本杰明·格雷厄姆与证券分析:一段回忆(沃尔特·J·施洛斯)
标题:本杰明·格雷厄姆与证券分析:一段回忆(Walter J. Schloss)
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 1
本杰明·格雷厄姆
与《证券分析》:
一段回忆
沃尔特·J·施洛斯
Benjamin Graham and Security Analysis: A Reminiscence Walter J. Schloss
格雷厄姆是一位原创性思想家,也是一位思路清晰的思想家。他道德标准极高,为人谦逊低调。他是独一无二的。我为他工作了将近 10 年,担任证券分析师。重读《证券分析》第一版序言时,本的观点再次让我印象深刻。我引用如下……“[我们]主要关注概念、方法、标准、原则,最重要的是逻辑推理。我们强调理论,并非为理论本身,而是因为它在实践中的价值。我们尽力避免制定过于严格而难以遵循的标准,或带来麻烦远超过其价值的技术方法。”
《证券分析》一书道尽了一切。接下来,就看分析师和投资者如何将本的思想付诸实践了。
早在 1935 年,我在 Loeb Rhodes(当时叫 Carl M. Loeb & Co.)工作时,有一次我请教一位合伙人阿曼德·埃普夫,怎样才能进入“统计部门”,他给了我一条很好的建议。在那个年代(也许今天在一定程度上也是如此),前进的最佳途径是带来业务。如果你有富裕的家人或朋友,你就能带来佣金。证券分析当时还处于萌芽阶段,你认识谁远比你知道什么重要得多。如果你没有关系,就很难出人头地。不管怎样,埃普夫先生告诉我,有一本新书叫《证券分析》,刚由一位叫本·格雷厄姆的人写成。
en Graham was an original thinker as well as a clear thinker. He had high ethical standards and was modest and unassuming. He was one of a kind. I worked for him for nearly 10 years as a security analyst. In re-reading the preface to the first edition of Security Analysis, I am impressed all over again with Ben’s views. I quote . . . “[W]e are concerned chiefly with concepts, methods, standards, principles, and above all with logical reasoning. We have stressed theory not for itself alone but for its value in practice. We have tried to avoid prescribing standards which are too stringent to follow or technical methods which are more trouble than they are worth.” Security Analysis says it all. It is up to analysts and investors to put Ben’s ideas into practice. Back in 1935 while working at Loeb Rhodes (then called Carl M. Loeb & Co.), one of the partners, Armand Erpf, gave a good piece of advice when I asked him how I could get into the “statistical department.” In those days and perhaps today to some extent, the best way to advance was by bringing in business. If you had a wealthy family or friends, you brought in commissions. Security analysis was in its infancy and who you knew was much more important than what you knew. If you didn’t have connections, it was difficult to get ahead. In any case Mr. Erpf told me that there was a new book called Security Analysis that had just been written by a man called Ben Graham.
B
B
经沃尔特·J·施洛斯私人著作(1976 年)授权转载。
Reproduced by permission from the private writings (1976) of Walter J. Schloss.
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 2
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 2
“读完这本书,书里的一切你都能掌握,以后就不用再读别的了。”
我在纽约证券交易所学院(纽约金融学院)选修了本的《高级证券分析》课程。本很会讲课,既热情又条理清晰。他做了一件我很少见人做过的事:他会拿当时一个被低估的案例,比如鲍德温机车的破产债券,展示新证券按其预期的盈利能力和资产总值能值多少钱,再对照这些债券的价格。许多华尔街的聪明人,比如高盛的格斯·莱维——后来成了全美顶尖的套利高手——都来上过他的课。我常常好奇,人们把本的想法转化成投资后,到底赚了多少钱。
本在思想和时间上都非常慷慨,尤其是对年轻人。1945 年底我即将退伍时,他给了我一份证券分析师的工作,这改变了我的人生。我知道他在我们这个领域里也帮助过其他人。
在本的追思会上,他的合著者戴夫·多德讲述了他是如何参与到那本书的写作中的。
事情是这样的:本受邀在哥伦比亚大学开设一门投资课程,他同意教,但前提是得有人帮他做笔记。年轻的教师戴夫·多德自告奋勇,在本的每堂课上都做了大量详细的笔记。本就用这些笔记,接着写了《证券分析》一书。正如戴夫所说,本做了全部工作,但他坚持要让戴夫作为合著者分享功劳。
多德教授后来成了一位非常成功的投资者,也是格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的董事。这家投资信托公司是本在 1936 年与合伙人杰罗姆·纽曼共同创立的。
在投资领域保持清晰思考、不受情绪左右,可不是件容易的事。恐惧和贪婪往往会左右一个人的判断。本对赚钱其实并没有很强的进取心,所以受这些情绪的影响比大多数人都小。
本曾因大萧条而遭受重创,所以他希望投资那些能在下跌时保护自己的东西。要做到这一点,最好的办法就是制定一套规则,只要遵循这些规则,就能降低亏损的概率。
“Read the book and when you know everything in it, you won’t have to read anything else.” I took Ben’s course in Advanced Security Analysis at the New York Stock Exchange Institute (New York Institute of Finance). Ben was a good speaker, enthusiastic and logical. Ben did something that I haven’t seen done often. He would take an undervalued situation at that time, such as the bankrupt bonds of Baldwin Locomotive, and show how much the new securities would be worth based on their projected earning power and assets and relate this to the price of the bonds. Many bright Wall Streeters such as Gus Levy of Goldman Sachs, who later became the top arbitrageur in the country, used to take his course. I often wondered how much money people made on Ben’s ideas by transforming them into investments. Ben was very generous with his thoughts and his time, particularly with young people. By offering me a job as his security analyst as I was about to leave the Army at the end of 1945, he changed my life. I know he helped others in our field too. At Ben’s memorial service, Dave Dodd, Ben’s co-author, told how he had got involved in the book. It seems that Ben was asked to teach a course at Columbia University on investments and he agreed to do it with the stipulation that he would only do so if someone would take notes. Dave Dodd, a young instructor, volunteered and took copious notes at each of Ben’s lectures. Ben, using the notes, then went ahead and wrote Security Analysis. As Dave said, Ben did the work but he insisted that Dave get credit by being co-author. Professor Dodd went on to become a very successful investor and a director of Graham-Newman Corporation, an investment trust that Ben had founded in 1936 with his partner, Jerome Newman. The ability to think clearly in the investment field without the emotions that are attached to it, is not an easy undertaking. Fear and greed tend to affect one’s judgment. Because Ben was not really very aggressive about making money, he was less affected by these emotions than were many others. Ben had been hurt by the Depression, so he wanted to invest in things that would protect him on the downside. The best way to do this was to lay out rules which, if followed, would reduce his chance of loss.
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 3
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 3
本杰明·格雷厄姆与《证券分析》:一段回忆
Benjamin Graham and Security Analysis: A Reminiscence
有个很好的例子:那天我碰巧在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司他的办公室里,他接到一个电话,说他们买进了政府雇员保险公司(现在的 GEICO)50% 的股份。他转过头对我说:“沃尔特,要是这笔买卖不成功,我们随时可以把它清盘,把钱拿回来。” GEICO 后来表现得比他最大胆的梦想还要好,但这并不是他当初追求的目标。俗话说,买得好就等于卖了一半。我觉得本在这方面是个行家。
格雷厄姆-纽曼公司遵循本制定的原则,基金运作得很成功。跟今天的投资公司相比,它规模很小。1946 年 1 月 31 日,它的总资产净值只有 330 万美元。
本的重点是用最小的风险来保护他预期中的利润。如果你想翻翻 1947 年到 1956 年间的穆迪投资手册,看看格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的持仓,会很有意思。其中很多都是规模很小、几乎无人知晓的公司,但从数字上看它们很便宜。读一下他们截至 1946 年 1 月的年报,很有启发意义。年报说他们的通用投资政策有两条:
- 以低于内在价值的价格买入证券——内在价值通过仔细分析确定,特别强调买入价格低于清算价值的证券。
- 从事套利和对冲操作。
我帮本一起修订了 1951 年出版的《证券分析》第三版。附录里有一篇关于特殊情况的文章,最早刊登在 1946 年的《分析师杂志》上。在那篇文章里,他推导出一个风险收益结果的代数公式,这个公式放到 37 年后的今天仍然适用。
1949 年,《聪明的投资者》出版了。这是一本写给普通读者的书,但聚焦于证券分析,为这个领域赢得了声望。它的第四版修订本至今仍在印行。
有一天,我发现了一只当时价格非常便宜的股票——卢肯斯钢铁公司。我们买了一些,原本打算再多买些。就在这时,本出去跟一个人吃午饭,那人席间不停地向本推荐一个又一个蓝筹股。吃完饭,他问本有没有看上的,本说我们在买一些卢肯斯钢铁。
A good example of this was the day I happened to be in his office at Graham-Newman when he received a telephone call that they had bought 50 percent of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now GEICO). He turned to me and said, “Walter, if this purchase doesn’t work out, we can always liquidate it and get our money back.” The fact that GEICO worked out better than his wildest dreams wasn’t what he was looking for. As the saying goes, a stock well bought is half sold. I think Ben was an expert in that area. Graham-Newman followed the precepts set down by Ben and the fund prospered. Compared to today’s investment company, it was tiny. Its total net assets on January 31, 1946, were $3,300,000. Ben’s emphasis was on protecting his expectation of profit with minimum risk. If one wants to get hold of Moody’s Investment Manuals for the 1947–1956 period, it is interesting to see Graham-Newman’s holdings. Many of them were small, practically unknown companies but they were cheap on the numbers. It is instructive to read their annual report for the year ended January 1946. It states that their general investment policies were twofold. 1. To purchase securities at prices less than their intrinsic value as determined by careful analysis with particular emphasis on the purchase of securities at less than their liquidating value. 2. To engage in arbitrage and hedging operations. I helped Ben with the third edition of Security Analysis, published in 1951. In the appendix is an article on special situations that first appeared in The Analysts Journal in 1946. In the article, he had worked out an algebraic formula for risk-reward results that could be applied today, 37 years later. In 1949, The Intelligent Investor was published. This was a book for the layman but it focused on security analysis and gave prestige to the field. Its fourth revised edition is still in print. One day, I came across a very cheap stock based on its price at the time, Lukens Steel. We bought some but expected to buy more. At this point, Ben went out to lunch with a man who kept telling Ben about one blue chip after another. At the end of the meal he asked Ben if he liked anything and Ben said we were buying some Lukens Steel.
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 4
3189 P-01 3/23/99 8:37 AM Page 4
我猜那人可能连一天都没等,就跑去买了一大笔卢肯斯公司的股票,直接把股价推到我们买不起的价位。本告诉我这事后,我感觉他当时不想显得太失礼,也没意识到自己那番话的分量有多大。
他总想把事情简单化。他写过,他不认为证券分析师做任何投资决策时,需要用上比算术更复杂的东西,最多再加点代数。
因为本是个有教养、兴趣广泛的人,他花在投资上的时间反倒没这个行当里其他人那么多。他喜欢尝试新想法。1930 年代末,他开始推广自己的“常稳粮仓理论”,还写了本书叫《储存与稳定》,主张用某些大宗商品和金属来支撑我们的货币。他的想法有理有据,当时棉花才六美分一磅,其他原材料价格也很低,所以这是个挺有意思的提议。不过他从来没有足够的影响力去说服国会,尽管他的朋友伯纳德·巴鲁克支持这个想法——而这个方案本可以是帮助农民、降低通胀威胁的好办法。
本·格雷厄姆这辈子干成的事很多,但在我看来,《证券分析》是他最伟大的成就。
本·格雷厄姆是让证券分析师这一职业获得地位的开路人。能有幸认识他,是我的荣幸。
I doubt if it took a day before the man went out and bought a great deal of Lukens and pushed the stock out of our buying range. I had the impression after Ben told me the story that he didn’t want to be rude and hadn’t realized how important his comments were. He tried to keep things simple. He wrote that he didn’t believe security analysts should use more than arithmetic and possibly a little algebra for any investment decision. Because Ben was a cultured, many-faceted man, he didn’t spend as much time on investments as did others in the field. He liked to try new ideas. In the late 1930s he became involved in promoting his evernormal granary theory and wrote a book on it called Storage and Stability in which some commodities and metals would be used as a backing for our currency. His ideas made sense and with cotton at six cents a pound and other raw materials at low prices, it was an interesting proposal. He never had the clout to sell it to the Congress, although Bernard Baruch, a friend of his, supported the idea and it could have been a useful way to help the farmers and reduce the threat of inflation. Of all the things that Ben accomplished in his lifetime, Security Analysis was, to me, his greatest achievement. Ben Graham was the leader in giving status to security analysts. It was a privilege to know him.