关于剧变的进一步思考
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
关于“沧海巨变”的进一步思考
Further Thoughts on Sea Change
5 月,我撰写了一份关于《沧海巨变》(2022 年 12 月)的后续备忘录,仅与橡树资本客户分享。在《沧海巨变之再思考》中,我主张,我在原备忘录中强调的趋势共同代表了投资环境的彻底变革,要求进行重大资本重新配置。这份备忘录最初于 2023 年 5 月 30 日发送给橡树资本客户。¹
这次或许真的不一样
1987 年 10 月 11 日,我第一次遇到“这次不一样”这句老话。据《纽约时报》阿尼斯·C. 华莱士的一篇文章所述,约翰·邓普顿爵士曾警告,当投资者说时代不同了,通常是在试图为相对于历史显得过高的估值找理由——而且这样做最终往往损害投资者的利益。1987 年,普遍存在的是高企的股价;我引用的那篇文章发表于“黑色星期一”前仅八天,当时道琼斯工业平均指数单日暴跌 22.6%。十二年后,人们热衷的新事物是互联网将改变世界的前景。这种信念为数字和电商股票的极高价格(以及无穷大的市盈率)提供了依据,其中许多股票在接下来的一年左右时间里市值蒸发了超过 90%。
然而,重要的是,邓普顿也承认,有 20% 的概率事情真的会不同。在极少数情况下,某些根本性的东西确实会改变,对投资产生重大影响。鉴于当今发展的速度——尤其是科技领域——我想事情真正不同的频率可能比邓普顿时代更高。
总之,以上都是开场白。我写这份备忘录的原因是,虽然我交谈过的大多数人似乎都同意我在《沧海巨变》中的许多具体观察,但很少有人明确认同我的总体结论并说:“我认为你是对的:我们可能正看到投资环境的重大且可能持久的变革。”这份备忘录的主要信息是,我在《沧海巨变》中描述的变化不仅仅是通常的周期性波动;相反,它们加在一起,代表了对投资环境的彻底变革,要求进行重大资本重新配置。
背景
我先从回顾《沧海巨变》中的基本论点开始:
In May, I wrote a follow-up memo to Sea Change (December 2022) that was shared exclusively with Oaktree clients. In Further Thoughts on Sea Change, I argued that the trends I had highlighted in the original memo collectively represented a sweeping alteration of the investment environment that called for significant capital reallocation. This memo was originally sent to Oaktree clients on May 30, 2023.1 This Time It Really Might Be Different On October 11, 1987, I first came across the saying “this time it’s different.” According to an article in The New York Times by Anise C. Wallace, Sir John Templeton had warned that when investors say times are different, it’s usually in an effort to rationalize valuations that appear high relative to history – and it’s usually done to investors’ ultimate detriment. In 1987, it was high equity prices in general; the article I cite was written just eight days before Black Monday, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by 22.6% in a single day. A dozen years later, the new thing people were excited about was the prospect that the Internet would change the world. This belief served to justify ultra-high prices (and p/e ratios of infinity) for digital and e-commerce stocks, many of which went on to lose more than 90% of their value over the next year or so. Importantly, however, Templeton allowed that things might really be different 20% of the time. On rare occasions, something fundamental does change, with significant implications for investing. Given the pace of developments these days – especially in technology – I imagine things might genuinely be different more often than they were in Templeton’s day. Anyway, that’s all preamble. My reason for writing this memo is that, while most people I speak with seem to agree with many of my individual observations in Sea Change, few have expressly agreed with my overall conclusion and said, “I think you’re right: We might be seeing a significant and possibly lasting change in the investment environment.” This memo’s main message is that the changes I described in Sea Change aren’t just usual cyclical fluctuations; rather, taken together, they represent a sweeping alteration of the investment environment, calling for significant capital reallocation. The Backdrop I’ll start off by recapping my basic arguments from Sea Change: •
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2008 年末,为将经济从全球金融危机的冲击中拯救出来,美联储首次将联邦基金利率降至零水平。
In late 2008, the Federal Reserve took the fed funds rate to zero for the first time ever in order to rescue the economy from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis.
本备忘录中引用的所有市场数据,截至 2023 年 5 月 30 日。
All market data cited in this memo is as of May 30, 2023.
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既然这并未推动通胀从低于 2% 的水平上升,美联储认为维持宽松政策—低利率和量化宽松—基本贯穿接下来 13 年都是合适的。
结果,我们经历了有记录以来最长的经济复苏—超过十年—企业谋利和融资迎来“好日子”。连亏损企业也能轻松上市、获得贷款,避免违约和破产。
2009-21 年盛行的低利率对资产持有者—较低的折现率让未来现金流更值钱—和借款人都是大好时机。这反过来让资产持有者自满,潜在买家跃跃欲试。错失恐惧症成了多数人最大的担忧。这一时期对捡便宜货的人和放贷者则相应充满挑战。
大规模的新冠疫情救助措施—加上供应链堵塞—导致过多资金追逐过少商品,这是通胀上升的经典条件。
2021 年出现的高通胀持续到 2022 年,迫使美联储放弃宽松立场。于是,美联储大幅加息—这是四十年来最快的紧缩周期—并结束了量化宽松。
出于多种原因,超低或不断下降的利率不太可能成为未来十年的常态。
因此,我们可能会看到企业利润、资产升值、借贷和避免违约都面临更艰难的时期。
归根结底:如果这确实是一场巨变—意味着投资环境已被根本性改变—你不应假设自 2009 年以来对你最有效的投资策略在未来的岁月里依然奏效。
Since that didn’t cause inflation to rise from its sub-2% level, the Fed felt comfortable maintaining accommodative policies – low interest rates and quantitative easing – for essentially all of the next 13 years. As a result, we had the longest economic recovery on record – exceeding ten years – and “easy times” for businesses seeking to earn profits and secure financing. Even money-losing businesses had little trouble going public, obtaining loans, and avoiding default and bankruptcy. The low interest rates that prevailed in 2009-21 made it a great time for asset owners – lower discount rates make future cash flows more valuable – and for borrowers. This in turn made asset owners complacent and potential buyers eager. And FOMO became most people’s main concern. The period was correspondingly challenging for bargain hunters and lenders. The massive Covid-19 relief measures – combined with supply-chain snags – resulted in too much money chasing too few goods, the classic condition for rising inflation. The higher inflation that arose in 2021 persisted into 2022, forcing the Fed to discontinue its accommodative stance. Thus, the Fed raised interest rates dramatically – its fastest tightening cycle in four decades – and ended QE. For a number of reasons, ultra-low or declining interest rates are unlikely to be the norm in the decade ahead. Thus, we’re likely to see tougher times for corporate profits, for asset appreciation, for borrowing, and for avoiding default. Bottom line: If this really is a sea change – meaning the investment environment has been fundamentally altered – you shouldn’t assume the investment strategies that have served you best since 2009 will do so in the years ahead.
在提供了这份概要之后,我将为这些框架填充细节,并分享一些额外的洞见。
一个里程碑式的发展
如今,为了活跃讨论,我常常先发问:“你们认为近几十年来金融界最重要的事件是什么?”有人说是全球金融危机和雷曼兄弟的破产,有人说是科技泡沫的破裂,还有人说是美联储及政府对疫情困境的应对措施。没有人提到我的答案:1980 年至 2020 年间利率下降了 2000 个基点。然而,正如我在《海变》中所写,那次下降可能贡献了该时期投资利润的最大份额。它怎会被忽视呢?
首先,我建议用温水煮青蛙来打个比方。据说,如果把青蛙放进一锅沸水里,它会立刻跳出来。但如果把它放进凉水里再点燃炉子,它就会傻坐着,毫无察觉,直到被煮死。青蛙察觉不到危险——正如人们未能领悟利率下降的重大意义——因为它是一个渐进、长期的过程。它不是突兀的发展,而是一个绵延漫长、影响深远的趋势。
其次,在《海变》中,我将这四十年的利率下降比作机场的自动人行道。如果你站在自动人行道上不动,你会毫不费力地前行;但如果你以正常步伐行走,你会快速前进——或许并未完全意识到为何如此。事实上,如果每个人都在自动人行道上行走,这样做很容易不被注意,而行人们可能会得出结论:他们的快速前进是“正常的”。
最后,还有约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷思所说的“金融记忆的极度短暂”。如今相对较少的投资者年长到能记得利率表现不同的时代。自 1980 年以来进入这个行业的每个人——换句话说,今天绝大多数的从业者——
Having supplied this summary, I’m going to put flesh on these bones and share some additional insights. A Momentous Development To promote discussion these days, I often start by asking people, “What do you consider to have been the most important event in the financial world in recent decades?” Some suggest the Global Financial Crisis and bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, some the bursting of the tech bubble, and some the Fed/government response to the pandemic-related woes. No one cites my candidate: the 2,000-basis-point decline in interest rates between 1980 and 2020. And yet, as I wrote in Sea Change, that decline was probably responsible for the lion’s share of investment profits made over that period. How could it be overlooked? First, I suggest the metaphor of boiling a frog. It’s said that if you put a frog in a pot of boiling water, it’ll jump out. But if you put it in cool water and turn on the stove, it’ll just sit there, oblivious, until it boils to death. The frog doesn’t detect the danger – just as people fail to perceive the significance of the interest rate decline – because of its gradual, long-term nature. It’s not an abrupt development, but rather a drawn out, highly influential trend. Second, in Sea Change, I compared the 40-year interest rate decline to the moving walkway at an airport. If you stand still on the walkway, you’ll move effortlessly; but, if you walk at your normal pace, you’ll move ahead rapidly – perhaps without being fully conscious of why. In fact, if everyone’s walking on the moving walkway, doing so can easily go unnoted, and the walkers might conclude that their rapid progress is “normal.” Finally, there’s what John Kenneth Galbraith called “the extreme brevity of the financial memory.” Relatively few investors today are old enough to remember a time when interest rates behaved differently. Everyone who has come into the business since 1980 – in other words, the vast majority of today’s
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投资者——除相对少数的例外——只见过利率不断下降或处于极低水平(甚至两者兼而有之)。你得入行超过 43 年,也就是年过 65 岁,才有机会经历一段并非如此的长周期。而且,由于 1970 年代的市场环境让本行业就业艰难,你很可能得像我一样在 1960 年代就找到第一份工作,才有机会见到利率既更高又稳定或不断上升的情形。我相信,经历过 70 年代的老兵如此稀缺,让人们很容易就得出结论:2009 年至 2021 年的利率走势才是常态。
历史的相关性
从 2009 年初到 2021 年底这 13 年间,经历了两次金融危机的救援、总体有利的宏观环境、极度宽松的央行政策、通胀无忧的格局、超低且不断下降的利率,以及大体上从未中断的投资收益。当然,问题是投资者是否应该预期这些趋势会持续下去。
investors – has, with relatively few exceptions, only seen interest rates that were either declining or ultra-low (or both). You have to have been working for more than 43 years, and thus be over 65, to have seen a prolonged period that was otherwise. And since market conditions made it tough to find employment in our industry in the 1970s, you probably had to get your first job in the 1960s (like me) to have seen interest rates that were either higher and stable or rising. I believe the scarcity of veterans from the ’70s has made it easy for people to conclude that the interest rate trends of 2009-21 were normal. The Relevance of History The 13-year period from the beginning of 2009 through the end of 2021 saw two rescues from financial crises, a generally favorable macro environment, aggressively accommodative central bank policies, a lack of inflation worries, ultra-low and declining interest rates, and generally uninterrupted investment gains. The question, of course, is whether investors should expect a continuation of those trends. •
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近来的事件表明,通胀上升的风险不能永远视而不见。而且,通胀心理的重新抬头,很可能让各国央行不再轻易认定,自己可以持续推行货币刺激而不必承担后果。因此,利率不能指望一直“长期偏低”,并带来永久的繁荣——许多人 2020 年底时还这么想。同样在 2020 年底,现代货币理论(Modern Monetary Theory)被一些人接受,大意是说,在“能够掌控本国货币”的国家,财政赤字和国债可以不用顾忌。(如今这种论调再也没人提了。)
Recent events have shown that the risk of rising inflation can’t be ignored in perpetuity. Moreover, the reawakening of inflationary psychology will probably make central banks less likely to conclude that they can engage in continuous monetary stimulation without consequences. Thus, interest rates can’t be counted on to stay “lower for longer” and produce perpetual prosperity, as many thought was the case in late 2020. Also in late 2020, Modern Monetary Theory was accepted by some as meaning deficits and national debt could be disregarded in countries “with control of their currencies.” (We no longer hear anything about this notion.)
在《海之变》中,我列举了几条理由,说明为何我认为利率不会永久回到那个时期的低点,至今我仍觉得这些论据很有说服力。尤其是,我很难相信美联储不认为自己长期维持超低利率是个错误。
如上所述,为应对全球金融危机,美联储在 2008 年底首次将联邦基金利率降至接近零。当时宏观形势令人恐惧,一场足以摧毁整个金融体系的恶性循环似乎正在上演。因此,采取激进措施无疑是必要的。但当我查看数据,发现美联储将利率维持在接近零的水平近七年之久时,我震惊了。将利率设为零是一种紧急措施,而我们显然没有持续到 2015 年底的紧急状态。对我来说,那些持续的低利率堪称一个不应重蹈覆辙的错误。
此外,到 2017-18 年,联邦基金利率在 1% 左右时,许多人已经清楚,美联储在衰退期间若需降息刺激经济,几乎没有操作空间。但当美联储试图加息以创造这种空间时,却遭到了投资者的阻力(见 2018 年第四季度)。我很难相信美联储会愿意重新给自己的工具箱套上这种限制。
我反复提到的一个主题是,尽管许多人认同自由市场在资源配置方面做得最好,但在过去大约二十年里,我们并没有一个自由的货币市场,这段时间美联储行动频繁。相反,美联储的政策几乎全程宽松,利率被人为压低。美联储没有让经济与市场力量来决定利率水平,而是异常积极地设定利率,极大地影响了经济和市场。
重要的是,这扭曲了经济与市场参与者的行为。它导致了一些本不该建的东西被建起来,一些本不该做的投资被做出。
In Sea Change, I listed several reasons why I don’t think interest rates are going back to that period’s lows on a permanent basis, and I still find these arguments compelling. In particular, I find it hard to believe the Fed doesn’t think it erred by sticking with ultra-low interest rates for so long. As noted above, to fight the GFC, the Fed took the fed funds rate to roughly zero for the first time in late 2008. Macro conditions were frightening, as a vicious cycle capable of undermining the entire financial system appeared to be underway. For this reason, aggressive action was certainly called for. But I was shocked when I looked at the data and saw that the Fed kept the rate near zero for nearly seven years. Setting interest rates at zero is an emergency measure, and we certainly didn’t have a continuous emergency through late 2015. To me, those sustained low rates stand out as a mistake not to be repeated. Further, by 2017-18, with the fed funds rate around 1%, it had become clear to many that there wasn’t room for the Fed to reduce rates if necessary to stimulate the economy during a recession. But when the Fed attempted to raise rates to create that room, it encountered pushback from investors (see the fourth quarter of 2018). I find it hard to believe the Fed would want to reimpose that limitation on its toolkit. A recurring theme of mine is that, even though many people agree that free markets do the best job of allocating resources, we haven’t had a free market in money in roughly the last two decades, a period of Fed activism. Instead, Fed policy has been accommodative almost the entire time, and interest rates have been kept artificially low. Rather than letting economic and market forces determine the rate of interest, the Fed has been unusually active in setting interest rates, greatly influencing the economy and the markets. Importantly, this distorts the behavior of economic and market participants. It causes things to be built that otherwise wouldn’t have been built, investments to be made that otherwise wouldn’t have
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在过去那段宽松货币时期,本不该被接受的决策和风险却成了现实。毋庸置疑,这总体上是事实,而我也确信这恰好描述了当时的情形。
许多关于硅谷银行和第一共和国银行问题的报道,都提到了之前“宽松货币”时期犯下的错误。在美联储政策宽松、市场预期一致向好、风险厌恶情绪低下的环境中,快速扩张、对客户的不当激励以及财务管理松懈都受到了助长。这恰恰印证了一句老话:“最糟糕的贷款往往是在最好的时机放出的。”我不认为美联储应该把我们带回一个被扭曲的环境,那种环境鼓励盲目乐观,让人相信存在所谓的“美联储看跌期权”,从而丧失了应有的审慎。
如果宽松货币时期那种利率不断下降和/或超低利率的情况在未来几年不再成为常态,那么很可能带来一系列后果:
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been made, and risks to be borne that otherwise wouldn’t have been accepted. There’s no doubt that this is true in general, and I’m convinced it accurately describes the period in question. Many articles about the problems at Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank cite errors that were made in the preceding “easy-money” period. Rapid growth, unwise inducements to customers, and lax financial management were all encouraged in a climate with accommodative Fed policy, uniformly positive expectations, and low levels of risk aversion. This is just one example of a time-worn adage in action: “The worst of loans are made in the best of times.” I don’t think the Fed should return us to an environment that has been distorted to encourage universal optimism, belief in the existence of a Fed put, and thus a dearth of prudence. If the declining and/or ultra-low interest rates of the easy-money period aren’t going to be the rule in the years ahead, numerous consequences seem probable: • • • • • • •
经济增长可能放缓;
利润率可能被侵蚀;
违约率可能走高;
资产增值不再那么可靠;
借贷成本不会持续下行(不过,为对抗通胀而提高的利率,一旦通胀缓解,很可能被允许有所回落);
投资者心态可能不再普遍乐观;
企业融资可能不再那么容易。
economic growth may be slower; profit margins may erode; default rates may head higher; asset appreciation may not be as reliable; the cost of borrowing won’t trend downward consistently (though interest rates raised to fight inflation likely will be permitted to recede somewhat once inflation eases); investor psychology may not be as uniformly positive; and businesses may not find it as easy to obtain financing.
换句话说,在投资领域经历了很长一段非同寻常的轻松期之后,大概率会回归某种更接近常态的状态。请注意,我并不是说利率在过去的 40 多年里下降了 2000 个基点,就会回升到 1980 年代的水平。实际上,我看不出五年后的短期利率有什么理由会显著高于今天。但即便如此,我认为轻松的日子——以及轻松赚钱的机会——基本上已经结束了。我该怎么最好地表达我的意思呢?试试这样想:五年前,一位投资者去银行贷款,银行家说:“我们给你 8 亿美元,利率 5%。”现在贷款需要再融资,银行家说:“我们给你 5 亿美元,利率 8%。”这意味着投资者的资本成本上升了,他的投资净回报下降了(或者变为负值),而且他还有一个 3 亿美元的缺口要填补。
哪些策略会最有效?
显而易见,如果在某一特定特征的环境下,某些策略表现最佳,那么在一个截然不同的环境中,优胜者的名单也必然会大幅改变。
In other words, after a long period when everything was unusually easy in the world of investing, something closer to normalcy is likely to set in. Please note that I’m not saying interest rates, having declined by 2,000 basis points over the last 40 or so years, are going back up to the levels seen in the 1980s. In fact, I see no reason why short-term interest rates five years from now should be appreciably higher than they are today. But still, I think the easy times – and easy money – are largely over. How can I best communicate what I’m talking about? Try this: Five years ago, an investor went to the bank for a loan, and the banker said, “We’ll give you $800 million at 5%.” Now the loan has to be refinanced, and the banker says, “We’ll give you $500 million at 8%.” That means the investor’s cost of capital is up, his net return on the investment is down (or negative), and he has a $300 million hole to fill. What Strategies Will Work Best? It seems obvious that if certain strategies were the best performers in a period with a given set of characteristics, it must be true that a starkly different environment will produce a dramatically altered list of winners. •
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正如上文“沧海巨变”回顾中所提到的,低利率且持续走低的这四十年,对资产所有者来说极为有利。贴现率下降,加之债券回报竞争力的相应削弱,带来了资产的大幅升值。因此,持有资产——无论是公司、公司的部分(股票),还是房产——成了绝佳之选。利率下行降低了借款人的资金成本。一旦如此,任何借贷都自动变得比原先设想的更为成功。
而且,正如我在“沧海巨变”里也提到的,以上种种对借钱买资产的投资者而言,叠加起来就是双重红利。回想沧海之初的那段岁月……
As mentioned above in the recap of Sea Change, the 40 years of low and declining interest rates were hugely beneficial for asset owners. Declining discount rates and the associated reduction in the competitiveness of bond returns led to substantial asset appreciation. Thus, asset ownership – whether related to companies, pieces of companies (equities), or properties – was the place to be. Falling interest rates brought down the cost of capital for borrowers. As this occurred, any borrowing automatically became more successful than originally contemplated. And, as I also mentioned in Sea Change, the combined result of the above for investors who bought assets on borrowed money was a double bonanza. Think back to the first of the sea
2023 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2023 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我在那份备忘录中提到的变化包括:1977-78 年高收益债券的问世,它催生了为获利而承担风险的趋势,以及杠杆投资策略的兴起。非常值得注意的是,杠杆投资策略几乎全部历史都写在了利率下降和/或超低利率的时期。比如,我敢说,自 1980 年利率开始下行以来,私募股权投资的资本几乎 100% 都投了进去。在这样的有利环境下,杠杆投资大行其道,难道还有什么好奇怪的?
与此同时,利率下行让放贷——或者说买入债务工具——的回报变低。整个时期里,不仅债务的预期回报低,那些急于逃离国债和投资级公司债等安全资产超低收益的投资者,还激烈竞争,争相把资本投到风险更高的市场,这导致许多人接受了更低的回报和更弱的放贷人保护。
最后,那些太平盛世的环境让寻底买家日子难过。最大的便宜货从哪来?答案:恐慌持有者的绝望。太平无事时,资产持有者自满,买家急切,没人急着退出,想捡大便宜就难了。
changes I mentioned in that memo: the advent of high yield bonds in 1977-78, which brought about the trend toward bearing risk for profit and the emergence of levered investment strategies. It’s very notable that almost the entire history of levered investment strategies has been written during a period of declining and/or ultra-low interest rates. For example, I would venture that nearly 100% of capital for private equity investing has been put to work since interest rates began their downward move in 1980. Should it come as a surprise that levered investing thrived in such salutary conditions? At the same time, declining interest rates rendered lending – or buying debt instruments – less rewarding. Not only were prospective returns on debt low throughout the period, but investors who were eager to get away from the ultra-low yields on safer securities like Treasurys and investment grade corporates competed spiritedly to deploy capital in higher-risk markets, and this caused many to accept lower returns and reduced lender protections. Finally, conditions in those halcyon days created tough times for bargain hunters. Where do the greatest bargains come from? The answer: the desperation of panicked holders. When times are untroubled, asset owners are complacent, and buyers are eager, no one has any urgency to exit, making it very hard to score significant bargains.
在这个时期,靠持有资产和杠杆投资策略获利的投资者,可能会忽略利率对资产价值和借贷成本的有利影响,反而以为利润来自策略本身的优越性,也许再沾点自己技巧和智慧的光。也就是说,他们可能违反了投资的一条基本规则:“永远不要把头脑和牛市混为一谈。”考虑到这段时期站在“自动人行道”上的好处,在我看来,用借来的钱买资产结果却失败,那得是决策糟透了或者运气糟透了才可能发生。
未来几年,持有资产还能像 2009-2021 年那样赚钱吗?如果利率不再持续下降,或者借贷成本远低于所购资产预期回报率的局面不再,杠杆还能带来同样的收益加成吗?无论资产所有权和杠杆投资的固有优点如何,人们都会觉得,未来几年的好处会打折扣。仅仅靠买入和加杠杆顺着正面趋势走,可能不再足以带来成功。在新环境下,要获得非凡回报,很可能得再次靠廉价买入的技巧,而在控股策略中,则要靠为所持资产增加价值。
放贷、信贷或固定收益投资理应相应好转。正如我在 12 月备忘录中所说,这 13 年对信贷投资者(包括橡树资本)来说是艰难、沉闷、低回报的时期。我们经营的大多数资产类别都提供了我们这些人从未见过的低预期回报。选择无非是:(a)持有并接受新的低回报,(b)降低风险,为最终由追求更高回报的需求所引发的回调做准备,或(c)为追求更高回报而增加风险。显然,这些选择都有缺陷。归根结底,在我们所经历的这类低回报世界里,安全可靠地追求高回报相当困难。
但现在,更高的预期回报来了。2022 年初,高收益债券(举例来说)的收益率在 4% 区间——这个回报没什么用。如今,它们的收益率超过 8%,意味着这些债券有潜力为投资组合业绩做出很大贡献。在整个非投资级信贷领域,情况大致相同。
Investors who profited in this period from asset ownership and levered investment strategies may overlook the salutary effect of interest rates on asset values and borrowing costs and instead think the profits stemmed from the inherent merit of their strategies, perhaps with some help from their own skill and wisdom. That is, they may have violated a basic rule in investing: “Never confuse brains and a bull market.” Given the benefits of being on the “moving walkway” during this period, it seems to me it would have required really bad decision-making or really bad luck for a purchase of assets made with borrowed money to have been unsuccessful. Will asset ownership be as profitable in the years ahead as in the 2009-21 period? Will leverage add as much to returns if interest rates don’t decline over time or if the cost of borrowing isn’t much below the expected rate of return on the assets purchased? Whatever the intrinsic merits of asset ownership and levered investment, one would think the benefits will be reduced in the years ahead. And merely riding positive trends by buying and levering may no longer be sufficient to produce success. In the new environment, earning exceptional returns will likely once again require skill in making bargain purchases and, in control strategies, adding value to the assets owned. Lending, credit, or fixed income investing should be correspondingly better off. As I mentioned in my December memo, the 13 years in question were a difficult, dreary, low-return period for credit investors, including Oaktree. Most of the asset classes we operate in were offering the lowest prospective returns any of us had ever seen. The options were to (a) hold and accept the new lower returns, (b) reduce risk to prepare for the correction that the demand for higher returns would eventually bring, or (c) increase risk in pursuit of higher returns. Obviously, all of these had drawbacks. The bottom line was that it was quite challenging to safely and dependably pursue high returns in a low-return world like the one we were experiencing. But now, higher prospective returns are here. In early 2022, high yield bonds (for example) yielded in the 4% range – not a very useful return. Today, they yield more than 8%, meaning these bonds have the potential to make a great contribution to portfolio results. The same is generally true across the entire spectrum of non-investment grade credit.
2023 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2023 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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当下的资产配置
我对这一巨变的想法,主要是在去年 10 月和 11 月拜访客户期间逐渐成形的。回到家后,我写下了那份备忘录,并开始讨论其中的论点。而在 12 月某非营利组织投资委员会的会议上,我说了这样的话:
卖掉大盘股、小盘股、价值股、成长股、美国股、外国股。把私募股权和公开股票一起卖掉,房地产、对冲基金、风险投资也统统卖掉。全卖了,把所得投到收益率 9% 的高收益债券里。
这家机构需要从捐赠基金中获得每年 6% 左右的回报,我相信,如果它持有一个组合得当、收益率 9% 的高收益债券投资组合,那么超出 6% 目标的可能性极大。但我的建议并非认真的,更多是想引发一场讨论——鉴于过去一年半的变化,如今投资者可以从信贷投资中获得堪比股票的回报。
标普 500 指数近一个世纪以来年化回报率略高于 10%,大家都很满意(年化 10% 持续 100 年,1 美元能变成近 1.4 万美元)。如今,ICE 美银美国高收益受限指数提供的收益率超过 8.5%,CS 杠杆贷款指数大约 10.0%,私募贷款还要高得多。换句话说,非投资级债务投资的预期税前收益率,如今已接近或超过股票的长期历史回报。
而且,重要的是,这些是契约性回报。1978 年我从股票转向债券时,被一个重大差异深深触动。对股票来说,短期或中期内你的大部分回报取决于市场的行为。用本·格雷厄姆的话说,如果市场先生心情好,你的回报就受益,反之亦然。而信贷工具则不同,你的回报绝大部分来自你与借款人之间的契约。你先付钱给借款人;他们每半年付你一次利息;到期时把钱还给你。而且,说得大大简化一点,如果借款人不按承诺还款,你和其余债权人就能通过破产程序获得公司所有权,这种可能性给了借款人很大的动力去履行契约。信贷投资者不依赖市场来获得回报;就算市场关闭或失去流动性,长期持有者的回报也不受影响。股票和债券回报来源之间的差异极为深刻,很多投资者可能理智上明白,却没有真正体会到位。
信贷的预期回报能与股票抗衡,这已经多年未见。如今又回到了这种局面。我所任职董事会的这家非营利组织,该不该把所有资金都放进信贷工具?或许不该。但查理·芒格告诫我们要“反过来想”,或者把这样的问题翻个个儿。对我来说,这意味着资产配置者应该问自己:“现在有什么理由,不把相当一部分资本投进信贷?”
这里我想提一句,这些年来,我见过机构投资者对市场的变化口头敷衍,然后相应地对自己的资产配置做些小调整。20 世纪 80 年代,早期指数基金跑赢主动管理时,他们说:“我们已经覆盖到了:我们把股票仓位的 2% 挪到了指数基金。”新兴市场看起来有吸引力时,回应往往是再挪 2%。时不时还有客户告诉我,他们放了 2% 在黄金上。但倘若我所描述的变化确实如我深信的那样是一场巨变——根本性、意义深远、可能持续很长时间——那么信贷工具大概应该在投资组合中占据相当大的比重……或许是大部分。
Asset Allocation Today My thinking about the sea change materialized mostly as I was visiting clients last October and November. When I got home, I wrote the memo and began to discuss its thesis. And at the December meeting of a non-profit investment committee, I said the following: Sell off the big stocks, the small stocks, the value stocks, the growth stocks, the U.S. stocks, and the foreign stocks. Sell the private equity along with the public equity, the real estate, the hedge funds, and the venture capital. Sell it all and put the proceeds into high yield bonds at 9%. This institution needs to earn an annual return of 6% or so on its endowment, and I’m convinced that if it holds a competently assembled portfolio of 9% high yield bonds, it would be overwhelmingly likely to exceed that 6% target. But mine wasn’t a serious suggestion, more a statement designed to evoke discussion of the fact that, thanks to the changes over the last year and a half, investors today can get equity-like returns from investments in credit. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has returned just over 10% per year for almost a century, and everyone’s very happy (10% a year for 100 years turns $1 into almost $14,000). Nowadays, the ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Constrained Index offers a yield of over 8.5%, the CS Leveraged Loan Index offers roughly 10.0%, and private loans offer considerably more. In other words, expected pre-tax yields from non-investment grade debt investments now approach or exceed the historical returns from equity. And, importantly, these are contractual returns. When I shifted from equities to bonds in 1978, I was struck by a major difference. With equities, the bulk of your return in the short or medium term depends on the behavior of the market. If Mr. Market’s in a good mood, as Ben Graham put it, your return will benefit, and vice versa. With credit instruments, on the other hand, your return comes overwhelmingly from the contract between you and the borrowers. You give a borrower money up front; they pay you interest every six months; and they give you your money back at the end. And, to greatly oversimplify, if the borrower doesn’t pay you as promised, you and the other creditors get ownership of the company via the bankruptcy process, a possibility that gives the borrower a lot of incentive to honor the contract. The credit investor isn’t dependent on the market for returns; if the market shuts down or becomes illiquid, the return for the long-term holder is unaffected. The difference between the sources of return on stocks and bonds is profound, something many investors may understand intellectually but not fully appreciate. It’s been years since prospective returns on credit were competitive with those on equities. Now it’s the case again. Should the non-profit whose board I sit on put all its money into credit instruments? Perhaps not. But Charlie Munger exhorts us to “invert,” or flip questions like this. To me, this means allocators should ask themselves, “What are the arguments for not putting a significant portion of our capital into credit today?” Here I’ll mention that, over the years, I’ve seen institutional investors pay lip service to developments in markets and make modest changes in their asset allocation in response. When the early index funds outperformed active management in the 1980s, they said, “We’ve got that covered: We’ve moved 2% of our equities to an index fund.” When emerging markets look attractive, the response is often to move another 2%. And from time to time, a client tells me they’ve put 2% in gold. But if the developments I describe really constitute a sea change as I believe – fundamental, significant, and potentially longlasting – credit instruments should probably represent a substantial portion of portfolios . . . perhaps the majority.
2023 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2023 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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那坏处是什么?这怎么会是错误呢?
What’s the downside? How could this be a mistake? •
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第一,个人借款人可能会违约、无力偿付。信贷经理的主要工作就是筛掉那些不还钱的人,历史表明这件事是能做到的。个别违约不太可能拖垮一个精选且分散得当的投资组合。如果你担心信贷组合遭遇一波违约潮,那想想那种环境对股票或其他所有权资产意味着什么。
第二,信贷工具本质上没什么升值潜力。因此,未来几年股票和杠杆投资策略完全有可能超预期上涨、表现更好。这一点无可否认,但要记住,这里的“下行风险”指的是错失回报的机会成本,而不是未能实现所寻求的回报。
第三,债券和贷款会面临价格波动,这意味着在疲弱时期被迫卖出可能造成亏损。但在这方面,信贷工具绝非独一份,而且“稳值”债券和贷款的波动幅度,受到到期偿还承诺所产生的“回归面值”磁吸效应的显著约束。
第四,我一直在讲的回报是名义回报。如果通胀没有得到控制,这些名义回报转换成实际回报时可能大幅缩水,而实际回报正是某些投资者最看重的。当然,其他投资的实际回报也可能受损。许多人认为股票和房地产有可能提供通胀保护,但据我对 1970 年代的回忆,这种保护通常只有在价格下跌、从而抬高未来预期回报之后才会显现。
最后,这场巨变最终可能不如我预期的那么持久,意思是美联储把联邦基金利率降回零或 1%,信贷收益率随之回落。幸运的是,通过买入多年期信贷工具,投资者可以在相当长的时期内锁定承诺的回报(假设该投资提供一定程度的赎回保护)。到期或赎回时不得不面对再投资问题,但一旦你做了我建议的信贷投资,至少能在工具存续期内确保获得承诺的收益率——或许要减去违约损失。
First, individual borrowers can default and fail to pay. It’s the main job of the credit manager to weed out the non-payers, and history shows it can be done. Isolated defaults are unlikely to derail a well-selected and well-diversified portfolio. And if you’re worried about a wave of defaults hitting your credit portfolio, think about what the implications of that environment would be for equities or other ownership assets. Second, by their nature, credit instruments don’t have much potential for appreciation. Thus, it’s entirely possible that equities and levered investment strategies will surprise on the upside and outperform in the years ahead. There’s no denying this, but it should be borne in mind that the “downside risk” here consists of the opportunity cost of returns forgone, not failing to achieve the return one sought. Third, bonds and loans are subject to price fluctuations, meaning having to sell in a weak period could cause losses to be realized. But credit instruments are far from alone in this regard, and the magnitude of the fluctuations on “money-good” bonds and loans is constrained significantly by the magnetic “pull to par” exerted by the promise of repayment upon maturity. Fourth, the returns I’ve been talking about are nominal returns. If inflation isn’t brought under control, those nominal returns could lose significant value when they’re converted into real returns, which are what some investors care about most. Of course, real returns on other investments could suffer as well. Many people think of stocks and real estate as potentially providing inflation protection, but my recollection from the 1970s is that the protection typically takes hold only after prices have declined so as to provide higher prospective returns. Finally, the sea change could end up being less long-lasting than I expect, meaning the Fed takes the fed funds rate back down to zero or 1% and the yields on credit recede accordingly. Fortunately, by buying multi-year credit instruments, an investor can tie up the promised return for a meaningful period (assuming the investment provides some degree of call protection). Reinvesting will have to be dealt with upon maturity or call, but once you’ve made the credit investments I’m suggesting, you will at least have secured the promised yield – perhaps minus losses on defaults – for the term of the instruments. *
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我思路转变的总主题是,很大程度上得益于高度宽松的货币政策,我们在相当长一段时间里,在许多重要方面都经历了异常轻松的时期,但那个时代已经结束。从今天的利率水平来看,显然没有多少下调空间,而且我认为短期利率在今后几年不会像最近那样低。出于这些及其他原因,我相信未来几年不会那么轻松。但即便我的预期可能被证明是对的,目前也还没有什么证据能让我笃定。为什么没有?我的回答是,经济和市场正处于一场远未完成的转型的早期阶段。资产价格是在认为价格会涨的买家与认为价格会跌的卖家之间的拉锯战中形成的。过去一年左右,随着人们对通胀、衰退、企业利润、地缘政治,尤其是美联储转向宽松政策的预期起起伏伏,这场拉锯战一直很活跃。拉锯战仍在进行,因此,标普 500 指数与一年前相比相差不到半个百分点。
我最近一直在想,当投资者多少得是个乐观主义者。投资者必须相信事情会顺利发展,相信自己的技能能让他们明智地……
The overarching theme of my sea-change thinking is that, largely thanks to highly accommodative monetary policy, we went through unusually easy times in a number of important regards over a prolonged period, but that time is over. There clearly isn’t much room for interest rate declines from today’s levels, and I don’t think short-term interest rates will be as low in the coming years as in the recent past. For these and other reasons, I believe the years ahead won’t be as easy. But while my expectations may prove correct, there’s no evidence yet on which I can hang my hat. Why not? My answer is that the economy and markets are in the early stages of a transition that’s far from complete. Asset prices are established through a tug-of-war between buyers who think prices will rise and sellers who think they’ll fall. There’s been an active one over the last year or so as sentiment has waxed and waned regarding the outlook for inflation, recession, corporate profits, geopolitics, and especially a Fed pivot back to accommodation. The tug-of-war is ongoing, and, as a result, the S&P 500 is within a half percent of where it was a year ago. I’ve been thinking lately about the fact that being an investor requires a person to be somewhat of an optimist. Investors have to believe things will work out and that their skill will enable them to wisely
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为未来配置资本。股票投资者必须特别乐观,因为他们必须相信,未来会有人出现,愿意以高于他们买入的价格购买他们的股票。我在这里想说的是,乐观主义者只会勉强放弃他们的乐观情绪,而认知失调与自欺欺人等现象,使得人们在相反的信息已经出现之后,仍能长久地坚持原有观点。这正是人们谈论股市时所说的原因之一:“事情可能比你想象的来得更慢,但一旦到来,却会比你想象的更快。”如今市场的横盘或“区间震荡”走势告诉我,尽管忧虑四起,投资者仍怀有相当程度的乐观。未来几个月,我们就会知道这份乐观是否站得住脚。
塑造 2009 年至 2021 年行情的那些积极力量,大约在 18 个月前开始转变。更高的通胀最终证明并非暂时现象。这引发了利率上调,人们担忧经济将陷入衰退,对亏损可能性的忧虑再度浮现,因而要求为承担风险获得更大的补偿。但尽管大多数人不再认为前景十全十美,也很少有人认为前景一片黯淡。正如乐观情绪在那 13 年里助长了正向循环,我相信,乐观情绪的消退将以多种方式向金融齿轮中撒入沙子,其中一些方式可能是无法预见的。
就后一点而言,必须承认,既然我们从未经历过与未来完全相同的时期——而且经济与金融环境的变化限制了历史的适用性——我们很可能会遭遇意外。如果环境变得不那么有利,那么这些意外很可能偏向不利的一面。
请注意,如前所述,我绝非在说利率会回到它们此前的历史高位。我没有理由相信,大多数人预期中的衰退会严重或持久。而且,虽然估值偏高,但还未高到离谱,我不认为股市崩盘是合理的预期。这不是呼吁大幅加强防御。我主要是谈论资本的重新配置,从所有权和杠杆转向放贷。
这不是我在职业生涯中常唱的歌。这是我指出的第一个海变,也是我为大幅增加信贷投资而做出的为数不多的呼吁之一。但我一再回归的底线是,信贷投资者如今能够获得的回报是:
position capital for the future. Equity investors have to be particularly optimistic, as they have to believe someone will come along who’ll buy their shares for more than they paid. My point here is that optimists surrender their optimism only grudgingly, and phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and self-delusion permit opinions to be held long after information to the contrary has arrived. This is among the reasons why they say of the stock market: “Things can take longer to happen than you thought they would, but then they happen faster than you thought they could.” Today’s sideways or “range-bound” market tells me investors possess a good amount of optimism despite the worries that have arisen. In the coming months, we’ll find out if the optimism was warranted. The positive forces that shaped the 2009-21 period began to change around 18 months ago. The higher inflation turned out not to be transitory. This brought on interest rate increases, concern that a recession would result, some resurrection of worry over the possibility of loss, and thus insistence on greater compensation for bearing risk. But while most people no longer see an outlook that’s flawless, few think it’s hopeless either. Just as optimism abetted a positive cycle in those 13 years, I believe a lessening of optimism will throw some sand into the financial gears in a variety of ways, some of which may be unforeseeable. In this latter regard, it’s essential to acknowledge that since we haven’t lived through times exactly like the years that lie ahead – and since changes in the economic/financial environment limit the applicability of history – we’re likely to encounter surprises. And if the environment is less favorable, the surprises are likely to be on the downside. Please note, as mentioned earlier, that I’m absolutely not saying interest rates are going back to the high levels from which they’ve come. I have no reason to believe that the recession most people believe lies ahead will be severe or long-lasting. And with valuations high, but not terribly so, I don’t think a stock market collapse can reasonably be predicted. This isn’t a call for dramatically increased defensiveness. Mostly I’m just talking about a reallocation of capital, away from ownership and leverage and toward lending. This isn’t a song I’ve sung often over the course of my career. This is the first sea change I’ve remarked on and one of the few calls I’ve made for substantially increasing investment in credit. But the bottom line I keep going back to is that credit investors can access returns today that: • • •
与股票的历史回报相比,这些回报极具竞争力,
超过了许多投资者的预期回报率或精算假设,
并且不确定性远低于股票回报。
are highly competitive versus the historical returns on equities, exceed many investors’ required returns or actuarial assumptions, and are much less uncertain than equity returns.
除非我的逻辑存在严重漏洞,否则我认为将大量资本重新配置到信贷领域是合理的。
Unless there are serious holes in my logic, I believe significant reallocation of capital toward credit is warranted.
October 11, 2023
October 11, 2023
2023 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2023 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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