消极主义的极限

2008 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 3830 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

消极主义的局限

The Limits to Negativism

周一市场表现,仿佛信贷危机已成过去——写下这几个字本身就已足够不可思议,无论真假与否。但不管哪种情况,反思近来的事件能带来哪些教训,都至关重要。(我上周就有这些想法,只是手速不够快,没赶在危机结束前写成备忘录。所以现在只能聊聊我们大家都希望已成为历史的东西,而不是展现什么先见之明。)

The markets acted on Monday as if the credit crisis is behind us – how incredible it is to be able to even write those words, whether true or not. Whichever is the case, however, it’s important to reflect on what can be learned from the recent events. (I developed these thoughts last week but just wasn’t quick enough to turn them into a memo. So I’m reduced to discussing what we all hope is history rather than displaying foresight.)

心理的摆动

The Swing of Psychology

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过去几周,我目睹了有生以来最严重的恐慌,其剧烈程度、波及资产之广、席卷全球之势,以及随之而来的末日预言之悲观,均前所未见。我经历过多次市场崩盘,但没有一次是源于世界金融体系即将崩溃的传言。

值得指出的是,近期价格急跌中,很少有与贬值资产或其背后公司的基本面疲软相关。相反,它们是心理因素、技术发展及其相互交织所引发的市场状况所致。最严重的下跌反映了一种恶性循环:证券价格下滑、盯市测试、资本不足、追加保证金、强制抛售,乃至破产倒闭。

显而易见,这种螺旋正在上演,而无人能预见其如何或何时结束。这确实是个难题:没有任何负面情景会夸张到不可信,任何带有一丝乐观的情景都被斥为天真幼稚。

当然,这其中不无道理:没有什么是不可能的。但面对未来,我们必须考虑两件事:(a)可能发生什么,以及(b)这一切发生的概率。

危机期间,许多坏事看似都有可能,但这并不意味着它们就会发生。在危机时刻,人们往往无法区分这两者。既然我们对未来知之甚少——而在危机中,由于因果交错、动荡不定,我们了解得比以往更少——我们必须判断,在这场辩论中,哪一方更可能带来盈利(或更不容易出错)。

The last few weeks witnessed the greatest panic I’ve ever seen, as measured by its severity, the range of assets affected, its worldwide scope and the negativity of the accompanying tales of doom. I’ve been through market crashes before, but none attributed to the coming collapse of the world financial system. It’s worth noting that few of the recent sharp price declines were associated with weakness in the depreciating assets or the companies behind them. Rather, they were the result of market conditions brought on by psychology, technical developments and their interconnection. The worst of them reflected a spiral of declining security prices, mark-to-market tests, capital inadequacy, margin calls, forced selling and failures. It was readily apparent that such a spiral was underway, and no one could see how or when it might end. That was really the problem: no scenario was too negative to be credible, and any scenario incorporating an element of optimism was dismissed as Pollyannaish. There was an element of truth in this, of course: nothing was impossible. But in dealing with the future, we must think about two things: (a) what might happen and (b) the probability it will happen. During the crisis, lots of bad things seemed possible, but that didn’t mean they were going to happen. In times of crisis, people fail to make that distinction. Since we never know much about what the future holds – and in a crisis, with careening causes and consequences, certainly less than ever – we must decide which side of the debate is more likely to be profitable (or less likely to be wrong).

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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四十年来,我目睹了投资者心理的躁郁循环疯狂摇摆:在恐惧与贪婪之间——这调子我们都熟——也在乐观与悲观之间,在轻信与怀疑之间。大体上,跟随羊群的信念——随着钟摆摆动——长期来看只能给你平庸的业绩,而在极端关头可能让你送命。

两三年之前,世界迥异得几乎让人无法记起。那时主宰一切的是贪婪、乐观与轻信。简而言之,与最近几周正好相反:再离谱的故事也有人信。

For forty years I’ve seen the manic-depressive cycle of investor psychology swing crazily: between fear and greed – we all know the refrain – but also between optimism and pessimism, and between credulity and skepticism. In general, following the beliefs of the herd – and swinging with the pendulum – will give you average performance in the long run and can get you killed at the extremes. Two or three years ago, the world was so different as to be almost beyond remembering. It was ruled by greed, optimism and credulity. In short, it was the opposite of the last few weeks: no story was too positive to be believed.     

“全球存在一堵‘流动性之墙’,永不干涸。”

“AAA 级债务抵押债券与 AAA 级公司债同样安全,却回报更高。”

“杠杆才是提升投资业绩的关键。”

“分层切块和转售正在分散风险,从而消除风险。”

“脱钩已降低各国经济对美国的依赖。”

“There’s a worldwide ‘wall of liquidity’ that can never dry up.” “Triple-A CDOs are as safe as triple-A corporate debt but will deliver higher returns.” “Leverage holds the key to better investment results.” “Tranching and selling onward are spreading the risk, thereby eliminating it.” “Decoupling has reduced nations’ economic reliance on the U.S.”

天哪,那真是一个该来点怀疑精神的好时机!要是当时多点怀疑,能避开多少损失啊。可当主流看法一片乐观时,几乎没人敢站出来唱反调。太早站出来的人,看起来错得离谱,被众人弃之不顾。这吓得别人也不敢再尝试,哪怕周期还在一步步推向亢奋的顶点。

Boy, what a good time that was for a dose of skepticism! What benefits it could have provided (in terms of losses avoided). But when conventional wisdom is rosy, few can stand against it. People who do so too early look woefully wrong and are swept aside. That discourages others from trying the same thing, even as the cycle swings further to the positive extreme.

黑天鹅

The Black Swan

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您可能还记得,五月份在《鸟笼》专栏里,我写过《黑天鹅》这本书,作者纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布,他的上一本书是《随机漫步的傻瓜》。在《黑天鹅》中,塔勒布谈论的是那些概率极低、极端、不可预测,却可能带来巨大冲击的事件。他这个书名源于一个事实:几个世纪前的欧洲人从未去过澳大利亚,也没见过那里的黑天鹅,因此深信天鹅全是白色的。换句话说,因为他们从没见过某样东西,就认定它不可能存在。

《黑天鹅》传达的信息是,认识到所有人都排除在外的事情仍然可能发生,这一点至关重要。这或许可以推广为一种对怀疑精神重要性的理解。

我会把怀疑精神定义为:不轻信别人告诉你的,也不轻信“人人”都认为是对的事情。在我看来,这是成功投资最重要的前提之一。如果你相信别人都相信的故事,你就会做别人都在做的事。通常,你会买在高位、卖在低位。你会轻信那些号称能无风险带来高回报的“银弹”故事。你会买表现好的、卖表现差的。于是,你在崩盘时亏钱,在从底部回升时踏空。换句话说,你是个随大流的人,而不是特立独行者(这个词如今已被用滥);是个跟风者,而不是逆向者。

You may recall that in “The Aviary” in May, I wrote about The Black Swan, the second book from Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of Fooled by Randomness. In The Black Swan, Taleb talks about unlikely, extreme, unpredictable events that have the potential for dramatic impact. His title was derived from the fact that, never having traveled to Australia and seen its black swans, Europeans of a few centuries ago were convinced all swans were white. In other words, because they’d never seen something, they considered it impossible. The message of The Black Swan is how important it is to realize that the things everyone rules out can still come to pass. That might be generalized into an understanding of the importance of skepticism. I’d define skepticism as not believing what you’re told or what “everyone” considers true. In my opinion, it’s one of the most important requirements for successful investing. If you believe the story everyone else believes, you’ll do what they do. Usually you’ll buy at high prices and sell at lows. You’ll fall for tales of the “silver bullet” capable of delivering high returns without risk. You’ll buy what’s been doing well and sell what’s been doing poorly. And you’ll suffer losses in crashes and miss out when things recover from bottoms. In other words, you’ll be a conformist, not a maverick (an overused word these days); a follower, not a contrarian.

2008 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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怀疑精神是看穿资产负债表、看穿最新金融工程奇迹或稳赚不赔故事的必要条件。投资银行家或券商兜售的创意,早已被精心包装,粉饰得光鲜亮丽。而且这种事往往一直表现得不错,让故事显得更可信。只有持怀疑态度的人,才能区分那些听上去不错且确实不错的东西,与那些听上去不错但实际上并非如此的东西。我认识的最优秀的投资者都具备这一特质。这绝对不可或缺。

Skepticism is what it takes to look behind a balance sheet, the latest miracle of financial engineering or the can’t-miss story. The idea being marketed by an investment banker or broker has been prettied up for presentation. And usually it’s been doing well, making the tale more credible. Only a skeptic can separate the things that sound good and are from the things that sound good and aren’t. The best investors I know exemplify this trait. It’s an absolute necessity.

白天鹅

The White Swan

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大多数人从《黑天鹅》里得到的教训,大概和我一样(以及“鸟类学”那章提到的):"不太可能"不等于"不可能",投资者必须在低潮期也能撑得过去。

当然,正是那些不太可能的事件引发了信贷危机。许多被视为不太可能(若非不可能)的坏事接连发生,而且同时砸在了那些高杠杆投资者头上。所以最简单的解释是,在信贷危机中受伤的人,就是不够怀疑——或者说不够悲观。

但这让我恍然大悟:怀疑和悲观不是一回事。当乐观过头时,怀疑要求悲观;但当悲观过头时,怀疑也要求乐观。这个话题我还会多写一些,但说到底就这么简单。

Most people probably took away from The Black Swan the same lessons I did (and the lessons mentioned in “The Aviary”): “unlikely” isn’t the same as “impossible,” and it’s essential for investors to be able to get through the low spots. Of course, it’s improbable events that brought on the credit crisis. Lots of bad things happened that had been considered unlikely (if not impossible), and they happened at the same time, to investors who’d taken on significant leverage. So the easy explanation is that the people who were hurt in the credit crisis hadn’t been skeptical – or pessimistic – enough. But that triggered an epiphany: Skepticism and pessimism aren’t synonymous. Skepticism calls for pessimism when optimism is excessive. But it also calls for optimism when pessimism is excessive . I’ll write some more on the subject, but it’s really as simple as that. U

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逆向思维——做与众人相反的事,或者“逆风而行”——是投资成功的关键。但上周信贷危机达到顶点时,人们屈服于风势,而非抵抗。我发现乐观者寥寥无几;大多数人都多少带着悲观。有些人确实陷入了消沉——连我认识几位了不起的投资者也不例外。关于即将到来的崩溃的负面故事通过电子邮件越传越凶。没有人持怀疑态度,也没有人说“那个恐怖故事不太可能是真的”。悲观情绪自我强化。人们唯一关心的是给投资组合穿上防弹衣,撑过即将到来的崩盘,或者筹足现金应付赎回。上周他们唯一没做的事,就是积极出价买入证券。于是价格跌了又跌——老话叫“跳空低开”——一次就跌好几个点。

关键之处——和往常一样——是对“所有人”的言行持怀疑态度。你大可以说:“没错,负面故事也许最终会成真,但肯定已经反映在市场价格里了。所以押注其上没什么赚头。反过来,如果它最终没成真,从今天这种低迷水平涨上去的幅度会大得惊人。我买!”负面故事也许看起来很有说服力,但正是那个少有人信的正面故事——过去和现在——蕴含着更大的盈利潜力。

Contrarianism – doing the opposite of what others do, or “leaning against the wind” – is essential for investment success. But as the credit crisis reached a peak last week, people succumbed to the wind rather than resisting. I found very few who were optimistic; most were pessimistic to some degree. Some became genuinely depressed – even a few great investors I know. Increasingly negative tales of the coming meltdown were exchanged via email. No one applied skepticism, or said “that horror story’s unlikely to be true.” Pessimism fed on itself. People’s only concern was bullet-proofing their portfolios to get through the coming collapse, or raising enough cash to meet redemptions. The one thing they weren’t doing last week was making aggressive bids for securities. So prices fell and fell – the old expression is “gapped down” – several points at a time. The key – as usual – was to become skeptical of what “everyone” was saying and doing. One might have said, “Sure, the negative story may turn out to be true, but certainly it’s priced into the market. So there’s little to be gained from betting on it. On the other hand, if it turns out not to be true, the appreciation from today’s depressed levels will be enormous. I buy!” The negative story may have looked compelling, but it’s the positive story – which few believed – that held, and still holds, the greater potential for profit.

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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The Future

The Future

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我写了很多东西来剖析和解释过去的事件,但这次我想换个更冒险的路子,谈谈未来,算是做点贡献。我看到了什么?

短期来看,事实已经充分证明,政府和央行会竭尽全力解决信贷危机。所有能想的办法都会想,几乎没有哪个选项会被放弃。现在多数人都认为,让雷曼兄弟倒闭是个大错:那是一次经过算计的决定,纪律压过了救援。结果灾难性十足,商业票据市场冻结,货币市场基金“跌破净值”,危机被推高了好几级台阶。

多数人不会重复自己的错误;他们会犯新的错误。所以我们应当预期,接下来这段时间,所有关键玩家都会得到救援。救援中的某些环节会是错误,但至少那些错误不会把金融体系拖垮。摩根士丹利是下一个大麻烦,但雷曼之后,摩根再被允许倒闭的可能性就变得微乎其微。有人问我:“美国政府会为日本机构的资本投资提供担保吗?”绝对会,如果那是必要的话。这比美国自己掏钱强。

正在抛出的金额是史无前例的:几千亿美元,加起来上万亿美元。但毫无犹豫:一切都会做。这不意味着一定管用,但大概率会管用。

沃尔特·里斯顿从 1967 年到 1984 年执掌花旗银行,几乎涵盖我在那儿的所有年头,只差最后一年。他是全球顶尖的银行家,也是个大好人。他最著名的论断之一是:“国家不会破产。”我猜他指的是国家拥有印钞机,因而有无穷能力偿还本币债务。这就是我们不该指望救援资源有任何上限的主要原因。需要的只是把印钞机开得足够久,重建金融机构的资本账户、兑现担保,并让借款人能展期未偿债务,而这些都是按名义价值计算的。对私人机构提供无限援助的哲学桥梁似乎已经跨过去了,印出必要的钞票也不太可能成为问题。

当然,那不意味着我们已经脱离险境。印钱不是故事的终点。后果会是什么?

首先,有钱的人得决定把钱借给那些需要资金来运营企业的人。美联储向金融机构提供资本——即便利率极低——还不够。如果银行廉价借入资金,又贷给不还钱的人,它们会损失大量低成本资本。而如果它们还要向美联储还款,那就更陷入困境了。由于残留的保守心态,迄今为止的措施可能只会产生“推绳子”那样的无效效果,这是我常说的

I write a lot to dissect and explain past events, but I’ll try here to make a contribution by taking the riskier path of talking about the future. What do I see? As for the short term, it’s been amply demonstrated that governments and central banks will do everything they can to resolve the credit crisis. No stone will go unturned, and few options will be declined. Most people now believe that letting Lehman Brothers go was a big mistake: as a result of a calculated decision, discipline took precedence over rescue. The results were disastrous, as the commercial paper market froze up, money market funds “broke the buck,” and the crisis was ratcheted up several notches. Most people don’t repeat their mistakes; they make new ones. So we should expect that all key players will be rescued in the period ahead. Some elements of that effort will be mistakes, but at least those mistakes won’t pull down the financial system. Morgan Stanley was the next big worry but, after Lehman, it became unlikely that Morgan would be allowed to fail. I was asked, “Will the U.S. government guarantee a capital investment made by a Japanese institution?” Absolutely, if that’s what it takes. It beats the U.S. having to put up its own money. The sums being thrown around are the biggest ever: hundreds of billions, adding up to trillions. But there’s no hesitation: everything will be done. That doesn’t mean it has to work, but it’s likely to. Walter Wriston led Citibank from 1967 to 1984, all but my final year there. He was the world’s leading banker and a great guy. One of his most famous observations was, “countries don’t go bust.” I assume he was making reference to their ownership of printing presses, and thus their unlimited ability to pay their local-currency obligations. That’s the main reason why we shouldn’t expect there to be any limit on the resources thrown at the problem. All it will take is running the printing presses long enough to rebuild financial institutions’ capital accounts, make good guarantees and enable borrowers to roll over their outstanding debt, all of which is reckoned in nominal terms. The philosophical bridge of unlimited aid to private institutions appears to have been crossed, and printing the necessary money is unlikely to be an issue. Of course, that doesn’t mean we’re out of the woods. Creating money isn’t the end of the story. What will be the effect? First, the people who have money have to make the decision to lend to those who need it to fund their businesses. The Fed’s provision of capital to financial institutions – even at ultra-low interest rates – isn’t enough. If banks borrow money cheaply and lend it to people who don’t repay them, they’ll be out a lot of low-cost capital. And if they’re on the hook for repaying the Fed, they’ll be way behind. Because of residual conservatism, the steps so far might have the ineffectiveness of “pushing on a string,” something I

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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1 月《现在怎么办?》一文提过,我们还在等待资金真正在体系里流动起来。吉姆·格兰特创办了《格兰特利率观察家》,他用一个绝妙的说法形容流动性和信贷——“头脑中的货币”。和真金白银不同,它随人的情绪涨落——我们刚见识了一场活生生的演示。所以美联储光把钱塞给金融机构还不够,还得让它们愿意向外放贷、提供流动性。近来美联储向银行注入了大量资金,同时也吸收了大量银行存进来的钱。我们希望美联储的贷款能转贷出去,而不是趴在账上吃利息。这才是重启信贷机器的关键。

不过,即便信贷重新流动起来,我怀疑事情也不会立刻回到从前的节奏。损失已经吃了,资本已经毁了,后面可能还有更多损失等着(问问自己,房价跌到底了没有)。更重要的是,心理受了伤:消费者的心态、放贷人的意愿,连投资者的信心都挨了重击。我不看好马上就能反弹,那股子扩张的劲头回不来了。我坚持《现在怎么办?》里说过的话。毫无疑问,信贷会变得更难拿,经济增长会放缓:问题在于它是保持微弱的正增长,还是掉进负值,够上“衰退”的标签。不管哪种,乐观情绪和随之而来的冒险意愿大概都会收敛。我能确定说的只有一句:金融层面的日子不会那么好过了,结果多半比原本可能的样子要差一截。

mentioned in “Now What?” in January. We still have to see money begin to circulate throughout the system. Jim Grant, the creator of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, uses a great phrase to describe liquidity and credit: “money of the mind.” Unlike actual currency, it grows and shrinks depending on people’s moods – we’ve just seen a great demonstration. So it’s not enough for the Fed to give money to financial institutions; they have to be convinced to provide liquidity and credit. In recent times, the Fed has provided a lot of capital to banks, but it has also taken in a lot of deposits from banks. We want to see the Fed’s advance reloaned, not put on deposit. That’s what it’ll take to restart the credit machine. Even when credit starts flowing again, however, I doubt things will return immediately to their old pace. Losses have been taken and capital destroyed, and more losses may still be incoming (ask yourself if home prices are finished going down). More importantly, psyches have been damaged: consumer psychology, lenders’ willingness, even investor confidence – all have taken a beating. I doubt if things will bounce right back. There just won’t be the same expansiveness. I’ll stick with what I said in “Now What?” Undoubtedly, credit will be harder to obtain. Economic growth will slow: the question is whether it will remain slightly positive or go negative, satisfying the requirement for the label “recession.” Regardless, positive thinking and thus risk taking are likely to be diminished. All I can say for sure is that the world will be less rosy in financial terms, and results are likely to be less positive than they otherwise would have been.

淹没在金钱中

Awash in Money

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从更长远的角度看,我们不得不思考,大量新印的美元、英镑和欧元会对世界带来什么影响。拥有印钞机之所以让偿还债务变得容易,是因为它能让一个国家贬值自己的货币。但人们会想,单位 GDP 对应的货币数量越多,就意味着货币贬值,进而购买力下降(也就是通货膨胀加剧)。

周日我沿着海德公园散步,看到一个街头小贩在卖旧股票凭证。我问他,你有纸币吗?有没有魏玛共和国时期的?最近几周,我一直想弄几张那样的纸币。

在德国魏玛时期,政府通过贬值货币来支付第一次世界大战的赔款……真的是字面意义上的贬值。我买的那张 1000 马克纸币,只是被红色印章盖上了“一百万马克”。瞧!现在我们人人都富了。

In the longer term, we have to wonder about the effect on the world of a glut of newly printed dollars, sterling and euros. The reason owning printing presses makes repayment easy is that it lets a nation cheapen its currency. But one would think that more units of currency per unit of GDP means a debasement of the currency, and thus reduced purchasing power (read: higher inflation). Walking along Hyde Park on Sunday, I saw a street vendor selling old stock certificates. Do you have any banknotes, I asked? Anything from the Weimar Republic? For the last few weeks, I’ve wanted to get some of those. In Weimar Germany, the government enabled itself to pay World War I reparations by cheapening its currency . . . literally. So the 1,000 mark note I bought was simply overstamped One Million Marks in red. Voila! Now we’re all rich.

2008 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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1921 年初,马克兑美元汇率从 60 跌至 1922 年初的 320,到 1922 年底又跌至 8000。这令人难以置信,但根据维基百科(用户维护,也许并非总是最权威)记载:1923 年 12 月,汇率为 4.2 万亿马克兑 1 美元。1923 年,通货膨胀率每月高达 3.25 × 10⁶ 个百分点(物价每两天翻一番)。

The mark fell from 60 to the U.S. dollar in early 1921 to 320 to the dollar in early 1922 and 8,000 to the dollar by the end of 1922. It’s hard to believe, but according to Wikipedia (user-maintained and perhaps not always the most authoritative): In December 1923 the exchange rate was 4,200,000,000,000 Marks to 1 U.S. dollar. In 1923, the rate of inflation hit 3.25 x 10 6 percent per month (prices double every two days). P

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印刷这种新纸币的其中一家公司,开出了一张 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05 马克(即 3.28 × 10¹⁹,或 330 京)的账单。(这不是笔误。)

One of the firms printing these [new 100 trillion Mark] notes submitted an invoice for 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05 (3.28 x 10 19 , or 33 quintillion) Marks. [That’s not a misprint.] P

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凯恩斯勋爵对当时的局势是这样判断的:

欧洲各国的货币体系通胀膨胀已经发展到极其严重的地步。各交战国政府,或无力、或胆怯、或目光短浅,无法通过借贷或税收获得所需资源,便靠增发纸币来填补缺口。

但事情没那么简单。手里有货要卖的人并不傻。于是,1000 马克已经买不到一只羊,现在一只羊要一百万马克。那张纸以前是一千马克的钞票——现在成了一百万马克的钞票——但能买到的还是同一只羊。

政府得到的好处是,它能用突然多出来一大堆的货币来偿还旧的名义债务……但这些货币的购买力已经大不如前。

所以,1923 年政府用贬了值的货币还债时,欠债 1000 马克的债权人只能买到一只羊的千分之一——而不是像 1920 年那样能买到一整只羊。

我已故的朋友亨利·赖希曼当时还是个小孩子,在柏林一家餐厅当洗碗工。他告诉我,他常常中午拿到工资就立刻跑出去把钱花掉,因为要是等到下班再去买东西,这点钱能买到的东西就更少了。

这就是恶性通胀。正如大萧条在信贷危机期间成为参照样板一样,魏玛德国的经历也给了我们一些关于新未来的思考。

我还没有聪明到能预知会发生什么,但我也没蠢到认为周一政府的那几项措施就足以解决我们所有的问题。

充其量,我们通常是用一个问题替换另一个问题——而且常常是用未来的问题来替代今天的。

我不知道该怎么应对这种风险,不知道它会不会真的酿成大祸,也不知道会严重到什么程度。我当然也不认为恶性通胀的概率高到值得为此大动干戈。但它确实可能让人重新思考,那些收益率低、因避险需求而被推高的长期国债,是否还值得持有。

Lord Keynes judged the situation this way: The inflationism of the currency systems of Europe has proceeded to extraordinary lengths. The various belligerent governments, unable, or too timid or too short-sighted to secure from loans or taxes the resources they required, have printed notes for the balance. But it’s not that easy. People with things to sell aren’t that stupid. So instead of 1,000 marks, a goat now costs one million marks. That piece of paper used to be a thousand mark note – and now it’s a million mark note – but it still buys the same goat. The benefit to the government is that it’s able to pay off its old nominal debts in currency of which it suddenly has a lot more . . . but which no longer has much purchasing power. So when repaid in the cheapened currency in 1923, the person to whom the government owed 1,000 marks can only buy one-thousandth of a goat – not a whole goat as in 1920. My late friend Henry Reichmann was a boy then, working as a busboy in a restaurant in Berlin. He told me he used to be paid at lunchtime and immediately ran out to spend his salary, since it would buy less if he waited until after work to shop. That’s hyperinflation. Just as the Great Depression became a model during the credit crisis, Weimar Germany gives us something to think about regarding our new future. I’m not smart enough to know what’s coming, but I’m also not dumb enough to think a few government actions on Monday were enough to solve all our problems. At best, we usually substitute one problem for another – usually one later on in lieu of today’s. I don’t know what to do about this risk, whether it’ll come home to roost, or to what extent. And I certainly don’t think hyperinflation can be assigned a high enough probability to make it worth doing much about. But it may cause one to rethink holdings of low-yielding, flight-to-quality-elevated, long-term Treasurys.

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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新金融秩序

The New Financial Order

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我的女儿简——家中那位富有艺术气质的一员——近来对政治和经济产生了浓厚兴趣。(我想美国各地的年轻人都是如此,这是个非常积极的现象。)周六她打电话来问我,对银行国有化有何看法。

我首先告诉她,我认为这能对解决短期问题起到重要作用,这是好事。

然而,其次,美国有着政府不干预商业的深厚传统,我们或许希望保持这种状态。“国有化”在美国比在大多数地方更是个敏感词(《国际先驱论坛报》10 月 14 日头条:“国有化规则:做可以,但别提它”)。我告诉简,我倾向于自由企业制度加上适度的成人监管。当我们对体制做出根本性变革时,很难预见所有后果。不妨思考以下问题:

My daughter Jane – the artistic member of the family – has developed a strong interest in politics and economics of late. (I think this is happening to young people all across the U.S., and it’s a very favorable development.) On Saturday she called to ask what I thought about government ownership of banks. First, I said, I thought it could make an important contribution to solving the short-term problem, and that’s good. Second, however, the U.S. has a strong tradition of government non-involvement in business, and we’d probably like to see it stay that way. “Nationalization” is a much dirtier word in America than in most other places (International Herald Tribune headline, October 14 – “Nationalization rule: Do it, but don’t say it”). My preference, I told Jane, is for free enterprise with some adult supervision. When we make fundamental changes in the system, it’s hard to foresee all the consequences. Consider these questions:          

立法者会不会逼着银行家给自己的选民多放贷款(还记得房利美和房地美吗)?

银行会不会被迫向所有人放贷,哪怕是信用薄弱的借款人?他们能不能拒绝申请者?

房贷拖欠不还的时候,银行会不会被拦着不许取消赎回权?

银行会不会被吓退,不敢去给杠杆收购这类“反社会”的投资项目提供融资?

高管薪酬会不会受到限制?那样的话,银行作为雇主是不是就没那么有吸引力了?

银行员工会不会担心,做错了要挨罚,可什么都不做反而没事?

如果是这样,银行里坐着的会不会全是一帮畏首畏尾、生怕冒险的人?他们会不会动不动就往下说“不”?

资本会不会更难弄到手,尤其是那些规模更小、更年轻的公司?

经济增长会不会因此慢下来,比本来该有的速度还慢?

非国有的银行会不会吃亏,因为信用评级更弱,融资成本就得比对手多掏一截?

Will legislators push bankers to make more loans to their constituents (remember Fannie and Freddie)? Will the banks have to lend to everyone, even weak borrowers? Will they be allowed to reject any applicants? Will they be prevented from foreclosing when mortgages are unpaid? Will they be deterred from financing “anti-social” investments like leveraged buyouts? Will they be limited in compensating executives? Will that make them less attractive as employers? Will bank employees worry about being penalized for errors of commission but not errors of omission? If so, will banks be staffed by people who are overly risk-averse? Will they lean toward saying “no”? Will capital be harder to come by, especially for smaller, younger companies? Will economic growth be slower than it otherwise would have been? Will non-government-owned banks be at a disadvantage because, as weaker credits, they’ll have to pay more than the competition for their capital?

没有人知道,但这些问题值得深思。根本问题在于:如果政府持有的股权没有投票权,这是否足以使它不插手银行事务?现在下结论还为时过早(也很难完全乐观)。我始终认为,未来的金融行业杠杆率会更低、风险偏好更弱、盈利能力更弱、增长更慢、监管更严。这将使它不再那么激动人心、不再那么光鲜亮丽、也不再是首选雇主。但自由市场体系的美妙之处在于,大多数发展既有利也有弊。多年来我一直相信,正如成功中蕴含着失败的种子(参见 2003-08),失败中也蕴含着成功的种子。

No one knows, but these questions deserve consideration. Here’s the underlying question: if the government’s equity is non-voting, will that be enough to keep it out of the banks’ affairs? It’s far too soon to say (and hard to be completely optimistic). I continue to believe the financial sector of the future will be less leveraged, less riskprone, less profitable, slower growing and more regulated. And that’ll make it less exciting, less glamorous and less the employer of choice. But the beauty of the freemarket system is that most developments entail plusses as well as minuses. I’ve believed for many years that just as success carries within itself the seeds of failure (see 200308), so does failure carry the seeds of success.

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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如果银行变得官僚化、规避风险——不再那么激进、不再那么有竞争力——我相信独立的精品投行会崛起并繁荣。我想的模型是森林大火:一年之后,从灰烬中长出嫩绿的新芽;事实上,我认为正是灰烬滋养了它们。想想这样的景象对 Moelis、Evercore、Gleacher 和 Greenhill 这类顾问公司意味着什么。

在自由市场环境中,就算遭受沉重打击,也挡不住进取者抓住机会。十年后的金融业将和一年前大不相同——这未必是坏事。

If the banks are made more bureaucratic and risk-averse – and less aggressive and competitive – I’m sure independent boutiques will arise and prosper. The model I have in mind is a forest fire: a year after, bright green shoots grow from the ashes; in fact, I think they’re fertilized by the ashes. Think what a landscape like that means for advisory firms like Moelis, Evercore, Gleacher and Greenhill. In a free-market environment, not even a good knock can keep aggressive people from responding to opportunities. The financial sector will look very different in ten years from what it was a year ago – and that won’t be all bad.

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我发现我常常以引用沃伦·巴菲特的话来结尾,而且常常是同一句:

别人行事越不谨慎,我们行事越要谨慎。

但现在我想谈谈另一面:当别人行事极度悲观时,值得保持乐观。当别人爱上某个东西时,我们应该憎恨它。但当别人憎恨它时,我们可以爱上它。

在三月的《潮水退去》中,我列出了牛市和熊市的各个阶段。我说在牛市的最后第三阶段,所有人都确信事情会永远好转。加入这种共识的愚蠢显而易见;那些认为永远不会有值得担心的事而投资的人,必定会受到伤害。

另一方面,在熊市的第三阶段,所有人都认为事情只会变得更糟。其中的风险——就机会成本或错失的利润而言——同样显而易见。我毫不怀疑,熊市上周已进入第三阶段。这并不意味着它不会进一步下跌,也不意味着牛市即将开始。但这确实意味着利空已摆在桌面上,乐观情绪荡然无存,更长期的风险可能在于不投资。

2003-2007 年周期上行阶段的过度、错误和愚蠢是我前所未见的。由此引发的恐慌也是如此。证券价格已遭受的损害或许足以纠正那些过度行为——或者过多,或者过少。但毫无疑问,这是在废墟中挑选的好时机。

I find that I often end with a quote from Warren Buffett, and often it’s the same one: The less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. But now I want to talk about the flip side: When others conduct their affairs with excessive negativism, it’s worth being positive. When others love ‘em, we should hate ‘em. But when others hate ‘em, we can love ‘em. In “The Tide Goes Out” in March, I listed the stages of both bull and bear markets. I said that in the terminal third stage of a bull market, everyone is convinced things will get better forever. The folly of joining that consensus is obvious; people who invest thinking there’ll never be anything to worry about are sure to get hurt. In the third stage of a bear market, on the other hand, everyone agrees things can only get worse. The risk in that – in terms of opportunity costs, or forgone profits – is equally clear. There’s no doubt in my mind that the bear market reached the third stage last week. That doesn’t mean it can’t decline further, or that a bull market’s about to start. But it does mean the negatives are on the table, optimism is thoroughly lacking, and the greater long-term risk probably lies in not investing. The excesses, mistakes and foolishness of the 2003-2007 upward leg of the cycle were the greatest I’ve ever witnessed. So has been the resulting panic. The damage that’s been done to security prices may be enough to correct for those excesses – or too much or too little. But certainly it’s a good time to pick among the rubble.

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2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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我想借此机会祝贺并感谢我的橡树同事们,感谢他们一直以来的坚定。在崩塌的市场中最大化利用机会有一个简单的公式:

(a)对资产的内在价值有坚定、有充分依据的估值;

(b)认识到资产价格何时跌至价值之下,并买入;

(c)如果价格继续下跌,向下摊平;以及

(d)对价值的判断是正确的。

洞察力和决心都至关重要。我的同事们始终展现出这两点。最近几周我们的买入清单大多数日子都很长,而卖出清单几乎不存在。在有现金的地方,我们都大力投入,激进地向下摊平,买进的都是我们认为极佳的投资标的。

我还要感谢客户们的信任和坚持。正如布鲁斯·卡什和我十天前在写给机会基金不良债务投资人的备忘录中所说:“……几年后我们会一起回忆,当年利用 2008-09 年的便宜货是多么容易。”无论危机最糟糕的时刻是否真的已经过去,我仍然保持这种感觉。

I want to take this opportunity to congratulate and thank my Oaktree colleagues for their ongoing steadfastness. There’s a simple formula for taking maximum advantage of opportunities in a collapsing market: (a) have a firm, well-reasoned estimate of an asset’s intrinsic value; (b) recognize when the asset’s price falls below its value, and buy; (c) average down if the price goes lower; and (d) be right about the value. Acumen and resolve are both essential. My colleagues continue to show both. In recent weeks our list of purchases has been long most days, and our list of sales almost nonexistent. Where there’s cash we’ve put a lot to work, averaging down aggressively, in what we think are great buys. I also want to thank our clients for trusting us and sticking with us. As Bruce Karsh and I wrote ten days ago in a memo to investors in our Opportunities Funds for distressed debt, “. . . in a few years we’ll reminisce together about how easy it was to take advantage of the bargains of 2008-09.” Whether or not the worst of the crisis is now truly behind us, I continue to feel that way.

October 15, 2008

October 15, 2008

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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