sequences or bubbles.
当局与其重新调整监管机构,不如为下一只靴子落地的时刻做好准备。我只提两点。有一种名为信用违约互换的晦涩金融工具,未平仓的 CDS 合约名义本金大约为 45 万亿美元(约合 23 万亿英镑)。作为参照,这大约相当于美国家庭总财富的一半,是国家债务的五倍。这个市场完全不受监管,持有合约的人并不知道自己的交易对手是否做好了充分的风险防护。一旦发生违约,部分交易对手很可能无法履行义务。这种风险像达摩克利斯之剑一样悬在金融市场之上,它迟早会落下,但只有在一些违约发生之后才会显现。这必然在美联储决定不让贝尔斯登倒闭的过程中发挥了作用。一个可能的解决方案是建立一个资本结构健全、保证金要求严格的清算所或交易所,所有现有和未来的合约都必须提交给该机构。这在净化市场环境方面将比一场大规模的监管重组更加有效。
Instead of reshuffling regulatory agencies, the authorities ought to prepare for the next shoes to drop. I shall mention only two. There is an esoteric financial instrument called credit default swaps. The notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding is roughly $45,000bn (£23,000bn). To put it into perspective, that is about equal to half the total US household wealth and about five times the national debt. The market is totally unregulated and those who hold the contracts do not know whether their counterparties have adequately protected themselves. If and when defaults occur, some of the counterparties are likely to prove unable to fulfill their obligations. This prospect hangs over the financial markets like a sword of Damocles that is bound to fall, but only after some defaults have occurred. That must have played a role in the Fed’s decision not to allow Bear Stearns to fail. One possible solution is to establish a clearing house or exchange with a sound capital structure and strict margin requirements to which all existing and future contracts would have to be submitted. That would do more good in clearing the air than a grand regulatory reorganisation.
另一个问题是止赎数量不断攀升。在 600 万笔未结清的次级贷款中,约 40% 将在未来两年内违约。选择性可调利率抵押贷款及其他受利率重置影响的贷款,违约规模大致相当,但时间跨度会更长。目前独栋住宅年化销量为 60 万套,止赎潮将压垮市场,导致房价过度下跌。这将使资不抵债的房主数量激增,其中不少人可能选择直接交还钥匙。若不介入政府干预,房价下跌将实际上无底可探。遏制止赎本应是当务之急,但迄今采取的措施不过是公关作秀。
The other issue is rising foreclosures. About 40 per cent of the 6m subprime loans outstanding will default in the next two years. The defaults of option-adjustable-rate mortgages and other mortgages subject to rate reset will be of the same order of magnitude but occur over a longer period. With single family home sales running at an annual rate of 600,000, foreclosures will overwhelm the market and cause prices to overshoot on the downside. This will swell the number of homeowners with negative equity who may be tempted to turn in their keys. The fall in house prices will become practically bottomless until the government intervenes. Cutting foreclosures should be a priority but the measures so far are public relations exercises.
布什政府因其市场原教旨主义意识形态而抵制使用纳税人的钱。除了两党共同支持的一揽子财政刺激计划外,它基本上把政策实施留给了美联储。然而,减少止赎需要动用到纳税人的钱。国会中民主党人提出的两项提案,在承认止赎权与抑制行使该权利之间找到了平衡点。一项提案将修改破产法,允许法官调整主要住宅的抵押贷款条款。另一项提案将提供联邦住房管理局担保,使抵押贷款持有人能以当前评估价值的 85% 获得清偿。这些提案并不能解决住房危机,但触及了问题的核心。它们应当得到认真考虑。
The Bush administration has resisted using taxpayers’ money because of its market fundamentalist ideology. Apart from a bipartisan fiscal stimulus, it has left the conduct of policy largely to the Fed. Yet taxpayers’ money will be needed to reduce foreclosures. Two proposals by Democrats in Congress strike a balance between the right to foreclosure and discouraging the exercise of that right. One would modify the bankruptcy laws allowing judges to modify the terms of mortgages on principal residences. Another would provide Federal Housing Administration guarantees that would enable mortgage holders to be paid off at 85 per cent of the current appraised value. These proposals will not solve the housing crisis, but go to the heart of the issue. They should be given serious consideration.