让狂野喧嚣开始吧

2022 · 随笔 · 原文约 6694 词
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让狂欢开始吧 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 * 观点 (接近尾声)美国第一场泡沫盛宴:房地产、股票、债券和大宗商品 执行摘要 发达国家所有 2 西格玛水平的股票泡沫都已回归趋势。 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 | 2022 年 1 月 20 日

LET THE WILD RUMPUS BEGIN JEREMY GRANTHAM * VIEWPOINTS (Approaching the End of) The First U.S. Bubble Extravaganza: Housing, Equities, Bonds, and Commodities EXECUTIVE SUMMARY All 2-sigma equity bubbles in developed Jeremy Grantham | January 20, 2022 countries have broken back to trend.

但在那之前,有少数几个泡沫演变成了 3 个标准差或更大的超级泡沫:美国 1929 年和 2000 年、日本 1989 年。泡沫中,没人想听看空的观点。那是最扫兴的扫帚星。还有美国 2006 年和日本 1989 年的房地产超级泡沫。全部五个超级泡沫都是人一生中最激动人心的金融体验。我曾参与过 1968 年至 1969 年一场精彩的微型股烟火表演,在那里赚了一笔小钱(相当于当时商学院全年学费的 7 倍)。我的主要持仓——美国赛车道,在我度假期间涨了两倍——从 7 美元涨到 21 美元——随后在圣诞节前涨到 100 美元,但到次年 6 月,几乎所有烟火都炸了,它跌得比涨得更快,我损失殆尽。这给我上了一课,让我从此学会谨慎。这段经历也让我很容易理解为什么泡沫中的看空建议总是来自那些“就是不明白”的老古董——因为当年我就听过老古董的劝告,但就是没听进去。我怀疑当前泡沫中的投机者现在也不会听我的;但给出这个建议是我的工作,也可能是正确的事。那么,再次冲锋吧,亲爱的朋友们。

去年此时,我们似乎面临一个标准泡沫,随之而来的是对经济的标准阵痛。但在这一年里,这个泡沫升级到了超级泡沫的类别——美国股市现代史上仅有三次——潜在阵痛也随之增加。对我们所有人来说更危险的是,这个去年就已伴随极端低利率和高债券价格的股票泡沫,如今又加上了房地产泡沫和初现端倪的大宗商品泡沫。

如今,美国正处于过去百年里的第四次超级泡沫之中。此前的股票超级泡沫都有一系列独特的特征,这些特征单独出现时罕见,同时出现时则是这些事件独有的。在每一个案例中,这些共同特征在本轮周期中都已出现。超级泡沫的各个阶段检查清单现已完成,狂欢随时可以开始。

But before they did, a handful went on to become superbubbles of 3-sigma or greater: in the U.S. in 1929 and 2000 Introduction and in Japan in 1989. There were also In a bubble, no one wants to hear the bear case. It is the worst kind of party-pooping. superbubbles in housing in the U.S. For bubbles, especially superbubbles where we are now, are often the most exhilarating in 2006 and Japan in 1989. All five of financial experiences of a lifetime. I participated in a wonderful micro-cap fireworks these superbubbles corrected all the display from 1968 to 1969, in which I made a small fortune (7 times the then full way back to trend with much greater cost of a year at business school). My main stock, American Raceways, tripled while I and longer pain than average. was on vacation – $7 to $21 – then went to $100 by Christmas, only to lose it all even quicker by the following June, as almost all the fireworks exploded and crashed. This Today in the U.S. we are in the fourth taught me a lesson, and it helped make me cautious. The experience also makes it easy superbubble of the last hundred years. for me to sympathize with the view that bearish advice in bubbles always comes from Previous equity superbubbles had old fogeys who “just don’t get it,” because I received that old fogey advice back then and a series of distinct features that just didn’t listen. I doubt speculators in the current bubble will listen to me now; but individually are rare and collectively giving this advice is my job and possibly the right thing to do. So, once more unto the are unique to these events. In each breach, dear friends. case, these shared characteristics This time last year it looked like we might have a standard bubble with resulting have already occurred in this cycle. The standard pain for the economy. But during the year, the bubble advanced to the checklist for a superbubble running category of superbubble, one of only three in modern times in U.S. equities, and the through its phases is now complete and potential pain has increased accordingly. Even more dangerously for all of us, the the wild rumpus can begin at any time. equity bubble, which last year was already accompanied by extreme low interest rates and high bond prices, has now been joined by a bubble in housing and an incipient bubble in commodities.

我之所以极度厌恶超级泡沫——并对美联储及其他金融当局放任甚至助长泡沫深怀不满——一个关键原因在于,泡沫在破裂并侵蚀我们财富的过程中所造成的那种鲜为人知的破坏。当泡沫形成时,它们会让我们对自己的真实财富产生一种荒谬至极的高估,从而诱使我们以此为基础大肆消费。随后,一旦泡沫破裂,绝大多数美梦随之粉碎,并在下行通道中加速释放负面的经济力量。放任泡沫,更不用说推波助澜,根本就是糟糕的经济政策。

One of the main reasons I deplore superbubbles – and resent the Fed and other financial authorities for allowing and facilitating them – is the underrecognized damage that bubbles cause as they deflate and mark down our wealth. As bubbles form, they give us a ludicrously overstated view of our real wealth, which encourages us to spend accordingly. Then, as bubbles break, they crush most of those dreams and accelerate the negative economic forces on the way down. To allow bubbles, let alone help them along, is simply bad economic policy.

似乎没人谈论的一点是,资产价格高了就是不如价格低的时候好。就拿农场或商业林来说,价格翻倍后收益率从 6% 降到 3%(实际情况正是如此),你会觉得自己更富了。但在泡沫价格下,你的财富复利速度慢得多,收入也会落后。

What nobody seems to discuss is that higher-priced assets are simply worse than lower-priced ones. When farms or commercial forests, for example, double in price so that yields fall from 6% to 3% (as they actually have) you feel richer. But your wealth compounds much more slowly at bubble pricing, and your income also falls behind.

公平交易!如果你还年轻,正等着买第一套房子或建立你的第一个投资组合,* 那门槛高得根本迈不进去。你只能羡慕你的父母,并为自己受到的待遇感到不公——正如莫里斯·桑达克在《野兽家园》里所写的那样,而你就是那个被亏待的孩子。

Some deal! And if you’re young, waiting to buy your first house or your first portfolio, * it is too expensive to get even started. You can only envy your parents and feel badly With reference to Maurice Sendak’s “Where the Wild treated, which you have been.

Things Are."

Things Are."

让狂野的喧闹开始吧 | 第 2 段 此外,资产价格上涨还带来了不平等的急剧恶化——许多人根本不曾拥有这些资产,而“许多人”如今已延伸到“中位数家庭甚至更广的范围”。他们被辜负了,他们心知肚明,并且日益(情有可原地)对此感到愤懑。这绝对在损害我们的经济。展望一二十年后,如果我们的民主制度遭遇不测,那么过去 50 年里收入与财富不平等的急剧加剧(CEO 收入从约为普通工人的 25 倍攀升至约 250 倍)将背负最大的责任,而不仅仅是资产泡沫的错。所以,让资产泡沫见鬼去吧!

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p2 And then there is the terrible increase in inequality that goes with higher prices of assets, which many simply do not own, and “many” applies these days up to the “ median family or beyond. They have been let down, know it, and increasingly (and understandably) resent it. And it absolutely hurts our economy. Looking back in a decade or two, if bad things have happened to our democracy, the huge surge in The bottom line is that income and wealth inequality of the last 50 years (as CEO income moved from about in general the bubbles in 25x the average worker’s to about 250x) will have carried the largest share of the multiple assets, not just blame. So, a pox on asset bubbles!

今天——书呆子警报——我将继续讲述关于超级泡沫的定义、统计数据、历史以及技术细节。归根结底,泡沫不仅局限于股票,而是蔓延至多种资产,总体而言这些泡沫仍在持续膨胀,因此一旦破裂可能带来的痛苦也在加剧。与通常情况一样,股票泡沫开始从市场风险最高的那一端率先泄气——自去年二月以来正是如此。那么,祝你好运!我们全都需要这份运气。

equities, have continued Today – nerd alert – I will cover more of the definitions, the statistics, the history, and to inflate and therefore the technical details of superbubbles. The bottom line is that in general the bubbles in multiple assets, not just equities, have continued to inflate and therefore the potential the potential pain from a pain from a break has increased. As usually happens, the equity bubble begins to break has increased. deflate from the riskiest end of the market first – as it has been doing since last February. So, good luck! We’ll all need it.

总结 发达国家所有 2 西格玛级别的股市泡沫均已回落至长期趋势线。但在回落之前,有少数泡沫进一步膨胀为 3 西格玛或以上的超级泡沫:包括美国 1929 年和 2000 年、日本 1989 年的股市泡沫,以及美国 2006 年和日本 1989 年的房地产超级泡沫。这五个超级泡沫无一例外,全都一路调整回长期趋势线,其带来的痛苦远超平均水平,且持续时间更长。

Summary All 2-sigma equity bubbles in developed countries have broken back to trend. But before they did, a handful went on to become superbubbles of 3-sigma or greater: in the U.S. in 1929 and 2000 and in Japan in 1989. There were also superbubbles in housing in the U.S. in 2006 and Japan in 1989. All five of these superbubbles corrected all the way back to trend with much greater and longer pain than average.

今天在美国,我们正处于过去一百年来的第四次超级泡沫之中。

Today in the U.S. we are in the fourth superbubble of the last hundred years.

以往的股市超级泡沫具有一系列鲜明的特征,这些特征单独出现时很罕见,而合在一起则构成了这些事件的独特性。每一次,这些共同的特征在本轮周期中都已经出现了。

Previous equity superbubbles had a series of distinct features that individually are rare and collectively are unique to these events. In each case, these shared characteristics have already occurred in this cycle.

这些超级泡沫的倒数第二个特征是价格上涨速度加速至整轮牛市平均速度的 2 到 3 倍。在本轮周期中,这一加速发生在 2020 年并于 2021 年 2 月结束,期间纳斯达克指数从 2019 年底算起上涨了 58%(如果从新冠疫情低点算起,涨幅更是惊人地达到了 105%)!

The penultimate feature of these superbubbles was an acceleration in the rate of price advance to two or three times the average speed of the full bull market. In this cycle, the acceleration occurred in 2020 and ended in February 2021, during which time the NASDAQ rose 58% measured from the end of 2019 (and an astonishing 105% from the Covid-19 low!).

大型超级泡沫的最后一个特征是市场的持续收窄,投机性股票的表现格外落后,其中许多股票在蓝筹股上涨时反而下跌。这种情况在 1929 年、2000 年发生过,如今正在重演。对这一效应一个合理的解释是:那些经验丰富的专业人士明知市场估值过高、充满危险,却出于商业原因觉得必须继续跳舞,他们至少更倾向于拿着更安全的股票跳下悬崖。这就是为什么在大型泡沫的尾声,信心蛀虫似乎首先攻击那些投机性最强、最脆弱的股票,然后逐步向上,有时相当缓慢地,最终侵蚀到蓝筹股。

The final feature of the great superbubbles has been a sustained narrowing of the market and unique underperformance of speculative stocks, many of which fall as the blue chip market rises. This occurred in 1929, in 2000, and it is occurring now. A plausible reason for this effect would be that experienced professionals who know that the market is dangerously overpriced yet feel for commercial reasons they must keep dancing prefer at least to dance off the cliff with safer stocks. This is why at the end of the great bubbles it seems as if the confidence termites attack the most speculative and vulnerable first and work their way up, sometimes quite slowly, to the blue chips.

泡沫后期最重要也最难定义的特征,是那种只可意会、不可言传的疯狂投资者行为。但在过去两年半里,我们无疑亲眼目睹了极其疯狂的投资者行为——比 2000 年甚至更严重——尤其是在 meme 股、电动汽车相关股票、加密货币和 NFT 领域。

The most important and hardest to define quality of a late-stage bubble is in the touchy-feely characteristic of crazy investor behavior. But in the last two and a half years there can surely be no doubt that we have seen crazy investor behavior in spades – more even than in 2000 – especially in meme stocks and in EV-related stocks, in cryptocurrencies, and in NFTs.

这一超级泡沫各阶段演进的检查清单现已完整填满,狂野大戏随时可以开场。

This checklist for a superbubble running through its phases is now complete and the wild rumpus can begin at any time.

“狂欢开始” | 第 3 页 这次的创新之处——且只有 20 世纪 80 年代的日本可以相提并论——在于将数个泡沫叠加在一起的极端危险性,正如我们今天所见,三个半主要资产类别有史以来第一次同时沸腾。当悲观情绪重回市场时,我们将面临美国历史上潜在的最大的感知财富减值。

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p3 What is new this time, and only comparable to Japan in the 1980s, is the extraordinary danger of adding several bubbles together, as we see today with three and a half major asset classes bubbling simultaneously for the first time in history. When pessimism returns to markets, we face the largest potential markdown of perceived wealth in U.S. history.

泡沫与超级泡沫的定义过去 20 多年来,我们在 GMO 一直用一种极端值的统计指标来定义投资泡沫——即偏离趋势两个标准差。对于一个随机、呈正态分布的序列,比如抛掷均匀硬币的结果,两个标准差的事件在“每个方向每 44 次试验”中应发生一次。这个指标是人为设定的,但看起来相当合理。

The Definition of a Bubble and a Superbubble We have defined investment bubbles at GMO for over 20 years now by a statistical measure of extremes – a 2-sigma deviation from trend. For a random, normally distributed series, like the sum of tosses of a fair coin, a 2-sigma event should occur once “ every 44 trials in each direction. This measure is arbitrary but seems quite reasonable.

但在现实生活中,人类并非(在经济意义上)高效的,而是常常相当不理性,并且容易头脑发热。因此,两西格玛(2-sigma)的极端事件出现的频率,比随机分布的发达股市所预示的要高——不是每 44 年一次,而是每 35 年一次。我们研究了金融市场历史上所有资产类别的可用数据,总共发现了超过 300 个两西格玛事件的案例¹。在发达股票市场中,过去 100 年间出现的每一次两西格玛级别的股市泡沫,最终都完全破灭,价格一路跌回到泡沫形成之前的长期趋势线位置。

In real life, though, humans are not efficient (in the economic sense) but are often quite irrational and can get carried away so that 2-sigma outliers occur more often than In developed equity random – not every 44 years, but every 35 years. We studied the available data across markets, every single all asset classes over financial history and found a total of more than 300 2-sigma example of a 2-sigma moves.1 In developed equity markets, every single example of a 2-sigma equity bubble equity bubble in the last in the last 100 years has eventually fully deflated with the price moving all the way back to the trend that existed prior to the bubble forming.

100 年最终完全泄气了,但市场的极端不会止步于 2 个西格玛。我把超级泡沫定义为 3 个西格玛事件。在一个抛均匀硬币的世界里,这大约每 100 次才出现一次,但在现实生活中,出现的频率却比这高两到三倍。我们人类真的很擅长发疯!然而,不管泡沫触及 2 个西格玛、3 个西格玛,甚至更高,它最终还是会跌回趋势线,造成巨大的资产价值损失。这里的关键是两件事同时成立:1)涨得越高,未来预期回报越低——你可以现在大快朵颐,也可以慢慢品味到遥远的未来,但两者不可兼得;2)涨得越高,要跌回趋势线所需承受的痛苦时间越长、程度越深——就当前情况而言,从市场可能触及的任何高点(目前接近 4700 点),回落到调整过时间因素后的标普 500 指数趋势值约 2500 点。

100 years has eventually fully deflated with the But market extremes do not stop at 2-sigma. I define a superbubble as a 3-sigma event. price moving all the That would occur in a world of tossing fair coins about once in every 100 events, but in real life appears to occur two or three times more frequently than that. We humans do way back to the trend crazy very well indeed! Yet whether the bubble hits 2-sigma, 3-sigma, or even higher, it that existed prior to the still falls all the way back to trend, incurring enormous asset value losses. The key here bubble forming. is that two things are true: 1) the higher you go, the lower the expected future return; you can gorge on your cake now or enjoy it piece by piece into the distant future, but you can’t do both; and 2) the higher you go, the longer and greater the pain you will have to endure to get back to trend – in the current case to a trend value of about 2500 on the S&P 500, adjusted for the passage of time, from whatever high point the market might reach (currently at nearly 4700).

美国资产史上三大泡沫——1929 年和 2000 年的股市,以及 2006 年的房市——莫不如此。日本股市和房地产市场在 1980 年代末的那场泡沫,更是变本加厉,同样如此。这五大史上最严重的泡沫,无一例外,全都一路跌回趋势线。

And so it was in the three great bubbles in U.S. assets – equities in 1929 and 2000, and housing in 2006. And so it was, in spades, in the Japanese stock and real estate markets in the late 1980s. All five of these greatest of all bubbles fell all the way back to trend.

多重资产泡沫同时爆发的危险。日本的案例尤其清楚地表明一点:虽然股市泡沫很危险——资产价值损失会通过财富效应引发失控的冲击,这曾是 1929 年大危机及随后大萧条的部分原因——但楼市泡沫危险得多,而两者同时爆发则危险至极。日本双重泡沫的经济后果,可以说至今仍在延续。图表 1 显示,无论股市还是地价,都尚未回升到 1989 年的峰值!

The Dangers of Multiple Asset Bubbles at the Same Time The Japanese case, in particular, made one thing pretty clear: while it is dangerous to have a bubble in equities – for the loss of value can cause a shock through the wealth effect that can get out of control, which was a part of the problem in 1929 and the ensuing slump – it is much more dangerous to have a bubble in housing, and it is very much more dangerous to have both together. The economic consequences of the double bubble in Japan are arguably still playing out. Exhibit 1 shows that neither the equity 1 market nor land have yet recovered their 1989 peaks!

这其中,超过 90% 的案例回归了原有的均值;几乎 10% 看起来是持续数十年的范式转变。然而,这 10% 的案例全部发生在商品领域,其有限性可能暗示着永久性短缺及由此引发的价格变化——正如石油领域所发生的情况(其 70 年的旧趋势线折合今日币值约为 23 美元);或是在房地产市场,区域规划限制导致了日益严重的供给短缺;又或在极少数情况下,出现于发展中经济体的股票市场,这些市场在经济发展和金融发展之前,估值曾处于极低水平。

Of these, over 90% reverted to the old mean; almost 10% appeared to be paradigm shifts that persisted for decades. These 10%, however, were all in commodities, whose finite nature might suggest the possibility of permanent shortages and resulting price shifts – as has occurred in oil (whose old trend line for 70 years was about $23 in today’s currency); or in real estate where zoning restrictions have caused increasing shortages; or in a very few cases in equity markets in developing economies where prior to economic and financial development valuations had been extremely low.

让狂欢开始吧 | p4 图表 1:日经指数与日本城市商业地产走势,1980 年至今 50000 800 40000 商业地产 30000 日经 225 指数 20000 10000 200 0 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 日经 225(左轴) “日本不动产研究所六大城市商业地产指数(右轴) 截至 2022 年 1 月 7 日 | 来源:彭博 ……在美国,我们首次同时出现……但现在,在美国,我们首次同时出现所有主要资产类别的泡沫。具体来说:首先,我们确实正身处史上范围最广、最极端的全球房地产泡沫之中。如今美国房价与家庭收入的倍数已达到历史最高,在去年创纪录上涨 20% 之后,甚至超过了 2006 年灾难性的房地产泡沫。但尽管美国房地产市场售价与家庭收入的倍数很高,却仍低于、有时远低于许多其他国家,例如加拿大、澳大利亚、英国,尤其是中国。(在中国,房地产在经济长期繁荣中扮演了异常重要且独特的角色,因此如果其房地产市场像我们目前所看到的那样开始泄气,不仅会给中国经济带来同样独特的风险,也会影响到世界其他地区。)

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p4 EXHIBIT 1: NIKKEI INDEX AND JAPANESE CITY COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE, 1980-TODAY 50000 800 40000 Commercial Real 30000 Nikkei 225 Estate index 20000 10000 200 0 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Nikkei 225 (left axis) “ Japan Real Estate Institute 6-City Commercial Real Estate index (right axis) As of 1/7/2022 | Source: Bloomberg …for the first time in the U.S. we have But now, for the first time in the U.S. we have simultaneous bubbles across all major simultaneous bubbles asset classes. To detail: across all major asset First, we are indeed participating in the broadest and most extreme global real classes. estate bubble in history. Today houses in the U.S. are at the highest multiple of family income ever, after a record 20% gain last year, ahead even of the disastrous housing bubble of 2006. But although the U.S. housing market is selling at a high multiple of family income, it is less, sometimes far less, than many other countries, e.g., Canada, Australia, the U.K., and especially China. (In China, real estate has played an unusually important and unique role in the extended boom and thereby poses an equally unique risk to the economy and hence the rest of the world if its real estate market loses air exactly as it appears to be doing as we sit.)

第二,美国股市正经历其历史上最狂热、最亢奋、甚至堪称疯狂的投资行为。在我看来,当前美国市场对“股票只涨不跌”这一观念的认同度达到了历史最高水平,而这正是泡沫的本质所在。(有趣的是,在其他发达国家领涨房价的同时,它们在股票价格上却落后于美国。其中一些国家,比如日本,差距如此之大,以至于如今它们的股价仅仅算是略微偏高。)

Second, we have the most exuberant, ecstatic, even crazy investor behavior in the history of the U.S. stock market. The U.S. market today has, in my opinion, the greatest buy-in ever to the idea that stocks only go up, which is surely the real essence of a bubble. (Interestingly, where other developed countries lead in housing prices, they lag the U.S. in equity prices. Some, such as Japan, by so much that they are merely slightly overpriced today.)

第三,雪上加霜的是,美国和全球多数国家还都经历了人类历史上价格最高的债券市场和与之相伴的最低利率。

Third, as if this were not enough, we also have the highest-priced bond markets in the U.S. and most other countries around the world, and the lowest rates, of course, that go with them, that human history has ever seen.

第四点,锦上添花的是(仿佛我们还需要更多似的),我们普遍面临着价格过高或高于趋势的商品,包括石油和大部分重要金属。此外,联合国全球食品价格指数正处于历史最高水平附近(见表 2)。这些高价之所以重要,是因为它们推高了通胀并压低了实际收入。我们曾在 2008 年看到过这种组合——商品价格仍在攀升,同时资产价格泡沫却在破裂——这是对经济的终极钳形攻势,几乎注定会带来重大的经济阵痛。

And fourth, as gravy (as if we needed any) we have broadly overpriced, or above trend, commodities including oil and most of the important metals. In addition, the UN’s index of global food prices is around its all-time high (see Exhibit 2). These high prices are important as they push inflation and stress real incomes. The combination, which we saw in 2008, of still-rising commodity prices with a deflating asset price bubble is the ultimate pincer attack on the economy and is all but guaranteed to lead to major economic pain.

让狂野派对开始吧 | 第 5 页 图表 2:联合国粮农组织食品价格指数 “我们的金融领导层应该明白:将这些风险——这三个半泡沫——叠加起来,如果损害同时发生,将会成倍放大整体冲击。而且,此刻这种局面比历史上任何时候都更可能抹去认知中的财富。我们在 2007 年曾写道,如果美国房价适度低于趋势线(事实正是如此),房价下跌可能直接导致 10 万亿美元损失,相当于半年多 GDP。但那时,债券市场仅仅是在高风险企业端定价过高,股票市场也只是正常偏高估值。(不过,股市依然——如果你愿意这么说的话——随主要事件即房地产及相关债务的下跌而腰斩了一半。)然而,尽管经历了那场近在咫尺的阵痛,如今多个重大泡沫叠加累积的所有经济和金融危险,似乎并未被美联储或全球大多数同行视为特别危险。事实上,这些警示信号几乎根本无人注意。”

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p5 EXHIBIT 2: UN FAO FOOD PRICE INDEX “ What our financial 0 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 leadership should know is that multiplying these As of 12/31/2021 | Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization risks – these three and a half bubbles – will What our financial leadership should know is that multiplying these risks – these three multiply the total shock and a half bubbles – will multiply the total shock if the damage occurs simultaneously. if the damage occurs And this package presents more potential for writing down perceived wealth than simultaneously. And this at any previous time in history. We wrote in 2007 that deflating U.S. housing prices could directly lose $10 trillion or well over half a year’s GDP if house prices declined to package presents more moderately below trend – which they did. But at that time the bond market was merely potential for writing overpriced at the risky corporate end and the stock market merely normally overvalued. down perceived wealth (The stock market still halved in price in sympathy, if you will, with the main event – than at any previous housing and housing-related debt.)2 Yet despite that recent pain, all of the economic and financial dangers that are now building up from multiple major bubbles do not appear time in history. to be considered especially dangerous by the Fed or most of its equivalents around the world. In fact, the warning signs appear to be barely noticed at all.

这是怎么发生的:美联储难道永远学不会吗?

How Did This Happen: Will the Fed Never Learn?

截至今日,美国在 25 年内出现了三次重大资产泡沫,远高于正常水平。我认为这远非运气不好,而是沃尔克之后的鸽派美联储掌门人体制的直接结果。现在正适合追问:美联储不仅放任这些事件发生,甚至本该鼓励和促成它们,这究竟是为什么。

As of today, the U.S. has seen three great asset bubbles in 25 years, far more than normal. I believe this is far from being a run of bad luck, rather this is a direct outcome of the post-Volcker regime of dovish Fed bosses. It is a good time to ask why on Earth the Fed would not only have allowed these events but should have actually encouraged and facilitated them.

事实是,他们当年没有“搞懂”资产泡沫,如今看来也没有。早在 1990 年代末,这种回避问题的态度就让我们觉得相当惊人。不过值得注意的是,2007 年美国住房建筑行业已经扩张到多建了 100 万套房子,给房产中介等带来了巨大刺激,而到 2010 年和 2011 年又收缩到比正常水平少 50 万套。这个降幅带来了沉重打击,并在很大程度上解释了这场衰退的深度以及经济刺激政策的失效。说到一点好消息,尽管美国房价比 2006 年时更加难以负担、也更脆弱,但至少住房建筑行业目前基本是正常运行的。

The fact is they did not “get” asset bubbles, nor do they appear to today. This avoidance 2 of the issue seemed to us remarkable as long ago as the late 1990s. Alan Greenspan, It is worth noting, though, that in 2007 the U.S. house who I considered then and now to be dangerously incompetent, famously acted as building industry had expanded to build an extra million cheerleader in the formation of the then greatest equity bubble by far in U.S. history in houses, with all the stimulus to realtors et al., and retrenched by 2010 and 2011 to a half million fewer the late 1990s and we all paid the price as it deflated.3 houses than normal. This drop packed a powerful punch and accounted for much of the depth of the recession Bernanke should have been wiser from the experience of this bubble bursting and and its resistance to stimulus. For a glimmer of good the ensuing pain, and he might have moved against the developing housing bubble news, although our house prices in the U.S. are even more – potentially more dangerous than an equity bubble as discussed. No such luck! It is unaffordable and even more vulnerable than in 2006, at least the house building industry is only jogging along pretty clear that Bernanke (and Yellen) were such believers in market efficiency that in more or less normally now. their world bubbles could never occur.

请注意,2000 年的科技泡沫伴随着一个对我来说并不陌生的现象,但我必须承认对此乐在其中。当时,债券市场异常便宜(通胀保值国债收益率达 4.3%!);房地产价格低廉(房地产投资信托基金收益率超过 9%);甚至价值股也很便宜——然而,面对美国房地产市场明显的 3 西格玛事件,伯南克却坚称“美国房地产市场仅仅反映了美国经济的强劲”,并且“美国房地产市场从未下跌过”。他想传递的信息虽未明说却很清楚:让狂欢开始吧。而且,“它永远不会下跌,因为不存在泡沫,也永远不可能有。”纯粹从统计角度看,美国房价的历史此前确实从未出现过全国性泡沫,因为各地市场高度分散——佛罗里达州在上涨,芝加哥平稳,而加州在下跌。直到格林斯潘和伯南克时代持续的过度刺激创造了一个绝佳机会,让所有地区最终一同暴涨。而美联储的统计学家们呢?要么戴着厚厚的学术眼罩,要么被我们熟知且热爱的职业风险所恐吓——不要传递你的老板不想听到的信息——他们要么完全沉默,要么毫无作为。

Note that the 2000 tech bubble was accompanied by This is old territory for me, but I have to admit to enjoying it. Back then, when confronted unusually cheap bond markets (TIPS at 4.3%!); cheap real with a clear 3-sigma event in the U.S. housing market, Bernanke insisted that “the estate (REITs yielding over 9%); even cheap value stocks – it was focused solely on U.S. growth stocks and still we U.S. housing market merely reflects a strong U.S. economy,” and that “the U.S. housing suffered from the negative wealth effect when it burst. market has never declined.” The information he meant to deliver was unsaid but clear: Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p6 “and it never will decline because there is no bubble and never can be.” On a purely statistical basis, the history of U.S. house prices had indeed never bubbled before, being so diversified collectively – booming in Florida while coasting in Chicago and falling in California. Until, that is, the sustained excess stimulation of the Greenspan and Bernanke era created a perfect opportunity to finally boom in every region together. And what of the Fed’s statisticians? Picked for either their thick academic blinders or intimidated by the usual career risk we all know and love so well – don’t deliver information your boss doesn’t want to hear – they were totally silent or ineffective.

随后,那场前所未有、看似不存在的房地产泡沫一路回撤到了泡沫出现之前的趋势线,然后,严格按照泡沫的典型走势,又跌到了趋势线之下。于是,这个 3 西格玛事件来了又走了——它是有史以来最漂亮、最规矩的泡沫(见图表 3)——却给美国和全球经济造成了深重的经济创伤,尤其因为针对新型抵押贷款相关工具的监管缺失。就这样,美联储第二次为一场巨大泡沫的形成提供了推波助澜。而这一次,痛苦因房地产崩盘、相关的抵押贷款混乱以及随后美国股市的下跌——股市只是严重高估,并非泡沫——而加剧,“感知财富”的合计损失威胁到了经济萧条,迫使当局实施前所未有的救助和规模庞大却相当笨拙的刺激措施。然而,当社会四处寻找责任归属、总结教训时,却仿佛极力在避开问题的核心。

Whereupon the unprecedented and apparently non-existent housing bubble retreated all the way back to its trend that had existed prior to the bubble, and then quite typically for a bubble, went well below. So, the 3-sigma event came and went, the best looking, most well-behaved bubble of all time (see Exhibit 3), causing profound economic damage to the U.S. and global economies, particularly because of the lack of regulation around the new mortgage-related instruments. Thus, the Fed had for the second time aided and abetted a great bubble forming. And this time the pain was augmented by the housing bust, associated mortgage mayhem, and the ensuing decline in the U.S. stock market – merely badly overpriced but not a bubble – with the combined loss of “perceived wealth” threatening a depression and necessitating an unprecedented bailout and massive, but rather inept, stimulus. Yet, when society looked around to assign blame and process lessons learned, it was as if it tried very hard to miss the point.

附件 3美国房地产泡沫

5.0

4.5

房价收入比中位数

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日 | 数据来源:全美房地产经纪人协会、美国人口普查局、GMO

没错,伯南克和保尔森事后确实在游说国会寻求援助等方面干得相当不错。但整体而言,就好比美联储手握一艘规模庞大的经济巨轮,却鲁莽地驾驶它穿越危险水域,对冰山风险视若无睹到了这种程度——船长本该被送上军事法庭,可船沉之后,他反而因为协助妇女儿童(以及花旗集团破产的银行家们)登上救生艇而受到了嘉奖。此前,格林斯潘甚至试图逼迫商品期货交易委员会的布鲁克斯利·伯恩不要监管日益泛滥的危险次级贷款工具,以此来助推这艘船加速。当她拒绝放弃自己分内的工作后,他又转而游说国会修改法律,让这些“我们自己设计的恶魔” * 完全不受监管。在这项臭名昭著的副业中,与他联手的是亚瑟·莱维特。

  • 引自理查德·布克斯塔伯精彩著作的书名。

EXHIBIT 3THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE 5.0 4.5 Median House Price to 4.0 Median Income Ratio 3.5 3.0 2.5 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 As of 12/31/2021 | Source: National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau, GMO Yes, Bernanke and Paulson did a perfectly fine job of lobbying Congress for help, etc., after the fact. But overall it was as if the Fed, at the wheel of a titanically-sized economy, had imprudently raced the economy through dangerous waters, ignoring the risks of icebergs so profoundly that the captain deserved a court martial but instead, after the boat sank, was rewarded for doing a serviceable job of helping women and children (and bankrupt bankers at Citi for that matter) into lifeboats. Previously, Greenspan had even fought to help the boat speed up, by trying to bully Brooksley Born at the CFTC to not regulate the growing wave of dangerous subprime instruments. When she refused to back off from a job that was clearly hers, he then resorted to lobbying Congress to change the law to leave these new “demons of our own design”4 4 altogether unregulated. In this infamous side job, he was joined by Arthur Levitt of From the title of the excellent book by Richard Bookstaber.

让狂欢开始吧 | p7 美国证券交易委员会(那帮人这回显然把“证券”当成脏字了)和我最欣赏的“特氟龙男人”之一拉里·萨默斯。他们这么鲁莽行事时到底在想什么?难道指望银行家们能自我监管?这件事在很多方面都令人咋舌,而我们如此轻易就忘掉它同样令人咋舌。但它出色地揭示了一点:格林斯潘的真心到底在哪——在放松监管上。

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p7 the SEC (who apparently on this occasion saw “security” as a dirty word) and one of my favorite Teflon men, Larry Summers. What were they thinking with this reckless behavior? That bankers could regulate themselves? The episode was remarkable in many ways as was our willingness to forget it. But what a good job it did in revealing where Greenspan’s heart really lay – in deregulation.

2000 年至 2002 年股市泡沫的危险暴露无遗,2006 年至 2010 年房地产泡沫的危险甚至更大,再加上 1980 年代末日本和 2007 年美国同时出现两种资产泡沫的额外风险,美联储学到了什么?绝对什么都没有,或者说看起来就是这样。事实上,经济界似乎从 2009 年的废墟中学到的唯一“教训”是,我们当时没有用足够的刺激措施来应对。我们本应首先采取预防措施以避免危机,这似乎是一个没有被学到的教训,实际上甚至没有被“教授”。所以我们满足于准备更多的救生艇,而不是避开冰山。我们原谅并忘记无能,甚至未能惩罚公然的不法行为。(冰岛,人口 30 万,将 26 名银行家送进监狱;美国,人口 3 亿,零人入狱。零!)当悲观情绪再次主导泡沫、增长与不平等时,也许这三个泡沫中更重要的长期负面影响(在 25 年的时间里压缩了资产价格)是对日益加剧的不平等形成的持续压力:要参与资产泡沫的上行,你需要拥有一些资产,而最贫穷的四分之一人口几乎一无所有。相比之下,最富有的 1% 人口拥有超过三分之一的资产。我们可以衡量自 1997 年以来不平等的迅速加剧,这使得美国成为所有富裕国家中最不平等的国家,更令人震惊的是,其经济流动性水平最低,甚至比英国还差——而几十年前我们曾嘲笑英国的社会和经济僵化。不平等的加剧直接削弱了广泛消费基础,因为在边际上,富人变得更富几乎不会花掉增量的一分一毫,而最贫穷的四分之一人口几乎会花掉全部。

With the clear dangers of an equity bubble revealed in 2000 to 2002, the even greater dangers of a housing bubble in 2006 to 2010, and the extra risk of doing two asset bubbles together in Japan in the late 1980s and in the U.S. in 2007, what has the Fed learned? Absolutely nothing, or so it would appear. In fact the only “lesson” that the economic establishment appears to have learned from the rubble of 2009 is that we didn’t address it with enough stimulus. That we should actually have taken precautions to avoid the crisis in the first place seems to be a lesson not learned, in fact not even “ taught. So we settle for more lifeboats rather than iceberg avoidance. And we forgive and forget incompetence and fail to punish even outright malfeasance. (Iceland, pop At some future date, 300,000, sent 26 bankers to prison; the U.S., pop 300,000,000, sent zero. Zero!) when pessimism rules Bubbles, Growth, and Inequality again as it does from Perhaps the most important longer-term negative of these three bubbles, compressed time to time, asset prices into 25 years, has been a sustained pressure increasing inequality: to participate in will decline. the upside of an asset bubble you need to own some assets and the poorer quarter of the public owns almost nothing. The top 1%, in contrast, own more than one-third of all assets. And we can measure the rapid increase in inequality since 1997, which has left the U.S. as the least equal of all rich countries and, even more shockingly, with the lowest level of economic mobility, even worse than that of the U.K., at whom we used to laugh a few decades back for its social and economic rigidity. This increase in inequality directly subtracts from broad-based consumption because, on the margin, rich people getting richer will spend little to nothing of the increment where the poorest quartile would spend almost all of it.

那么,我们又来了。这一次,伴随着房地产泡沫破裂后创纪录的刺激措施,紧接着又是为应对新冠疫情而推出的难以估量的巨额刺激措施。(其中一部分当然是必要的——具体有多少,只能留待未来揭晓。)但凡事皆有后果,而这次的后果或许会包括某些棘手的通胀问题,也可能不会。不过,它已经毫无疑问地包含了金融史上最具危险性的资产全面高估。在未来的某个时刻,当悲观情绪像过去那样再度主宰市场时,资产价格将会下跌。而如果所有这些资产类别的估值哪怕只是向历史均值回归三分之二,仅美国一国的财富损失就将高达约 35 万亿美元。如果这种负财富效应和收入效应再被能源、食品及其他短缺引发的通胀压力所放大,我们将面临严重的经济问题。

So, here we are again. This time with world record stimulus from the housing bust The back-of-the-envelope calculation goes like this: days, followed up by ineffably massive stimulus for Covid. (Some of it of course 1. Currently, the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector is necessary – just how much to be revealed at a later date.) But everything has worth $48 trillion. If cyclically-adjusted P/Es fall from consequences and the consequences this time may or may not include some intractable their current level of nearly 40 to 25 – which would still be among the highest valuations ever recorded inflation. But it has already definitely included the most dangerous breadth of asset prior to 1997 – this would be a 37% loss of value, over overpricing in financial history. At some future date, when pessimism rules again as it $17 trillion. does from time to time, asset prices will decline. And if valuations across all of these 2. U.S. households own real estate worth $41 trillion. asset classes return even two-thirds of the way back to historical norms, total wealth Current Census data on median household incomes losses will be on the order of $35 trillion in the U.S. alone.5 If this negative wealth and and median home sale prices suggest a price to income ratio of about 5.5 after accounting for a income effect is compounded by inflationary pressures from energy, food, and other considerable estimated increase in incomes in 2021 shortages, we will have serious economic problems.

(最后一个数据点是 2020 年)。如果这个比率回到 4.0——这远高于 2006 年代中期房地产泡沫之前的任何水平——那么价值将损失 27%,再补充一些关于市场狂热与广度超过 11 万亿美元的收尾信息。大型泡沫的倒数第二阶段通常会以“井喷式上涨”为特征——美国国债、政府机构/政府支持企业债务和公司债的股价加速增长,达到前一轮牛市平均水平的两到三倍。这一模式在 2020 年表现得与历史上其他任何大型超级泡沫一样清晰(见图表 4)。流通中的证券总额分别约为 24 万亿美元、11 万亿美元和 15 万亿美元。我们可以比较保守地估算这三个板块的久期分别为 5 年、4 年和 7 年。如果利率仅上升 2%——从当前 10 年期通胀保值债券-0.7% 的水平升至仅仅 1.3% 的实际长期利率,仍显著低于历史常态——而且公司债利差在此基础上再上升 0.5%,那么债务证券的损失总计将达到约 6 万亿美元。

(last datapoint was 2020). If this ratio returns to 4.0 – which is well above any levels prior to the mid-2000s housing bubble – this would be a 27% loss of value, Some Last-Minute Color on Market Frenzy and Breadth over $11 trillion. The penultimate phase of major bubbles has been characterized by a “blow-off” – 3. U.S. Treasury, agency/GSE, and corporate debt an accelerating rate of stock price growth to two or three times the average of the securities outstanding come to about $24 trillion, $11 preceding bull market. This pattern was shown as clearly as any of history’s other great trillion, and $15 trillion, respectively. We can quite superbubbles in 2020 (see Exhibit 4). conservatively estimate the duration of these three sectors at 5 years, 4 years, and 7 years, respectively. If rates rise a mere 2% – from current levels of -0.7% for 10-year TIPS, this would take us to only 1.3% real at the long end, still significantly below historic norms – and if corporate spreads rise only 0.5% on top of that, losses on debt securities would total about $6 trillion.

让狂野派对开始吧 | 第 8 页 附件 4:股市超级泡沫的顶部出逃形态 美国 1929 年:希勒标普 500 指数代理指标 科技股 2000 年:纳斯达克综合指数 16 2000 年出逃 1000 出逃 4 500 1921 1924 1927 1930 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 日本 1989 年:日经 225 指数 美国 2022 年:标普 500 指数 40000 4000 20000 10000 2000 出逃 出逃 2500 1000 1975 1980 1985 1990 2012 2015 2018 2021 数据截至 2022 年 1 月 14 日 | 来源:罗伯特·希勒,DataStream 说到投机狂热,2020 年就已经涌现了大量匪夷所思的泡沫轶事,我在去年的文章里写过。自那以后,轶事更加精彩。我们看到了:■ GME 和 AMC 的模因股疯狂——这两家本已在衰退行业里的公司,又遭新冠疫情重创,却因留言板情绪推动,从疫情后低点涨到 2021 年高点,分别飙升了 120 倍和 38 倍,让 GME 的市值一度占到整个罗素 2000 指数的 20%;■ 狗狗币阶段,这种本是对加密货币热潮的恶搞而创造的数字货币,因为埃隆·马斯克不停的玩笑,竟然涨了近 300 倍,市值达到 90 亿美元;以及■ 最后的重头戏:赫兹(2020 年的模因股明星之一)因宣布将购买一批特斯拉汽车而股价暴涨后,阿维斯有些可怜地说了一句,“嘿,兄弟们,我们可能也要买电动车”,结果股价一天之内翻了三倍!

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p8 EXHIBIT 4: STOCK MARKET SUPERBUBBLES HAVE BLOW-OFF TOPS U.S. 1929: Shiller S&P 500 Proxy Tech 2000: NASDAQ Composite 16 2000 BLOW-OFF 1000 BLOW-OFF 4 500 1921 1924 1927 1930 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Japan 1989: Nikkei 225 U.S. 2022: S&P 500 40000 4000 20000 10000 2000 BLOW-OFF BLOW-OFF 2500 1000 1975 1980 1985 1990 2012 2015 2018 2021 As of 1/14/2022 | Source: Robert Shiller, DataStream As for speculative madness, there were already many fantastic bubble anecdotes from 2020, which I wrote about last year.6 Since then, the anecdotes have been even better. We’ve had: ■ The meme stock madness of GME and AMC – two companies in declining industries further decimated by Covid-19 – that managed to rally 120x and 38x, respectively, from their post-pandemic lows to their 2021 highs, driven by message board sentiment, taking GME briefly to 20% of the entire Russell 2000; ■ The dogecoin phase, in which a cryptocurrency conceived as a parody of the crypto craze went up nearly 300x, to a market cap of $90 billion because Elon Musk kept joking about it; and ■ La pièce de résistance: after Hertz (one of 2020’s meme stock stars) saw a quick stock surge from announcing it would purchase a fleet of Teslas, Avis rather plaintively said something like, “Hey dudes, we might buy electric cars too,” and tripled in a day!

但——正如一场大泡沫终将进入“市场缩窄”的最后阶段——这类事件大多已是过去式,过去六个月里,人们对狂热情绪的感知愈发麻木(见图表 5)。GME、AMC、狗狗币以及超过三分之一的纳斯达克股票,如今均较其高点下跌超过 50%。比特币跌幅超过 40%,而我自己不幸持有的 Quantumscape——13 个月前其市值还超过通用汽车(1929 年有过许多极端投机,但从未达到这种规模)——则从 2020 年 12 月的峰值下跌了 83%。哎!

But – as fits the final “narrowing market” phase of a great bubble – most of these events are now well in the past, and the last six months have seen a growing numbness to the euphoria (see Exhibit 5). GME, AMC, dogecoin, and more than one-third of all NASDAQ stocks are now all down more than 50% from their highs. Bitcoin is down over 40%, and my own unfortunate Quantumscape, which 13 months ago was worth more than GM (1929 had many extreme speculations but nothing on this scale), is down from its December 2020 peak by 83%. Ouch!

杰里米·格兰瑟姆,《等待最后一舞:晚期大泡沫中资产配置的风险》,2021 年 1 月 5 日。

Jeremy Grantham, “Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble,” January 5, 2021.

让野性大狂欢开始吧 | 第 9 页 杰里米·格兰瑟姆

图表 5:最大且质量最高的股票

格兰瑟姆先生于 1977 年联合创立了 GMO,

在 2021 年扛起了市场的大旗

标普 500 指数中规模最大的 10 家公司

他是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任公司的长期投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会的成员,也曾任职于多家非营利组织的投资委员会。在创立 GMO 之前,格兰瑟姆先生于 1969 年联合创立了巴特里玛奇金融管理公司,并于 1971 年推荐了商业指数化投资,这被认为是开创性举措之一。他的投资生涯始于皇家荷兰壳牌公司的经济学家岗位。格兰瑟姆先生在英国谢菲尔德大学获得本科学位,并在哈佛商学院获得 MBA 学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,持有英国 CBE 勋章,并获得了卡内基慈善奖章。

权责声明

本文表达的观点是作者本人的观点,不一定反映 GMO 的观点。本文内容仅供参考,不构成投资建议或任何证券的买卖要约。所讨论的投资可能存在高风险,并不一定适合所有投资者。过往业绩不代表未来结果。

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p9 Jeremy Grantham EXHIBIT 5: BIGGEST AND HIGHEST QUALITY STOCKS Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 CARRIED THE MARKET IN 2021 10 Largest and is a member of Names in S&P 500 GMO’s Asset Allocation 1.4 Cap-Weighted team, serving as the 1.3 S&P 500 firm’s long-term investment strategist. He 1.2 is a member of the GMO Board of Directors Russell 2000 Total Return 1.1 and has also served on the investment 1.0 boards of several non-profit organizations. Goldman Sachs 0.9 Non-Profitable Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham 0.8 Tech index was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended 0.7 commercial indexing in 1971, one of several 0.6 Dec-20 Mar-21 Jun-21 Sep-21 Dec-21 claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch As of 12/31/2021 | Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs, GMO Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business The Death of the Vampire School. He is a member of the Academy of In the meantime, we are in what I think of as the vampire phase of the bull market, Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK where you throw everything you have at it: you stab it with Covid, you shoot it with and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for the end of QE and the promise of higher rates, and you poison it with unexpected Philanthropy. inflation – which has always killed P/E ratios before, but quite uniquely, not this time yet7 – and still the creature flies. (Just as it staggered through the second half of 2007 as its mortgage and other financial wounds increased one by one.) Until, just as you’re Disclaimer beginning to think the thing is completely immortal, it finally, and perhaps a little The views expressed are the views of anticlimactically, keels over and dies. The sooner the better for everyone.

截至 2022 年 1 月 20 日,杰里米·格兰瑟姆的观点随时可能因市场及其他情况而变化。作为一名投资者该怎么做?GMO 有一套详细的建议,我表示认同。简单概括的话,或许是避开美股,重点配置新兴市场的价值股以及几个较便宜的发达国家市场,尤其是日本。就我个人而言,我还喜欢留一些现金以保持灵活性,配置一些资源类资产来对冲通胀,再添一点点黄金和白银。(加密货币越来越让我觉得自己像个盯着赤裸皇帝游行的男孩——那么多显赫人物和机构都在欣赏他那件无比华美的外衣,技术如此复杂、如此卓越,普通人根本看不懂,只能盲目相信。我可不会。在这种局面下,我学会的教训是宁可信其无,不可信其有。)

Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 20, 2022, and are subject to change What to Do as an Investor? at any time based on market and other GMO has a detailed set of recommendations available that I agree with. A summary conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation might be to avoid U.S. equities and emphasize the value stocks of emerging markets for the purchase or sale of any security and several cheaper developed countries, most notably Japan. Speaking personally, and should not be construed as such. I also like some cash for flexibility, some resources for inflation protection, as well as References to specific securities and issuers a little gold and silver. (Cryptocurrencies leave me increasingly feeling like the boy are for illustrative purposes only and are not watching the naked emperor passing in procession. So many significant people and intended to be, and should not be interpreted institutions are admiring his incredible coat, which is so technically complicated and as, recommendations to purchase or sell superior that normal people simply can’t comprehend it and must take it on trust. I such securities. would not. In such situations I have learned to prefer avoidance to trust.)

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Copyright © 2022 by GMO LLC.

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All rights reserved.

附录:通胀与市盈率释疑——狂欢盛宴开场 | 第 10 页 附录 通胀与市盈率释疑 当下的泡沫完全无视当前 100% 的通胀率 GMO 市盈率解释模型 50 1) 净资产收益率 2) 通胀波动率 40 3) GDP 波动率 30 相关性:92% 1925 1938 1951 1964 1977 1990 2003 2016 预测市盈率 10 实际市盈率 10 截至 2021 年 12 月 31 日 | 来源:GMO GMO 解释市盈率的模型主要由两个因素驱动:通胀(市场厌恶)和利润率(市场喜爱)。自 1925 年数据开始以来,通胀飙升一直严重打压市盈率……直到现在。目前,通胀被 100% 忽略……暂时如此。

See Appendix: Inflation and Explaining P/E Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p10 APPENDIX Inflation and Explaining P/E TODAY’S BUBBLE DEPENDS ON IGNORING 100% OF CURRENT INFLATION GMO Explaining P/E Model 50 1) Return on Equity 2) Inflation Volatility 40 3) GDP Volatility 30 Correlation: 92% 1925 1938 1951 1964 1977 1990 2003 2016 Predicted P/E 10 Realized P/E 10 As of 12/31/2021 | Source: GMO GMO’s model to explain P/E is dominated by two factors: inflation, which multiples hate, and profit margins, which they love. Since the data starts in 1925, inflation surges had always hurt multiples badly…until now. Currently, inflation is 100% ignored…for now.

泡沫规则回顾(供分心的读者参考)1. 发达国家股市中所有 2 个标准差级别的股票泡沫均已破裂——一路回归到趋势线。美国在 2020 年夏季触及了 2 个标准差水平。

Rules of The Bubble Reviewed (For Distracted Readers) 1. All 2-sigma equity bubbles in developed equity markets have burst – all the way back to trend. The U.S. reached the 2-sigma level in the summer of 2020.

2. 但其中一些泡沫在破裂前达到了 3 个标准差甚至更高——造成了更持久、更深的痛苦。美国在 2021 年末达到了 3 个标准差。

2. But some of them went to 3-sigma or more before they burst – producing longer and deeper pain. The U.S. reached 3-sigma in late 2021.

3. 时机是不确定的,当市场进入像现在这样的三西格玛超级泡沫时,可参考的案例很少。但这些超级泡沫在破裂之前,都表现出了一些共同特征。

3. Timing is uncertain and when you get to 3-sigma superbubbles, such as we have now, there are few examples. Yet they have all shown certain characteristics before they broke.

a. 投机者狂热,催生了能流传数十年的故事——这一现象我们已经持续了一年多;b. 倒数第二阶段的井喷行情,股票涨幅加速——这发生在 2020 年;c. 最终的收窄阶段——这是少数几个超级泡沫所独有的——此时,越来越少的大盘蓝筹股上涨,而风险更高、投机性更强的股票表现落后甚至下跌,就像 1929 年和 2000 年那样,也像 2021 年 2 月以来我们所看到的一样。

a. A speculative investor frenzy that generated stories for distant decades, which we have had for well over a year; b. A penultimate blow-off phase where stock gains accelerate, as we had in 2020; c. And the ultimate narrowing phase – unique to these few superbubbles – where a decreasing number of very large blue chips go up as riskier and more speculative stocks underperform or even decline, as they did in 1929 and 2000 and as they have done since February 2021.

如果 a、b、c 都齐备了,那就点燃蓝色引信,退到安全距离,祈祷出现范式转换吧。

If a, b, and c are accounted for, light the blue touchpaper8 and retire to a safe distance, praying for a paradigm shift.

用美国人的话来说,就是“导火索”。

In U.S. speak, the fuse.

让狂欢开始吧 | 第 11 页 附录 在股票超级泡沫中赚钱并降低风险 Matt Kadnar | 2022 年 1 月 应对与泡沫(尤其是超级泡沫)相关的职业风险历来非常棘手,这也是投资管理行业最大的失败之一。我们 GMO 致力于在宏观判断上做到正确。极端的市场环境,类似于我们目前正在经历的,是我们在历史上能够为投资者的投资组合显著增值的时刻。如下表所示,面对市场极端情况,我们采取了一些非常规操作,并持有了一些非常规的投资组合。

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p11 ADDENDUM Making Money and Reducing Risk in an Equity Superbubble Matt Kadnar | January 2022 Navigating the career risk associated with bubbles (especially superbubbles) has always been tricky and is one of the biggest failings in the investment management industry.9 We at GMO dedicate ourselves to trying to get the big picture calls right. Extreme market environments, similar to the one we are experiencing currently, are where we have historically been able to add significant value to investors’ portfolios. As the table shows, we have made some unconventional moves and owned some very unconventional portfolios in the face of market extremes.

泡沫时期GMO 的仓位布局
1989 年日本股票泡沫在国际股票投资组合中对日本零配置
1999 年 TMT 泡沫降低股票仓位,聚焦价值股、房地产投资信托基金和债券
2007 年全球金融危机/风险泡沫降低股票仓位,聚焦美国优质股和多空策略
2022 年股票超级泡沫降低股票仓位,聚焦非美国价值股和另类策略;股权错位策略仓位占 20%(旨在从成长股泡沫破裂中获利);少量固定收益,无美国国债,仅持有专业信贷资产

Bubble GMO Positioning 1989 Japanese Equity Bubble Zero weight in Japan in International Equity portfolio 1999 TMT Bubble Reduced equity, focus on Value stocks, REITs, and bonds 2007 Global Financial Crisis/Risk Bubble Reduced equity, focus on U.S. Quality and long/short strategies 2022 Equity Superbubble Reduced equity, focus on non-U.S. Value and alternative strategies; Equity Dislocation at 20% (designed to profit from Growth bubble bursting); modest fixed income, no Treasuries, and only specialized credit As we move through the fourth “bubble era” in GMO’s history, we have once again positioned our Asset Allocation portfolios to reduce risk and take advantage of what we believe will be a generational opportunity for adding alpha through asset allocation.

随着我们步入 GMO 历史上的第四个“泡沫时代”,我们再次调整了资产配置组合的仓位,旨在降低风险,并利用我们认为将通过资产配置产生阿尔法收益的、一代人难遇的机遇。

Equity Dislocation: Betting on the Bubble in Growth Stocks Bursting While the overall U.S. market is in bubble territory as Jeremy has outlined, the epicenter of the bubble – both at home and abroad – is concentrated in Growth stocks. As such, the largest risk position in our flagship Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy (as well as in our Alternative Allocation Strategy) is long a global portfolio of Value stocks and short a global portfolio of Growth stocks. To build these portfolios, we use a proprietary definition of “Value” and “Growth” that aims to assess the intrinsic value of companies and provides, in our view, a better lens on valuation than traditional value metrics or indices. This approach has proved to be incredibly successful: in an unusual year like 2021, where Value beat Growth by 200 bps globally, our custom approach See Jeremy Grantham’s April 2012 GMO White Paper, “My generated alpha of approximately 1,500 bps. We believe significant room remains for Sister's Pension Assets and Agency Problems (The Tension this holding to continue its strong outperformance. This portfolio is available for direct between Protecting Your Job or Your Clients' Money)”.

股权错位:押注成长股泡沫破裂

正如杰里米所指出的,虽然整个美国市场处于泡沫区域,但泡沫的中心——无论是在国内还是国外——都集中在成长股上。因此,我们旗舰产品“无基准配置策略”(以及“另类配置策略”)中最大的风险头寸是做多全球价值股组合,同时做空全球成长股组合。为了构建这些投资组合,我们使用了一套专有的“价值”和“成长”定义,旨在评估公司的内在价值,并且在我们看来,它比传统的价值指标或指数提供了更好的估值视角。这种方法已被证明非常成功:在 2021 年这样一个不寻常的年份,全球范围内价值股跑赢成长股 200 个基点,而我们这个定制化的方法(参见杰里米·格兰瑟姆 2012 年 4 月的 GMO 白皮书《我姐姐的养老金资产与代理问题:保护你的工作还是客户资金之间的张力》)创造了大约 1500 个基点的阿尔法收益。我们相信,这一持仓仍有很大的空间继续其强劲的优异表现。该投资组合可通过“股权错位策略”进行直接投资。我们还与一位客户合作构建了一个纯美国成长股的空头组合,聚焦于成长股宇宙中最昂贵的股票。我们认为,这种特定类型的投资组合是对许多投资者通过投资科技类私募股权和风险投资所获得的巨额收益的一种极佳对冲。

Let The Wild Rumpus Begin | p12 Matt Kadnar investment via the Equity Dislocation Strategy. We also have worked with a client to build Mr. Kadnar is a a pure U.S. Growth short portfolio, with a focus on the most expensive names in the member of GMO’s Growth universe. We believe this particular type of portfolio is an excellent hedge to Asset Allocation the significant gains many have experienced via investments in technology-focused team. Prior to joining private equity and venture capital.

限制股票风险敞口,聚焦最具吸引力的领域(价值、优质、主题)

除了多空策略之外,我们还大幅降低了股票风险敞口,并重点配置了非美国股票,我们相信这些股票比它们的美国同行便宜得多。我们将风险敞口集中到全球的非美国价值股上,包括新兴市场和日本的价值股。对我们来说,这些股票相对于美国股票看起来很便宜,而就新兴市场和日本价值股(尤其是日本小盘价值股)而言,它们在绝对价值上也具有吸引力。日本还受益于与股东友好型改革、盈利能力改善以及股东权益回报率提升相关的长期顺风因素。

GMO in 2004, he was an investment specialist and consultant Limited Equity Risk and Focus on Most Attractive Pockets relations manager at Putnam Investments.

在我们的全球股票组合和基准敏感的全球资产配置组合中,我们维持了对“优质策略”的配置,该策略由我们的聚焦股票团队管理,通常由具有深厚护城河、低杠杆率以及持续高盈利能力的一流公司组成。我们看到一些客户仍然希望维持对成长股的配置,但对整体估值持谨慎态度,我们建议他们配置我们的优质策略。优质股通常具有更强的成长属性,但由于我们对估值的重视,我们的优质策略与价值股的相关性,现在比过去 20 年的任何时候都要高。资源类股票(很大程度上属于价值股的一个细分领域)相对于世界其他地区看起来也很便宜。我们还看到一些客户将我们的资源策略配置作为对冲通胀的工具。最后,杰里米为持有我们的气候变化策略提出了令人信服的理由,该策略旨在抓住与缓解气候变化影响相关的机遇。资源组合和气候变化组合也由我们的聚焦股票团队管理,关键的是,该团队在股票选择中坚持严格的估值纪律。

Previously, he served as in-house counsel (Value, Quality, Thematic) for LPL Financial Services and as a senior Outside of long/short strategies, we have reduced our equity risk considerably and associate at Melick & Porter, LLP. Mr. Kadnar emphasized non-U.S. stocks, which we believe are considerably cheaper than their U.S. has a B.S. from Boston College majoring in counterparts. We have concentrated our exposure to non-U.S. Value stocks globally, Finance and Philosophy and a J.D. from St. including those in Emerging Markets and Japan. To us, these stocks look very cheap Louis University School of Law. He is a CFA relative to the U.S. and in the case of Emerging Markets and Japan Value, particularly charterholder. Japanese Small Value, they are attractive in absolute terms as well. Japan also benefits from secular tailwinds related to shareholder-friendly reforms and improved profitability and return on shareholder equity.10 Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Matt In our Global Equity and our benchmark-sensitive Global Asset Allocation portfolios, Kadnar through the period ending January we have also maintained an allocation to our Quality Strategy, managed by our Focused 20, 2022, and are subject to change at any Equity team and generally composed of outstanding companies with deep moats, low time based on market and other conditions. levels of leverage, and consistent, high, profitability. We have seen clients who still This is not an offer or solicitation for the want to maintain an allocation to Growth but are cautious about overall valuations purchase or sale of any security and should allocate to our Quality Strategy. Quality generally has growthier characteristics, but not be construed as such. References because of our focus on valuation, our Quality Strategy is now more highly correlated to specific securities and issuers are for to Value than at any point in the last 20 years. Resource equities, which are largely a illustrative purposes only and are not segment of Value, also look cheap relative to the rest of the world. We have also seen intended to be, and should not be interpreted clients allocate to our Resources Strategy as a hedge against inflation. Finally, Jeremy as, recommendations to purchase or sell has made a compelling case for owning our Climate Change Strategy, which seeks to such securities. take advantage of opportunities related to mitigating the effects of climate change.

在降低风险的同时赚钱

应对泡沫充满了各种风险——绝对风险、相对风险和职业风险。这一次也不例外:均值回归何时开始,本质上不可知。然而,当今市场仍然存在着显著的赚钱和降低风险的机会,就像 1987 年、1999 年和 2008 年那样。我们知道,卖出赢家、再平衡买入输家是良好的投资纪律,但由于一系列行为因素,要做到这一点极其困难。鉴于杰里米所阐述的风险,这种投资纪律尤其关键。

The Resources and Climate Change portfolios are also managed by our Focused Equity Copyright © 2022 by GMO LLC. team that, critically, maintains a significant valuation discipline in their stock selection. All rights reserved.

参见 GMO 2022 年 1 月白皮书《日本股票:根深蒂固的认知忽视了不断改善的现实》,作者:Drew Edwards 和 Rick Friedman。

Making Money While Reducing Risk Navigating bubbles is fraught with all types of risk – absolute, relative, and career.

让狂欢开始吧 | 第 12 页 Matt Kadnar 是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员。在 2004 年加入 GMO 之前,他曾在 Putnam Investments 担任投资专家和客户关系经理。此前,他曾在 LPL Financial Services 担任内部法律顾问,并在 Melick & Porter, LLP 担任高级助理。Kadnar 先生拥有波士顿学院金融与哲学专业理学学士学位,以及圣路易斯大学法学院法学博士学位。他是 CFA 持证人。

This time is no different: when mean reversion will begin is inherently unknowable.

免责声明

本文表达的观点是 Matt Kadnar 截至 2022 年 1 月 20 日的观点,并可能根据市场和其他条件随时发生变化。这不是任何证券的购买或销售要约或邀请,也不应被理解为如此。对特定证券和发行人的引用仅供说明之用,无意也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

However, there remain significant opportunities to make money and reduce risk in today’s market, just as there were in 1987, 1999, and 2008. We know that selling winners and rebalancing into losers is good investment discipline but incredibly difficult to do for a whole host of behavioral reasons. That investment discipline is particularly critical given the risks Jeremy has articulated.

版权所有 © 2022 GMO LLC。保留所有权利。

See “Japan Equities: Entrenched Perceptions Ignore Improving Reality,” a January 2022 GMO white paper by Drew Edwards and Rick Friedman.