2012 年 Charlie Rose：'Tap Dancing to Work'

'Tap Dancing to Work'

Monday 11/26/2012

https://charlierose.com/videos/17620

Warren Buffett and Carol Loomis, author of "Tap Dancing to Work," discuss Buffett's political views, career decisions, and philanthropic efforts.

Charlie Rose: Warren Buffett and Carol Loomis are here. He's one of the world's most successful investors and a long time friend of this program. She is the legendary "Fortune" magazine writer who has followed his career since he was a 35-year-old hedge fund manager from Omaha. Back in 1966 she couldn't even get his name right. When Carol Loomis made the first mention of Warren Buffett in "Fortune" she spelled his name with only one "t". It was an unlikely start to a beautiful friendship and to "Fortune's" coverage of the man who we've come to know as the chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. "Tap Dancing to Work" is Carol Loomis' new book; it is a collection of articles telling the remarkable story of Warren Buffett. It's also a story about friendship. I am pleased to have them together at this table. Welcome.

Warren Buffett: Thank you.

Charlie Rose: It's so good to have you; you both have been here separately --

Carol J. Loomis: It's good to be here.

Charlie Rose: -- but to have you together.

Carol J. Loomis: It's terrific.

Charlie Rose: And so I want to talk about the book and about the career and about "Fortune" magazine and the relationship, but first this morning we all got up to read an op-ed by you called "A minimum tax for the wealthy". And you start off by saying that most investors you know, if it's a good deal they're not going to be upset about the fact that they're going to have to pay some tax.

Warren Buffett: Every investor I know. I've never -- I'm 82 years old and I'm looking like Diogenes; I'm out there looking at that investor who says "I think I'll pass on this chance to make a lot of money."

Charlie Rose: Even if it's a certain deal I'm going to pass --

Warren Buffett: Charlie I'm going to call you tonight at midnight and I'm going to not be panning and I'm going to say "This is the best idea I've ever had." And you're going to say "How much will the tax I have to pay?"

Charlie Rose: I don't think so. Here is how you in the article you say "In the meantime maybe we'll run into someone with a terrific investment idea who won't go forward with it because of the tax he would owe when he succeeds. Send it my way. Let me unburden him."

Warren Buffett: That offer goes to all viewers.

Charlie Rose: You started with that but you have a serious purpose here.

Warren Buffett: Sure.

Charlie Rose: What is the minimum tax that you think ought to be done today by Congress and not wait for all the time it might take and all the deals it might take to reform the tax code?

Warren Buffett: I think on incomes of over $1 million that the excess over $1 million should be -- have a minimum tax of 30 percent. As you know, they're talking about bringing the top tax rate up to 39.6 percent.

Charlie Rose: Right, right.

Warren Buffett: And right now the tax rate is 36 percent.

Charlie Rose: So if you make from $1 million to $10 million a minimum tax of 30 percent.

Warren Buffett: On the $1 million to $10 million.

Charlie Rose: Right.

Warren Buffett: And then over $10 million 35 percent.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: And the reason I'm suggesting that is because the 400 highest taxpayers in the most recent year we have figures for, 2009, who had average incomes of $202 million, half of those people paid at a rate below 20 percent. A quarter paid at a rate below 15 percent. And believe it or not, six, average income of $202 million paid nothing. I mean they were members of Romney's 47 percent. I mean -- and I suspect he got their vote -- but they're just a bunch of moochers, just a bunch of moochers.

Charlie Rose: You think that they voted for him, did they?

Warren Buffett: Yes. You know, but they're -- well, we've conducted a survey three times in my office in three different years and the office has between 16 and probably 21 employees during that period and each time my tax rate was considerably lower -- I'm talking about payroll taxes plus income taxes -- considerably lower than anybody else in the office. And these -- these people made various incomes. And -- and the tax law in many cases is not progressive. I think the tax law should be progressive. I think that when people make $15 or $20 million or $200 million and pay a 10 percent rate I think -- I think something should be done about that.

Charlie Rose: But people say that -- people step forward and say well, that's because most of the income comes from dividends which is taxed at a lower rate.

Warren Buffett: Well most -- they would probably say most of it comes from capital gains.

Charlie Rose: Right.

Warren Buffett: And that's taxed at a lower rate.

Charlie Rose: I mean capital gains.

Warren Buffett: This -- yes this just -- this just makes sure that people that have really high incomes pay at a rate the sort of like the people next door to them are you know who are making $100,000 a year or something of the sort.

Charlie Rose: If you had automatic powers to establish what the tax rate should be both for -- for capital gains and for ordinary income, what would you set it at? Well, I would -- I would probably have -- I would probably feel that capital gains should be at least at the 25 percent level and I would -- and -- and dividends should be as ordinary income and I would have a more progressive tax system than we have. But since -- since the lobbyists and the lawyers for the rich are so good at getting around these things I would have a minimum tax so no matter who your lobbyist or lawyer was, if you -- if you had $10 million or $20 million of income you paid at a rate comparable to what most of the people who are watching this program pay. You write about and you know enormously successful businessmen and women. Do you think that if you sat down on a one-on-one conversation, they would agree with him or not? Which are they?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, I don't think -- I don't think it would be unanimous by any means.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: Well, the majority --

Charlie Rose: Does he represent a voice in the wilderness for very wealthy people in the ideas he has about what's necessary and fair to do?

Carol J. Loomis: I think there are a lot of people who agree with him. But I'm not sure that it would be over 50 percent by any means.

Charlie Rose: So you think he's right?

Carol J. Loomis: I do think he's right. And I must say, my husband worked on Wall Street during a time when there was a lot of income associated with working on Wall Street and so I'm not talking as someone who wouldn't be subject to quite a lot of tax. And I think the problem is no one's ever talking about the payroll tax. That just doesn't ever come into the discussion. But when you add it in as Warren has pointed out that you should do, it makes a huge difference and so I do think he's right.

Charlie Rose: You hope that the President will be responsive to this. You think it's what ought to happen today.

Warren Buffett: I think -- I hope the President and the Congress is responsive to it.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: I think that -- I don't think we should wait around to have a -- there are all kinds of things wrong with the tax code. Reform is called for. Expenditure cuts are called for. But I don't want to wait around until all of that stuff is done to do some things that are obvious now. So the people who talk reform, some of them -- many of them really are seeking reform. But some of them are saying "reform" because it just means pushing things down the road another year or two. And I -- I do not want to have something that obviously should be done be held hostage to getting everything done.

Charlie Rose: So therefore do the minimum tax now?

Warren Buffett: I'd like to say starting January 1st.

Charlie Rose: What happens if the fiscal cliff comes and happens? What will it do to our economy?

Warren Buffett: I -- I don't think it will do that much because I think people will assume that a solution will be found quite promptly. It's a little like the debt ceiling question. I mean people know -- the rest of the world may think that we're idiotic at times but they don't think we're going to commit suicide. And -- and so I think if -- I hope something gets worked out before January 1st, but if it -- if it goes a little bit beyond that I do not think --

Charlie Rose: So January 10th or January 2nd --

Warren Buffett: I will not -- if you guaranteed me that the fiscal cliff we would go past that, I wouldn't sell a share of stock today.

Charlie Rose: That -- you have that confidence that in the end they will fix it?

Warren Buffett: Yes, and that this economy works.

Charlie Rose: Is it getting better?

Warren Buffett: It's getting better. It's been getting better since really the summer of 2009. And you know we've got four years straight now where the stock market's given a positive return. I mean the economy is getting better. We had a tremendous bubble and when it burst it was -- it had ramifications for all aspects of society and it was magnified by the abuses that had taken place in -- in -- in Wall Street and all kinds of places. So the dominos were lined up. We had plenty of problems. But we have been on -- we've been the mend now for -- for three years and it's taken a long time because it was a big problem but we are getting better all the time.

Charlie Rose: This book is about "Tap Dancing to Work. Why did you choose that title?

Carol J. Loomis: Let me tell you I've learned a lot about the publishing world in the last few months and I've learned that the title is a process of negotiation between the publisher and you. And I came up with this after we'd considered two or three others and the publisher just displayed great judgment. Said "I think it's a wonderful title, let's go with it." And that's what's apt because he is a man, who tap dances to work; he has forever.

Charlie Rose: This -- and has talked about it. I mean in the interviews yo have talked about tap dancing. It is someone -- you explain to me tap dancing was?

Warren Buffett: Well it just means that I can hardly wait to get to work in the morning. And -- and -- and I mean it's the most exciting part of the day is getting there. And I -- there's never been a day I haven't looked forward to it.

Charlie Rose: Do you like Monday through Friday better than Saturday and Sunday?

Warren Buffett: It depends whether Nebraska is playing football.

Charlie Rose: Or if they're playing Notre Dame.

Warren Buffett: Yes, well, yes I don't want us to play Notre Dame this year.

Carol J. Loomis: What makes you think he doesn't go to the office on Saturday and Sunday?

Warren Buffett: I go to the office on Saturday.

Charlie Rose: But -- but what you do at the office and what you do at home is the same thing. You're reading and on the phone.

Warren Buffett: I'm reading and -- I'm reading and thinking and on the phone and talking to friends. And -- you know, there's very little difference in my -- in Saturday and Sunday from the weekdays. A little more action during the week, though.

Charlie Rose: This reminds me of what surprised you most about in terms of advice. You asked him what was the worst advice?

Carol J. Loomis: I ask him what --

Charlie Rose: Or some of the best advice.

Carol J. Loomis: Well, we were -- we were doing a big action (ph).

Warren Buffett: Right. He was going to be on the cover and so I -- without truly knowing the answer to the question I said all right, now, tell me what is the best advice you've ever gotten in your life from anyone? And he proceeded to talk for a long time about the worst advice that he had ever gotten. And so I went back and told my managing editor this, which probably kind of -- with my head down in -- in thinking well I hadn't come back with quite the right thing and we put him on the cover anyway. So --

Charlie Rose: But what's interesting is what you -- the way you answered the question which is smart people told you don't go into the securities business.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: And what did you read from that? Because you went into the securities business.

Warren Buffett: Yes not only smart people, but people that love me and that I love them. So I mean they were giving me their best advice.

Charlie Rose: Because they thought you weren't ready for it or the security business was a bad business at that time.

Warren Buffett: They thought stocks were selling too high because the Dow Jones was above 200 and I always feel on almost anything that if you're going to do it, get started. And I mean the idea of sitting around and waiting for a different time did not -- did not register with me. Now, it's also possible that I was 20 years old then and that I was behaving like I was about 14 and looked like I was about 16 or something.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: So they -- that may have been their nice way of telling me "Grow up a little bit before you do it." But beyond that, though, they really did feel -- here are the two guys I admired the most in the world and they told me they thought the stock market was too high.

Charlie Rose: This is your father and Ben Graham.

Warren Buffett: My father and Ben Graham and I just said "Listen, I want to get going." You know I -- I didn't want to go to college.

Charlie Rose: Yes but you'd already been going because you already had been investing since you were 11 years old.

Warren Buffett: That's true but now I could do it full time.

Charlie Rose: So the first time you met this guy.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: You were actually doing a piece. Before you met him you were doing a piece on a hedge fund guy -- what's his name?

Carol J. Loomis: Alfred Winslow Jones.

Charlie Rose: Alfred Winslow Jones.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: One of the --

Carol J. Loomis: He's very famous.

Charlie Rose: A very famous guy and the name Buffett came up.

Carol J. Loomis: Buffett came up and Sam Stamen, a bridge player, was an investor in this strange thing called Buffett Partnership Limited.

Charlie Rose: Yes?

Carol J. Loomis: And I just blithely went ahead and spelled it with only one "t". So I -- the first time that he was ever in "Fortune" we misspelled his name. And you know I say that's the editorial "we" because it was I who did it.

Warren Buffett: And since she's never been wrong I've been (INAUDIBLE) with one "t" ever since.

Charlie Rose: Your husband, John Loomis.

Carol J. Loomis: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Met him first.

Carol J. Loomis: Yes, he did.

Charlie Rose: And came back and said what?

Carol J. Loomis: He said "I think I've just met the smartest investor in the country." And of course I'm sure like wives do I rolled my eyes and thought, oh, yes, yes. Then I met him with his wife -- first wife Susie and I realized how terribly impressive he was and from that day forward I thought that, too.

Charlie Rose: And then he formed Berkshire Hathaway.

Carol J. Loomis: Well, he'd taken over Berkshire Hathaway but it was -- nobody even knew the name. It was totally insignificant. And so then we worked up from that one sentence with the word misspelled to two paragraphs in 1970. But by 1977 we had a 7,000-word piece by Warren himself. We recognized that he was a very good writer and we -- we went forward with that, too. And so there -- this book has a dozen pieces by him and that the one I just mentioned was only one.

Charlie Rose: What was that piece? The first piece?

Warren Buffett: Well, that was how inflation swindles the equity investor.

Charlie Rose: And people still talk about that piece.

Warren Buffett: I'm not sure what they say about it.

Charlie Rose: I read that. There are still people --

Carol J. Loomis: They write -- they write him about it. They write us about it. It's a -- it's a famous piece. It really is.

Charlie Rose: If you were writing today the same kind of piece-- and perhaps you are -- other than the letter to stockholders, what would you be saying about where we are?

Warren Buffett: I would say that -- I would do a lot of historical things and all of that but basically I would say that for most -- overwhelmingly for people that can invest over time that -- that equities are the best place to put their money.

Charlie Rose: I should also talk about the letter to the stockholders. You came in to do -- you knew her, you admired her, you thought she was the best business writer you'd ever met.

Warren Buffett: Absolutely.

Charlie Rose: And still do.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Tell me about the letter to stockholders and what you want to do with that and who you're addressing in your own mind's eye?

Warren Buffett: I'm addressing partners, there are 600,000 of them. But in my mind I usually have my two sisters Bertie and Doris. And they're very bright. They don't work in the financial world. They've been gone for a year, metaphorically, and they've got a lot of their money in Berkshire and I want to tell them what I think is important to them. What I would want them to tell me if our positions were reversed. So I try to do that. And then I occasionally branch into an essay on something that I think may be important in the investment world generally.

Charlie Rose: Or even the country.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: And you got involved in the beginning --

Carol J. Loomis: Well, I got involved with the letter 1977 and --

Charlie Rose: Warren said take a look at this?

Carol J. Loomis: Warren sent it to me and said "I'm trying something new with the annual report, would you just look it over and tell me what you think?" And I was very timid in what I came back with. I said, I think I suggested changing a "the" to an "a".

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: And then that seemed to work all right and so the next year he sent it again and then it became a routine where he would write it in long hand. His assistant would type it and it would come to me and then we would have drafts flying back and forth with suggestions from me.

Charlie Rose: Well, I think there's a story in here, too, that the first thing you wrote the editors wanted to change some things. Was it the first thing? And -- and basically they almost killed the article because you didn't want that much editing?

Warren Buffett: Well, and -- and I think that was the 1977 article.

Charlie Rose: Yes right, exactly.

Warren Buffett: Yes Meg Greenfield, who was a famous writer for "Newsweek" and --

Charlie Rose: Right, yes.

Warren Buffett: I showed her the -- the article I'd written and Meg very gently said to me "Warren, you don't have to tell everything you know in one article." Although I go with the

Charlie Rose: Isn't there a story in there that one of the editors at "Fortune" went in to the big editor and said --

Carol J. Loomis: One of the editors went in -- the one who was assigned to the piece and went out to Omaha to get him to change certain things called up and said "I'm not having too much luck getting him to change anything. Maybe we should think about not running this." And the managing editor said "No I think it's worthwhile."

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: And so we did. 7,000 words without many pictures -- really not about, not any pictures.

Charlie Rose: And so what does she do now? Just dotting "I's" and crossing --

Warren Buffett: No, for one thing I -- I -- I rewrite it about ten times before I send it to her. And then -- and then I send it to her and -- and she never tries to change the content or anything like that but -- but she points out when the flow is wrong, where there's lots of grammatical errors, all kinds of things and -- and sometimes she'll write "This is my least favorite part of the report," which is -- and usually it is, too.

Charlie Rose: So how many years has it been this friendship?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, what is that? 35? 35 years. Oh, the friendship has been longer than that.

Warren Buffett: Yes, yes.

Carol J. Loomis: The friendship goes back to 1967.

Warren Buffett: Yes. She has a charm bracelet -- four charm bracelets, a replica of every -- a copy of every report.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: So what's the secret to the friendship?

Warren Buffett: Well, I -- certainly on my part all kinds of things. I mean she's a wonderful friend but she's -- she's also one of the smartest people I've ever seen and she's objective and -- and in a very, very nice way she tells me when I'm full of baloney and a few things.

Charlie Rose: Is that how you see it Carol?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, I do think I'm one of the few people who argue with him.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: I do think that. And I do sometimes about --

Charlie Rose: You don't have people argue with you?

Warren Buffett: Charlie -- my partner Charlie Munger -- we've never had an argument, we had a lot of disagreements and wherever we have a disagreement his clincher always is "Warren, when we get through talking about this you'll agree with me because you're smart and I'm right."

Carol J. Loomis: And I will include Charlie in the few people who argue with him. I just -- I do think it's only a handful.

Charlie Rose: That will argue with him. Here is what interests me. Why is he -- does he the record he does? And you have said in a conversation with me he understands how to look at accounting statements and find the telling point. And it may be in a footnote.

Carol J. Loomis: That's true.

Charlie Rose: So that he'll see opportunity and see the future.

Carol J. Loomis: He will. He has a -- an ability to do that that I think is matched by very few other investors. And he has this broad, extensive knowledge of business and I think maybe I said this to you. So when something new comes up, he has a frame of reference in which to place it. And then he adds this rationality that I really think just a handful --

Charlie Rose: What do you mean by rationality?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, he doesn't let emotion take over when he's considering whether to buy. He goes at the decision in a very rational way and then the price goes down and he buys more whereas most people panic and sell when the price goes down. And he just is -- he's extremely disciplined in the way he thinks about investments.

Charlie Rose: This will take a long time to explain, but -- but how is it that you know value so well? So that if it goes down you know the value hasn't changed so you buy more. And so that you know the value -- so you're not going to pay a nickel more than the value you see.

Warren Buffett: I only get into the situations where I do know the value. There's -- there's thousands of companies whose value I don't know.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: But I know -- I know the ones that I know and -- and -- and incidentally, it is -- you don't pinpoint things. I mean, if somebody walks in this door now and they weigh between 300 and 350 pounds, I don't need to say they weigh 327 to say that they're fat.

Charlie Rose: Right.

Warren Buffett: So if -- if they're in that zone I'm fine with it. And -- but I also know that there are all kinds of companies that I can't figure out. So I don't -- so I do know -- I usually know when I'm dealing with companies that I understand and then I do -- accounting is a language, and it's a language that I like.

Charlie Rose: A language you not only understand but like.

Warren Buffett: I like it, yes.

Charlie Rose: Because it speaks to you.

Warren Buffett: It really speaks to me and -- and -- and when it speaks in a false voice I can detect that sometimes, too. So you know I mean it's -- yo know -- it -- it is almost like playing music, you know, when you look at an accounting statement. And that's not true of all companies. It's not true of all companies at all. But you don't have to be right about -- I don't have to be right about the ones I ignore.

Charlie Rose: When you see a footnote that says something to you, you just feel of kind of emotional --

Warren Buffett: It's -- it's in the footnotes. Yes you're right. I mean the footnotes -- the footnotes are --

Charlie Rose: Good or bad, there's a story.

Warren Buffett: There's a tipoff there. Yes and Carol is very, very good at this, incidentally, herself.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: Well, so far down the ladder on this compared to where he is.

Charlie Rose: Let's look at the investments that Berkshire and some of this -- you still have a lot of Coca-Cola?

Warren Buffett: A lot. Yes.

Charlie Rose: You saw the value of that early on.

Warren Buffett: Well, not early enough. I mean, I probably had my first soft drink in 1935 and I didn't buy the stock until 1988. So I would -- I would put me in the slow category on that one.

Charlie Rose: You still have a lot of Wells Fargo and buying more.

Warren Buffett: Yes a lot of Wells Fargo.

Charlie Rose: Yes value there you saw.

Warren Buffett: Yes. And the qualities you look for -- management is one. Sure, some kind of an enduring competitive advantage.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: Enduring being the emphasis. I mean hula hoops were great for a while or bedrocks and all that sort of thing.

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Warren Buffett: But -- but I like -- I like something where I think I can look out five or ten years and still see the same sort of advantage that -- maintaining.

Charlie Rose: So you just invested in John Deere.

Warren Buffett: That wasn't me. No. We have two other --

Charlie Rose: OK. OK.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: But you know what they're doing, do you not?

Warren Buffett: No. I don't want to know what they're doing. I don't want to know what they're doing.

Charlie Rose: Why is that? (INAUDIBLE) you hired to be sort of --

Warren Buffett: Well because I guess -- they manage -- they managing something around $4 billion or something like that.

Charlie Rose: You don't want to know what they're doing?

Warren Buffett: No. I don't -- I -- they have -- they have the responsibility for managing that money. They've got to have full authority. They can't look at me and see whether I'm smiling or frowning over and they get paid based on how those securities do.

Charlie Rose: You have said you're hunting for a big elephant.

Warren Buffett: You bet, the bigger the better.

Charlie Rose: What qualifies as a big elephant?

Warren Buffett: Well, in terms of our present resources probably something from $20 billion maybe up a little bit.

Charlie Rose: How high?

Warren Buffett: Well, it would depend on how -- how attractive that elephant was. So I mean -- not all elephants look alike.

Charlie Rose: Coming to you, Carol, in just a moment. So you're looking around. How will you go about this process of looking for a big elephant? Because you've said that the trigger is -- you've got your hand on the trigger.

Warren Buffett: Absolutely.

Charlie Rose: You're ready to fire.

Warren Buffett: You bet.

Charlie Rose: You've got the money. You've got $45 billion or whatever it is.

Warren Buffett: Enough.

Charlie Rose: Enough. You've got it sitting right there.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: You're prepared to do it. How are you going to find the candidate?

Warren Buffett: Well if you're talking about buying an entire business, which we're talking about in this case.

Charlie Rose: Right, right.

Warren Buffett: I'm familiar with all the companies when you get to that size. I mean I've seen all the elephants. I've seen them all. And so -- so it's really a question of when they -- somebody at the company, the

Ceo: Yes.

Warren Buffett: -- is -- is actually thinking about doing something. And then I can -- I can tell very quickly --

Charlie Rose: Well you know whether they are open to --

Warren Buffett: Oh yes, whether -- the initiative really has to come from -- from them because, you know, Coca-Cola isn't for sale, Wells Fargo isn't for sale. And 99 percent of the companies are not --

Charlie Rose: IBM is not for sale.

Warren Buffett: Sure. And so and I know the universe of companies of this size we're talking about and if I pick up the phone one day and somebody says, you know, we've really been thinking about things and we feel that we'd do better as a part of Berkshire, I'm ready to --

Charlie Rose: This is what's amazing, don't you think Carol, is that a lot of the companies that come to Berkshire Hathaway, they wanted to be there.

Carol J. Loomis: That's right. That's absolutely right.

Charlie Rose: You know if they like the phone call, I'm thinking about the Israeli company.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: If somebody says Mr. Buffett, can I come to Omaha and talk to you.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: And you're pretty quick on the draw to figure out whether you want to go forward.

Warren Buffett: Five or ten seconds, yes.

Charlie Rose: Talk about that.

Carol J. Loomis: Well he -- he --

Charlie Rose: Because mergers --

Carol J. Loomis: Mergers.

Charlie Rose: And acquisition.

Carol J. Loomis: You know he does make up his mind in literally minutes if not seconds as to whether this is something he wants to consider further. And he will, within that much time, say to the guy on the other end of the phone, "Well, I'm interested" or "Well, I don't think this is for us."

Charlie Rose: Yes.

Carol J. Loomis: And -- and he knows. He's seen this great universe of companies and this is what I was talking about. He brings this frame of reference to it and knows that this company has nothing of a kind of eternal nature to offer. Like Coca-Cola has something eternal to offer.

Charlie Rose: Yes. You also get in this book about biggest mistakes, right?

Carol J. Loomis: I do.

Charlie Rose: What's the biggest mistake this guy has made?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, Warren himself would say that there -- that there are acts of omission where he has known that he should buy a stock and hasn't bought it. One of that he cited there is Fannie Mae. This is before Fannie Mae got into trouble. That's right but he would have gotten out, I think. But he did get out of Freddie Mac, which was a case where he bought a lot and did get out at the right time. And so the biggest mistakes, well, a couple of times he's been hurt by people who erred in the way that they acted. There's no question about that. Well they were -- but this is the person that I'm thinking about had done a remarkable amount -- David Sokol-- had done a remarkable amount for Berkshire Hathaway and so I don't think it was something that Warren could have known that presented with a certain set of facts that David Sokol acted in a way that didn't work.

Charlie Rose: I bet you asked yourself that question, didn't you?

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: How could I have not seen --

Warren Buffett: I don't know the answer.

Charlie Rose: You don't, could never. Did you review in your mind --

Warren Buffett: And he did a lot of good things for Berkshire.

Charlie Rose: Yes of course.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: But you've said the hardest thing to do -- and it doesn't happen that often is to fire somebody.

Warren Buffett: Yes. It's -- it's absolutely miserable. But -- and you know, I don't have to do it very often. But I'd pay a lot of money to have a designated firer. But the trouble is -- the trouble is I can't do it because these are people who are friends of mine.

Charlie Rose: You -- one of these cover stories -- and you have to remind me which one it was -- signal, I think it was the one you wrote, the big profile, of the transition from investor to CEO and manager.

Carol J. Loomis: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Showing that -- that Warren Buffett had those skills as well.

Carol J. Loomis: Right. Well, there are several articles in the book that really pertain to that. But I think the one that you have in mind is "The Inside Story of Warren Buffett."

Charlie Rose: That was the first big profile.

Carol J. Loomis: That's a big profile. And it was the first big article I ever wrote about Warren. I'd only written two paragraphs that kind of thing. And it was 1988 and he was making a transition then. At the time he had six companies that he called the sainted six -- six or seven?

Warren Buffett: I think it was seven.

Carol J. Loomis: Seven that's right, Sainted Seven. And names like Fetchheimer that you are --

Charlie Rose: Right, right.

Carol J. Loomis: -- that you know they don't ring wildly but even now.

Charlie Rose: Right.

Carol J. Loomis: And -- but he was clearly headed in that direction and Charlie was helping him because Charlie was pointing out to him the virtues of things like C's Candy. And they were really at that moment transitioning to a company that had been distinguished by its investments to a company distinguished by the companies that it owned entirely. And even today I think that Berkshire Hathaway is underestimated. Warren is not underestimated. But Berkshire Hathaway and its power and might I do think is a little bit underestimated.

Charlie Rose: But you have a reputation for delegation.

Warren Buffett: Yes. Abdication, actually, is what you call it. I like other people to do the work, Charlie.

Charlie Rose: But you're not out on a boat somewhere. You're not out --

Warren Buffett: No.

Charlie Rose: -- you know, you don't delegate because you want to go do something else. What you want to do is the same thing you've been doing everyday for a long time.

Warren Buffett: You bet, yes. I like knowing what's going on but I don't want to direct the orchestra, I want to listen to it.

Charlie Rose: I once asked what was the allocation of capital -- how would he define -- he said "Well, they send the money to Omaha." That's what allocation of capital is.

Warren Buffett: I got wise. I do that.

Carol J. Loomis: And the CEOs of the subsidiary say they don't even have to worry about it. They just ship it off to Omaha and that's it.

Charlie Rose: We'll make it, you spend it. Is that your idea of what makes Berkshire Hathaway great?

Warren Buffett: Well, we've got this $12 billion or $13 billion a year to work with.

Charlie Rose: All right, these are some pearls of wisdom. Rules of investment: Rule number one: never lose money. Rule Number two: never forget rule number one. And on a career advice I think this is very important. I always tell college students to take the job that you would take if you were independently wealthy. You're going to do well at it. You and I, true.

Carol J. Loomis: That's absolutely true. You know that in most companies merit is recognized. And so what you need to do is to get into a company and show how good you are and you will get pushed up.

Charlie Rose: That's exactly what I say.

Warren Buffett: I moved to New York when I was 23. We had a child, we another one on the way and I took a job with Ben Graham, who was my hero. And I did not know my paycheck until I got -- my pay until I got my first paycheck. I never asked what the salary was. I just knew I would love the job.

Charlie Rose: He and your dad still remain the people that had the most influence on you in terms of --

Warren Buffett: Well, they were huge but I've had others, too. I mean, yes, Joe Rosenfield, Tom Murphy. Certainly my wives. Carol's had a lot of influence on me.

Charlie Rose: She played bridge with you.

Warren Buffett: She's just had a lot of influence.

Charlie Rose: What would you -- you call her up every day.

Warren Buffett: Just about every day.

Charlie Rose: Or she calls you every day?

Warren Buffett: No I call her.

Charlie Rose: You call her.

Warren Buffett: Just about every day.

Charlie Rose: So what's the conversation about? Did you see this? It's the kind of thing that --

Warren Buffett: Just depends what's going on.

Charlie Rose: Did you read this story? That kind of thing?

Warren Buffett: There's plenty to talk about.

Carol J. Loomis: Right. Big business events, you know. We haven't been so busy with our --

Warren Buffett: Your show last night.

Charlie Rose: Which you see the next morning while you're working out. This is another thing. "The Internet won't change chewing gum. When I look at the Internet, I try to figure out how an industry or company can be hurt or changed by it and then I avoid it.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: Take Wrigley's, I don't think the Internet is going to change the way people chew gum.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Warren Buffett: Well, you know, the innovations are enormously important for society. But they disrupt a lot of things and, you know, I used in one of the articles in the book the auto industry. There's a couple thousand auto companies and a few succeeded-- barely. So auto was enormously important. I love the fact that it was invented. The airplane was enormously important. But if you take all of what's happened in the airline industry since Orville was down there in it Kitty Hawk, some capitalist should have shot him down because he's cost us money.

Charlie Rose: What's wrong with the airline industry?

Warren Buffett: Well, it happens to be selling something that's regarded as very much a commodity product. The incremental seat cost for the airline is nothing. So they have this temptation to try to fill the last seat at any price. And if you get four or five guys that trying to fill the last seat at any price you do not get very good prices.

Charlie Rose: And these go down.

Warren Buffett: It' structurally set up so that it's very, very difficult to have a sustained competitive advantage. And you get this enormous fixed investment in planes. Now you've got the plane. It cost you a couple hundred million and you're trying to fill a seat and you read in the newspaper today what your competitor is charging and you have to charge the same price. It's got terrible structural aspects to it. And I bought into it.

Charlie Rose: You also bought into the railroad industry.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Freight carrying railroad industry.

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Burlington --

Warren Buffett: BNSF.

Charlie Rose: Burlington --

Warren Buffett: -- Northern Santa Fe.

Charlie Rose: -- Northern Santa Fe, right. Why did you do that?

Warren Buffett: Well, the railroad industry carries 42 percent of all tonnage intercity. It carries -- carrying a ton of cargo 500 miles on as gallon of diesel. I mean it's an enormously efficient way of moving things. And now you have four huge railroads in the United States. They're not going to build any more of them and it will be the backbone of the movement of goods 50 years from now or 100 years from now.

Charlie Rose: What's this history with derivatives?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, he has a checkered history with derivatives, I'd say. First of all, one of the best stories in the book is from 1987 right after the crash of '87 and it's a letter that he wrote Congressman Dingle in which he warned --

Charlie Rose: John Dingle.

Carol J. Loomis: -- right. Absolutely -- in which he warned about what could happen with index -- trading futures -- index trading futures -- trading of index which was just then being about to be approved by Congress and was approved by it. And Warren warned about that and if he had been listened to I think we would be far better off today and he has always -- so that's an early thing about derivatives.

Charlie Rose: So you saw him -- go ahead.

Warren Buffett: I think I actually wrote the letter in '82.

Carol J. Loomis: Well, you wrote in the '82 but we printed it in '87 after the crash.

Warren Buffett: After the troubles.

Carol J. Loomis: Right.

Charlie Rose: You wrote the letter but it wasn't printed until '87?

Carol J. Loomis: "Fortune" printed it and ran it. But then on derivatives, what I say about Warren is that he really cannot ignore securities that have -- are mispriced. I think that he has --

Warren Buffett: You noticed that, huh?

Carol J. Loomis: You know, he doesn't go out and buy raw cotton or anything like that, or not very often. But derivatives in his eyes have often been mispriced.

Charlie Rose: Missed opportunity for him.

Carol J. Loomis: So on the one hand -- on one hand, he will be writing in the annual report warning about derivatives and over on the other hand he'll be buying those that are clearly mispriced.

Charlie Rose: Mr. Buffett, I plead you.

Warren Buffett: Well I -- we have 200 -- I know every single derivative we own and they're all the product of my purchase. Now, we've bought a company called General Rhee which had 23,000 and it cost us $400 million before we got out of those. We tried to liquidate every one -- there's still a few --

Charlie Rose: As fast as you could.

Warren Buffett: Absolutely. But the 200 and some that I picked, you know, I think we'll make money on. But I'm a familiar with every one of those. I think when you have an -- well Lehman had probably a million and you get huge counterparty risks. General Rhee when we went in -- we had over 900 counterparties. I didn't know who 300 or 400 of them were. I couldn't pronounce their names. I mean that is not my idea of prudent finance.

Charlie Rose: Doesn't Dodd-Frank speak to derivatives?

Carol J. Loomis: It does, to some extent. But I'm like Warren, I haven't read the whole thing and I have not written about in which case I really would have an opinion. But I could not express a strong -- the Volcker Rule appeals to me.

Charlie Rose: Does it appeal to you?

Warren Buffett: Yes, it appeals to me.

Charlie Rose: It's the right thing?

Warren Buffett: In general. Yes. I think -- no but I think -- I think the more banks stick with just pure banking the better I like it. I mean they have a franchise from the United States government in that people look at their deposits as guaranteed by the U.S. government. That's not totally correct but that's what they -- and when you have the ability to take in money from people who feel that they have the U.S. government behind it, they're going to give you money whether you're credit worthy or not. And therefore you need some real regulation to make sure that people don't go wild with that franchise. And banks with those funds and with that trust can some do some pretty extreme things. Particularly when they've go -- the upside belongs to management. I don't worry about moral hazard with stockholders. Stockholders get killed in all these banks but the management's made lots of money and they didn't go away broke.

Charlie Rose: How do you assess -- I mean, this is part of that, I think-- what happened in 2008 and the subprime?

Warren Buffett: Well, it wasn't just subprime but it was -- we left --

Charlie Rose: That was part of it.

Warren Buffett: We had a housing bubble like the world has never seen. Well, housing was $22 trillion at the peak out of maybe total assets in the United States of $60 trillion or something. So it was an enormous asset. 50 million people, families, had borrowed against that and they borrowed $11 or $12 trillion. So you had an asset that had a huge bubble that was owned on margin, basically. And people thought it could do nothing but go up just like in the '20s they thought stocks could do nothing but go up. So when that bubble burst -- not only in housing -- it just started rippling through the economy. And we found out that almost every company in the United States was a big domino and they were lined up very close to each other and they started toppling.

Charlie Rose: Do you believe the executive there knew what they were doing?

Warren Buffett: Well, they did not see the consequences of the dominos starting to topple. I mean people -- when the dominos topple, eventually they get to everybody and people did not realize how big they were, how close to each other they were. I mean people looked at Freddie and Fanny which were the first ones to get in trouble in September, more or less. And then WaMu then Lehman and then Merrill was going and all of a sudden people realized if they had bank lines that (INAUDIBLE) it wasn't going to happen so it was as close -- to the wildest panic I ever saw.

Charlie Rose: The wildest you ever saw?

Warren Buffett: By far.

Charlie Rose: You got out of the hedge fund business in --

Carol J. Loomis: 19-- end of 1969.

Charlie Rose: You got out because?

Warren Buffett: I got out because I didn't -- I had a good record up until then. I had all these people counting on me and I thought things were getting very speculative and I didn't know how to make money in that period and I was competitive enough to feel that I didn't want to do lousy compared to other people and yet I didn't want to do the things they were doing. So the only thing to do was give the money back and I gave the money back.

Charlie Rose: What do you think of hedge funds today?

Warren Buffett: Well, I think that -- I made a famous bet that carol has been keeping track of where I'm betting that hedge -- a large group of hedge funds, funds of funds will underperform the S&P over time.

Charlie Rose: What's the bet?

Warren Buffett: Well, we've got a million-dollar bet for charity actually out in -- something called long bets. But calling yourself a hedge fund does not make -- it gives you no special way to make money and the fees associated with it are very, very high. And I'm -- I do not think the results of hedge funds in aggregate will be better than the S&P which you can buy for --

Charlie Rose: In the couple years that you didn't do as well as the S& P.

Warren Buffett: Well, there's been a number of years. Yes.

Charlie Rose: How does that make you feel?

Warren Buffett: Makes me feel like I better do better next year. I mean that's my job.

Carol J. Loomis: Have you noticed he's competitive?

Warren Buffett: I wouldn't be in this business if I wasn't. Over time --

Charlie Rose: There's also the question which always is asked of you is succession. You have said the board of directors knows who my successor is as of this moment.

Warren Buffett: They know tomorrow. If I die tonight, tomorrow morning they will appoint somebody they know.

Charlie Rose: and the person they appoint does not know he is the one to be appointed.

Warren Buffett: That's correct.

Charlie Rose: And will the role be the same role that you have?

Warren Buffett: No, it will be half my role. It will be running the businesses and there will be -- Todd and Ted (INAUDIBLE) -- they will run investments. They will run investments. My job will be split.

Charlie Rose: But is running the businesses as important to you as the investment aspect of it which you grew up on?

Warren Buffett: Well, running the businesses will be more important over time, sure. It is right now.

Charlie Rose: But does it have the same psychic imprint to you --

Warren Buffett: Running a business has more psychic satisfaction.

Charlie Rose: This friendship with Bill Gates, you and I have talked about this many time, with you and with Bill. But for this audience at this moment -- from the moment that you two had dinner together at Bill's mother's house and Bill's father started asking questions about what was the quality that most admired and I think Bill said focus.

Warren Buffett: We both answered focus. Yes.

Charlie Rose: And then you make a decision that when it came time after Susie's death that you wanted to do what she would have done to make -- do philanthropic contribution you chose Bill because you thought that the Gates Foundation did it right?

Warren Buffett: I chose five foundations but the Gates was the largest one.

Charlie Rose: Big one. But the friendship itself is born out of what?

Warren Buffett: Well, I'm -- it's like with Charlie Munger, you find the other person very interesting. You find them trustworthy. I mean you have a good time with them and -- but it's important to point out that there are five foundations. I just doubled what I give to each one of my children's foundation. So they have over two billion each there but they couldn't scale up the same way as Bill. He' operating on a scale.

Charlie Rose: And the mount for Bill's Foundation --

Warren Buffett: Yes, it would be -- it's probably still about the same. It's five percent of a declining balance so if a stock goes up more than five percent a year the amount actually keeps increasing.

Charlie Rose: What is it -- knowing this man as long as you have, shared as many conversations as you have, what are you curious about with respect to him?

Carol J. Loomis: Well, I don't see how he has as much energy as he constantly has. I think he draws energy from being out like talking to you. He's amazing about that. I worry about my getting tired while he's just out there just running around all the time. What am I curious about? Well, I wonder what he thinks in his innermost thoughts sometimes about some of his maybe not perfect investments. But I'm not curious about a lot because I know an awful lot.

Warren Buffett: She knows every chapter of the book. Believe me, she knows -- she knows it all.

Charlie Rose: I know a lot of it.

Warren Buffett: I know you do.

Carol J. Loomis: And you know, doing the book, as a matter of fact, kind of refreshed everything that I knew.

Charlie Rose: There was this item, too. Berkshire Hathaway has overcome General Electric. It's now the sixth largest company in terms of market value? Market cap?

Warren Buffett: I mean look -- that doesn't surprise me in this area.

Charlie Rose: Does that mean anything to you?

Warren Buffett: Well, it means --

Charlie Rose: I bet it does. I bet it does.

Warren Buffett: What it means -- what means something is having it outperform the general market over time. I mean that -- my job is to do better for my investors than they would do if they were doing it themselves. And since we retain all the earnings, we've gotten very large, but we'll get a lot larger.

Charlie Rose: When you first met him, I think Berkshire Hathaway was $22 a share, something like that?

Carol J. Loomis: That's right.

Charlie Rose: It is now $133?

Carol J. Loomis: I don't know what it is today but $130,000 a share. And that's the same stock, $22 to $133. It's remarkable.

Charlie Rose: Let me just come back to the nation's health and the global economy. Europe?

Warren Buffett: Europe is still drifting downward to some degree. I mean we have businesses that operate worldwide and actually Asia's coming off the best rate of growth but they're coming -- they're coming down somewhat.

Charlie Rose: No longer in double digits?

Warren Buffett: Europe has been sliding, you know, for some time and the U.S. actually is I would say strongest relative to where it was six months ago or nine months ago. The housing is coming back big time.

Charlie Rose: And the emerging nations? I mean even Brazil, they're all higher.

Warren Buffett: Yes. But five years from now, ten years from now, the world everywhere will be doing better, in my view.

Charlie Rose: Because?

Warren Buffett: Just because capitalism and market systems work. I mean it's been working since 1776 here and it wasn't because we had stimulus programs in 1794. It's because, you know, a system -- our system unleashes people's potential and we've got 312 million people that want to do better tomorrow than today and over time that works. Human potential is still untapped to a big degree and our system does unleash it over time. We do it in fit and starts but this country goes forward and it will continue to go forward. The luckiest person in history on a probability basis, in my view, is the baby being born in the United States today.

Charlie Rose: More so than China? More so than places where the base is lower and they'll have a greater opportunity to --

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: What has created the most number of billionaires in the last three years?

Warren Buffett: I don't know about the last three years but finance created a lot of them and I would say that relative to their contribution to society, a disproportionate number --

Charlie Rose: Well, that's a point that's made. Some people argue that th financial sector is too large a percentage of our economy.

Warren Buffett: When you get a huge capitalistic system, just the crumbs that fall off the table can make people very rich particularly if they're very good at getting other people to hand them their money and if they get favored tax treatment and a bunch of things. I said a long time ago that if you want to get rich per point of IQ and per erg of energy, just hold your nose and go to Wall Street. There's a certain truth in that. That doesn't mean they're charitable people or anything like that, it just means the payoff there is so much greater relative to what you bring to the party than it is in most aspects of society. Take journalism.

Charlie Rose: Buy newspapers, community newspapers?

Warren Buffett: Yes.

Charlie Rose: Is that simply because you had an opportunity to buy from that particular company, a number of them? Or you believe in something or simply just like Rupert Murdoch, it's in your blood.

Warren Buffett: Well, it's in my blood but I won't pay a price that reflects the fact that's in my blood.

Charlie Rose: Have you ever paid -- I mean I believe you could argue that Rupert, for example, would buy something because he had to have it and pay more.

Warren Buffett: That's right. That's right.

Charlie Rose: Believing that he could make some kind of efficiencies and he'd still have it. Have you ever done that? Ever paid more than you've - -

Warren Buffett: No, I wouldn't do in the Berkshire Hathaway.

Charlie Rose: That's what you owe to your stockholders?

Warren Buffett: Yes, I mean it's their money. That's why we don't take a editorial -- I don't dictate an editorial position to the newspaper. I voted for Obama. We have 12 newspapers that endorsed -- ten of them endorsed Romney and, you know, I'm the CEO. But two papers endorsed Obama who I voted for and ten endorsed Romney.

Charlie Rose: Speaking of Obama, the President, do you think he'll be different in the second term?

Warren Buffett: Somewhat. He won't --

Charlie Rose: What makes you think that and how?

Warren Buffett: Well, I think second terms are different than the first terms. I mean first terms --

Charlie Rose: Sometimes they can be full of land mines, too.

Warren Buffett: They can be. But in the first term to some extent you and your party have to be thinking about your re-election, I mean. And a second term certainly frees up that aspect of it and then the question is how effective you can be in getting Congress to work with you.

Charlie Rose: I mean you have access to him. He calls you and --

Warren Buffett: I've never called him. I've never called the President.

Charlie Rose: But say he calls and you go and you talk to him on the phone. And you go meet him and other CEOs. Do you think he has a new attitude about business that's come about because of the first four years?

Warren Buffett: I think that in the first term he felt that business misunderstood him and I think that business felt that he misunderstood -- they were misunderstood. I think they --

Charlie Rose: Do you think he believes and understands that business is the place where jobs are created?

Warren Buffett: Oh, there's no question about it. He knows he's dependent on capitalism working and that business is part of that. I think to some extent when people do feel misunderstood by the other party it can develop its own dynamic.

Charlie Rose: That's what happened here.

Warren Buffett: And I think that -- but I think both sides should just say forget it, you know. Wipe the slate clean and it's sometimes a good idea in human relationships. I think it's a particularly good idea when the country's well-being is at stake. So I would recommend both sides just say maybe I was misunderstood by you but forget it. We work together going forward.

Charlie Rose: But do you think he wants to do that?

Warren Buffett: I think he wants to succeed big time. And I think he will and I think the economy will be a help to him. But I think it's -- I mean that isn't -- you know, neither side can roll over in terms of the things they feel strongly about but I feel the rhetoric certainly should be very civil all the time and I think that you look for ways to work with each other.

Charlie Rose: Does this send a big signal to the country if he would appoint as Secretary of the Treasury someone like Jamie Dimon? Or Jamie Dimon?

Warren Buffett: Well, I think that that might be a big signal.

Charlie Rose: Appointing Jamie Dimon as Secretary of the Treasury?

Warren Buffett: Well, I think Jamie Dimon actually would be -- I think he'd be terrific because I think he -- I think he -- if we did run into problems in markets I think he would absolutely be the best person you could have.

Charlie Rose: He knows that much about markets --

Warren Buffett: And I think world leaders would have confidence.

Charlie Rose: So when you see a problem that Jamie's had with London and the (INAUDIBLE) all that, what do you mark that up to?

Warren Buffett: If you're running a $2 trillion institution -- if I run Berkshire for decades, some things are going to wrong go wrong. I mean if you run an army, if you run a church, if you run a government, any large institution people go off the reservation sometimes and sometimes they'll get away with it for a long period. And of course, when you work in a financial institution you can add a lot of zeros very quickly. So, you know, obviously there was a failure of control but there had been failures of control at Berkshire. I am going to make more mistakes. I hope I minimize, I hope I catch them fast but there can be mistakes and there can be big mistakes.

Charlie Rose: Should Bowles-Simpson be the operating model from the menu that they operate on and do you believe that's the direction to go?

Warren Buffett: Well, I think the menu should be something that raises 18.5 percent of GDP in revenues and embodies -- with no loopholes, basically, the idea of a progressive tax system and I think that expenditures should be reduced to the 21 percent of

Gdp Level: Do you want to eliminate the deficit or the debt?

Warren Buffett: It eliminates -- it does not eliminate the annual deficit.

Charlie Rose: Right.

Warren Buffett: It keeps the debt as a percentage of GDP constant.

Charlie Rose: and that's what we can live with in essence.

Warren Buffett: We can live with it. The net debt is in the 70s. It's around 73 percent or something like that. That's what we always talked about until everybody got excited lately. That was 120 percent coming out of World War II. And it will stay in the 70s, might even come down into the 60s if we -- the 18.5 percent and 21 percent won't increase the ratio of debt-to-GDP. And it may very well bring it down slightly.

Charlie Rose: What has this meant to you this friendship with Warren Buffett?

Carol J. Loomis: Oh well, it's been a wonderful friendship. Can you imagine the chance to Warren Buffett about almost anything? To ask his opinion about every story you've ever had on your mind? It's -- it's priceless. And it's been priceless in a way to go at this book and to see it all put down again, to add my introductions and to see how good fortune was at staying with this man as -- as I say, we were standing by while Warren Buffett was becoming Warren Buffett. and it was a remarkable thing that we were allowed to do and I loved it.

Charlie Rose: I'm smart enough to give her the last word.

Warren Buffett: You are smart.

Charlie Rose: This book is called "Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything"; from 1966 to 2012, collected and expanded by Carol J. Loomis. Thank you.

Warren Buffett: Thank you, Charlie.

Carol J. Loomis: Thank you, Charlie.

Charlie Rose: Thank you for joining us.