前线访谈：约翰·博格——美国退休面临的“火车失事”

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约翰·博格：美国退休制度正面临“火车失事” | 《前线》| PBS | 官方网站 | 纪录片系列

John Bogle: The "Train Wreck" Awaiting American Retirement | FRONTLINE | PBS | Official Site | Documentary Series

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约翰·博格：美国退休制度正面临的“火车失事”

John Bogle: The “Train Wreck” Awaiting American Retirement

约翰·博格：美国退休制度正面临的“火车失事”

John Bogle: The “Train Wreck” Awaiting American Retirement

Jason M. Breslow

April 23, 2013

约翰·博格是先锋集团（Vanguard Group）的创始人，长期倡导投资指数基金。美国的退休制度“几乎是在与人的心理作对——人们觉得过去表现好的东西，将来也会表现好，”博格告诉《前线》。“那不是真的。那绝对是错的。”以下是对他 2012 年 11 月 5 日采访的编辑稿。我想回顾一些历史，因为你本人也见证了不少历史。你经历了很多事。我们就从共同基金行业开始说起吧。最初为什么会有共同基金？是谁想出来的，又是为什么？

John Bogle is the founder of The Vanguard Group and a longtime champion of investing in index funds. America’s retirement system “is almost rigged against human psychology that says [if] something has done well in the past, it will do well in the future,” Bogle told FRONTLINE. “That is not true. That is categorically false.” This is the edited transcript of an interview conducted on Nov. 5, 2012. I’d like to cover some history, since you’ve covered some history yourself. You’ve seen a lot of things go by. Let’s just start with the mutual fund industry. Why do we have mutual funds in the first place? Who came up with the idea, and why?

……第一只真正的共同基金，马萨诸塞投资者信托（Massachusetts Investors Trust），创立于 1924 年。推动这个行业发展的，是它背后的常识：我会说，第一是分散投资——这个好处被严重低估了；第二是效率；第三，在当时是相对低成本；第四——我通常把它放最后——是管理，因为管理无法增加价值，但人们总觉得有人管理他们的投资会更安心。

… The first actual mutual fund, Mass[achusetts] Investors Trust, was started in 1924. What makes the industry go is the common sense behind it: I would say, number one, diversification — very underrated benefit; number two, efficiency; and number three, for those days, relatively low cost; and number four — I always put this last — management, because management cannot add value, but people somehow feel more comfortable with management looking over their investments.

顺便说一句，在那个年代，典型的共同基金非常像指数基金。它们是有管理的，但年复一年地追踪市场。……

In those days, by the way, the typical mutual fund was very much like an index fund. They were managed, but they tracked the market for years and years. …

……第一批共同基金本质上就是指数基金，让没有太多钱的人可以买入一只基金，从而实现分散投资，因为这些基金是一篮子的迷你股票。

… The first mutual funds were essentially index funds that allowed an investor that didn’t have a lot of money to buy into a fund and therefore diversify, because these were baskets of mini-stocks.

对。而且相当高效，相当长期化，焦点也很集中，那是最初的共同基金。所以它们不像今天这样频繁交易。它们基本上买入一篮子蓝筹股。……

Right. And it was fairly efficient, and it was fairly long term, and it’s focused, the original mutual fund. So they weren’t doing all the trading like they’re doing today. They bought, basically, a basket of blue-chip stocks. …

它最初也是一种受托人业务。很多早期的共同基金与销售其份额毫无关系。有专门的公司在市场上销售共同基金份额并收取佣金，但买卖决策由基金自己做。我们当时根本没想到要营销。

It began also as a business of trusteeship. Many of the original mutual funds had nothing to do with the marketing of their shares. Firms were out there that sold mutual fund shares and made a commission on it, but they did the buying and selling. We didn’t even think about marketing.

你创立了一只基金，中间路线的基金。那个年代都是这样，20 年代末、30 年代初，一直到 40 年代，甚至到了 50 年代。所以基金由受托人管理，我认为他们对投资者有一种受托责任感。营销不是核心。营销是辅助性的，即使管理人控制了营销方。

You started a fund, middle-of-the-road fund. They all were in those days, in the late ’20s and early ’30s and into the ’40s and really up to the ’50s. And so they were run by trustees who felt a certain sense, I think, of fiduciary duty to their investors. Marketing was not in the middle of the picture. Marketing [was] peripheral, even if the manager controlled the marketer.

“当我进入这个行业时，这是一个带有商业元素的职业。如今，共同基金行业是一个带有职业元素的商业，而且职业元素还太少。”当你只有一只基金时，想想你的视角。就像我在威灵顿基金（Wellington Fund）时。我 1951 年加入公司时，那是我们唯一的一只基金。我们与威灵顿基金同生共死。我们想要好好照管那只基金，我们每时每刻都知道它在做什么。

“When I joined this business, it was a profession with elements of a business. Today the mutual fund industry is a business with elements of a profession, and too few elements at that.” And when you had only one fund, think about your perspective. Like I was at the Wellington Fund. When I joined the firm in 1951, [it] was the only fund we had. We lived and died with Wellington Fund. It was a fund that we wanted to take good care of, and we knew what it was doing every minute of every day.

如今，这一切都消失了。这些私人投资经理，如果你愿意叫他们受托人的话，常常被大型金融集团取代，它们收购了基金业务；或者被看到了盈利前景的基金经理取代，它们上市了，拥有公众投资者。

Today all that has vanished. These private investment managers, trustees if you will, have been replaced often by giant financial conglomerates that bought into the fund business, or by fund managers that could see the profitability in it, that went public and had public investors.

在最大的 50 家基金中，我想大概只有六家仍然是私人持有的，然后还有先锋集团，由它自己的股东持有——结果证明，这比私人持有更好。

Of the 50 largest funds, I think the number is about six that are still privately held, and then there’s Vanguard, which is held by its own shareholders — better than privately held, as it turns out.

然后突然间，我们不再是受托人照看一只基金，而是进入了营销业务。所以现在的大公司，包括先锋集团，都有 150 只、250 只、350 只不同的基金在同一管理之下。人们不可能了解；董事不可能了解；管理层也不可能了解。你无法追踪 300 只或 200 只基金。这是一个营销业务。

Then all of a sudden, instead of one fund that we’re looking after as trustees, we’re in the marketing business. So now the big firms, including Vanguard, have 150, 250, 350 different funds under one management. People can’t possibly know; the directors can’t know; the management can’t know. You can’t track 300 funds or 200 funds. It’s a marketing business.

我们需要一只针对这个市场板块的基金，一只针对成长股的，一只针对价值股的，一只针对新兴市场的，一只针对能源股的，一只针对医疗保健股的。所以我们回应市场的需求，却失去了服务投资者的焦点，转而服务我们自己，说实话，是满足市场的需求。这是非常不同的业务。

We need one for this sector of the market, one for growth, one for value, one for emerging markets, one for energy, one for health care. So we respond to the needs of the market and lose our focus on serving the investor rather than serving ourselves, to be truthful, and meeting the needs of the marketplace. It’s a very different business.

为什么这不是个好主意？你现在分散到了许多不同的板块，每个人都有适合自己的基金，并且启动了一台营销机器，出去告诉人们他们拥有哪些选择。

Why isn’t that a good idea? You’ve now diversified into many different sectors, and there’s a fund for everybody, and started a marketing machine that goes out and informs people of all the choices they have.

选择越少越好。选择是你的敌人，因为你的选择基于一件事：过往业绩。过往业绩不会重现。而且，在营销业务中，你还会开始采用非常极端的投资方法。

The less choice the better. Choice is your enemy, because you choose based on one thing: past performance. Past performance does not recur. And you also start to get, in the marketing business, very extreme kinds of investment approaches.

例如，在互联网时代，或者说是信息时代，在 1990 年代末，人们开始设立互联网基金。它们暴跌，其中一半、四分之三，也许 80% 现在都不存在了。

For example, in the Internet age, information age if you will, back in the late 1990s, people were starting Internet funds. They went crashing down, and half of them, three-quarters of them, maybe 80 percent of them are now gone.

所以试图迎合市场不是个好主意。好好照看你已有的东西，确保把工作做到最好，这才是个好主意，因为潮流和风尚来来去去。……

So it’s not a good idea to try and feed the market. It’s a good idea to watch over what you’ve already got and make sure you do the best possible job, because fads and fashions come and go. …

当我进入这个行业时，这是一个带有商业元素的职业。如今，共同基金行业是一个带有职业元素的商业，而且职业元素还太少。

When I joined this business, it was a profession with elements of a business. Today the mutual fund industry is a business with elements of a profession, and too few elements at that.

你说的职业，是指一种受托责任，把消费者、客户的利益放在心上，而不是一个只考虑自己利益的商业。

And by profession you mean a trust that has the interest of the consumer, the client, in mind, as opposed to a business that has its own interests in mind.

正是如此。商业有一个明显的存在理由——赚取利润，对管理公司来说就是利润。不需要天才也能明白，管理公司的利润越大，投资者获得的利润就越小，因为两者都基于吸收资产和提高费用。

Exactly so. Business has an obvious reason for existence — to earn a profit, and that’s a profit for the management company. It doesn’t take a genius to know that the bigger the profit of the management company, the smaller the profit that investors get, because they’re both based on gathering assets and raising fees.

所以你管理的资产越多，你收取的费用就越多。当你可以削减费用来帮助基金股东时，你面临着一个“一仆不能侍二主”的困境。你应该服务管理公司的所有者——如今通常是上市公司或被集团拥有——还是服务基金股东的利益？

So the more assets you have, the more fees you get. And when you could cut them back to help the fund shareholder, you’re faced with this no-man-can-serve-two-masters dilemma. Should you serve the owners of the management company, now public or owned by a conglomerate, which is to serve the interest of the fund shareholders?

成本是一个关键问题，投资的回报如何在投资者与资金管理者或营销者之间分配。资金管理者总是想要更多，这在大多数行业里很自然，但对这个行业却不对。

And cost is a crucial issue, how the returns of investing are allocated between investors and money managers or marketers. So the money managers always want more, and that’s natural enough in most businesses, but it’s not right for this business.

那么从某种意义上说，营销、竞争，所有这些都是资本主义体系的核心。这关乎竞争。这关乎发明一个更好的灯泡。

In a sense then, marketing, competition, all of this, it’s the capitalist system at its core. It’s about competition. It’s about inventing a better light bulb.

市场自由进入。

Free entry into the marketplace.

但在这个案例中，它并没有服务消费者。

But this is not serving, in this case, consumers.

它没有服务消费者，原因很简单，我借用布兰代斯大法官（Justice Louis Brandeis）的话，称之为“冷酷的朴素算术法则”。那就是，我们仍然认为 2 加 2 等于 4，或者 2 减 2 等于 0。但当我们谈论市场时，我们谈论的是市场回报，而这个回报是在投资者和管理者之间分配的。

It is not serving consumers for the very simple reason, I call it “the relentless rules of humble arithmetic” after Justice [Louis] Brandeis. And that is, we still think 2 and 2 makes 4, or 2 minus 2 equals zero. But when we talk about the market, we’re talking about the market return, and that return is allocated between investors and managers.

所以冷酷的算术法则本质上说，我们在市场上赚取的所有总回报，减去获得那些服务的成本——

So the relentless rules of arithmetic say essentially, this gross return that all of us earn in the markets, minus the cost of thank you, gaining that service —

就是他们收取的费用。

Those are the fees that they charge.

费用、开支、基金内部的投资组合周转率、销售佣金、咨询费、运营费用——全部扣除，剩下的净回报才分配给投资者。所以成本是方程式中一个关键部分。

Fees, expenses, portfolio turnover inside of the fund, sales loads, advisory fees, operating expenses — take them all out, and the net return divided up by investors is what’s left. So costs are a crucial part of the equation.

很多人说，“那又怎样？”想想这个。我们很幸运地获得了市场 7% 的回报。这意味着投资者作为一个整体分配这 7% 的回报，不应该让任何人惊讶。假设获得这个回报的成本是 2%——可能略高，但大致在这个范围——那么总回报 7% 的投资者将净得 5%。

And a lot of people say, “So what?” Well, think about this. We’re lucky enough to get a 7 percent return on the market. That means it should not surprise anybody that investors as a group divide up 7 percent. Suppose it costs two percent — maybe a little bit high but in the ballpark — to gain that return. Then investors who grossed 7 percent will net 5 percent.

现在，当市场上涨时，就像 80 年代和 90 年代那样，年回报 17%，2% 看起来不算什么。但这其实是非常多的。如果你把 7% 和 5% 的回报复利 50 年，我们称之为一个投资生命周期——实际上投资生命周期比那更长——那么大约 70% 的市场回报流向了服务的提供者，华尔街如果你愿意的话，只有 30% 流向了基金所有者。……

Now, when the market’s going up, as it did in the ’80s and ’90s, at 17 percent a year, 2 percent doesn’t seem like much. But it’s an awful lot. And if you compound a 7 percent and the 5 percent return over, say, 50 years, let’s call that an investment lifetime — well, in fact the investment lifetime is longer than that — something like 70 percent of the market return goes to the purveyors of the services, Wall Street if you will, and 30 percent goes to the fund owners. …

所以它被严重低估了，部分原因是我们都太关注短期。我们不考虑为一生的投资。

So it’s greatly underrated, in part because we’re all so short-term-focused. We don’t think about investing for a lifetime.

……假设我有 100 美元，我为此支付 1% 到 2% 的费用。【怎么可能】到我退休生活结束时，我只拿回了如果没有被收取这些费用时本应拿回的 30%？

… Say I have $100, and I’m paying 1 to 2 percent of that in fees. [How is it possible] that at the end of my retirement life I’m only taking home 30 percent of what I would have taken home if I hadn’t been charged those fees?

这正是我们所有人都学过的经典例子，大概从小学就开始了，关于复利回报的魔力，长期来看的复利。

What it is is the classic example all of us have been taught, probably from grade school on, about the magic of compounding returns, compound interest if you will, over the long term.

在基金业务中发生的情况是，复利回报的魔力被复利成本的暴政所压倒。这是一个数学事实。无法回避。我们没有关注到这一点，这对我们来说太糟糕了。

What happens in the fund business is the magic of compound returns is overwhelmed by the tyranny of compounding cost. It’s a mathematical fact. There’s no getting around it. The fact that we don’t look at it, too bad for us.

……什么是受托人？这个行业发生了什么？

… What is a fiduciary, and what happened to the business?

受托人是指被委托承担责任的人，在此例中是他人资产的责任，受托人的义务是把他所管理资金的那些人的利益置于自己的利益之前。

The fiduciary is one who is entrusted with the responsibility, in this case the assets of others, and the duty of a fiduciary is to put the interest of those persons for whom he is running the money first before his own.

这是一个合同协议吗？

And that’s a contractual agreement.

这不完全是合同协议，但它肯定是一种相互理解，并且绝对符合 1940 年《投资公司法》——我们基金行业的指导法规——所说的，即共同基金股东的利益必须置于基金受托人、管理人、高管、董事和分销商的利益之前。而现实并非如此。

It’s not quite a contractual agreement, but it is certainly a mutual understanding and absolutely consistent with what the Investment Company Act of 1940 — our guiding statute in the fund business — says, which is the interest of mutual fund shareholders must be placed ahead of the interest of fund trustees, managers, officers and directors and distributors. And that’s not happening.

……直到个人退休账户（IRA）推出之后，人们才开始看到普通人买入共同基金。1974 年的《雇员退休收入保障法》（ERISA）和 IRA 的推出有多重要？

… It wasn’t until the introduction of the IRA [individual retirement account] that you started to see ordinary people buy into mutual funds. What’s the importance of the ERISA act [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] of [1974] and the launching of the IRA?

嗯，这一点以后会变得很重要。但真实情况是，进入 60 年代中期后，那被称为“沸腾年代”。那是热门共同基金的时代，这些基金押注的是股票价格，而不是股票的内在价值。

Well, that’s going to be important later on. But [what] really happened [was] as we got into the middle 1960s, it was called the go-go era. It was the era of the hot mutual fund, the funds that were betting on stock prices rather than the stock intrinsic values.

为了满足对沸腾基金的需求，大量基金被创建出来，这标志着这个行业开始从本质上是一个保守的行业，转变为一个本质上咄咄逼人的营销行业。一切就是从这里开始的。

A plethora of funds were created to meet the demand for go-go funds, and that was the start of changing this industry from what was essentially a conservative industry to essentially an aggressive marketing industry. That’s where it began.

然后这之后……有两个十年，80 年代和 90 年代，股市平均回报率达到 17%。那段时期股票价值本身增长并不多，但股票倍数、股票估值、市盈率从 80 年代初的 10 倍，即 10 块钱买一块钱的盈利，涨到了 80 年代末的 20 倍，再到 90 年代末的 40 倍。

Then that [was] followed [by] … two decades, the ’80s and the ’90s, [in] which stock market returns averaged 17 percent. Stock values didn’t do so much during that period, but stock multiples, stock evaluations, price earnings multiples went from 10 at the beginning of the ’80s, 10 times earnings, $10 to buy a dollar of earnings, to 20 times at the end of the ’80s and to 40 times at the end of the ’90s.

……换句话说，就公司的整体价值而言，股票的价值并没有真正改变，改变的是人们愿意为其支付更高价格的意愿。投机性的。

… In other words, the value of the share in terms of the company’s overall worth didn’t really change, but what changed was the willingness of people to just pay more for it. Speculative.

投机。……这是一个相当简单的等式。首先，你买入时，就知道股息收益率是多少。其次，你知道盈利与美国 GDP（国内生产总值）之间有非常高的相关性。美国企业盈利大致与这个国家同步增长。

Speculation. … And it’s a pretty simple equation. First, when you buy in, you know what the dividend yield is. And second, you know that earnings have a very high correlation with the GDP, gross domestic product, in the United States. Corporate earnings grow very roughly with America.

所以，你有一个众所周知的给定事实，即收益率；第二，一个合理的预期，即企业会与国家一起增长。而国家应该有一个正常的增长率，名义增长率，经通胀调整后，大约在 5% 左右。

So you’ve got one, a well-known and given fact, the yield, and two, a reasonable expectation that corporations will grow with the country. And the country should have a normal growth rate, nominal growth rate adjusted for inflation, of around 5 percent.

你有 3% 的通胀有助于推升价值，再加上 2% 的经通胀调整后的真实盈利增长。所以，人们在花大价钱买的是，你想想看，2% 的真实盈利增长。仅此而已。永远都只是这样。

You have 3 percent inflation that helps to build up the values, and so you get 2 percent real, after adjustment or inflation, earnings growth. So people are paying a lot of money for, when you think about it, 2 percent real earnings growth. That’s all it is. That’s all it will ever be.

如果随着时间的推移，盈利增长率为 2%，那么你大约有 2% 的股息。

If [you have] 2 percent earnings growth over time, then you have about a 2 percent dividend.

这是另一个发生重大变化的事情。80 年代开始时，至少是 70 年代末，股息收益率接近 6%。到 80 年代末，接近 3%，到 90 年代末，变成了 1%。

That’s another big thing that changed. We started off the ’80s, at least in the late ’70s, the dividend yield was almost 6 percent. By the end of the ’80s, it was almost 3 percent, and by the end of the ’90s, it was 1 percent.

因为我们有所有这些不支付任何股息的互联网股票。

Because we had all these dot-com stocks that didn’t pay any dividends.

是啊，而且人们普遍在抬高股价。……

Yeah, and also people were bidding up prices generally. …

那么，这个行业到底是怎么回事？

So what’s this business about?

首先，股票的长期回报率是 9%，对吧？这是历史回报，因为它平均下来，过去 100 年股息收益率平均为 4.5%，盈利增长率为 4.5%。这就是 9。……

First of all, the long-term return on stocks is 9 percent, OK? That’s the historical return, because it averages 4.5 percent of dividend yield averages over 100 years and 4.5 percent of earnings growth. That’s the 9. …

但你对未来的预测低于这个数字。

But your prediction for the future is lower than that.

部分原因是更低了，我告诉你简单的部分。我刚才告诉你的原始回报率是基于 4.5% 的初始股息收益率，而现在我们只有 2% 的股息收益率。

It’s lower than that in part to give you the simple part. The original returns I just told you [were] based on a 4.5 percent opening dividend yield, and now we have a 2 percent dividend yield.

所以展望未来……按照你的设想，似乎能赚到的钱非常非常少。

So going forward, … it seems like by your scenario, there’s very, very little money to be made.

……这么看吧。如果股息收益率比长期历史回报率 9% 低了 2%，那回报率会降到 7%。那 2% 的股息是净损失。所以，在这个时代，7% 的回报率已经相当不错了，因为债券收益率可能只有 2% 或 3%，这取决于你的投资组合。所以，对于未来十年来说，股票确实是一项相当好的投资。应该是的。

… Look at it this way. If the dividend yield is 2 percent lower than the long-term return of 9 percent, we’ll drop to 7. It’s a deadweight loss, that dividend. So 7 percent is a pretty good return in this day and age, because bonds are yielding maybe 2, maybe 3 percent depending on your portfolio. So stocks are really a pretty good investment for the next 10 years. Should be.

……但一旦你扣除了费用，调整了通胀，再减去税务成本，剩下的回报就相当微薄了，1% 或 2%。

… But once you subtract your fees, you adjust for inflation, and you subtract tax costs, you’re down into pretty paltry return, 1 or 2 percent.

我们可不会告诉人们这点，你明白，在这个行业里。

We don’t tell people that, you see, in this business.

那你会是一个非常糟糕的营销者。……

You’d be a very bad marketer. …

……我不销售主动管理型共同基金。我创立了第一只指数共同基金。所以，我不是从市场回报中每年抽取比如说 2%，而是只抽取 5 个基点，即不到市场回报的 0.1%。所以如果市场回报是 7%，通过指数基金，我会给你 6.95%，因为运营成本只有 0.5%。

… I’m not selling managed mutual funds. I created the first index mutual fund. So instead of taking out, say, 2 percent a year from the market’s return, I’m going take five basis points, less than 0.1 of 1 percent out of that market return. So if we get a 7 percent return, I’m going to give you 6.95 in the index fund because it only costs 0.5 of 1 percent to run.

这样，我扣除了管理成本，扣除了投资组合周转成本，扣除了几乎所有的税务成本，因为我们不是一直在交易并实现资本利得。我不想显得商业化，但这在数学上是一个无法被证伪的命题。……

So I take out the management cost, I take out the portfolio turnover cost, I take out almost all the tax cost, because we’re not trading all the time and realizing capital gains. I don’t mean to be commercial about this, but it is simply mathematically a proposition that cannot be disproven. …

就美国退休保障的演变而言，我们已经从固定收益计划、养老金，转向了固定缴款计划。……请描述一下，随着这些（不同的）工具被引入以及人们纷纷涌入共同基金，我们的退休保障正在发生什么。……

In terms of the evolution of America’s retirement health, we’ve moved from defined benefit programs, pensions, to defined contribution. … Describe what’s happening to our retirement health as these [different] instruments are introduced and the rush of people into mutual funds. …

……在我的新书《文化的冲突》中，有一章是关于未来退休规划的，它说我们的退休系统……注定要发生一场火车事故，除非我们对此采取行动。

… In my new book, which is called The Clash of the Cultures , I have a chapter on future retirement planning, and it says our retirement system is … headed for a train wreck unless we do something about it.

简单来说，我从社会保障开始讲起，它必须通过渐进、微小的调整才能再次具备偿付能力。……然后是企业固定收益计划。他们假设——州和地方政府的固定收益计划情况更糟——他们都假设其投资组合的市场年回报率是 8%。

I start off, simply put, with Social Security, which has to be changed in gradual, small ways to become solvent again. … Then you go to corporate defined benefit plans. They are assuming — and state and local government defined benefit plans even worse — they are all assuming that the market return in their portfolio will be 8 percent a year.

绝无可能，他们根本不可能赚到 8%。这是不可能的。无论他们做什么，鉴于我们对股票和债券市场的预期，他们都深陷困境。……他们真正能期望的最好情况是 5% 的回报率，除非未来出现某种美妙且有吸引力的情景，但这实在难以想象。情况只会更糟。

There is no way under the sun that they’re going to earn 8 percent. It’s just impossible. No matter what they do, they’re stuck in a bind given the kind of markets we expect in stocks and bonds. … The best they can really hope for is a 5 percent return unless some wonderful, attractive scenario for the future unfolds, which is really unimaginable. If anything, it’s going to be worse.

所以，如果你想到他们的回报是以 4%，而不是他们计划中假设的 8% 在复利增长，他们就必须开始向这些计划投入大量资金。他们会破产的。

So if you think about them compounding their returns at 4 percent instead of the 8 percent that they build into the plan, they’re going to have to start putting a lot of money into those plans. They’re going to be bankrupt.

这些计划已经消亡很长时间了。

Those plans have been dying out for a long time.

……它们正在被淘汰。企业正在转向固定缴款计划。但如果你遇到一个糟糕的年份，你没有为你的员工缴款，管理层说“今年负担不起”，好吧，那恰恰是他们应该负担得起的年份。所以固定缴款制度存在严重缺陷。

… They’re dropping out. They’re changing to defined contribution plans, the corporations are. But if you have a bad year, you don’t make any contributions for your employees, the management says, “Can’t afford it this year,” well, that’s the year they should afford it. So the defined contribution system is deeply flawed.

而它真正是什么——当你看 IRA 和 401(k)，特别是 401(k) 储蓄计划时——它们是储蓄计划。它们不是退休计划。它们从来就不是被设计成退休计划的，但我们现在却用它们来构建退休计划，这根本行不通。……

And what it really is — when you look at IRA and 401(k), and particularly 401(k) thrift plans — they are thrift plans. They are not retirement plans. They were never designed to be retirement plans, but we’re using them to build a retirement plan now, and it simply is not going to work. …

401(k) 来了。是什么催生了它？

The 401(k) arrived. What prompted its creation?

……一些非常聪明的人发现了一个法律上的漏洞，不算坏的漏洞，就是可以让公司把钱放进去，员工也把钱放进去，然后你可以获得许可，确保这部分钱不缴任何税。这基本上就是 401(k) 计划。

… Some very smart people found a sort of loophole in the law, not a bad loophole, where you could have companies put their money in and employees put their money in together, and you could get clearance to make sure that didn’t have any taxes on it. That’s the 401(k) plan in essence.

但你想的时候就可以把钱取出来。你可以说你有急事。而最糟糕的一点是：你可以选择任何你想要的基金。……

But you can get out of it when you want. You can say you have an emergency when you want. And here’s the worst of it: You can pick any fund that you want. …

如果你想拿你的退休金去赌博，我只能说请便，但请意识到数学上的现实。玩这个游戏而做得更好的机会微乎其微。如果我想给它一个具体的数字，让我凭直觉说，你长期能跑赢市场的概率可能只有 0.1%。

If you want to gamble with your retirement money, all I can say is be my guest, but be aware of the mathematical reality. The chances you will do better playing that game are infinitely small. If I want to put a number on it, let me just say [off the] top of the head that maybe you have 0.1 of 1 percent chance of beating the market over time.

现在，想一下这个。你 25 岁，你要投资未来 50 年，所以你买入一只指数基金并一直持有。你永远不用担心基金经理。不会有新扫帚进来把一切扫干净。

Now, think about this for a minute. You’re 25 years old, and you’re going to invest for the next 50 years, so you’re going to buy an index fund and hold it all that time. You never have to worry about the manager. There aren’t new brooms that come in and sweep clean.

现在你买一只主动管理型基金。首先，今天市场上存在的主动管理型共同基金，有一半在十年后就不存在了。失败率会达到 50%。过去 20 年里我们就看到了这一点。……

Now you buy an actually managed fund. First of all, half of the actively managed mutual funds that are out there today aren’t going to be around 10 years from now. There’s going to be a 50 percent failure rate. We’ve had that in the past, in the last 20 years. …

所以，如果你拥有的基金本身都无法长期存在，你怎么能成为长期投资者呢？还有一点。即使你足够幸运，处于那存活下来的一半基金中，它们也会每五年换一次经理。这就是这个行业里一位投资组合经理的平均任期。

So how can you be a long-term investor if the fund you own doesn’t last for the long term? And then there’s something else. Even if you’re lucky enough to be in that half of funds that does survive, they’re going to have a new manager every five years. That’s how long a portfolio manager lasts in this business.

所以，假设你有四只共同基金，每五年你就会换四位经理，如果把这个时间拉长到 50 年，你会经历 40 位经理。想想看，40 位收取高额费用的共同基金经理，有哪一点能接近一只不主动管理、低费率的指数基金的回报呢？根本不存在。数学上就不可能存在。

So if you have, say, four mutual funds, you’re going to have four managers every five years, and if you take that to 50 years, you’re going to have 40 managers. Think about the possibility of 40 mutual fund managers with those high fees coming anywhere near the return of an unmanaged low-expense index fund. It just isn’t there. Mathematically can’t be there.

营销告诉你的不是这样。而且这个行业制造了一些传奇，比如彼得·林奇管理的富达麦哲伦基金，它年复一年地跑赢大盘，跑赢你的指数基金。所以，为了给人们提供选择，行业推出了像麦哲伦这样的基金，让你有机会战胜市场。这不是一件好事吗？

The marketing tells you otherwise. And the industry has created legends, such as Peter Lynch at Fidelity Magellan Fund, who outperform the broad market, outperform your index fund, year after year after year. So in the interest of giving people choices, the industry puts forward funds like Magellan and gives you an opportunity to beat the market. Isn’t that a good thing?

嗯，如果过去能预示未来，那将是件大好事。但你看，麦哲伦基金就是一个绝佳的例子。……来自雇主的压力，要求引入外部基金，为他们的投资者提供“开放架构”，这种压力如此之大，以至于我们允许他们加入麦哲伦基金。

Well, if only the past were prologue it would be a great thing. But look, the Magellan Funds are a great example. … The pressure from employers to bring in outside funds, to have “open architecture” for their investors, was so powerful that we allowed them to add Magellan Fund.

判断失误。麦哲伦基金在 1992 年达到市场顶峰。它在 1992 年拥有 1050 亿美元的资产。在随后的 20 年里，它几乎可以说是一个彻底的失败，比平庸还差。远低于平均水平。现在该基金的资产是 100 亿美元。比 1992 年减少了 950 亿美元，规模缩小了 92%。现在每个人都在撤离麦哲伦。……

Bad judgment. Magellan Fund reached its peak over the market in 1992. It had $105 billion of assets in 1992. It has been pretty much an abject failure, worse than mediocre, in the 20 years that followed. Way below par. And the fund now has assets of $10 billion. That’s $95 billion smaller, 92 percent smaller than it was in 1992. Everybody’s getting out of Magellan now. …

你对华尔街、投机的兴起、高频交易的兴起，以及这些对人们退休希望和梦想所造成的影响，写得相当尖刻。

You write pretty scathingly about Wall Street, the rise of speculation, the rise of high-frequency trading, and what this has done to people’s retirement hopes and dreams.

我所提供的只是事实。……现在，金融体系的主要功能是为资本主义的机器加油，这意味着筹集新资金，用于购买新股，这些新股来自新公司、增长最快的公司、盈利潜力最大的公司，并把资金引导到那里去。

All I offer is the facts. … Now, principal function of the financial system is to oil the machinery of capitalism, so that means raising new money to buy shares in the new companies, the companies that are growing the fastest, the companies that have the greatest potential for profitability, and direct that money there.

我们可以每年从首次公开发行（IPO）、新公司以及现有公司的增发中衡量这一点。我们每年在这方面投入多少？答案是 2500 亿美元的新资金从投资者流向企业。

We can measure that year after year in initial public offerings, the new companies, and supplementary equity offerings of existing companies. How much do we do of that every year? The answer to that is $250 billion of new money flowing from investors to corporations.

因为这是美国集体的储蓄，流入金融行业，流向华尔街，然后借给公司，以便它们能开发新产品、建造桥梁，或从事任何它们赖以生存的业务。

Because this is the collective savings of America that goes into the financial industry, to Wall Street, and then is lent out to companies so they can build new products, build bridges, whatever they do for a living.

完全正确。说得太好了。那么，现实情况是什么？……在华尔街，我们互相来回交易，显然除了华尔街彼此之间，对谁都没好处。……

Exactly. Perfectly said. Now, what is the reality? … In Wall Street we trade with each other back and forth, obviously to no one’s avail except for Wall Street’s with one another. …

我们互相下注。

We make bets with each other.

你们互相下注，所以我们作为一个群体不可能赢。这个总量每年是 33 万亿美元。……所以如果从这个角度来看——我承认，这有点过于简单化了——那就意味着我们金融体系所做的 99.2% 是赌场，只有 0.8% 是经典的资本主义，将新投资引导到最高、最好、最有利可图的用途上。

You make bets with each other, so we can’t win as a group. That total is $33 trillion a year. … So if you want to look at it from that vantage point — that’s a little bit oversimplified; I admit that — that means that 99.2 percent of what our financial system does is a casino, and 0.8 percent is classic capitalism, directing new investment to its highest and best and most profitable uses.

我现在就能听到华尔街在说：“得了吧，杰克。我们是在为系统提供流动性。所有这些来回交易让资金流动，让一切运转起来，我们都知道当资金停止流动时会发生什么。”

I can hear Wall Street saying right now: “Come on, Jack. We’re providing liquidity for the system. All that trading back and forth keeps money moving, keeps things going around, and we all know what happens when that money stops flowing.”

……不是说流动性不好。流动性是好的；是必要的；是一切。

… It’s not that liquidity is bad. It is good; it is necessary; it is everything.

但我们需要多少流动性？我们需要一个年换手率 250% 的市场吗？答案是我们过去从来不需要。……现在的交易量相对于流通股数量是 60 年前的 10 倍。那时我们有充足的流动性。现在我们也有充足的流动性。而这只是让彼此交易变得更方便、成本更低。我认为这不值得。

But how much liquidity do we need? Do we need a market turning over at 250 percent a year? The answer is we never used to. … It’s 10 times as much trading relative to the amount of stock outstanding than there was 60 years ago. We had plenty of liquidity then. We have plenty of liquidity now. And it just makes trading with one another easier and less expensive. I don’t think it’s worth it.

如果华尔街想大举下注，这跟我和我的退休基金有什么关系？我们知道，当他们在一堆糟糕的抵押贷款上下了坏赌注时，那会造成真正的问题。但总的来说，当华尔街在忙于其业务，彼此买卖，交易衍生品和各种难以理解的 fancy 东西时，为什么那会影响我的退休基金？

What’s this got to do with me and my retirement funds if Wall Street wants to make a lot of bets? Now, we know that when they make bad bets on a lot of crappy mortgages, that can cause real problems. But generally, when Wall Street’s going about its business and buying and selling with each other, trading derivatives and all sorts of fancy things that are hard to understand, why does that affect my retirement fund?

这是一个非常好的问题，我只能这样回答：如果你不参与那个疯狂的游戏，不参与那个繁忙的赌场，它对你毫无影响。……

That’s a really good question, and I can only answer it this way: If you don’t participate in that crazy game, in that busy casino, it affects you zero. …

但大多数人都是那个系统的一部分。

But most people are part of that system.

换句话说，你的基金经理可能在你不知情的情况下做着那些事。你可能会受到我们遭遇的这些剧烈波动的影响。你不应该受影响，但很多人确实受了影响。这就是为什么当我们出现闪电崩盘之类的事情时，成交量会大幅上升。

In other words, your manager is doing that maybe unbeknownst to you. You may be affected by these wild fluctuations we get. You should not be, but a lot of people are. That’s why volumes go way up when we get these flash crashes and things like that.

所以退出这个系统，你就会没事。忽略股市的日常波动，你就会没事。……

So get out of the system and you’ll be fine. Ignore the daily fluctuations of the stock market, you’ll be fine. …

那我怎么退出呢？

So how do I get out?

持有指数基金。持有一只持有整个美国股市的基金，不做任何交易。它的成本是每年 0.5 个基点的一半，即 5 个基点，或者说是每年 0.05%，这是唯一的方法。那样你就是市场的产物，而不是赌场的产物。

Own an index fund. Own a fund that owns the entire U.S. stock market, does no trading. It has a cost of half of 10 basis points, five basis points, or 0.05 of 1 percent a year to own, and that is the only way to do it. Then you are the creature of the market and not of the casino.

……你现在告诉我应该持有整个市场。我不明白。

… Now you’re telling me I should own the whole market. I don’t get it.

因为它不交易。你没有陷入交易的心态。你没有陷入赌场的数学逻辑。你持有美国企业，并且永远持有。这就是指数化，与持有美国企业这些小片段或大片段并让经理们进进出出截然不同。

Because it doesn’t trade. You don’t get into the trading mentality. You don’t get into the casino math. You own American business, and you hold it forever. That’s what indexing is, as distinct from owning these little segments of American business or big segments and having managers get in and out.

他们今天有价值偏好，明天又有成长偏好。他们今天可能喜欢科技股，明天喜欢能源股，后天喜欢医疗股，他们进进出出——造成了市场的不平衡。作为一个群体，没有人能进进出出。

They have a value bias one day and a growth bias the next. They may like technology stocks one day and energy stocks the next and medical care stocks the next, and they get in and out — an unbalance in the market. Nobody gets in and out as a group.

换句话说，如果你卖出你的医疗股，别人就会买入那些医疗股。如果你卖，那么别人就在买。……就是这么简单。

In other words, if you get out of your medical stocks, somebody else is getting into the medical stocks. If you sell, then somebody else is buying. … It is that simple.

你谈到你是简单的使徒。

You talk about you’re the apostle of simplicity.

是的，奥卡姆剃刀。当一个问题的解决方案有多种时，选择最简单的一个。这对我来说一直很管用。

Yeah, Occam’s razor. Where there are multiple solutions to a problem, choose the simplest one. It’s served me well.

很多人会说：“嗯，那太无聊了。我能做得更好。我认识一个顾问，他赚了很好的回报，如果我跟着那个人，我就会做得更好。”

A lot of people would say: “Well, that’s boring. I can do better. I know an adviser who is making good returns, and if I go with that guy or that woman, I’ll do better.”

回报是不可持续的。……好市场会变成坏市场；坏市场会变成好市场。那些业绩火爆的基金，比如麦哲伦，它们达到顶峰后就会衰落。……

Returns do not persist. … The good markets turn to bad markets; bad markets turn to good markets. Funds with hot performance, say Magellan, they peak. …

“你真的想投资一个这样的系统吗？在这个系统里，你——共同基金股东——投入了 100% 的资本，承担了 100% 的风险，却只得到 30% 的回报？”我有一张图表，列出了现代大约八只最受欢迎的基金。……它们达到顶峰，然后下跌，但你在顶峰时爱上了它们。没有人在它们表现平平的时候爱上它们。

“Do you really want to invest in a system where you put up 100 percent of the capital, you, the mutual fund shareholder, you take 100 percent of the risk, and you get 30 percent of the return?” I’ve got a chart of about the eight most popular funds of the modern era. … They peak and then they fall, but you fall in love with them at the peak. Nobody falls in love with them when they’ve done nothing.

所以这个系统几乎是在与人类心理作对，这种心理说，如果某样东西过去表现好，将来也会表现好。这不是真的。这绝对是错误的。

So the system is almost rigged against human psychology that says [if] something has done well in the past, it will do well in the future. That is not true. That is categorically false.

极有可能——这事从无绝对——极有可能，当你在某个人的顶峰遇到他时，他即将走向低谷。那在后的，将要在前；在前的，将要在后。

The high likelihood — there’s never a certainty in this — a high likelihood is when you get to somebody at its peak, he’s about to go down to the valley. The last shall be first and the first shall be last.

富达的那位负责人曾经谈到你的指数基金，他说他认为大多数美国人不会满足于平均回报。

The chief over at Fidelity once said of your index funds that he didn’t think that most Americans would be satisfied with average returns.

他确实说过，现在他是业内第二大指数化公司。所以我不知道。我猜是营销意识妨碍了他对投资者想要什么的确定性。……

He sure said that, and now he’s the second biggest indexer in the business. So I don’t know. My guess is marketing sense got in the way of his certainty about what investors want. …

我最初启动的那只指数基金，被称为“博格尔的蠢事”。人们嘲笑它。你为什么会对一个平庸的外科医生感到满意？你为什么会对一个平庸的律师感到满意？这反映了对市场本质的根本误解。

That first index fund that I started, it was called “Bogle’s folly.” People laughed about it. Why would you be satisfied with an average surgeon? Why would you be satisfied with an average lawyer? That reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what the markets are.

我们都是平均水平。如果某人有某种技能能在一段时间内脱颖而出，但不会更久，那么就会有人以完全相同的幅度落后于市场。最终这一切都会回归。最终一切都会平均化。没有什么比共同基金行业的记录更清楚的了。长期来看，业绩没有持续性。完全没有，一点也没有，零。……

We are all average. If somebody has a skill that differentiates them for a while, no longer than that, then somebody’s going to be below the market by the exact same amount. And it all comes out in the end. It all evens out in the end. Nothing could be clearer than the record of the mutual fund industry. There’s no persistence in performance over the long run. None, nada , nil. …

2006 年我们有了《养老金保护法案》。那对我们有帮助吗？

[In] 2006 we got the Pension Protection Act. Did that help us?

远远不够。

Not nearly enough.

Why not?

他们对其做了很多修补。

They had done a lot of tinkering with it.

似乎一直以来，政府都在努力改善我们的退休状况，但一直以来，这些改变似乎都没有帮到我们。这到底是怎么回事？

It seems that all the way through, government has been trying to improve our retirement situation, and all the way through, these changes don’t seem to help us. What happened here?

……我认为必须要有某种政府机构。我碰巧不认为一有问题就该把政府拉进来，但在这里我看不到如何避免。

… What there has to be is some kind of I think government agency. And I don’t happen to be a big believer in bringing the government in whenever there’s a problem, but I don’t see how to avoid it here.

并且应该有一个准入关卡，允许你参与固定缴费计划业务。如果你是一个高成本基金，这个机构，我称之为联邦退休委员会，会说：“不行，你不能在这里销售你的基金。它们太贵了。它们太不谨慎了。它们太注重短期了，”诸如此类。“你不能进入。”这本质上是在说，如果你不是一个真正的受托人，你就不能进入这个系统。

And there should be an admission gate to allow you to participate in the defined contribution business. If you’re a very high-cost fund, this agency, or I call it federal retirement board, would say: “Nope, you can’t sell your funds in here. They’re too expensive. They are too imprudent. They’re too short-term in focus,” all those kind of things. “You can’t get in.” It’s saying, essentially, that if you’re not a true fiduciary you cannot get into the system.

……我理解《养老金保护法案》背后的想法是收紧规则。但它把人们赶出了固定收益计划，我们最终得到了更多的固定缴费计划。

… The idea behind the Pension Protection Act was, as I understand it, to tighten the rules. But it drove people out of defined benefit programs, and we ended up with more defined contribution.

我对得出这个结论持怀疑态度。……我怀疑的原因是，那些有固定收益计划的公司可以看到它们将成为一个持续的财务负担，它们不喜欢这样。

I’d be skeptical about coming to that conclusion. … The reason I’m skeptical is because the companies, corporations that had defined benefit plans could see that they were going to be a constant financial burden, and they didn’t like it.

它们将风险转移给了员工，通过一个固定的储蓄计划。……更多的业余人士被置于负责自身财务的境地。……所以你负责选择自己的投资，这通常应该总是共同基金，但你可以在那个账户里开一个经纪账户。简直疯了，因为挑选个股绝对不应该被考虑。

They transferred the risk over to their employees with a defined thrift plan. … More amateurs were put in charge of their own financial affairs. … So you’re responsible for picking your own investments, which generally should be always mutual funds, but you can have a brokerage account in that account. Just insane, because picking individual stocks should be just absolutely out of consideration.

但是[公司]说：“所以我们把它交给你。……我们会给你一份你可以选择的基金清单。”那些清单通常比应有的要大得多，给公司无辜的员工提供了各种各样的选择，这是坏事。在这个领域，你选择的余地越多，事情就变得越复杂，而你没有足够的知识做出明智的选择。……

But [companies] said: “So we turn it over to you. … We’re going to give you a list of funds from which you can select.” And those lists are generally much larger than they should be, giving innocent employees of a company a whole multiplicity of choices, which is bad. The more you have to choose from in this area, the more complicated it gets, and you don’t know enough to make intelligent choices. …

所以在你看来，给人们更多的投资选择并不会帮助他们？

So in your view, we’re not helping people by giving them more choices of where to invest their money?

比那更糟，我们在伤害他们。

Worst than that, we’re hurting them.

……这有点违反逻辑。我以为拥有更多选择、更多自由、在更大场地上玩耍的能力是件好事。

… It kind of defies logic. I thought it was a good thing to have more choice, more freedom, more ability to play on a bigger field.

在抽象理论上你当然是对的。当你把这些规则应用到共同基金领域时，结果发现，普通投资者不够聪明，无法做出正确的选择。而实际上这个系统会导致那个投资者做出错误的选择。也就是说，他忽视成本，忽视长期，寻找那些过去表现更好的基金。我们不会推销那些表现非常糟糕的基金。谁会想买过去十年表现最差的基金？我们都想买过去十年表现最好的基金。

In the abstract of course you’re right. When you apply those rules, if you will, to the mutual fund field, it turns out that the average investor is not intelligent enough to make the right choices. And the system in effect causes that investor to make the wrong choices. That is, he ignores cost, he ignores the long term, and he looks for funds that have done better. We don’t market funds that have done very badly. Who would want to buy the worst performing fund over the last decade? We all want to buy the best performing fund over the last decade.

而那个最差的基金在未来十年表现优于那个最好的基金的可能性，很可能大于 50%。所以这违反直觉，但这都体现在投资者偏好的潮起潮落中。

And the odds are probably greater than 50-50 that that worst fund will outperform that best fund in the decade to follow. So it’s counterintuitive, but it’s all in the ebb and flow of investor preferences. …

……我不难理解选股有多难，但我难以理解的是，我可能为自己持有的主动管理型共同基金支付 2% 的管理费，而这居然会对我未来的退休储蓄产生巨大影响。你该怎么让人们明白这一点？

… I don’t have a hard time understanding that it’s hard to pick winners, but what I have a hard time understanding is that 2 percent fee that I might pay to an actively managed mutual fund is going to really have a great impact on my future retirement savings. How do you get that across to people?

……嗯，你得靠别人拿出复利表，看的不是对当年回报的影响，而是对一个投资生命周期内的影响。

… Well, you have to rely on somebody to get out a compound interest table and look at not the impact on the year’s return, but look on the impact over an investment lifetime.

假设股市年化回报为 7%，再对比 5%——同样是那个股市回报减掉 2%——到了投资生命周期结束时，……市场每带来 100 美分，就有 30% 的差距。你只能拿到 30 美分，也就是 30%。

You compound 7 percent, let’s say as a hypothetical stock market return, and compare it with 5 percent, which is the same stock market return minus 2, and at the end of the investment lifetime, … there’s a gap of 30 percent for each 100 cents the market delivers. You get 30 cents, or 30 percent.

我损失了三分之二的退休储蓄。

I’ve lost two-thirds of my retirement savings.

没错。这在数学上是一个确定性事件。……那为什么没人会问那个我将谦虚地称为“博格尔问题”的问题呢？你真的想在一个你投入 100% 的资本、你——共同基金股东——承担 100% 的风险、却只获得 30% 回报的系统里投资吗？……

Exactly. It’s mathematically a certainty. … So why don’t we have people asking what I will call, in all modesty, the Bogle question? Do you really want to invest in a system where you put up 100 percent of the capital, you, the mutual fund shareholder, you take 100 percent of the risk, and you get 30 percent of the return? …

现在投入退休储蓄的总资金中，有多少比例投向了指数基金？

What percentage of overall money invested in retirement savings is invested in index funds?

我猜大概是 40%。

I’m going to say about 40 percent.

那么 60% 的资金投向了收费显著更高的基金。

So 60 percent of it is invested in funds that charge appreciably more.

Yes.

所以有 60% 的人不知为何没收到这个信息。

So 60 percent of the people somehow aren’t getting the message.

嗯，如果你看到那条曲线——指数基金（尤其是我们和富达的）的崛起，以及主动管理型基金（特别是麦哲伦基金和美国基金成长基金）资产的下滑——你就会发现……现在大概有 80% 的现金流流向了指数基金，只有 20% 流向主动管理型基金。

Well, if you saw the curve, with the rise of index funds, including ours and Fidelity’s in particular, and the fall in actively managed fund assets, including particularly Magellan’s and then American Fund’s growth fund, you’d see that … probably 80 percent of the cash flow now is going into the index funds and only 20 percent of the active.

所以在你看来，趋势是积极的。

So the trend is positive as far as you see it.

趋势是积极的。毫无疑问。

The trend is positive. No question about that.

……你的竞争对手，那些……大型共同基金公司，他们对你有什么话说？

… What do your competitors over at … all the big mutual fund companies have to say to you?

沉默震耳欲聋。他们不跟我说话。

The silence is deafening. They don’t talk to me.

通常每年我都会去华盛顿参加投资公司协会（Investment Company Institute）的会员大会。我会半开玩笑但离真相不远地说：如果你在这个行业干了超过 25 年，你甚至都不会跟我有眼神交流。如果你在这个行业干了 5 年或更短，你会对我说两件事之一：“博格尔先生，你是我的英雄”，或者“我希望我们公司能像你们公司那样运营共同基金。”

Usually every year I go to the Investment Company Institute general membership meetings down in Washington. And I say a little bit tongue in cheek but not far from the mark that if you’ve been in this business for more than 25 years, you don’t even make eye contact with me. And if you’ve been in the business for five years or less, you say one of two things to me: “Mr. Bogle, you’re my hero,” or, “I wish our firm could run their mutual funds the way your firm does.”

我猜他们心里还有另一件事，某些高管会想：这是一场关于赚钱的游戏，而我要比杰克·博格尔成功得多。我是亿万富翁；杰克·博格尔不是。

I imagine there’s another thing that they think, some of these executives, and that is that this is a game about making money, and I’m much more successful than Jack Bogle. I’m a billionaire; Jack Bogle’s not.

……如果那是他们的人生目标，祝他们好运。

… If that’s their objective in life, more power to them.

但华尔街就是这样衡量成功的。

But that’s how success is measured on Wall Street.

整个美国都是这样衡量成功的。

That’s how success is measured all over America.

在金融领域。

In the financial sector.

无处不在。公司高管拿很高的薪水。成功就是比你的同行赚得多。如果这是伟大社会的解药，那我就是走错了路。我不认为这是解药。……

Everywhere. Corporate executives get paid a lot of money. Success is making more than your peers. If that’s a remedy for a great society, then I’m just on the wrong track. I don’t think it is. …

但你很久以前那个简单的想法，已经被证明是正确的了。

But you had a simple idea a long time ago that has proven right.

它年复一年地被证明是正确的，因为它不可能被证明是错的。这是一个数学上的确定性——如果你愿意，可以说是一个同义反复。

It has been proven right year after year after year, because it can’t be proven wrong. It’s a mathematical certainty — a tautology, if you will.

发生了什么？为什么在这个时代，贪婪对美国精神、美国的商业精神有如此牢固的掌控？

What’s happened? Why has greed at this time in our history taken such a firm hold on the American ethos, the business ethos in America?

……我认为我们面前有很多虚假的偶像，头号偶像就是金钱。你知道，努力为家人赚更多钱之类的事没什么错。那是美国方式，也是正确的方式。

… I think we have a whole lot of false idols out there, number one of which is money. And you know, [there’s] nothing the matter with trying to make more money for your family, that kind of thing. That’s the American way, and it’s the right way.

但在程度和性质之间是有区别的，当赚钱累积成一座失控的金钱大山时，性质就变了。人们会像对我说的那样告诉你，贪婪无处不在；它一直伴随着我们。我认为现在更糟了。

But there is such a thing as a difference between degree and kind, difference of [the] kind when it’s the building of that mountain of money that just gets out of hand. People are going to tell you as they tell me, greed is everywhere; it’s always been with us. I think it’s worse now.

其中很大一部分建立在糟糕的金融体系之上。华尔街的所作所为集中体现了大量的贪婪，我认为部分原因在于薪酬体系的变化。高管们按股价拿钱，而不是按公司价值。

A lot of it is built on a bad financial system. An awful lot of the greed is encapsulated in what Wall Street does, and I think part of that is a change in [the] compensation system. Executives get paid by the price of their stock and not the value of their company.

让股价在短期内上涨是世界上最容易的事，而随着时间的推移，建立公司的内在价值是世界上最难的事。……

It’s the easiest thing in the world to make the price of your stock go up for a little while and the most difficult thing in the world to build the intrinsic value of your company over time. …

……不过，要不是那些为他们赚钱的钱是退休金，这还不算太糟。

… Now, this wouldn’t be so bad except that the money that they’re making money on is retirement money.

那是别人的钱。而且这些钱没有被像管理自己的钱那样管理。……我想像管理自己的钱那样管理这些钱，但这并没有发生。我无法想象基金董事们会大量持有竞争对手推出的那些热门基金。

Other people’s money. And it’s not run the way you would run your own money. … I wanted to run the money as if it was their own, and that doesn’t happen. I can’t imagine fund directors owning large amounts of these hot funds that competitors bring out.

这个行业有黑暗的一面。他们常常推出我们所说的“孵化基金”。一家公司会推出五只孵化基金，试图让这五只基金全部大放异彩。当然，其中四只不会成功，但有一只成功了。于是他们放弃另外四只，让那只表现优异的基金以出色的业绩记录上市，并兜售那个记录。

There’s just a dark side of the business. They often bring out what we call incubation funds. A firm will go out and start five incubation funds, and they will try and shoot the lights out with all five of them. And of course they don’t with four of them, but they do with one. So they drop the other four and take the one that did very well public with a great record and sell the record.

这真是可耻，我甚至想说这应该是非法的，但我不知道该怎样让它变得完全非法。你知道，这是一个自由的世界。管理别人的钱，需要有比这更高的标准。

It’s really disgraceful, and I would say it should be illegal, but I wouldn’t know how to make it quite illegal. You know, it’s a free world. And there have to be higher standards than that for the management of other people’s money.

一个持有 401(k) 账户的人要支付很多种不同的费用。你能说出这些费用吗？有人说多达 17 种。

There’s a lot of different fees that a person with a 401(k) account is charged. Can you name those fees? Somebody said there are as many as 17.

……我当然说不出 17 种，但它们通常比这更一揽子化。你会有一笔行政管理和投资管理的费用，但其中一部分会花在营销上，另一部分会花在管理者的利润上。

… I certainly couldn’t name 17, but they’re usually much more bundled than that. And you’ll have a fee for administration and investment management, but part of that will be spent on marketing, and part of it will be spent on the profits to the manager.

这三项费用可能应该单独列出并分别披露。另一方面，这里明显的问题是，基金的管理费包含了所有这些服务。但对于 401(k) 来说，还有一笔行政管理费。现在，很多交易发生在幕后。……但只要你知道总额是 1.5%，不管那个数字是多少，我不确定你是否需要知道更多。……

And those three fees probably should be individualized and shown separately. On the other hand, the obvious problem that comes along here is the fund has a management fee that does those things all-inclusive. But it also has an administration fee for 401(k)s. Now, a lot goes on behind the scenes. … But as long as you know it comes to a total of 1.5 percent, whatever the number might be, I’m not sure you need to know too much more. …

“这个系统几乎是在利用人类心理中‘过去表现好的东西，未来也会表现好’这个倾向。这不是真的。这绝对不真实。”但人们应该对此有更多的认识，我一直认为我们应该向股东披露——不管是不是退休股东——在寄送年度报表时，告诉他们费用是多少美元金额——用美元金额而不是比例。然后我得到了行业里强烈的反对——嗯，这非常复杂，持有一个月的基金持有人会看起来费用很低，持有一年的基金持有人等等，等等，等等。

“The system is almost rigged against human psychology that says [if] something has done well in the past, it will do well in the future. That is not true. That is categorically false.” But there should be much more awareness of it, and I always thought that we should disclose to shareholders, retirement shareholders or not, when you send out their annual statement to say how much their fees are in dollar amount — in dollar amount and not ratios. And I got this big argument from the industry — well, it’s very complicated, and people that own funds for a month and are going to look like they have low fees, people that own funds for a year, blah, blah, blah, blah.

……但我主张你应该做的，实际上就是说，这里是基金当前的费用率，应用于你当前在该基金的投资。也就是说，用费用率乘以你年底投资的美元价值，然后说这就是该基金基本上年化成本的总和。

… But I argued that what you should just do is say, in effect, here’s the fund’s present expense ratio applied to your present investment in the fund. That is to say, multiply the expense ratio times the dollar value of your investment at year end and say here’s the total at basically the annualized cost of the fund.

这就是你将要付出的 3000 美元。

This is the $3,000 that it’s going to cost you.

最简单的事情。任何人都能做这个计算。我们都能做到。行业里的每一家公司都能。……

Easiest thing. Anybody can do that calculation. We all can do it. Every firm in the industry. …

美国证券交易委员会（SEC）不愿意强制要求。竞争对手们会回避它，可能也会回避我，因为我那些异想天开的想法。但我们会朝那个方向前进。

The SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] isn’t willing to compel it. The competitors are going to shun it and probably shun me, too, for my imaginative ideas. But we will be moving toward that.

你需要知道的一件事是，明智的披露会以尽可能快的速度推进。现在它进展不快，我们必须在明智的披露和过于庞杂的披露之间划清界限。就像孩子们说的，有一种东西叫“信息太多”，太多信息了。

One thing you need to know is that sensible disclosure will advance as fast as it can. Now it doesn’t advance very rapidly, and we have [to] define that fine line between sensible disclosure and overwhelming disclosure. As the kids would say, there’s such a thing as TMI, too much information.

对。监管过度。

Right. Too much regulation.

嗯，与其说是过度，不如说可能是对错误的东西监管得太严了，而对正确的东西又监管得不够。

Well, it’s not so much too much but maybe regulating the wrong thing too heavily and the right things not enough.

……人们看着这个行业，看看它收取的费用和它返还的价值，再看看你从投资中获得的价值，会感到彻底厌恶。考虑到人们支付的一些费用，把钱放在床垫下似乎都更划算。

… One becomes thoroughly disgusted when one looks at this industry and what it’s charging and what it’s giving back, with the value that you’re getting for your investment. I’d do better to keep my money in a mattress, it would seem, given some of these fees that people are paying.

在那些极端案例中，数学表明你把钱放在床垫下会更划算，而可悲的是，你在货币市场基金里会更划算一些。至少还能赚点利息。如今典型货币市场基金的收益率大约是 0.1%，所以你也好不到哪去。所以你必须出去，设法让你的资本获得合理的回报。

In the egregious cases, the mathematics say you would do better to put your money in a mattress, and sad to say you’d do even better with a money market fund. At least it would earn something. The yield in a typical money market fund today is about 0.1 of 1 percent, so you’re not going to do much better. So you have to go out and try to get a reasonable return on your capital.

但这正是我要说的，你对华尔街拿你的钱做的事感到彻底厌恶。同时，如果你想过一个体面的退休生活，你别无选择，只能投资于市场。

But that’s what I was getting at, is that you’re thoroughly disgusted with what Wall Street is doing with your money. At the same time, you don’t have an option but to invest in the market if you want to have a decent retirement.

指数基金。把华尔街从等式里剔除。把交易从等式里剔除。把管理费从等式里剔除。把过高的税收……从等式里剔除。然后忘掉它。拥有信心——这是合理的，但不是百分之百确定——相信美国企业会随着美国一起成长。……

Index fund. Get Wall Street out of the equation. Get trading out of the equation. Get management fees out of the equation. Get excessive taxes … out of the equation. And then forget it. Have confidence, which is reasonable but not 100 percent sure, that corporate America will grow with America. …

……对一个来自火星的人来说，你会如何描述、定义美国的退休制度？

… To a man from Mars, how would you describe, define the retirement system in the United States?

退休制度，我认为从根本上说，是一个投资者不仅得不到他们所支付的东西——也就是市场回报——而且恰恰得到的是他们没为之支付的东西的体系。因此，他们支付得越少，得到就越多；如果他们什么都不支付，就得到一切。……

The retirement system is I think by definition a system where investors not only don’t get what they pay for — that is the market return — they get precisely what they don’t pay for. And therefore, the less they pay, the more they get, and if they pay nothing, they get everything. …

这个制度从一开始就注定要失败，因为简单的逻辑告诉我们，这个庞大的退休计划投资了数万亿美元，养老金市场上是五万亿、十万亿美元。换句话说，你选 A，我选 B，别人选 C、D、E 和 F，我们共同拥有整个市场。这是绕不开的事实。

It’s a system that is designed to fail because simple logic tells us that this massive retirement plan invests trillions of dollars, five, 10 trillions of dollars in pension. In other words, you pick A, I pick B, someone else picks C, D, E and F, and together we own the market. There’s no way around it.

如果市场上有一只大盘股，我们姑且称之为 IBM 或微软，甚至苹果，我们所有人投在苹果上的钱，都会比投在微软、通用汽车或其他公司上的多，而投在小盘股上的钱会更少。这就是市场。

If there’s a big stock in the market, let me call it IBM or Microsoft or even Apple, we’re all going to have more money in Apple than we have in Microsoft and General Motors or whatever and less in the little tiny stocks. That’s the market.

我们会这样看待它。我们会获取市场回报。而我们之所以会输，是因为华尔街收取的所有成本。……

We’re going to look at it that way. We’re going to capture the market return. And we’re going to lose because [of] all the costs that Wall Street charges. …

但我认为自己比旁边的人聪明一点。

But I’m a little smarter than the next guy, I think.

没错。我们都这么想。

Absolutely. We all are.

然后我会去找查克，他会告诉我该把钱投到哪里。而且那会是更好的建议，因为我很聪明，知道去哪里能获得更好的建议。所以，没错，我站在投机者那一边，他们经常与其他投机者交易，但我是那群人里赢的那一方。

And I’m going to talk to Chuck, and he’s going to tell me where I can invest my money. And it’s going to be better advice [because] I’ve been smart enough to figure out where to go to get better advice. And so, yeah, I’m on that side of speculators that are trading often with other speculators, but I’m on the winning side of that group.

你不可能成为那群人里赢的那一方。

You can’t be on the winning side of that group.

Why not?

因为时间跨度太长，管理者太多，嘉信理财所有客户作为一个整体，其分散化程度太高，以至于结果只能等同于一只指数基金。只不过那是一只昂贵的指数基金。

Because there are too many time periods, too many different managers, too much diversification among all of the Schwab clients as a whole to be other than an index fund. But it’s an expensive index fund.

沃伦·巴菲特会说，他是这群投资者里聪明的那一方。

Warren Buffett would say that he’s on the smart side of those investors.

可以想象，以前就有人跟我提过这个。我说，举出两个例子来。

People have brought that up to me before, as you can imagine. And I say name two.

本杰明·格雷厄姆，沃伦·巴菲特。

Benjamin Graham, Warren Buffett.

嗯，本杰明·格雷厄姆已经不在世了，没法替你管钱。顺便说一句，他自己也经历过一些非常可怕的磨难。他可能是古往今来最睿智的投资者。……

Well, Benjamin Graham is no longer around to manage your money. And by the way, he went through some terrible travails himself. He was probably the wisest investor of all time. …

他用一种非常简单的方式看待事物。他指出了我此刻正在谈论的那些缺陷。他说：“在短期内，股票市场是一台投票机。从长远来看，股票市场是一台称重机。”这就是投机（投票）与内在价值（称重）之间的区别。

He looked at things in a very simple way. He called attention to the very flaws that I’m talking about. He said: “In the short run, the stock market is a voting machine. In the long run, the stock market is a weighing machine.” That’s the difference between speculation, voting, and intrinsic value, weighing.

他是一个非常睿智的人。他说，你看，这些机构在干什么？它们每天都在收进彼此的脏衣服，洗干净，然后再把衣服送还给其他机构。除了洗衣工，没人能从这里面赚到钱。

He was a very wise man. He said, look, what are these institutions doing? They’re taking in each other’s laundry every day, cleaning it up and then sending the laundry out to their fellow institutions. There can be no profit for that except for the laundry.

只有少数像本杰明·格雷厄姆那个时代的他、沃伦·巴菲特时代的他，以及少数其他人那样睿智的人。但共同基金行业也曾有过明星——共同系列基金的迈克尔·普莱斯。

And a few wise people like Benjamin Graham in his time, Warren Buffett in his time, and a few others. But there were stars in the mutual fund industry — Michael Price of Mutual Series.

比尔·米勒、格雷格·梅森、彼得·林奇。别忘了伟大的彼得，也别忘了 T. Rowe Price 成长基金。他们来了，又走了，而且他们的记录从未持续过，永远没有。他们崛起，达到顶峰，然后衰落。

Bill Miller, Greg Mason, Peter Lynch. Don’t forget the great Peter, and don’t forget T. Rowe Price Growth. They come and they go, and their records are not sustained, ever. They get up, they peak, and they go down.

所以我们只听到“来”，听不到“去”。

So we only hear about the coming and not the going.

我们只听到“来”，听不到“去”。投资者应该认识到一个核心事实：人生不过是一连串的来与去，投资业绩也是如此。

We only hear about the coming and not the going. And as investors ought to realize, a very central fact, life is just a series of comings and goings, and so is investment performance.

……我们目前的退休体系健康状况如何？……

… Where are we in terms of our retirement health? …

我们正面临一场灾难。

We’re facing a train wreck.

给我们具体说几个数字。

Put some numbers on that for us.

有各种各样的数字，但你可以信赖的主要数字，第一，是社保体系的失败。它必须被改革。……第二部分是，企业和州及地方政府养老金基金，正在假定 8% 的回报率，而这个回报率根本不可能实现，未来十年绝对不可能。

There’s a whole variety of numbers, but the main numbers you can rely on to see this is, a, the failure of the Social Security system. It has to be changed. … Second part of it is that corporations and state and local government pension funds are simply assuming returns of 8 percent that are not in the cards, unequivocally not in the cards for the next decade.

所以这些企业和州及地方政府养老计划将不得不寻求一些帮助，处理这两者都不容易。企业不愿意在回报率问题上说实话，因为一旦说实话，它们就得向养老金计划注入更多资金，那会降低利润。

So these corporations and state and local government pension plans are going to have to have some help, and it’s not easy to deal with either one of them. The corporations don’t want to be honest about returns because when they are, they’re going to have to put a lot more money into their pension plans, and that’s going to reduce earnings.

所以社保资金不足。

So Social Security is underfunded.

社保资金不足，州和地方政府也资金不足。

Social Security is underfunded, state and local government underfunded.

… And the 401(k)?

它（401[k] 计划）的根本问题在于，它是一个储蓄计划，而不是退休计划。你几乎可以随时把钱取出来。你可以从中借钱。你可以自己选择基金，想得到多少帮助或不帮助都可以。你可以跟你姐夫商量——这通常不是个好主意。我们知道，投资者做出的这些选择很糟糕，对他们很不利。……

Its basic problem is that it’s a thrift plan, not a retirement plan. You can take your money out pretty much whenever you want to. You can borrow from it. You can select funds on your own with as much help or non-help as you want. You can talk to your brother-in-law — not usually a good idea. And we know that those choices that are made are bad, unfortunate for investors. …

就像那些期待 8% 回报但实际上只能得到 4% 到 5% 的企业一样，投资 401(k) 计划的个人，基于他们可以投资的基金列表中某个热门选项的历史回报，被引导着相信他们能赚到 9%、10%、11%。这是个问题吗？

And like the corporations that expect 8 percent but only return 4 to 5 percent, the individual who invests in a 401(k) plan is led to believe, based on past returns of a hot choice on the list of funds that they can invest in, that they can make 9, 10, 11 percent. Is that a problem?

那当然是个问题。他们做不到。现在，这就是投资行业的问题。也许有人能做到，然后每个人都会说：“他做到了！他搞明白了！”并非如此。

Of course that’s a problem. They can’t do it. Now, this is the problem with the investment business. Somebody will probably do it, and everybody will say: “He got it! He figured it out!” Not so.

如果他能做到，我也能做到。

If he can do it, I can do it.

没错，但想想这里到底发生了什么。我认为沃伦（巴菲特）用过这个例子。你把 100 只猴子送到一间健身房里扔硬币，它们不停地扔啊扔，最终，我想大概是一千两百分之一的概率，有只猴子每次都扔出正面，人们就说它是天才。它不是天才。在任何时间段内，总会出现一只总能扔出正面的猴子。

Exactly, but think about what’s going on here. I think Warren [Buffett] uses this example. You send 100 monkeys into a gym flipping coins, and they keep flipping and flipping, and finally I think it’s one out of 1,200 flips heads every time, and they say he’s a genius. He’s not a genius. There’s always going to be one that flips heads any time period.

它只是一只幸运的猴子。

He’s just a lucky monkey.

就只是一只幸运的猴子。……

It’s just the lucky monkey. …

你谈到了利益冲突。你指的是哪些方面？

You talk about conflicts of interest. What are you talking about there?

我今天看到的最严重的利益冲突是，基金经理通常是上市公司，其投资者要求资本回报。他们买入一家上市公司的股票，这家公司叫 T. Rowe Price。

The most serious conflict of interest that I see today is that money managers are often publicly held by investors who demand a return on their capital. They buy into a publicly held company. It’s called T. Rowe Price.

T. Rowe Price 听起来可能有点奇怪，但它有信托责任，要回报其普通股的投资者。同时，它也有信托责任，要用尽可能高的回报来回报基金投资者。这就是利益冲突。一个人不能事奉两个主。……

T. Rowe Price has, odd as it may sound, a fiduciary duty to reward those investors in its common stock. They also have a fiduciary duty to reward fund investors with the highest possible returns. This is a conflict of interest. No man can serve two masters. …

……我还有另一个想理解的利益冲突，那就是涉及收入分成的那一个。你能解释一下为什么它在 401(k) 计划中是个问题吗？

… There’s another conflict of interest that I wanted to understand, and that is the one that involves revenue sharing. Can you explain why that’s a problem in the 401(k) plans?

……让我先走一个更简单的步骤，暂且跳出 401(k) 计划，说说经纪商的分销公司。如果你把你从基金里获得的部分收入付给它们，它们就会把你放在它们的名单里，让它们来分销你的基金。

… Let me take a little easier step if I can, take it out of the 401(k) a second to brokers’ distributing firms. They will put you on their list to distribute you funds if you pay them part of the revenue you get from the funds.

一种“付费进场”的东西。

A pay-to-play kind of thing.

付费进场——正是如此。这有问题的地方在于，那些受托管理他人资金的受托人，本应分文不付地进场，并相应地降低成本，从而提高他们有责任照顾的那些股东的回报，而不是花钱进场。

Pay to play — that’s exactly what it is. And the thing that’s the matter with that is that the fiduciary entrusted for the management of other people’s money, instead of paying to get in there, would not pay anything and reduce the cost commensurately and therefore increase the returns to the shareholders that he has a duty to.

现在，他们做这个更像是搞营销。就先锋集团的情况而言，我是在一个行业里长大的，从 1928 年到 1977 年，我们和其他所有人一样收取销售佣金，直到 1977 年我们取消了所有销售佣金，也许比我们应该取消的时间晚了一点，但那是我第一次有机会这么做。

Now, they’re more in the marketing business to do this. What happened in Vanguard’s case is, I grew up in an industry that we had sales loads like everybody else from 1928 to 1977, when we dropped all those sales loads, maybe a little later than we should, but that was the first time I had an opportunity to do it.

我们从一个供给推动——付钱给分销商、销售佣金、付钱给分销商、把付钱的事放到一边（听不清）、如果需要就付钱——转向了一个需求拉动的系统。让产品变得如此有吸引力，以至于它会通过口碑传播开来。……

And we went from a supply push — pay off the distributors, sales loads, pay the distributors, leave aside pay (UNINTEL) off, pay off if you need to — to a system of demand pull. Make the product so attractive that it will spread by word of mouth. …

这在保险行业尤其如此，因为谁给他们最高的佣金，谁就最有可能获得他们最多的业务。这太疯狂了。

And this is very true of the insurance industry, because whoever offers them the highest commission is apt to get the highest amount of their business. This is crazy.

……所以，如果我是一家大型保险公司，正在向一群雇主提供 401(k) 计划，而那边的富达想要把它旗下的基金纳入这个组合，富达就必须付钱给我，才能让它的基金出现在我提供给客户（也就是那些雇员）的基金菜单上？

… So if I’m a big insurance company and I’m offering a 401(k) plan out to a bunch of employers, and Fidelity over here wants to get their funds into the mix, they have to pay me to list their funds on my menu of offerings to the customers, the employees?

这是这个行业里某种不为人知的部分，关于它的信息不多。但事实上，据我所知，那种付钱给经纪商来分销你股票的做法，已经成了这个体系的一部分。不过我们在这里不用担心这个，因为我们没有经纪商。

This is a kind of sub rosa part of this industry, and there’s not a lot of information about it. But the fact of the matter is, as far as I know, that those kind of payments to brokers for distributing your shares has simply become part of the system. Now we don’t have to worry about it here, because we don’t have any brokers.

富达付钱给我，以便能被列在菜单上，这有什么问题吗？

Is there anything wrong with [the fact] that Fidelity pays me to get listed?

问题在于，这分流了本应属于共同基金持有人的回报，而你对这些持有人负有信托责任。换句话说，如果你不这么做，你就可以降低你的费用，从而降低基金的成本，而你如果这么做了，费用就会更高。

What’s wrong with it is that that diverts returns from the mutual fund directors to whom you have a fiduciary duty. In other words, if you didn’t do that, you could reduce your fees and have lower expenses for the funds, and when you do that you have higher fees.

所以那些雇员在购买富达基金时，将不得不额外支付费用，这样富达才有钱付给你，好让自己能被列在菜单上。

So those employees are going to have to pay extra money in fees for when they buy that Fidelity fund so that Fidelity can pay to be listed on the menu.

是的。现在，我不知道那个案例的任何具体细节，但我认为这是一个例子，说明了这个行业今天是如何运作的。

Yeah. Now, I don’t know any specifics about that case, but it’s an example that I think is the way the industry works today.

所以我们不知道富达是否有这个习惯，但这肯定是整个行业的运作方式。

So we don’t know if that’s Fidelity’s habit, but it certainly is the way the industry as a whole works.

这渗透了整个行业。经纪商们在这里开始有点讲道义了。他们说：“我凭什么要分销你的基金，除非你付钱给我？你收了那么高的管理费。我要分一杯羹。你拿得够多了。分我一点。”

It permeates the industry. The brokers are getting a little religion here. They’re saying: “Why should I distribute your funds unless you pay me to? You get these big management fees. I want some of it. You’re getting plenty. Give me some.”

而这钱谁来付？

And who pays for that?

基金持有人。他们以放弃费用减免的方式支付。

The fund shareholders. They pay it in the way of foregone expense reductions.

The employees.

是的——嗯，就是 401(k) 计划里的那些雇员们。……

Yep — well, the employees in the 401(k)s. …

商业与经济

Business and Economy

Jason M. Breslow

前数字编辑

Former Digital Editor

Email:

[email protected]

Journalistic Standards