丹麦方案解决美国抵押贷款危机
美国财政部与国会民主党人就房利美和房地美这两家政府赞助抵押贷款担保机构的命运达成的妥协，堪称最糟糕的局面。财政部开出了一张空白支票，必要时出手救援，但两家公司的管理层都留任了。他们知道自己的生存取决于不动用那张空白支票。因此，他们会尽其所能来减少对任何会稀释股权的新的权益资本需求。简言之，作为私人拥有但资本不足的金融机构，这两家 GSE 无法履行其既定使命——为国家的住房金融体系提供稳定性、流动性和可负担性。
The recent compromise struck between the Treasury and Democrats in Congress on the fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored mortgage guarantors, constitutes the worst of all possible worlds. The Treasury offered a blank cheque to come to the rescue, if necessary, but the managements of both companies were kept in place. They know that their survival depends on not drawing on that blank cheque. They will therefore do everything in their power to reduce the need for any new equity capital that would be dilutive. In short, as privately owned but undercapitalised financial institutions, the GSEs cannot fulfil their stated mission of providing stability, liquidity and affordability to the nation’s housing finance system.
在公布巨额季度亏损后向投资者做的演示中，两家 GSE 表示，他们将减少购买抵押贷款，并可能缩减持仓以保全资本。他们强调，其保险担保业务的费用几乎翻了一番。他们还通过专注于信用资质更高、首付比例更大的借款人，提高了新贷款的质量。这意味着，两家 GSE 已显著提高了抵押贷款成本，并收紧了贷款标准。
In presentations to investors, which followed big quarterly losses, the GSEs said they would curtail purchases of mortgages and might shrink their holdings to preserve capital. They highlighted that fees from their insurance guarantee business had nearly doubled. They also improved the quality of new loans by focusing on borrowers with higher-quality credit, who put down greater down payments. This means that the GSEs have significantly increased the cost of mortgages and tightened lending standards.
银行体系的问题已使这两家 GSE 成为抵押贷款市场上唯一的选择。他们在新增抵押贷款中的市场份额在过去一年翻了一番，如今接近 80%。其余大部分份额由联邦住房管理局——一家完全由政府担保的机构——占据。随着这两家公司为生存而战并试图减少对新资本的需求，美国抵押贷款的可获得性和成本都受到了影响。在房屋供应因止赎浪潮不断高涨而膨胀之际出现这种情况，是灾难的配方。房价已大幅下跌，除非能以更优惠的条件向更广泛的人群提供抵押贷款，否则房价将继续下跌。
The problems in the banking system have left the two GSEs as the only game in town in the mortgage market. Their market share of new mortgages has doubled over the past year and is now close to 80 per cent. Much of the balance is accounted for by the Federal Housing Administration, a fully guaranteed government agency. As the two companies fight for survival and try to reduce their need for new capital, the availability and cost of mortgages in the US suffer. Coming at a time when the supply of houses is swollen by a rising tide of foreclosures, this is a recipe for disaster. House prices have already fallen sharply and will continue to fall unless mortgages are made available on more favourable terms to a broader group of people.
这种妥协，或者说僵局，几乎确保房价会过度下跌。这反过来又使 GSE 的政策变得适得其反，因为更低的房价会增加他们的损失，进一步将他们推向资不抵债。GSE 危机只是被推迟了，而代价是使房市危机更加严重。
This compromise, or stalemate, practically ensures that house prices will overshoot on the downside. That, in turn, renders the policies of the GSEs self-defeating as lower house prices increase their losses and push them further into insolvency. The GSE crisis has merely been postponed, at a cost of making the housing crisis more severe.
对 GSE 担保债券的信心已经动摇。股票仍面临压力。市场正在迫使官员们拿出更好的解决方案。我们需要认识到，GSE 的商业模式存在致命缺陷。它们是公私合营的伙伴关系，风险由公共部门承担，而利润归于私营部门：管理层和股东。这些公司一直受到会计问题和其他违规行为的困扰；他们的管理层在游说国会山上花费了巨额资金。这不是一个值得永久保存的商业模式。
Confidence in GSE-backed bonds has been shaken. The stocks remain under pressure. Markets are forcing officials to come up with a better solution. We need to recognise that the business model of the GSEs is fatally flawed. They are public/private partnerships in which the risks are borne by the public sector while profits accrue to the private sector: management and shareholders. The companies have been plagued by accounting problems and other irregularities; their managements have spent enormous sums lobbying Capitol Hill. This is not a business model that deserves to be perpetuated.
幸运的是，替代方案是存在的。财政部长汉克·保尔森建议使用担保债券，一种在欧洲流行的抵押贷款融资工具。我推荐丹麦使用的抵押贷款信用体系，在该体系中，贷款价值比和承保标准由一个单一、强有力的监管机构严格执行。这些抵押贷款被转化为可即日交易的债券。债券的担保来自抵押贷款和发行这些债券的金融机构的信用。抵押贷款仍保留在发行人的资产负债表上，消除了美国体系内在的道德风险，该体系基于通过向市场出售贷款来赚取费用。
Fortunately, alternatives are available. Hank Paulson, the Treasury secretary, has suggested the use of covered bonds, a mortgage-financing vehicle popular in Europe. I would recommend the system of mortgage credit used in Denmark, where loan-to-value ratios and underwriting standards are strictly enforced by a single, strong regulator. These mortgages are transformed into instantly tradable bonds. Cover for the bonds is provided by both the mortgages and the credit of the financial institutions issuing them. The mortgages remain on the balance sheets of the issuers, eliminating the moral hazard inherent in the US system, which is based on earning fees from selling them on to the market.
丹麦体系中抵押贷款的标准化促进了透明度和流动性。房主可以随时通过购买债券来提前偿还抵押贷款。由于房屋价值和债券价格往往同步变动，这种安排降低了房主权益变为负值的风险。对于发行银行来说，持有这些债券所需的资本要求更低，因此这些债券的售价高于普通担保债券。自 1795 年哥本哈根大火后不久创立以来，这套体系一直存续至今，并提供了可负担的住房抵押贷款。
The standardisation of mortgages in the Danish system promotes transparency and liquidity. Householders can prepay their mortgages at any time by buying the bonds. Since house values and bond prices tend to move in unison this arrangement reduces the danger of householders’ equity falling into negative territory. For the issuing banks, owning these bonds carries lower capital requirements so the bonds sell at a premium to ordinary covered bonds. This system has survived and provided affordable home mortgages since its creation shortly after the great Copenhagen fire of 1795.
我在保尔·奥尼尔担任财政部长时，在他的支持下，率先在墨西哥引入了丹麦体系。经过修改，它为美国提供可负担抵押贷款提供了一个长期的解决方案。
I pioneered the introduction of the Danish system in Mexico with the support of Paul O’Neill, when he was Treasury secretary. With modification, it offers a long-term solution to providing affordable mortgages in the US.
本文作者著有《金融市场的新范式》，是索罗斯基金管理公司的主席，该公司曾持有并继续持有 GSE 的空头头寸。
The writer, author of The New Paradigm for Financial Markets, is chair of Soros Fund Management, which has held and continues to hold short positions in GSEs