德国的沉默威胁欧洲稳定
在周四于罗马举行的会议上，四国首脑同意采取步骤推进银行业联盟，并推出一个适度的刺激方案以补充财政契约。但默克尔总理拒绝了一切旨在救助西班牙和意大利、使其免于承担市场上过高风险溢价的提议。这有可能使六月峰会变成一场惨败，而这场惨败很可能致命，因为它将使欧元区其他成员国缺乏足够强大的防火墙来抵御希腊退出的可能性。
At the meeting in Rome last Thursday the four heads of state agreed on steps towards a banking union and a modest stimulus package to complement the fiscal compact. But Chancellor Merkel resisted all proposals to provide relief to Spain and Italy from the excessive risk premiums prevailing in the market. This threatens to turn the June summit into a fiasco which may well prove fatal because it will leave the rest of the eurozone without a strong enough firewall to protect it against the possibility of a Greek exit.
即使可以避免一场灾难性的崩溃，债权国与债务国之间的鸿沟仍将进一步加深，“外围”国家也将无法重获竞争力，因为竞争环境对它们不利。这或许符合德国狭隘的自身利益，但它将塑造出一个截然不同的欧洲——一个与曾经激发人们想象的开放社会大相径庭的欧洲。它将使德国成为帝国的中心，并将“外围”国家置于永久性的从属地位。这并非默克尔总理或绝大多数德国人所支持的局面。
Even if a fatal accident can be avoided the division between creditor and debtor countries will be reinforced and the “periphery” countries will have no chance to regain competitiveness because the playing field is tilted against them. This may serve Germany’s narrow self-interest but it will create a very different Europe from the open society that fired people’s imagination. It will make Germany the center of an empire and put the “periphery” into a permanently subordinated position. That is not what Chancellor Merkel or the overwhelming majority of Germans stand for.
默克尔总理认为，利用欧洲央行来解决成员国的财政问题是违反规则的——她是对的。欧洲央行行长德拉吉也表达了类似观点。当前六月峰会的计划中缺少一个要素：一个能与欧洲央行协同行动的欧洲财政机构（EFA），去做欧洲央行单凭自身无法完成的事情。它可以设立一个减债基金——这是默克尔总理经济顾问委员会提出、并得到社民党和绿党支持的一种改良版欧洲债务赎回协议。作为意大利和西班牙实施特定结构改革的回报，该基金将收购并持有它们相当大比例的未偿债务存量。
Chancellor Merkel argued that it is against the rules to use the ECB to solve the fiscal problems of member countries – and she is right. President Draghi of the ECB has said much the same. There is a missing element in the current plans for the June summit: a European Fiscal Authority (EFA) which, in partnership with the ECB, can do what the ECB cannot do on its own. It could establish a Debt Reduction Fund – a modified form of the European Debt Redemption Pact that was proposed by Chancellor Merkel’s Council of Economic Advisors and is endorsed by the Social Democrats and Greens. In return for Italy and Spain undertaking specified structural reforms the Fund would acquire and hold a significant portion of their outstanding stock of debt.
它将通过发行欧洲国库券（欧盟成员国承担连带责任的联合债券）来为购买行为融资，并将低成本融资的好处转给相关国家。监管机构将赋予这些国库券零风险评级，并认定其为欧洲央行回购操作中的最高质量抵押品。银行系统急需无风险流动资产——目前银行在欧洲央行存放着超过 7000 亿欧元的过剩流动性，利息仅有 0.25%。这为以 1% 或更低利率发行的国库券提供了庞大且现成的市场。
It would finance the purchases by issuing European Treasury Bills – a joint and several obligations of the member countries – and pass on the benefit of cheap financing to the countries concerned. The Bills will be assigned zero risk rating by the authorities and will be treated as the highest quality collateral for repo operations at the ECB. The banking system has an urgent need for risk-free liquid assets. Banks are currently holding more than €700 billion of surplus liquidity at the ECB earning only one quarter of 1% interest. This assures a large and ready market for the Bills at 1% or less.
如果某个参与国后来未能履行其承诺，欧洲财政管理局（EFA）可以处以与违规行为相称的罚款或其他形式的处罚，这样就不至于让处罚变成一项无法执行的重磅核武器。这将为防范道德风险提供强有力的保障。例如，这会使意大利继任政府几乎不可能打破蒙蒂政府所承担的任何承诺。让意大利近一半的债务由欧洲国库券融资，将产生类似于缩短其债务平均到期日的效果。这将使继任政府对欧洲财政管理局施加的任何惩罚更加敏感。
Should a participating country subsequently fail to live up to its commitments the EFA may impose a fine or other form of penalty which would be proportionate to the violation so that it would not turn into a nuclear option that cannot be exercised. This would provide strong protection against moral hazard. For instance, it would make it practically impossible for a successor government in Italy to break any commitments undertaken by the Monti government. Having practically half the Italian debt financed by European Treasury Bills will have an effect similar to a reduction in the average maturity of its debt. That would make a successor government all the more responsive to any punishment imposed by the EFA.
经过一段适当的时间后，参与国将启动债务削减计划，这些计划会被量身定制，以免危及它们的增长。
After a suitable period the participating countries will enter into debt reduction programs which will be tailored not to jeopardize their growth.
这将是建立完整政治联盟和引入欧洲债券的前奏。发行欧洲国债当然需要德国联邦议院批准，但这符合德国联邦宪法法院的要求——即任何经由联邦议院批准的承诺，在时间和规模上都应受到限制。
That will be the prelude the establishment of a full political union and the introduction of eurobonds. The issuance of European Treasury Bills would of course require the approval of the Bundestag but it would be in conformity with the requirement by the German Constitutional Court that any commitment approved by the Bundestag should be limited in time and size.
现在还不算晚，可以把它变成一份政治宣言，不仅阐明政治联盟的长期目标，还要规划出通往财政与银行业联盟的路线图。在这份宣言的指引下，欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）可以立即接手欧洲央行持有的希腊债券，欧洲央行可以开始积累西班牙和意大利债券，而意大利和西班牙则可以实施结构性改革，让自己有资格获得债务赎回基金的支持。
It is not too late to turn into a Political Declaration which outlines not only the long-term goal of a political union but also a road map towards a fiscal and banking union. Guided by this Declaration the EFSF could immediately takeover the ECB holdings of Greek bonds, the ECB could start accumulating Spanish and Italian bonds and Italy and Spain could implement the structural reforms that will qualify them for the Debt Redemption Fund.
这对市场的影响，将如同 2009 年 11 月各国财长宣言拯救了金融体系那般。它也将改变政治格局。
This would have the same effect on markets as the finance ministers’ declaration in November 2009 which saved the financial system. It would also change the political dynamics.
主要障碍在于德国政治陷入了“做不了”的模式。默克尔总理坚持认为，政治联盟应先行于成熟的财政与银行联盟。这既不现实也不合理。这三者必须一步一个脚印地协同发展。如果代表德国选民的联邦议院批准，没有任何条约或宪法条款能阻止欧洲财政管理局的建立——否则也不可能会有欧洲稳定机制。如果欧洲其他国家一致支持这一提议而联邦议院却加以否决，德国必须为随之而来的金融与政治后果承担全部责任。
The main obstacle is in German politics which is mired in a “can’t do” mode. Chancellor Merkel insists that a political union should precede a full-fledged fiscal and banking union. That is both unrealistic and unreasonable. The three have to be developed together step-by-step. There can be no treaty or constitutional clause preventing the establishment of the EFA if the German electorate as represented by the Bundestag approves it – otherwise there could have been no ESM. If the rest of Europe is united behind this proposal and the Bundestag rejects it Germany must take full responsibility for the financial and political consequences.