另一方面
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
另一方面,
On the Other Hand
常有这样的事:就在我准备发布备忘录时,碰上某件必须写进去的事。6 月 12 日就是这样,当天《这一次不一样》已经刊发。我正在读伦敦投资管理机构 Ruffer 的第一季度报告,看到下面这个问题:
美联储凭它的裁量权和火力,能不能让市场错位止步不前,或者在它一旦开始后将其遏制?
这个问题让我想起几天前美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔就美联储如何应对贸易战可能性及其潜在后果所发表的言论:
我们正密切监测这些事态发展对美国经济前景的影响,而且一如既往,我们将采取适当行动维持经济扩张,保持劳动力市场强劲,让通胀接近我们对称的 2% 目标。(CNBC,6 月 4 日)
这两条信息放在一起,促使我反思美联储的角色和权力。简而言之,维持经济扩张、让市场错位无限期不发生的责任,是不是该由美联储来扛?我的结论是,《这一次不一样》不该回避这个话题,于是我把量化宽松那一节的结尾重新改写,加了一段新的收尾:
政府行动能不能永久性地抬高一个经济体的需求水平,还是说它们大多只是把未来的需求提前挪到当下?如果是后者,量化宽松能不能让 GDP 永远高于它本来会有的水平?我表示怀疑。可如果真能如此,那到头来岂不是要催生我所说的“过剩”,进而引发衰退?
还有,每当听到人们谈论美联储防止衰退的可能性,我都忍不住想,把防止衰退当成它的目标,到底可不可取。照上面说的,衰退究竟是当真躲得开,还是仅仅能往后拖?如果是后者,那让它们自然发生,是不是比人为推迟更好?为推迟而做的努力,会不会让人对美联储的力量和意图产生过度信心,从而让道德风险卷土重来?而假如美联储接连挡掉一次次小衰退,到头来会不会只是意味着,当它再也挡不住的时候,最后降临的那场衰退会格外猛烈?
这些最后一刻的灵感让我把上面这段写进去,我特别庆幸。我觉得这个话题非常重要,重要到我接下来要专门写一篇备忘录,谈美联储的利率管理。
It often happens that just as I’m about to release a memo, I come across something that absolutely has to be incorporated. That was the case on June 12, the day “This Time It’s Different” was published. I was reading a first-quarter report from Ruffer, a London-based money manager, and I came across the following question: Can the Fed, with its discretions and its firepower, keep a market dislocation at bay, or halt it once it has begun? That question caused me to think back to remarks made a few days earlier by Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell regarding how the Fed would deal with the possibility of a trade war and its potential ramifications: We are closely monitoring the implications of these developments for the U.S. economic outlook and, as always, we will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion, with a strong labor market and inflation near our symmetric 2% objective. (CNBC, June 4) Together, these two inputs prompted me to reflect on the role and powers of the Fed. In short, is it the Fed’s job to sustain expansions and keep market dislocations at bay ad infinitum? I concluded that “This Time It’s Different” shouldn’t ignore this subject and, as a result, reworked the end of its section on quantitative easing, adding a new final paragraph: Can government actions permanently raise the level of demand in an economy, or do they mostly accelerate future demand into the present? If the latter, can QE elevate GDP forever above what it otherwise would have been? I doubt it. But if it could, wouldn’t that eventually cause what I call an “excess,” leading to a recession? Finally, when I hear people talk about the possibility that the Fed will prevent a recession, I wonder whether it’s even desirable for it to have that goal. Per the above, are recessions really avoidable or merely postponable? And if the latter, is it better for them to occur naturally or be postponed unnaturally? Might efforts to postpone them create undue faith in the power and intentions of the Fed, and thus a return of moral hazard? And if the Fed wards off a series of little recessions, mightn’t that just mean that, when the ability to keep doing so reaches its limit, the one that finally arrives will be a doozy? I’m so glad these last-minute inspirations caused me to include the above. I think the topic is very important, so much so that I’m now going to devote a memo to the subject of Fed interest-rate management.
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美联储的动作告诉了我们什么?
很多人观察经济运行和央行影响经济的努力时,看到的是合乎逻辑、直截了当的东西。另一些人看到的则是一个复杂的生态系统,包含金融、政治和行为层面的成分,其趋势可以理解,但无疑充满重大的不确定性和模糊性。我属于后者。我认为美联储及其考量是复杂的、多层面的,充满大量“一方面……另一方面”的权衡。下面我会详细解释,先照例声明:我不是经济学家,不是货币政策专家,也不是美联储观察人士——只是个随便看看的旁观者。
很多人把美联储的动作只看表面。当美联储降息时——市场共识预期它很快就会这么做——投资者会把它当作“买入”信号。他们的思路很简单:经济疲软 → 降息 → 经济刺激 → 国内生产总值增强 → 企业利润上升 → 股价走高。正因如此,很多人——那些典型的“第一层思维者”——把鲍威尔上面那种表态看得很简单,当作利好。
但事情远不止这么简单。往深里挖,应该问:“美联储为什么降息?”答案当然是,美联储预见到经济疲软(或看到它正在发生),想把它挡开。所以“第二层思维者”会想:前景有多糟糕?如果不降息,情况会不会更坏?降息够不够避免一场衰退?
2006 年,在通往全球金融危机的路上,次贷违约开始攀升。这一趋势在 2007 年年中变得更加明显,导致抵押贷款支持证券价格下跌;抵押贷款支持证券基金面临追加保证金(来自给它们加了杠杆的银行);最终,基金崩盘。最引人注目的是,2007 年 7 月 31 日,贝尔斯登管理的两只抵押贷款支持证券基金申请破产。
投资者想要帮助,美联储冲过来救场。9 月 18 日,它把联邦基金利率下调 50 个基点,从 5.25% 降到 4.75%,并发布了一份声明,内容包括:
今天的行动旨在帮助防范金融市场混乱可能对整体经济产生的某些不利影响,并促进未来一段时间的温和增长。……
自委员会上次例会以来,金融市场的发展加大了经济前景的不确定性。委员会将继续评估这些及其他发展对经济前景的影响,并将根据需要采取行动,以促进价格稳定和可持续的经济增长。
这次降息和表态受到热烈欢迎,标普 500 指数在接下来两周里上涨超过 6%。我想,当时很少有人质疑这到底是不是好消息。
第一次降息后不久,我琢磨了这么一个问题:如果你因为生病去看医生,他掏出一根巨大的皮下注射针头,你会把这当好事还是坏事?既然美联储绝大多数的动作只是 25 个基点的加息或降息,那么降 50 个基点难道不意味着美联储觉得前景特别令人担忧吗?如果降 25 个基点对市场是好消息,那降 50 个基点到底是更好还是更坏?
What Do Fed Actions Tell Us? Many people look at the operation of an economy and the efforts of a central bank to influence it and see things that are logical and straightforward. Others see a complex ecosystem that has financial, political and behavioral components, with tendencies that are understandable but certainly subject to significant uncertainty and ambiguity. I’m one of the latter. I think of the Fed and its considerations as complex, multi-faceted and characterized by a great deal of on-the-one-hand-but-on-the-otherhand. I’ll explain at length below, right after issuing my usual caveats: I’m not an economist, an expert on monetary policy or a Fed watcher – just a casual observer. Many people take Fed actions at face value. When the Fed cuts interest rates, as the consensus expects it to do soon, investors take that as a “buy” signal. Their thought process is simple: weak economy → rate cuts → economic stimulus → stronger GDP → higher corporate profits → higher stock prices. For this reason, many people – first-level thinkers that they are – take a statement like Powell’s above as simplistic and a positive. But there’s much more to the story. Digging deeper, one should ask, “Why is the Fed cutting rates?” The answer, of course, is that the Fed anticipates economic weakness (or sees it taking place) and wants to ward it off. So the second-level thinker wonders how bad the outlook is, how much worse it might have gotten without the rate cut, and whether the cut will be sufficient to avert a slowdown. In 2006, on the way to the Global Financial Crisis, delinquencies on sub-prime mortgages began to rise. The trend became more noticeable in mid-2007, leading to falling prices for mortgage-backed securities; margin calls for mortgage-backed-securities funds (from banks that had given them leverage); and, eventually, fund meltdowns. Most prominently, on July 31, 2007, two mortgagebacked-securities funds managed by Bear Stearns filed for bankruptcy. Investors wanted help, and the Fed rode to the rescue. On September 18, it cut the fed funds rate by 50 basis points, from 5.25% to 4.75%, and issued a statement that included the following: Today’s action is intended to help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and to promote moderate growth over time. . . . Developments in financial markets since the Committee’s last regular meeting have increased the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of these and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth. The rate cut and message were warmly received, with the S&P 500 rising more than 6% over the next two weeks. Few people, I think, questioned whether this really was good news. Shortly after that first cut, I considered the following question: If you went to the doctor for an ailment and he pulled out a huge hypodermic needle, would you take that as good news or bad? Since the vast majority of Fed actions consist of 25-basis-point interest rate cuts or increases, doesn’t a cut of 50 basis points mean the Fed finds the outlook particularly worrisome? If a rate cut of 25 basis points is good news for the markets, is a cut of 50 basis points better or worse?
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我要说的是,降息的影响并非总像表面看起来那么简单。假设美联储判断准确,那么决定降息未必是好消息。你可以辩称,如果前方有麻烦,有降息总比没有强。但这并不能让它成为好消息。首先,这意味着美联储认为麻烦正在逼近。其次,它当然不能保证问题会得到解决。(值得注意的一点是,2007 年 9 月首次降息后的 18 个月里——期间又连续十次降息,最终将联邦基金利率降至接近零——标普 500 指数才最终触底,从首次降息当日的水平下跌超过 50%。)
My point is that a rate cut’s implications aren’t always as simple a matter as they may appear to be. Assuming the Fed is a good diagnostician, a decision to cut rates isn’t necessarily good news. You can argue that, if there’s trouble ahead, we’re better off with a rate cut than without one. But that still doesn’t make it good news. First, it means the Fed thinks trouble is looming. And second, it certainly doesn’t guarantee the problem will be solved. (It’s worth noting that 18 months after that first rate cut in September 2007 – during which time ten more cuts followed, eventually taking the fed funds rate to nearly zero – the S&P 500 finally bottomed out, down more than 50% from where it stood on the day of the first cut.)
低利率是好事吗?
今年年初,美联储决定放弃此前公布的加息计划,外界普遍认为,这是投资者停止抛售、不再打压市场的主要推手——即便不是唯一推手——也是标普 500 指数今年以来上涨约 20% 的行情背后的支撑因素。此后,涨势又因降息预期以及鲍威尔在第一版面上的言论而得到进一步推动。
之所以如此,是因为市场普遍相信我在上面列出的那一套传导逻辑:经济疲软 → 降息 → 经济刺激 → 国内生产总值走强 → 企业利润上升 → 股价上涨。但低利率究竟是如何促进财富创造的呢?
Are Low Interest Rates a Good Thing? The Fed’s decision early this year to depart from its announced program of rate increases is widely recognized as a main contributor – if not the main contributor – to investors’ decision to stop pushing down the markets through selling, as well as to the rally indicated by the S&P 500’s gain of roughly 20% so far this year. Since then the rally has been propelled by the expectation of rate cuts, and by statements like Powell’s on page one. This is the case because of the widespread general faith in the progression I laid out above: weak economy → rate cuts → economic stimulus → stronger GDP → higher corporate profits → higher stock prices. But how, exactly, do low rates contribute to wealth creation?
低利率会鼓励消费者增加支出。低利率降低了借贷成本,从而提振了对常以分期付款或租赁方式购买的商品的需求,比如汽车、住宅和家电。此外,低利率还能降低浮动利率房贷的月供,让消费者有更多可支配收入用于消费。最后,在利率低企时,花钱而非存钱所带来的机会成本微乎其微。
低利率同样能鼓励企业投资,因为它降低了资本成本,从而也降低了支出的回报门槛。
商品和服务需求的增长会带动就业增加、失业率下降和劳动力市场趋紧,进而引发工资通胀。工资上涨让工薪族口袋里有了更多钱,也改善了他们的心态,从而进一步刺激消费支出。
通过降低企业浮动利率债务的利息支出,低利率能提升企业利润;让企业更容易偿还债务;并为资本开支(这部分计入 GDP)以及股息和股票回购(这些把钱放进投资者腰包)留出更多现金。
低利率会降低计算未来现金流现值时所使用的贴现因子。因此,在其他条件不变的情况下,利率下行与资产价格上行之间存在直接关联。(我认为这其实是过去十年金融世界的主导特征。)
储蓄和固定收益投资回报率低,会驱使投资者为追求体面收益而接受更高风险。在低回报的环境中,这种风险承受力的上升让金融市场更具包容性,为那些原本可能资金短缺的项目拓宽了融资渠道。
最后,降息往往被视为进一步降息的预兆,意味着上述种种效应还会加剧。当这些因素朝积极方向运动时,以上所述的各个层面就会共同营造出一种良性循环的表象。
Low interest rates encourage spending on the part of consumers. Low rates reduce the cost of borrowing, lifting demand for things that are often bought on time or leased, like cars, homes and appliances. Further, low rates translate into lower monthly payments on floatingrate mortgages, leaving consumers more disposable income to spend. Finally, with rates low, spending instead of saving entails little in the way of opportunity costs. Low rates likewise encourage investment on the part of businesses by reducing the cost of capital, and therefore the return hurdle for expenditures. Increased demand for goods and services leads to increased hiring, reduced unemployment and a tighter labor market, and thus to wage inflation. Rising wages encourage consumer spending by putting more money into wage-earners’ pockets and improving their mood. By reducing the interest expense on companies’ floating-rate debt, low rates enhance companies’ profits; make it easier for them to service their debt; and leave them more cash for capital expenditures (which add to GDP), and dividends and stock buy-backs (which put money in investors’ pockets). Low rates reduce the discount factor used in calculating the net present value of future cash flows. Thus, all else being equal, there’s a direct connection between declining interest rates and rising asset prices. (I consider this to have been the dominant feature of the world of finance over the last ten years.) Low rates on savings and fixed-income investments drive investors to accept increased risk in order to pursue decent returns in a low-return world. This increased risk tolerance makes the financial markets more accommodating, increasing the availability of financing for ventures that otherwise might find capital in short supply. Finally, rate cuts are taken as a predictor of further rate cuts, implying more of all the above. When they’re moving in a positive direction, the things described above contribute to the appearance of a virtuous circle.
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基于这些原因,大多数市场参与者(a)宁愿利率低也不愿利率高,(b)似乎认为利率越低越好。在当下这个时点,美国由一位热衷于低利率的强力推动者领导。事实上,鲍威尔在 2018 年决定延续前任的加息和量化紧缩政策,这使他上了特朗普总统不满者名单。以下是特朗普对鲍威尔看重的几个迹象:
我最大的威胁是美联储。因为美联储加息太快,而且它独立运作,所以我不跟他说话,但我对他的所作所为不满意。(特朗普,2018 年 10 月 16 日接受福克斯商业网采访)
“这家伙,以前没人听说过他,现在是我提拔了他,他却想显示自己有多强硬?行啊。让他展示吧,”特朗普先生周三说。“他干得不怎么样。”
……“我们应该让(欧洲央行行长)德拉吉来干,而不是我们美联储的人,”特朗普先生说。“德拉吉,上周,他说要降低利率,我们要刺激经济。他们要向经济注资。”
……这些评论是在特朗普先生周一指责美联储搞砸了工作之后发表的。“现在他们像倔强的孩子一样僵着,当我们需要降息和宽松来应对其他国家针对我们的行动时。搞砸了!”特朗普先生在推特上说。(《纽约时报》,6 月 26 日)
为什么特朗普想要更低的利率?以下是一些可能的解释:
For these reasons, most market participants (a) would rather have low rates than high rates and (b) seem to believe that the lower rates are, the better. At this point in time, the U.S. is led by a great cheerleader for low rates. In fact, Powell’s 2018 decision to continue his predecessor’s rate increases and quantitative tightening earned him a place on the list of people experiencing President Trump’s wrath. Here are a few indications of the esteem in which Trump holds Powell: My biggest threat is the Fed. Because the Fed is raising rates too fast, and it’s independent, so I don’t speak to him, but I’m not happy with what he’s doing. (Trump, speaking to Fox Business Network, October 16, 2018) “Here’s a guy, nobody ever heard of before, and now I made him and he wants to show how tough he is? O.K. Let him show how tough he is,” Mr. Trump said on Wednesday. “He’s not doing a good job.” . . . “We should have [European Central Bank head] Draghi, instead of our Fed person,” Mr. Trump said. “Draghi, last week, he said lower interest rates and we’re going to stimulate the economy. They’re going to put money into the economy.” . . . Those comments came after Mr. Trump on Monday accused the Fed of botching the job. “Now they stick, like a stubborn child, when we need rate cuts and easing, to make up for what other countries are doing against us. Blew it!” Mr. Trump said on Twitter. (The New York Times, June 26) Why would Trump want lower rates? Here are a few possible explanations:
他是做房地产的,这个行业靠的就是高杠杆运作。特朗普大半辈子都在大举借贷,所以对他来说,低利率“全是好处”。
眼下特朗普一心扑在连任上,未来 16 个月里确保经济增长、股市走高,是他能指望的最有力抓手之一。
顺着这个思路,若连任是他的头等大事,那么 2020 年大选日之后的事他可能就不太在乎了——那时他最看重的成绩单已经盖棺定论。
He’s a real estate guy, and the real estate industry lives on high leverage. Trump has been a substantial borrower for much of his life, so for him low rates are “all good.” Right now Trump is tightly focused on getting reelected, and ensuring economic growth and a rising stock market over the next 16 months is one of the best things he can do to make that a reality. Along those lines, if reelection is his main goal, he may be relatively indifferent as to what happens after Election Day 2020, when the scorecard he cares about most will be closed out.
以下是特朗普对利率立场的一个表述:
“我们国家的经济表现令人难以置信地好,”他周五对记者说。然而,尽管特朗普先生对强劲的就业数据表示庆祝,他却再次呼吁美联储降息——这一举措通常意味着对经济方向的担忧。他宣称,如果美联储采取行动,经济增长“将像火箭飞船一样”。(《纽约时报》,7 月 6 日)
基于以上内容,有人可能会得出结论,认为特朗普认为利率应该始终保持在低位。但至少有一次,他认为利率被维持得过低:
2015 年底,时任候选人唐纳德·特朗普指责美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦参与了一场政治阴谋。他坚称,耶伦一直在将利率……
Here’s an expression of Trump’s position on rates: “Our country’s doing unbelievably well economically,” he told reporters Friday. Yet even as Mr. Trump celebrated the robust hiring numbers, he called again for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates – a step that would ordinarily suggest worries about the economy’s direction. Growth “would be like a rocket ship” if the Fed acted, he declared. (The New York Times, July 6) On the basis of the above, one might conclude that Trump thinks rates should always be low. But there was at least one instance when he thought rates were being held too low: In late 2015 then-candidate Donald Trump accused Janet Yellen, chair of the Federal Reserve, of being part of a political conspiracy. Yellen, he insisted, was keeping
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有人指责美联储为了帮助希拉里·克林顿赢得总统大选,而将利率不合理地维持在过低水平。(《纽约时报》,6 月 20 日)
无论如何,眼下很明显,特朗普认为低利率是好事,没必要担心潜在的负面影响。但这并不意味着这些影响不存在。
interest rates unjustifiably low in an attempt to help Hillary Clinton win the presidency. (The New York Times, June 20) Regardless, it’s clear that, at this time, Trump thinks low rates are good and there’s no reason to worry about potential negative ramifications. But that doesn’t mean they don’t exist.
低利率有没有负面影响?
老实说,低利率确实有让人不舒服、甚至可能造成危害的地方。具体包括:
这些:
Is There a Downside to Low Interest Rates? The truth is, there are ways in which low rates are undesirable and potentially harmful. They include these:
如前所述,低利率会刺激经济,大多数经济学家和商界人士相信,经济存在过热一说。主要的担忧在于过度通胀。虽然一定程度的通胀是好事,但过高的通胀则不然。人们普遍认为,第三页所描述的诸多利好,若过了头,可能导致商品和服务需求过热;劳动力市场过于紧张,引发工资涨幅过高;卖家手中的市场定价权过强;从而推动物价上涨。
通胀过高会给依赖固定收入生活的人带来困难,因为他们的开支在快速攀升,收入却原地踏步。此外,低收入家庭通常没有高收入家庭那样的手段来对冲通胀,比如通过投资股票和实物资产。
低利率让储蓄者受损,因为现金、货币市场基金、储蓄账户、国债和高等级债券等安全工具的回报被压低。储蓄者若要维持过去那种安全获取的较高收益,除了接受更低的收入,就只能去承担更多风险。
于是,低利率可能诱使资金流向不合格的公司和岌岌可危的证券,鼓励过度使用杠杆,催生最终可能破裂的资产泡沫。归根结底,投资者追逐收益、过度冒险的倾向,可能给整个金融体系的稳定带来隐患。
最后一点也非常重要:当利率处于低位时,央行手中最有力的经济刺激工具——降息——可用的空间就不多了。
Low rates stimulate the economy, as described above, and most economists and businesspeople believe there’s such a thing as the economy becoming too hot. The principal worry is excessive inflation. While some inflation is a good thing, too much isn’t. It’s generally accepted that too much of the positives described on page three can lead to excessive demand for goods and services; too-tight labor conditions, leading to excessive wage inflation; too much market power in the hands of sellers of goods; and thus rising prices. Too much inflation imposes a hardship on people living on fixed incomes, since their costs increase rapidly while their incomes don’t. Also, low-income households typically don’t have the means to hedge against inflation that high-income ones do, such as through investments in equities and real assets. When low rates penalize savers by reducing the returns available on safe instruments like cash, money market funds, savings accounts, Treasury securities and high grade bonds, savers’ alternative to accepting lower incomes is to assume increased risk in pursuit of the higher returns they used to earn safely. Thus low rates can lead to investment in undeserving companies and shaky securities, encourage the use of excessive leverage, and create asset bubbles that eventually can burst. Ultimately, investors’ tendency to reach for yield and assume excessive risk can introduce risk to overall financial stability. Finally, but very importantly, when interest rates are low, central banks don’t have at their disposal as much of their best tool for stimulating economies: the ability to cut rates.
以下内容摘自 RDQ Economics 6 月 27 日的报告:
在政策评估中,似乎忽略了对过度宽松货币政策风险的细致讨论。鲍威尔本周确实表示:“我们也意识到,货币政策不应过度反应于任何单一数据点或短期情绪波动。这样做可能会给前景增加更多不确定性。”然而,我们认为,鲍威尔对鸽派过度反应下行的观察,并未充分评估当前情况下不必要地增加货币宽松措施的风险。
……潜在通胀已接近目标,而美联储过去(20 世纪 60 年代末至 70 年代初)试图以略高通胀换取持续低失业率的做法,结果非常糟糕。另外,来自劳动力成本上升的压力……
The following is from a report from RDQ Economics dated June 27: What seems lost in the policy assessment is a careful discussion of the risks of overly accommodative monetary policy. Powell did say this week, “we are also mindful that monetary policy should not overreact to any individual data point or short-term swing in sentiment. Doing so would risk adding even more uncertainty to the outlook.” However, our view is that Powell’s observation of the downside of a dovish overreaction is an inadequate assessment of the risk from unnecessarily adding monetary accommodation at this time. . . . underlying inflation is already close to target and the Fed’s past attempts (in the late 1960s/early 1970s) to trade off a little more inflation for sustained lower rates of unemployment turned out very badly. Alternatively, higher labor costs from an
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就业市场过热可能挤压企业利润空间,进而导致投资和招聘活动的收缩。
overheated jobs market might squeeze company profit margins and lead to a pullback in investment and hiring.
一项艰巨的任务
将上述利弊清单并列对照,可见低利率——正如经济学的其他许多方面——既有利也有弊。很大程度上取决于人们如何看待它们。我收藏的一幅最棒的漫画正好说明了这一点:
A Daunting Task The juxtaposition of the above lists of positives and negatives shows that low interest rates – just like most other aspects of economics – have both pros and cons. A lot depends on how they’re viewed. This is illustrated by one of the greatest cartoons from my collection:
那幅漫画是 38 年前画的。而《纽约时报》在短短几周前是这样报道的:
本周的上涨始于美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔暗示美国央行对经济感到担忧之后。而就在几天前,就业市场的强劲数据还对股市产生了相反的影响。
这种对新闻的反直觉反应,是一种可以通过利率预期来解释的现象。经济前景的疲软意味着,借贷成本很可能会下降——在合适的环境下,这对股市可能是好事。(《纽约时报》,7 月 12 日)
许多人把经济看作一台按照图表和规则运转的可靠机器,把央行的行动看作可以拉动来调节这台机器运转的杠杆。但相反,我认为经济的运转存在大量不确定性和变数,
That cartoon is 38 years old. Here’s how The Times put it as recently as a couple of weeks ago: The gains this week began after Federal Reserve chair, Jerome Powell, suggested the nation’s central bank was worried about the economy. Just days earlier, strong data on the job market had the opposite effect on stocks. This counterintuitive reaction to the news is a phenomenon that’s explained by expectations for interest rates. The weakening outlook for the economy means, in all likelihood, borrowing costs are coming down — and in the right circumstances, this can be good for stocks. (The New York Times, July 12) Many people think of an economy as a dependable machine that operates according to diagrams and rules, and of central bank actions as levers that can be pulled to adjust the functioning of that machine. But, instead, I believe a lot of uncertainty and variability exist regarding the functioning of
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经济体和中央银行。这意味着管理经济的任务十分艰巨,其目标不应被视为可靠可达成。
我认为《纽约时报》最近的一篇文章很好地描绘了这项工作多么具有挑战性,以及有多少种可能出错的方式。以下是其大部分内容:
在周三(6 月 19 日)的政策决定和新闻发布会之前,美联储官员有很多可能把事情搞砸的方式。
一种可能是重演 12 月的会议,当时市场判断主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔和美联储对市场和全球经济中积聚的负面力量视而不见,随后几天内市场急剧抛售。
但相反的风险同样存在——出于对重演 12 月事件的恐惧,鲍威尔先生可能对近期通胀压力和工业活动放缓的迹象反应过度。如果这些被证明是虚惊一场,那么现在降息将适得其反,因为它会传递悲观情绪,让美联储看起来紧张不安,甚至可能显得过分受特朗普总统威胁要因利率政策而降职鲍威尔先生的影响……
实际上,美联储官员暗示他们认为很可能需要降息,但正在等待更多证据。
金融市场相对平淡的反应表明,华尔街认为这一举措(即 6 月 19 日维持利率不变,但预示今年晚些时候可能降息)达到了适当的平衡。股市上涨,但涨幅微小,这有助于减少美联储仅仅是在支撑股市的感觉,而债券收益率进一步下降,因为市场更加确信降息即将到来。
因此,从狭义目标来看——即顺利度过周三而不让市场崩溃或美联储信誉受损——这对鲍威尔先生来说是个好日子。
但另一方面,一些悬而未决的问题被推迟到了另一天。
决定等待更多证据也是一个决定。等待可能会给美联储更多时间确保做出正确决策,但代价是失去展示其积极进取、愿意领先于潜在严重问题的机会。
换句话说,如果你等到有完全令人信服的经济转向证据才采取行动,你可能就太迟了。
另一方面,如果美联储后来判断最近的坏消息确实只是暂时性的小波动,实际上不需要降息,那么他们将面临降息预期已进一步融入国债价格的现实。要让这些价格重新对齐将是一个极其困难的调整。如果利率的急剧下降已经
economies and central banks. This means the task of managing an economy is difficult, and its goals shouldn’t be thought of as dependably achievable. I think a recent article from The Times provides a great picture of how challenging the job is, and how many ways there are to be wrong. Here’s most of it: Heading into their policy decision and news conference Wednesday [June 19], there were a lot of ways Federal Reserve officials could have messed things up. One possibility was a repeat of the meeting in December, when markets judged Chairman Jerome Powell and the Fed to be oblivious about negative forces building in the markets and in the global economy, and sold off precipitously over the next days. But the opposite risk was present as well — that out of fear of repeating the December episode, Mr. Powell would exhibit too much of a hair-trigger reaction to recent signs of a slowdown in inflation pressures and industrial activity. If those turn out to be false alarms, a rate cut now would be counterproductive by signaling pessimism and making the Fed look jittery and perhaps even overly influenced by President Trump’s threats to try to demote Mr. Powell over interest rate policy. . . . In effect, Fed officials are indicating they think it’s pretty likely they will need to cut rates, but are waiting for more evidence. The relatively muted reaction of financial markets suggests that Wall Street viewed the move [i.e., no change in rates on June 19 but foreshadowing likely cuts later in the year] as appropriately balanced. The stock market was up, but only a little, which helps reduce the sense the Fed is just acting to prop up stocks, while bond yields fell further as markets became more confident that rate cuts were on the way. So in terms of the narrow goal of getting through Wednesday without either markets falling apart or the Fed’s credibility being shredded, it was a good day for Mr. Powell. But the flip side of that is that some lingering questions have been put off to another day. Deciding to wait for more evidence is a decision, too. Waiting might buy the Fed more time to make sure it’s getting the decision right, but at the cost of losing the opportunity to show it is aggressive and willing to get ahead of a potentially serious problem. Put differently, if you wait until there is completely compelling evidence of an economic shift before doing something about it, you’re probably too late. On the other hand, if the Fed later judges that the recent bad news really was just a temporary blip and that rate cuts were actually not needed, they will face the reality of rate cuts even more baked into the prices of Treasury bonds. It would be a doozy of an adjustment to bring them into alignment. If the sharp drop in rates that has
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11 月以来的变化如果迅速逆转,可能对住房和汽车等利率敏感行业造成巨大损害。(《美联储暂时走钢丝》,6 月 21 日——着重号系原文所加)
换句话说,风险在于反应迟钝或反应过度,以及做得过多或过少、过早或过晚。
美联储通常根据整体经济前景行事:美国人每天进行的数亿笔交易。但在鲍威尔所说美联储当前监控的“事态”中,有一些非常具体、很大程度上属于政治性的行动。尤其是,美联储必须预判并应对贸易战的可能性,这可能是当今经济不确定性的最大来源。它必须根据对特朗普将采取何种行动(及其影响)的判断,来做出利率和量化宽松的决策。更不用说,如果答案不是低利率,鲍威尔的职位可能岌岌可危,这一挥之不去的风险。当然,这些事情几乎没有一件可以称得上科学或可靠。
此外,美联储还必须运用心理学:
……鲍威尔在新闻发布会上被问及一项学术研究,该研究提出,当利率接近零时,央行在经济衰退时降息应当更加激进,而不是更加保守——以维持其不会让通缩扎根的信誉。
在《这次不一样》中,我表达过我的观点:利率调整之所以有效,原因之一是人们普遍相信它会奏效。当降息宣布时,人们凭信念认定它会让经济走强、市场上涨。于是他们得出结论,认为增加支出和投资是合适的,而他们随之而来的行为在经济和市场中产生了预期的反应。到底是更低的利率导致了上涨,还是对降息效力的信念?我说,两者都有。但后者的贡献肯定不小。正如我在《这次不一样》中所问的:如果降息没有伴随公告,它还会产生同样的影响吗?显然,关于美联储管理的普遍看法,对其行动的效果至关重要。
美联储不仅要弄清楚应采取哪些行动来保持经济机器平稳运转,还要判断人们是否会积极回应并相信这些行动会奏效。换句话说,是心理学,而不仅仅是经济学。
[鲍威尔]承认那项[学术]研究背后的想法,说“一分预防胜过十分治疗”,但拒绝将其与美联储在当前情况下究竟可能采取什么行动联系起来。“我不知道这对未来某次降息的规模意味着什么,”他说。
那么,美联储周三通过鲍威尔选择的平衡而细致的方式,是否做对了?答案是:几个月后再问吧。
taken place since November were to reverse quickly, it could cause huge damage to interest-sensitive sectors like housing and automobiles. (“The Fed Threads the Needle, for Now,” June 21 – emphasis added) In other words, there’s the risk of being unresponsive or over-responsive, along with the risk of doing too much or too little, and of doing it too soon or too late. The Fed usually acts in response to the overall outlook for the economy: hundreds of millions of transactions entered into by Americans each day. But among the “developments” Powell said the Fed is monitoring today are some very specific, largely political actions. In particular, the Fed has to anticipate and cope with the possibility of a trade war, probably the greatest source of economic uncertainty today. It has to make interest rate and quantitative easing decisions based on its judgment as to what Trump will do (and its impact). Not to mention the lingering risk that Powell’s job hangs in the balance if the answer isn’t low rates. Certainly little of this can be thought of as scientific or reliable. Further, the Fed has to practice psychology: . . . Mr. Powell was asked at the news conference about academic research suggesting that when interest rates are near zero, a central bank actually should be more aggressive, rather than less, about cutting rates in the event of a slump — to maintain credibility that it will not let deflation take hold. In “This Time It’s Different,” I expressed my view that one of the reasons interest rate adjustments work is that it’s commonly accepted that they will work. When a rate cut is announced, people take it on faith that it will cause the economy to strengthen and markets to rise. Thus they conclude it’s appropriate to spend more and invest more, and their resulting behavior produces the desired response in the economy and markets. Do the lower rates cause the rise, or is it belief in the efficacy of rate cuts? Both, I’d say. But certainly the latter’s contribution isn’t insignificant. As I asked in “This Time,” would a rate cut have the same impact if it weren’t accompanied by an announcement? Clearly, prevailing opinion regarding Fed management matters a great deal in the efficacy of its actions. Not only does the Fed have to figure out what actions it should take to keep the economic machine humming, but also whether people will react positively and trust in them to work. In other words, psychology, not just economics. [Powell] acknowledged the idea behind that [academic] work, saying that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” but declined to connect it to what exactly the Fed might do in the current circumstance. “I don’t know what that means in terms of the size of a particular rate cut going forward,” he said. So did the Fed get it right Wednesday with the balanced, nuanced approach Mr. Powell chose? The answer is: Ask in a few months.
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那么结论是什么?一方面,我们的经济仍在扩张。经济疲软、无法创造就业时,通过降息实施货币刺激(正如通过赤字支出实施财政刺激)是合理的。但在像今天这样的时刻——经济增长尚可,失业率处于 50 年低位,工资上涨,复苏刚成为史上最长——刺激措施可能介于多余和适得其反之间。正如我在 2017 年 12 月特朗普减税法案通过时所说,医生不会给健康的病人开肾上腺素。如今的经济是健康的。但美联储必须担心它能否保持健康,尤其是会不会与中国爆发全面贸易战。因此,另一方面,人们担心经济疲软的可能性。近期市场反应表明,投资者正遵循他们一贯的简单逻辑:经济疲软→降息→经济刺激→GDP 走强→企业利润上升→股价上涨。当鲍威尔在 7 月 10 日表示降息可能比多数人预期的更早到来时,市场为之一振,标普 500 指数首次突破 3000 点。我们始终值得思考,投资者是否对降息前景反应过度乐观,而对支撑降息的经济疲软(以及降息可能带来的意外后果)关注太少。
因此,从“第三只手”的角度,我想回到上面引用的《这次不一样》中的那段话:
最后,当我听到人们谈论美联储可能阻止衰退时,我怀疑它是否有这个目标是否可取。依据上述分析,衰退真的能避免,还是只能推迟?如果是后者,让它们自然发生比人为推迟更好吗?努力推迟衰退是否会让人对美联储的权力和意图产生过度信心,从而让道德风险卷土重来?如果美联储一次次化解小衰退,那是否意味着,当它继续这样做下去的能力达到极限时,最终到来的那次衰退会格外猛烈?
看到美联储试图延长经济扩张和牛市——它们已经是史上最长——我们应该高兴吗?它该努力创造永久繁荣、永远挡开回调吗?这样做的努力本身有没有风险?这一切都取决于用哪只手在掂量。
So what’s the bottom line? On one hand, our economy is still expanding. Monetary stimulus via rate cuts (just like fiscal stimulus via deficit spending) is in order when the economy is weak and failing to create jobs. But stimulus may be somewhere between unneeded and counterproductive at times like today, when the economy is growing acceptably, the unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, wages are rising, and the recovery has just become the longest in history. As I said when the Trump tax cut was enacted in December 2017, doctors don’t prescribe adrenaline for healthy patients. The economy today is healthy. But the Fed has to worry about whether it will remain so, and in particular whether there will be a full-fledged trade war with China. Thus, on the other hand, people are concerned about the potential for economic weakness. Recent market reaction suggests investors are following their usual elementary take: weak economy → rate cuts → economic stimulus → stronger GDP → higher corporate profits → higher stock prices. When Powell indicated on July 10 that a rate cut could be more imminent than most had thought, the market sat up and saluted, taking the S&P 500 above 3,000 for the first time. It’s always worth considering whether investors are reacting too positively to the prospect of rate cuts and paying too little heed to the economic weakness on which they’re predicated (and the potential unintended consequences they might bring on). Thus, on the “third hand,” I want to return to the paragraph I included above from “This Time It’s Different”: Finally, when I hear people talk about the possibility that the Fed will prevent a recession, I wonder whether it’s even desirable for it to have that goal. Per the above, are recessions really avoidable or merely postponable? And if the latter, is it better for them to occur naturally or be postponed unnaturally? Might efforts to postpone them create undue faith in the power and intentions of the Fed, and thus a return of moral hazard? And if the Fed wards off a series of little recessions, mightn’t that just mean that, when the ability to keep doing so reaches its limit, the one that finally arrives will be a doozy? Should we be happy to see the Fed trying to prolong the economic expansion and the bull market when they’re already the longest in history? Should it try to produce perpetual prosperity and permanently ward off a correction? Are there risks in its trying to do so? It all depends on which hand is doing the weighing.
July 26, 2019
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