苏格兰抵押贷款:在快速变化的世界中投资异类(《信托》杂志,2022年春季刊)

2022 · 文章 · 原文约 3217 词
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苏格兰抵押贷款信托:在快速变化的世界中投资异类

Scottish Mortgage: investing in outliers in a fast-changing world

詹姆斯·安德森 – 投资经理

劳伦斯·伯恩斯 – 苏格兰抵押贷款信托副经理

James Anderson – Investment manager Lawrence Burns – Deputy manager, Scottish Mortgage

投资经理如何才能想象未来,并适应一个快速变化的世界?苏格兰抵押贷款投资信托(Scottish Mortgage Investment Trust)的联席经理詹姆斯·安德森与副经理劳伦斯·伯恩斯分享了一些临别感言。

How can investment managers imagine the future and adapt to a fast-changing world? James Anderson, joint manager of Scottish Mortgage Investment Trust, shares some parting thoughts with deputy manager Lawrence Burns.

詹姆斯和劳伦斯在潘缪尔故居的阅览室中。摄影:罗伯特·奥默罗德。

James and Lawrence in the reading room at Panmure House Photography by Robert Ormerod

请记住,投资价值可能下跌,您可能无法收回投资本金。本文最初发表于 Baillie Gifford 2022 年春季刊《信托》杂志。

Please remember that the value of an investment can fall and you may not get back the amount invested. This article originally featured in Baillie Gifford’s Spring 2022 issue of  Trust  magazine.

爱丁堡皇家大道上的潘缪尔故居是亚当·斯密从 1778 年居住直至 1790 年去世的地方。正是在潘缪尔的阅览室里,斯密被认为完成了《道德情操论》和《国富论》的最终版本。这些写于工业革命初期的著作,是我们现代理解人类与市场相关行为的核心。

Panmure House on Edinburgh’s Royal Mile is where Adam Smith lived from 1778 until he died in 1790. It’s in the reading room at Panmure that Smith is thought to have completed the final editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. These books, written at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, are core to our modern understanding of human behaviour in relation to markets.

在这个适合讨论第一原理的环境里,《信托》杂志将詹姆斯·安德森和劳伦斯·伯恩斯聚在了一起。詹姆斯将于今年 4 月卸任苏格兰抵押贷款信托的经理。他自 2000 年起担任该信托的经理,自 2015 年起与汤姆·斯莱特共同担任联席经理。在此期间,詹姆斯为股东带来了非凡的回报,并开创了该信托在转型增长型公司以及私募股权投资方面的策略。劳伦斯去年加入苏格兰抵押贷款信托,担任副经理。他在 Baillie Gifford 与詹姆斯密切合作了十年,负责一系列国际投资组合,并且由于专注于转型增长型公司,他深谙苏格兰抵押贷款信托的投资理念。

In this setting, conducive to the discussion of first principles, Trust brought together James Anderson and Lawrence Burns. James steps down as manager of Scottish Mortgage in April this year. He has been manager of the Trust since 2000 and, since 2015, joint manager with Tom Slater. James has delivered exceptional returns for shareholders during this time and pioneered the Trust’s approach to both transformational growth companies and its investments in private companies. Lawrence joined Scottish Mortgage as deputy manager last year. He has worked closely with James at Baillie Gifford for a decade on a range of international investment portfolios and, given his focus on transformative growth companies, is imbued with Scottish Mortgage’s philosophy.

詹姆斯和劳伦斯坐下来探讨了在技术主导转型的时代进行增长型投资的想法。

James and Lawrence sat down to explore ideas on growth investing in an era of technology-led transformation.

詹姆斯·安德森:劳伦斯,你觉得这么多年来我们讨论得最多的话题是什么?

James Anderson: What would you say is the topic we’ve discussed most over the years, Lawrence?

劳伦斯·伯恩斯:我会说是变化的本质,以及我们应该去哪里寻找变化。我们如何确保自己充分抓住了变化的潜力?我一直很惊讶,对苏格兰抵押贷款信托业绩贡献最大的股票,往往是我们基于概率对未来价值所做的计算在技术上最不准确的股票,因为我们低估了潜在的上行空间。我们很多讨论都集中在如何确保我们充分理解公司可能拥有的各种潜力上。

Lawrence Burns: I’d say it’s the nature of change and where we need to look for change. How do we make sure we’re fully grasping its potential? I’m always struck that the biggest contributors to Scottish Mortgage’s performance are often the stocks where our calculations of future value based on probability have technically been most wrong because we have underestimated the potential upside. A lot of our discussion has been about making sure we fully grasp the many kinds of potential that companies have.

JA是的,这就是想象一家伟大公司内在可能性的难度。

JAYes, it’s the difficulty of imagining the possibilities inherent in a great company.

LB这是更广泛的投资挑战。你如何把握住某种被指数级力量推动、因此在未来会看起来截然不同的东西?过去 20 年涌现的某些商业模式的性质,使得在公司发展早期就更难理解其全貌。

LBThat’s the broader investment challenge. How do you grasp something that’s being propelled by exponential forces and will therefore look radically different in the future? The nature of some of the business models emerging over the last 20 years has made it even more difficult to wrap one’s head around that at the early stages of a company’s life.

JA我们很幸运能够成功投资的绝大部分,都是稳定且可见的指数级变化的果实。用一个棋盘类比(第一个格子放一粒米,第二个格子放两粒,然后持续加倍),我们买入的位置大概在棋盘上的第四到第六格。在我看来,思考这对未来的影响,其风险和概率都比大多数投资要低、要高。

JAMost of what we’ve been lucky enough to be successful in investing in is the fruit of steady and visible exponential changes. In a chessboard analogy [where one grain of rice is placed on the first square, two on the second, and you keep doubling as you go], we’re buying somewhere around squares four to six on the board. Thinking about how that plays out is, to my mind, lower risk and higher probability than most investments.

如果早在 1980 年代初期有人就将摩尔定律(预测计算机处理能力每两年翻一番)视为既定事实,那么在我的职业生涯余下时间里,很可能也在你的余下职业生涯里,你都可以推断出这会产生影响。当然,会有一些意外,但也有一些相当明显的、顺应摩尔定律的投资机会。

If one had just taken Moore’s Law [which predicts that computer processing power doubles every two years] as read in the early 1980s, for the rest of my career and probably the rest of your career as well, you could work out that this would have an impact. Sure, there would be some surprises but there are also some quite obvious investments to make in line with Moore’s Law.

LB我认为确实如此。我们的困难在于想象那种变化的猛烈程度,以及它会把你带向何方。作为基金经理,我们想要理解和阐明“如何”发生,而不是仅仅说:“嗯,我们不知道,但很可能运气不错。”

LBI think that’s true. The difficulty we have is imagining that ferocity of change and where it takes you. As fund managers, we want to understand and articulate the ‘how’ rather than just saying: “Well, we don’t know but it’s probably going to be fortuitous.”

Industry problems

Industry problems

JA这真的既不是世界的问题,也不是技术的问题,而是基金管理的问题吗?人们把它看作一项分析性任务,而不是想象力和创造性任务?

JAIs this really neither a problem of the world nor of technologies, but of fund management? That people see it as an analytical rather than an imaginative and creative task?

LB这个问题的根源在于进化生物学。人类大脑的运作方式,不太善于处理指数级变化、不确定性以及宽泛的结果区间。在此基础上,我们又叠加了各种机构,而这些机构非但没有减轻某些固有的偏见,反而让情况更糟。如果你看看股票市场是如何运作的,以及我们行业是如何建立的,就会发现它与回报产生的地点和方式并不匹配。

LBThe roots of that problem lie in evolutionary biology. The way humans are wired doesn’t cope well with the nature of exponential change, uncertainty and wide ranges of outcomes. On top of that, we’ve layered on institutions that, rather than mitigate some of those innate biases, make them worse. If you look at how stock markets work and how as an industry we’ve set ourselves up, it doesn’t match the characteristics of where and how returns arise.

JA确实如此,但你把责任归咎于人类进化和生物学,未免太纵容基金管理行业了。在我职业生涯的大部分时间里,我们很多人都坚持认为,CFA(特许金融分析师)协会之类的机构让这个行业“更高效”,而你可以利用的低效率只是短期的波动。现在,在我职业生涯的这个阶段,我可以问一个问题:在将基金管理打造成一门职业的过程中,我们是否反而让它变得极度低效?但这当然为那些准备以不同方式思考的人留下了广阔的空间。

JAThat’s for sure, but you’re indulging fund management too much by blaming human evolution and biology. For much of my career, many of us have adhered to the view that the CFA [Chartered Financial Analyst] Institute and the like made the industry ‘more efficient’, and that the inefficiencies you could exploit are short-term blips. Now, at this stage in my career, I’m allowed to ask whether in the search to make fund management a profession, we haven’t made it deeply inefficient. But that of course leaves the field wide open for those prepared to think differently.

LB它让那些在基金管理行业工作的人变得非常高效——这正是该体系围绕的构建核心——而不是为了投资者的最终结果。这就是为什么尽管没有发挥核心作用,它却一直持续存在。基金管理的很多低效率源于行业的收费结构。大多数客户根据管理资产规模的百分比向我们支付费用,无论业绩如何。因此,主要目标是保住资产。而保住资产的方法就是通过不冒大风险、紧跟指数来平滑掉表现不佳的时期。

LBIt’s made it very efficient for those who work in fund management, which is what it’s been built around, rather than for outcomes for investors. That’s why it’s been sustained, despite not performing its core role. A lot of the inefficiencies of fund management stem from the industry’s fee structures. We get paid a percentage of assets under management by most clients, no matter what the performance. And so the main aim is to keep the assets. And the way you keep assets is by smoothing out periods of underperformance by not taking big risks, by hugging the index.

而且,如果你确实像我们所知道的那样,跑赢了很多,最常见的反应是客户往往会拿走资金。因此,你可以理解为什么在基金管理行业内部存在大量保守行为。

And if you do, as we know, outperform by quite a lot, the most common reaction is that clients will often take the money away. You can see why therefore a lot of conservative behaviours exist within fund management.

摩尔定律很可能会持续很长时间,其影响会扩展到新的领域

You have a very high probability of Moore’s Law continuing for a long time with its impact expanding to new areas

JA当你表现出色时资金反而被抽走,这是一个很大的变化。过去并非如此,尤其是在 1990 年代,当时建立业务的方式其实就是表现出色。这些都是重要的问题,我们不应该回避。议程实际上并非由传统的基金管理行业设定,而是由投资银行和对冲基金设定的,它们交易并从交易中获利的倾向非常强烈。但另一个我们无法忽视的更阴暗的问题是,各种类型的基金管理公司在多大程度上是被当作企业来运营的,由那些设法让这些公司成为持久、稳定的利润创造者的人管理,而不是专注于基金管理这门手艺本身。我不确定大多数基金管理公司是否真的致力于为客户带来超额回报。

JAThis taking away of money when you do well is a big change. It didn’t use to happen, particularly not in the 1990s, when the way to build businesses was actually to do well. These are important issues that we shouldn’t edit away. The agenda is not actually set by the traditional fund management industry but by investment banks and hedge funds whose proclivity to trade and profit from trade is very strong. But the other even darker part that we can’t ignore is the question of how far fund management firms of all types are run as businesses, and by people managing to make those firms big, consistent profit generators, rather than focusing on the craft of fund management. I’m not sure that most fund management firms are really dedicated to producing outsized returns for their clients.

LB两点想法:第一,具有讽刺意味的是,基金管理公司追求回报的稳定性,却对更广泛的市场、公司创建和社会产生了严重后果。另一个有趣的观点是,人们假设随着你在投资界资历越来越深,你会离公司和分析越来越远。我一直觉得这很奇怪。按理说,你在基金管理公司资历变深是因为你做了好的分析和好的投资。那为什么还要让这个人离开分析公司的实际工作呢?

LBTwo reflections: one is that there’s an irony in fund management firms seeking consistency of returns because that has grave consequences for the broader market, company creation and society. The other interesting one is the assumption that as you become more senior in the investment world, you move further away from the companies and the analysis. I’ve always found that bizarre. Presumably, you become senior in a fund management organisation by doing good analysis and good investment. So why take that person away from doing the actual job of company analysis?

A golden period?

A golden period?

JA你如何看待转型增长型投资的演变?我们只是处在一个黄金时期吗?你认为方法的演进,甚至是革命,对苏格兰抵押贷款信托的未来至关重要吗?

JAHow do you feel about the evolution of transformative growth investing? Are we simply in a golden period? Do you think an evolution or even a revolution in methodology will be vital for Scottish Mortgage’s future?

LB这是黄金时期吗?正如亚利桑那州立大学亨德里克·贝森宾德教授的研究所示,产生超额回报的始终是一小部分公司。回顾这些公司的本质,我们不一定认为它们是变革性的,因为我们被它们今天的样子蒙蔽了双眼。但它们确实是变革性的,只是方式不同而已。

LBIs it a golden period? As research from Professor Hendrik Bessembinder at Arizona State University shows, it’s always been a small number of companies that have produced outsized returns. Looking back at the nature of those companies, we wouldn’t necessarily view them as transformative because we’re so blinkered by what they are today. But they were transformative, just in different ways.

大约十年前,我们讨论过消费互联网之后会出现什么,因为我们意识到这些业务很特殊。它们之所以特殊,有不同的原因。一是互联网技术推动了很多变化。二是这种变化如何演变的规律,这很不同,也更引人注目。机会集也更加全球化,或者至少比以前更快地走向全球化。

About a decade ago, we had a conversation about what comes after the consumer internet because we realised these businesses were special. And they were special for different reasons. One was that internet technology pushed lots of change. The second was about the economics of how that change played out. This was different and more spectacular. The opportunity sets were also more global or at least went global faster than before.

同样让我印象深刻的是,我们可能仍然处于看到这些计算技术影响的早期阶段。到目前为止,被这种变化颠覆的行业——零售、广告和媒体——相对较小,但变化似乎正在向更大、更深刻的领域蔓延。特别是,我想到的是医疗保健。

It also strikes me that we may actually still be early in seeing the impact of these computing technologies. So far, the set of industries upended by this change – retail, advertising and media – is relatively small, but there are larger and more profound areas that change now appears to be spreading to. In particular, I’m thinking about healthcare.

我看到生物学的很多进步都与摩尔定律和计算技术的产出有关。能源转型提供了另一个在未来 20 年值得思考的巨大且独特的领域。因此,摩尔定律很可能会持续很长时间,其影响会扩展到新的领域,同时还有一个甚至不依赖于此的明显增长引擎,这非常有意义。所以,现在看起来可能有点黄金时期的感觉,但我希望 20 年后回顾时,它会显得不那么特别。

I see a lot of progress in biology as being linked to the outputs of Moore’s Law and computing technology. The energy transition also provides a further large and distinct area to think about over the next 20 years. So, you have a very high probability of Moore’s Law continuing for a long time with its impact expanding to new areas, and at the same time a second engine of growth that isn’t obviously even dependent on that, which is quite meaningful. So things might appear a little bit golden now, but I would hope they will appear less special when we look back at them in 20 years.

JA你认为是否会出现需要改变苏格兰抵押贷款信托投资方法的线索或提示,无论改变是多么轻微或剧烈?我的观察是,市场往往不是周期性的,而是长期地处于有效和无效的持久阶段。很多人错误地认为市场会回到以前的状态,这似乎极不可能。你如何确保我们持续更新我们的判断?

JADo you think there will be clues or prompts towards the need to change the investment approach of Scottish Mortgage, however modestly or radically? My observation is that markets tend not to have cycles but very prolonged periods of working and not working. A lot of people make the mistake of thinking that the market will revert to how it was before, which seems profoundly unlikely. How do you make sure that we continue to update our prognosis?

LB我们的应对方式从不固化、始终在进化,这一点很有帮助。它定下了一种基调:无论明示还是暗示,都不存在一个永远适用的答案。投资是由现实世界中正在发生的事情以及其他金融市场参与者的行为共同塑造的,而这种进化的能力恰恰可以成为你的优势。不过,我怀疑某些方面会证明是持久的差异。苏格兰抵押贷款公司成功的一个核心要素是真正着眼长期,如果这一点发生变化,我会感到意外。我看不到大多数投资者变得更长期——实际上,我看到他们正走向相反的方向。

LBIt helps that our response has never been static, it’s always been evolving. That helps set the tone that, whether implicitly or explicitly, there isn’t one answer that works forever. Investing is shaped by what’s happening in the real world and by what other financial market participants are doing, and that ability to evolve can effectively be your edge. I suspect some aspects will, though, prove to be enduring differences. One of the core elements of Scottish Mortgage’s success is being genuinely long term, and I’d be surprised if that changes. I don’t see most investors becoming more long term. In fact, I see them going the opposite way.

关于我们的第二点是,我们愿意相当频繁地犯错,或者接受犯错是必然发生的,这在行为上对人来说非常困难。更有趣的问题是,你还能做些什么来放大我们自认为拥有的一些优势?首先要认识到,这不能仅仅来自我们个人,我们如何将更多的外部洞察引入到我们的流程中?

The second thing about us is our willingness to be wrong a fair bit. Or to accept that that’s going to happen, which is behaviourally very difficult for people to do. The more interesting question is what else can you do to magnify some of the advantages we think we have. Starting with the view that it can’t just come from us as individuals, how do we get more outside insights into our process?

我们有学术联系,有与公司的关系。但我仍然认为这些关系还没有达到应有的水平,而且在与学术界合作方面,我们还有很长的路要走。我不确定答案是什么,但如果十年后我们做的和现在一模一样,我会感到失望。

We’ve got the academic links. We’ve got the relationships with companies. But I still don’t think these relationships are where they could be, and I still think we have further to go in terms of what we could do with academia. I’m not sure what the answer is, but I would be disappointed if in 10 years we were doing exactly the same as we are now.

个人的角色

The role of individuals

JA劳伦斯,我们的经验难道不正是这样吗:与其说是帮助企业,不如说主要是去支持并识别那些值得我们追随的个人?那么,我们是否因此需要帮助这些人创立公司,而不是等他们的公司已经存在后才投资?我们试图做的,难道不是赋能那些极具天赋的个人及其文化吗?

JAIsn’t it really our experience, Lawrence, that rather than helping companies, it’s mostly about backing and identifying individuals to follow? Don’t we, therefore, need to help these people invent the companies, rather than investing in their company once it’s already in existence? Isn’t enabling deeply talented individuals and cultures what we’re trying to do?

LB有些人对个人的角色出人意料地不以为然,也许是出于对“英雄叙事”的警惕。但从我们的经验来看,个人绝对并且极其关键。即使特斯拉在埃隆·马斯克之前就已存在,但如果缺少这个人,很难说特斯拉会以现在的方式存在,或者汽车行业不会比现在落后十年。有时候,可能是一个组织中的一两个人,但通常就是一个人。

LBSome are surprisingly dismissive of the role of individuals, perhaps out of wariness of the ‘hero narrative’. But from our experience, individuals have been absolutely and utterly crucial. Even though it existed before Elon Musk, it’s hard to argue that Tesla would have existed in the way that it does now or that the auto industry wouldn’t be 10 years behind where it is now if it wasn’t for that one individual. Sometimes it can be one or two people from an organisation, but it tends to be one.

JA把伟大的创意变成可投资的公司,个人领导力或小群体领导力至关重要。

JAIn terms of turning great ideas into investible companies, it’s individual leadership or small group leadership that’s critically important.

LB是的。对于公司来说,你需要对抗现状。而这样做既是身体上的也是情感上的消耗。这让我想问:詹姆斯,这对你来说有多难?我猜你经历过一些相当艰难的战役。我感兴趣的是,你从哪里获得了打这些仗所需的信念,因为你一直很谦逊,从未对任何事情宣称过百分之百的信念。然而,我们有时需要奋力一搏,却无法确知我们推动的方向是否正确。

LBYes. With companies, you need to go against the status quo. And doing that can be both physically and emotionally exhausting. Which prompts me to ask: James, how difficult was it for you? I’m assuming there have been some quite hard battles. I’m interested in where you got the conviction necessary to fight those battles because you’ve always been humble and never claimed 100 per cent conviction in anything. Yet we sometimes need to fight quite hard without it being possible to know for sure the direction we are pushing is the right one.

从我们的经验来看,个人绝对并且极其关键。

From our experience, individuals have been absolutely and utterly crucial

JA这对我来说是个公允的描述,但找到方法让未来的进化变得更容易至关重要。我想我感觉到,如果给一个相当长的时期,胜算会充分地向我们倾斜。但我们确实享受到了深深的运气,因为我们做的大部分事情很快开始奏效,随着证据表明我们的方法在起作用,事情变得更容易了。我非常强烈地认为,我们最需要的是继续前进的能力,而且我们必须做自己。我们必须学习和适应。我想亚当·斯密会赞同这一点。我会对被锁定在现在所做的事情上感到恐惧,就像被过去所做的事情束缚一样。这听起来合理吗?

JAThat is a fair account of how it has been from my perspective, but it’s crucial to find ways to make evolving easier in the future. I suppose I felt that, if given a reasonably long period, the odds were being shifted sufficiently in our favour. But we did enjoy a profound stroke of luck in that most of what we were doing began to work fairly soon, and it became easier as evidence emerged that our approach was working. I feel extremely strongly that what we need most of all is the ability to move on, and that we have to be ourselves. We have to learn and adapt. I think Adam Smith would have approved. I would be as horrified at being locked into what we’re doing now as being stuck with what we were doing in the past. Does that seem reasonable?

LB是的,我认为合理。

LBYes, I think it does.

JA抱歉,我不该问是否“合理”。做人讲理是一件可怕的事情!

JASorry, I shouldn’t ask if it seems ‘reasonable’. Being reasonable is an awful thing to be!

Transformational thinking

Transformational thinking

LB过去一年左右,我们一直在谈论公司对社会的影响。让我突然想到的是,如果你看看苏格兰抵押贷款投资组合中最大的持股,像 Moderna、特斯拉、Illumina、ASML 和 Ginkgo Bioworks 这样的公司对社会的影响是深远的。这与过去二十年通常的情况不同。是因为我们选择持有的公司性质有些不同吗?感觉我们的持股之间比以前有更多的相关性。如果一家公司在投资上是异类,那它在影响力上往往也是异类。

LBWe’ve talked over the last year or so about the impact that companies have on society. It strikes me that if you look at the biggest holdings in the Scottish Mortgage portfolio, the societal impact of companies such as Moderna, Tesla, Illumina, ASML and Ginkgo Bioworks has been profound. This is different from what has been usual over the last 20 years. Is it because the nature of the companies that we’re choosing to own is a bit different? It feels there’s more correlation in terms of our holdings than in the past. If a company is an outlier in investment terms, it’s increasingly often an outlier in impact terms.

JA这更多地反映了这样一个事实:世界正在发生的革命正进入这些公司产生更深层影响的领域。20 年前有类似的机会吗?当然有。但我认为现在投资组合中广泛的社会影响力是值得庆幸的。社会意义上的影响力,就算不是更集中,也同样是集中在少数公司身上。我们应该为能声称拥有如此有益的影响而感到无比高兴。我们应该大声宣扬这一点,而不是纠结于那些细节数字,这些数字常常具有误导性。在计算上以及我们对一家公司对社会是好是坏的认知水平上的误差范围如此之大,以至于对于绝大多数公司,我认为我们永远无法确信自己是在帮助还是阻碍。

JAIt’s more a reflection of the fact that the revolutions that are happening in the world are moving into areas where these companies have that deeper impact. Were there similar opportunities available 20 years ago? Yes, of course. But I think the broad scale of societal impact in the portfolio now is something to be revelled in. Impact in a societal sense is just as much, if not more, concentrated in a small number of companies. We should be inordinately pleased that we can claim such a beneficial impact. We should be shouting that from the rooftops rather than obsessing over detailed sums, which are anyway often misleading. The margins of error on calculation and on our level of understanding of whether a company is societally good or bad are so great that with the vast majority of companies I don’t think we can ever have confidence as to whether we’re helping or not helping.

LB我认为,除了我们判断能力有限之外,还增加了复杂性的因素是任何判断都带有纯粹的主观性。

LBI suppose what adds a complication beyond our ability to judge is the sheer subjectivity of any judgment.

JA是的,这种主观性被包装在计算中,当你逐个审视时,这些计算如此可疑。主观是关键词——在我看来,这是伪科学。

JAYes, which is dressed up in calculations that are so doubtful when you look at them one by one. Subjective is the word – it’s mock-science, to my mind.

做人讲理是一件可怕的事情!

Being reasonable is an awful thing to be!

LB你觉得你自己在方法论上最大的飞跃是什么?这些飞跃的触发因素有没有什么共性?

LBWhat do you feel have been your own biggest leaps in methodology? Are there any commonalities in terms of what sparked them?

JA这是个有趣的问题。我认为,我们努力向世界上最聪明的人(无论是学术界还是公司里)学习,这一点极其重要。我们必须保持这种外部视角。我认为在与世界互动方面,我们还有很多事情要做,而且我们现在已经足够了解该和谁谈了。

JAThat’s an interesting one. I think our efforts to learn from the smartest people in the world, both in academia and in companies, were profoundly important. We absolutely need to keep that external focus. I think there is a whole lot more to do to engage with the world, and we know enough about who to talk to now.

你需要一定程度的谦逊——这不是基金管理行业的典型特征——来承认我们对事物的理解非常平庸,并且我们可以学习。同样,也要对我们预测未来的能力保持谦逊。

And you need a degree of humility – not a characteristic of the fund management industry – to admit that we are very mediocre in our understanding, and we can learn. It’s also about being humble about our ability to predict the future.

LB给你留下最深刻印象的领导者有什么特质?他们之间有没有共性?

LBWhat are the characteristics of the leaders who have most impressed you? Are there commonalities that they share?

JA我认为绝对有。首要的一点是思想独立,这对于公司再造和公司创建的过程至关重要。我希望,在我们自己小小的方式中,当我们思考投资管理相关的那些信条是否真的正确时,我们也在展现这一点。然后,我们用从学术界和其他公司那里得到的反馈来检验这些想法。

JAI think there absolutely are. The one above all is independence of mind, which is critical for the process of reinvention and the process of company creation. I hope, in our own small way, that that’s what we also demonstrate when we think about whether the nostrums surrounding investment management are really correct. We then test that against what we get back from the likes of academia and other companies.

你想看到这种思想独立体现在公司的性质及其运作方式中——即公司的文化。对我来说,最有力的例子是亚马逊。因为杰夫·贝索斯,如你所知,非常乐意向外部世界和公司内部阐述这种独立性。

You’re wanting to see that independence of mind expressed in the nature of the company and the way it conducts itself – the culture of that company. To me, the strongest example of this was Amazon. Because Jeff Bezos, as you well know, is very happy to try to articulate that independence both to the outside world and to the company.

实验的概念在亚马逊非常重要,因此有了“双披萨原则”(组建小到可以用两个大披萨喂饱的团队),其核心理念是:沟通不应过多,团队应拥有绝对自主权,项目领导者应涵盖所有方面。我认为其他一切都源于这种思想独立,以及它所植根的深刻智慧和对世界的思考。你呢?

The notion of experimentation has been deeply important at Amazon, hence the ‘two-pizza principle’ [forming teams small enough to be fed by two large pizzas] based on the notion that you shouldn’t have too much communication, that teams should have absolute autonomy and leaders of projects should cover all the aspects. I think everything else follows from that independence of mind and the deep intelligence and the reflection on the world that it stems from. What about you?

LB我认为思想独立和逆流而上的能力是一个原则。另一个是渴望从多样化的来源不断学习。我们在一些接触过的、最鼓舞人心的创始人身上看到了这一点。他们永远试图了解别人在做什么、在想什么。他们不一定想全盘接受这些想法,但他们确实想看看从中能发现什么原则、什么趋势。我认为这对我们的许多创始人来说非常重要。

LBI think independence of mind and the ability to go against the crowd is one principle. Another is a desire to keep learning from a diverse range of sources. We see that in some of the most inspirational founders that we speak to. They’re permanently trying to be plugged into what other people are doing and what they’re thinking. They don’t want to take those ideas wholesale necessarily, but they do want to see what principles, what trends they can ascertain from that. And I think that’s been quite important to a number of our founders.

JA而且我认为这与一种永久的“不满足状态”相关联,不是吗?我不确定我们谈到的那些人中有谁会说过:“哦,我们已经解决了这个问题。”他们总是在追求更多。这就是为什么这些人在外界看来如此令人不安,也是为什么他们将继续保持如此关键的重要性。

JAAnd I think that’s linked, isn’t it, with a permanent state of dissatisfaction. I’m not sure that any of the people that we’re talking to ever say, “Oh, we’ve solved this.” There’s a constant search for more. That’s why many of these people are so disconcerting to the outside world and why they’ll remain so critically important.