给我信贷

2025 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 3975 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

Gimme Credit

Gimme Credit

客户提出的问题让我能够实时了解他们心里在想什么。过去十年里,不同时期最常被问到的问题各不相同:有时是“美联储什么时候加息或降息?”;危机期间,通常是“我们现在打到第几局了?”;这一两年,变成了“我们能聊聊私募信贷吗?”;而最近几个月,则成了“利差怎么看?”。

自从 2022 年利率从地板上一跃而起,人们对信贷的兴趣就与日俱增,这也是我写这期备忘录的原因。这次的内容比往常更接近“推销我的持仓”,但我觉得这个话题值得这么写。我大部分论述会聚焦高收益债券,因为这是我经验最丰富的领域,数据也最齐全,而且固定票息让解释起来最直截了当。但我要讲的观点,对广义的信贷同样适用。

在铺垫背景之前,我想先澄清一件事。当有人问我“我们能聊聊私募信贷吗?”我的回答永远一样:“我们能聊聊信贷吗?”我看不出有什么理由让投资者绕过公开交易的信贷工具,直接扑向私募信贷。因此,我在这里两者都会谈到。

去年对信贷来说是丰收的一年,以 ICE 美银美国高收益债券指数的 8.2% 回报率为证。这还是在 2023 年更亮眼的表现之后——那一年该基准指数回报率达 13.5%。这些回报背后的驱动力是什么?又让信贷行业走到了什么位置?

背景

众所周知,在我反复提到的那段低利率时期(2009 年至 2021 年),信贷工具的名义收益率低得可怜。2022 年初,在美联储启动加息进程之前,高收益债券的收益率在 4% 上下,新发行利率落在 3% 区间,甚至有一笔债券以 2% 的票息发行!我当时把橡树资本的挑战描述为“在一个低回报的世界里投资”。超低债券收益率对大多数机构投资者毫无帮助,许多人干脆告别了固定收益投资。但私募信贷倒是热火朝天,约 6% 的收益率被杠杆放大到 9% 上下。

2022 年,投资者担心美联储加息会引发衰退,导致高收益债券的平均价格把风险保护计入其中,表现为超过 4% 的收益率利差,整体收益率因此被推高到大约 9.5%。我当时论证,这些承诺回报(a)绝对水平很高,(b)因其契约属性而相对安全,(c)远高于大多数机构设定的回报目标。基于这些理由,我敦促投资者在组合中显著配置信贷。

单是这些接近两位数的收益率,就能给持有者带来可观的回报。但投资者开始买入,是因为他们看到信贷存在明显价值,同时预期降息会让高票息债券变得更抢手。随着时间推移,投资者对潜在衰退的担忧也越来越淡,这导致他们不再那么坚持要求通过信贷利差获取慷慨的风险保护。需求上升、利率下行、对更高利差形式的风险保护要求减弱——这是价格上涨的完美公式,而它确实应验了。这导致债券的总回报超过了

The questions I get from clients enable me to understand in real time what’s on their minds. At various points in the last ten years, the most frequently asked question was “when will the Fed raise/cut rates?” During crises, it’s usually “what inning are we in?” For a year or two, it’s been “can we talk about private credit?” And in the last few months, it’s “what about spreads?” Ever since interest rates got up off the floor in 2022, there’s been increased interest in credit, and that’s why I’m devoting this memo to it. It’ll come a little closer than usual to “talking my book,” but I think the subject justifies that. Most of my references will be to high yield bonds, where I have the most experience, there’s the most data, and the fixed coupon rates make the explanations most straightforward. But the points I’ll make are applicable to credit in general. While I’m setting the stage, I want to get one thing out of the way. When people ask me, “can we talk about private credit?” my answer is always the same: “can we talk about credit?” I see no reason why investors should blithely skip over public credit instruments and go straight to private credit. For that reason, I’m going to address both here. Last year was a great one for credit, illustrated by the 8.2% return on the ICE BofA US High Yield Bond Index. That followed even better results in 2023, when the benchmark returned 13.5%. What’s been behind these returns, and where do they leave the credit sector? Background As everyone knows, promised yields on credit instruments were meager in the low-interest-rate period I’ve discussed so much: 2009-21. At the beginning of 2022, before the Fed embarked on its program of interest rate hikes, high yield bonds yielded in the 4% range, with issuance taking place in the 3s and one bond issued in the 2s! I described Oaktree’s challenge at that time as “investing in a low-return world.” The ultra-low bond yields were unhelpful for most institutional investors, and many got out of the habit of investing in fixed income. There was, however, good interest in private credit, where yields in the area of 6% were being levered up to 9% or so. In 2022, investors who feared the Fed’s rate increases would bring on a recession caused the average high yield bond price to incorporate risk protection in the form of a yield spread of more than 4%, taking the overall yield to roughly 9½%. I argued at the time that these promised returns were (a) high in the absolute, (b) relatively safe because of their contractual nature, and (c) well in excess of the returns most institutions targeted. For these reasons, I urged that credit should be weighted significantly in portfolios. These high-single-digit yields alone would have given holders healthy returns. However, investors began to buy because they saw there was good value in credit, and they anticipated rate cuts that would make bonds with high coupons more desirable. Over time, investors also became less worried about a possible recession, and this led to reduced insistence on generous risk protection via credit spreads. Increased demand, lower interest rates, and reduced insistence on risk protection in the form of higher spreads is a perfect formula for price appreciation, and it ensued. This caused the bonds’ total returns to exceed the

2025 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2025 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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承诺的收益率,结果就是,高收益债市场在 2023-24 这两年间实现了 10.8% 的年化回报。

当然,价格上涨的另一面是预期回报下降。由于上述变化,目前高收益债的平均到期收益率已从 9.5% 降至略高于 7%。正如恐惧加剧和风险厌恶情绪上升会让投资提供更高的预期回报,乐观情绪上升和风险承受意愿增强则会压低回报,体现为收益率利差收窄。(收益率下降还部分源于基准利率下调 100 个基点。)

什么是收益率利差?

既然有大量安全的借款方可选,为什么还要把钱借给高风险借款方?答案是,高风险借款方要为自己的融资付出更高代价。如果你能向高风险借款方收取足够高的利率,使回报超过安全债务的收益水平,即使扣除预期信用损失后仍然如此,那承担这个风险就是值得的。这正是 70 年代末迈克尔·米尔肯推广高收益债所依据的理论,也是我职业生涯的理论基础。

高风险债务的承诺收益率与风险较低的参照债务收益率之间的差额,叫作“收益率利差”“信用利差”,或干脆叫“利差”。它也被称为“风险溢价”,这确实是它的本质:你为接受额外违约风险而获得的增量回报。因此,它相当于一笔保险费:保单持有人支付费用,让车险公司承担他们撞车的风险。

收益率利差主要随违约趋势以及投资者对违约的心理预期而波动。当更多公司违约、投资者预期未来违约率上升时,他们会要求更高的保护,体现为更宽的利差。当他们对手头信用状况感到乐观时,要求的保护就会少一些。因此,利差是投资者心理的良好晴雨表,或者说是一种“恐惧指标”。有一点显而易见但值得指出:利差并不告诉你实际违约率会是多少——有些人错误地这么说。它告诉你的是投资者认为违约率会是多少。有思想的投资者必须把这种观点表达和现实可能发生的情况做对比,评估投资者是过于乐观还是过于悲观。

今天的收益率利差够吗?

这就是当下最核心的问题。假设高收益债收益率为 8%,同期限国债收益率为 5%,利差就是 3%,即 300 个基点。哪个更划算?这完全取决于违约概率。如果高收益债每年有 4% 的概率违约,而一旦违约你可能损失四分之三的本金,那么预期年化信用损失就是 3%(4% × 75%)。如果这些估计准确,你对两者应该无差异。或者(在违约时损失 75% 不变的前提下),如果高收益债违约概率高于 4%,你应该选国债;如果低于 4%,你应该选高收益债。

我管理高收益债的时候,认为利差的正常范围是 350-550 个基点。到最近,我觉得这个区间已经修正为 400-600 个基点。但今天,收益率利差大约在 290 个基点,是高收益债自 1977-78 年开始发行以来有记录以来最窄的水平之一。这是否意味着投资者现在不应该持有它们?这就是人们问我“我们能聊聊利差吗”时的意思。

promised yields, and as a result, the high yield bond market delivered an annualized return of 10.8% over the two-year period 2023-24. The flip side of a rising price, of course, is a declining prospective return. As a result of the developments described above, the yield to maturity on the average high yield bond now stands just above 7%, down from 9½%. Just as rising fear and risk aversion cause investments to offer higher prospective returns, rising optimism and risk tolerance lead to lower ones, incorporating reduced yield spreads. (The reduced yield is also attributable to 100 basis points of cuts in the base interest rate.) What Is a Yield Spread? Why would someone lend money to a risky borrower when there are plenty of safe borrowers to lend to? The answer is that risky borrowers pay more for their money, and if you can charge a risky borrower an interest rate that’s high enough to produce a return above that available on safe debt, even after allowing for expected credit losses, it could be worth taking the risk. That was precisely the theory that underpinned Michael Milken’s popularization of high yield bonds in the late ’70s, as well as my career. The differential between the promised yield on risky debt and the yield on a less risky comparator is called a “yield spread,” “credit spread,” or just plain “spread.” It’s also called a “risk premium,” which is what it is: the incremental return you’re offered to accept incremental default risk. Thus, it’s the equivalent of an insurance premium: what policyholders pay to get auto insurers to shoulder the risk that they’ll crash their cars. Yield spreads primarily fluctuate with trends in, and investor psychology regarding, defaults. When more companies are defaulting and investors expect elevated defaults in the future, they’ll demand more protection in the form of wider spreads. They’ll do so to a lesser degree when they’re optimistic about creditworthiness. Thus, the spread is a good barometer of investor psychology, or a “fear gauge.” It’s worth noting the obvious: the spread doesn’t tell you what the actual default rate will be, as some mistakenly say. It tells you what investors think the default rate will be. The thoughtful investor has to evaluate that expression of opinion against what the reality is likely to be and assess whether investors are being too optimistic or too pessimistic. Are Today’s Yield Spreads Adequate? This is the question of the day. Let’s say high yield bonds yield 8% and a Treasury note of the same maturity offers 5%, for a yield spread of 3%, or 300 basis points. Which is the better deal? It all depends on the likelihood of default. If high yield bonds have a 4% chance of defaulting each year and you’re likely to lose three-quarters of your money in a default, your expected annual credit loss is 3% (4% x 75%). If those estimates are accurate, you should be indifferent between the two. Or (holding constant the 75% loss in case of default), you should prefer the Treasury note if high yield bonds are more than 4% likely to default or high yield bonds if they’re less than 4% likely to default. When I managed high yield bonds, I considered the normal range for spreads to be 350-550 basis points. More recently, I think this has been revised to 400-600 bps. Today, however, the yield spread is around 290 bps, one of the narrowest spreads on record since high yield bonds began to be issued in 1977-78. Does that mean investors shouldn’t hold them here? That’s what people mean when they ask me, “can we talk about spreads?”

2025 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

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必须指出,上文提到的“正常”利差已被证明远远够用。我们之所以知道这一点,是因为未管理的高收益债券指数——即便算上违约和信用损失——也显著跑赢了无风险的美国国债。巴克莱的数据显示,从 1986 年到 2024 年,也就是橡树资本投资记录覆盖的这 39 年间,高收益债券的年化回报率为 7.83%,而 10 年期国债为 5.14%。平均而言,高收益债券每年给投资者带来的回报比国债高出 269 个基点,这一事实告诉我们,历史利差远超弥补信用损失所需。因此,历史利差未必是判断充足性的标准,投资者即使在利差低于历史均值的情况下,也可能明智地选择高收益债券而非国债。

所以,关键问题不在于今天的利差是否处于历史低位,而在于今天的利差是否足以弥补将要发生的信用损失。这又把我们带回了前面三段讨论的计算。在橡树资本 39 年高收益债券投资记录所覆盖的 1986 年到 2024 年间,高收益债券市场的平均违约率为 3.5%,而违约债券让投资者损失了约三分之二的本金,这意味着每年的信用损失大约为 230 个基点(3.5% 的三分之二)。这表明,当前约 290 个基点的历史低位利差,本应足以弥补过去发生的违约。然而,在把这当作该问题的恰当结论之前,还有一些注意事项需要考虑:

It’s essential to note that the “normal” spreads mentioned above have proved far more than adequate. We know this because the unmanaged high yield bond indices – even with their defaults and credit losses – have significantly outperformed no-risk Treasurys. Data from Barclays shows that from 1986 through 2024, the 39-year period covered by Oaktree’s record, the annualized return on high yield bonds was 7.83%, compared to 5.14% on 10-year Treasurys. The fact that the average high yield bond gave investors 269 bps more return per year than Treasurys tells us the historical spread was considerably more than sufficient to offset credit losses. Thus, the historical spread shouldn’t necessarily be the standard for adequacy, and investors might intelligently opt for high yield bonds over Treasurys even at spreads below the historical average. Thus, the key question isn’t whether today’s spread is historically narrow or not. It’s whether today’s spread is sufficient to offset the credit losses that will occur. This takes us back to the calculation discussed three paragraphs above. Over the course of Oaktree’s 39-year track record in high yield bonds, from 1986 through 2024, the high yield bond universe’s default rate has averaged 3.5%, and defaulting bonds have cost investors about 2/3 of the money they had at stake, meaning annual credit losses have amounted to about 230 bps (two-thirds of 3.5%). This suggests today’s historically narrow spread of about 290 bps would have been enough to offset the defaults that occurred in the past. Before that’s accepted as the appropriate conclusion on the subject, however, there are caveats to be considered: •

3.5% 的平均违约率高估了典型的经验。这一平均值远非常态。在橡树资本业绩记录所覆盖的 39 年中,只有 14 年该领域的违约率达到或超过 3.5%,其余 25 年则低于此水平。平均值被 1990-1991 年和 2001-2002 年危机期间两位数的违约率拉高。如果剔除这四年(连同违约率为 1.0% 或更低的四个最佳年份),剩余 31 年的平均值仅为 3.0%。此外,39 年间的中位违约率(即年度观测值的中点)更低,为 2.7%。

The average default rate of 3.5% overstates the typical experience. That 3.5% average is far from the norm. Out of the 39 years covered by Oaktree’s track record, there were only 14 years when the universe’s default rate was at or above 3.5%, and 25 when it was below. The average was pulled up by double-digit default rates during crises in 1990-91 and 2001-02. If you took out those four years (along with the four best years, in which defaults were 1.0% or less), the average for the remaining 31 years was just 3.0%. Further, the median default rate for the 39 years (the midpoint of the annual observations) was even lower, at 2.7%.

历史违约率未必适用于未来。在 2008-09 年全球金融危机和 2020 年新冠疫情期间,各国央行和财政部展现出他们已开发出应对经济衰退和信贷紧缩的工具。因此,这些事件中的违约经历远低于早期危机,即便从宏观角度看,全球金融危机和疫情要严重得多。由此可见,可以说宏观环境已变得更加安全,历史利差水平不再适用。

The historical default rate might not be relevant to the future. In the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 and the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, central banks and national treasuries showed that they’ve developed tools with which to counter recessions and credit crunches. As a result, the default experiences associated with those events were well below those in the earlier crises, even though the GFC and pandemic were much more serious in a macro sense. Thus, it can be argued that the macro environment has become safer, meaning the historical spreads are no longer called for.

平均高收益债券的信用评级(按理说是质量的指示器)已大幅提升。主要原因是如今公司对评级不那么在意,大量投资级中评级为 BBB 的公司选择增加杠杆使用,让自己的评级滑落至 BB 级,即高收益债券领域的高端层级。下表显示了近 25 年来高收益债券领域评级结构的变动情况:

The average high yield bond’s credit rating (supposedly an indicator of quality) has risen substantially. Mainly because companies are less concerned about ratings these days, large numbers of investment grade triple-B-rated companies have opted to increase their use of leverage and allow their rating to slip to double-B, the upper tier of the high yield bond universe. The following table shows the change in the ratings profile of the high yield bond universe over the last 25 years:

BB

B

CCC 及以下

BB B CCC and below

December 31, 1999

December 31, 1999

December 31, 2024

December 31, 2024

32.7%

54.6

12.7

32.7% 54.6 12.7

52.6%

33.7

13.7

52.6% 33.7 13.7

来自洲际交易所(ICE)的数据

Data from ICE

2025 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

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巴克莱的研究表明,由于如今平均高收益债券的信用质量更高,当前的平均收益率利差每单位信用风险所提供的补偿,比 2007 年“历史最紧”时期要多出不少。

Research from Barclays indicates that since the average high yield bond is now higher in creditworthiness, today’s average yield spread provides a good bit more compensation per unit of credit risk today than it did at the “all-time tight” of 2007. •

主动型信贷经理努力降低两方面的风险:(a)其投资组合中违约的发生率,以及(b)一旦发生违约时资本损失的百分比。由于历史利差一直足以抵御过去平均水平的信贷损失,这意味着对于具备卓越信贷识别能力的投资者来说,这些利差已被证明绰绰有余。对于能够通过主动管理减少信贷损失的高收益债券经理而言,利差更有可能被证明足以弥补未来的信贷损失。

Active credit managers strive to reduce (a) the incidence of default in their portfolios and (b) the percentage of capital lost when defaults occur. Since the historical spreads have been adequate to protect against average credit losses in the past, that means they’ve proved more than adequate for investors with superior credit discernment. For high yield bond managers with the ability to reduce credit losses through active management, there’s a greater likelihood that spreads will prove sufficient to offset future credit losses.

基于上述种种原因,再加上另外一点,我认为对历史级狭窄利差的担忧被严重夸大了。我要补充的一点是,利差扩大是短期现象,就像股票的波动一样。如果收益率利差扩大,意味着要求的收益率上升,债券持有人的价格就会下跌。但价格下跌是暂时的,而更高的利息支付每年都能拿到……最终债券到期时还会回到面值(假设它不违约)。我与橡树资本的妮可·阿德里安做了一些研究来验证这一论点。我们找出了常用的高收益债券基准指数有史以来的最低收益率利差,并考察如果在那天买入债券,我们的表现会如何。最低利差为 241 个基点,出现在 2007 年 6 月,恰在全球金融危机爆发之前。以下就是如果你选择在那个时点投资,高收益债券和几个对比指数的回报表现:

美国高收益债券利差创历史最窄水平后的年化回报

For all these reasons plus one more, I believe the concern about historically narrow spreads is very much overblown. My additional point is that spread widening is a short-term phenomenon, analogous to volatility in stocks. If the yield spread widens, increasing the demanded yield, that results in a price decline for bondholders. But the price decline is temporary, whereas the higher interest payments are received every year . . . and then the bond eventually returns to par at maturity (assuming it performs). I did some research with Oaktree’s Nicole Adrien to test this thesis. We identified the all-time lowest yield spread on our usual high yield bond benchmark and looked to see how we would’ve fared if we’d bought bonds that day. The lowest spread was 241 bps, reached in June 2007, just prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. Here are the results for high yield bonds and some comparative indices if you chose that time to invest: Annualized Returns Following All-Time Tight U.S. High Yield Bond Spread

1 年

3 年

5 年

10 年

15 年

1 year 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years

ICE 美国银行美国高收益指数

ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index

美国银行美国国债指数

ICE BofA U.S. Treasury Index

彭博美国综合债券指数

Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Index

-1.13%

5.29

7.26

7.35

6.01

-1.13% 5.29 7.26 7.35 6.01

10.19%

7.27

7.20

4.15

3.03

10.19% 7.27 7.20 4.15 3.03

7.54%

6.99

6.83

4.47

3.34

7.54% 6.99 6.83 4.47 3.34

信息来源:洲际交易所(ICE)、彭博社

注:美国银行美国高收益指数创历史最窄的政府债券利差(241 个基点)记录于 2007 年 6 月 1 日

Source: ICE, Bloomberg Note: BofA U.S. High Yield Index all-time tight gov’t OAS spread (241 bps) recorded on June 1, 2007

高收益债券的一年期回报数据显示,毫不意外,如果你在某个风险资产最受追捧时买入,紧接着就遇上全球最严重的金融危机之一,那么最初的体验不会太好。因此,在利差处于低点时买入后的第一年,高收益债券跑输美国国债 11.3 个百分点,跑输美国综合债券指数 8.7 个百分点。但请注意,高收益债券投资者仍然几乎没亏什么钱,这要归功于利息收入!(在橡树资本,我们称之为“票息的力量”。)高收益债券直到第五年才追平国债和综合指数,但在 10 年和 15 年区间内,尽管是在利差最糟糕的时点买入,它们每年仍跑赢上述指数约 3 个百分点。当然,能够驾驭高收益领域违约风险的经理人,本可取得更优异的回报。上述数据表明,买入时利差狭窄,远不等于中长期表现平庸。

The one-year return on high yield bonds shows, unsurprisingly, that if you buy a risky asset at the height of its popularity and immediately encounter one of the worst financial crises the world has seen, your initial experience won’t be good. Thus, in the first year following the purchase at the low on spreads, high yield bonds underperformed Treasurys by 11.3 percentage points and the U.S. Aggregate Bond Index by 8.7 percentage points. But note that the high yield bond investor still lost very little money, thanks to the receipt of interest! (At Oaktree, we call this “the power of the coupon.”) High yield bonds didn’t pull ahead of Treasurys and the Aggregate until the five-year mark, but over the 10- and 15-year periods, they outperformed those indices by about 3 percentage points per year despite having been bought at the worst possible moment spread-wise. Of course, managers able to navigate defaults in the high yield universe would have achieved even better returns. As the above data shows, narrow spreads at purchase are far from synonymous with sub-par performance in the medium-tolong term.

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对我而言,最重要的结论——正如我对每个问起的人所说——是你不能靠利差吃饭、靠利差花钱,或者靠利差支付养老金。这些都需要回报。利差必须被评估,以确保其足以抵消信用损失,但最终,重要的是总回报。

合同性回报

高收益债券即使在利差处于历史低位时也能表现良好,如上所示——以及投资者能够忽视迄今已发生的利差收窄——这一能力的重要原因,源于债券回报的合同性质。你以某个到期收益率买入债券,该收益率可能包含微弱的收益率利差。如果投资者后来要求更高的违约保护,利差会扩大,并且在其他条件不变的情况下,债券价格会下跌。但只要发行人按承诺支付利息和本金,利差扩大导致的价格下跌只有暂时影响。当你以面值得到偿还时,你会收到你预期的收益率,无论期间经历何种价格波动,包括与利差扩大相关的下跌。这个结论适用于所有债券:如果你持有至到期且债券兑付,你会收到你签约时的收益率。我已经对此写了太多,不想再赘述(见我的备忘录《关于资产配置的沉思》,2024 年 10 月),但我随时愿意讨论。

(在债券专家们对我群起而攻之前,我承认上述说法并非 100% 准确。债券回报中有三个组成部分,而不是两个。人人都知道利息支付和到期时价格向面值回归。但还有第三个:将年度利息支付再投资所赚取的利息,更广为人知的是“利息上的利息”,而得益于长期复利的力量,这在 20 年或 30 年期的债券上是一个重大问题。标准的到期收益率计算假设利息收入按计算时(例如购买时)的收益率进行再投资,但这是一个简化假设,实际情况很可能不同。没有人愿意看到自己持有的债券价格下跌。但事实是,如果债券价格下跌,收益率会上升,这意味着收到的利息支付可以按高于预期的利率进行再投资。因此,令人惊讶的是,期间的价格下跌可以提高持有债券至到期的整体回报。)

私人信贷怎么样?

这是当今另一个常见问题,和关于利差的问题并列。很多人对私人信贷有疑问,这让人不禁好奇,该行业怎么会看到如此强劲的资本流入。我的回答通常是这样的:

The bottom line for me – as I tell anyone who asks – is that you can’t eat spread, or spend spread, or pay pension benefits with spread. For those things, you need returns. Spreads have to be assessed to ensure they’ll be adequate to offset credit losses, but in the end, it’s the total return that matters. Contractual Returns A good part of the reason for the ability of high yield bonds to perform even when spreads have been historically tight, as shown above – and for investors’ ability to ignore the spread tightening that has taken place to date, as I argue – stems from the contractual nature of bond returns. You buy a bond at a given yield to maturity, which could incorporate an anemic yield spread. And if investors decide later to demand increased default protection, the spread will widen and – all else being equal – the price of the bond will decline. But as long as the issuer pays interest and principal as promised, the price decline brought on by spread widening has only a temporary effect. When you’re repaid at par, you’ll have received the yield you expected, regardless of price fluctuations experienced in the meantime, including declines related to spread widening. The bottom line is one that applies to all bonds: if you hold to maturity and the bonds pay, you receive the yield you signed up for. I’ve written so much about this that I’m not going to belabor it further (see my memo Ruminating on Asset Allocation, October 2024), but I’m always available to talk. (Before the bond pros jump down my throat, I’ll admit that the foregoing is less than 100% accurate. There are three components in bond returns, not two. Everyone knows about the interest payments and the movement of price to par at maturity. But there’s a third: the interest earned from reinvesting the annual interest payments, better known as “interest on interest,” and thanks to the power of long-term compounding, this is a major matter on 20- or 30-year bonds. The standard yield-to-maturity calculation assumes interest receipts are reinvested at the yield in effect at time the calculation is performed (for example, at purchase), but that’s a simplifying assumption, and the reality may well be different. No one wants to see the price of a bond one owns decline. But the truth is that if the bond price declines, the yield rises, meaning interest payments received can be reinvested at a higher rate than was anticipated. Thus, surprisingly, interim price declines can raise the overall return earned from holding a bond to maturity.) What About Private Credit? This is today’s other FAQ, along with the one about spreads. A lot of people have questions about private credit, which makes one wonder how the sector can be seeing such strong capital inflows. My responses generally go like this: •

和任何事物一样,私募信贷也各有利弊。最明显的好处是,为了弥补流动性的缺失,私募信贷提供的收益率高于公开信贷。其次是私募信贷管理人能够提供带杠杆的基金(以及相应的回报),而大多数公开信贷基金做不到这一点。主要弊端源于贷款缺乏市场,因而流动性差,持仓难以主动管理。此外,由于没有市场,私募信贷实际上无法按市价估值。最后一个弊端是,私募信贷的投资费用高于公开信贷,通常还包含业绩提成。

Like anything else, there are pros and cons. The most obvious pro is that, to compensate for the lack of liquidity, private credit offers higher yields than public credit. The second is that private credit managers are able to offer funds (and thus returns) that are levered, which isn’t true of most public credit funds. The main negative stems from the absence of a market for the loans, and thus their illiquidity and the difficulty of actively managing holdings. Further, because there’s no market, private credit can’t actually mark to market. A final negative is that the fees are higher on private credit investing than on public credit, often including an incentive fee.

那不做按市值计价、账面波动因此很低,这个问题怎么讲?要说私人贷款的价值没有起伏,显然不现实。可换个角度看,

What about the lack of marking to market, and the resulting low level of volatility? It’s obviously unrealistic to think the value of private loans doesn’t fluctuate. But on the other hand,

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很多人觉得不按市价计价是个优点,因为这样他们就能声称在困境中自己的投资没怎么跌。私募信贷的经理人本该根据基本面按实际状况给资产估值,但这显然比按市价估值波动更小,也更不客观。可话说回来,公开资产的价格非要反映投资者心理的每一次起伏吗?不按市价计价或许不太现实,但也未尝不是件好事。(投资公开证券的人要是有类似体验,大可不看报纸,把券商账单扔进抽屉里,但这种做法怕是要被骂不负责任。)

it seems many people consider the non-marking to market a plus, in that they can report that their investments didn’t go down much in a difficult environment. Private credit managers are supposed to mark their holdings to reality based on fundamentals, but that’s clearly less volatile (and less objective) than marking to a market. On the other hand, is it desirable that public asset prices reflect every up and down of investor psychology? Not marking to market may be unrealistic, but it may be welcome. (Investors in public securities could have the same experience if they refused to read the newspapers and tossed their brokerage statements in the drawer, but such behavior would be called irresponsible.) •

对我而言,关于私人信贷最重要的一点是,它主要是在 2011 年之后,为了应对全球金融危机后银行放贷活动的减少而兴起的。自那以后,经济经历了异常漫长的一段没有衰退的年份(如果你不把 2020 年年中爆发并迅速逆转的那场与新冠疫情相关的两个月衰退算在内的话)。套用沃伦·巴菲特的话,私人信贷的潮水从未退去过,这意味着我们还没有机会看到它的缺陷。在我看来,主要的缺陷在于,一些管理人可能急于吸收资本并投入运作,以便他们能再度募集更多资金,从而放松了信贷标准,未能要求足够的安全边际。如果经济和市场再度经历艰难时期,我们就会看到后果。注意:这不是对贷款本身的泛泛担忧,只是对个别管理人行为的一个疑问。

For me, the most important observation about private credit is that it mostly emerged since 2011 in response to banks’ reduced lending activity after the Global Financial Crisis. Since then, the economy has witnessed an unusually long string of years without a recession (if you don’t count the two-month Covid 19-related recession that flared up and was reversed in mid-2020). To paraphrase Warren Buffett, the tide has never gone out on private credit, meaning we haven’t had an opportunity to see its flaws. As far as I’m concerned, the main one is the possibility that some managers have been in such a hurry to scoop up capital and put it to work – so they could come back for more – that they relaxed their credit standards and failed to demand a sufficient margin of safety. If there’s ever another difficult period in the economy and the market, we’ll see the result. Note: this isn’t a sweeping concern about the loans themselves, just a question about the behavior of individual managers.

与上面提到的(以及缺乏按市值计价这一点)相关的是,我们不知道困难环境如果真的到来时会怎样。经理们有没有能力上限,不把估值标得过高?基金回报忽视基本面恶化,这合理吗?经理们能不能靠给予宽限和“把罐子踢到路上”来回避承认信用困难?能拖多久?在此期间,基金投资者会不会受到不良影响?既然私募信贷经理大多不受监管,真相会浮出水面吗?哪种真相?这类问题同样只有退潮时才有答案。

Connected to the above (and to the absence of marking to market), we don’t know what’ll happen if and when a difficult environment does arrive. Is there a limit on the ability of managers to keep marks too high? Is it right for fund returns to ignore deteriorated fundamentals? Can managers avoid recognizing credit difficulties by granting forbearances and “kicking the can down the road”? For how long? Are there ill effects on fund investors in the meantime? Since private credit managers are mostly unregulated, will the truth come out? Which truth? Questions like these also are answered only when the tide goes out.

最后,我不认为私募信贷构成系统性风险。自全球金融危机(GFC)以来,人们就一直在警惕系统性风险,当时陷入困境的银行把麻烦传染给其他银行,拖垮了它们。我的看法是,私募信贷的风险不具备系统性,因为(a)私募贷款组合及其持有者的杠杆率远不及 2007-2008 年时的银行,而且(b)彼此之间的关联度或者说“对手方风险”没那么高——贷款持有者不像金融危机前的银行那样互相出售违约保护和其他对冲工具。也有些人认为,部分私募信贷持有者叠加了多层杠杆,这在下行情景下可能放大风险,但我无从知晓。

Lastly, I don’t believe private credit represents a systemic risk. People have been on the lookout for systemic risk ever since the GFC, in which troubled banks brought trouble to other banks and took them down. My belief is that the risk in private credit isn’t systemic, since (a) private loan portfolios and their owners aren’t levered nearly as much as banks were in 2007-08 and (b) there isn’t the same level of interconnectedness, or “counterparty risk,” since the holders haven’t sold each other default protection and other forms of hedging, like banks did before the GFC. There are those who believe some holders of private credit have multiple layers of leverage, which could increase the risk in a downside scenario, but I have no way of knowing.

对我而言,最终结论是,考虑到各自的优劣,私人信贷相对于公开信贷的超额回报率大致是公允的。额外回报固然是好事,但流动性不足及由此带来的主动管理持仓困难这一负面因素,确实需要认真权衡。在其他条件相同的情况下,我建议两者搭配使用。

信贷与股票之比较

我最近一次就股票估值发表看法——主要参照标普 500 指数——是在今年 1 月的备忘录《论泡沫观察》中。简单来说,根据历史数据,从类似如今的市盈率水平出发,标普 500 指数此后十年的年均回报率历来在 -2% 到 2% 之间。

The bottom line for me is that the return premium on private credit relative to public credit seems roughly fair given the merits. Extra return is a good thing, but the downside related to the lack of liquidity and resulting difficulty in actively managing holdings is a real consideration. All else equal, I would suggest employing a combination of the two. Credit Versus Equities I’ve written about equity valuations – primarily referencing the Standard & Poor’s 500 – as recently as this January in my memo On Bubble Watch. Suffice it to say that, according to past data, from p/e ratios like today’s, the S&P has historically produced ten-year returns averaging between -2% and 2% per year,

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一些投资银行也表达了类似的预期,低至中个位数。显然,当前信贷市场的预期回报要高得多。1 月 27 日,《华尔街日报》头版文章写道:“至少从一项指标来看,股票市场的吸引力已降至互联网泡沫时期以来的最低点。”这里并非指市盈率偏高,而是指 10 年期美国国债收益率高于标普 500 指数的“盈利收益率”(即市盈率的倒数)。这并不能证明未来几年债券将跑赢股票,但却是又一个论据。而如果国债收益率有望超过标普 500 指数,高收益债券的收益率优势将更为明显(假设信用损失不超过历史水平)。正如我最近在其他备忘录中所写,当前提供的收益率水平意味着信贷投资的回报将高于标普 500 指数,且这些回报是合同约定的,因此波动性和不确定性要小得多。尽管过去两年市场情绪从悲观转向乐观导致回报率收缩,甚至考虑到当前利差较窄,这一结论依然成立。

and some investment banks have expressed expectations that are similarly in the low to mid-single digits. Obviously, today’s expected returns on credit are considerably higher. On January 27, an article on the front page of The Wall Street Journal said the following: “Stocks haven’t looked this unattractive, by at least one measure, since the aftermath of the dot-com era.” This wasn’t a reference to the elevated p/e ratio, but to the fact that the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note is higher than the “earnings yield” on the S&P 500 stock index. (The earnings yield is the ratio of earnings to price, the inverse of the p/e ratio.) This doesn’t prove that bonds are going to beat stocks in the years ahead, but it’s one more argument. And if Treasurys are poised to out-yield the S&P 500, high yield bonds will do so to an even greater extent (assuming credit losses don’t exceed the historical experience). As I’ve written in other memos recently, the current level of offered yields implies higher returns from credit than the S&P 500, with returns that are contractual and thus subject to much less variability and uncertainty. This is true despite the return contraction that has been brought on by the swing from pessimism to optimism over the last two years, and even given today’s narrow spreads. *

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结论很明确:眼下信贷的性价比优于股票(以标普 500 指数代表股票而言),即便按当前利差水平看也是如此。信贷如今算不上白送,但能带来可观的绝对回报,相对定价也合理。尽管收益率利差收窄,上述判断依然成立。这些观察不只适用于高收益债,也适用于优先级贷款、夹层债务、资产支持贷款、CLO(贷款抵押债券)和私募信贷。

我们当然更愿意在收益率更高、利差更宽的时点出手,将来或许会有这样的机会……也可能没有。但这一偏好本身,并不构成当下不增配信贷的理由。

2025 年 3 月 6 日

The bottom line is that credit presently offers a better deal than equities (to the extent the S&P 500 is representative of equities), even at today’s spreads. Credit isn’t a giveaway today, but it offers healthy absolute returns and is fairly priced in relative terms. This is true despite the narrowness of yield spreads. These observations aren’t limited to high yield bonds. They also apply to senior loans, mezzanine debt, asset-backed loans, CLOs, and private lending. We’d rather buy at higher yields and wider spreads, and we may get a chance to do so . . . or not. But that preference in itself isn’t a reason for not increasing allocations to credit today. March 6, 2025

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