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1990 (inferred) · memo · 原文约 782 词

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第三季度客户信函附录　发件人：霍华德·S·马克斯　事由：通往业绩之路

Addendum to Third Quarter Client Letter From: Howard S. Marks Re: The Route to Performance

我们都追求超越平均水平的投资业绩，但如何实现这一目标仍是核心问题。随着年岁增长，我对这一课题的看法日益聚焦，而九月底发生的两件事——尤其是它们并列出现的时点——让我更加清楚要如何（以及不要如何）去追求那些卓越的回报。

首先，《华尔街日报》刊登了一篇关于某家知名资产管理公司业绩落后的文章。该公司截至八月的十二个月股票业绩落后标普 500 指数 1840 个基点，由此其五年业绩也跌至标普之下。公司总裁解释说，他们大胆的超配和低配并没有错，只是行动过早。以下是他的解释，我强烈不同意：

如果你想跻身基金经理前 5%，你也必须愿意接受垫底 5% 的可能。

上述说法让我想起我在 1988 年二季度致可转换债券客户信中提到的一只可转换共同基金。该基金在 1987 年前八个月持有大量普通股，此后转为持有现金。结果，其当年回报比平均可转换基金高出逾 1600 个基点，领先第二名基金 945 个基点。在接下来的半年里，其策略同样特立独行……但这次错了，业绩大幅落后，足以抵消 1987 年的大部分成就，并将其 18 个月业绩拖回平庸区间。我当时对此的观察与上面那位基金经理如出一辙，只是站在反面立场：

……为了追求远离常态且更优的业绩，你必须做的事情会暴露你于远离常态且更差的可能性。

这些案例说明，为追求卓越业绩而采取的激进举措，其错误概率与正确概率一样大。更糟的是，大幅超越平均和大幅落后平均的年份叠加，最终可能形成一段以波动和平庸为特征的长期记录。

We all seek investment performance which is above average, but how to achieve it remains a major question. My views on the subject have come increasingly into focus as the years have gone by, and two events in late September -- and especially their juxtaposition -- made it even clearer how (and how not) to best pursue those superior results. First, there was an article in the Wall Street Journal about a prominent money management firm's lagging performance. Its equity results were 1,840 basis points behind the S&P 500 for the twelve months through August, and as a result its five-year performance had fallen behind the S&P as well. The president of the firm explained that its bold over- and under-weightings weren't wrong, just too early. Here is his explanation, with which I strongly disagree: If you want to be in the top 5% of money managers, you have to be willing to be in the bottom 5%, too. The above calls to mind a convertible mutual fund I discussed in my second quarter 1988 letter to convertible clients. The fund held large amounts of common stock in the first eight months of 1987 and cash after that. As a result, its return was more than 1,600 basis points better than the average convertible fund for the year, and 945 b.p. ahead of the second-place fund. In the next half year, its tactics were equally divergent ... but wrong this time, producing performance which was far enough behind to negate the majority of its 1987 achievement and pull its 18-month results well back into the pack. My observation at that time mirrored the fund manager quoted above, but from a negative viewpoint: . . . in order to strive for performance which is far different from the norm and better, you must do things which expose you to the possibility of being far different from the norm and worse. These cases illustrate that bold steps taken in pursuit of great performance can just as easily be wrong as right. Even worse, a combination of far above-average and far belowaverage years can lead to a long-term record which is characterized by volatility and mediocrity. U

作为替代方案，我想引用中西部一家大型养老基金的做法，上个月我与该基金的主管交谈过。该基金股票投资组合去年的回报率

As an alternative, I would like to cite the approach of a major mid-West pension plan whose director I spoke with last month. The return on the plan's equities over the last

十四年来，在这位先生及其前任的领导下，一直遥遥领先于标普 500 指数。他与我分享了他认为的关键所在：

我们在此期间从未有一年低于第 47 百分位，或直至 1990 年，从未高于第 27 百分位。因此，就整段十四年而言，我们处于第 4 百分位。

我坚信，试图通过连续多年跻身前十之列来取得卓越的长期记录，难以如愿。相反，每年力求比平均水平略好一点——并通过纪律在逆境中取得远超同侪的相对表现——才是：

fourteen years, under the direction of this man and his predecessors, has been way ahead of the S&P 500. He shared with me what he considered the key: We have never had a year below the 47th percentile over that period or, until 1990, above the 27th percentile. As a result, we are in the fourth percentile for the fourteen year period as a whole. I feel strongly that attempting to achieve a superior long term record by stringing together a run of top-decile years is unlikely to succeed. Rather, striving to do a little better than average every year -- and through discipline to have highly superior relative results in bad times -- is: -

更不容易带来剧烈波动，更不容易造成无法挽回的巨大损失，最重要的是，考虑到我们都只是凡人，更容易行得通。

less likely to produce extreme volatility, less likely to produce huge losses which can't be recouped and, most importantly, more likely to work (given the fact that all of us are only human).

简单说，养老基金的业绩记录告诉我的是，在股票投资上，只要你能避开输家（以及亏损的年份），赢家自然会照顾好自己。我坚信这一点在我的团队擅长的机会型细分领域同样成立——取得长期超平均表现的最佳基础，就是不发生灾难。正是因为这个原因，追求持续性和保护，而非单一年份的辉煌，是我们所有投资产品共同的主线：

在可转换债券上，我们坚持，对潜在上涨空间的判断必须伴随着高于平均水平的抗跌能力。

Simply put, what the pension fund's record tells me is that, in equities, if you can avoid losers (and losing years), the winners will take care of themselves. I believe most strongly that this holds true in my group's opportunistic niches as well -- that the best foundation for above-average long term performance is an absence of disasters. It is for this reason that a quest for consistency and protection, not single-year greatness, is a common thread underlying all of our investment products: In convertibles , we insist that our call on potential appreciation be accompanied by above average resistance to declines. U

在高收益债券领域，我们追求的是通过规避信用损失来提升相对业绩，而非追逐更高但更不确定的收益率。

In high yield bonds , we strive to raise our relative performance by avoiding credit losses, not by reaching for higher (but more uncertain) yields.

在困境公司债务投资中，我们只买入那些我们认为成本价已被资产价值完全覆盖的标的。

In distressed company debt , we buy only where we believe our cost price is fully covered by asset values. U

总会有一些年份和市场环境下，一切顺利时，那些承担更多风险的人会比我们做得更好。然而，从长远来看，我坚信，追求持续略高于平均水平的相对表现——并在艰难时期防范绝对业绩不佳——将比“奋力一搏”更为有效。

There will always be cases and years in which, when all goes right, those who take on more risk will do better than we do. In the long run, however, I feel strongly that seeking relative performance which is just a little bit above average on a consistent basis -- with protection against poor absolute results in tough times -- will prove more effective than "swinging for the fences."

October 12, 1990