1994 年伯克希尔完整年报

完整年报 · 原文约 24471 词
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94-93442

UT 阿林顿 LIS

ARIES

3 1334 00927 3083

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

1994

年报

94-93442 UT ARLINOTON LIS ARIES 3 1334 00927 3083 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT

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业务活动

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司是一家控股公司,旗下子公司涉足多种业务活动。其中最为重要的,是通过多个子公司直接和以再保险方式开展的财产意外险业务,这些子公司在本次报告中被统称为伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险集团。保险子公司的投资组合包含其他上市公司的大量股权。截至 1994 年底,这些投资包括:GEICO 公司约 50% 的已发行股本、大都会/美国广播公司约 13% 的股本、可口可乐公司约 8% 的股本、《华盛顿邮报》公司约 15% 的股本、吉列公司约 11% 的股本、富国银行约 13% 的普通股,以及所罗门公司的普通股和可转换优先股,合计拥有该公司约 20% 的投票权。关于这些上市公司的信息非常丰富,包括各公司自身不时发布的公开信息。

此外,伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司还出版纽约州北部的日报和周日报《布法罗新闻》。其他非保险子公司的业务活动包括:出版和发行百科全书及相关教育教材(World Book 和 Childcraft 产品)、制造和销售家用清洁系统及相关配件(主要使用 Kirby 品牌)、制造和销售盒装巧克力及其他糖果产品(喜诗糖果)、零售家居用品(内布拉斯加家具城)、制造和销售制服(Fechheimer Brothers 公司)、制造、进口和销售鞋类(H.H. Brown 鞋业公司、Lowell 鞋业公司和 Dexter 鞋业公司),以及制造和销售空气压缩机、气动工具和喷涂系统(Campbell Hausfeld 产品)。伯克希尔还拥有其他一些从事多种业务的公司,详见本报告。

各项伯克希尔业务的运营决策由各业务单元的经理人制定。伯克希尔及其子公司的投资决策及所有其他资本配置决策,由沃伦·E·巴菲特在咨询查尔斯·T·芒格后作出。巴菲特先生担任伯克希尔董事会主席,芒格先生担任副主席。

Business Activities in a number of diverse business activities. The most important of these is the Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning subsidiaries engaged reinsurance basis through a number of subsidiaries collectively referred to in this casualty insurance business conducted on both a direct and report as the Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group. ownership percenrages of other publicly traded companies. Such investments at Investment portfolios of insurance subsidiaries include meaningful equity the end of 1994 included approximately 50% of the outstanding capital stock of GEICO Corporation, approximately 13% of the capital stock of Capital Company, Cities/ABC, Inc., approximately 8% of the capital stock of The Coca-Cola Company, approximately 11% of the capital stock of The Gillette approximately 15% of the capital stock of The Washington Post Company, common and convertible preferred stock of Salomon Ine having approximately approximately 13% of the common stock of Wells Fargo & Company, and publicly-owned companies is available, including information released from time 20% of the total voting power of that company. Much information about these to time by the companies themselves. and Sunday newspaper in upstate New York. Other business activities conducted Additionally, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. publishes the Buffalo News, a daily encyclopedias and related educational and instructional material (World Book non-insurance subsidiaries include publication distribution of and Childcraft products), manutacture and marketing of home cleaning systems sale of boxed chocolates and other confectionery products (See's Candies), and related accessories (sold principally under the Kirby name), manufacture and retailing of home furnishings (Nebraska Furniture Mart), manufacture and and distribution of footwear (H.H. Brown Shoe Company, Lowell Shoe, Inc. and distribution of uniforms (Fechheimer Brothers Company), manufacture, import tools and painting systems (Campbell Hausfeld products). Berkshire also owns Dexter Shoe Company) and manufacture and distribution of air compressors, air this report. a number of other businesses engaged in a variety of activities, as identified in managers of the business units. Investment decisions and all other capital Operating decisions for the various Berkshire businesses are made by allocation decisions are made for Berkshire and its subsidiaries by Warren E Buffett, in consultation with Charles T. Munger. Mr. Buffett is Chairman and Mr. Munger is Vice Chairman of Berkshire's Board of Directors.

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

1994 年年报

目录

业务活动 内封

企业所有者相关经营原则 2

公司业绩 vs 标普 500 指数 4

董事长致股东信* 5

附录:收购标准 21

独立审计报告 22

合并财务报表 23

管理层讨论 40

过去五年精选财务数据 49

股东指定捐款 50

伯克希尔业务板块合并财务报表(未经审计) 53

普通股数据 内封

公司董事及高级职员 内封

*版权所有 © 1995 沃伦·E·巴菲特

保留所有权利

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Business Activities Inside Front Cover Owner-Related Business Principles 2 Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 4 Chairman's Letter* 5 Appendix: Acquisition Crieria 21 Independent Auditors' Report .22 Consolidated Financial Statements . 23 Management's Discussion 40 Selected Financial Data For The Past Five Years 49 Shareholder-Designated Contributions 50 Combined Financial Statements — Unaudited — for Berkshire Business Groups . 53 Common Stock Data Directors and Officers of the Company ......... Inside Back Cover *Copyright © 1995 By Warren E. Buffett All Rights Reserved

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们:

某些“企业所有者相关经营原则”曾包含在 1983 年年报的董事长致股东信中。鉴于这些内容仍有现实意义,现将其转载于此页及下页。

由于有如此多新股东加入,有必要总结一下我们遵循的主要经营原则,这些原则涉及管理者与所有者之间的关系:

• 尽管公司形式上是公司制,但我们的态度是合伙制。查理·芒格和我将我们的股东视为所有者合伙人,将我们自己视为管理合伙人。(由于我们持股规模较大,无论好坏,我们也是控股合伙人。)我们不把公司本身视为企业资产的最终所有者,而是将公司视为一个渠道,股东通过它拥有这些资产。

• 与这种所有者导向相一致,我们的董事都是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的大股东。至少有四位董事,其家庭净资产的 50% 以上由伯克希尔的持股构成。我们吃自己做的饭。

• 我们的长期经济目标(受制于后面提到的一些限制条件)是最大化每股内在业务价值的年均增长率。我们不依据伯克希尔的规模来衡量其经济意义或业绩;我们通过每股的进展来衡量。我们确信,未来每股进展的速度将会放缓——资本基数的巨大扩张将确保这一趋势。但如果我们的增长率不能超过美国大公司的平均水平,我们会感到失望。

• 我们倾向于通过直接拥有一组多元化的、能够产生现金并持续获得高于平均回报率的企业来实现这一目标。我们的第二选择是拥有类似企业的一部分权益,主要通过我们的保险公司购买可流通普通股来实现。任何一年资本配置的具体情况,取决于企业的价格和可获得性,以及保险资本的需求。

由于这种双管齐下的企业所有权方式,以及传统会计的局限性,合并后的报告收益可能相对很少揭示我们真正的经济表现。查理和我,作为所有者和管理者,基本上忽略了这些合并后的数字。然而,我们会向你们报告我们控制的各个主要企业的收益,我们认为这些数字非常重要。这些数字,连同我们将提供的关于各个企业的其他信息,通常应能帮助你们对它们做出判断。

会计后果不会影响我们的经营或资本配置决策。当收购成本相似时,我们远更倾向于购买 2 美元的不可报告收益(按标准会计原则计算),而不是购买 1 美元的可报告收益。这恰恰是我们经常面临的选择,因为整个企业(其收益将完全可报告)的售价常常是部分股权(其收益基本不可报告)按比例价格的两倍。总体而言,随着时间的推移,我们预期这些未报告的收益将完全通过资本利得反映在我们的内在业务价值中。

我们很少大量举债,即便举债,也力求将其结构化为长期固定利率债务。我们宁愿放弃有趣的机会,也不愿过度杠杆化我们的资产负债表。这种保守主义有时会拖累我们的业绩,但这是唯一让我们感到安心的行为方式,考虑到我们对保单持有人、存款人、贷款人以及那些将异常大比例净资产托付给我们照管的众多股权持有人所承担的信托责任。(正如印第安纳波利斯 500 大赛的一位获胜者所说:“要想第一个完赛,你必须先完赛。”)

*版权 © 1984 沃伦·E·巴菲特

保留所有权利

Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. in the 1983 Annual Report. Because the material remains topical, Certain OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES were included in the Chairman's letter* to it is reproduced on this and the following page. that pertain to the manager-owner relationship: With so many new shareholders, it's appropriate to summarize the major business principles we follow shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves • Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholdings we also, are, for better or worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself as as managing partners. (Because of the size of our the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which out shareholders own the assets. the case of at least four, over 50% of family net worth is represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own • In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In cooking. average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic • Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize the significance or performance of Berkshire bylits size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future —a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation. generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of • Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by out insurance year's capital allocation. conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about our true economic Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of However, we will also report to you the earnings of'each major business we control, numbers we consider of performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. should generally aid you in making judgments about them. great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase S2 of carnings that is not reportable by us under Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When standard accounting principles than to purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely unreportable). In aggregate and over time, that often faces us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains. We will reject interesting • We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to structure it on a long-term fixed-rate basis. penalized our results butitis the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis "500" winners said: "To finish first, you must first to policyholders, depositors, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions finish.") *Copyrighi & 1984 by Warren E. Buffer A!! Rights Reserved 2

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我们将用你们的钱去做的事,也只会是我们用自己的钱会做的事——会充分权衡你们通过直接在股市买入来分散投资所能获得的价值。我们不会为了满足管理层的“愿望清单”而让股东付出代价,也不会通过以不考虑对股东长期经济后果的控股价格收购整家企业来实现多元化。

• 我们认为崇高的意图应该定期用结果来检验。我们检验留存收益的智慧时,会评估留存下来、随着时间推移能否为股东每保留 1 美元就带来至少 1 美元的市场价值。到目前为止,这一检验都通过了。我们会继续以五年滚动的方式应用这一标准。随着我们净资产的增长,明智地使用留存收益会越来越难。

我们只有在获得等值的商业价值时才会发行普通股。这条规则适用于所有形式的发行——不仅仅是并购或公开发行股票,也包括债转股、股票期权和可转换证券。我们不会在违背整个企业价值的前提下,出售你们公司的一小部分——而发行股票本质上就是如此。

• 你们应该充分了解查理和我共有的一种态度,它损害了我们的财务表现:无论价格如何,我们毫无兴趣出售伯克希尔拥有的任何优质企业,也非常不愿意出售那些平庸的企业,只要它们预计至少能产生一些现金流,并且我们对它们的经理和劳资关系感到满意。我们希望不再重复那些导致我们陷入这些平庸企业的资本配置错误。我们对那种靠大规模资本支出就能让糟糕企业恢复满意盈利能力的建议,反应非常谨慎。(预测会——提议者会充满诚意——但最终,在一个糟糕的行业里大举追加投资,通常就像在流沙中挣扎一样徒劳。)然而,金拉米式管理(每轮都扔掉你最没前途的业务)不是我们的风格。我们宁愿让整体结果受拖累,也不愿那样做。

• 我们在向你们汇报时会保持坦诚,强调评估企业价值时重要的正面和负面因素。我们的原则是:告诉你们那些如果我们角色互换会想知道的事实。这是我们对你们最起码的责任。此外,作为一家拥有重要传媒业务的公司,我们如果在报道自己时比要求自己的新闻人员报道他人时标准更低——在准确性、平衡性和洞见性方面——那是不可原谅的。我们也相信坦诚对我们管理者自身有益:公开误导他人的 CEO,最终可能在私下也误导了自己。

• 尽管我们奉行坦诚政策,但在可交易证券方面,我们只会讨论法律要求披露的部分。好的投资想法是稀缺的、有价值的,并且和好的产品或业务收购想法一样,容易受到竞争性窃取。因此,我们通常不会谈论我们的投资想法。这个禁令甚至延伸到我们已经卖出的证券(因为我们可能再次买入),也延伸到那些被错误传闻我们在买入的股票。如果我们否认那些传闻,而在其他场合却说“无可奉告”,那么“无可奉告”就成了确认。

entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will A managerial "wish list" will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market. only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least $1 of market value • We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely. applies to all forms of issuance — not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company — and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to —on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise. regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very • You should be fully aware of' one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: reluctant to sell sub-pat businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior

  • the advocates will be sincere — but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry

(discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were • We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a majot communications business, it would be than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private. legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good • Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say "no comment" on other occasions, the no- ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are comments become confirmation.

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原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

伯克希尔业绩 vs. 标普 500 指数

年度百分比变化

伯克希尔每股

账面价值

标普 500 指数

含股息

相对业绩

年份

(1)

(2)

(1)-(2)

1965

23.8

10.0

13.8

1966

20.3

(11.7)

32.0

1967

11.0

30.9

(19.9)

1968

16.2

11.0

5.2

1969

(8.4)

(8.4)

0.0

1970

12.0

3.9

8.1

1971

16.4

14.6

1.8

1972

21.7

18.9

2.8

1973

4.7

(14.8)

19.5

1974

5.5

(26.4)

31.9

1975

21.9

37.2

(15.3)

1976

59.3

23.6

35.7

1977

31.9

(7.4)

39.3

1978

24.0

6.4

17.6

1979

35.7

18.2

17.5

1980

19.3

32.3

(13.0)

1981

31.4

(5.0)

36.4

1982

40.0

21.4

18.6

1983

32.3

22.4

9.9

1984

13.6

6.1

7.5

1985

48.2

31.6

16.6

1986

26.1

18.6

7.5

1987

19.5

5.1

14.4

1988

20.1

16.6

3.5

1989

44.4

31.7

12.7

1990

7.4

(3.1)

10.5

1991

39.6

30.5

9.1

1992

20.3

7.6

12.7

1993

14.3

10.1

4.2

注:数据按日历年度计算,但以下年份例外:1965 和 1966 年为截至 9 月 30 日的年度;1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。

自 1979 年起,会计准则要求保险公司将其持有的权益证券按市值计价,而非此前要求的成本与市价孰低法。本表中,伯克希尔 1978 年及以前年度的业绩已按新规则重新列报。

1993 年,会计准则再次变更,要求所有普通股(包括非保险实体持有的)均按市值入账。全部调整计入 1993 年,因为对早年数据的重新列报只会产生微小影响。

标普 500 指数数据为税前数据,而伯克希尔数据为税后数据。如果一个像伯克希尔这样的公司仅仅持有标普 500 指数并计提相应税金,那么在该指数取得正回报的年份,其业绩将落后于标普 500 指数,但在指数取得负回报的年份则将超越标普 500 指数。多年来,这些税收成本会导致总体滞后幅度相当可观。

Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change Book Valuc of in Per-Share with Dividends in S&l 500 Year Berkshire Included Relative Results 11) (2) 1965 1966 23.8 20.3 10.0 _ (1)-(2) 1968 1967 11.0 (11.7) 13.8 30.9 (19.9) 32.0 1969 16.2 11.0 (8.4) 24.6 8.0 1970 1972 1971 16.4 12.0 14.6 3.9 8.1 1973 21.7 (14.8) 18.9 1.8 1975 1974 4.7 2.8 21.9 5.5 (26.4) 31.9 19.5 1977 1976 59.3 23.6 37.2 (15.3) 1978 31.9 (7.4) 39.3 35.7 1979 24.0 6.4 1981 1980 35.7 18.2 17.5 17.6 31.4 19.3 32.3 21.4 (5.0) (13.0) 1982 1983 32.3 40.0 36.4 22.4 18.6 1984 13.6 31.6 6.1 7.5 9.9 1985 1986 26.1 48.2 18.6 16.6 1987 1988 19.5 16.6 5.1 14.4 7.5 1989 20.1 1991 1990 44.4 31.7 12.7 3.5 39.6 7.4 30.5 (3.1) 10.5 1992 1993 14.3 20.3 10.1 7.6 12.7 9.1 1994 13.9 1.3 12.6 4.2 Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previousiy the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies 1o value the equity securities they hold at market through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In 1993, accounting rules changed so that all common equities, including those held by non-insurance entities, are years would have resulted in only minor adjustments. now carried at market. The entire change was credited to 1993, since the restatement of the figures for earlier simplylo have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tir whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax, If'a corporation such as Berkshire were years when that inder showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in vears when the inder showed a negative return. Over the rears, the lat costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial. 4

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东:

1994 年我们的净资产增加了 14.5 亿美元,增幅 13.9%。在过去 30 年里(即现任管理层接手以来),我们每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 10,083 美元,年复合增长率达到 23%。

查理·芒格——伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人——和我很少做预测。但我们愿意自信地做出一个预测:伯克希尔未来的表现将无法接近过去的水准。

问题不在于过去有效的做法将来会失效。相反,我们相信我们的公式——以合理价格买入那些基础经济良好、由诚实能干的人经营的企业——一定会带来合理的成功。我们预计,因此将继续表现良好。

然而,鼓鼓的钱包是卓越投资业绩的敌人。伯克希尔目前的净资产是 119 亿美元,而查理和我开始管理公司时只有约 2200 万美元。尽管好企业的数量一如既往,但如果我们买入的规模对伯克希尔的资本而言微不足道,那这样的收购就毫无意义。(正如查理经常提醒我的:“如果一件事根本不值得做,那就不值得做好。”)

但我们仍会坚持让我们走到今天的方法,并努力不放松标准。泰德·威廉姆斯在《我的生活故事》中解释了原因:“我的论点是,要成为好击球手,你必须等来一个好球。这是书里的第一条规则。如果我被迫去咬那些在我舒适区之外的球,那我只能打出 0.250 的打击率,而不是 0.344。”查理和我同意这一点,会努力等待那些好机会。

我们将继续忽略政治和经济预测——对许多投资者和商人来说,这些是代价高昂的干扰。30 年前,没有人能预见越南战争的急剧升级、工资和物价管制、两次石油危机、一位总统辞职、苏联解体、道琼斯指数单日暴跌 508 点,或者国库券收益率在 2.8% 到 17.4% 之间剧烈波动。

但令人惊讶的是——所有这些重磅事件都没有对本·格雷厄姆的投资原则造成丝毫影响,也没有让以合理价格协商收购优质企业的做法变得不靠谱。恐惧是跟风者的敌人,却是基本面投资者的朋友。事实上,我们最好的买入通常是在对某些宏观事件忧心忡忡之时做出的。如果我们因为对未知的恐惧而推迟或改变了资本部署,那代价将是巨大的。

未来 30 年必定还会发生一系列不同的重大冲击。我们既不会试图预测它们,也不会试图从中获利。如果我们能找到与我们过去买过的类似的企业,外部意外对我们长期业绩的影响就微乎其微。

我们向你们承诺——伴随更温和的收益——在你们持有伯克希尔的期间,你们的境遇将和查理与我完全一样。如果你们亏损,我们也亏损;如果我们繁荣,你们也繁荣。我们不会通过引入那种让我们在上涨时比下跌时分享更多利益的薪酬安排来打破这种纽带。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Ine.: present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or at a rate of Our gain in net worth during 1994 was S1.45 billion or 13.9%. Over the last 30 years (that is, since 23% compounded annually. confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I make few predictions. One we will performance of the past. we believe that our formula — the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, therefore, to keep on doing well. economics and are run by honest and able people — is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect, of $11.9 billion compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though A fat wallet, however, is the enery of superior investment results. And Berkshire now has a net worth there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be a good hitter, you've got to get a Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted a 344 hitter. I might only be a 250 hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for opportunities that are good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the huge expansion of the Vietnam We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%. principles. Nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. But, surprise — none of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of nor to profit from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next 30 years. We will neither try to predier these surprises will have little effect on our long-term results. you will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will you. And we will not What we promise you — along with more modest gains — is that during your ownership of Berkshire, Than the downside. break this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside

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我们还向各位承诺,我们个人的身家将始终以压倒性的比重集中于伯克希尔股票:我们绝不会让你们来投资,却把自己的钱投到别处。此外,伯克希尔的股票也牢牢占据着我们大多数家人和许多老友投资组合的核心,这些朋友都曾参与查理和我在 20 世纪 60 年代经营的合伙企业。正因如此,我们做好本职工作的动力之大,无出其右。

幸运的是,我们有一个相当不错的起点。十年前,也就是 1984 年,伯克希尔旗下的保险公司持有的证券市值为 17 亿美元,约合每股伯克希尔 1500 美元。撇开这些证券带来的全部收入和资本利得不谈,伯克希尔当年的税前利润只有大约 600 万美元。我们从各类制造、零售和服务业务中确实获得了盈利,但这些盈利几乎被保险业务的承保亏损、公司管理费用和利息支出完全抵消。

如今我们持有的证券市值达到 180 亿美元,折合每股伯克希尔超过 1.5 万美元。如果再次剔除所有这些证券产生的收入,我们 1994 年的税前利润大约为 3.83 亿美元。过去这十年间,我们的员工人数从 5000 人增长到了 22000 人(其中包括全球总部的 11 名员工)。

我们的收益来自一支极为出色的运营经理人队伍,他们从一些看似平平无奇的业务中取得了非凡的成果。凯西·斯坦格尔在形容管理一支棒球队时曾说:“别人打出本垒打,你拿报酬。”这也是我在伯克希尔的模式。

我们只持有部分权益的那些公司,对伯克希尔的成功同样至关重要。几个数据足以说明它们的分量:1994 年,可口可乐售出大约 2800 亿份 8 盎司装饮料,我们对其中的 210 亿份享有经济权益,这些份额为我们贡献了近 2 亿美元的“软饮料利润”——每份赚的还不到 1 美分,但积少成多。通过持有可口可乐 7.8% 的股权,伯克希尔实现了上述收益。类似地,借助持有的吉列股票,伯克希尔在全球剃须刀片和刀架市场(按营收而非数量计算)中拥有了接近 7% 的份额,这相当于我们在 1994 年获得了约 2.5 亿美元的销售额。而富国银行,一家总资产达 530 亿美元的银行,我们 13% 的持股相当于拥有一家价值 70 亿美元的“伯克希尔银行”,这家“银行”在 1994 年赚了大约 1 亿美元。

刚刚提到的这些公司,每一家都堪称稀世珍宝。最妙的是,我们并不会局限于仅仅拥有几颗这样的宝石,而是坐拥一个日益壮大的收藏组合。拥有效仿“希望之钻”的珍品的一大部分,远胜于拥有一整块卵石。只不过,价格是个难题:近期我们没能以诱人的价格买到整颗钻石,但我们会耐心等待,并在机会出现时果断出手。我们相信伯克希尔的内在价值将以令人满意的速度增长。

账面价值与内在价值

我们定期披露每股账面价值,这是一个容易计算但用途有限的数字。同样,我们也定期告诉大家,真正重要的是内在价值,这个数字尽管无法精确计算,却必须加以估算。

例如,1964 年我们可以确切地说,伯克希尔的每股账面价值是 19.46 美元。然而,这个数字严重高估了该股票的内在价值,因为公司的全部资源都被套牢在一项微利的纺织业务里。我们的纺织资产既没有持续经营价值,其清算价值也无法达到账面值。因此,在 1964 年,若有人试图探究伯克希尔资产负债表的稳健程度,或许很配得上一位名声不太清白的好莱坞大亨曾给出的那个回答:“别担心,负债是实打实的。”

如今,伯克希尔的情况已截然相反:我们控制的许多企业,其实际价值远超账面价值。(那些我们并不控制的企业,如可口可乐或吉列,则按当前市场价值入账。)不过,我们仍然会向各位提供账面价值数据,因为它可以作为衡量内在价值的一个粗略(尽管存在缺陷)的参照基准,而且计算起来很方便。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960's. We could not be more motivared to do our dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many friends who companies held securities having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire share. Leaving aside Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were and interest expense. income from these securities, our pre-tax carnings in 1994 were about $383 million. During the decade, Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000 (including eleven people at World Headquarters). extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also. statistics will illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280 billion 8-ounce servings and The businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings, which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of Coke, $200 million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has close to a 7% share of the worid's razor and blade market (measured by revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250 million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994 ompanies lust mentioned easily qually as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't lunited to simply a tew of thi is far better to own a signiticant portion of the Hope diamond than 100% of a chiuestone, and u breed, but instead possess a growing collection. do so prices i vener, ve o lee at high pretates sharple sort od tis noses ne will hail is ups end increase in value at a satisfactory rate. Book Value and Intrinsic Value Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. essential to estimate. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. values equal to their carrying vatues. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid." their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit 6

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被严重低估了,是衡量伯克希尔内在价值的跟踪指标。事实上,去年这两个指标同步变动:账面价值增长了 13.9%,内在价值也大致增长了同样幅度。

我们将内在价值定义为:一家企业在其存续期内可以提取的现金的折现值。任何计算内在价值的人,得出的必然是一个高度主观的数字,它会随着对未来现金流估算的修正以及利率的变动而改变。尽管如此,内在价值仍然至关重要,是评估投资和企业相对吸引力的唯一合乎逻辑的方法。

为了看清楚历史投入(账面价值)和未来产出(内在价值)可能出现的巨大差异,我们来看看另一种形式的投资——大学教育。把教育的成本看作它的“账面价值”。如果要准确,这个成本应该包括学生因为选择上大学而不是工作而放弃的收入。

在这个例子里,我们忽略教育带来的重要非经济收益,只严格关注其经济价值。首先,我们必须估算毕业生一生所能赚到的收入,然后从中减去若他没有接受教育本可赚到的估计金额。这得出一个超额收益的数字,然后必须以适当的利率折现回毕业那天。美元结果就代表了教育的内在经济价值。

有些毕业生会发现,他们教育的账面价值超过了内在价值,这意味着为教育买单的人没能物有所值。另一些情况下,教育的内在价值会远超其账面价值,这个结果证明了资本被明智地配置了。在所有情况下,有一点是明确的:账面价值作为内在价值的指标是毫无意义的。

现在,我们别谈那么多理论了,来看看伯克希尔自身经历中的一个例子——斯科特-费泽。这个例子不仅能说明账面价值与内在价值的关系如何变化,还会提供一堂我知道你们一直翘首以盼的会计课。当然,我在这里选择谈论的是一笔已被证明是大赢家的收购。

伯克希尔在 1986 年初收购了斯科特-费泽。当时,这家公司由 22 家企业组成,今天我们的阵容完全一样——没有新增,也没有卖出。斯科特-费泽的主要业务是 World Book、Kirby 和 Campbell Hausfeld,但其他许多部门也是利润的重要贡献者。

我们为斯科特-费泽支付了 3.152 亿美元,而当时它的账面价值是 1.726 亿美元。我们支付的 1.426 亿美元溢价表明,我们相信这家公司的内在价值接近其账面价值的两倍。

在下表中,我们追踪了自收购以来斯科特-费泽的账面价值,以及它的盈利和股息。

年份期初账面价值 (1)盈利 (2)股息 (3)期末账面价值 (1)+(2)-(3)
1986$172.6$40.3$125.0$87.9
198787.948.6136.5
1988136.558.041.0153.5
1989153.558.535.0177.0
1990177.061.371.5166.8
1991166.861.433.5194.7
1992194.770.574.0191.2
1993191.279.377.5193.0
1994193.080.076.0197.0

significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also. its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business daring however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, investments and businesses. another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at rather than a job. be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college on its economic value. First, we must For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education. gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value. education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also will Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner. of 22 businesses, and today we have exactly the same line-up — no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well. million premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 its book value. our purchase. In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings and dividends, since (1) Year Book Value Beginning (2) (3) Ending (4) Earnings (In Millions) Dividends Book Value (1)+(2) - (3) 1986 1988 1987 S172.6 87.9 $ 40.3 1989 95.5 48.6 $125.0 199| 1990 •••..•..... 118.5 58.0 41.0 $ 87.9 105.5 58.5 35.0 95.5 133.3 61.3 71.5 118.5 1992 1994 1993 111.2 120.7 61.4 33.5 105.5 70.5 74.0 133.3 90.7 79.3 77.5 98.0 80.0 120.7 111.2 76.0 94.0 90.7 7

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我们收购它时,它几乎没有债务(除了其金融子公司使用的债务)。同样,我们也没有将杠杆引入斯科特-费泽的资产负债表。事实上,该公司在我们收购时只有非常适度的债务,尽管当时它只赚了 4030 万美元。由于交易时公司有多余现金,斯科特-费泽在 1986 年向伯克希尔支付了 1.25 亿美元的股息,尽管它当年只赚了 4030 万美元。我们没有出售工厂再租回,也没有出售应收账款,也没有做类似的操作。在我们拥有斯科特-费泽的整个过程中,它一直以财务保守且流动性强的企业运营。

如你所见,斯科特-费泽的盈利自我们收购以来稳步增长,但账面价值并没有同步增长。因此,其净资产收益率——在我们收购时就已经非常出色——如今已变得极为惊人。这种惊人程度可以通过比较斯科特-费泽与《财富》500 强公司的表现来体现,如果它是一家独立公司,它本可以入选该榜单。假如斯科特-费泽出现在 1993 年的《财富》500 强名单上(这是最近可供查阅的年份),其净资产收益率将排名第四。但这远非故事的全部。在净资产收益率排名前三的公司:Insilco、LTV 和 Gaylord Container,它们均在 1993 年走出破产,当年除了因破产程序中的债务豁免而实现的收益外,没有获得任何有意义的盈利。撇开这些非经营性意外之财,斯科特-费泽的净资产收益率将排在第一,远超第二名。实际上,斯科特-费泽的净资产收益率是排名第十的公司两倍。

你可能会认为,斯科特-费泽的成功只能用盈利的周期性峰值、垄断地位或杠杆来解释。但这里并不存在这些情况。相反,公司的成功来自 CEO 拉尔夫·舍伊的管理专长,我稍后会多谈谈他。

然而,首先是承诺的会计课:当我们为斯科特-费泽支付超过其账面价值 1.426 亿美元的溢价时,这个数字必须记录在伯克希尔的资产负债表上。我略过具体计算细节(这些已经在 1986 年年报的附录中说明),直接看结论:这笔溢价入账后,在几乎所有情况下,都必须通过每年计提的费用逐步摊销,这些费用会显示在收购方的利润表中,作为成本。

下表显示了,第一,伯克希尔为逐步核销斯科特-费泽收购溢价而计提的年度费用;第二,我们账面上剩余的溢价。这些费用对现金或我们缴纳的税款没有影响,而且在我们看来,并不是经济成本(尽管许多会计师会不同意)。它们仅仅是我们用来降低斯科特-费泽在账面价值的工具,以便最终该数字与斯科特-费泽在其业务中实际使用的净资产相匹配。

年份期初收购溢价伯克希尔利润表费用期末收购溢价
(单位:百万美元)
1986$142.6
1987131.0$ 11.6123.9
1988123.97.1131.0
1989115.98.0123.9
1990108.97.1115.9
1991101.87.0108.9
199294.96.9101.8
199387.27.794.9
199459.128.187.2

purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we of $125 million in 1986, though it carned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise. As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott not grown commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our company. Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500, a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone on equity would have ranked fourth. But that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list — the latest available for inspection — the company's return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and debt forgiveness in bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those they realized when they were accorded return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth. on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's monopolistic position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later. for Scott Fetzer, that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet. I'll spare you the details of how First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we paid a $142.6 million premium over book value this worked (these were laid out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the bottom line: charges that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings statement. After a premium is initially recorded, it must in almost all cases be written off over time through annual Fetzer acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our books. These charges have no The following table shows, first, the annual charges Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott effect on cash or the taxes we pay, and are not, in our view, an aconomic cost (though many accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott Fetzer actually employs in its business. Beginning Purchase Purchase-Premium Berkshire Earnings Charge to Purchase Ending Year Premium Premium 1986 $142.6 (In Millions) 1987 131.0 $ 11.6 123.9 7.1 $131.0 1988 1990 115.9 8.0 123.9 1992 1991 101.8 108.9 7.1 7.0 115.9 1989 108.9 1994 1993 94.9 6.9 101.8 59.1 872 28.1 7.7 87.2 94.9 4.9 59.1 54.2 8

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斯科特-费泽 1994 年底的账面价值为 9400 万美元,加上这笔溢价后,总额达到 1.482 亿美元,这就是斯科特-费泽目前在伯克希尔账面上的入账价值。请注意,到 1994 年底,这笔溢价已减至 5420 万美元。这个数额还不到我们当初收购这家公司时入账价值的一半。然而,斯科特-费泽目前的盈利能力已是当时的两倍左右。显然,这家企业的内在价值一直在持续增长,而与此同时,我们却一直通过收购溢价摊销(这减少了伯克希尔的盈利和净资产)不断地调低其账面价值。

斯科特-费泽的内在价值与其在伯克希尔账面上的入账价值之间的差额,如今已极为巨大。正如我此前说过——也很乐意再说一遍——这种令人愉悦的错位要归功于拉尔夫·谢伊,一位专注、聪明且品格高尚的管理者。

拉尔夫成功的理由并不复杂。45 年前,本·格雷厄姆就教导我:在投资中,你不需要做非凡的事就能获得非凡的成果。到晚年,我惊讶地发现,这个论断在企业管理中同样成立。一个经理人该做的就是处理好基本事务,并且不偏离主航道。这正是拉尔夫的法则。他设定正确的目标,并且从不忘记自己当初要做什么。从个人层面讲,和拉尔夫共事是一种享受。他对问题直言不讳,自信却不自负。

他同样经验丰富。虽然我不知道拉尔夫的具体年龄,但我知道他和我们的许多经理人一样,已年过 65。在伯克希尔,我们看重的是业绩,而不是日历:查理和我,现在分别是 71 岁和 64 岁,在我们办公桌上都放着乔治·福尔曼的照片。你们可以打赌,我们对强制退休年龄的轻蔑,只会一年比一年更强。

内在价值与资本配置

理解内在价值对管理者来说,和对投资者一样重要。当管理者在进行资本配置决策时——包括是否回购股份——至关重要的是,他们必须采取能增加每股内在价值的方式,并避免会减少它的举动。这条原则看似显而易见,但我们却一再看到它被违反。而当资本配置失误发生时,股东就会受损。

例如,在考虑企业并购时,许多管理者往往只关注交易是否立即对每股收益有稀释或反稀释作用(对于金融机构而言,则是对每股账面价值)。这种侧重隐含巨大风险。回到我们那个大学教育的例子,假设一位 25 岁的 MBA 一年级学生正在考虑,将他未来自身权益的经济利益与一名 25 岁的日工合并。这位不赚钱的 MBA 学生会发现,如果他与日工进行“一股换一股”的权益合并,会大幅提升他近期的收益!但对学生来说,还有比这更愚蠢的交易吗?

在企业交易中,如果潜在收购对象有着不同的前景、不同的经营性和非经营性资产组合、或者不同的资本结构,那么有意收购方同样愚蠢的做法就是只看重当前收益。在伯克希尔,我们拒绝了许多并购和收购机会,这些机会如果按常规教条行事,本可以提振当期和近期收益,但却会降低每股内在价值。相反,我们的做法是遵循韦恩·格雷茨基的建议:“滑向冰球要去的地方,而不是它现在所在的地方。”结果就是,我们的股东现在比他们要是按标准教条行事时,要富有数十亿美元。

可悲的事实是,大多数大型收购都显示出一种惊人的失衡:它们对目标公司的股东来说是横财;它们增加了收购方管理层的收入和地位;它们对双方的投资银行家和其他专业人士而言是蜜罐。但可惜的是,它们往往损害的是收购方股东的利益。

Scott Fetzer's year-end book value of s94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which is the current carrying Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to $54.2 million. When this figure is added to value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for the intrinsic value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have just as consistently marked down company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the its carrying value through purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and net worth. huge. As 1 mentioned earlier — but am delighted to mention again — credit for this agreeable mismatch goes The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart and high-grade manager. investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important. he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar: Charlie and I, at 71 and 64 He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, respectively, now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year. Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions ways that increase per-share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious — including decisions to repurchase shares

  • it's vital that they act in

but we constantly see it violated. And, when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt. whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share (or, at financial For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on institutions, to per-share book value). An emphasis of'this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old first-year MBA student is considering merging his future a "share-for-share" merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind? the prospective acquiree has either ditterent prospects, a ditterent mix of operating and non-operating assets, In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when would have boosted current and near-term earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value. Our or a ditterent capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase opportunities that approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck is going to be, not to if we had used the standard catechism. where it is." As a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management; and they The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But, alas, they usually

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收购方通常放弃的内在价值大于它得到的。这种事干多了,正如已退休的瓦乔维亚银行(Wachovia Corp.)负责人约翰·梅德林(John Medlin)所说,“你就是在倒着玩连锁信游戏。”结果往往是收购方股东财富缩水,而且经常是大幅缩水。原因在于,一家真正出色的企业,至少在度过早期阶段之后,几乎注定会产生远超其内部需求的资金。公司当然可以通过分红或回购的方式把钱分给股东。但 CEO 常常会问战略规划部门、顾问或投资银行家,做一两次收购是否有道理。这就好比问你的室内设计师你家是否需要一张 5 万美元的地毯。收购问题往往还因一种生物性偏差而加剧:许多 CEO 之所以能坐上高位,部分原因就是他们拥有旺盛的动物精神和自我意识。如果一位高管身上这些特质特别突出——应该承认,这些特质有时也有好处——那他坐到最高位后也不会消失。当这样的 CEO 被顾问们鼓动去做交易时,他的反应就像一个被父亲鼓励去拥有正常性生活的十几岁男孩:他需要的是推力吗?不,不是。前些年,我一位 CEO 朋友——当然,这是在开玩笑——无意中描述了许多大型交易背后的病态。这位朋友经营一家财产险保险公司,当时他正在向董事们解释为什么想收购一家寿险公司。他不太有说服力地念完收购的经济和战略理由后,突然扔掉了讲稿,一脸调皮地说:“唉,伙计们,其他小孩都有啊。”在伯克希尔,我们的经理人将继续从看似普通的生意中赚取非凡回报。作为第一步,这些经理人会寻找方法,在自己所管的业务中有利地部署利润。我们的目标是收购那些我们自认为能理解、拥有良好且可持续的基本面、并由我们喜欢、欣赏和信任的经理人经营的企业的部分或全部股权,从而提升每股内在价值。薪酬方面,在伯克希尔,我们力求像对待资本配置一样理性地对待薪酬。例如,我们根据斯科特-费泽的业绩而非伯克希尔的业绩来给拉尔夫·沙伊(Ralph Schey)付酬。还有什么比这更合理的吗?毕竟他只负责一个业务,而不负责另一个。一个与伯克希尔业绩挂钩的现金奖励或股票期权,会给拉尔夫带来完全随机的回报。例如,他可以在斯科特-费泽打出全垒打,而查理和我在伯克希尔连番失误,从而在很多倍上抵消他的努力。反过来,如果伯克希尔其他部分表现良好而斯科特-费泽落后,为什么拉尔夫就该获得期权收益或奖金呢?在设定薪酬时,我们喜欢许诺大块的胡萝卜,但要确保这些胡萝卜的派发与管理者所控制领域的业绩直接挂钩。当投入某个业务的资本数额巨大时,我们不仅对经理人增加使用的增量资本收取高额费率,对他们释放的资本也给予同样高的费率。这种“钱不是免费的”方法的效果在斯科特-费泽身上清晰可见。如果拉尔夫能用增量资金获得良好回报,那对他是有利的:当额外资本创造的收益超过一个有意义的高门槛时,他的奖金就会增加。但我们的奖金计算是对称的:如果增量投资的回报低于标准,那么亏损对拉尔夫和对伯克希尔同样代价高昂。这种双向安排的结果是,拉尔夫有动力——而且动力十足——把他无法在自身业务中有利可图的任何现金都送回奥马哈。10

acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that enough, says John Medlin, the retired reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the head of Wackovia Corp., and"you are running a chain letter in reverse." enterprise's value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates fat more money (at least after its Over time, the skill with which a company's managers allocate capital has an enormous impact on the carly years) than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or whether you need a $50,000 rug. investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias: Many CEO's attain their positions when he reaches the iop. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much these qualities — which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages — they won't disappear as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex life. It's not a push he needs. pathology of many big deals. This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining to his directors Some years back, a CEO friend of mine — in jest, it must be said — unintentionally described the why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply said: "Aw, fetlas, all the other kids have one." businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in their At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we admire and trust. understand, that have good, sustainable underlying economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, Compensation compensate Ralph Schey based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and 1 rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire but Scott Fetzer is lagging? is tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, but make sure their delivery significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release. incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when earnings on additional The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge. But our bonus calculation is symmetrica: If incremental investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The any cash he can't advantageously use in his business. consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph — and pays him well — to send to Omaha 10

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在上市公司,把几乎所有薪酬方案都描述为“使管理层与股东利益一致”,已经成了一种时髦。在我们看来,利益一致意味着成为双向的合伙人,不能只分享上行收益。许多号称“利益一致”的方案都通不过这个基本测试,不过是“正面我赢,反面你输”的巧妙包装罢了。

一种常见的不一致体现在典型的股票期权安排中,它不会定期上调行权价,以抵消留存收益不断累积带来的公司财富增长。事实上,一份十年期期权,加上低股息和复利效应,足以让一个业绩平平、原地踏步的经理人赚得盆满钵满。一位刻薄之人或许还会指出,当付给股东的回报被压低时,持有期权的经理人反而获利更丰。我至今没在哪份征求股东批准期权计划的委托声明书中,看到有人把这一要害问题讲清楚。

我忍不住要提一句,我们跟拉尔夫·斯凯(Ralph Schey)的薪酬协议,大约五分钟就敲定了,就在我们买下斯科特-费泽(Scott Fetzer)之后,没有借助律师或薪酬顾问的“帮忙”。这份协议体现的是一些极为简单的理念——不是薪酬顾问偏爱的那种条款,他们不先证明你有一个大问题(当然,这问题还需要每年复核一次),就很难开出一张大额账单。我们与拉尔夫的协议从未改过。1986 年它对他对我都合情合理,现在依然如此。我们与其他所有部门经理的薪酬安排也类似地简单,只是具体条款会根据相关业务的经营特点、部分经理持有子公司股权的情况等因素而有所不同。

在任何情况下,我们都追求理性。那些不顾经理人自身业绩、凭运气的奖励安排,或许会受到某些经理人的欢迎。毕竟,谁会拒绝一张免费的彩票呢?但此类安排对公司是一种浪费,也会让经理人偏离自己本应关注的领域。此外,母公司的非理性行为,很可能催生子公司的效仿。

在伯克希尔,只有查理和我对整个企业负有管理责任。因此,我们是唯一按理应根据企业整体表现获取报酬的两个人。即便如此,那也不是我们想要的薪酬安排。我们精心设计了公司和自己的工作,以便能与喜欢的人一起做我们喜欢做的事。同样重要的是,我们几乎不必从事无聊或不愉快的工作。我们同时也是海量物质财富的受益者——由股东们掏腰包支付的大量薪酬,我们其实根本用不上。事实上,就算分文不取,查理和我也对这轻松安逸的工作甘之如饴。说到底,我们信奉罗纳德·里根的格言:“艰苦奋斗大概从未要过谁的命,但我想,何必去冒这个险呢。”

报告利润来源

下页的表格列示了伯克希尔报告利润的主要来源。在本项列示中,此前我们在斯科特-费泽分析中讨论过的那种收购溢价摊销费用,并未分配至相关的具体业务,而是汇总后单独列示。这种方法能让你看到,如果我们没有收购这些业务,它们本会报告怎样的利润。在我们看来,这种方式对投资者和经理人而言,比遵循 GAAP 要求的逐项业务摊销收购溢价的做法更实用。当然,表中所示利润总额,与经审计的财务报表中的 GAAP 总额完全一致。

the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in It has become fashionable at publie companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning "heads I win, tails you lose." both directions, not just on the upside. Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms of periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of'a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and compound increases. I have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option-holding manager an option plan. five minutes, immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the "help" of lawyers or I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was worked out in about favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas — not the kind of terms problem (and one, of course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with Ralph has never been with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements the unit by managers, etc. fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries. we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a AL Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced whole. Even so, that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we have no possible need. bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At I figure why take the chance." Sources of Reported Earnings purchase-premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis of Scott Fetzer are not assigned The table on the next page shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not one utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The total purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements. 11

[第 14 页]

[PAGE 14]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦

净收益份额

1994

税前收益

(税后及

1993

1994

少数股东权益)

1993

(千美元)

经营利润:

保险集团:

承保

《布法罗新闻》

净投资收益

129,926

$

419,422

30,876

$ 80,860

350,453

$

54,238

375,401

20,156

费希海默

14,260

50,962

31,685

320,776

金融业务

22,168

13,442

14,593

7,107

29,096

科比

42,349

23,240

6,931

内布拉斯加家具城

39,435

17,356

21,540

39,147

27,719

25,056

14,706

喜诗糖果

斯科特-费泽制造集团

85,503

47,539

38,196

24,909

8,652

23,809

10,398

鞋业集团

41,150

世界图书

(22,595)

24,662

43,755*

55,750

28,247

28,559

24,367

利息费用**

收购溢价摊销

19,915

17,275

(10,419)

(60,111)

(56,545)

(17,033)

(37,264)

(19,355)

(13,996)

13,537

其他

股东指定捐赠

28,698

(9,448)

(6,668)

(35,614)

35,632

22,275

(5,994)

15,364

证券销售

经营利润

839,365

美国航空优先股减值

(268,500)

91,332

643,296

546,422

606,238

(172,579)

61,139

477,751

356,702

新会计准则导致的税务计提

(146,332)

所有实体总收益

662,197

$1,189,718

$494,798

$ 688,121

  • 包括德克斯特自收购日(1993 年 11 月 7 日)起的收益。

** 不包括金融业务的利息费用。

在 37-48 页上,你会找到关于这些业务的大量信息,此外,我方按公认会计准则(GAAP)报告分部利润。在 53-59 页上,我们以非 GAAP 口径将伯克希尔财务数据重新划分为四个分部,这种呈现方式对应着查理和我的思考方式。我们的意图是提供你希望我们提供的那类财务信息——如果我们双方角色互换的话。

“透视盈余”

在过去的报告中,我们讨论过透视盈余,我们认为它比 GAAP 结果更准确地描绘了伯克希尔的真实收益。按我们的计算方法,透视盈余由以下部分组成:(1)上一部分报告的经营利润,加上;(2)主要被投资公司在 GAAP 会计下未反映在我们利润中的留存经营收益,减去;(3)如果这些被投资公司的留存收益当初是分派给我们的,伯克希尔本应为此缴纳的税款备抵。这里所说的“经营利润”排除了资本利得、特殊会计项目和重大重组费用。

如果我们的内在价值要以 15% 的目标增长率增长,那么长期来看,我们的透视盈余也必须以大致相同的速度增长。几年前我第一次解释这个概念时,我曾告诉你们……

Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings 1994 Pre-Tax Earnings (after taxes and 1993 1994 minority interesis) 1993 (000s omitted) Operating Earnings: Insurance Group: Underwriting Buffalo News. Net Investment Income 129,926 $ 419,422 30,876 $ 80,860 350,453 $ 54,238 375,401 20,156 Fechheimer . . 14,260 50,962 31,685 320,776 Finance Businesses 22,168 13,442 14,593 7,107 29,096 Kirby 42,349 23,240 6,931 Nebraska Furniture Mart 39,435 17,356 21,540 39,147 27,719 25,056 14,706 See's Candies Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 85,503 47,539 38,196 24,909 8,652 23,809 10,398 Shoe Group 41,150 World Book (22,595) 24,662 43,755* 55,750 28,247 28,559 24,367 Interest Expense** Purchase-Price Premium Charges 19,915 17,275 (10,419) (60,1 l1) (56,545) (17,033) (37,264) (19,355) (13,996) 13,537 Other Shareholder-Designated Contributions 28,698 (9,448) (6,668) (35,614) 35,632 22,275 (5,994) 15,364 Sales of Secunties Operating Earnings 839,365 Decline in Value of USAir Preferred Stock (268,500) 91,332 643,296 546,422 606,238 (172,579) 61,139 477,751 356,702 Tax Accruals Caused by New Accounting Rules (146.332) Total Earnings - All Entities 662,197 $1,189,718 $494,798 $ 688,121

  • Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired, November 7, 1993.

** Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses. find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have rearranged A large amount of information about these businesses is given on pages 37-48, where you will also Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the we would wish you to give us if'our positions were reversed. way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that "Look-Through" Earnings earnings of Berkshire than does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings consist of: In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major restructuring charges. also increase at about that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I told you that If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%, our look-through earnings, over time, must 12

[第 15 页]

[PAGE 15]

实现这个 15% 目标,要求我们到 2000 年产生约 18 亿美元的透视盈余。

由于我们后来增发了大约 3% 的股份,这个数字已经增长到 18.5 亿美元。

因为我们的巨灾再保险业务近期贡献的盈利远超趋势线预期(这个结果我将在下一节讨论),我们现在在实现目标的进度上稍稍领先于预定计划。但给这种异常情况适当加权后,我们仍然预期能达成目标——当然,这绝非板上钉钉之事。

下表展示了我们如何计算透视盈余,不过我要提醒您,这些数字必然非常粗略。(这些被投资公司支付给我们的股息已计入第 12 页列出的经营利润,主要归于“保险集团:净投资收益”项下。)

伯克希尔主要被投资公司的透视盈余(单位:百万美元)

主要被投资公司1994 年末持股1993 年末持股1994 年应占未分配经营利润1993 年应占未分配经营利润
美国运通5.5%2.4%25²16
大都会/美国广播公司(Capital Cities/ABC)13.0%13.0%8583²
可口可乐公司7.8%7.2%116²94
联邦住房贷款抵押公司(房地美)6.3%¹6.8%¹47²41²
甘尼特公司4.9%
政府雇员保险公司(GEICO)50.2%48.4%63³76³
吉列公司10.8%10.9%5144
PNC 银行8.3%10²
《华盛顿邮报》公司15.2%14.8%1815
富国银行13.3%12.2%7353²
伯克希尔应占主要被投资公司的未分配利润492422
对上述未分配利润计提的假设税款(68)(59)
伯克希尔已报告经营利润606478
伯克希尔透视盈余合计1,030841

¹ 已扣除西科金融公司的少数股东权益。

² 按全年平均持股比例计算。

³ 不包括已实现资本利得;这类利得既反复出现,金额也相当可观。

⁴ 假设所适用的税率为 14%。

meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate look-through earnings of about S1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85 billion. because our super-caf insurance business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line expectancy (an We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but to a significant degree that is outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our targei but that, of course, is no sure thing. are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating The tollowing table shows how we calculate look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures earnings itemized on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.") Berkshire's Major Investees _Ownership at Yearend Berkshire's Approximate m Berkshire's Share of Undistributed _Operating Earnings (in millions) 1994 1993. 1994 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. American Express Company 5.5% The Coca-Cola Company 13.0% 2.4% Gannett Co., Inc. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 7.8% 13.0% 2531 1993 $ 16 6.3%'" 7.2% 85 83121 The Gillette Company GEICO Corp. 50.2% 4.9% 6.8%l" 116) 47121 4121 413 94 48.4% 10.9% 51 63130 PNC Bank Corp. 10.8% 76131 The Washington Post Company 8.3% 10121 44 Wells Fargo & Company 15.2% 14.8% 18 - 12.2% 73 5312 15 13.3% Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees Reported operating earnings of Berkshire Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings!; $ 492 (68) $422 Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,030 606 (59) 478 $ 841 (1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest at Wesco (3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant (2) Calculated on average ownership for the year (4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives Insurance Operations we develop and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims. float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually That leaves it running an "underwriting loss" — and that loss is the cost of float. Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of its float is higher An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company than market rates for money. winner. For the table, we have compiled our float — which we generate in exceptional amounts relative As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous to our premium volume — by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance 13

[第 16 页]

[PAGE 16]

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

假设和未赚保费准备金,然后减去代理人余额、预付购置成本、预付税款以及与假定再保险相关的递延费用,我们就能得到承保损失或利润。在那些我们有承保利润的年份——比如过去两年——我们的浮存金成本为负,我们通过将承保利润加到浮存金收益上来确定我们的保险收益。

(1) (2)

年终收益率

承保

损失

(单位:百万美元)

平均浮存金

资金成本

近似

长期

政府债券收益率

(比率 1 比 2)

1967

1968

利润

利润

17.3

19.9

小于零

小于零

5.50%

1969

1970

$ 0.37

利润

23.4

小于零

5.90%

1971

利润

利润

52.5

32.4

1.14%

6.25%

6.79%

1973

1972

利润

69.5

小于零

小于零

小于零

5.81%

1974

11.35

7.36

79.1

73.3

7.27%

5.82%

1975

1977

1976

87.6

12.96%

9.30%

8.03%

8.13%

利润

利润

102.6

139.0

小于零

7.30%

1979

1978

利润

利润

227.3

190.4

小于零

8.93%

7.97%

小于零

1980

228.4

237.0

小于零

10.08%

1981

利润

利润

小于零

220.6

小于零

13.61%

11.94%

1982

1984

1983

33.87

21.56

253.2

231.3

14.64%

9.77%

11.84%

10.64%

48.06

1986

1985

44.23

390.2

18.98%

1,266.7

797.5

11.34%

11.58%

1988

1987

55.43

55.84

7.00%

7.60%

9.34%

1990

1989

24.40

11.08

1,541.3

1,497.7

4.38%

0.74%

9.00%

8.95%

1,895.0

1,637.3

1.58%

26.65

1.63%

8.24%

7.97%

1992

1991

119.59

1993

108.96

2,624.7

2,290.4

小于零

4.76%

6.31%

7.39%

7.40%

1994

利润

利润

3,056.6

小于零

6.35%

7.88%

免费。但我们今年的信息与 1993 年传达的一样:尽管我们的保险业务很优秀,但查理和我很高兴我们的浮存金在 1994 年有所增长,更高兴的是它被证明是成本低廉的。它并非看起来那么好。

我们必须重复这一警示的原因在于,我们的“巨灾再保险”业务(即出售保单给保险公司和再保险公司,帮助它们抵御特大灾难冲击的业务)再次取得了极高的盈利能力。由于特大灾难并不频繁发生,巨灾再保险业务在多数年份可以预期显示出巨额利润,但偶尔也会录得巨额损失。换句话说,我们巨灾再保险业务的吸引力需要很多年才能衡量出来。当然,1994 年应被视为接近最佳情况。我们唯一的重大损失来自于一月份的加州地震。我要补充一点,我们并不预期在 1995 年初的神户地震中遭受重大损失。

14

assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by underwriting profit to float income. two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding (1) (2) Yearend Yield Underwriting LOsS (In Millions) Average Float Cost of Funds Approximate on Long-Term Govt. Bonds (Ratio of 1 to 2) 1967 1968 profit profit 17.3 19.9 less than zero less than zero 5.50% 1969 1970 $ 0.37 profit 23.4 less than zero 5.90% 1971 profit profit 52.5 32.4 1.14% 6.25% 6.79% 1973 1972 profit 69.5 less than zero less than zero less than zero 5.81% 1974 11.35 7.36 79.1 73.3 7.27% 5.82% 1975 1977 1976 87.6 12.96% 9.30% 8.03% 8.13% profit profit 102.6 139.0 less than zero 7.30% 1979 1978 profit profit 227.3 190.4 less than zero 8.93% 7.97% less than zero 1980 228.4 237.0 less than zero 10.08% 1981 profit profit less than zero 220.6 less than zero 13.61% 11.94% 1982 1984 1983 33.87 21.56 253.2 231.3 14.64% 9.77% 11.84% 10.64% 48.06 1986 1985 44.23 390.2 18.98% 1,266.7 797.5 11.34% 11.58% 1988 1987 55.43 55.84 7.00% 7.60% 9.34% 1990 1989 24.40 11.08 1,541.3 1,497.7 4.38% 0.74% 9.00% 8.95% 1,895.0 1,637.3 1.58% 26.65 1.63% 8.24% 7.97% 1992 1991 119.59 1993 108.96 2,624.7 2,290.4 less than zero 4.76% 6.31% 7.39% 7.40% 1994 profit profit 3,056.6 less than zero 6.35% 7.88% free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we have a fine insurance business, Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost- It is not as good as it currently looks. and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega-catastrophes) was again highly The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat" business (which sells policies that insurance large profits in most years but occasionally to record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our super- profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be expected to show cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995 Kobe earthquake. 14

[第 17 页]

[PAGE 17]

这门生意对判断力的要求远高于,比如说,汽车保险的承保,后者有一大堆数据可用。巨灾再保险保单数量少、金额大、且非标准化。因此,承保这类业务,我们的阿吉特·贾恩是最出色的。他对我们的价值极其巨大。

此外,伯克希尔在巨灾再保险业务中还有一个特殊优势,那就是我们强大的财务实力,这从两方面帮到我们。第一,审慎的保险公司希望自己用来防范特大灾难——比如长岛地区 500 亿美元的飓风损失,或加州同等规模的地震——的保护措施绝对可靠。但同一家保险公司也清楚,让它依赖大额巨灾再保险赔付的灾难,也可能导致许多再保险公司违约。为那种关键时刻会失效的保障付保费,可没什么意义。因此,伯克希尔在一场无法想象的灾难过后仍有偿付能力且保持流动性这一确定性,对我们是巨大的竞争优势。

我们资本实力的第二个好处是,我们能承保其他公司想都不敢想的巨额保单。例如,1994 年期间,一家主保险公司想买一份 4 亿美元的短期加州地震险保单,我们当即就写了这份保单。据我们所知,世界上没有其他人会为自己账户承担 4 亿美元的风险,或者任何接近这个数字的风险。

通常,经纪公司会试图通过将大额保障的责任分散到多家小保单上来安排投保。但充其量,那种安排方式需要相当长的时间。在此期间,想要再保险的公司只能持有一份它不想要、并可能严重威胁其健康的风险。

而在伯克希尔,我们可以在被邀请报价的当天,就为高达 5 亿美元的保障报出价格。业内没有其他人会这么做。

通过承保大块保单,我们显然让伯克希尔面对起伏不定的财务结果。这完全是我们能接受的:很多时候,保险公司(以及其他企业)为了“平滑”它们的报告利润,会采取次优策略。通过接受业绩波动的可能性,我们期望获得更高的长期回报。

考虑到我们承担的风险,阿吉特和我始终关注“最坏情况”,当然,我们也知道这很难判断,因为你可能会在同一年遇到长岛飓风、加州地震和巨灾再保险 X。此外,保险损失还可能伴随着非保险领域的麻烦。例如,如果我们因南加州大地震而遭受巨灾再保险损失,那很可能同时伴随着我们在喜诗糖果、富国银行和房地美持仓的大幅贬值。

综合来看,我们相信,目前我们最坏的巨灾再保险损失大约是税后 5.6 亿美元,这个金额略高于伯克希尔来自其他来源的年度盈利。如果你对这个风险规模感到不安,那现在就该卖掉你的伯克希尔股票,而不是等到那场必然到来的特大灾难之后。

我们的巨灾再保险业务量在 1995 年可能会下降。普通保单的价格有所下降,而几年前涌入再保险业务的资金洪流,也倾向于追逐保费,不管这些保费是否充足。不过,我们与一个重要客户群体保持着牢固的关系,这些客户将在 1995 年为我们提供可观的业务量。

伯克希尔的其他保险业务在 1994 年取得了出色业绩。我们的本州业务,由罗德·埃尔德雷德领导;我们的工伤保险业务,由布拉德·金斯特勒领导;我们的信用卡业务,由基泽家族管理;国民赔偿公司传统的汽车和一般责任险业务,由唐·沃斯特领导——所有这些业务都产生了显著的承保利润,并伴随着大量的浮存金。

我们可以像去年一样总结本节:总而言之,我们拥有一流的保险业务。尽管其业绩会高度波动,但这项业务的固有价值远远超过其账面价值——实际上,比伯克希尔任何其他业务都超出更多。

15

this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a mass of data Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous. is available. Here Berkshire has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose underwriting skills strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega- In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the super-cat business because of our towering financial California — to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a catastrophes -— such as a $50 billion windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire large super-cat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense for us. will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage even consider. For example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for $400 million The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can of California earthquake coverage, and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for their own account. small policies. But, at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well-being we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same. acceptable to us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow sub-optimum strategies in order to By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally "smooth" their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our "worst case," knowing, of course, that it is and Super Cat X all in the same year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by non-insurance troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac. after-tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from other sources. If you are not All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance loss from a super-cat is now about 5600 million comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega-catastrophe. and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago will be inclined to Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, chase premiums, irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in 1995. Eldred: our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card operation, managed by Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod the Kizer family; National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster — all of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float. its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though amount — larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business. 15

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普通股投资

这些投资属于伯克希尔持股不到 100% 的子公司。下面列出市值超过 8.3 亿美元的普通股持仓。其中一小部分

12/31/94

股份数

公司

成本

市值

27,759,941

美国运通公司

7.239 亿美元

(单位:千美元)

20,000,000

大都会/美国广播公司

3.45 亿美元

8.18918 亿美元

100,000,000

可口可乐公司

12.98888 亿美元

51.5 亿美元

1,705,000

12,761,200

联邦住房贷款抵押公司(“房地美”)

6.8545 亿美元

甘尼特公司

3.35216 亿美元

2.70468 亿美元

644,441

365,002

34,250,000

24,000,000

吉列公司

GEICO 公司

6 亿美元

4.5713 亿美元

10.7825 亿美元

19,453,300

PNC 银行集团

5.03046 亿美元

1.797 亿美元

1.727765 亿美元

《华盛顿邮报》公司

4.10951 亿美元

6.791218 亿美元

富国银行

4.2368 亿美元

9.731 亿美元

4.18983 亿美元

9.84727 亿美元

我们的投资仍然数量少、概念简单:重大的投资想法通常用一小段话就能说清楚。我们喜欢那些拥有持久竞争优势、由能干且以股东为导向的人经营的企业。当这些条件具备,并且我们能以合理价格买入时,就很难出错(这是一个我们偶尔才能克服的挑战)。

投资者应该记住,他们的记分牌不是用奥运跳水的方式计算的:难度系数不重要。如果你对一个企业的判断是正确的,而该企业的价值很大程度上依赖于一个既容易理解又持久的单一关键因素,那么回报就等同于你正确分析了一个由许多不断变化的复杂变量组成的投资替代品。

我们试图定价,而不是择时。在我们看来,因为对无法预测的经济或股市的短期担忧,就放弃买入一家长期未来可预测的优质企业,这是愚蠢的。为什么要因为一个无知的猜测而放弃一个明智的决定?

我们是在 1967 年买入国民赔偿公司,1972 年买入喜诗糖果,1977 年买入《布法罗新闻》,1983 年买入内布拉斯加家具城,1986 年买入斯科特-费泽,因为那些年份它们变得可以购买,并且我们认为其价格可以接受。在每种情况下,我们思考的是企业可能会做什么,而不是道琼斯指数、美联储或经济可能会做什么。如果我们在整体收购企业时认为这种方法有意义,为什么在股票市场上购买优秀企业的小部分股权时却要改变策略呢?

在考察新投资之前,我们会考虑增持旧投资。如果一家企业足够吸引人,值得买入一次,那么重复这个过程很可能是值得的。我们很乐意增加在喜诗糖果或斯科特-费泽中的经济利益,但我们还没有找到办法来增持一家 100% 持股的公司。然而,在股票市场上,投资者经常有机会增加在那些他们熟悉和喜欢的企业中的经济利益。去年我们就是朝这个方向走的,增持了可口可乐和美国运通。

我们与美国运通的渊源可以追溯到很久以前,事实上,这符合我从过去的关系中得出当前投资决策的模式。例如,1951 年,GEICO 的股票占我个人投资组合的 70%,而 GEICO 也是我作为证券推销员卖出的第一只股票——我当时 20 岁——(卖给了我的爱丽丝阿姨,她,愿上帝保佑她,会买我建议的任何东西)。二十五年后,在 GEICO 濒临破产时,伯克希尔买入了它的大量股份。

另一个例子是《华盛顿邮报》,我最初的投资资金中大约有一半来自于 1940 年代我在送报时攒下的钱。三十年后的 1970 年代,伯克希尔买入了该报的大量头寸。

Common Stock Investments investinents belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%. Below we list out common stockholdings having a value of over 8300 million. A small portion of these 12/31/94 Shares Company Cost Market 27,759,941 American Express Company S 723,919 (000s omitted) 20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 345,000 $ 818,918 100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company 1,298,888 5,150,000 1,705,000 12,761,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ("Freddie Mac") 6,854,500 Gannett Co., Inc. .. 335,216 270,468 644,441 365,002 34,250,000 24,000,000 The Gillette Company GEICO Corp. 600,000 45,713 1,078,250 19,453,300 PNC Bank Corporation .... 503,046 1,797,000 1,727,765 The Washington Post Company 410,951 6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company 423,680 9,731 418,983 984,727 Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept: The truly big investment idea can usualiy be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage to overcome). is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases of-difficulty doesn't count.if you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic-diving methods: Degree- analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables. key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly outstanding business whose long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries about an economy We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to forego buying shares in an or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess? Mart in 1983, and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972, Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furnitare thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the of wonderful businesses in the stock market? to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in businesses he knows and likes. See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express. investment decisions out of past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised 70% of my Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact, fits the pattern of my pulling current (the sale was 100 shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested). Twenty- personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I sold — 1 was then 20 — as a secunty salesman In another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my initial investment funds came from five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. delivering the paper in the 1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position in the 16

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我与美国运通的故事有几段:1960 年代中期,就在该公司因臭名昭著的沙拉油丑闻而股价重挫后,我们把巴菲特合伙公司约 40% 的资金投进了这只股票——这是合伙公司有史以来最大的一笔投资。我应当补充一点,这笔投资让我们以 1300 万美元的成本获得了美国运通超过 5% 的股权。在我写这封信的当下,我们持有略低于 10% 的股份,花费了 13.6 亿美元。(美国运通 1964 年盈利 1250 万美元,1994 年盈利 14 亿美元。)我与美国运通旗下 IDS 部门——该部门目前贡献了该公司约三分之一盈利——的渊源则更早。1953 年,当 IDS 快速增长,市盈率仅为 3 倍时,我第一次买入其股票。(那时候遍地都是唾手可得的果实。)我甚至为此写了一份长篇报告——我什么时候写过短的?——通过《华尔街日报》上的一则广告以 1 美元的价格出售。显而易见,如今的美国运通和 IDS(最近更名为美国运通财务顾问)与当年已大不相同。然而,我发现,长期熟悉一家公司及其产品,在评估时往往很有帮助。

当日错误

错误发生在做出决策的那一刻。然而,只有当决策的愚蠢之处变得显而易见时,我们才能颁出“当日错误奖”。按此标准,1994 年是个竞争激烈的丰收年。在此,我很想告诉你,我将要描述的错误都源自查理。但每当我试图这样解释时,我的鼻子就开始变长。

而候选者是……

1993 年末,我以 63 美元卖出了 1000 万股大都会/ABC 的股票;到 1994 年底,其价格为 85.25 美元。(对于不想自己算账的痛苦,差额是 2.225 亿美元。)1986 年,当我们以 17.25 美元买入这只股票时,我曾告诉你们,我在 1978-80 年间以每股 4.30 美元卖出了大都会/ABC 的持股,并补充说我对自己早前的行为感到困惑。现在我又犯了同样的错误。也许是时候找个监护人了。

尽管令人震惊,但大都会/ABC 的决策只赢得了一枚银牌。金奖归于我在五年前犯下的一个错误,该错误在 1994 年完全成熟:我们以 3.58 亿美元买入美国航空优先股,该股股息在 9 月份被暂停。在 1990 年的年报中,我准确地将这笔交易描述为一个“非受迫性失误”,意思是,我既没有被迫进行这项投资,也没有被任何人误导。相反,这是一个分析草率的案例,这一疏忽可能源于我们购买的是优先证券,或者出于自负。无论原因如何,这个错误代价高昂。

在这次购买之前,我根本没有关注到一家成本高昂且极难降低成本的航空公司所必然面临的问题。在早年,这些危及生存的成本几乎不成问题。当时,航空公司受监管保护免于竞争,它们可以承担高成本,因为能够通过同样高昂的票价将其转嫁出去。当放松管制来临时,局面并未立即改变:低成本航空公司的运力很小,以至于高成本航线在很大程度上可以维持其现有票价结构。在此期间,那些长期问题基本不可见,却在慢慢扩散,不可持续的成本进一步固化。随着低成本运营商的座位容量扩大,它们的票价开始迫使老牌、高成本航空公司削减自身成本。这些航空公司清算的日子可以通过注入资本(比如我们投给美国航空的资金)来推迟,但最终,一条基本经济规律占了上风:在一个不受监管的商品业务中,公司必须将成本降至竞争水平,否则就面临灭亡。这条原则对你的董事长来说本应显而易见,但我却错过了。

company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture — this was in the before 1 finally got it: The real money was in the syrup.

  • Was buying a six-pack of Coke for 25g and selling cach bottle for 5¢. It took only fiity years

battered by the company's infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Ltd's capital My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In the mid-1960's, just after the stock was into the stock — the largest investment the partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion. (Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.) company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly and My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even ad in the Wall Street Journal. produced a long report - do I ever write a short one? — on the company that I sold for $1 through an different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term familiarity with Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors) are far a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating it. Mistake Du Jour the foolishness of a decision becomes obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year with keen Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our mistake-du-jour award, however, when with Charlie. But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow. competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated And the nominees are... difference is $222.5 million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself.) Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at year-end 1994, the price was $85'4. (The holdings at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior. When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in 1986, I told you that I had previously sold out Cap Cities Now I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed. made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock, on Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I which the dividend was suspended in September. In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal making it. Rather, this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that as an "unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large. whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening costs Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high. carriers was so small that the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing fare structures. When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture: The capacity of low-cost During this period, with the longer-term problems largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded. cost airlines to cut their own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line, high- capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an principle should have been obvious to your Chairman, but I missed it. unregulated commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This 17

[第 20 页]

[PAGE 20]

到目前为止,还没能做到。部分原因是,他拥有的玩具目标太近了。

部分主要航空公司获得了劳工让步,其他航空公司则受益于破产程序中的“全新开始”成本。(西南航空 CEO 赫布·凯莱赫曾说过:“对航空公司来说,破产法庭已经变成了一个健康水疗中心。”)此外,任何人不应感到意外的是,那些依合约领取高于市场薪资的航空公司员工,只要他们的支票还能兑现,就会抗拒任何减薪。

这种估值反映了两种可能性:一是我们的优先股价值可能完全或大幅恢复,二是该股票最终可能变得一文不值。无论结果如何,我们都会遵循一条重要的投资法则:你用不着用同样的方式把钱赚回来。

我们对全美航空减记的会计影响很复杂。在资产负债表上,我们按估计市值记录股票。因此,在去年第三季度末,我们持有全美航空优先股的金额为 8950 万美元,即成本的 25%。换句话说,当时我们的净资产反映了一个远低于我们 3.58 亿美元成本的全美航空价值。

但在第四季度,我们判定,按会计术语来说,这种价值下跌是“非暂时性的”,这一判断要求我们将 2.685 亿美元的减记通过损益表处理。这笔金额对第四季度没有其他影响。也就是说,它并未减少我们的净资产,因为价值的缩减已经反映在那里了。

不过,如果全美航空希望咨询我们,我们乐于提供力所能及的帮助。

查理和我不会在即将到来的股东大会上竞选连任全美航空的董事。

杂项

两位为伯克希尔股东做出巨大贡献的 CEO 去年退休了:大都会/美国广播公司的丹·伯克和富国银行的卡尔·赖卡特。丹和卡尔在近年遭遇了非常严峻的行业环境。但他们作为经理人的能力使他们所经营的企业得以度过这些时期,实现创纪录的盈利、增添光彩并拥有光明前景。此外,丹和卡尔为离任做好了充分准备,将公司交到了杰出的接班人手中。我们感激他们。

通过该计划进行的捐款总额为 1040 万美元,共有 3330 家慈善机构受益。

伯克希尔 1994 年股东指定捐款计划中,约有 95.7% 的合格股份参与了。

每年都有少数股东因为未在规定的登记日期前将股票登记在自己名下,或者未能在规定的 60 天期限内将指定表格返还给我们,而错过参与该计划。由于我们对不符合要求的情况不破例,我们强烈建议新老股东阅读第 50-51 页关于我们股东指定捐款计划的说明。

要参与未来的计划,你必须确保你的股票登记在实际所有人名下,而不是以经纪商、银行或存管机构的提名名义持有。截至 1994 年 8 月 31 日未如此登记的股票将没有资格参与 1995 年的计划。

18

to date, has not managed to do so. or part, this is because he has had toys wor a most ne target. the result of certain major carriers having obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted Airlines, has said: "Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.") Additionally, it should be no from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings. (As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to clear. viably lo this mitiut is taton, strat willaphieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored and Accordingly, we wrote our USA ir investment down to $89.5 million, or 25é on the dollar, at yearend 1994 an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it back the way that you lost it. stocks at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated. On our balance sheet, we carry reflecting a value for USAir that was far below our $358 million cost. our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time temporary," and that judgment required us to send the writedown of $268.5 million through our income But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was, in accounting terms, "other than statement. The amount had no other fourth-quarter effect. That is, it did not reduce our net worth, because the diminution of value had already been reflected there. Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can. Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Miscellaneous Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well conditions in recent years. But their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our gratitude.

program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,330 charities were recipients. About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they tail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 50-51. wner not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or devositorv. Shares not so registered on August 31. 199. › participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actua will be ineligible for the 1995 program.

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寻找好的收购目标始终是我们的当务之急。1994 年,我们只完成了一笔小型收购——一家小型连锁鞋店——但我们寻找合适候选标的的兴趣一如既往地浓厚。我们用于收购或合并的标准详见附录第 21 页。

去年春天,我们曾提出与一家家族控股的大企业合并,方案中包括伯克希尔的可转换优先股。尽管最终未能达成协议,但这件事情让我意识到,如果未来出现类似的收购机会,我们需要能够迅速行动。因此,我们的代理声明中提出了一项提案,要求股东授权我们未来在必要时发行优先股,以便董事会能够根据条款迅速推进收购。你们可以确信的是,查理和我只有在完全确定我们获得的内在价值与付出的对等时,才会动用这些股份。

  • * *

查理和我都希望你们能来参加今年的股东大会——地点换了。去年,人数略微超过了奥芬剧院 2750 个座位的容量,因此我们将于 1995 年 5 月 1 日(星期一)上午 9:30 在假日会议中心(Holiday Convention Centre)集合。该中心的主舞厅能容纳 3300 人,如有必要,我们会在隔壁房间配备音视频设备,再容纳 1000 人。

去年我们在会上展示了一些伯克希尔的产品,结果卖出了大约 800 磅糖果、507 双鞋以及价值超过 1.2 万美元的《世界百科全書》及相关刊物。今年这些商品将再次出售。虽然我们倾向于将股东大会视为一次精神体验,但我们必须记住,即便最神圣的宗教也少不了募捐盘这个环节。

我恳请你们穿“哈士奇红”来参加年会,并向你们保证,至少 50% 的管理层会穿着得体。这是向内布拉斯加州的橄榄球教练汤姆·奥斯本(Tom Osborne)和他的玉米收割者队——全国排名第一的大学球队——致敬。

我们建议你们尽快预订酒店,因为预计参会人数会很多。那些喜欢待在市中心(距会议中心约 6 英里)的人,可以选择入住雷迪森瑞迪克塔(Radisson Redick Tower),这是一家小巧(88 间房)但不错的酒店,或者几个街区外更大的红狮酒店(Red Lion Hotel)。会议中心附近有假日酒店(403 间房)、Homewood Suites(118 间房)和汉普顿酒店(136 间房)。另一个推荐地点是万豪酒店,位于奥马哈西区,距离波仙珠宝约 100 码,距会议中心十分钟车程。万豪酒店会在早上 8:30 和 8:45 有班车前往会场,并在会后返回。

代理材料的附件会说明如何获取入场所需的证件。会议中心有充足的停车位,而住在假日酒店、Homewood Suites 和汉普顿酒店的客人则可以步行前往。

和往常一样,会后我们会安排巴士送你们去内布拉斯加家具城和波仙珠宝,然后再从那里送你们回酒店或机场。我特别希望你们能去一趟内布拉斯加家具城,因为它新开了 Mega Mart 卖场——一个名副其实的零售奇观,销售电子产品、家电、电脑、CD、相机和音频设备。自开业以来,销售业绩惊人,你们一定会对商品种类和陈列方式感到惊叹。

Mega Mart 毗邻 NFM 主店,位于我们占地 64 英亩的园区内,距会议中心以北约两英里。门店营业时间是周五上午 10 点到晚上 9 点,周六上午 10 点到下午 6 点,周日上午 10 点到下午 6 点。到时候一定记得去 B 夫人仓库跟我们 101 岁的 B 夫人打个招呼,她一天都不休息——一个小时都不放过。

波仙珠宝通常周日不营业,但会在周日中午到下午 6 点专门为股东和他们的客人开放。这向来是特殊的一天,我们会准备一些小惊喜。通常这也是全年销售额最高的一天,所以不论出于哪个原因,查理和我都希望在那里见到你们。

finding good candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ tor purchases or mergers is We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 — a small retail shoe chain — but our interest in detailed in the appendix on page 21. Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, family-controlled business on terms that included a move quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the Board of that we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving. Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied

  • * *

overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30 a.m. on Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a new site. Last year, we slightly Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another 1,000 people. pounds of candy, 507 pairs of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications. All these Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting: and as a result sold about 800 we must remember that even the saintliest of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate. goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, I urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least 50% of your is a salute to Nebraska's footbali coach, Tom Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team managerial duo will be in appropriate attire. Those of you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the Radisson We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends. from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave to the meeting. A good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who stay at the Holiday An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting. meeting and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a special effort to visit As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor. electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre site about two miles north of the to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work Centre. The stores are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and noon in our Mrs. B's Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store — or, for that matter, an hour. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there. 19

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4 月 29 日星期六晚上,罗森布拉特体育场(Rosenblatt Stadium)将上演奥马哈皇家队(Omaha Royals)对阵布法罗野牛队(Buffalo Bisons)的棒球赛。布法罗队是我的朋友明迪和鲍勃·里奇父子(Bob Rich Jr.)的球队,我希望他们能到场。如果来了,我会设法引诱鲍勃在投手丘上来一场一球定胜负的对决。鲍勃就像是资本家版的兰迪·约翰逊(Randy Johnson)——年轻、强壮、运动能力出众——绝不是你想在赛季初就碰上的那种角色。所以,我需要你们为我高声助威。

委托书里会附有比赛门票的相关信息。去年大约有 1400 名股东参加了这场比赛。当晚的开幕投球,我手感不错,投出了一记好球,记分牌显示时速为 8 英里。很多球迷没注意到的是,我没有理会接球手要我投快速球的暗号,而是改投了一记变速球。今年嘛,我会全是烟雾弹。

沃伦·E·巴菲特

董事会主席

1995 年 3 月 7 日

Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich, On Saturday avening, April 29, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob early in the season. So I will need plenty of vocal support. is a capitalist's Randy Johnson — young, strong and athletic -— and not the sort of fellow you want to face shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, l had my stuff and threw a strike The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be all smoke. Warren E. Buffett March 7, 1995 Chairman of the Board 20

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附录

收购标准

我们渴望了解符合以下所有条件的生意:

(1)大额收购(税后利润至少 1000 万美元),

(2)已证明的持续盈利能力(我们对未来预测毫无兴趣,对扭亏为盈的处境也毫无兴趣),

(3)净资产收益率良好且极少负债或无负债,

(4)现有管理层留任(我们无法提供管理层),

(5)业务简单(如果涉及大量技术,我们就无法理解),

(6)有明确的报价(我们不想在价格未知的情况下谈交易,哪怕只是初步接触,这会浪费我们和卖方的时间)。

公司越大,我们的兴趣会越大:我们希望进行 20-30 亿美元量级的收购。我们不会发起敌意收购。我们可以承诺完全保密,并给出极其迅速的答复——通常在五分钟内——表明我们是否感兴趣。我们倾向于以现金收购,但如果我们将获得的内在商业价值与我们所付出的相当,也会考虑发行股票。

我们最偏好的收购形式,是符合我们收购内布拉斯加家具城、费希海默、波仙珠宝和中央州立保险公司那种模式的交易。在这些案例中,公司的所有者兼管理者希望生成大量现金,有时是为他们自己,但通常是为他们的家人或不参与经营的股东。与此同时,这些管理者希望继续做重要的股东,并像过去一样继续经营自己的公司。我们认为,对于有这类目标的所有者而言,我们提供了一个特别契合的选择,并诚邀潜在卖方通过联系与我们有过合作的人来了解我们。

查理和我经常接到一些与我们的标准相去甚远的收购接触:我们发现,如果你登广告说想买柯利牧羊犬,会有很多人打电话来,想卖给你他们的可卡犬。一句乡村歌曲的歌词可以表达我们对新创企业、扭亏为盈或拍卖式出售的感受:“电话不响的时候,你就知道是我。”

除了对收购上述类型的企业感兴趣外,我们还对通过协议方式收购大型但不构成控股的股权感兴趣,与我们在大都会、所罗门、吉列、全美航空及冠军国际的持股类似。不过,我们不希望收到关于我们在普通股票市场上可以买什么的建议。

APPENDIX ACQUISITION CRITERIA We are cager to hear about businesses that meet all of the following criteria: (1) Large purchases (at least SIO million of after-tax earnings), "turnaround" situations), Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us. nor are (4) (3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt. (6) (5) Management in place (we can't supply it), imple businesses (it there's lots of technology, we won't understand il preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown). n ofering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, eve billion range. The larger the company, the greater will be our interest: We would like to make an acquisition in the $2-3 answer — customarily within five minutes —as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Our favorite form of Mart, Fechheimer's, Borsheim's and Central States Indemnity. In cases like these, the company's owner- purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit tor owners with or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue business in the past. such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me." cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our teeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market. 21

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德勤会计师事务所

第一国民中心 2000 号

内布拉斯加州 奥马哈 68102-1578

电话:(402) 346-7788

传真:(402) 346-0711

(402) 344-0372

独立审计报告

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

致董事会与股东:

我们已审计了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司及其子公司截至 1994 年及 1993 年 12 月 31 日的合并资产负债表,以及截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日三年期内各年的相关合并收益表和现金流量表。这些财务报表由公司管理层负责。我们的责任是根据审计结果对这些财务报表发表意见。

我们依照公认审计准则进行了审计。该准则要求我们规划并执行审计,以合理确信财务报表是否不存在重大错报。审计包括在测试基础上检查财务报表金额和披露的证据。审计还包括评估管理层采用的会计原则和重大估计,以及评价总体财务报表列报。我们相信我们的审计为我们的意见提供了合理基础。

我们认为,上述合并财务报表在所有重大方面公允反映了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司及其子公司截至 1994 年及 1993 年 12 月 31 日的财务状况,以及截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日三年期内各年的经营成果和现金流量,符合公认会计原则。

如合并财务报表附注 1 所述,1993 年公司改变了所得税和投资的会计方法,以符合财务会计准则委员会近期公告的要求。

1995 年 3 月 9 日

德勤·关黄陈方国际会计师事务所

Deloitte & Touche LLP 2000 First National Center Omaha, Nebraska 68102-1578 Telephone: (402) 346-7788 Facsimile: (402) 346-0711 (402) 344-0372 INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT Berkshire Hathaway Inc To the Board of Directors and Shareholders We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1994 and 1993, and the related consolidated statements of earnings, and are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1994. These financial statements financial statements based on our audits. require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those standards supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. In our opinion, such consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1994 and 1993, and the results of conformity with generally accepted accounting principles their operations and their cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1994 in As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, in 1993 the Company changed its method Accounting Standards Board of accounting for income taxes and investments to conform with recent pronouncements of the Financial March 9, 1995 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International 22

[第 25 页]

[PAGE 25]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

合并资产负债表

及子公司

(除每股数据外,金额单位为千美元)

12 月 31 日

1994 年 1993 年

资产

现金及现金等价物 $ 273,881 $ 1,817,558

投资:

权益性有价证券 $ 1,820,733 $ 1,397,812

固定到期证券 15,236,494 12,516,613

所罗门公司 1,023,418 580,600

存货 425,431 524,963

应收款 275,667 378,386

物业及设备 717,082 259,736

其他资产 984,876 1,029,416

金融业务资产 872,401 746,385

$21,338,182 $19,520,469

负债与股东权益

财产及意外险保单持有人负债 $ 4,200,813 $ 3,807,188

所得税 397,384 562,443

应付账款、应计费用及其他负债 3,292,602 3,030,189

金融业务负债 810,719 729,366

投资协议借款及其他债务 562,443 810,719

9,263,961 8,909,816

少数股东权益 199,339 182,279

股东权益:

普通股,面值 5 美元;授权 1,500,000 股;

已发行 1,381,308 股 6,907 6,907

资本公积 656,074 656,074

投资未实现增值,净额 6,364,362 4,885,173

留存收益 4,390,375 5,412,652

11,912,516 10,460,008

减:库藏普通股(按成本计,203,558 股) 37,634 37,634

股东权益合计 11,874,882 10,428,374

$21,338,182 $19,520,469

参见合并财务报表附注

23

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS and Subsidiaries (dollars in thomsands except per share amounts) December 31. 1994 1993 Cash and cash equivalents. ASSETS Investments: $ 273,881 1,817,558 Marketable equity securities Securities with fixed maturities 1,820,733 Salomon Inc 15,236,494 1,397,812 Inventories Receivables 1,023,418 12,516,613 580,600 723,584 Properties and equipment 425,431 524,963 Other assets Assets of finance businesses 275,667 378,386 717,082 259,736 984,876 1,029,416 872,401 $21.338,182 $ 19.520,469 Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY Income taxes Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities .. $ 4,200,813 397,384 $ 3,807,188 Liabilities of finance businesses Borrowings under investment agreements and other debt 3,292,602 370,684 562,443 810,719 3,030,189 972,389 729.366 9.263.961 8,909,816 Minority shareholders' interests 199,339 182,279 Shareholders' equity: Common stock of $5 par value. Authorized 1,500,000 shares; Capital in excess of par value Issued 1,381,308 shares 656,074 6,907 656,074 6,907 Unrealized appreciation of investments, net Retained earnings............ 6,364,362 4,885,173 4.390,375 5,412,652 Less common stock in treasury, at cost (203,558 shares) 11,912,516 37,634 10,460,008 37,634 Total shareholders' equity ....... 11.874,882 10,428.374 $ 21,338,182 $ 19,520,469 See accompanying Noles to Consolidated Financial Statements 23

[第 26 页]

[PAGE 26]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司及其子公司合并收益表(除每股金额外,单位:千美元)

199419931992
截至 12 月 31 日的年度
收入:
已赚保费$2,351,918$1,962,862$1,774,436
销售收入与服务收入923,180650,726546,422
所罗门公司投资收入30,058354,02889,937
利息与股息收入426,094364,895297,066
金融业务收入24,88591,33291,449
已实现投资收益63,00022,22620,696
其他收入28,33263,00020,696
总收入3,847,4673,599,2642,977,257
成本与费用:
产品与服务销售成本1,449,9991,180,0421,049,721
保险损失及损失调整费用565,257450,659505,023
销售、一般及管理费用613,406687,625552,618
保险承保费用169,08260,11185,628
所罗门公司投资公允价值非暂时性下降
利息费用227,99798,64356,545
全美航空集团优先股投资公允价值非暂时性下降268,500
少数股东权益8,73375,3489,963
成本与费用合计3,185,2702,409,5462,426,640
所得税、少数股东权益及会计变更累积影响前收益662,1971,189,718550,617
所得税:
除递延税款因未实现增值适用的所得税税率变动影响外158,666345,302138,089
递延税款因未实现增值适用的所得税税率变动影响75,3485,243
所得税合计158,666420,650143,332
少数股东权益8,7339,963
会计变更累积影响前收益494,798759,105407,285
会计变更(所得税会计)累积影响(70,984)
净利润$494,798$688,121$407,285
平均流通股数1,177,7501,156,2431,146,492
每股收益:
会计变更累积影响前$420$656$355
会计变更(所得税会计)累积影响(61)
净利润$420$595$355

参见合并财务报表附注。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS and Subsidiaries (dollars in thousands except per share umounts) 1994 Year Ended December 31,_ 1993 1992 Revenues: Insurance premiums earned Sales and service revenues $2,351,918 Income from investment in Salomon Inc Interest and dividend income 923,180 $1,962,862 426,094 650,726 $1,774,436 Income from finance businesses 30,058 354,028 664,293 Realized investment gain 24,885 63,000 364,895 91,332 22,226 20,696 63,000 546,422 89,937 Cost and expenses: 3,847,467 3,599,264 2,977,257 Cost of products and services sold Insurance losses and loss adjustment expenses 1,449,999 565,257 1,180,042 450,659 1,049,721 Selling, general and administrative expenses Insurance underwriting expenses 227,997 Other than temporary decline in value of investment in Interest expense 613,406 169,082 687,625 60,111 552,618 505,023 85,628 56,545 98,643 USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock 268,500 3,185,270 2,409,546 2,426,640 Earnings before income taxes, minority interest and Income taxes - cumulative effect of accounting change 662,197 1,189,718 550,617 Other than effect of change in income tax rate on deferred taxes applicable to unrealized Effect of change in income tax rate on deferred appreciation 158,666 345,302 138,089 Minority interest taxes applicable to unrealized appreciation 8,733 75,348 9,963 5,243 Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change Cumulative effect of change in accounting for income 494,798 759,105 407,285 taxes «... (70,984) Net earnings $ 494,798 $ 688,121 $ 407,285 Average shares outstanding 1,177,750 1,156,243 1,146,492 Earnings per share: Before cumulative effect of accounting change Cumulative effect of change in accounting for income $420 $656 $355 taxes (61) Net earnings $420 $595 $355 See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 24

[第 27 页]

[PAGE 27]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司及其子公司合并现金流量表(单位:千美元)截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日止年度经营活动产生的现金流量:1993 年 1992 年调整净利润以得自经营活动的现金流量:1994 年 494,798 美元 688,121 美元 407,285 美元投资价值非暂时性下跌(除美国航空公司优先股)已实现投资收益 … (91,332) (546,422) (89,937)折旧与摊销 268,500 62,547 75,348 所得税税率变动对递延所得税的影响 50,180 41,074 会计变更累积影响前的资产与负债变动:- 70,984 损失及损失调整费用 284,123 102,789 134,077 分保再保险的递延费用 25,349 (22,798) 10,171 应收款项 83,937 75,274 46,931 未赚保费 (49,829) (8,518) 所得税 (257,102) 210,495 107,931 应付账款、应计费用及其他负债 34,996 150,615 239,428 其他 77 (5,278) 29,004 33,644 经营活动产生的现金流量净额 929,108 726,169 997,185 投资活动产生的现金流量:购买固定期限投资 (3,050,025) (2,485,768) (272,249) 购买可交易权益证券 (858,879) (258,617) 出售固定期限投资所得款项 1,772,050 (913,037) 284,301 出售可交易权益证券所得款项 85,881 1,188,510 318,881 固定期限投资赎回及到期所得款项 371,514 1,466,775 (119,948) 金融业务发放的贷款及投资 100,270 (246,797) (866,843) 收购企业 (160,261) 332,398 (23,160) 金融业务贷款的收回 269,345 19,578 127,913 其他 (5,294) 投资活动产生的现金流量净额 (12,148,646) (201,657) (573,159) 筹资活动产生的现金流量:其他借款所得款项 1,225,301 208,561 1,264,972 金融业务借款所得款项 591,853 961,565 38,862 金融业务借款偿还 (390,506) (1,399,901) (316,318) 其他借款偿还 (1,387,674) (906,964) (84,792) 其他 (908) (2,860) (2,334) 筹资活动产生的现金流量净额 (345,226) 137,746 6,337 现金及现金等价物年初余额 1,854,621 1,192,363 762,000 现金及现金等价物增加(减少)额 (1,564,764) 662,258 430,363 现金及现金等价物年末余额 * 289,857 美元 1,854,621 美元 1,192,363 美元 *年末现金及现金等价物由以下部分组成:其他 273,081 美元 15,976 美元 37,063 美元 金融业务 16,776 1,837,645 1,155,300 合计 289,857 美元 1,854,621 美元 1,192,363 美元 参见合并财务报表附注 25

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS and Subsidiaries (dollars in thousands) Year Ended December 31, 1994 Cash flows from operating activities: 1993 1992 Adjustments to reconcile net income to cash flows $ 494,798 $ 688,121 $ 407,285 from operating activities: Other than temporary decline in value of investment Realized investment gain ... (91,332) (546,422) (89,937) in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock 268,500 Depreciation and amortization .. Effect of change in income tax rate on deferred taxes 62,547 75,348 50,180 41,074 Changes in assets and liabilities before effects from cumulative ettect ot accounting change . - 70,984 Losses and loss adjustment expenses business acquisitions: Deferred charges re reinsurance assumed 274,123 Receivables Unearned premiums 25,349 (22,798) 10,171 102,789 134,077 83,937 75,274 46.931 (49,829) (8,518) Income taxes Accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities (257,102) 210,495 107,931 34,996 150,615 239,428 Other 77 (5,278) 29,004 33,644 Net cash flows from operating activities 929,108 726,169 997,185 Cash flows from investing activities: Purchases of fixed maturity investments Purchases of marketable equity securities (3,050,025) (2,485,768) (272,249) (858,879) (258,617) Proceeds from sales of fixed maturity investments Proceeds from redemptions and maturities of fixed 1,772,050 (913,037) 284,301 Proceeds from sales of marketable equity securities maturity investments 85,881 1,188,510 318,881 371,514 Loans and investments originated in finance businesses Acquisition of businesses 1,466,775 (119,948) 100,270 Principal collection on loans and investments (246,797) (866,843) (160,261) originated in finance businesses 332,398 (23,160) 269,345 19,578 127,913 (5,294) Net cash flows from investing activities Cash flows from financing activities: 12,148,646) (201,657) (573,159) Proceeds from other borrowings Proceeds from borrowings of finance businesses 1,225,301 208,561 1,264,972 591,853 961,565 38,862 Repayments of borrowings of finance businesses Other Repayments of other borrowings .... (390,506) (1,399,901) (316,318) (1,387,674) (906,964) (84,792) (908) (2,860) (2.334) Net cash flows from financing activities (345.226) 137,746 6,337 Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents .. (1,564,764) 662,258 430,363 1,854,621 1.192,363 762,000 Cash and cash equivalents at end of year * 289.857 $1.854.021 $1,192,363

  • Cashand cash equivalems at end of vear are comprised of the folloning:

Other Finance businesses 273.08L 15.976 37.063 _ 289.852 $ _1.854621 1.817,558 1.127,996 64.367 8 1.192.362 See accompanying Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 25

[第 28 页]

[PAGE 28]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

合并财务报表附注

及其子公司

1994 年 12 月 31 日

(1) 重要会计政策与实务

(a) 合并基础

随附的合并财务报表包含伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司(“公司”或“伯克希尔”)及其所有子公司的报表。公司间账户及交易已被抵销。在 1993 年和 1992 年的随附财务报表中,已按要求进行了重分类调整,以符合本年度的列报方式。

(b) 现金等价物

现金等价物由投资于货币市场账户的资金以及购买时距到期日不超过三个月的投资构成。

(c) 投资

管理层在购买时确定固定到期日证券及可流通权益证券投资的适当分类,并在每个资产负债表日重新评估此类认定。于 1994 年 12 月 31 日,固定到期日证券投资(金融企业持有的此类证券除外)及可流通权益证券被归类为可供出售。金融企业持有的固定到期日证券被归类为持有至到期。于 1993 年 12 月 31 日,所有固定到期日证券均被归类为持有至到期。当公司有能力且明确意图持有至到期时,固定到期日证券被视为持有至到期证券。持有至到期证券按摊余成本计量。可供出售证券按公允价值列报,未实现损益(税后净额)在股东权益的一个单独组成部分中列报。已实现投资损益(按个别认定法确定)计入合并收益表。

(d) 收购企业的商誉

收购成本与被收购企业净资产公允价值之间的差额,在四十年内按直线法摊销。未摊销净余额列示于其他资产。

(e) 保险保单获取成本

就财务报告而言,某些保险保单的获取成本予以递延,但需以可收回为条件。

(f) 分出再保险的递延费用

对于提供保险风险补偿(结构化赔付除外)的追溯性财产/意外再保险合同,保险集团最终须支付的索赔及理赔费用估计负债超出所收对价的差额,在该类合同初始时确认为递延费用。该递延费用随后在索赔负债的预计结算期间内采用利息法摊销。递延费用的未摊销余额列示于其他资产。

(g) 财产及意外险保单持有人负债

财产及意外险保单持有人负债主要由以下各项构成:(i) 未付损失及损失理算费用,(ii) 未赚保费,以及 (iii) 分出再保险合同项下持有的资金。

未付损失及损失理算费用负债,代表保险集团成员公司就以下合同所承担该类义务的合计金额:(i) 预期性财产/意外保险及再保险合同,(ii) 提供保险风险补偿(结构化赔付除外)的追溯性财产/意外再保险合同,以及 (iii) 就已决赔款提供定期支付(“结构化赔付”)的再保险合同。除按折现现值列示的结构性赔付负债外,未付损失及损失理算费用负债按估计的最终赔付总额列报。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS and Subsidiaries December 31, 1994 (1) Significant accounting policies and practices (a) Basis of consolidation The accompanying Consolidated Financial Statements include the accounts of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (the "Company" or "Berkshire") consolidated with accounts of all its subsidiaries. Intercompany accounts and have been made when required to conform to the current year presentation. transactions have been eliminated. In the accompanying financial statements for 1993 and 1992, reclassifications (b) Cash equivalents Cash maturity of three months or less when purchased. equivalents consist of funds invested in money market accounts and in investments with (e) Investments Management determines the appropriate classifications of investments in securities with fixed maturities and date. At December 31, 1994, investments in securities with fixed maturities (except for such securities held by marketable equity securities at the time of purchase and reevaluates such designations as of each balance sheet maturities held by finance businesses are classitied as held-to-maturity. At December 31, 1993, all fixed maturity finance businesses) and marketable equity securities, are classified as available-for-sale. Securities with fixed securities were classified as held-to-maturity. Securities with fixed maturities are deemed to be held-to- maturity securities are carried at amortized cost. Available-for-sale securities are stated at fair value, with maturity securities when the Company has the ability and positive intent to hold them to maturity. Held-to- and losses on sales of investments, unrealized gains and losses, net oftax, reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity. Realized gains Consolidated Statements of Earnings. as determined on a specific identification basis, are included in the (d) Goodwill of acquired businesses The difference between purchase cost and the fair value of the net assets of acquired businesses is amortized on a straight line basis over forty years. The net unamortized balance is carried in other assets. (e) Insurance premium acquisition costs For financial reporting certain costs of acquiring insurance premiums are deferred, subject ( Deferred charges re reinsurance assumed The excess of estimated liabilities for claims and claim costs ultimately payable by the Insurance Group over consideration received with respect to retroactive property/casualty reinsurance contracts that provide for inception of such contracts. The deferred charges are subsequently amortized using the interest method over indemnification of insurance risk, other than structured settlements, is established as a deferred charge at the expected settlement periods of the claim liabilities. The unamortized balance of deferred charges is included (g) Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities are comprised primarily of (i) unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses, (ii) uncarned premiums, and (ii) funds held under reinsurance assumed. Liability for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses represents the aggregate of such obligations of members of the Insurance Group with respect to: (i) prospective property/casualty insurance and reinsurance contracts, (ii) retroactive property/casualty reinsurance contracts that provide for indemnification of insurance risk, other than structured settlements, and (l) reinsurance contracts providing for periodic payments with respect to settled claims ("structured settlements"). Except for structured settlement liabilities which are stated estimated ultimate payment amounts. at discounted present values, the liability for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses is at the aggregate of 26

[第 29 页]

[PAGE 29]

(1) 重要会计政策与惯例(续)

(g) 财产与意外险保单持有人负债(续)

预期合同的最终赔付金额,根据 (i) 逐案估计、(ii) 基于过往经验的已发生但未报告损失估计,以及 (iii) 分出保险公司的损失报告来确定。

对于提供赔偿或保险风险(结构性结算除外)的追溯性再保险合同,其最终金额在财务报告中按合同项下的最高赔偿限额确认。(另见上文第 1[f] 条,与假设再保险相关的递延费用。)

结构性结算合同项下的负债,在合同签订时按精算确定的最终赔付金额,以当时的市场利率折现后的现值确认。此后,负债的年度增值计入已发生损失。

假设再保险条约下持有的资金,主要由应退还被保险人的存款余额构成,其所对应的险种,按财务会计准则公告第 113 号《短期与长期合同的再保险会计与报告》的定义,公司认为并未向分出公司提供保险风险赔偿。

(h) 保费

预期保险和非财产巨灾再保险保单的保费,在其期限内按比例确认为收入,未赚保费按月或按天按比例计算。巨灾超赔再保险覆盖的保费,推迟至损失发生或保单到期两者中较早的时间确认。因承担追溯性再保险合同和结构性结算下的风险而收到的对价,在合同生效时确认为已赚保费。已赚保费按扣除分出给再保险公司的净额列示。

(i) 损失及损失调整费用准备在随附的合并利润表中,按扣除再保险合同下预计可收回金额后的净额列报。1994、1993 和 1992 年的此类可收回金额分别为 6100 万美元、3400 万美元和 9000 万美元。再保险合同并不能解除保险集团成员对基础保险和再保险合同项下保单持有人的赔偿义务。再保险合同下可收回的损失及损失费用估计数,计入应收款项。

(k) 会计变更

自 1993 年 1 月 1 日起,公司采纳了财务会计准则公告第 109 号《所得税会计》(“SFAS 109”)。采纳 SFAS 109 后,公司的所得税会计方法从“递延法”变更为“资产负债法”。此前,公司对财务报告与应税收入之间时间性差异的过往税收影响进行递延处理。根据 SFAS 109 的资产负债法,递延所得税资产和负债应针对现有资产和负债的财务报表账面金额与其各自计税基础之间的差异所带来的未来税务后果进行确认。SFAS 109 的规定要求,税率变动对递延税款的影响,应在包含生效日期的期间内确认为损益。

1993 年 5 月,财务会计准则委员会发布了财务会计准则公告第 115 号《对某些债务与权益证券投资的会计处理》(“SFAS 115”)。根据该公告的允许,公司选择自 1993 年 12 月 31 日起采纳其规定。在其各项条款中,该公告要求变更非保险实体持有的可交易权益证券的会计处理方法。在采纳 SFAS 115 之前,此类证券按总成本与市价孰低法计量。根据 SFAS 115 的规定,这些证券现在按市价计量,其会计处理方式与公司保险子公司持有的可交易权益证券相同。

(1) Significant accounting policies and practices (Continued) (g) Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities (Continued) Ultimate payment amounts with respect to prospective contracts are determined from (i) individual case from ceding insurers. estimates, (ii) estimates of incurred but not reported losses, based on past experience, and (iii) reports of losses Ultimate indemnification or insurance risk, other than structured settlements, are established for financial roporing amounts with respect retroactive reinsurance contracts that provide charges re reinsurance assumed.) purposes at maximum limits of indemnification under the contracts. (See also 1(f) above related to deferred Liabilities under structured settlement contracts are established when the contracts are entered into, at the then interest rate. Thereafter, annual accretions to the liabilities are charged to losses incurred present value of the actuarially determined ultimate payment amount discounted at the prevailing market Funds held under reinsurance assumed treaties primarily consist of deposit balances refundable to insureds for by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 113, "Accounting and Reporting for Reinsurance of coverages which the Company believes do not indemnify the ceding company against insurance risk, as defined Short-Duration and Long-Duration Contracts" (h) Insurance premiums Insurance premiums for prospective insurance and non-property catastrophe reinsurance policies are recognized Premiums for catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance coverages are deferred until the earlier of a loss as tevenues ratably over their terms with unearned premiums computed on a monthly or daily pro rata basis. occurrence or policy expiration. Consideration received for indemnification of risk under retroactive reinsurance Premiums earned are stated net of amounts ceded to reinsurers. contracts and structured settlements is accounted for as premiums earned at the inception of the contracts. 0) Provisions for losses and loss adjustment expenses are reported in the accompanying Consolidated Statements of Earnings after deducting estimates of recoveries under reinsurance contracts. Such recoveries totalled $61 relieve the Insurance Group Members of their obligations to indemnify policyholders with respect to the million, $34 million, and $90 million for 1994, 1993 and 1992, respectively. Reinsurance contracts do not reinsurance contracts are included in receivables. underlying insurance and reinsurance contracts. Estimates of losses and loss expenses recoverable under (k) Effective January 1, 1993, the Company adopted the provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Accounting changes No. 109 "Accounting for Income Taxes" ("SEAS 109"). The adoption of SEAS 109 changed the Company's Previously the Company deferred the past tax effects of timing differences between financial reporting and method of accounting for income taxes from the "deferred method" to the "asset and liability method" taxable income. Under the asset and liability method of SFAS 109, deferred tax assets and liabilities are of existing assets and liabilities and their respective tax bases. The provisions of SFAS 109 require that the recognized for future tax consequences attributable to differences between financial statement carrying amounts enactment date. effect on deferred taxes of a change in tax rates be recognized in income in the period that includes the In May 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. statement, the Company elected to adopt the statement's provisions as of December 31, 1993. Among its 115 "'Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities" ("SFAS 115"). As permitted under the insurance entities. Prior to the adoption of SFAS 115, such securities were carried at the lower of aggregate provisions, the statement requires a change in the accounting for marketable equity securities held by non- cost or market. Under the provisions of SFAS 115, these securities are now carried at market and accounted for in the same manner as marketable equity securities held by the Company's insurance subsidiaries. 27

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[PAGE 30]

合并财务报表附注(续)

(2) 德克斯特鞋业公司合并

1993 年 11 月 7 日,公司完成了与私营德克斯特鞋业公司(“Dexter”)的合并,通过重新发行库存持有的 25,203 股普通股,换取德克斯特全部已发行普通股。此次合并按购买法进行会计处理,因此,德克斯特的经营业绩自合并生效日起纳入公司合并经营业绩。德克斯特生产和销售男女正装鞋、休闲鞋和运动鞋。若德克斯特的经营业绩自 1992 年起纳入合并,则报告结果不会受到重大影响。

(3) 固定期限证券投资

截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,固定期限证券投资的摊余成本和估计公允价值如下(单位:千美元):

摊余成本未实现总收益未实现总损失估计公允价值
1994 年 12 月 31 日
美国国债及美国政府机构债券$ 733,543-$ (16,721)$ 716,822
州及地方政府债券601,0098,030(3,453)619,822
公司债券422,92322,266(12,971)434,954
抵押贷款支持证券40,01015,002(40)38,644
可赎回优先股10,4912,463(1,401)10,491
合计$ 1,805,51539,766(24,548)$ 1,820,733
1993 年 12 月 31 日
债券:
美国国债及美国政府机构债券$ 9,286131(4)$ 9,413
州及地方政府债券681,88263,550(810)692,187
公司债券643,09449,903(90,060)607,010
抵押贷款支持证券65,1781,635(2)65,178
可赎回优先股49,90315,188(5)49,903
合计$ 1,397,81265,857(90,881)$ 1,373,788

以上金额不包括金融业务持有的固定期限证券。参见附注 7。

以下按合同到期日列示截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日上述证券的摊余成本和估计公允价值。实际到期日将与合同到期日不同,因为某些证券的发行人保留提前赎回或提前还款的权利。金额单位为千美元。

到期期限摊余成本估计公允价值
一年以内$ 904,129$ 920,960
一年以上至五年以内647,401647,054
五年以上至十年以内199,551196,918
十年以上14,42417,157
小计$ 1,765,505$ 1,782,089
抵押贷款支持证券40,01038,644
合计$ 1,805,515$ 1,820,733

出售和赎回固定期限证券实现的毛收益和毛损失如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年1993 年1992 年
毛实现收益6,80840,10980,076
毛实现损失(4,268)(174)(563)

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (2) Dexter Shoe Companies merger by reissuing 25,203 shares of its common stock held in treasury in exchange for 100% of the outstanding common stock of On November 7, 1993, the Company consummated a merger with the privately held Dexter Shoe Companies ("Dexter") for by the purchase method of accounting and, accordingly. Dexter's operating results are included in the Company's Dexter. Dexter manufactures and distributes men's and women's dress, casual and athletic shoes. The merger was accounted with operations in 1992, the reported results would not have been materially affected. consolidated results of operations from the effective date of the merger. Had the results of Dexter been included commencing (3) Investments in securities with fixed maturities maturities are as follows (in thousands): The amortized cost and estimated fair values as of December 31, 1994 and 1993, of investments in securities with fixed December 31, 1994 Amortized Gross Cost Unrealized Gross Gains Unrealized Estimated Losses Value Fair U.S. Treasury securities and obligations of Obligations of states, municipalities U.S. government corporations and agencies $ 733,543 - $ (16,721) $ 716,822 Corporate bonds and political subdivisions 601,009 422,923 8,030 22,266 2,463 (3,453) 40,010 15,002 (2) 619,822 Mortgage-backed securities Redeemable preferred stocks 35 12,971) 10,491 (1,401) 434.954 38,644 $ 1,805,515 39,766 _(24,548) $ 1,820,733 December 31, 1993 Amorlized Gross Cost Unrealized Gross Gains Unrealized Estimated Losses Value Fair Bonds: U.S. Treasury securities and obligations of Obligations of states, municipalities U.S. government corporations and agencies $ 9,286 131 (4) 9,413 Mortgage-backed securities Redeemable preferred stocks and political subdivisions 681,882 643,094 49,903 63,550 15,188 (810) 1,635 (90,060) 692,187 (2) 607,010 65,178 $ 1.397,812 65.857 $(90,881) $ 1.373,788 Amounts above exclude securities with fixed maturities held by finance businesses. See note 7. contractual maturity dates. Actual maturities will differ from contractual maturities because issuers of certain of the securities Shown below are the amortized cost and estimated fair values of the above securities at December 31, 1994, by retain early call or prepayment rights. Amounts are in thousands. Amortized Estimated Due in one year or less Cost Fair Value Due after five years through ten years Due after one year through five years $ 904,129 647,401 647,054 199,551 920,960 Due after ten years 14,424 196,918 17,157 $ 1,765,505 $ 1,782,089 Mortgage-backed securities 40,010 38,644 $ 1,805,515 $ 1,820,733 thousands): Gross realized gains and losses on sales and redemptions of securities with fixed maturities were as follows (in 1994 1993 Gross realized gains. 6,808 40,109 1992 80,076 Gross realized losses (4,268) (174) (563) 28

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[PAGE 31]

(4)

上市交易股权证券投资

(单位:千美元)

以下是合并报表中上市交易股权证券投资的汇总数据:

1994 年 12 月 31 日

普通股:成本未实现收益市值
可口可乐公司345,000$ 1,360,000$ 1,705,000
大都会/美国广播公司 (a)45,7133,851,1125,150,000
GEICO 公司 (b)1,298,8881,632,5372,869,830
吉列公司423,6801,197,0001,678,250
富国银行 (c)600,0001,678,2501,051,687
其他所有上市交易股权证券1,632,5375,150,0003,921,517
合计$ 5,583,111$ 9,653,383$ 15,236,494

1993 年 12 月 31 日

普通股:成本未实现收益市值
可口可乐公司345,000$ 1,239,000$ 1,894,000
大都会/美国广播公司 (a)45,7131,713,8814,167,975
GEICO 公司 (b)1,023,9203,144,0552,862,581
吉列公司423,6801,182,6211,454,934
富国银行 (c)600,000831,0001,759,594
其他所有上市交易股权证券1,857,8094,167,9753,040,430
合计$ 4,296,122$ 8,220,491$ 12,516,613

(a) 伯克希尔下属子公司持有的大都会/美国广播公司(“大都会”)普通股,在 1994 年 12 月 31 日拥有大都会所有在外流通股约 13% 的投票权。这些股份的持有受一份协议约束,该协议授予大都会购买这些股份的优先购买权,并对这些股份的出售或转让方式作出规定,有效期至 1997 年 1 月 3 日。此外,伯克希尔及其子公司已将不可撤销的代理权授予大都会,委托托马斯·S·墨菲或丹尼尔·B·伯克(只要其中一人仍担任大都会首席执行官),在大都会股东的所有会议上就这些股份投票。该代理权于 1997 年 1 月 2 日,或在此二人均不再担任大都会首席执行官之日起的较早日期到期。

(b) 伯克希尔下属子公司持有 GEICO 公司普通股,在 1994 年 12 月 31 日拥有 GEICO 所有在外流通股约 50% 的投票权。根据 GEICO 所在地保险监管机构的要求,伯克希尔维持了一项独立的股份投票安排。该安排源于 1976 年伯克希尔子公司对 GEICO 股份的大规模收购,禁止伯克希尔寻求或促使变更该独立代理人。此外,根据该命令,伯克希尔或其任何关联公司或子公司的官员或董事均不得担任 GEICO 董事。由于该命令剥夺了伯克希尔对 GEICO 股份的投票权,伯克希尔对其 GEICO 投资不采用权益法核算。

(c) 伯克希尔下属子公司持有富国银行(“富国”)普通股,在 1994 年 12 月 31 日拥有富国所有在外流通股约 13% 的投票权。这些股份的持有受一份“被动协议”约束,该协议禁止伯克希尔在未经旧金山联邦储备委员会事先批准的情况下,寻求在富国银行董事会中取得代表权,或在任何单笔交易中处置超过 5% 的富国证券。为此,伯克希尔已就已持有的全部富国股票,以及未来可能购买并持有的此类额外富国股票,向富国银行秘书授予了代理权。

(d) 代表未实现收益总额 $1,187,893,减去未实现亏损总额 $36,206。

(e) 代表未实现收益总额 $1,275,413,减去未实现亏损总额 $92,792。

出售上市交易股权证券的已实现收益和亏损总额如下(单位:千美元):

199419931992
已实现收益总额$ 185,702$ 518,347$ 10,595
已实现亏损总额(96,910)(11,860)(171)

1993 年第四季度,伯克希尔一家子公司出售了其对大都会公司投资中的 10,000,000 股普通股,以配合大都会公司当时向股东回购至多 20,000,000 股自身股票的收购要约。在此次出售之前,且自 1986 年以来,伯克希尔子公司一直持有大都会 30,000,000 股股票,约占该公司在外流通股的 18%。伯克希尔从此交易中获得的已实现收益总额为 4.575 亿美元。

(4) Investments in marketable equity securities thousands): Aggregaid data with respect to the consolidated investment in marketable equity securities are shown below (in December 31, 1994 Unrealized Common stock of: _Lost Grains Marker The Coca-Cola Company Capital Cities/ABC. Inc. ia) 345,000 GEICO Corporation "1 ............ 1,298.888 $ 1,360,000 The Gillette Company 45,713 3,851,112 $ 1,705.000 All other marketable equity securities .. Wells Fargo & Company " 600,000 1,632,537 5.150,000 2,869.830 423.680 1,197,000 1,678,250 1.051.6874 561,047 1,797,000 3,921,517 984,727 December 31, 1993 $ 5.583,111 3 9.653,383 $ 15.236.494 Cost Unrealized Common stock of: Gains Market The Coca-Cola Company Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. *) 345,000 $ The Gillette Company GEICO Corporation 1,023,920 3,144,055 894,000 $ 1,239,000 45,713 1,713,881 4,167,975 All other marketable equity securities Wells Fargo & Company 1* 600,000 831,000 1,759,594 1,857,809 423.680 1.182,621* 454,934 1,431,000 3,040.430 878.614 $ 4,296,122 $ 8.220,491 $ 12.516.613 (a) Common shares of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ("Capital Cities") owned by Berkshire subsidiaries possessed approximately Agreement, the terms of which grant to Capital Cities a right of first refusal to purchase the shares and otherwise govern 13% of the voting rights of all Capital Cities shares outstanding at December 31. 1994. The shares ure held subject to an delivered to Capital Cities irrevocable proxies with respect to these shures in favor of Thomas S. Murphy or Daniel B. until Januury 3, 1997, the manner by which the shares muy be sold or transferred Also, Berkslare and its subsidiaries have of shareholders of Capital Cities. The proxies expire on January 2. 1997, or at the earlier dale when nether of such persons Burke, so long as either shall be the chief executive officer of Capital Cities, to vole the shares ut any and all meetings is chief executive officer of Capital Ciries: Subsidiaries of Berkshire owned shares of common stock of GEICO Corporation that possessed approximately 50% of arrangement for voting of the shares as reguired by Order of GEICO's domiciliary insurance supervisory authority. The the voting rights of all GEICO shares outstanding at December 31. 1994. Berkshire maintains an independent provy causing to change the independent proxy. Also, under the Order, no officer or director of Berkshire or of any affiliate or Order, dating from Berkshire subsidiaries' major purchase of the shares in 1976. prohibits Berkshire from seeking or with respect to the shares, Berkshire does not use the equiry method of accounting for its investment in GEICO. subsidiary of Berkshire is permitted to serve as a director of GEICO. Because the Order divests Berkshire of its voting rights Subsidiaries of Berkshire owned common shares of Wells Fargo & Company ("Wells Fargo") that possessed approximately 13% of the voting rights of all Wells Fargo shares outstanding at December 31, 1994. The shares are held subject to a Reserve Board of San Francisco, from seeking representation on the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo and from disposing Passivity Agreement, the terms of which among other things prohibit Berkshire, without prior approval from the Federal of more than 5% of the Wells Fargo securilies in any single transaction. In connection therewith, Berkshire has granted additional shares of Wells Fargo stock as Berkshire may purchase and hold in the future. a proxyto the Secretary of Wells Fargo, with respect to all Wells Forgo stock presently owned and with respect to such (d) Represents gross unrealized gains $1,187,893, less gross unrealized losses $/36,206. (e) Represents gross unrealized gains $1,275,413, less gross unrealized losses $92,792. Gross realized gains and losses on sales of marketable equity securities were as follows (in thousands): 7994

  • 1995

1992 Gross realized gains. $ 185.702 $ 518347* $10,595 Gross realized losses (96,910) (11.860) (171) During the fourth quarter of 1993. a subsidiary of Berkshire sold 10,000.000 common shares of its invesiment in Cupital the sale and since 1986, Berkshire subsidiaries owned 30.000.000 shares of Capital Cities or approximately 18%% of that Cities in connection with that company's offer to buy from its shareholders up to 20,000,000 of its compion shares. Prior to company's outstanding stock. Berkshire's gross realized gain from this transaction was $457.5 million. 29

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合并财务报表附注(续)

(5)对所罗门公司的投资

本公司对所罗门公司的投资构成如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年 12 月 31 日1993 年 12 月 31 日
成本公允价值账面价值成本公允价值账面价值
累积可转换优先股$ 700,000$ 735,000$ 735,000$ 700,000$ 875,000$ 700,000
普通股324,445248,760288,41821,63623,58423,584
合计$ 1,024,445$ 983,760$ 1,023,418$ 121,636$ 898,584$ 723,584

优先股(“优先股”)。截至 1994 年和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,伯克希尔子公司均持有 700,000 股累积可转换优先股。优先股赎回价为每股 $1,000,有权按年率每股 $5 收取季度股息。优先股可按每股 $38 的价格转换为所罗门公司普通股,且每股可转换成的普通股(截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日为 18,421,053 股)享有一票投票权。自 1995 年起,每年 10 月 31 日,所罗门公司将按成本赎回 140,000 股优先股或届时较少的已发行数量。如附注 1(c) 所述,截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日,优先股按公允价值入账,而截至 1993 年 12 月 31 日则按成本入账。

伯克希尔子公司持有略超过所罗门公司 20% 的总投票权。(该投票权包括前述优先股附带的权利,加上截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日持有的 6,633,600 股普通股。)

自 1994 年 4 月 1 日起,本公司对所罗门公司的投资采用权益法核算。因此,如前所述,优先股继续按公允价值入账,而对所罗门公司投资的收益构成如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年1993 年1992 年
优先股股息$ 63,000$ 63,000$ 63,000
普通股持股应占所罗门净亏损的权益(32,942)
合计$ 30,058$ 63,000$ 63,000

*已考虑对所罗门普通股成本超出其相关账面价值部分在四十年内摊销的影响。

(6)对美国航空集团公司优先股的投资

固定到期日证券投资包括 358,000 股美国航空集团公司 A 系列累积可转换优先股(“美国航空优先股”)。美国航空优先股于 1989 年以每股 $1,000(总计 $358,000,000)加应计股息收购。若非在 1999 年 8 月 7 日前被赎回或转换,美国航空优先股须由美国航空集团公司(“美国航空”)在到期时强制赎回。

过去五年,美国航空亏损极其严重。1994 年 9 月 29 日,美国航空宣布推迟支付原定于 1994 年 9 月 30 日到期的美国航空优先股季度股息。截至 1995 年 3 月 7 日,原定于 1994 年 9 月 30 日和 12 月 31 日到期的季度股息均未收到。美国航空公开表示,其在低票价竞争环境中的生存能力取决于其能否通过降低人员成本和其它成本节约措施来永久性地降低运营成本。美国航空管理层目前正与其工会员工领导层进行讨论,以实现降低人员成本的目标。尽管美国航空管理层表示他们致力于与劳工团体达成协议,但谈判的时间和结果均不确定。

伯克希尔管理层得出结论,美国航空优先股的价值已发生非暂时性下跌。因此,1994 年合并收益表中计入一笔 $268,500,000 的减值费用,以反映该下跌。虽然前述收益费用已于 1994 年第四季度入账,但股东权益的减记已在 1994 年更早的财务报告期间记录。自 1994 年 3 月 31 日起,固定到期日证券被分类为可供出售并按公允价值入账,税后未实现收益及损失计入股东权益。截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日,美国航空优先股的账面价值已调整为当时估计的公允价值 $179,000,000。而截至 1993 年 12 月 31 日,该优先股按成本 $358,000,000 入账。

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (5) Investment in Salomon Ine The Company's investment in Salomon ine consists of the following (in thousands): December 31, 1994 December 31, 1993 Lost Value Fair Carrying Value Cost Value Fair Carrying Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock.. $ 700,000 $ 735,000 $ 735,000 $ 700.000 $ 875,000 700.000 Value Common Stock 324,445 248,760 288,418 21,636 23,584 23,584 $1,024.445 $ 983,760 $1,023.418 $ 121,636 $ 898,584 $ 723,584 Preferred Stock ‹"Preferred Shares"). The Preferred Shares have a redemption value of $1,000 per share and are entitled At both December 31, 1994 and 1993, Berkshire subsidiaries owned 700,000 shares of Cumulative Convertible to receive quarterly dividends at the annual rate of 590 per share. The Preferred Shares can be converted into shares of Salomon Inc common stock at $38 per share and are entitled to one vote per share of common stock into which such Inc will redeem, at cost, 140,000 of the Preferred Shares or such fewer number as are then outstanding. As discussed shares are convertible (18,421,053 at December 31, 1994). Annually on each October 31, commencing in 1995, Salomon at December 31, 1993 in Note 1(c), the Preferred Shares are carried at fair value at December 31, 1994, whereas they were carried at cost of rights attaching to the aforementioned Preferred Shares plus 6,633,600 common shares held at December 31, 1994.) Berkshire subsidiaries possess slightly in excess of 20% of the total voting rights in Salomon. (Such rights consisting Effective April 1, 1994, the Company adopted the equity method of accounting with respect to its investment in Salomon Accordingly, as previously discussed, the Preferred Shares continue to be carried at fair value in accordance with income from the investment in Salomon Inc consists of the following (in thousands): Dividends on Preterred Shares $63,000 1994 1993 Equity in net loss of Salomon attributable to $63,000 $63,000 1992 common stock holdings * (32,942) $30,058 $03,000 $63,000 *Affer giving effectto amortization, over forty years, of the excess of the cost of Salomon common stock over its related book value. (6) Investment in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock Convertible Preferred Stock ("USAir Preferred Shares"). The USAir Preferred Shares were acquired in 1989 for $358 Investments in securities with fixed maturities include 358,000 shares of USAir Group, Inc. Series A Cumulative USA ir Group, Inc. ("USAir") at $1,000 per share ($358 million in the aggregate), plus accrued dividends. million. If not called or converted prior to August 7, 1999, the USAir Preferred Shares are mandatorily redeemable by was deferring the quarterly dividend payment due September 30, 1994, on the USAir Preferred Shares. As of March 7, For the past five years USAir has incurred very significant losses. On September 29, 1994, USAit announced that it publicly stated that its ability to survive in the low fare competitive environment is contingent upon USAir's ability 1995 neither the quarterly dividend due September 30, 1994, or December 31, 1994, had been received. USAir has permanently to reduce its operating costs through reductions in personnel costs and other cost saving initiatives. USAir reducing personnel costs. While USAir's management has stated they are committed to reaching an agreement with the management is currently engaged in discussions with the leadership of its unionized employees to achieve its goal of labor groups, both the timing and the outcome of the negotiations are uncertain. Berkshire management has concluded that an other than temporary decline in the value of the USAir Preferred Shares As a result of the extended period of losses and the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the labor negotiations, the decline. While the aforementioned charge to earnings was recorded in the fourth quarter of 1994; the charge to has arisen. Accordingly, the 1994 Consolidated Statement of Earnings includes a charge of $268.5 million to reflect shareholders' equity, however, had been recorded in earlier 1994 reporting periods. Effective March 31, 1994, investments in securities with fixed maturities were classified as available-for-sale and carried at fair value with the net after-tax value of the USAir Preferred Shares was adjusted to reflect its then estimated fair value of $179.0 million. At September December 31, 1994. 30

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[PAGE 33]

(7)金融业务

伯克希尔金融业务的资产和负债汇总如下(单位:千美元):

伯克希尔的金融业务由商业和消费金融公司以及一项年金业务构成。

12 月 31 日

资产

1994 年

1993 年

分期应收贷款

现金及现金等价物

15,976 美元

37,063 美元

其他

固定到期投资

157,985 美元

538,866 美元

163,827 美元

4,255 美元

667,101 美元

4,410 美元

717,082 美元

872,401 美元

负债

1996 年到期的 8.125% 票据

120,000 美元

120,000 美元

年金储备

369,964 美元

551,909 美元

投资协议项下借款 (b)

其他

41,021 美元

31,458 美元

52,022 美元

5,435 美元

562,443 美元

729,366 美元

截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,该科目中分别包括 396,033 美元和 534,352 美元的机构抵押贷款支持证券。截至 1994 年和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,这些证券的估计公允价值和未实现损益如下(单位:千美元),每只证券均至少获得两家评级机构的最高评级:

摊余成本未实现收益未实现损失估计公允价值
1994 年538,866 美元2,025 美元(21,091) 美元518,430 美元
1993 年607,101 美元655 美元(1,660) 美元667,466 美元

(b) 投资协议项下借款根据合同订立,期限通常为六个月至三十年,利息通常每半年支付一次,固定利率范围为 2.5% 至 7.3%。截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日的未偿还金额预计最早支付时间如下(单位:千美元):

1995 年

256,270 美元

1996 年

35,717 美元

1997 年

3,998 美元

1998 年

254 美元

1999 年

71,857 美元

1999 年后

1,868 美元

过去三年金融业务的收入汇总如下(单位:千美元):

收入

1994 年

1993 年

1992 年

贷款利息

37,407 美元

42,671 美元

51,564 美元

利息和股息收入

35,998 美元

20,107 美元

5,615 美元

年金保费收入

34,749 美元

15,950 美元

108,154 美元

68,393 美元

67,514 美元

成本和费用

利息支出

37,664 美元

31,665 美元

24,204 美元

一般及管理费用

5,724 美元

25,854 美元

13,940 美元

年金给付及承保费用

16,239 美元

20,964 美元

83,269 美元

46,167 美元

46,818 美元

税前收入

24,885 美元

22,226 美元*

20,696 美元*

  • 直到 1993 年 10 月,该业务组中还包含一项储蓄和贷款业务。1993 年和 1992 年金融业务收入中分别包括来自该业务的收益 35,857 美元和 4,547 美元。

(7) Finance businesses Assets and liabilities of Berkshire's fiance businesses are summarized below (in thousands): Berkshire's finance businesses are comprised of commercial and consumer finance companies and an annuity business. Dec. 31. 1994 Dec. 31, Assets 1993 Installment loans receivable Cash and cash equivalents $ 15,976 Other Fixed maturity investments 157,985 $ 37,063 538,866 163,827 4,255 667,10l 4,410 Liabilities $717.082 $872.401 8.125% Notes, payable in 1996 Annuity reserves.............. Borrowings under investment agreements " $120,000 369,964 $120,000 Other 41,021 551,909 31.458 52,022 5,435 $562,443 $729,366 Al December 31, 1994 and 1993, mortgage-backed securities of $396,033 and $534,352 respectively were agencies. Estimated fair values and gross unrealized gains and losses as of December 31, 1994 and 1993, are included in this caption. Each of these securities has received the highest rating from at least two rating as follows (in thousands): Unrealized Gross Gross Amortized Cost Gains Unrealized Estimated Losses Value Fair 1994 1993 $538,866 607,101 2,025 655 $(21,091) (1,660) $518,430 667,466 (b) Borrowings under investment agreements are made pursuant lo contracts with terms generally ranging from 2.5% to 7.3% per annum. Payments of amounts outstanding at December 31, 1994, are expected to be required six months to thirty years calling for interest payable, normally semiannually, at fixed rates ranging from no earlier than as follows (in thousands): 1995 1996 $256,270 1997 35,717 1999 1998 3,998 254 After 1999 71,857 1,868 Income from finance businesses for each of the past three years is summarized below (in thousands): Revenues 1994 1993 1992 Interest on loans.. Interest and dividend income $ 37,407 Annuity premiums earned 35,998 34,749 $ 42,671 20,107 $ 51,564 5,615 15,950 Cost and expenses 108,154 68,393 67,514 Interest expense General and administrative expenses Annuity bénefits and underwriting expenses 37,664 31,665 24,204 5,724 25,854 13,940 16,239 20,964 83,269 46,167 46,818 $ 24,885 $ 22.226* $ 20.696*

  • Until October 1993, a savings and loan business was also included in this group of businesses.

finance businesses includes earnings of 35,857 and $4,547 in 1993 and 1992 respectively from this business. Income from 31

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[PAGE 34]

合并财务报表附注(续)

(8) 其他资产

其他资产汇总如下(单位:千美元):

12 月 31 日

商誉

其他

再保险分入相关递延费用

1994 年 $ 454,633

1993 年 $ 440,664

$ 467,544

89,579

25,859

466,013

$ 984,876

$ 1,029,416

(9) 财产与意外险保单持有人负债

财产与意外险保单持有人负债汇总如下(单位:千美元):

12 月 31 日

未决损失与损失调整费用*

1994 年 $ 3,430,028

1993 年 $ 3,155,905

再保险分入下持有的资金

预收保费

307,232

315,750

其他

156,266

307,287

215,773

119,760

$ 4,200,813

$ 3,807,188

  • 未决损失与损失调整费用包括针对提供保险风险赔偿的追溯再保险合同所建立的负债。截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,这些负债分别合计 1,295,991 美元和 1,181,235 美元。相关递延费用已就这些合同建立,并作为其他资产列报。未决损失与损失调整费用中还包括折现后的结构化结算再保险负债,截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日和 1993 年 12 月 31 日,该负债分别合计 231,255 美元和 254,325 美元。

财产/意外险子公司未决损失与损失调整费用的补充数据(单位:千美元):

未决损失与损失调整费用:

1994 年 1993 年 1992 年

减:分出负债与递延费用

年初余额 $ 3,155,905

597,860 $ 3,219,441

已发生损失记录:

净余额 2,558,045 2,564,132

655,309 $ 2,978,837

2,326,796

652,041

所有以往事故年度*

当前事故年度 505,058

已发生损失合计 60,199

439,404

11,255

658,484

29,141

支付相关:

565,257

450,659

687,625

当前事故年度 216,346

50,859

47,029

所有以往事故年度 267,205

456,746

409,717

支付合计 53,845

476,750

未决损失与损失调整费用:

净余额 2,856,097

573,931

2,558,045

597,860

2,537,671

652,865

加:分出负债与递延费用

年末余额 $ 3,430,028

$ 3,155,905

$ 3,190,536**

  • 已发生损失“所有以往事故年度”反映了每年计入或冲减收益的估计误差金额。此外,该金额还包括再保险分入相关递延费用的摊销以及折现后结构化结算负债的增值。

** 不包括奥马哈中央各州赔偿公司(本公司于 1992 年底收购)的未付负债。

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (8) Other assets Other assets are summarized below (in thousands): Dec. 31, Goodwill Other Deferred charges re reinsurance assumed $ 1994 Dec. 31, 454,633 1993 440,664 467,544 89,579 25,859 466,013 $ 984.876 $ 1.029,416 (9) Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities Property and casualty insurance policyholder liabilities are summarized below (in thousands): Dee. 31, 1994 Dec. 31. Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses* 1993 Funds held under reinsurance assumed Unearned premiums $ 3,430,028 $ 3,155,905 307,232 315,750 Other 156,266 307,287 215,773 119,760 $ 4,200,813 $ 3,807,188 * Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses include liabilities established with respect to retroactive reinsurance contracts that provide for indemnification of insurance risk. These liabilities aggregated $1,295,991 and respect to these contracts and are reported as other assets. Also included in unpaid losses and loss adjustment $1.181,235 al December 31, 1994 and 1993, respectively. Related deferred charges were established with expenses are discounted structured settlement reinsurance liabilities, which totalled $231,255 and $254,325 at December 31, 1994 and 1993, respectively. subsidiaries (in thousands): Supplemental data with respect to unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses of property/casualty insurance Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses: 1994 1993 1992 Less ceded liabilities and deferred charges Balance at beginning of year $3,155,905 597,860 $3,219,441 Incurred losses recorded: Net balance..... 2,558,045 2,564,132 655,309 $2,978,837 2,326,796 652,041 All prior accident years * Current accident year 505,058 Total incurred losses 60,199 439,404 11,255 658,484 29.141 Payments with respect to: 565,257 450,659 687,625 Current accident year Total payments ... All prior accident years. 216,346 50,859 47,029 Unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses: 267,205 456,746 409,717 53,845 476,750 Plus ceded liabilities and deferred charges Net balance at end of year. 2,856,097 573,931 2,558,045 597,860 2,537,671 652,865 Balance at end of year .................... $3,430,028 $3,155,905 $3,190,536**

  • Incurred losses "all prior years" reflects the amount of estimation error charged or credited to earnings in each

year. In addition, this amount includes amortization of deferred charges re reinsurance assumed and accretion of discounted structured settlement liabilities. ** Excludes unpaid liabilities of Central States Indemnity Company of Omaha - acquired by the Company at the end of 1992. 32

[第 35 页]

[PAGE 35]

(10)所得税

附注合并资产负债表中反映的所得税负债为估算金额(单位:千美元):

1994 年 12 月 31 日1993 年 12 月 31 日
当期应付$ 3,230,201$ 2,740,503
递延02,401289,686
合计$ 3,329,602$ 3,030,189

如附注 1(k) 所述,公司于 1993 年 1 月 1 日采用了 SFAS 109。采用该准则的累计影响是使公司 1993 年净利润减少约 7100 万美元。该金额体现在 1993 年度合并利润表中,作为会计原则变更的累计影响。它主要代表调整与有价权益证券未实现增值相关的递延所得税的影响,该增值产生于 1987 年之前,调整后反映出当时 34% 的资本利得税率,而非该递延税项产生时实际生效的 28% 税率。该会计变更对 1993 年税前利润及累计影响之前年度利润的影响并不重大。以往年度财务报表未进行重述。

1993 年期间,联邦公司所得税和资本利得税率从 34% 追溯提高至 35%,自 1993 年 1 月 1 日起生效。因此,按 SFAS 109 的要求,公司向 1993 年利润计入约 7500 万美元的费用。这笔费用大部分与调整适用于有价权益证券未实现增值的递延所得税的影响有关。

合并利润表中反映的所得税费用如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年1993 年*1992 年
联邦$ 133,443$ 320,419$ 110,276
外国22,10120,8573,122
4,02624,4303,383
当期小计158,666345,302138,089
递延29,816(55,460)45,159
合计$ 188,482$ 400,762$ 183,248
*不包括所得税会计变更的累计影响(70,984 美元)以及联邦所得税税率变动对适用于有价权益证券未实现增值的递延税项的影响(75,348 美元)。

产生重大递延所得税资产和递延所得税负债的暂时性差异的税务影响,以及 1994 年和 1993 年 12 月 31 日的相关负债如下(单位:千美元):

递延所得税负债:1994 年1993 年
与有价权益证券未实现增值相关$ 3,381,328$ 2,848,681
其他71,88373,638
合计3,453,2112,922,319
递延所得税资产(223,010)(181,816)
递延所得税负债净额$ 3,230,201$ 2,740,503

下表将所得税费用与按联邦法定税率计算的假设金额进行调节(单位:千美元):

1994 年1993 年1992 年
税前净利润$ 662,197$ 1,189,718$ 550,617
按联邦法定税率计算的上方假设金额$ 231,769$ 416,401187,210
以下项目导致的减少:
股息扣除(81,235)(68,333)(14,727)
免税利息收入(14,548)(62,085)(1,303)
州所得税(扣除联邦所得税优惠后)14,366(15,020)11,563
其他净差异8,31413,55716,128
所得税合计$ 158,666345,302*$ 138,089
* 不包括所得税会计变更的累计影响以及联邦所得税税率变动对适用于有价权益证券未实现增值的递延税项的影响。

(10) Income taxes liabilities as follows (in thousands): The liability for income taxes as reflected in the accompanying Consolidated Balance Sheets represent estimates of Dec. 31, 1994 Dec. 31, Payable currently 1993 Deferred $ 3.230,201 02,401 $ 2,740,503 289,686 $ 3292602 $ 3.030,189 SEAS 109 on the Company's financial statements was to decrease 1993 net income by about $71 million. This amount is As discussed in Note 1(k), the Company adopted SEAS 109 as of January 1, 1993. The cumulative effect of adopting represents the impact of adjusting deferred taxes related to unrealized appreciation of marketable equity securities which arose reflected in the 1993 Consolidated Statement of Earnings as the cumulative effect of change in accounting principle. It primarily prior to 1987 to reflect the then current capital gain tax rate of 34% as opposed to the 28% rate which was in effect when the adjustment was not material. Por year financial statements have not been restated. deferred taxes originated. The eftect of the accounting change on 1993 earnings before income taxes and cumulative effect to January 1, 1993. Accordingly, as required under SFAS 109, the Company recorded a charge to 1993 earnings of During 1993, the federal corporate income and capital gain tax rate was increased from 34% to 35% retroactive appreciation of marketable equity securities. approximately $75 million. Most of this charge relates to the impact of adjusting deferred taxes applicable to unrealized The Consolidated Statements of Earnings reflect charges for income taxes as shown below (in thousands): Federal 1994 1993* 1992 Foreign State 133,443 22,101 $ 320,419 20,857 $ 110,276 3,122 4,026 24,430 3,383 $ 158,666 $ 345,302 $ 138,089 Current Deferred $ 188,482 $ 400.762 (29,816) (55,460) $ 183,248 (45,159) $ 158.666 $ 345,302 $ 138,089 *Excludes the cumulative effect of change in accounting for income taxes ($70.984) and the effect of the change in federal income tax rate on deferred taxes applicable io unrealized appreciation of marketable equity securities ($75,348). liabilities at December 31, 1994 and 1993, are shown below (in thousands): The tax effects of temporary differences that give rise to significant portions of deferred tax assets and deferred tax Deferred tax liabilities: 1994 1993 Relating to unrealized appreciation of Other marketable equity securities $ 3,381,328 71,883 $ 2,848,681 73,638 Deferred tax assets 3,453,211 (223,010) 2,922,319 (181.816) Net deferred tax liability $ 3,230,201 $ 2,740,503 shown below (in thousands): Charges for income taxes are reconciled to hypothetical amounts computed at the federal statutory rate in the table 1994 1993 1992 Net earnings before income taxes Hypothetical amounts applicable to above $ 662.197 $ 1,189,718 $ 550,617 Decreases, resulting from: computed at the federal statutory rate $ 231,769 $ 416,401 187,210 Dividends received deduction Tax-exempt interest income.. (81,235) (14,548) (15,020) State income taxes, less federal income tax benefit 14,366 (68.333) (14,727) Net other differences 8.314 13,557 (62,085) (1,303) 11,563 16.128 Total income taxes $ 158.666 345,302* $ 138,089

  • Excludes the cumulative effect of change in accounting for income taxes and the effect of the change in federal

income lar rare on deferred laxes applicable to unrealized appreciation of marketable equity securities. 33

[第 36 页]

[PAGE 36]

合并财务报表附注(续)

(11)投资协议项下借款及其他债务

该资产负债表科目反映的负债如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年 12 月 31 日1993 年 12 月 31 日
投资协议项下借款754,079915,079
其他债务56,6407,310
合计810,719972,389

投资协议项下借款根据合同进行,合同期限通常为三个月至四十年,利息通常每半年支付一次,固定年利率在 3.0% 至 9.0% 之间。这些借款是公司的高级无担保债务。各项债务协议中均不包含任何实质性的限制性契约。

截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日,未偿还金额的预计最早到期时间如下(单位:千美元):

1995 年1996 年1997 年1998 年1999 年1999 年以后
36,14815,38120,09017,01844,054678,028

(12)股东权益账户

最近三年股东权益账户变动情况如下(除每股数据外,金额单位:千美元):

普通股面值 5 美元超过面值的资本金未实现增值留存收益库存股
1991 年 12 月 31 日余额6,876157,3773,962,9893,294,96942,293
1992 年可出售权益证券计入账面价值的未实现增值增加1,644,810
1992 年按权益法确认的适用所得税变动(559,235)
少数股东权益中未实现增值的增加(1,345)
零息可转换次级票据转换为普通股(2,162 股)24887
1992 年净利润407,285
1992 年 12 月 31 日余额6,900158,2645,047,2193,702,25442,293
零息可转换次级票据转换为普通股(3,944 股)720,060
收购 Dexter 制鞋公司发行普通股(25,203 股)428,353(4,659)
1993 年可出售权益证券计入账面价值的未实现增值增加316,002
1993 年按权益法确认的适用所得税变动(119,843)
少数股东权益中未实现增值的增加(2,501)
1993 年净利润688,121
1993 年 12 月 31 日采用 SFAS 115 的累积影响(见附注 1[k])(171,775)
1993 年 12 月 31 日余额6,907656,0745,412,6524,390,37537,634
1994 年投资计入账面价值的未实现增值增加1,481,162
1994 年按权益法确认的适用所得税变动(519,514)
少数股东权益中未实现增值的增加(9,938)
1994 年净利润494,798
1994 年 12 月 31 日余额6,907656,0746,364,3624,885,17337,634

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (11) Borrowings under investment agreements and other debt Liabilities reflected for this balance sheet caption are as follows (in thousands): Dec. 31. 1994 Dec. 31. Borrowings under investment agreements Other debt 754,079 $ 915,079 1993 56,640 $7,310 810.719 $ 972,389 Borrowings under investment agreements are made pursuant to contracts with terms generally ranging from three months = borrowings are senior unsecured debt obligations of the Company. No materally restrictive covenants are included in any to forty years and calling for interest payable, normally semiannually, at fixed rates ranging from 3.0% to 9.0% per annum. The of the various debt agreements. thousands): Payments of amounts outstanding at December 31, 1994, are expected to be required no earlier than as follows (in 1995 1996 $36,148 $15,381 1997 1998 1999 $20,090 $17,018 $44,054 After 1999 $ 678,028 (12) Shareholders' equity accounts except per share amounts): Changes in Shareholders' Equity accounts during the most recent three years were as follows (dollars in thousands Stock of $5 Common in excess Capital Par Value of par value Net Unrealized Retained Appreciation Earnings Treasury Stock Balance December 31, 1991 Increase during 1992 in unrealized appreciation $6,876 $157,377 $3,962,989 $3,294,969 $42,293 securities included in carrying value of marketable equity Change during 1992 in deemed applicable income 1,644,810 Increase in minority shareholders' interest in taxes (559,235) Common stock (2,162 shares) issued upon conversion unrealized appreciation (1,345) Net earnings 1992 of Zero Coupon Convertible Subordinated Notes 24,887 407.285 Common stock (3,944 shares) issued upon conversion Balance December 31, 1992 6,887 182,264 5,047,219 3.702,254 42.293 Common stock (25,203 shares) issued in connection of Zero Coupon Convertible Subordinated Notes 20 45,457 Increase during 1993 in unrealized appreciation with acquisition of Dexter Shoe Companies 428,353 (4,659) securities included in carrying value of markelable equity Change during 1993 in deemed applicable income 316,002 Increase in minority shareholders' interest in laxes (119,843) Nel earnings 1993 unrealized appreciation (2,501) Cumulative effect of adoption on December 31, 1993, of 688,121 SFAS 115 (See note 1[kj) _ 171,775 Balance December 31, 1993 $6,907 $656,074 $5,412.652 $4,390,375 $37,634 Increase during 1994 in unrealized appreciation Change during 1994 in deemed applicable income included in carrying value of investments. 1,481,162 Increase in minority shareholders' interest in taxes (519.514) Net earnings 1994 unrealized appreciation.. (9,938) 494,798 Balance December 31, 1994 $6,907 $656.074 $0.364.362 $4,885,173 $37,634 34

[第 37 页]

[PAGE 37]

(13)股息限制——保险子公司

保险集团成员支付股息的行为受保险法规和条例限制。未经事先批准,1995 年伯克希尔可从保险子公司获得最高约 54.88 亿美元的股息。按法定会计规则确定的保险子公司合并股东权益(保单持有人盈余)在 1994 年 12 月 31 日约为 134 亿美元。这一金额比按公认会计原则确定的相应金额高出约 24 亿美元;差异主要代表递延所得税资产和负债,以及因再保险分出业务产生的递延费用,这些在财务报告中被确认,但在法定报告中不被确认。

(14)金融工具的公允价值

财务会计准则公告第 107 号《金融工具公允价值披露》(“SFAS 107”)要求对某些公允价值进行披露。公允价值披露要求适用于大多数投资证券以及其他合同性资产和负债。某些金融工具,包括保险合同,因被认为公允价值难以计量而被排除在 SFAS 107 的披露要求之外。因此,未对未付损失和损失调整费用进行公允价值估算。在确定公允价值时,公司尽可能采用市场报价。对于没有市场报价的工具,公司使用独立定价服务或公司管理层的评估。这些服务和评估反映了利用类似工具的当前风险调整市场利率得出的估计现值。因此,本文提供的估算值不一定代表公司能在当前市场交易中实现的金额。在解释市场数据以形成公允价值估算时,必然需要大量的判断。使用不同的市场假设和/或估算方法可能对估算的公允价值产生重大影响。现金及现金等价物、应收账款和应付账款、应计项目及其他负债的账面价值被认为是对其公允价值的合理估计。公司其他金融工具在 1994 年 12 月 31 日和 1993 年 12 月 31 日的估计公允价值如下(单位:千美元):

1994 年账面价值1994 年估计公允价值1993 年账面价值1993 年估计公允价值
固定期限证券投资1,820,7331,820,7331,397,8121,397,812
可交易权益证券投资15,236,49415,236,49412,516,61312,516,613
金融业务资产1,023,4181,023,4181,373,7881,373,788
对 Salomon Inc 的投资717,082717,082872,401872,401
投资协议及其他债务项下的借款723,584723,584702,858702,858
金融业务负债983,760983,760891,505891,505
其他债务898,584898,584810,719810,719

(15)补充现金流信息

补充现金流信息汇总如下表(单位:千美元):

年内支付的现金:1994 年1993 年1992 年
利息411,092235,015121,027
所得税90,59670,62995,730
非现金投资和融资活动:
收购业务时承担的负债26,09345,735
零息可转换次级票据转换时发行的普通股45,47724,898
收购 Dexter Shoe Companies 时发行的普通股433,01235,000

(13) Dividend restrictions - Insurance subsidiaries regulatory approval in 1995, Berkshire can receive up to approximately 5488 million as dividends from insurance subsidiaries. Pavments of dividends by Insurance Group members are restricted by insurance statutes and regulations. Without prior Surplus as Regards Policyholders) was approximately $13.4 billion at December 31, 1994. This amount exceeded by Combined shareholders' equity of insurance subsidiaries determined pursuant to statutory accounting rules (Statutory approximately $2.4 billion the corresponding amount determined on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles; the difference principally represents deferred income tax assets and liabilities and deferred charges re reinsurance assumed recognized for financial reporting purposes but not for statutory reporting purposes. (14) Fair values of financial instruments 107"'), requires certain fair value disclosures. Fair value disclosures are required for most investment securities as well as other Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 107, "Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments" ('SFAS disclosure requirements due to perceived difficulties in measuring fair value. Accordingly, an estimation of fair value was not contractual assets and liabilities. Certain financial instruments, including insurance contracts, were excluded from SFAS 107 made with respect to unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses. prices were not available, the Company used independent pricing services or appraisals by the Company's management. Those In determining fair value, the Company used quoted market prices when available. For instruments where quoted market services and appraisals reflected the estimated present values utilizing current risk adjusted market rates of similar instruments. Accordingly, the estimates presented herein are not necessarily indicative of the amounts the Company could realize in a Considerable judgement is necessarily required in interpreting market data to develop the estimates of fair value. on the estimated fair value. current market exchange. The use of different market assumptions and/or estimation methodologies may have a material effect deemed to be reasonable estimates of their fair values. The estimated fair values of the Company's other financial instruments The carrying values of cash and cash equivalents, receivables and accounts payable, accruals and other liabilities are as of December 31, 1994 and 1993, are as follows (in thousands): 1994 Carrying Value Estimated Fair Value Investments in securities with fixed 1993 1994 1993 Investments in marketable equity securities maturities 1,820,733 Assets of finance businesses Investment in Salomon Inc 15,236,494 1,397,812 1,023,418 12,516,613 15,236,494 1,820,733 $ 1,373,788 Borrowings under investment agreements and 717,082 872,401 723,584 702,858 983,760 12,516,613 891,505 898,584 Liabilities of finance businesses other debt 810,719 562,443 729,366 972,389 768,595 546,667 1,048,623 735,521 (15) Supplemental cash flow information A summary of supplemental cash flow information is presented in the following table (in thousands): Cash paid during the year for: 1994 1993 1992 Interest.• Income taxes......... $ 411,092 Non-cash investing and financing activities: 90,596 $ 235,015 70,629 $ 121,027 95,730 Liabilities assumed in connection with acquisition of businesses Common shares issued upon conversions of Zero Coupon 26,093 45,735 Common shares issued in connection with acquisition of Convertible Subordinated Notes 45,477 24,898 Dexter Shoe Companies ... 433.012 - 35

[第 38 页]

[PAGE 38]

合并财务报表附注(续)

(16)季度数据

信息未经审计。金额单位为千美元,每股数据除外。

下表列示了过去两年每个季度的收入与收益摘要。

1994 年

第一季度第二季度第三季度第四季度
收入917,963868,360795,5001,265,644
收益:
扣除已实现投资收益82,312158,784110,46682,097*
已实现投资收益(损失)50,5785,863(4,646)9,344
净收益132,890164,647105,82091,441
每股收益:
扣除已实现投资收益69.89134.8293.7969.71*
已实现投资收益(损失)42.944.98(3.94)7.93
净收益112.83139.8089.8577.64
  • 包含一项 172,579 美元(每股 146.53 美元)的非经常性费用,系对美国航空集团公司优先股投资的减值(非暂时性下跌)。参见附注 6。

1993 年

第一季度第二季度第三季度第四季度
收入725,827703,698744,1271,425,612
收益:
扣除已实现投资收益和会计变更累计影响84,105103,83612,389*202,073
已实现投资收益16,6308,12710,405321,540**
会计变更累计影响
所得税会计变更(70,984)
净收益29,751111,96322,794523,613
每股收益:
扣除已实现投资收益和会计变更累计影响72.9790.0910.75*173.10
已实现投资收益14.437.059.03275.45**
会计变更累计影响
所得税会计变更(16.59)
净收益25.8197.1419.78448.55
  • 包含一项 75,348 美元(每股 65.38 美元)的非经常性费用,系联邦所得税税率变动对未实现增值相关递延所得税的影响。参见附注 10。

** 包含与出售 10,000,000 股大都会/美国广播公司普通股相关的 297,375 美元(每股 254.75 美元),已扣除税款。参见附注 4。

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (16) Quarterly data information is unaudited. Dollars are in thousands, except per share amounts. A summary of revenues and earnings by quarter for each of the last two years is presented in the following table. This 1994 1st Quarter Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Revenues $917,963 $868,360 $795,500 $ 1,265,644 Earnings: Excluding realized investment gain Realized investment gain (loss) $ 82,312 50,578 $158,784 5,863 $110,466 (4,646) 82,097* 9,344 Net earnings $132,890 $164,647 $105,820 91,441 Earnings per share: Realized investment gain (loss) Before realized investment gain $ 69.89 42.94 $134.82 4.98 $93.79 (3.94) $69.71* 7.93 Net earnings $112.83 $139.80 $89.85 $77.64

  • Includes a nonrecurring charge of $172,579 ($146. 53/share) representing an other than temporary decline in value of'

investment in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock. See note 6. 1993 Quarter lst Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Revenues 5725.827 $703,698 $744,127 $1.425,612 Earnings: Excluding realized investment gain and Cumulative effect of change in accounting Realized investment gain.. cumulative effect of accounting change $ 84,105 16,630 $103,836 8,127 $ 12,389* 10,405 202,073 321,540** for income taxes (70,984) Net earnings $ 29,751 $111,963 $ 22,794 $ 523,613 Earnings per share: Before realized investment gain and Realized investment gain cumulative effect of accounting change $72.97 Cumulative effect of change in accounting 14.43 $90.09 7.05 $10.75* 9.03 $173.10 275.45** for income taxes 16159) Net earnings $25.81 $97.14 $19.78 $448.55

  • Includes a nonrecurring charge of $75,348 ($65.38/share) representing the effect of the change in federal income tax rates

on deferred taxes apolicable to unrealized appreciation. See note 10. **Includes $297,375 ($254.75/share), net of taxes, related to sale of 10,000.000 shares of Capital Cities/ABC. Inc. common stock. See note 4. 36

[第 39 页]

[PAGE 39]

(17) 业务分部数据

根据财务会计准则第 14 号声明,伯克希尔为 1994 年报告确定了 8 个业务分部。这些包括财产与意外险及再保险业务(保险分部),加上 7 个独立开展的非保险业务,如下所示:

业务总部所在地和产品活动
喜诗糖果南旧金山,CA / 糖果制造和零售及邮购分销
世界图书公司芝加哥,IL / 百科全书及其他参考资料主要通过直销方式出版和营销
斯科特-费泽公司的 Kirby、Douglas 和 Cleveland Wood 分部克利夫兰,OH / 家用清洁系统制造并主要销售给分销商
内布拉斯加家具城奥马哈,NE / 家居用品零售
《布法罗新闻》布法罗,NY / 报纸出版日报和周日版报纸
H. H. 布朗鞋业公司、Dexter 鞋业公司、Lowell 鞋业公司等NH 和 Dexter,ME;格林尼治,CT;Hudson / 鞋类制造、进口及批发零售分销
Fechheimer Bros. Co.辛辛那提,OH / 制服制造及批发零售分销

上述已确认的业务分部在 1994 年贡献了伯克希尔合并收入的 83%。其他在 1994 年合计贡献了伯克希尔合并收入 16% 的业务活动如下:

业务产品/服务/活动
Adalet导管配件、防爆接线盒、接头和终端
BHR房地产管理
伯克希尔·哈撒韦人寿保险公司年金
伯克希尔·哈撒韦信用公司商业融资
蓝筹印花营销激励服务
Borsheim's高档珠宝零售
Campbell Hausfeld空气压缩机、气动工具、喷漆系统和高压清洗机
Carefree房车用遮阳和控光产品及配件
法国电器控制装置、点火及信号变压器
Halex锌压铸电气配件
K&W 产品汽车化合物
Meriam压力和流量测量设备
Northland分数马力电机
Precision钢服务中心
Powerwinch船用绞盘、起锚机和起重机
Quikut刀具
Scot!Care心肺康复和监测设备
Scot Labs商业和消费金融公司
Scott Fetzer Financial Group商用及消费金融公司
Stahl清洁和维护化学品
韦恩炉用燃烧器;污水、排污和污水泵
Western Enterprises定制钢制维修车身和工具箱
Wesco 金融公司房地产管理
Western Plastics模塑塑料部件
Western Enterprises压缩气体配件和调节器

(17) Business Segment Data Accounting Standards No. 14. These include the property and casualty insurance and reinsurance business (The Insurance Berkshire identified eight business segments for purposes of 1994 reporting pursuant to Starement of Financial Segment) plus seven separately conducted non-insurance businesses as follows: identity and headquarters Business See's Candies Product South San Francisco, CA Candy Activity Manufacture and distribution at retai and by catalog solicitation Chicago, IL World Book Encyclopedias and other reference materials ublication and marketin rincipally by the direct sales metho Kirby, Douglas and of The Scott Fetzer Company Cleveland Wood Divisions Cleveland, OH Home cleaning systems Manufacture and sale principally to distribuiors Nebraska Furniture Mart Omaha, NE Home furnishings Retailing Buffalo News Buffalo, NY Newspaper Publication of a daily and Sunday newspaper I. H. Brown Shoe C Dexter Shoe Companies Lowell Shoe, Inc. ano NH and Dexter, ME Greenwich, CT, Hudson Shoes Manufacture, importing and distribution at wholesale and retail Fechheimer Bros. Co. Cincinnati, OH Uniforms Manufacture and distribution at wholesale and retail businesses activities that contributed for 1994, in the aggregate, 16% of Berkshire's consolidated revenues, were as follows: The business segments identified above were responsible in 1994 for 83% of Berkshire's consolidated revenues. Other Business identity Adalet Product Service/Activity BHR Conduit fittings, explosion proof junction boxes, couplings and terminations Berkshire Hathuway Real estate management Berkshire Hathaway Life Credit Corporation Commercial financing Blue Chip Stamps Insurance Co Annuities Borsheim's Marketing motivational services Campbell Hausfeld Retailing fine jewelry France Carefree Sun and shade control products and accessories for RVs Air compressors, air tools, painting systems and pressure washers Halex Appliance controls, ignition and sign transformers Meriam K&W Products Zinc die cast electrical fittings Autometive compounds Northland Pressure and flow measurement devices Precision Powerwinch Fractional horsepower motors oat winches, windlasses and hoist: Scot!Care Quikur Cutlery teel service center Scot Labs Scolt Fetzer Financial Group Cardiopulmonary rehabilitation and monitoring equipment Commercial and consumer finance companies Wayne Stahl Cleaning and maintenance chemicals Custom steel service bodies and tool boxes for trucks Wesco Financial urnace burners; sump, utility and sewage pump Western Enterprises eal estate managemen Western Plasties Molded plastic components Compressed gas fittings and regulators 37

[第 40 页]

[PAGE 40]

合并财务报表附注(续)

(17) 业务分部数据(续)

本页及下页续。金额单位为千美元。

下表列示伯克希尔合并数据在最近三个年度的细分情况:

营业收入税前经营利润
199419931992199419931992
已识别分部:
保险业务$ 639,218$ 961,397$ 298,715
非保险业务$1,436,966$1,591,226$1,078,419275,399224,795209,871
1,771,8701,440,1201,283,240
3,208,8363,031,3462,361,659914,6171,186,192508,586
利息费用 *(192,309)(60,111)(56,545)(192,309)**(60,111)(56,545)
已识别分部以外638,631567,918615,598(60,071)140,674(98,643)
合并总计$3,847,467$3,599,264$2,977,257$ 662,127$1,189,718$ 550,617
  • 利息费用金额代表投资协议及其他债务(不含金融业务债务)的借款利息。

** 包含一笔 2.685 亿美元的税前费用,系所持美国航空集团公司优先股价值的非暂时性下跌。

保险分部

营业收入税前经营利润
199419931992199419931992
已赚保费:*
再保险分入281,074442,425249,585
直接或主要业务688,537650,726664,293
再保险分出(46,431)(41,284)(45,673)
投资收益421,753555,868361,517
承保利润$ 129,010$ 30,070$(108,961)
已实现投资收益92,03352,60952,609418,175375,459355,067
合计$1,430,966$1,591,226$1,283,24092,03352,60952,609
$ 639,218$ 961,397$ 298,715
  • 已赚保费如下:
199419931992
再保险分入$ 271,151$ 247,173$ 153,177
直接或主要业务689,932528,768626,159
再保险分出(45,562)(38,854)(39,762)
$ 915,521$ 737,087$ 739,567

非保险业务分部

营业收入税前经营利润
199419931992199419931992
百科全书及其他参考材料$ 216,060$ 200,979$ 197,017$ 40,564$ 40,270$ 41,382
糖果207,567191,297150,91543,93837,74438,228
家居用品191,297150,91543,93837,74438,228
家居清洁系统190,072245,395214,87324,37519,37516,902
报纸609,398370,211139,76453,66628,22840,944
制衣21,09416,665
制服151,238122,164109,81113,53876,41640,003
鞋类76,41640,00350,39025,58647,29112,719
合计$1,771,870$1,440,120$1,283,240$ 275,399$ 224,795$ 202,871

Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) (17) Business Segment Data (Continued) follow on this and the following page. Amounts are in thousands. A disaggregation of Berkshire's consolidated data for each of the three most recent years is presented in the tables which 1994 Revenues 1993 1992 Operating profit before taxes Identified Segments: 1994 1993 1992 Insurance Non-insurance businesses $1,436,966 1,771,870 $1,591,226 $1,078,419 1.440,120 1,283,240 $ 639,218 $ 961,397 $ 3,208,836 3,031,346 2,361,659 275,399 — 224,795 209,871 298,715 914.617 1,186,192 508,586 Interest expense * Other than identified segments 638,631 567,918 615,598 (192,309)** (60,111) 60.071 (56,545) 140,674 (98,643) Aggregate consolidated total $3,847,467 $3.599,264 $2,977,257 $ 662,127 $1,189,718 $ 550,617

  • Amounts of interest expense represent those for borrowings under investment agreements and other debt exclusive of

that of finance businesses. ** Includes pre-tax charge of $268,500 representing an other than temporary decline in value of investment in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock. Insurance Segment 1994 Revenues 1993 1992 1994 Operating profit before taxes Premiums earned: * 1993 1992 Reinsurance assumed Primary or direct. 281,074 $ Reinsurance ceded 688,537 442,425 249,585 $ 179,441 923,180 (46,431) _ 650,726 (41,284) 530,525 664,293 (45,673) Investment income Underwriting Realized investment gain 421,753 92,033 555,868 384,632 361,517 $ 129,010 $ 30,070 $ (108,961) 52,609 418,175 92,033 _ 555,868 375,459 355,067 52,609 $1,430,966 $1,591,226 § 639,218 $ 961,397 $ 298.715

  • Premiums written were as follows:

Reinsurance assumed Primary or direct.. 1994 1993 1992 S 271,151 $ 247,173 $ 153,177 Reinsurance ceded 689,932 (45,562) 528,768 (38,854) (39,762) 626,159 $ 915,521 737,087 $ 739,567 Non-Insurance Business Segments 1994 Revenues 1993 1992 Operating profit before taxes 1994 1993 1992 Encyclopedias, other reference material Candy $ 216,060 S 200,979 197,017 Home furnishings Home cleaning systems 207,567 191,297 40,564 S 208,598 193,891 198,807 190,072 246,107 24,375 40,270 $ 41,382 150,915 145,470 185,596 43,938 19,375 28,228 Newspaper 245,395 609,398 370,211 214,873 139,764 53,666 16.902 40,944 21,094 16,665 37,744 Uniformns Shoes 151,238 122.164 109,811 13,538 76,416 40,003 50,390 25,586 47,291 12,719 12,975 $1,771,870 $1,440,120 $1,283,240 $ 275,399 $ 224,795 $ 202,871 38

[第 41 页]

[PAGE 41]

(17) 业务分部数据(续)

其他(非已识别分部)

营业收入税前经营利润
199419931992199419931992
未归属特定业务的:
其他业务$ 607,350550,754$ 517,259$ 59,209$ 55,185$ 54,321
已实现投资利得(损失)31,982(9,444)37,32831,982(9,444)37,328
利息和股息收入(701)26,60861,011(701)26,60861,011
除利息支出外的所有其他项目(282,799)*(12,278)(11,986)(282,799)*(12,278)(11,986)
$ 638,631$ 567,918$ 615,598$ (192,309)$ 60,071$ 140,674
  • 包含一笔 2.685 亿美元的税前费用,系所持美国航空集团公司优先股价值的非暂时性下跌。

资本支出 * 和有形资产折旧与摊销

资本支出有形资产折旧与摊销
199419931992199419931992
保险$ 4,111$ 935$ 1,207$ 4,095$ 908$ 812
糖果1304,2871,0711,3664,116840
家居清洁系统22,6339591,4701846,2264,208
百科全书及其他参考材料7364,1675,2591,4494,0615,156
报纸5,2547691,3795,1565,254769
家居装饰17,9123,6028,5281,37910,2182,181
制服10,6984,5941,0412,6634,9422,171
鞋类4,4072,1713,3701,8552,21017,943
其他2,4911,8365,2012,37312,9628,881
67,12834,966$ 31,80149,63640,512$ 35,357
  • 作为业务收购一部分的支出未包含在内。

年末可识别资产

199419931992
糖果$ 69,442$ 75,856$ 70,201
保险18,494,19516,126,93314,788,237
百科全书及其他参考材料74,67665,88057,356
家居装饰128,389101,14788,331
家居清洁系统42,11448,70343,751
鞋类672,704641,548510,692
报纸1,712,1351,717,71285,392
制服94,90487,546208,218
其他2,324,31387,546208,218
$ 21,338,182$ 19,520,469$ 17,131,998

(17) Business Segment Data (Continued) Other Than Identified Segments 1994 Revenues 1993 1992 Operating profit before taxes 1994 1993 1992 Not identified with specific businesses: Other businesses $ 607,350 550,754 $ 517,259 $ 59,209 $ 55,185$ 54,321 Realized investment gain (loss) .... Interest and dividend income ...... 31,982 All other except interest expense . .... (701) 26,608 (9,444) 37,328 61,011 31,982 (701) 26,608 (9,444) 61,011 (282,799)* (12,278) (11,986) 37,328 $ 638.631 $ 567918 $ 615,598 $ (192.309) $ 60,071 ≤ 140,674

  • Includes pre-tax charge of $268,500 representing an other than temporary decline in value of investment in USAir

Group, Inc. Preferred Stock. 1994 Capital expenditures * Deprec. & amort. 1993 1992 1994 of tangible assets 1993 1992 Insurance Candy $ 4,111 935 $ 1,207 $ Home cleaning systems 130 4,287 1,071 Encyclopedias, other reference material Newspaper Home furnishings 22,633 959 1,470 736 4,167 $ 4,095 908 S 812 $ 1,366 4,116 840 184 6,226 4.208 5,259 1,449 4,06l Shoes 5,156 5,254 769 1,379 Uniforms 17,912 3,602 8,528 10,218 2,181 2,663 4.942 Other 10,698 4,594 1,041 4,407 2,171 3,370 1,855 2,210 17,943 2,491 1,836 5,201 2,373 12,962 8.881 2,660 3,027 17,321 14,692 1,833 67,128 34,966 $ 31,801 49.636 40.512 S 35.357

  • Expenditures which were part of business acquisitions are excluded.

Identifiable assets 1094 at year-end 1993 1992 Candy .. Insurance $ 18,494,195 69,442 $16,126,933 75,856 70.201 $14,788,237 Encyclopedias, other reference material 74,676 65,880 Home furnishings Home cleaning systems........... 42,114 48,703 83,778 Shoes Newspaper 128,389 48,443 101,147 $0,692 45,402 88,331 Uniforms 672,704 641,548 43,751 Other 1.712,135 94,904 2,324,313 87,546 208,218

  • 1,717,712

85,392 $21,338,182 $19,520,469 $17,131,998 39

[第 42 页]

[PAGE 42]

财务状况与经营成果

管理层讨论与分析

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

经营成果

(扣除少数股东权益和税项后)

过去三年每年的净利润在下表中分项列示。以下金额均为税后数据。

(单位:百万美元)

财产与意外险板块:1994 年1993 年1992 年
投资收益79.919.2(71.1)
承保损益61.6349.2362.7
已实现投资利得320.9305.836.1
非保险业务板块490.7165.8702.8
财产与意外险板块合计133.3123.4270.8
其他项目:
未含在上述项目中的已实现投资利得(损失)36.4(0.5)33.2
其他业务30.712.3(6.1)
除利息费用外所有其他项目6.821.923.4
利息费用 *(37.3)(35.6)(62.9)
非常项目前及会计变更影响前收益667.4834.4407.3
非常项目及会计变更影响(172.6)(146.3)
净利润494.8688.1407.3
  • 金融业务产生的利息费用未作为“利息费用”反映,而是反映在“其他业务”一栏中。

本报告前述各页的业务板块数据(合并财务报表附注 17)应与本讨论一并阅读。

财产与意外险承保业务

上表中显示的财产与意外险承保业务的税后数据来源于以下内容:

(单位:百万美元)

承保利得(损失):1994 年1993 年1992 年
再保险分入业务48.312.7(117.0)
直接或原保险业务80.717.38.0
税前承保利得(损失)129.030.0(109.0)
适用所得税48.310.237.7
适用少数股东权益0.80.60.2
税后承保利得(损失)79.919.2(71.1)

伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险集团同时从事财产/意外险的保险和再保险业务。在其保险活动中,与再保险活动不同,其成员承担来自主要直接承担风险的个人的损失风险。在其再保险活动中,成员承担其他保险公司和再保险公司在其自身保险业务中已承担的类似或不同风险的特定部分。过去三年,再保险分入业务贡献了财产与意外险集团已赚保费总额的约 75%。

所有保险集团成员遵循的一项重要的营销策略是维持高于平均水平的资本实力。保险集团针对保单持有人的法定盈余在 1994 年底增至约 134 亿美元。这一非凡的资本实力为保险集团成员创造了机会,使其能够谈判并签订专门设计的保险合同,以满足复杂保险和再保险买家的特殊需求。

Financial Condition and Results of Operations Management's Discussion and Analysis of BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. Results of Operations deducting minority interests and taxes. Net earnings for each of the past three years are disaggregated in the table that follows. Amounts are after (dollars in millions) Property and Casualty Insurance Segment: 1994 1993 1992 Investment income Underwriting $ 79.9 $ 19.2 $ (71.1) Realized investment gain _ 61.6 349.2 362.7 320.9 305.8 36.1 Non-Insurance business segments .... Total - Property and Casualty Insurance Segment . ......... 490.7 165.8 702.8 133.3 123.4 270.8 Realized investment gain (loss) not included above Other busmesses 36.4 (0.5) 33.2 30.7 All other except interest expense 12.3 (6.1) 6.8 21.9 23.4 Interest expense * (37.3) (35.6) (62.9) Earnings before nonrecurring charges Nonrecurring charges and effect of accounting change and effect of accounting change (172.6) 667.4 (146.3) 834.4 407.3 Net earnings $ 494.8 $688.1 $407.3

  • Interest expense incurred by finance businesses is not reflected as "Interest expense" but instead is reflecied in amounts shown for

"Other businesses". this report should be read in conjunction with this discussion. The business segment data (Note 17 to the Consolidated Financial Statements) on the preceding pages of Property and Casualty Insurance Underwriting following: The after-tax figures shown above for Property and Casualty Insurance underwriting derive from the

  • (dollars in millions).

Underwriting gain (loss): 1994 1993 1992 Reinsurance assumed Primary or direct insurance $ 48.3 80.7 $ 12.7 17.3 $ [117.0) 8.0 Applicable income taxes Underwriting gain (loss) pre-tax ... 129.0 30.0 Applicable minority interest 48.3 0.8 10.2 (109.0) 0.6 (37.7) _(0.2) After-tax underwriting gain (loss) $ 79.9 $ 19.2 $ (711) risks. In its insurance activities, as distinguished from its reinsurance activities, its members assume risks of loss from The Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group engages in both insurance and reinsurance of property/casualty of similar or dissimilar risks to which other insurers and reinsurers have subjected themselves in their own insuring persons primarily and directly subject to the risks. In its reinsurance activities, the members assume defined portions activities. Over the past three years, reinsurance assumed activities have produced about 75% of the aggregate premiums earned by the property and casualty insurance group average capital strength. Statutory surplus as regards policyholders of the Insurance Group increased to A significant marketing strategy followed by all Insurance Group members is the maintenance of above approximately $13.4 billion at year-end 1994. This extraordinary capital strength creates opportunities for needs of sophisticated insurance and reinsurance buyers. Insurance Group members to negotiate and enter into contracts of insurance specially designed to meet unique 40

[第 43 页]

[PAGE 43]

财产及意外险承保(续)

为便于讨论,以下保费及损失与损失费用金额已扣除分保部分。过去三年与再保险分入业务相关的承保结果汇总如下表。承保结果依据公认会计准则("GAAP")列报。

(单位:百万美元)

1994 年1993 年1992 年
金额%金额%金额%
承保保费$ 689.8$ 528.7$ 607.2
已赚保费$ 688.4100.0$ 442.4100.0$ 511.5100.0
损失及损失费用476.969.3350.979.3425.183.1
承保费用130.819.0115.326.1122.924.0
损失及费用合计607.788.3466.2105.4548.0107.1
承保利润(亏损)—税前80.711.7$ (23.8)(5.4)$ (36.5)(7.1)

再保险分入业务由国民赔偿公司位于康涅狄格州斯坦福德的总部运营。保险集团签订多种类型的再保险合同,包括超额损失合同和成数分保合同。超额损失合同为分出公司提供全部或部分损失赔偿,这些损失超过指定的自留额(或免赔额)。此类自留额可适用于单个损失事件或多个损失事件的集合。成数分保合同则按计算出的比例向分出公司赔偿其自身损失的一部分。每种合同均规定了赔偿的最高累计金额。

1994 年来自再保险分入业务的已赚保费比 1993 年增加了 2.46 亿美元(55.6%)。这一增长是由于巨灾超额损失再保险保单的已赚保费增加所致,部分被成数分保合同、结构性理赔再保险及追溯性再保险合同的已赚保费下降所抵消。(1994 年来自巨灾超额损失保单的已赚保费总额约为 4.47 亿美元,而 1993 年为 1.52 亿美元)。管理层认为,近年来保险业投入巨灾再保险市场的资本水平有所增加,这可能会迫使竞争者将价格降至被认为充足的水平以下。因此,管理层预计 1995 年可能接受的巨灾再保险业务量将会减少。

1993 年的再保险已赚保费比 1992 年减少了 6910 万美元(13.5%)。这一下降主要归因于来自追溯性再保险合同的已赚保费减少。在追溯性再保险市场中,日益激烈的竞争减少了承揽此类业务的机会,同时新的会计准则对分出公司产生了深远影响,极大地限制了此类业务的开展。1994 年结构性理赔再保险业务量极少,因为类似类型的年金合同通过非财产/意外险关联公司进行了更大力度的营销。

1994 年和 1993 年分别产生了约 2.4 亿美元和 1.1 亿美元的承保利润,这些利润来自保险集团的巨灾再保险业务。在此期间,该业务贡献了可观金额的已赚保费,加上仅有 1994 年的北岭地震造成了一次重大巨灾损失,共同促成了 1994 年和 1993 年的承保利润。1992 年发生的巨灾损失约为 1.25 亿美元(主要与安德鲁飓风相关),导致当年出现了小幅承保亏损。

无论是从 1994 年和 1993 年所录得的承保利润规模来看,还是从当前预期——1995 年初的日本神户地震不会给保险集团造成重大损失——来看,都不应让人感到多少安慰。该业务在任何特定年份产生的承保利润,很容易在下一年被损失所超越。因此,周期性承保结果过去是,预计未来也将面临着巨大的波动性。然而,只要存在合理的长远盈利前景,伯克希尔的管理层愿意接受这种波动性。

Property and Casualty Insurance Underwriting (continued) reinsurance ceded. For purposes of this Discussion, premiums and losses and loss expenses amounts are stated net of Reinsurance Assumed to the reinsurance assumed business for the past three years are summarized in the following table. Underwriting results, stated on the basis of generally accopted accounting principles ("GAAP"), with respect 1994

  • (dollars in millions)

1993 Premiums written Amount % Amount Amount 1992 % $ 089.8 $ 528.7 Premiums earned $ 688.4 100.0 $ 442.4 $ 607.2 Underwriting expenses Losses and loss expenses 476.9 130.8 69.3 Total losses and expenses 607.7 19.0 350.9 100.0 74.2 79.3 $ 511.5 100.0 16.7 589.7 38.8 115.3 7.6 88.3 425.1 96.0 628.5 122.9 Underwriting gain (loss) — pre-tax 80.7 17.3 $(117.0) Connecticut. The Insurance Group enters into a variety of types of reinsurance contracts, including excess of loss and Reinsurance assumed operations are conducted from National Indemnity Company's offices in Stamford, quota share contracts. Excess of loss contracts provide indemnification to ceding companies for all or part of covered or an aggregation of occurrences. Quota share contracts provide indemnification to ceding companies in specified losses in excess of specified retentions (or deductibles). Such retentions may apply to either an individual loss occurrence proportion of the ceding companies' own losses. Each type of contract specifies a maximum aggregate amount of indemnification. million (55.6%). This increase was due to higher amounts earned from catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance policies, Premiums earned from reinsurance assumed activities in 1994 exceeded amounts eared in 1993 by $246.0 contracts. (Amounts eared from catastrophe excess of loss policies totalled about $447 million in 1994 vs $152 million offset somewhat by declines in premiums earned under quota share, structured settlement, and retroactive reinsurance in 1993). Management believes that increased levels of capital devoted to the catastrophe reinsurance market by the adequate. Therefore, management anticipates a reduction in the level of catastrophe reinsurance business that may insurance industry in recent years may put pressure on competitors to lower prices below the levels considered be accepted in 1995. decline was primarily attributed to lesser amounts eamed from retroactive reinsurance contracts. Increasing competition Reinsurance premiums earned in 1993 declined by $69.1 million (13.5%) from amounts earned in 1992. The reduced the opportunities to write such business. Minimal amounts of structured settlement reinsurance was written in retroactive reinsurance markets and the effects of new accounting standards for ceding companies have drastically affiliate. in 1994 as a similar type of annuity contract was more heavily marketed through a non-property/casualty insurance from the Insurance Group's catastrophe reinsurance business. The considerable amounts of premiums earned from Underwriting gains of approximately $240 million and $110 million in 1994 and 1993 respectively, resulted this business, coupled with the fact that only the 1994 Northridge earthquake produced a significant catastrophe loss about $125 million (primarily related to Hurricane Andrew) which caused a small underwriting loss for that year. during the period, contributed to the underwriting gains for 1994 and 1993. In 1992, catastrophe losses incurred were 1993 or (b) the current expectation that the early 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake will not result in a significant loss to Little comfort should be gained from either (a) the magnitude of undervriting gains recorded in 1994 and the Insurance Group. The underwriting gains produced by this business in any given year can be easily exceeded by losses in the next. Thus periodic underwriting results were and are expected to be subject to substantial volatility. long term profitability. Berkshire's management, however, is willing to accept such volatility, provided that there is a reasonable prospect of 41

[第 44 页]

[PAGE 44]

管理层讨论(续)

财产与意外险承保(续)

再保险分出业务(续)

1994 年、1993 年和 1992 年,与追溯保单和结构性赔付保单相关的承保损失分别为 7800 万美元、6400 万美元和 6600 万美元,这主要反映了再保险分出相关的递延费用摊销,以及折现后的结构性赔付负债的增值。请参见合并财务报表附注 1(f) 和 (g) 以获取相关信息。摊销和增值费用被报告为已发生损失,因此,由于没有相关的保费收入,这些费用和负债会体现为承保损失。预计 1995 年的摊销和增值费用约为 7000 万美元。

其他非巨灾再保险业务在 1994 年和 1993 年分别产生了约 5.8 亿美元和 2800 万美元的承保损失,这反映了其“长尾”特性。对于某些意外险或责任险的再保险尤其如此,这些合同的保费在很大程度上基于预期损失的时间贴现。损失和损失费用是按未贴现的基础为这些合同确认的,因此在财务报告中表现为承保损失。尽管如此,之所以接受这类业务,是因为它能产生大量的可投资保单持有人的资金(或者说“浮存金”)。1994 年的承保损失中包括了约 3700 万美元的费用,用于 1994 年之前的损失事故的不利进展。1993 年和 1992 年的承保结果反映的损失进展金额相对较小。

直接或直保业务承保

以下是伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险集团直接或直保业务的、按照 GAAP(公认会计准则)列示的合并承保结果汇总。

(单位:百万美元)

199419931992
金额占比金额占比金额占比
承保保费$ 225.7$ 208.4$ 132.4
已赚保费$ 234.8100.0$ 208.3100.0$ 152.8100.0
损失及损失费用88.437.695.846.099.865.3
承保费用98.141.899.847.945.029.5
损失及费用合计186.579.4\*195.693.9144.894.8\*
承保利润——税前48.320.612.76.1$ 8.05.2

\* 包含有利的损失进展抵免。若不考虑这些抵免,损失及费用合计占已赚保费的比例分别为:1994 年 102.4%,1993 年 113.9%,1992 年 118.6%。

直接或直保业务包括来自国民赔偿公司奥马哈办公室的“传统”业务,这部分业务主要代表商业账户的意外险保障。位于康涅狄格州斯坦福德的商业意外险/职业责任险/特殊风险业务单位,则会为呈现出异常性质和/或特别大额风险的投保人承保各种商业保单。总部位于本州的保险公司——主要分布在它们所在的州,即内布拉斯加州和科罗拉多州——承保标准风险的各种商业险种。Cypress 保险公司是一家专业承运商,在竞争激烈的加州市场环境中承保工伤保险。此外,自 1993 年起,由于伯克希尔在 1992 年底收购了奥马哈的中部州立赔偿公司(CSI),这些业务还包括信用卡保险的承保。

CSI 的业务与伯克希尔保险集团其他成员承保的保险业务存在显著差异。CSI 的保费来源于通过信用卡发卡机构产生的大量小额保费交易。CSI 的承保费用占已赚保费的比例大约是其他保险集团成员的两倍。另一方面,CSI 发生的损失及损失费用占已赚保费的比例则远低于其他直保业务单位。总体而言,预计该业务的承保业绩波动性会小于其他直接或直保业务。CSI 在 1994 年和 1993 年产生的已赚保费分别为 7200 万美元和 6900 万美元。CSI 的净承保利润在 1994 年约为 400 万美元,1993 年为 500 万美元。

Management's Discussion (continued) Property and Casualty Insurance Underwriting (continued) Reinsurance Assumed (continued) for 1994, $64 million for 1993 and $66 million for 1992, reflecting principally the amortization of deferred Underwriting losses with respect to retroactive and structured settlement coverages amounted to $78 million to the Consolidated Financial Statements for information charges re reinsurance assumed and accretion of discounted structured settlement liabilities. See Notes 1(f) and (g) amortization and accretion are reported as losses incurred, and thus, because there is no related premium income, with respect to such charges and liabilities. The as underwriting losses. Amortization and accretion charges of about $70 million are expected in 1995. Other non-catastrophe reinsurance business produced underwriting losses of about 580 million, $28 million "tail". This is especially true with respect to reinsurance of certain casualty or liability coverages for which the for these contracts on an undiscounted basis, thus resulting in underwriting losses for financial reporting purposes. This premiums are based in significant part on time discounting of expected losses. Losses and loss expenses are established produces. Underwriting losses in 1994 include charges of about $37 million for adverse development of pre-1994 loss business is accepted, nonetheless, because of the large amounts of investable policyholder funds (or "float") that it occurrences. Underwriting results in 1993 and 1992 reflect relatively minor amounts of loss development. Primary or Direct Insurance Underwriting Hathaway Insurance Group's primary or direct insurance operations. A summary follows of the combined underwriting results, stated on a GAAP basis, of the Berkshire 1994 (dollars are in millions) 1993 1992 Amount Amount % Amount Premiums written $ 225.7 $ 208.4 $ 132.4 Premiums earned $ 234.8 Losses and loss expenses 88.4 100.0 $ 208.3 $ 152.8 100.0 Underwriting expenses 98.1 41.8 37.6 95.8 99.8 98.0 46.8 30.7 64.1 Total losses and expenses 186.5 79.4* 195.6 144.8 94.8* Underwriting gain — pre-lax 48.3 12.7 S 8.0

  • Includes favorable loss development credits.

earned were: 1994 - 102.4%, 1993 - - 113.9%, and 1992 - 118.6%. Without such credits, total losses and expenses as a percentage of premiums Primary or direct insurance activities include the "traditional" business, directed from National Indemnity commercial casualty/professional liability/specialty risk operations located in Stamford, Connecticut, enter into insurance Company's Omaha offices. This business represents principally casualty coverages for commercial accounts. The underwrite various commercial coverages for standard risks located predominantly in their home states — Nebraska contracts with insureds presenting risks unusual in nature and/or especially large in amount. The homestate companies competitive market environment in California. Additionally, since 1993 these activities include the underwriting of credit and Colorado. Cypress Insurance Company, a specialty carrier, underwrites workers' compensation risks in a highly ("'CSI"). card credit insurance as a result of Berkshire's 1992 yearend acquisition of Central States Indemnity Co. of Omaha Insurance Group. CST's premiums derive from a high volume of small dollar premium transactions generated through CST's business differs substantially from the insurance business underwritten by the other members of the of the other Insurance Group members. On the other hand CSI's losses and loss expenses incurred, as percentages credit card issuers. CSI's underwriting expenses as a percentage of premiums earned are roughly twice as great as that underwriting results from this business are anticipated to be less volatile than the other primary or direct insurance of premiums earned are substantially lower than for the other primary or direct underwriting units. Overall, periodic underwriting gain was about $4 million for 1994 and $5 million for 1993. operations. CSI produced premiums earned of $72 million and $69 million for 1994 and 1993, respectively. CSI's net 42

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[PAGE 45]

财产与意外险承保(续)

直接保险承保(续)

伯克希尔其他直接保险业务的保费收入在 1994 年、1993 年和 1992 年分别为 1.63 亿美元、1.4 亿美元和 1.53 亿美元。前页描述的每个业务单元 1994 年的保费收入均高于 1993 年。集团旗下的商业意外险/职业责任险/特殊风险业务贡献了 1994 年较 1993 年保费收入增长的大约一半。这一增长源于对早年签发的少量“追溯费率”保单的调整。根据这些保单的条款,保费金额可能在保单到期后根据承保损失的变化向上或向下调整。因此,1994 年增加的保费收入很大程度上是对承保损失增加的回应。此外,工伤保险业务 1994 年的保费收入较 1993 年增加了约 500 万美元,反映了该业务营销力度的加大。然而,该业务在一个高度竞争的市场中运营,该市场近期经历了重大监管变化,因此 1995 年可能难以维持这样的收入增长。

其他直接保险业务在 1994 年实现了约 4400 万美元的净承保收益,而 1993 年和 1992 年的收益均为约 800 万美元。1994 年,所有其他直接保险业务均有显著的净承保收益,这反映出因对早年损失事件损失准备金进行重新估算而产生的承保损失贷项增加。在过去三年中的每一年,都有有利的损失发展贷项被确认。损失发展代表对估算误差的修正,并在发生的年度被计入或扣减收益。1994 年确认的有利发展主要涉及传统商业汽车保险业务以及商业意外险/职业责任险/特殊风险业务。1993 年和 1992 年,有利的发展贷项主要与传统商业汽车保险业务相关。虽然近年来确认的有利发展趋势令人鼓舞,但无法确定这种趋势会持续到未来。估算损失的性质本身就存在不精确性,尤其是对于那些需要长时间才能报告和结案的损失。未来,更多信息将会被披露,包括针对 1995 年之前损失中未知数量和规模的额外案件报告。

1994 年,多数直接意外伤害保险险种的市场状况依然疲软,这种状况已持续数年。集团成员奉行严谨的承保方针,鼓励拒绝定价过低的保单,而不考虑业务量。管理层预计市场状况不会发生任何重大变化,从而很快扭转当前保费规模低迷的趋势。

保险业务分部投资收益

以下是过去三年保险集团净投资收益的汇总。

1994 年 1993 年 1992 年

(单位:百万美元)

税前投资收益 418.2 美元 375.4 美元 355.1 美元

应计所得税 64.3 58.3 49.1

应计少数股东权益 4.7 3.3 3.2

税后及少数股东权益后投资收益 349.2 美元 320.9 美元 305.8 美元

过去三年中,投资资产每年都在增加。在这三年期间,伯克希尔向保险集团贡献了约 4.2 亿美元的额外资本。同期保险集团的留存收益约为 10 亿美元。另一个推动投资资产增加的因素是来自保单持有人资金的“浮存金”在过去三年中增加了约 12 亿美元。这个术语指的是未付损失、未付损失理算费用和未赚取保费以及保单持有人的其他负债总额,减去应收代理人余额、可收回再保险金额、递延保单获取成本、递延分出再保险费用和预付所得税。1994 年底的净浮存金约为 34 亿美元。此外,1994 年投资收益的增加部分归因于保险集团几家主要权益法被投资公司支付的股息率提高。上表显示的 1994 年税前净投资收益金额中扣除了一项 3290 万美元的费用,该费用代表保险集团对所罗门公司普通股投资的权益法净亏损。关于所罗门公司投资的更多信息,请参阅合并财务报表附注 S。

Property and Casualty Insurance Underwriting (continued) Primary or Direct Insurance Underwriting (continued) million and $153 million for 1994, 1993 and 1992, respectively. Each of these business units, described on the preceding Premiums earned by Berkshire's other primary or direct insurance businesses totalled $163 million, $140 liability/specialty risks businesses accounted for about half of the increase in premiums earned in 1994 over 1993. This page, reported higher premiums earned in 1994 as compared with 1993. The Group's commercial casualty professional terms of those policies, premium amounts may be adjusted upward or downward after policy expiration based upon increase was due to adjustments on a small number of "retrospectively rated" policies written in prior years. Under the to additional amounts of losses incurred. In addition, premiums earned in 1994 by the worker's compensation insurance changes to losses incurred under the policies. Thus the additional premiums earned in 1994 were largely in response unit exceeded 1993 by about $5 million reflecting increased marketing efforts of that business. However, that business gains may be difficult to sustain in 1995. operates in a highly competitive market which has recently undergone substantial regulatory changes and such revenue compared to gains of about $8 million for both 1993 and 1992. In 1994, all of the other primary or direct insurance Other primary or direct businesses produced a net underwriting gain of about $44 million for 1994 operations had significant net underwriting gains, reflecting increased amounts of credits against losses incurred from the reestimation of loss reserves for prior year loss occurrences. Favorable loss development credits were recorded in to earnings in the year made. The favorable development recorded in 1994 related principally to the traditional each of the last three years. Loss development represents corrections of estimation error and is credited or charged commercial automobile business and to the commercial casualty/professional liability/specialty risks operations. In 1993 the trend of favorable development recognized in recent years is encouraging, there is no certainty that it will continue and 1992, the favorable development credits related primarily to the traditional commercial automobile business. While are reported and settled over lengthy periods of time. In the future, additional information will be revealed, including into future periods. The nature of estimating losses is inherently unprecise, particularly with respect to losses which reports of additional cases of an unknown number and magnitude for pre-1995 losses. have prevailed for the past several years. Group members follow disciplined underwriting approaches which encourage Soft market conditions for most primary or direct casualty insurance coverages continued during 1994, as rejection of underpriced risks without regard to volume considerations. Management does not foresee any significant changes in market conditions which would soon reverse the current trend of low premium volume. Insurance Segment Investment Income Following is a summary of Insurance Group net investment income for the past three years. 1994 -(dollars in millions). 1993 1992 Investment income before taxes Applicable income taxes $418.2 64.3 $375.4 $355.1 Applicable minority interest 4.7 _ 3.3 Investment income after taxes and minority interest $349.2 $320.9 $305.8 approximately $420 million additional capital to the Insurance Group. Reinvested earnings of the Insurance Group Invested assets increased in each of the past three years. In the three year period, Berkshire contributed about a $1.2 billion increase during the past three year period in the amount of "float" from policyholder funds. for that period amounted to approximately $1.0 billion. Contributing to a further increase in invested assets was That tenn denotes the sum of unpaid losses, unpaid loss adjusiment expenses and unearned premiums, and other on paid and unpaid losses, deferred policy acquisition costs, deferred charges re reinsurance assumed and prepaid liabilities to policyholders less the aggregate of agents' balances receivable, amounts recoverable as reinsurance income taxes. The net amount of float was approximately $3.4 billion at the end of 1994. In addition, increased investment income in 1994 was partially attributed to higher dividend rates paid by several of the Insurance Group's charge of $32.9 million which represents the equity in net loss from the Insurance Group's investment in common major equity investees. The amount of pre-tax net investment income for 1994 shown in the table above reflects a investment in Salomon Inc. stock of Salomon Inc. See Note S to the Consolidated Financial Statements for additional information regarding the 43

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管理层讨论(续)

非保险业务板块

三年汇总

以下为过去三年这些已识别的业务板块对伯克希尔的业绩贡献汇总:

1004

(单位:百万美元)

1993

1992

收入

金额

成本与费用

$1,771.9

%

所得税

营业利润

1,496.5

100.0

金额

275.4

84.5

$1,440.1

1,215.3

100.0

金额

84.4

$1,283.2

1,073.3

100.0

少数股东权益

106.2

15.5

3.4

0.2

6.0

224.8

87.8

15.6

209.9

83.6

3.7

6.1

83.2

16.4

3.3

0.3

6.5

0.3

对净利润的贡献

$ 165.8

9.3

$ 133.3

9.2

$ 123.4

9.0

各可识别的非保险业务板块如下。

以下是 1994 年、1993 年和 1992 年七个板块各自的收入与营业利润比较:

板块

1994

收入

(单位:百万美元)

1992

营业利润

(占收入百分比)

营业利润

1993

1994 1993

1992

1994

1993

1992

糖果

百科全书及其他参考材料

216.1

家居用品

家用清洁系统

207.6

191.3

201.0

198.8

197.0

190.1

246.1

$ 46.6 $ 40.3

24.4

19.4

$ 41.4

185.6

43.9

40.9

28.2

21.6

139.7

16.9

21.1

37.7

12.8

20.0

21.1

9.8

21.0

报纸

245.4

193.9

35.6

6.9

10.1

21.1

11.5

制服

鞋类

609.4

150.9

145.5

208.6

109.8

214.9

53.7

76.4

50.4

16.7

19.8

13.5

40.0

47.3

12.5

34.6

9.0

151.2

122.1

370.2

12.7

13.0

25.6

8.9

10.8

33.9

10.4

11.9

11.8

$1,771.9

$1,440.1

$1,283.2

$275.4

$224.8

$209.9

1994 年与 1993 年对比:

七个可识别非保险业务板块的收入为 17.719 亿美元,较上年增加 3.318 亿美元(23.0%);这些业务板块的整体营业利润为 2.754 亿美元,增加 5060 万美元(22.5%)。以下是对各非保险业务板块比较业绩有重大影响的事项讨论。

糖果

糖果板块收入增加 1510 万美元(7.5%),营业利润增加 630 万美元(15.6%)。收入和营业利润的增长主要源于销量增加。糖果总销量增长约 5.3%,其中大部分增长来自喜诗的邮购和批量订购计划。自 1993 年起,喜诗加大了对这些计划的营销力度。该力度在 1994 年得以延续,因此 1994 年通过批量订购和邮购计划售出的总磅数增长约 15%。

百科全书及其他参考材料

该板块收入比 1993 年减少 750 万美元(3.8%)。这一下降延续了自 1989 年开始的印刷版百科全书(《世界百科全书》和《儿童手工艺》)单位销量下滑趋势。在一定程度上抵消《世界百科全书》和《儿童手工艺》销量下降的是《世界百科全书》当前 CD-ROM 产品 Infofinder 的销售额增长;该产品新增了音频、视频和动画功能,并以《世界百科全书多媒体百科全书》的名称进行营销。

1995 年 4 月,Windows 和 Macintosh 版本的《世界百科全书》CD-ROM 产品将上市。预计印刷材料向电子媒体的行业趋势将持续。管理层无法预测升级版 CD-ROM 产品将对销售额或收入产生何种影响。不过,管理层认为其核心印刷产品仍将拥有一个盈利的市场,但印刷版产品的销量将继续承压。

Management's Discussion (continued) Non-Insurance Business Segments three years. A summary follows of results to Berkshire from these identified business segments for the past 1004 (dollars in millions) 1993 1992 Revenues Amount Cost and expenses $1,771.9 % Income taxes Operating profit 1,496.5 100.0 Amount 275.4 84.5 $1,440.1 1,215.3 100.0 Amount 84.4 $1,283.2 1.073.3 100.0 Minority interest 106.2 15.5 3.4 0.2 6.0 224.8 87.8 15.6 209.9 83.6 3.7 6.1 83.2 16.4 3.3 0.3 6.5 0.3 Contribution to net earnings $ 165.8 9.3 $ 133.3 9.2 $ 123.4 9.0 identifiable non-insurance business segments follows. A comparison of revenues and operating profits between 1994, 1993 and 1992 for each of the seven Segment 1994 Revenues (dollars in millions) 1992 Operating Profits as a % of Revenucs Operating Profit 1993 1994 1993 1992 1994 1993 1992 Candy Encyclopedias, other reference material 216.1 Home furnishings Home cleaning systems 207.6 191.3 201.0 198.8 197.0 190.1 246.1 $ 46.6 $ 40.3 24.4 19.4 $ 41.4 185.6 43.9 40.9 28.2 21.6 139.7 16.9 21.1 37.7 12.8 20.0 21.1 9.8 21.0 Newspaper 245.4 193.9 35.6 6.9 10.1 21.1 11.5 Uniforms Shoes 609.4 150.9 145.5 208.6 109.8 214.9 53.7 76.4 50.4 16.7 19.8 13.5 40.0 47.3 12.5 34.6 9.0 151.2 122.1 370.2 12.7 13.0 25.6 8.9 10.8 33.9 10.4 11.9 11.8 $1.771.9 $1,440.! $1,283.2 $275.4 $224.8 $209.9 1994 compared to 1993 million (23.0%) from the prior year: The overall operating profit from these business segments of $275.4 million Revenues from the seven identifiable non-insurance business segments of $1,771.9 million increased $331.8 increased $50.6 million (22.5%). The following is a discussion of significant matters impacting comparative results for each of the non-insurance business segments. Candy (15.6%) over comparable prior year amounts. The comparative increases in revenues and operating profits are Revenues of the candy segment increased S15.1 million (7.5%) and operating protits increased $6.3 million primarily due to increased volume. Total pounds of candy sold increased about 5.3%. Much of the increase arose from See's mail order and quantity order programs. Beginning in 1993 See's intensified its marketing efforts relative to these programs. Such efforts continued during 1994 and as a result total pounds sold during 1994 resulting from quantity order and mail order programs increased about 15%. Encyclopedias, Other Reference Materials reduced unit sales of printed encyclopedias (World Book and Childcraft) which began in 1989. Somewhat offsetting the Revenues of this segment declined $7.5 million (3.8%) from 1993. This decline continues the trend of decline in World Book and Childerafi sales were sales increases of World Book's current CD-ROM product, Infofinder: with the enhancements of audio, video and animation and marketed as the World Book Multimedia Encyclopedia. In April 1995, the Windows and Maclntosh versions of World Book's CD-ROM product will be available it is anticipated that the industry trend away from printed material and toward electronic media will continue. While Management cannot predict the impact on sales or income that the upgraded CD-ROM product will have. However, management believes that there will continue to be a profitable market for its core printed product, the quantity of 44

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非保险业务板块(续)

1994 年与 1993 年相比(续)

百科全书及其他参考资料(续)

配置 CD-ROM 的家用电脑日益普及,以及普通人群电脑知识水平的提升,导致成套印刷品销量下降;如果成套印刷品的销量无法恢复到以往水平,未来可供销售的印刷产品的数量可能会受到限制,因为 CD-ROM 产品相对于百科全书套装的销量持续增加且将继续大幅减少。此外,印刷套装的单位销量下降预计将在一定程度上被 CD-ROM 升级版的销售所抵消。不过,《世界图书多媒体百科全书》将向购买者提供年度升级版。因此,预计印刷版年度销量的下降将被 CD-ROM 升级版的销售部分抵消。

家用清洁系统

家用清洁系统板块的收入增加了 1370 万美元(增长 7.0%),经营利润增加了 300 万美元(增长 7.3%)。这一增长主要归因于平均经销商数量较 1993 年有所增加,以及海外市场销售组织结构的改善。Kirby 在美国国内的销量略有增长,而在海外市场则增长了 14%。海外 Kirby 业务约占总销量的 22%。管理层预计该业务将继续取得显著增长,同时国内市场的增长也较为温和,并对该板块的持续成功充满信心。

家居用品

1994 年,家居用品板块的收入比上一年增加了 3680 万美元(增长 17.6%)。所有主要产品类别均实现了增长。1994 年 11 月,一家占地 102,000 平方英尺的家电和电子产品大型卖场在内布拉斯加家具城(“NFM”)旁边开业。这家大型卖场被称为“Mega Mart”,为 NFM 原本丰富的电子产品及家电选择增添了音乐 CD 和扩展的电脑软件系列等新品类。

经营利润为 1690 万美元,比 1993 年减少了 420 万美元(下降 19.9%)。下降的主要原因来自 Mega Mart 盛大开业相关的门店开业成本。此外,1994 年还记录了约 230 万美元的非常规费用,涉及对某些不再使用的固定资产进行核销。

管理层乐观地认为,撇开门店开业成本和非常规费用,1995 年的经营利润将有所改善。预计 1995 年经营利润占收入的比重将较 1994 年有所提高。然而,由于利润率较低的 Mega Mart 业务将占据预期收入增长的很大一部分,所达到的利润率水平可能仍低于 Mega Mart 开业前 NFM 的历年水平。

报纸

1994 年的经营利润为 5370 万美元,比 1993 年增加了 330 万美元(增长 6.5%)。尽管最近几年的对比成绩令人瞩目,但 1995 年及以后的前景并不那么乐观。1994 年,《布法罗新闻》的发行量出现下降。部分下降是由于 1994 年将每日报纸的零售价格从 35 美分提高到 50 美分所致。同时,一项实施了多年的激进新订户折扣计划在 1994 年被逐步取消,许多过去享受大幅折扣的订户没有续订。从收入金额角度来看,提价抵消了发行量的下降。

预计 1995 年的盈利将会下降。过去几年,新闻纸的成本要么保持稳定,要么有所下降。这一趋势现已急剧逆转。预计 1995 年剩余时间内每公吨的新成本更高,加上价格上涨,将使新闻纸成本较 1994 年增加 700 万美元,增幅近 40%。

总体而言,该报业板块在未来一年面临一些重大挑战。不过,《布法罗新闻》控制其他运营成本的能力,应有助于减轻发行量下降和新闻纸成本急剧上升带来的影响。

Non-Insurance Business Segments (continued) 1994 compared to /993 (continued) Encyclopedias, Other Relerence Material (continted) home computers equipped with CD-ROMs, increased computer literacy of the general population, and the lower price the printed products which can be sold may, in the future, be limited due to the continued increase in the number of has and will continue to reduce significantly the volume of Annual sales if printed set sales do not return to prior levels. of CD-ROM products in comparison to encyclopedia sets. Additionally, the decline in the unit volume of printed sets anticipated that reductions in printed Annual sales will be somewhat ollset by sales of CD-ROM upgrades. However, the World Book Multimedia Encyclopedia will be offered in annual upgrades to purchasers. Therefore, it is Home Cleaning Systems increased $3.0 million (7.3%). This comparative increase can be attributed primarily to an increase in the average Revenue of the home cleaning systems segment increased $13.7 million (7.0%) and operating profits number of distributors over 1993 and improvements in the structure of the sales organization in foreign markets. Unit sales of Kirbys increased slightly in domestic markets and were up by 14% in foreign markets. Foreign Kirby sales business and combined with more modest growth in domestic markets expects continued successful results from this represent approximately 22% oftotal unit volume. Management anticipates continued significant growth in its foreign segment. Home Furnishings year. Increases were achieved in all major product categories. In November 1994, a 102,000 square foot appliance and Revenues from the home fumishings segment increased in 1994 by $36.8 million (17.6%) over the prior "Mega Mart" has added new products such as music compact discs and an expanded computer software line to NEM'S electronics superstore was opened adjacent to the Nebraska Furniture Mart ('NFM"). This superstore known as the previously large selection of electronics and appliances. from store opening costs in connection with the grand opening of the Mega Mart. In addition, umusual charges of Operating profits of $16.9 million were $4.2 million (19.9%) less than in 1993. Much of the decline resulted Management is optimistic that absent the store opening costs and unusual charges, an improvement in operating profit approximately $2.3 million were recorded in 1994 relating to the write-off of certain fixed assets no longer in use. will be experienced in 1995. It is expected that operating profits as a percentage of revenues will improve during 1995 the anticipated revenue growth, the percentage levels attained will likely be less than experienced by NEM in years as compared to 1994. However, due to the fact that the lower margin Mega Mart business will account for much of prior to the opening of the Mega Mart. Newspaper comparative results are impressive and have been for several recent years, the outlook for 1995 and beyond is not as Operating profits during 1994 of $53.7 million were $3.3 million (6.5%) greater than in 1993. While the increase during 1994 in the newsstand price of the daily newspaper from 35¢ to 50¢. Also an aggressive new subscriber encouraging. During 1994, the Buffalo News experienced a decline in circulation. Part of the decline was caused by an discount program which had been in place a number of years was phased out in 1994, and many subscribers used to circulation. a large discount did not resubscribe. From a dollar volume standpoint, the price increase offset the decline in stable or has declined. This trend has now sharply reversed. New higher costs per metric ton, as well as increased Earnings are expected to decline in 1995. For the past several years the cost of newsprint has either been prices expected during the remainder of 1995, are expected to increase newsprint costs by $7 million or nearly 40% over 1994 costs. Buffalo News' ability to control its other operating costs should help mitigate the impact of the decline in circulation Overall, the newspaper segment faces some signiticant challenges during the next year. However, the and the steep rise in newsprint costs. 45

[第 48 页]

[PAGE 48]

管理层讨论(续)

非保险业务板块(续)

1994 年与 1993 年对比(续)

鞋类

该板块包括 H. H. Brown 鞋业公司(“H. H. Brown”)、Lowell 鞋业公司(“Lowell”)和 Dexter 鞋业公司(“Dexter”)。这些企业是在 1991 年 6 月至 1993 年 11 月期间由伯克希尔收购的。H. H. Brown 于 1991 年收购,是一家工装鞋、安全鞋和休闲鞋的制造商和经销商。Lowell 于 1992 年底收购,制造和销售女式休闲鞋、服务鞋和护士鞋。Dexter 于 1993 年底收购,是男女正装鞋、休闲鞋和运动鞋的制造商。此外,Dexter 还经营着 77 家零售折扣店。

1994 年营收为 6.094 亿美元,比上年增加 2.392 亿美元(64.6%)。这一大幅增长主要归因于 Dexter 在 1994 年全年并入报表,而 1993 年只并入了不到两个月。Dexter 的 1994 年营业利润占该板块营业利润增长 3640 万美元(91.0%)的大部分。管理层对 Dexter 的 1994 年表现感到满意,并预计 1995 年会取得更好业绩。这种乐观来自近期批发价格调整,应有助于减轻此前几年 Dexter 成本上涨的影响。此外,随着 Dexter 新建的计算机化配送中心投入运营以及先进制造技术的应用,预计运营效率也会提升。

H. H. Brown 贡献了该板块剩余的比较营收增长中的大部分。这一增长的一部分与 1994 年下半年收购一家拥有 11 家零售店的连锁店有关。这些零售店位于马里兰州、宾夕法尼亚州和弗吉尼亚州,销售 H. H. Brown 自产的产品以及其他鞋类制造商的产品。H. H. Brown 的制造和经销业务反映为营收小幅增长和营业利润略有下降。下降的主要原因是销售毛利率小幅下降,以及比较后进先出法费用增加,这两者被营收的小幅增长部分抵消。

Lowell 的 1994 年营收相比 1993 年略有下降。然而,比较营业利润在 1994 年高于 1993 年。这一改善主要源于 1993 年因实施更严格的库存控制程序而计提了 380 万美元的非常费用。

制服

制服板块的 1994 年营收比 1993 年增加了 2910 万美元(23.8%)。其中近 60% 的增长来自 1994 年启动的一项特殊计划,据此与纽约市消防局达成协议,为消防员提供安全制服及相关配件。初始合同期限为三年。其余的比较营收增长来自该板块核心制服制造业务的增长。

1994 年营业利润为 1350 万美元,略高于 1993 年的可比营业利润。上述营收增长带来的额外利润,基本上被以下因素抵消:a) 因执行纽约市消防局计划而产生的一些计划外启动成本;b) 与按计划安装新计算机系统相关的成本;以及 c) 在近期收购的某些零售店中所遇到的问题。

目前正着手解决零售店收购中遇到的问题,有望在 1995 年得到解决。总体而言,管理层保持审慎乐观,认为 1995 年的营业利润无论在绝对金额上还是占营收的百分比上,都将超过前两年的业绩。

1993 年与 1992 年对比

非保险业务板块的 1993 年营收比 1992 年增加了 1.569 亿美元(12.2%)。增幅最大的板块是“鞋类”,其营收比上一年度增加了 1.553 亿美元(72.3%)。正如本管理层讨论的前一节更全面描述的那样,

Management's Discussion (continued) Non-Insurance Business Segments (continued) 1994 compared to 1993 (continued) Shoes Dexter Shoe Companies ('Dexter'"). These businesses were acquired by Berkshire during the period between June 1991 This segment includes H. H. Brown Shoe Company, Inc. ("H. H. Brown"), Lowell Shoe, Inc. ("Lowell") and and November 1993. H. H. Brown, acquired in 1991, is a manufacturer and distributor of work, safety and casual The acquisition of Dexter occurred in late 1993. Dexter is a manufacturer of men's and women's dress, casual and footwear: Lowell, acquired at the end of 1992, manufactures and markets women's casual, service and nurses' footwear. athletic footwear. Additionally, Dexter operates 77 retail outlet stores. substantial increase was largely due to the inclusion of Dexter's results for the full year in 1994 as compared to just Revenues during 1994 of $609.4 million were greater than the prior year by $239.2 million (64.6%). This (91.0%) increase in comparative operating profits. Management was pleased with Dexter's 1994 performance and under two months during 1993. Dexter's 1994 operating profits account for most of this segments $36.4 million better results are anticipated during 1995. This optimism results from the fact that recent wholesale price adjustments should help mitigate the effects of prior years increases in Dexter's costs. Additionally, operating efficiencies are anticipated in connection with the start-up of Dexter's new computerized distribution center and from advanced manufacturing technologies. of such increase is related to the acquisition during the second half of 1994 of a chain of 11 retail stores. The retail H. H. Brown accounts for most of the remaining comparative revenue increase for this segment. A portion stores, located in Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, carry H. H. Brown manufactured products as well as those of revenues and a slight decline in operating profits. The decline is largely a result of slightly lower gross margins on sales other shoe manufacturers. H. H. Brown's manufacturing and distribution business results reflect a modest increase in and an increased comparative LIFO charge being somewhat offset by the modest revenue increase. were greater in 1994 than during 1993. The improvement largely arises from the fact that during 1993, unusual charges Lowell's revenues were slightly lower in 1994 as compared to 1993. However, comparative operating profits of $3.8 million were recorded in connection with the implementation of more stringent inventory control procedures. Unitorms of the increase arose as a result of a special program begun during 1994 whereby an agreement was entered into with The uniform segment's revenues increased $29.1 million (23.8%) in 1994 as compared to 1993. Almost 60% the New York City Fire Department to supply fire fighters with safety uniforms and related accessories. The initial contractual arrangement is for a period of three years. The remainder of the comparative revenue increase resulted from increases in this segment's core uniform manufacturing operations. additional margin resulting from the aforementioned revenue increases was substantially offset by a) the incurrence Operating profits for 1994 of $13.5 million were slightly above comparable 1993 operating profits. The of certain unplanned start-up costs relative to the implementation of the New York City Fire Department program; b) costs incurred in connection with the scheduled installation of'a new computer system; and c) problems which have arisen related to certain recent retail store acquisitions. long-tenn. The problems being encountered in connection with the retail store acquisitions are being addressed and Management expects that the program with the New York City Fire Department will be successful in the will hopefully be resolved during 1995. Overall, management is cautiously optimistic that 1995's operating profit will exceed the results of the prior two years both in absolute terms and as a percentage of revenues. 1993 compared to 1992 to 1992. The most significant revenue increase arose in the "shoes" segment where revenues increased $155.3 million Revenues from the non-insurance business segments increased $156.9 million (12.2%) in 1993 as compared (72.3%) over the comparable prior year figures. As more fully described in the preceding section of this discussion, 46

[第 49 页]

[PAGE 49]

非保险业务板块(续)

1993 年与 1992 年比较(续)

Lowell(1992 年底收购)和 Dexter(1993 年底收购)的收购占营收增长比较的很大一部分。除“百科全书及其他参考资料”板块外,1993 年所有其他五个可报告板块的营收为 8.711 亿美元,而 1992 年为 8.222 亿美元。1993 年与 1992 年相比,所有其他非保险业务板块的营收均实现增长。抵消其他非保险业务板块营收增长的,是“百科全书及其他参考资料”板块营收减少 4730 万美元(19.2%)。这一下降是 1989 年开始的印刷版百科全书销量持续下滑的结果。(关于《世界百科全书》单位销量下降的讨论,请参见前文关于 1994 年与 1993 年结果比较的部分。)

1993 年营业利润为 2.248 亿美元,比 1992 年增加 1490 万美元(7.1%)。“鞋类”板块营收同比增加 1440 万美元(56.3%),是营收增长的主要贡献者。除了 Lowell 和 Dexter 收购对营业利润比较的影响外,H. H. Brown 能够实现同比增长,主要是由于工装鞋的受欢迎以及运动鞋需求下降。其他可报告板块的营业利润总体相对不变。

非识别业务板块

1094

(百万美元)

1993

1992

营收

$607.4

$550.8

$517.3

营业利润

少数股权

所得税

22.1

59.2

$

55.2

0.7

20.8

$

54.3

1.2

21.8

1.8

对净利润的贡献

$ 36.4

$ 332

30.7

以上是 1994 年共 23 家企业的汇总数据。伯克希尔管理层认为,鉴于年度间汇总数据的相对一贯性,对各组成企业结果的叙述性讨论不会为投资者或其他读者带来显著益处。

利息支出

1994 年与 1993 年相比,利息支出小幅增加,主要是由于投资协议项下的平均未偿借款在 1994 年增加约 8200 万美元,而与 1993 年相比,这些借款的平均利率从约 6.9% 降至 6.0%。借款平均水平上升对利息支出的影响被利率下降部分抵消。1992 年的利息支出包括赎回定期债务支付的 1620 万美元溢价,以及一笔 630 万美元的费用,该费用涉及注销与 1992 年 12 月被要求赎回的一批可转换次级债券相关的递延融资成本。

已实现投资收益

多年来,已实现投资收益一直是伯克希尔净利润中反复出现的要素。已实现投资收益对伯克希尔的合并净利润具有重要影响。但是,任何给定时期的已实现投资收益金额——在已增值证券被出售时入账——往往在不同时期之间大幅波动,因此不具有预测价值,且不同时期之间的金额差异也没有实际分析价值,尤其是考虑到伯克希尔合并投资组合中目前存在的未实现价格增值。

1993 年第四季度,伯克希尔的一家保险子公司出售了 1000 万股大都会/美国广播公司(“大都会”)的普通股,以配合该公司向股东回购最多 2000 万股普通股的要约。自 1986 年以来,伯克希尔子公司一直持有大都会 3000 万股股票,约占该公司流通股的 18%。伯克希尔在此交易中的税后收益为 2.974 亿美元。

Non-Insurance Business Segments (continued) 1993 compared to 1992 (continued, the acquisition of Lowell (in late 1992) and Dexter (in late 1993) account for a substantial portion of the comparative increase in revenues. With the exception of the "encyclopedias, other reference material" segment, all other reportable five segments in 1993 were $871.1 million vs. $822.2 in 1992. Offsetting the increases attributable to the other non- non-insurance business segmenis experienced increases in comparative revenues in 1993 vs. 1992. Revenues from these reference material" segment. This decline was a result of the continuation of a reduction which began in 1989 in insurance business segments was a reduction in revenues of $47.3 million (19.2%) from the "encyclopedias, other printed encyclopedia sales. (See preceding section regarding comparative 1994 vs. 1993 results for a discussion regarding the decline in World Book unit sales.) segment with a comparative increase of $14.4 million (56.3%) was the major contributor to the comparative increase. Operating profits of $224.8 million during 1993 were $14.9 million (7.1%) greater than in 1992. The "shoes" was able to achieve comparative incrcases largely resulting from the popularity of work shoes and reduced demand In addition to the impact that the acquisitions of Lowell and Dexter had on comparative operating profits, H. H. Brown for athletic shoes. The operating profits of the other reportable segments in the aggregate were relatively unchanged Business Other Than Identified Segments 1094 (dollars in mittions)- 1993. 1992 Revenues $607,4 S550.8 S517.3 Operating profit Minority interest Income taxes 22.1 59.2 $ 55.2 0.7 20.8 $ 54.3 1.2 21.8 1.8 Contribution to net earnings $ 36.4 $ 332 30.7 believes that narrative discussion of the results of the constituent businesses would not yield significant benefit to The above represent aggregate data for businesses that numbered 23 in 1994. Berkshire management investors or others, particularly in view of the relative consistency of the year-to-year aggregate data. Interest Expense average outstanding borrowings under investment agreements increased by approximately $82 million during 1994 as The small increase in interest expense in 1994 as compared to 1993 primarily results from the fact that a reduction in the average interest rate on such borrowings from approximately 6.9% in 1993 to 6.0% in 1994. Interest compared to 1993. Somewhat offsetting the effect on interest expense of the increased average level of borrowings was expense for 1992 includes premiums paid of $16.2 million to redeem term debt and a charge of $6.3 million representing the write-off of deferred financing costs related to an issue of Convertibie Subordinated Debentures which was called for redemption in December 1992. Realized Investment Gain Realized investment gain has been a recurring element in Berkshire's net earnings for many years. The a meaningful effect upon Berkshire's consolidated net earnings. But, the amount of realized investment gain for any recorded when appreciated securities are sold-—tends to fluctuate significantly from period to period, with particulariy in view of the unrealized price appreciation now existing in Berkshire's consolidated investment portfolio. given period has no predictive value, and variations in amount from period to period have no practical analytical value, of' its investment in Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ("Capital Cities") in connection with that company's offer to buy from During the fourth quarter of 1993, an insurance subsidiary of Berkshire sold ten million common shares its shareholders up to twenty million of its common shares. Prior to the sale and since 1986, Berkshire subsidiaries after-tax gain from this transaction was $297.4 million. orned thirty million shares of Capital Cities or approximately 18% of that company's outstanding stock. Berkshire's 47

[第 50 页]

[PAGE 50]

管理层讨论(续)

非经常性费用和会计变更

如合并财务报表附注 6 中更详细的描述,该公司因确认其对美国航空公司集团(USAir Group, Inc.)优先股投资的减值(非暂时性下跌)而记录了一笔 2.685 亿美元(税后及少数股东权益后为 1.726 亿美元)的税前费用。虽然该项费用计入 1994 年第四季度的收益,但对股东权益的扣除早已在之前的 1994 年报告期内记录。

自 1993 年 1 月 1 日起,公司采用了财务会计准则第 109 号“所得税会计”(“SFAS 109”)的规定。采用 SFAS 109 对 1993 年公司业绩的累计影响是使净收益减少约 7100 万美元。此外,在 1993 年,因联邦企业所得税税率从 34% 提高到 35%,记录了一笔 7500 万美元的费用。有关会计变更及因联邦所得税税率变化导致的收益费用更详细的描述,请参见合并财务报表的附注 1(k) 和 10。

流动性和资本资源

截至 1994 年 12 月 31 日,伯克希尔的合并资产负债表反映出持续强劲的资本实力。在过去三年中,伯克希尔的股东权益从 1991 年 12 月 31 日的约 74 亿美元增加至 1994 年 12 月 31 日的约 119 亿美元。在这三年期间,已实现和未实现的证券收益增加了约 29 亿美元的股权资本,而除已实现证券收益外的留存收益约为 11 亿美元。

Management's Discussion (continued) Nonrecurring charges and accounting changes tax charge of $268.5 million ($172.6 million after-taxes and minority interests) as result of recognizing an other than As more fully described in Vote 6 to the Consolidated Financial Statements, the Company recorded a pre- was recorded in the fourth quarter of 1994, the charge to shareholders' equity had been recorded in earlier 1994 temporary decline in the value of its investment in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock. While the charge to earnings reporting penods. Standards No. 109 "Accounting for Income Taxes" ("SFAS 109"). The cumulative effect of adopting SFAS 109 on the Effective January 1, 1993, the Company adopted the provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Company's 1993 results was to decrease net earings by about $71 million. Additionally, dunng 1993 a charge of $75.. nillion was recorded as a result of the increase in the Federal corporate income tax rate from 34% to 35%. For tax rates, see Notes 1(k) and 10 to the Consolidated Financial Statements. further description of the accounting change and the charge to earnings resulting from the change in Federal income Liquidity and Capital Resources Berkshire's Consolidated Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1994, reflects continuing capital strength. In to approximately $11.9 billion at December 31, 1994. In that three-year period, realized and unrealized securities gains the past three years, Berkshire shareholders' equity has increased from approximately $7.4 billion at December 31, 1991 about S1.1 billion. increased equity capital by approximately $2.9 billion, and reinvested earnings, other than realized securities gains, were 48

[第 51 页]

[PAGE 51]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

过去五年精选财务数据

(除每股数据外,金额单位均为千美元)

1994 | 1993 | 1992 | 1991 | 1990

营业收入:

销售和服务收入

已赚保费

……

……

2,351,918 美元 | 1,962,862 美元 | 1,774,436 美元 | 1,651,134 美元 | 1,580,074 美元

来自所罗门股份的投资收益

利息和股息收入

923,180 | 426,094 | 354,028 | 650,726 | 664,293

364,895 | 347,293 | 776,413 | 591,540 | 30,058

63,000 | 63,000 | 63,000 | 63,000 | 317,095

金融业务收入

24,885 | 22,226 | 20,696 | 19,475 | 13,498

已实现投资收益

91,332 | 346,422 | 89,937 | 192,478 | 33,989

营业收入总额

3,847,467 美元 | 3,599,264 美元 | 2,977,257 美元 | 3,049,793 美元 | 2,599,196 美元

收益:

在已实现投资收益和会计变更累计影响前

433,659 美元 1 | 402,403 美元 2 | 356,702 美元 | 347,726 美元 | 370,745 美元

已实现投资收益

61,139 | 59,559 | 315,753 | 124,155 | 33,989

所得税会计变更的累计影响

23,348 | (70,984)

净收益

494,798 | 688,121 | 407,285 | 439,908 | 394,093

每股收益:

在已实现投资收益和会计变更累计影响前

368.21 美元 1 | 348.03 美元 2 | 308.50 美元 | 303.29 美元 | 323.39 美元

已实现投资收益

51.91 | 1.95 | 275.42 | 108.30 | 29.64

所得税会计变更的累计影响

20.36 | (61.39)

净收益

420.12 美元 | 595.14 美元 | 355.24 美元 | 383.72 美元 | 343.75 美元

年末数据:

总资产

21,338,182 美元 | 19,520,469 美元 | 17,131,998 美元 | 14,461,902 美元 | 10,670,423 美元

投资协议借款及其他债务 (3)

810,719 | 972,389 | 1,154,697 | 1,100,464 | 1,082,265

股东权益

8,896,331 | 7,379,918 | 5,287,454

流通普通股股数

(千股)

1,178 | 1,178 | 1,149 | 1,146 | 1,146

每股股东权益

10,083 美元 | 8,354 美元 | 7,745 美元 | 6,437 美元 | 4,612 美元

1 包含一项 1.72579 亿美元(每股 146.53 美元)的扣减,代表 USAur 集团公司优先股投资的非暂时性减值。

2 包含一项 7534.8 万美元(每股 65.38 美元)的扣减,代表联邦所得税税率变动对未实现增值所对应递延所得税的影响。

3 不包括金融业务的借款。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. Selected Financial Data for the Past Five Years (dollars in thousands, except per share data) 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 Revenues: Sales and service revenues Insurance premiums carned ...... ... $ 2,351,918 $ 1,962,862 $ 1,774,436 $ 1,651,134 § 1,580,074 Income from investment in Salomon Inc.. Interest and dividend income 923,180 426,094 354,028 650,726 664,293 364,895 347,293 776,413 591,540 30,058 63,000 63,000 63,000 317,095 Income from finance businesses 24,885 22,226 20,696 19,475 13,498 63,000 Realized investment gain 91,332 346,422 89,937 192,478 33,989 Total revenues $ 3.847,467 $ 3,599,264 $ 2,977,257 $ 3,049,793 $ 2,599,196 Earnings: Before realized investment gain and Realized investment gain cumulative effect of accounting change.. $ 433,659' $ 61,139 402,4032 $ 356,702 347,726 59,559 $ 315,753 124,155 $ 370,745 Cumulative effect of change in accounting 23,348 for income taxes (70,984) Net earnings 494,798 688.121 407.285 $ 439.908 $ 394,093 Earnings per share: Before realized investment gain and Realized investment gain cumulative effect of accounting change.. $368.211 51.91 $348.0312 308.50 $303.29 $1.95 $275.42 108.30 $323.39 Cumulative effect of change in accounting 20.36 for income taxes (61.39) Net earnings $420.12 $595.14 $355.24 $383.72 $343.75 Year-end data: Total assets Borrowings under investment agreements $21,338,182 $19,520,469 $17,131,998 $14,461.902 $10,670,423 Shareholders' equity and other debt (3) ... 810,719 Common shares outstanding. 11,874,882 10,428,374 972,389 1,154,697 8,896,331 1,100,464 7,379,918 1,082,265 5,287,454 Shareholders' equity per in thousands . . . • 1,178 1,178 1,149 1,146 1,146 outstanding share 10.083 _ 8,354 $ 7,745 $ 6.437 s 4,612 ''' Includes a charge of $172.579 ($146. 53/share; representing an other than temporary decline in value of investment in USAur Group, Inc. Preferred Stock. ! Includes a charge of $75.348 ($65.38/share) representing the effect of the change in federal income tax rates on deferred taxes applicable to unrealized appreciation. 1) Excludes borrowings of finance businesses. 49

[第 52 页]

[PAGE 52]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东指定捐赠计划

1981 年 10 月 14 日,董事长致信股东*,对该计划作出说明。信的部分内容如下:

公司在过去十四年中的每一年都实施了这项企业捐赠计划。在大多数年份,该计划应能为股东所选定的慈善机构带来可观的收益。

“1981 年 9 月 30 日,伯克希尔收到了美国财政部税务部门的裁决,

——每位伯克希尔股东——按其所持有的伯克希尔股份数量等比例——将能够指定公司慈善捐赠的接收方。股东只需指定慈善机构,伯克希尔负责开支票。该裁决指出,股东作出此类指定不会产生个人税务后果。

“这样一来,我们大约 1500 位股东现在可以行使一项特权,这项特权虽在股权集中的非上市公司中通常由股东行使,但在股权分散的企业中,却几乎完全由管理层独揽。

“在股权分散的公司,高管通常自行安排所有慈善捐赠,完全不征求股东意见,主要分为两类:

(1)被认为能给公司带来直接利益、且利益大致与捐赠成本相匹配的捐赠;

(2)被认为通过难以衡量、反馈延迟的各种长期效应,能给公司带来间接利益的捐赠。

“我和其他伯克希尔高管过去安排、将来也将继续安排所有第一类慈善捐赠。但此类别的捐赠总额一直很低,并且很可能将保持低位,因为能够证明能产生大致等量直接回报的捐赠并不多。

“在第二类捐赠上,伯克希尔的慈善支出几乎为零,因为我对常规的公司做法感到不安,又找不到更好的做法来替代。让我对常规公司做法感到不安的是,捐赠往往更多地取决于谁来请求、及同行企业如何回应,而不是基于对受赠方活动的客观评估。惯例常常压倒理性。

“一个常见的后果是,用股东的钱来落实公司经理个人的慈善偏好,而这位经理通常深受施加在他身上的特定社会压力所影响。还时常出现另一种不协调:许多公司经理鄙视政府分配纳税人的钱,却对由自己来分配股东的钱热情有加。

“对伯克希尔来说,一种不同的模式似乎更合适。正如我不希望您凭个人判断用我的银行账户开支票给您选定的慈善机构一样,我觉得用您在公司里的‘银行账户’来为我选定的慈善机构开支票也同样不妥。您的慈善偏好与我的同样好,而且,对您我双方而言,可用于以税前扣除方式支持慈善事业的资金,主要掌握在公司层面,而非我们个人手中。

“在此情形下,我认为伯克希尔应该效仿股权集中的公司,而不是大型上市公司。如果您和我各拥有一家公司 50% 的股份,我们的慈善决策将很简单。与我们企业运营直接相关的慈善机构,对我们的可用慈善资金享有优先索偿权。扣除‘与运营相关’的捐赠后,剩余的资金将大致按照与我们各自持股比例相当的基础,在我俩的各种慈善关注方向之间进行分配。如果我们公司的经理提出某些建议,我们会认真倾听——但最终决定权在我们。尽管我们采用了公司形式,但在这一经营层面,我们的行为很可能就像一家合伙企业。”

*1981 年版权属沃伦·E·巴菲特所有

保留所有权利

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. SHAREHOLDER-DESIGNATED CONTRIBUTIONS October 14, 1981, the Chairman sent to the shareholders a letter* explaining the program. Portions of that letter The Company has conducted this program of corporate giving during each of the past fourteen years. On in most years, should produce a significant benefit for charities of your choice. "On September 30, 1981 Berkshire received a tax ruling from the U.S. Treasury Department that, he owns "Each Berkshire shareholder — on a basis proportional to the number of shares of Berkshire that name the charity; Berkshire will write the check. The ruling states that there will be no personal tax

  • will be able to designate recipients of charitable contributions by our company. You'll

consequences to our shareholders from making such designations. "Thus, our approximately 1500 owners now can exercise a perquisite that, although routinely more widely-held businesses. exercised by the owners in closely-held businesses, is almost exclusively exercised by the managers in input at all from shareholders, in two main categories: "In a widely-held corporation the executives ordinarily arrange all charitable donations, with no (1) Donations considered to benefit the corporation directly in an amount (2) Donations considered to benefit the corporation indirectly through hard-to- roughly commensurate with the cost of the donation; and measure, long-delayed feedback effects of various kinds. charitable donations in the first category. However, the aggregate level of giving in such category has "Tand other Berkshire executives have arranged in the past, as we will arrange in the future, all roughly commensurate direct benefits to Berkshire. been quite low, and very likely will remain quite low, because not many gifts can be shown to produce comfortable with ordinary corporate practice and had no better practice to substitute. What bothers "In the second category, Berkshire's charitable gifts have been virtually nil, because I am not asking and how corporate peers are responding than me about ordinary corporate practice is the way gifts tend to be made based more on who does the activities. Conventionality often overpowers rationality. on an objective evaluation of the donee's of the corporate manager, who usually is heavily influenced by specific social pressures on him. "A common result is the use of the stockholder's money to implement the charitable inclinations of the taxpayer's dollar but embrace enthusiastically their own allocation of the shareholder's dollar. Frequently there is an added incongruity; many corporate managers deplore governmental allocation your personal judgments by writing checks on my bank account for charities of your choice, I feel it "For Berkshire, a different model seems appropriate. Just as I wouldn't want you to implement inappropriate to write checks on your corporate "bank account" for charities of my choice. Your charitable preferences are as good as mine and, for both you and me, funds available to foster own hands. charitable interests in a tax-deductible manner reside largely at the corporate level rather than in our larger public companies. If you and 1 each own 50% of a corporation, out charitable decision making "Under such circumstances, I believe Berkshire should imitate more closely-held companies, not on our available charitable funds. Any balance available after the "operations-related" contributions would be simple. Charities very directly related to the operations of the business would have first claim to our ownership interest. If the manager of our company had some suggestions, we would listen would be divided among various charitable interests of the two of us, on a basis roughly proportional business we probably would behave as if we were a partnership. carefully — but the final decision would be ours. Despite our corporate form, in this aspect of the *Copyright © 1981 By Warren E. Buffett All Rights Reserved 50

[第 53 页]

[PAGE 53]

在这一领域采取类似合伙企业的做法是可取的,我坚信应保持这种合伙心态,即使我们是通过一家规模庞大、股权相当分散的公司来运营。我们的税务裁定将允许此类操作。令人欣慰的是,伯克希尔的捐赠可以变为由所有者主导。具有讽刺意味但也合乎情理的是,数量众多且不断增加的大型企业都有慈善捐赠政策,它们会根据员工(准备好接受这个——很多甚至还会匹配董事的捐赠)的捐赠进行配捐,但据我所知,没有一家公司拥有匹配所有者慈善捐赠的计划。我说“合乎情理”,是因为许多大公司的股票是以“转门”方式由机构持有的,这些机构投资眼光短浅,缺乏长期所有者的视角。

而我们自己的股东是另一类人。正如我在 1979 年年报中提到的,每年年底,超过 98% 的股份由年初即为公司股东的人持有。这种对企业的长期承诺反映了所有者的心态,作为你们的管理者,我打算以一切可行的方式予以认可。指定捐赠政策就是这种意图的一个体现。

自该计划启动以来,其项下捐赠的历史记录如下:

年份每股指定金额参与配捐的合格*股份比例捐赠金额参与慈善机构数量
19822 美元95.6%1,783,655 美元704
19812 美元95.8%3,066,501 美元675
19843 美元97.2%890,948 美元
19831 美元95.8%3,179,049 美元1,353
19864 美元97.1%4,006,260 美元1,519
19853 美元96.4%3,996,820 美元1,724
19874 美元97.2%4,937,574 美元1,934
19895 美元96.9%5,867,254 美元2,050
19885 美元97.4%4,965,665 美元2,319
19916 美元96.9%5,823,672 美元2,550
19906 美元97.7%6,772,024 美元2,600
19927 美元97.0%7,634,784 美元2,630
199410 美元95.7%9,448,370 美元2,810
19938 美元97.3%10,419,497 美元3,330

*以名义持有人(street name)注册的股份不符合参与条件。

除上述股东指定捐赠外,伯克希尔及其子公司还根据各业务运营经理的本地决策进行了一定捐赠。该计划可能无法在某些偶尔年份(如果有的话)中执行,即当捐赠会导致税收抵扣低于标准或无税收抵扣时。在其他年份,伯克希尔预计会告知股东每股可指定的捐赠金额,通知将附上一份回复表格,供股东回复其指定。如果该计划在 1995 年执行,通知将于 9 月 15 日左右邮寄给截至 1995 年 8 月 31 日营业结束时登记在册的股东,股东将有直到 11 月 15 日的时间进行回复。

股东应注意,以名义持有人(street name)持有的股份不符合参与该计划的条件。要获得资格,股份必须在 8 月 31 日以所有者个人姓名、或作为拥有者的信托、公司、合伙企业或遗产的名义,在股份登记处进行登记。

partnership-like behavior in this area.. we operate through a large, fairly widely heid corporation. Our Treasury ruling will allow such "Wherever feasible, 1 believe in maintaining such a partnership frame of mind, even though am pleased that Berkshire donations can become owner-directed. Il is ironic, but pursuant to which they will match gifts made by men employees (and brace yourselt for this one understandable, that a large and growing number of major corporations have charitable policies charitable gifts by owners. I say

  • many even match gifts made by directors) but none, to my knowledge, has a plan matching

"understandable" because much of the stock of many large horizons, and that lack a long-term owner's perspective.. corporations is owned on a "revolving door" basis by institutions that have short-term investment "Our own shareholders are a different breed. As I mentioned in the 1979 annual report, at the end of each year more than 98% of our shares are owned by people who were shareholders at the as your manager, 1 intend to acknowledge in all feasible ways. The designated contributions policy is beginning of the year. This long-term commitment to the business reflects an owner mentality which, an example of that intent." The history of contributions made pursuant to this program since its inception follows: Year Specified Amount Percent of per share Eligible* Shares Contributed Amount Charities No. of Participating 1982 1981 S2 1984 1983 S1 95.6% $3 95.8% $ 1,783,655 $ 3,066,501 890,948 704 675 1986 1985 $4 $3 97.2% 96.4% 96.8% $ 3,179,049 1,353 97.1% $ 4,006,260 1,519 1987 S4 97.2% 3,996,820 1.724 1989 1988 $5 97.4% 4,937,574 1,934 $5 97.3% 96.9% $ 5,867,254 4,965,665 2,050 1991 1990 $6 $6 2,319 97.7% $ 5,823,672 2,550 1992 $7 97.0% S 6,772,024 2,600 1994 1993 $10 $8 97.3% $ 7,634,784 2,630 95.7% $ 9.448,370 2,810 $11 $ 10,419,497 3,330 3,110

  • Shares registered in street name are not eligible to participate.

have made certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions of operating managers of the businesses. In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions summarized above, Berkshire and its subsidiaries substandard or no tax deductions. In other years Berkshire expects to inform shareholders of the amount per The program may not be conducted in the occasional year, if any, when the contributions would produce share that may be designated, and a reply form will accompany the notice allowing shareholders to respond with shareholders of record reflected in our Registrar's records as of the close of business August 31, 1995, and their designations. If the program is conducted in 1995, the notice will be mailed on or about September 15 to shareholders will be given until November 15 to respond. program. To qualify, shares must be registered with our Registrar on August 31 in the owner's individual Shareholders should note the fact that shares held in street name are not eligible to participare in the name(s) or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, as applicable. 51

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[第 55 页]

[PAGE 55]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

合并财务报表

业务分组

伯克希尔的合并数据在接下来六页的列报中,被重新归为四个类别,这对应了巴菲特先生和芒格先生思考伯克希尔各项业务的方式。这些列报或许有助于读者对伯克希尔的内在价值进行估算。

本部分中的列报并未在所有方面都符合公认会计原则。与公认会计原则的主要偏离涉及企业收购中取得资产的会计处理,不过会计学的学生和从业者会识别出其他的偏离之处。这些数据并未征求伯克希尔独立审计师的意见。这四类列报完全不在他们的审计范围内。

53

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS BUSINESS GROUPS Berkshite's consolidated data is rearranged in the presentations on the following six pages into four categories, corresponding to the way Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger think about Berkshire's businesses. The presentations may be helpful to readers in making estimates of Berkshire's intrinsic value. The presentations in this section do not conform in all respects to generally accepted accounting principles. Principal departures from GAAP relate to accounting treatment for assets acquired in business acquisitions, although students and practitioners of accounting will recognize others. Opinions of Rerkshire's independent auditors were not solicited for this data. The four-category presentations in no way fell within their purview. 53

[第 56 页]

[PAGE 56]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

保险集团

伯克希尔的财产/意外险业务由 13 家独立子公司经营。这些成员公司承保多种主要责任险种,主要面向商业客户,例如为卡车和客车运营商提供责任险,以及为特别大型或特殊风险提供意外险。商业意外险部门和专业责任与特殊风险部门负责招揽和承保这些特殊大型风险。注册地位于科罗拉多州和内布拉斯加州的成员公司,主要为“本州”居民提供标准的多种类财产/意外险。一家注册在加利福尼亚州的成员公司,则向全国范围内的信用卡发卡机构提供保险。

再保险部门为其他财产/意外险保险公司和再保险公司提供合约再保险。该部门目前是全球财产/巨灾转分保(即,为再保险公司提供的再保险)市场的主要提供者之一。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦保险集团保持着无与伦比的资本实力,显著高于行业正常水平。这种实力使得集团成员区别于其竞争对手。例如,1994 年集团的净承保保费约为集团年末法定盈余的 7.5%。相比之下,行业平均保费与盈余比约为 133%(1993 年数据)。由此为集团投保人提供的明显安全边际,在逐单协商的保险和再保险合同营销中尤具说服力。

保险集团的合并财务报表——未经审计且未完全按照公认会计原则调整——列示在下一页。

54

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. INSURANCE GROUP subsidiaries. The members underwrite multiple lines of principally casualty coverages Berkshire's property/casualty insurance business is conducted by 13 separate for primarily commercial accounts, providing, for example, liability coverages for truck and bus operators, and casually coverages for especially large or unusual risks. The Commercial Casualty Division and the Professional Liability and Special Risk in the states of Colorado and Nebraska provide standard multiple-line Division solicit and underwrite the special large risks. Member companies domiciled property/casualty insurance to primaniy "homestate" residents. A California domiciled credit card issuers nationwide. insurers and reinsurers. This division is currently one of the leading providers in the A Reinsurance Division provides treaty reinsurance to other property/casualty reinsurers). world of property/cafastrophe retrocessional protection (ie., reinsurance for unparalleled nigh levels, significanty higher man normal in the industry. This The Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group maintains capital strength at strength diferentiates Group members from their competitors. For example, the end statutory surpius. That compares to an industry average premiums-to-surplus Group's net premiums written in 1994 were approximately 7.5% of the Group's year- ratio of about 133% (for 1993). The obvious margins of safety thus provided to negotiated insurance and reinsurance contracts. insureds of the Group are particularly persuasive in marketing of individually Combined financial statements of the Insurance Group - unaudited and not presented on the following page. fully adjusted to conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are 54

[第 57 页]

[PAGE 57]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

保险集团

(单位:百万美元)

资产负债表

12 月 31 日

资产

1994 年

1993 年

投资:

固定到期证券(1994 年按市值,1993 年按摊余成本):

优先股

债券

$ 1,099.0

权益证券(按市值):

410.4

715.9

650.9

可口可乐公司

大都会/美国广播公司

1,208.0

GEICO

4,157.3

富国银行

吉列

1,759.6

1,431.0

所罗门公司

其他

2,873.6

854.6

673.6

现金及现金等价物

14,324.5

其他

递延费用

1,368.0

490.6

$ 16,473.5

290.4

负债

损失及损失调整费用

分入再保险持有资金

未赚保费

$ 3,155.9

315.8

所得税,主要为递延

应付账款、应计费用及其他

233.6

215.8

6,865.6

2,944.5

权益

少数股东权益*

伯克希尔股东权益

9,483.0

124.9

$ 16,473.5

9,607.9

利润表

(单位:百万美元)

承保保费

已赚保费

损失及损失费用

承保费用

承保利润(亏损)– 税前

总损失及费用

已实现投资收益

净投资收益*

非暂时性投资减值

美国航空集团优先股

税前利润

所得税费用

少数股东权益

净利润

4.3

  • 净投资收益汇总如下:

利息

股息

$ 362.4

投资费用

所罗门公司净亏损权益份额

(31.7)

92.2

$ 419.4

(8.5)

这些报表并非在所有方面均符合 GAAP

这些报表未经审计

55

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. INSURANCE GROUP (dollars in millions) Balance Sheets December 31. Assets 1994 1993 Investments: Fixed maturities at market in 1994 and amortized cost in 1993: Preferred stocks Bonds. $ 1,099.0 Equity securities at market: 410.4 715.9 650.9 Coca-Cola Company Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 1,208.0 GEICO 4,157.3 Wells Fargo & Company Gillette 1,759.6 1,431.0 Saiomion Inc Other 2,873.6 854.6 673.6 Cash and cash equivalents 14,324.5 Other. Deferred costs 1,368.0 490.6 $ 16,473.5 290.4 Liabilities Losses and loss adjustment expenses Funds held under reinsurance assumed Unearned premiums $ 3,155.9 315.8 Income taxes, principally deferred Accounts payable, accruals and other 233.6 215.8 6,865.6 2,944.5 Equity Minority shareholders* Berkshire shareholders 9.483.0 124.9 $ 16,473.5 9,607.9 Statements of Earnings (dollars in millions) Premiums written Premiums earned Losses and loss expenses Underwriting expenses. Underwriting gain (loss) - pre-tax Total losses and expenses Realized investment gain Net investment income* Other than temporary decline in value of investment Earnings before income taxes in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock Income tax expense Minority interest Net earnings 4.3

  • Net investment income is stammarized below:

Interest Dividends $362.4 Investment expenses Equity in net loss of Salomon Inc (31.7) 92.2 $419.4 (8.5) These statements do not conform to GAAP in all respects These statements are unaudited 55

[第 58 页]

[PAGE 58]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

制造业、出版业与零售业

伯克希尔制造业、出版业和零售业的合并财务报表——未经审计且未完全按公认会计原则调整——列示于下一页。其数据合并纳入这些列报的运营主体包括:

运营主体

产品/服务/活动

Adalet

导管配件、防爆接线盒、管接头及接线端子

蓝筹印花

营销激励服务

波仙珠宝

高档珠宝零售

《布法罗新闻》

日报及周日版报纸

Campbell Hausfeld

空压机、气动工具、喷涂系统及高压清洗机

Carefree

房车遮阳与控光产品及配件

Cleveland Wood Products

吸尘器刷头

Dexter Shoe Companies

正装鞋、休闲鞋及运动鞋

Douglas Products

手持式电动及无线吸尘器

Fechheimer Bros. Co.

制服及配件

France

家电控制器、点火变压器及信号变压器

H. H. Brown Shoe Co.

工作鞋、靴子及休闲鞋

Halex

锌压铸电气配件

K&W Products

汽车用化合物

Kirby

家用清洁系统

Lowell Shoe, Inc.

女鞋及护士鞋

Meriam

压力与流量测量设备

内布拉斯加家具城

家居用品零售

Northland

分马力电机

Powerwinch

船用绞盘、起锚机及起重设备

Precision Steel Products

钢材服务中心

Quikut

刀具

ScottCare

心肺康复及监测设备

Scot Labs

清洁及维护化学品

喜诗糖果

盒装巧克力及其他糖果产品

Stahl

定制钢制车身及卡车工具箱

Wayne

炉用燃烧器;污水泵、通用泵及排污泵

Western Enterprises

压缩气体配件及调节器

Western Plastics

模塑塑料部件

World Book

百科全书及其他参考资料

56

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. MANUFACTURING, PUBLISHING AND RETAILING BUSINESSES acijusted to conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - are presented on the following page. The operations wilose Combined financial statements of Berkshire's Manufacturing, Publishing and Retailing businesses - unaudited and not fully data have been combined in these presentations include the following: Operation Product/Service/Activity Adalet Conduit fittings, explosion proof junction boxes, couplings and terminations Blue Chip Stamps Marketing motivational services Borsheim's Retailing fine jewelry Buffalo News Daily and Sunday newspaper Campbell Hausfeld Air compressors, air tools, paining systems and pressure washers Carefree Sun and shade control products and accessories for RVs Cleveland Wood Products Vacuum cleaner brushes Dexter Shoe Companies Dress, casual and athletic shoes Douglas Products Hand-held electric and cordless vacuum cleaners Fechheimer Bros. Co. Uniforms and accessories France Appliance controls, ignition and sign transformers H. H. Brown Shoe Co. Work shoes, boots and casual footwear Halex Zine die cast elecirical fittings K&W Products Automotive compounds Kirby Home cleaning systems Lowell Shoe, inc Women's and nurses' shoes Meriam Pressure and flow measurement devices Nebraska Furniture Mart Retailing home furnishings Northland Fractional horsepower motors Powerwinch Boat winches, windlasses and hoists Precision Steel Producis Steel service center Quikut Cutlery ScottCare Cardiopulmonary rehabilitation and monitoring equipment Scot Labs Cieaning and maintenance chemicals See's Candies Boxed chocolates and other confectionery produets Staht Custom steel service bodies and tool boxes for trucks Wavne Furnace burners; sump, utility and sewage pumps Western Enterprises Compressed gas fittings and regulators Western Plastics Molded plastic components World Book Encyclopedias and other reference materials 56

[第 59 页]

[PAGE 59]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

制造业、出版与零售业务

(单位:百万美元)

资产负债表

12 月 31 日

资产

1994 年

1993 年

现金及现金等价物

$ 308.8

$ 195.9

存货

77.0

29.8

应收账款

90.4

36.1

其他

219.6

41.8

房产与设备

398.2

351.0

合计

$ 1,033.4

$ 949.3

负债

所得税

$ 31.1

$ 25.3

应付账款、应计费用及其他

293.4

257.2

定期债务及其他借款

45.6

21.7

合计

$ 320.4

$ 304.2

权益

伯克希尔股东权益*

$ 647.7

$ 593.1

少数股东权益

40.1

35.8

负债及权益合计

$ 1,033.4

$ 949.3

利润表

(单位:百万美元)

1994 年

1993 年

1992 年

收入:

利息收入

$ 9.0

$ 8.0

$ 7.5

销售与服务收入

2,352.0

1,962.9

1,774.4

合计

2,361.0

1,970.9

1,781.9

成本与费用:

销售产品或服务成本

1,442.9

1,172.5

1,043.6

债务利息

3.7

3.7

4.6

销售、一般及管理费用

578.5

522.2

481.5

所得税前营业利润

335.9

272.5

252.2

所得税费用

122.3

103.7

97.4

少数股东权益

4.9

4.5

4.2

净利润

$ 208.7

$ 164.3

$ 150.6

*Dexter 的经营成果仅反映在收购日之后。

Dexter 鞋业公司(“Dexter”)于 1993 年 11 月 7 日完成收购。因此,本表格反映的是收购后的经营状况。

伯克希尔业务收购产生的购买价格会计调整(包括商誉)未反映在这些报表中,而是反映在第 59 页的非经营活动报表中。

这些报表不完全符合公认会计原则(GAAP)。

这些报表未经审计。

57

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. MANUFACTURING, PUBLISHING AND RETAILING BUSINESSES (dollars in mittions) Balance sneets December 31, Assets 1994) 1993 Cash and cash equivalents Inventories Accounts receivable $ 308.8 77.0 90.4 Other Properties and equipment 219.6 398.2 351.0 275.9 1.033.4 29.8 195.9 S 949.3 36.1 Liabilities Income taxes Accounts payable, accruals and other 293.4 30.5 $ 257.2 Term debt and other borrowings 345.6 21.7 38.5 320.4 24.7 Equity Berkshire shareholders* Minority shareholders 647.7 40.1 35.8 $ 1,033.4 687.8 628.9 593.1 949.3 Statements of Earnings (dollars in millions) 1994 1993 1992 Kevenues: Interest income Sales and service revenues S2,352.0 9.0 S1,962.9 Costs and expenses: 2.361.0 1,970.9 8.0 $1,774.4 .1.781.9 7.5 Costs of products and services sold Interest on debt Selling, general and administrative expenses 1,442.9 578.5 1,172.5 3.7 522.2 1,043.6 Incorne tax expense Earnings from operations before income taxes 2,025.1 3.7 481.5 335.9 1.698.4 4.6 213.6 122.3 103.7 272.5 1.529.7 252.2 Minority interest 4.9 168.8 97.4 Net earnings 208.7 164.3 4.5 154.8 150.6 4.2 Dexter's results of operations only for the period subseguent to the acquisition date. Dexter Shoe Company ("Dexter") was acquired effective November 7, 1993. Accordingly this presentation reflects reflected in these statements, but instead are reflected in the statements of non-operating activities at page 59. Purchase-price accounting adjustments, including goodwill, arising from Berkshire's business acquisitions are not These statements do not conform to GAAr in all respects These statements are unaudited 57

[第 60 页]

[PAGE 60]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

金融业务

斯科特-费泽金融集团、伯克希尔·哈撒韦信贷公司和伯克希尔·哈撒韦内布拉斯加寿险公司构成了伯克希尔的金融业务。1993 年 10 月之前,互助储蓄与贷款协会也被归入这一业务组。1993 年 10 月,一家联邦储蓄银行承担了互助储蓄的储蓄账户负债,并以其房地产贷款、现金及某些其他资产作为抵消。

(单位:百万美元)

资产负债表

12 月 31 日

资产

1994 年

1993 年

现金及现金等价物

$ 538.9

$ 16.0

分期应收款及其他应收款

37.0

173.2

固定期限投资

667.1

6.2

其他

179.8

1.5

递延所得税资产

4.2

$ 735.8

负债

$ 889.7

1.6

应付账款、应计负债及其他

601.6

41.0

投资协议借款及其他债务

52.1

31.5

年金准备金

772.7

674.1

权益

830.2

5.4

伯克希尔股东权益

735.8

61.7

总负债与权益

$ 889.7

$ 59.5

损益表

(单位:百万美元)

收入:

1994 年

1993 年

1992 年

贷款及融资应收款的利息和费用

$ 37.8

$ 35.4

$ 36.0

年金保费收入

109.2

5.6

证券投资的利息和股息

37.7

35.5

13.9

费用:

5.6

利息支出

87.1

22.1

一般及管理费用

7.5

23.2

年金给付及承保费用

14.6

15.5

税前经营利润

7.7

6.4

所得税费用

14.6

14.7

净利润

0.8

0.7

少数股东权益

这些报表并非在所有方面均符合公认会计准则

这些报表未经审计

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. FINANCE BUSINESSES Nebraska make up Berkshire's finance businesses. Until October 1993, Mutual Savings and Loan Association was also included Scott Fetzer Financial Group, Inc., Berkshire Hathaway Credit Corporation and Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Co. of substantially by real estate loans, cash and certain other assets of Mutual. in this group of businesses. In October 1993, a federal savings bank assumed Mutual's savings account liabilities, offset (dollars in millions) Balance Sheets December 31. Assets 1994 1993 Cash and cash equivalents Installment and other receivables Fixed maturity investments S 538.9 16.0 $ 37.0 Other Deferred tax assets 173.2 667.1 6.2 179.8 1.5 4.2 Liabilities 735.8 889.7 1.6 Accounts payable, accruals and other Borrowings under investment agreements and other debt 601.6 Annuity reserves . 41.0 31.5 S 772.7 52.1 Equity 674.1 830.2 5.4 Berkshire shareholders' 735.8 61.7 889.7 59.5 Statements of Earnings (collars in millions) Revenues: 1994 1993 1992 Interest and fees on loans and financed receivables Annuity premiums earned Interest and dividends on investrent securities S 37.8 35.4 S 36.0 Expenses: 109.2 5.6 Interest expense General and administrative. Annuity benefits and underwriting expenses 37.7 35.5 13.9 5.6 Income tax expense Earnings from onerations before income taxes 87.1 22.1 7.5 23.2 Net earnings Minority interest 14,6 15.5 7.7 6.4 14.6 14.7 0.8 0.7 These statements do not conform to GAAP in all respects These statements are unaudited 58

[第 61 页]

[PAGE 61]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

非经营项目

以及在本公司此前提交的未经审计、且未完全按通用会计准则(GAAP)调整的各集团报表(第 53 至 58 页)中,未归入任何伯克希尔经营集团的费用。

这些报表反映了资产、负债、股东权益、收入的合并财务报表价值。

净资产表

(单位:百万美元)

1994 年

12 月 31 日

资产

1993 年

投资:

现金及现金等价物

106.2

$

358.9

固定到期证券:

债券

权益证券

优先股

286.8

113.0

75.8

232.5

81.0

递延所得税资产

未摊销商誉及财产账户调整*

520.4

541.8

其他

1,296.5

186.3

8.0

$

1,396.8

174.9

7.7

负债

所得税

应付账款、应计费用及其他

67.3

62.2

$

59.4

62.8

投资协议项下借款及其他债务

799.0

928.5

1,082.4

960.2

权益

伯克希尔股东权益

少数股东权益*

345.3

22.7

292.8

21.6

1,296.5

368.0

1,396.8

314.4

收益表

(单位:百万美元)

收入:

1994 年

1993 年

1992 年

利息及股息收入

已实现投资收益(损失)

$

31.1

30.4

(0.7)

$

24.3

(9.4)

$

58.9

14.9

96.2

37.3

费用:

股东指定捐款

公司行政管理费用

5.0

债务利息

商誉及财产账户调整摊销

22.5

10.4

9.4

4.9

4.2

17.1

12.0

7.6

其他(收入)费用

$9.4

投资价值非暂时性下降(美国航空集团优先股)

1.7

34.0

(2.3)

94.5

(2.0)

7.5

所得税费用(收益)

税前亏损

106.5

(22.8)

(76.1)

(68.2)

83.1

116.3

(194.0)

125.88*

(20.1)

净亏损

少数股东权益

(53.3)

(29.0)

8.9

(52.8)

(0.5)

$ (194.6)

0.6

(26.7)

(23.)

  • 财产账户调整及商誉产生于企业收购的会计核算。

** 包含因采用一项有关所得税会计处理的新规则而产生的 1.463 亿美元非经常性费用。

这些报表并非在所有方面均符合通用会计准则(GAAP)。

这些报表未经审计。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. NON-OPERATING ACTIVITIES and expenses that were not assigned to any Berkshire operang group in the unaudite, and not fully GAAP - adjusted group These statements reflect the consolidated financial statement values for assets, liabilities, shareholders' equity, revenues financial statements heretofore presented (pages 53 to 58). Statements of Net Assets (dollars in millions) 1994 December 31. Assets 1993 Investments: Cash and cash equivalents 106.2 $ 358.9 Fixed maturities: Bonds.. Equity securities. Preferred stocks 286.8 113.0 75.8 232.5 81.0 Deferred tax assets Unamortized goodwill and property account adjustments * 520.4 541.8 Other 1,296.5 186.3 8,0 S 1,396.8 174.9 7.7 Liabilities Income taxes .. Accounts payable, accruals and other 67.3 62.2 S 59.4 62.8 Borrowings under investinent agreements and other debt 799.0 928.5 1.082.4 960.2 Equity Berkshire shareholders' Minority shareholders* 345.3 22.7 292.8 21.6 1,296.5 368.0 1,396.8 314.4 Statements of Farnings (dollars in millions) Revenues: 1994 1993 1992 Interest and dividend income Realized investment gain (loss) $ 31.1 Experises: 30,4 (0.7) S 24.3 (9.4) S 58.9 14.9 96.2 37.3 Shareholder-designated contributions Corporate administration 5.0 Interest on debt Amortization of goodwill and property account adjustments 22.5 10.4 94 4.9 4.2 17.1 12.0 7.6 Other (income) expense $9.4 Other than temporary decline in value of investment 1.7 34.0 (2.3) 94.5 (2.0) in USAir Group, Inc. Preferred Stock 7.5 Income tax expense (benefit) Loss before income taxes 106.5 (22.8) (76.1) (68.2) 83.1 116.3 (194.0) 125.88* (20.1) Net loss Minority interest (53.3) (29.0) 8.9 (52 8) (0.5) 5(194.6) 0.6 (26.7) (23.

  • Property account adjustments and goodwill arose in accounting for business acquisitions.

** Includes nonrecurring charges of S146.3 million related to adoption ofa new rule regarding the accounting for income taxes: These statements do not conform to GAAP in all respects These statements are unaudited 59

[第 62 页]

[PAGE 62]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

普通股

股份转让代理

公司普通股的转让代理人和登记机构。与公司部门的通信应寄往投资者关系部,邮件停靠站 45-02-09。重新发行或转让的股票证书应寄往转让处理科,邮件停靠站 45-01-05。股票证书不应邮寄给公司。

波士顿银行股东服务部,地址:P.O. Box 644, Boston, MA 02102-0644,担任转让代理人。

股东

截至 1995 年 3 月 7 日,公司普通股的登记持有人约为 8,400 名。登记持有人包括为代表实际受益但未登记的所有者而持有至少 190,000 股的提名机构。

管理层认为公司拥有超过 20,000 名实际受益人。

普通股价格范围

公司的普通股在纽约证券交易所上市交易,交易代码:BRK。

下表列出了在所示期间内,根据纽约证券交易所综合报价系统报告的每股最高和最低销售价格:

1994 年

第一季度

最高

最低

1993 年

第三季度

第二季度

$16,900

16,700

$15,150

第一季度

最高

最低

第四季度

20,800

19,750

16,425

15,400

第二季度

$13,200

19,200

第三季度

16,200

$11,350

第四季度

17,800

17,800

15,100

16,200

股息

自 1967 年以来,伯克希尔从未宣派过现金股息。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. COMMON STOCK Stock Transfer Agent Transfer Agent and Registrar for the Company's common stock. Correspondence with the Division may be The Bank of Boston Shareholder Services Division, P.O. Box 644, Boston, MA 02102-0644 serves as the Transfer Processing Section, Mail Stop 45-01-05. Certificates should not be mailed to the Company. directed to Investor Relations, Mail Stop 45-02-09. Certificates for re-issue or transfer should be directed to Shareholders owners included nominees holding at least 190,000 shares on behalf of beneficial-but-not-of-record owners. The Company had approximately 8,400 record holders of its common stock at March 7, 1995. Record Management believes that the Company has more than 20,000 beneficial owners. Price Range of Common Stock The following table sets forth the high and low sales prices per share, as reported on the New York Stock The Company's Common Stock is listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, trading symbol: BRK. Exchange Composite List during the periods indicated: 1994 First Quarter High Low 1993 Third Quarter Second Quarter $16,900 16,700 $15,150 First Quarter High Low Fourth Quarter 20,800 19,750 16,425 15,400 Second Quarter $13,200 19,200 Third Quarter 16,200 $11,350 Fourth Quarter 17,800 .... 17,800 15,100 16,200 Dividends Berkshire has not declared a cash dividend since 1967. 60

[第 63 页]

[PAGE 63]

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

董事

沃伦·E·巴菲特,董事长;伯克希尔首席执行官

查理·T·芒格,伯克希尔副董事长

苏珊·T·巴菲特

霍华德·G·巴菲特,阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰公司副总裁;该公司主要从事农产品加工与销售

马尔科姆·G·蔡斯三世

小沃尔特·斯科特,彼得·基维特父子公司董事长兼首席执行官;该公司在全球从事建筑、采矿、包装和林地业务

高级管理人员

沃伦·E·巴菲特,董事长兼首席执行官

查理·T·芒格,副董事长

罗伯特·H·伯德,副总裁

马克·D·汉堡,副总裁兼财务主管

斯坦福·利普西,副总裁

丹尼尔·J·贾克西奇,财务总监

福雷斯特·N·克鲁特,秘书

罗伯特·M·菲茨西蒙斯,内部审计总监

杰里·W·赫夫顿,税务总监

马克·D·米勒德,金融资产总监

应要求可提供两套早期年报致股东信汇编:一套涵盖 1977—1986 年,另一套涵盖 1987—1993 年。公司免费提供单册,索取地址:3555 Farnam St., Suite 1440, Omaha, NE 68131;电话:(402)346-1400。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. DIRECTORS WARREN E. BUFFETT, Chairman Chief Executive Officer of Berkshire CHARLES T. MUNGER, Vice Chairman of Berkshire SUSAN T. BUFFETT HOWARD G. BUFFETT, Vice President of Archer Daniels Midland Company, engaged principally in the business of processing and merchandising agricultural commodities. MALCOLM G. CHACE, III WALTER SCOTT, JR., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., engaged worldwide in construction, mining, packaging and timberlands. OFFICERS WARREN E. BUFFETT, Chairman and CEO CHARLES T. MUNGER, Vice Chairman ROBERT H. BIRD, Vice Presiden MARC D. HAMBURG, Vice President, Treasurer STANFORD LIPSEY, Vice President DANIEL J. JAKSICH, Controller FORREST N. KRUTTER, Secrelary ROBERT M. FITZSIMMONS, Director of Internal Auditing Director of Taxes JERRY W. HUFTON, MARK D. MILLARD, Director of Financial Assets Two compilations of letters from earlier Annual Reports are available upon request. Single copies are furnished without charge in response to requests received by the Company One is from reports for 1977 through 1986, the other, from reports for 1.987 through 1993. at 3555 Farnam St., Suite 1440, Omaha, NE 68131, (402) 346-1400.

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

行政办公室 — 内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基维特广场 1440 号,邮编 68131

再生纸印制

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. Executive Offices — 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha, Nebraska 68131 Printed on recycled paper