特朗普会在华为问题上出卖美国吗？
特朗普政府在外交政策上最伟大的成就——也可能是唯一成就——是制定了一套连贯且真正两党一致的对华（习近平领导的中国）政策。这届政府正确地将北京定性为战略竞争对手，并把中国跨国电信巨头华为以国家安全威胁为由列入商务部的所谓“实体清单”。这使得美国公司无法与华为开展业务。
The greatest—and perhaps only—foreign policy accomplishment of the Trump administration has been the development of a coherent and genuinely bipartisan policy toward Xi Jinping ’s China. The administration rightly declared Beijing a strategic rival and placed Huawei, China’s multinational telecommunications giant, on the Commerce Department’s so-called “entity list” as a national-security threat. This prevents U.S. companies from doing business with Huawei.
中国在人工智能和机器学习领域是个危险的竞争对手。但目前，中国仍依赖大约 30 家美国公司向华为供应其在 5G 市场竞争所需的核心组件。只要华为还在实体清单上，它就会缺乏关键技术，从而受到严重削弱。
China is a dangerous rival in artificial intelligence and machine learning. But for now it still depends on about 30 U.S. companies to supply Huawei with the core components it needs to compete in the 5G market. As long as Huawei remains on the entity list, it will lack crucial technology and be seriously weakened.
因此，未来几年对于决定美国和中国谁能在 5G 领域胜出至关重要。目前的局势对美国极为有利。然而，特朗普总统可能很快会破坏自己的对华政策，把优势拱手让给北京。
The coming years will therefore be crucial in determining whether the U.S. or China comes out ahead in 5G. The current situation strongly favors the U.S. However, President Trump may soon undermine his own China policy and cede the advantage to Beijing.
共和党众议员迈克·加拉格尔在 7 月于《国防授权法案》中提出一项修正案，禁止特朗普总统在未经国会同意的情况下将华为从实体清单中移除。参议员米特·罗姆尼在参议院也提出了类似的修正案。特朗普总统想要摆脱这一约束。在我看来，他计划在 2020 年大选临近时安排与习近平主席会面，并与他达成一项贸易协议，他有意将华为的地位摆上谈判桌，作为他的筹码之一。
Republican Rep. Mike Gallagher introduced an amendment in July to the National Defense Authorization Act that would prohibit President Trump from removing Huawei from the entity list without the consent of Congress. Sen. Mitt Romney introduced a similar amendment in the Senate. President Trump wants to remove this constraint. In my view, he wants to arrange a meeting with President Xi Jinping as the 2020 election approaches and make a trade deal with him, and he wants Huawei’s status on the table as one of his bargaining chips.
这并非特朗普先生第一次对中国做出考虑不周的让步。去年，在华为较小的竞争对手中兴通讯规避美国制裁后，他解除了对中兴的限制。如果他对华为给予类似的宽待，将其作为贸易协议的一部分从实体清单中移除，那么华为就能巩固其在 5G 市场的领先地位。
This wouldn’t be the first time Mr. Trump made an ill-conceived concession to China. Last year he lifted restrictions on ZTE, Huawei’s smaller rival, after it had evaded U.S. sanctions. If he gives Huawei a similar break, removing it from the entity list as part of a trade deal, the company could consolidate its leading position in the 5G market.
很难确切知道特朗普先生此举的动机是什么，但他似乎急于与习近平主席达成协议，以提振美国股市和经济，增加自己连任的胜算——将自己的选举利益置于美国的利益之上。
It’s hard to know exactly what’s motivating Mr. Trump, but he appears desperate for a deal with President Xi to bolster the U.S. stock market and economy to improve his chances at re-election—putting his electoral interests ahead of America’s interests.
国会必须阻止这种情况发生。特朗普先生自己的国防部和国家安全委员会都承认华为构成的严重威胁。如果共和党人允许特朗普先生救助这家由共产党经营的电信巨头，他们就是在放弃自己最基本的民主责任。
Congress must prevent this from happening. Mr. Trump’s own Defense Department and National Security Council recognize the grave threat Huawei poses. If Republicans allow Mr. Trump to bail out the Communist Party-run telecom giant, they will be abdicating their most basic democratic responsibilities.
作为开放社会基金会的创始人，我击败习近平领导下的中国的兴趣超越了美国国家利益。正如我在今年早些时候达沃斯的一次演讲中所解释的那样，我认为北京正在建设的社会信用体系，如果任其扩张，可能不仅在中国，而且在全球范围内敲响开放社会的丧钟。独裁者们将急切地购买中国公司的技术，使自己在政治和财政上依赖中国，同时在全世界扩张北京的政治控制体系。
As founder of the Open Society Foundations, my interest in defeating Xi Jinping’s China goes beyond U.S. national interests. As I explained in a speech in Davos earlier this year, I believe that the social-credit system Beijing is building, if allowed to expand, could sound the death knell of open societies not only in China but also around the globe. Despots will be eager to buy the know-how of Chinese companies, making them politically and financially dependent on China and expanding Beijing’s systems of political control world-wide.