查理·芒格文稿/演讲实录:2009年牺牲以恢复市场信心
牺牲以重振市场信心
查尔斯·T·芒格
2009 年 2 月 11 日,星期三
Sacrificing To Restore Market Confidence By Charles T. Munger Wednesday, February 11, 2009
我们的处境十分严峻。在自由市场资本主义中,适度的繁荣与萧条不可避免。但像眼下这场导致我们陷入痛苦的、如此剧烈的繁荣-萧条周期,是危险的,必须防止其重演。整个国家陷入沮丧情有可原——深陷于财政刺激(这是必要的)以及提升银行实力等问题的泥沼中。一个关键问题是:我们是否应该为了获得更美好的未来,而选择承受比现在更多的痛苦?例如,我们是否应该建立新的管制措施,以根除诸多罪恶与愚蠢行为,从而抑制未来的繁荣?答案是肯定的。
明智的改革无法避免带来显著的痛苦,但为了获得更高的安全性和更模范的行为,这种痛苦值得承受。而且,只有当公众产生强烈反感——就像如今这样——立法者才有可能最大限度地削弱强大特殊利益集团的影响力,从而推动法律进行必要的修订。
导致我们这场过度繁荣、进而引发严重萧条的诸多因素,我们都很清楚。其中包括:对银行和投资银行在道德与审慎方面的管控不足;投资银行的不良行为;在直接或隐含使用政府信贷的助推下,金融杠杆大幅扩张;以及在推动消费信贷过程中出现的极端过度行为,有时甚至构成欺诈。不健全的会计处理普遍存在。
各种高度杠杆化的投机活动也严重过度。或许房地产投机造成的破坏最大。但涉及公司债券的新型衍生品合约交易则首当其冲。这个让完全不相关的实体在几乎毫无监管的情况下进行数万亿美元押注的体系,催生了两样东西:一是类似 20 世纪 20 年代“赌场”(bucket shops)的赌博设施,在那里,赌徒似的客户可以押注证券价格(而非赛马),而几乎没有人实际持有任何证券;二是大量强烈期盼某些公司倒闭的实体。赌场老板们推动了这个体系,而那些本应更明智的学者们则在一旁助阵。不幸的是,他们说服了监管者,让后者相信我们金融体系的成员会在使用这些新型投机机会时,利大于弊。
考虑到这些活动巨大的盈利潜力,除了传统的、有钱的特殊利益集团之外,似乎不太可能有任何重要的反对改革的力量。但学术界也有很多人会抵制。重要的是,改革方案必须将道德和会计概念与传统经济概念相结合。许多经济学家对于反对这种混合推理深感自豪。但这些经济学家喜欢思考的事物,与他们不喜欢思考的事物,在复杂的层面上是功能性地交织在一起的。那些抵制更广泛思考的人,其行为就像工程师为了简化计算,把圆周率从 3.14 四舍五入成整数 3 一样。其结果是一种故意的无知,导致对许多重要的事情无法理解。
此外,在当前形势下,理性要求经济思维做出更大程度的延伸。公共讨论不仅应包括私人道德和会计问题,还应包括公共道德问题,尤其是在税收方面。美国长期以来一直同时存在巨额的贸易和财政赤字,与此同时,又利用其自身巨大的优势,发行着一个深陷困境且深度相互依存的世界的主要储备货币。这个世界如今还面临着来自拥有核武器国家数量不断增加的新风险。因此,美国现在可能负有一项类似的责任,就像二战后危险时期,马歇尔计划在跨党派共识下获得通过,从而重建了满目疮痍的欧洲一样。
当时的共识建立在国务卿乔治·马歇尔(George Marshall)的道德责任概念之上,并辅以审慎的考虑。这种责任的现代形式,至少要求适当增加常规税收,或开征一些新的消费税。这样一来,“我们会不惜一切代价”这一必要且鼓舞人心的经济信息,就会得到一个推论:“并且不会让我们的货币贬值到无法接受的地步。” 考虑到以下两点,这种更复杂的信息无疑更具责任感:第一,我们常年双赤字运作的做法,依赖于消耗并非无限的信任储备;第二,如果没有伴随新的税收,这个推论的信息就不会被广泛相信。
此外,在某些情况下增税,或许很容易获得两党支持。可以肯定的是,如今两党完全可以共同对对冲基金经理薪酬中的“附带权益”部分征税,仿佛这部分收入是通过开出租车这类更具建设性的方式赚取的一样。
最近关于两党合作的文章和言论很多,在两党合作的框架下取得成功,或许能在此带来巨大优势。的确可以设想,如果立法能够以两党合作的方式通过,而不是党派仇恨的产物,那么那些遏制金融体系过度行为并加强保障措施的解决方案,或许就能减少而不是增加国家的痛苦。在那么多想当然的东西都失败之后,公众需要重建信心。而获得他人信心最可靠的方法,就是值得他人信赖——就像马歇尔在推动通过一些有史以来最优秀的立法时所做的那样。
以两党合作的方式制定涵盖众多议题的一揽子立法将是困难的。在未来几周共同工作时,官员们或许可以借鉴一个帮助建立我们共和国的先例。1787 年制宪会议的议事规则在富有成果的妥协中创造了奇迹,并最终产生了美国宪法。在今天的立法者中,既然没有像马歇尔那样受到各方信任的人物,也许开国元勋们可以再次为我们服务。
本文作者为共和党人,现任伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway Inc.)副董事长,该公司持有《华盛顿邮报》公司(The Washington Post Co.)21% 的普通股。
Our situation is dire. Moderate booms and busts are inevitable in free-market capitalism. But a boom-bust cycle as gross as the one that caused our present misery is dangerous, and recurrences should be prevented. The country is understandably depressed -- mired in issues involving fiscal stimulus, which is needed, and improvements in bank strength. A key question: Should we opt for even more pain now to gain a better future? For instance, should we create new controls to stamp out much sin and folly and thus dampen future booms? The answer is yes. Sensible reform cannot avoid causing significant pain, which is worth enduring to gain extra safety and more exemplary conduct. And only when there is strong public revulsion, such as exists today, can legislators minimize the influence of powerful special interests enough to bring about needed revisions in law. Many contributors to our over-the-top boom, which led to the gross bust, are known. They include insufficient controls over morality and prudence in banks and investment banks; undesirable conduct among investment banks; greatly expanded financial leverage, aided by direct or implied use of government credit; and extreme excess, sometimes amounting to fraud, in the promotion of consumer credit. Unsound accounting was widespread. There was also great excess in highly leveraged speculation of all kinds. Perhaps real estate speculation did the most damage. But the new trading in derivative contracts involving corporate bonds took the prize. This system, in which completely unrelated entities bet trillions with virtually no regulation, created two things: a gambling facility that mimicked the 1920s "bucket shops" wherein bookie-customer types could bet on security prices, instead of horse races, with almost no one owning any securities, and, second, a large group of entities that had an intense desire that certain companies should fail. Croupier types pushed this system, assisted by academics who should have known better. Unfortunately, they convinced regulators that denizens of our financial system would use the new speculative opportunities without causing more harm than benefit. Considering the huge profit potential of these activities, it may seem unlikely that any important opposition to reform would come from parties other than conventional, moneyed special interests. But many in academia, too, will resist. It is important that reform plans mix moral and accounting concepts with traditional economic concepts. Many economists take fierce pride in opposing that sort of mixed reasoning. But what these economists like to think about is functionally intertwined, in complex ways, with what they don't like to think about. Those who resist the wider thinking are acting as engineers would if they rounded pi from 3.14 to an even 3 to simplify their calculations. The result is a kind of willful ignorance that fails to understand much that is important. Moreover, rationality in the current situation requires even more stretch in economic thinking. Public deliberations should include not only private morality and accounting issues but also issues of public morality, particularly with regard to taxation. The United States has long run large, concurrent trade and fiscal deficits while, to its own great advantage, issuing the main reserve currency of a deeply troubled and deeply interdependent world. That world now faces new risks from an expanding group of nations possessing nuclear weapons. And so the United States may now have a duty similar to the one that, in the danger that followed World War II, caused the Marshall Plan to be approved in a bipartisan consensus and rebuild a devastated Europe. The consensus was grounded in Secretary of State George Marshall's concept of moral duty, supplemented by prudential considerations. The modern form of this duty would demand at least some increase in conventional taxes or the imposition of some new consumption taxes. In so doing, the needed and cheering economic message, "We will do what it takes," would get a corollary: "and without unacceptably devaluing our money." Surely the more complex message is more responsible, considering that, first, our practices of running twin deficits depend on drawing from reserves of trust that are not infinite and, second, the message of the corollary would not be widely believed unless it was accompanied by some new taxes. Moreover, increasing taxes in some instances might easily gain bipartisan approval. Surely both political parties can now join in taxing the "carry" part of the compensation of hedge fund managers as if it was more constructively earned in, say, cab driving. Much has been said and written recently about bipartisanship, and success in a bipartisan approach might provide great advantage here. Indeed, it is conceivable that, if legislation were adopted in a bipartisan way, instead of as a consequence of partisan hatred, the solutions that curbed excess and improved safeguards in our financial system could reduce national pain instead of increasing it. After the failure of so much that was assumed, the public needs a restoration of confidence. And the surest way to gain the confidence of others is to deserve the confidence of others, as Marshall did when he helped cause passage of some of the best legislation ever enacted. Creating in a bipartisan manner a legislative package that covers many subjects will be difficult. As they work together in the coming weeks, officials might want to consider a precedent that helped establish our republic. The deliberative rules of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 worked wonders in fruitful compromise and eventually produced the U.S. Constitution. With no Marshall figure, trusted by all, amid today's legislators, perhaps the Founding Fathers can once more serve us. The writer, a Republican, is vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., which owns 21 percent of The Washington Post Co.'s common stock.