告诉我我错了
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
请告诉我我错了。
Tell Me I’m Wrong
我的读者待我不薄。他们纵容我剖析旧事的癖好,还送来暖心的鼓励之辞。为回报这份厚意,我打算涉足一个我素来回避的话题:美国经济的未来。
这份备忘录不谈整体前景,只讲让我忧心的方面。在我看来,每位投资者要么偏重忧思,要么偏重梦想。我已多次坦言:我是个忧思型的人。这么一说,我便免去了描绘整个未来的责任。我只谈负面,从眼下的问题说起,一直谈到体制层面的痼疾(后者部分内容呼应了 2008 年 8 月 28 日《什么让我忧心》一文的主题)。至于另一面的故事,我建议你去请教那些如今似乎掌管市场的乐观派。
My readers treat me well. They indulge my penchant for dissecting the past, and they send kind messages of encouragement. To repay their generosity, I’m going to venture into something I usually avoid: the future of the U.S. economy. This memo won’t be about the future in general, just the elements I find worrisome. As I see it, every investor is either predominantly a worrier or predominantly a dreamer. I’ve come clean many times: I’m a worrier. By saying that, I absolve myself of having to describe the whole future. I’m going to cover the negatives, starting with the immediate and ending with the systemic (some of the latter repeats themes from “What Worries Me,” August 28, 2008). For the other side of the story, I’d suggest you consult the optimists who seem to be in charge of the markets these days.
近期展望
有一点毋庸置疑:全球金融市场的反弹已经跑在了基本面前面。2009 年初,多数旁观者预期经济总体疲弱,担心消费者和银行的行为会保持保守。他们 100% 说对了,基本面至今依然脆弱。然而,这轮反弹超出了我所知的任何预期。
市场参与者紧紧抓住那些细弱的“绿色嫩芽”:一些东西在下降,但速度放缓;或者不再恶化;或者开始好转,尽管步履蹒跚(例如,“在全国几家最大的银行,消费者贷款坏账数量开始趋于平稳。”《纽约时报》,1 月 21 日)。大部分好消息都落在这些类别里;几乎没有任何消息让人眼前一亮。我们没看到多少压倒性的积极经济新闻,尽管事实是(a)今天的比较基准是去年同期非常疲弱的时期,(b)美元走低 10%-20% 让我们的出口变得更便宜,(c)政府出台了巨量刺激措施。报道的增长往往只有十分之几个百分点,前几天我开车时听的电台评论员说:“新招聘人数几乎等于裁员人数。” 这并不让我觉得我们正处于强劲复苏之中,或正在走向强劲复苏。
尤其是,大多数公司的销售仍然相当疲软。经济在所谓的“顶线”上几乎没产生什么增长,而国内生产总值正是基于这条顶线。相反,报告的利润增长在很大程度上靠削减成本支撑。但“削减成本”和“生产率提升”不过是好听的说法,实际意思是公司在用更少的劳动力勉强维持。因此,雇主的生产率提升可能就是员工的失业。这对
The Near Term One thing is indisputable: the rally in financial markets worldwide has outpaced the fundamentals. At the beginning of 2009, most onlookers expected a generally weak economy and were concerned that the behavior of consumers and banks would remain conservative. They were 100% right, and fundamentals are still tenuous. And yet, the rally has exceeded all expectations of which I’m aware. Market participants have grasped at slender “green shoots”: things that are declining but at a slower rate, or that have stopped getting worse, or that have begun to improve, albeit anemically (e.g., “At some of the nation’s largest lenders, the number of consumer loans that are going bad is starting to level off.” The New York Times, January 21). Most of the good news falls into those categories; little or nothing has blown anyone’s socks off. We haven’t seen much economic news that’s overwhelmingly positive, despite the fact that (a) today’s comparisons are against very weak periods a year ago, (b) our exports have been made cheaper by a dollar that’s 10-20% lower, and (c) there’s been an enormous amount of government stimulus. The gains being reported are often in tenths of a percent, and the other day my drive-time radio commentator said, “Hirings are almost equal to firings.” That doesn’t tell me we’re in the midst of a strong recovery, or on track for one. In particular, most companies’ sales remain quite weak. The economy is generating very little growth at the so-called “top line” on which Gross Domestic Product is based. Rather, the profit gains being reported have been aided in large part by cost cutting. But “cost cutting” and “productivity gains” are nice-sounding ways of saying companies are getting by with less labor. Thus the employer’s productivity gain can be the employee’s job loss. It doesn’t bode well for
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如果商业活动的水平,即收入所体现的规模,没有增长,那么整体福利、消费者支出或 GDP 增长也不会受益;GDP 并不会因利润率扩大而获益。
the general welfare, consumer spending or GDP growth if the level of business activity, as seen in revenues, isn’t rising; GDP doesn’t benefit from profit margin expansion.
依赖政府刺激
大约一年前,政府以大规模刺激计划出手拯救经济。以大萧条为参照,伯南克等人决心限制流动性收缩、支持金融机构、鼓励经济活动。有人说花钱太多,由此产生的赤字令人担忧,而且计划彻底失败,因为经济仍萎靡不振,失业率居高不下。
但增长缓慢并不意味着刺激失效。关键问题不是经济现在怎么样,而是跟没有刺激时相比,增长到底如何。“假如没有”这类问题基本无从回答,但我确信,比起得不到政府帮助的情形,我们眼下好得多。
住房销售疲软,但要是联邦政府没有直接或间接地为 80% 到 85% 的新增抵押贷款背书、没有为首套房买家提供 8000 美元税收抵免,销售又会是什么样?2009 年汽车销量要是没有“旧车换现金”计划,又会是多少?GDP 增长不算强劲,但要是政府支出没有实现两位数增长,又会怎样?
虽然并非所有钱都花在了刀刃上——纽约联邦储备银行行长威廉·达德利称之为“粗暴而混乱的解决方案”(见 2010 年 1 月 21 日《纽约时报》)——但刺激计划显然阻止了一个糟糕得多的结局。即便如此,经济反应依然温吞,我不禁怀疑,缓慢增长是否反映了负面的长期结构性趋势。这让我倾向于预期复苏乏力,而且要好几年才能回到接近危机前那种活力的状态。
我拿一个比喻来说:一辆抛锚的汽车(经济)被拖车(政府刺激)拽着走。拖车总有一天要放汽车下来,自己上路。汽车能自己跑起来吗?只能等着看。我觉得它更可能是磕磕绊绊地挪动,而不是劲头十足地往前冲。但至少我们不用再担心十五个月前那个比喻:一架引擎熄火的飞机。飞行途中失去动力的飞机,可比抛锚的汽车让人揪心多了。
Reliance on Government Stimulus A year or so ago, the government came to the rescue of the economy with massive stimulus. With the Great Depression as a reference point, Bernanke et al. were determined to limit the contraction in liquidity, support financial institutions and encourage economic activity. Some say too much has been spent, the resulting deficits are worrisome, and the program’s a flop, since the economy’s still languishing and unemployment remains high. But the fact that growth is sluggish doesn’t mean the stimulus has failed. The relevant question isn’t how the economy is doing, but how growth compares against what it would have been without the stimulus. “What if” questions like that are largely unanswerable, but I’m sure we’re much better off than we would have been without the government’s help. Home sales are weak, but what would they be if the federal government wasn’t directly or indirectly backing 80-85% of all new mortgages and providing $8,000 tax credits to first-time home buyers? What would 2009 auto sales have been without the “cash for clunkers” program? GDP growth is insubstantial, but what would it be if government spending hadn’t risen by double digits? Although not all the money has been well spent – “a blunt and messy solution” according to William Dudley, president of the New York Federal Reserve (The New York Times, January 21) – it seems clear the stimulus program has prevented a much more dire outcome. Regardless, the economy’s response is tepid, and I wonder whether the slow growth reflects negative underlying secular trends. This makes me tend toward an expectation that the recovery will be lackluster, and that it will take years before we get back to anything approaching the vibrancy of the period preceding the crisis. I fall back on the analogy of a stalled car (the economy) being pulled by a tow truck (government stimulus). The tow truck will want to let the car down one of these days and go on its way. Will the car be able to move on its own? We can only wait and see. I think it’s more likely to sputter along than it is to move forward energetically. But at least we don’t have to worry any longer about the analogy of fifteen months ago: an airplane whose engine has flamed out. A powerless plane in mid-flight presents a far more troubling image than a stalled car.
利率的作用
降息在政府终结危机、重振经济的过程中,扮演了极为重要的角色。
The Role of Interest Rates Interest rate reduction has played an extremely important part in the government’s efforts to end the crisis and bring the economy back to life.
通过降低短期利率(此处降至接近零的水平),政府使消费和投资更具吸引力,从而刺激经济。这是最直接的效果。
By reducing short-term interest rates (in this case to near-zero), the government makes it more attractive to spend and invest, stimulating the economy. This is the most direct effect.
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低利率也为金融机构提供了直接补贴,它们可以低价借款,再以较高利率放贷。(如果一家银行能以 1% 的利率从政府借入 100 美元,再以 6% 的利率贷出,那就如同政府给这家银行开了张 5 美元的支票——只是方式更隐蔽,或许也让普通民众不那么反感,还可能带来正向的乘数效应。)考虑到 2008 年金融机构的状况,这一因素显然是至关重要的。
Lower rates also provide a direct subsidy to financial institutions, which can borrow cheaply and lend at higher rates. (If a bank can borrow $100 from the government at 1% and lend it out at 6%, it’s as if the government wrote the bank a check for $5 – but more subtle and perhaps less vexing to Main Street, and with potentially positive multiplier effects.) Given the state of financial institutions in 2008, it’s clear this element was essential.
还有第三个不那么直接的影响。国库券利率低到谷底,逼着人们追逐高回报,去冒更大的风险。一年前,靠利息过日子的退休者翻开年终基金对账单,看到自己买的短期国库券或货币市场基金回报率接近零。他抓起电话打给公司说:“把我从那个基金里撤出来,转投那个能付 15% 回报的”……于是就成了高收益债券投资者。
There’s a third, less direct effect. Rock-bottom rates on Treasurys push people to chase high returns by undertaking riskier investments. A year ago, the pensioner living on interest opened his year-end mutual fund statement and saw that the return on his T-bill or money market fund was close to zero. He grabbed the phone and called the company to say, “Get me out of that fund and into the one that’s paying 15%” . . . and so became a high yield bond investor.
从市场表现来看,显然有什么因素一直在推动投资回报走高,因为涨幅最大的恰恰是那些基本面风险最高的资产。一部分原因是去年那种过度避险和恐慌情绪总体缓解了,另一部分则是从过低价格中合理反弹。但毫无疑问,接近零的利率在其中扮演了重要角色。与大多数“药方”——无论是经济领域还是其他领域——一样,超低利率也引发了一些疑问:
It’s clear from the behavior of the markets that something has been goosing investment performance, since the best gains have been seen in the fundamentally riskiest assets. Part of it is general easing of the excessive risk aversion and fear of a year ago, and part is a justified rebound from too-low prices. But certainly near-zero interest rates have played a major part. As with most remedies – economic and otherwise – ultra-low interest rates raise questions:
如果利率回到市场水平,经济复苏还能持续吗?
金融机构在失去低利率补贴后,还能维持生存吗?
住宅房地产市场在没有廉价抵押贷款支持的情况下,能够复苏吗?
Will economic recovery continue if rates go to market levels? Will financial institutions remain viable without the subsidy of low rates? Can the residential real estate market recover without support from cheap mortgages?
但如果利率持续走低呢?
But what if rates remain low?
外国人还会继续借钱给美国填补赤字吗?如果国际市场对美元的需求减弱,没人想用美元投资于低收益的美国资产,美元对其它货币的汇率还撑得住吗?市场参与者大多习惯把汇率走势线性外推,而不是预测它会反转。那么,如果低利率导致美元走弱,非美国投资者会不会为了避开持续贬值而更加远离美元,进而让问题雪上加霜?
Will foreigners continue to lend the U.S. the money it needs to cover its deficits? Can the dollar hold its value against other currencies if international demand weakens for dollars with which to invest in the low-yielding U.S.? Most market participants tend to extrapolate currency movements (rather than project their reversal). So if low rates cause the dollar to weaken, will non-U.S. investors shy further from our currency to avoid continued weakness, exacerbating these issues?
全球考量要求更高的利率,但对抗国内经济疲软则依赖低利率。化解这一两难困境不会容易……也不会没有痛苦。
Global considerations call for higher rates, but fighting domestic economic weakness relies on low rates. Resolving this dilemma won’t be easy . . . or painless.
消费支出的重要性
消费支出占美国国内生产总值的三分之二,在信贷危机爆发前的十余年里,它是美国经济增长的关键支点。而这一支出快速增长的基础,在于消费信贷的可得性以及人们使用它的意愿。
消费信贷的创新和爆发——我认为始于 20 世纪 70 年代——让美国人得以花没有的钱,买买不起的东西。到了本世纪头十年,这一趋势进一步加剧:首套房贷款的信贷标准大幅放宽,原本称为“二套房贷款”的产品被激进扩张,并重新包装为“房屋”
The Importance of Consumer Spending At two-thirds of GDP, consumer spending was the linchpin of U.S. economic growth in the decade-plus leading up to the credit crisis. And the foundation for the rapid growth in that spending was the availability of consumer credit and the willingness to use it. The innovation and explosion of consumer credit, which I view as having begun in the 1970s, enabled Americans to spend money they didn’t have to buy things they couldn’t afford. This was compounded in the current decade by vastly lowered credit standards for first mortgages and by radical expansion of what used to be called second mortgages but were re-labeled “home
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房屋净值贷款。”这最后一块拼图,是过去十年储蓄率骤降至近乎为零。于是,消费者花光所有收入,在很多情况下,还入不敷出。这些趋势让支出增速超过了收入增速,为 GDP 增长添了不小的一把火。可似乎没几个人明白,房价上涨不是铁定的规律,也没人觉得背上看不到偿还途径的债务有什么不对。购物成了全民消遣,“投资型着装”“投资收藏品”这类风潮,让挥霍无度看起来倒像是理性之举。
当房价上涨势头坍塌、消费信贷和房屋贷款变得无处可寻,这一切便轰然瓦解。恐惧瞬间取代了消费者心中无边的乐观,购物成了可有可无的事,储蓄率反弹到 5% 左右——这意味着支出增速突然慢于收入增速(而收入本身也在缩水)。曾经托举经济的消费趋势,如今成了拖累经济下滑的领头羊。同时,企业也没了扩充库存或扩大工厂产能的理由,于是放缓的势头又传导到了制造业。
未来会怎样?消费会回升吗?还是说这股转向节俭储蓄的风气会就此扎根?我最近读到一篇文章,对后一种可能嗤之以鼻,说“人们还是想要更好的生活。”我不怀疑这一点,可如果那“更好的生活”被定义为攒下更多钱、背上更少的债,而不是换辆新车或再添个手提包呢?
据 12 月 17 日的《华尔街日报》报道:
……从制鞋商到金融服务、再到豪华酒店,各类企业都不指望美国消费者短期内回到挥金如土的老路上。它们看到,消费者从这场惨痛衰退中走出来时,带着一种全新的心态:谨慎、务实、更有社会责任感,也对炫耀财富的做派感到难为情。
审慎之道,在于人该有点积蓄。但我得赶紧补一句:“该”不等于“会”。有句老话说,“低估美国消费者的头脑,还从没让谁破产过。”我倒更乐见消费者储蓄,而不是重回过度消费的老路——长远来看,这对家庭和经济都更健康,既能留出应急的储备,也提供了可用于投资的资本。但如果他们不这么做,我也不会觉得意外。
equity loans.” The final element in the equation was the decline in the savings rate to roughly zero in the last decade. Thus consumers spent all they made and, in many cases, more. These trends enabled growth in spending to exceed the growth in incomes, adding substantially to the growth in GDP. Few people seemed to understand that increases in home prices weren’t inexorable, or that there was anything wrong with incurring debts without a foreseeable way to repay them. Shopping became a national pursuit, and fads like “investment dressing” and “investing in collectibles” made reckless spending seem rational. This all fell apart when the uptrend in home prices collapsed and consumer credit and home loans became unavailable. Fear suddenly replaced limitless optimism among consumers, shopping became dispensable, and the savings rate rebounded to around 5% – meaning spending suddenly grew slower than incomes (which themselves were contracting). The trend in consumer spending, which had buoyed the economy, now led its decline. Further, businesses saw no reason to expand inventories or factory capacity, transferring the slowdown to the manufacturing sector. What will happen in the future? Will spending rebound? Or will the swing toward frugality and savings be permanent? I recently read an article which dismissed the latter possibility, saying, “People still want a better life.” I don’t doubt that, but what if that “better life” comes to be defined as having more savings and less debt, rather than a new car or another handbag? According to The Wall Street Journal of December 17: . . . businesses ranging from shoemakers to financial services to luxury hotels don’t expect American consumers to return to their spendthrift ways anytime soon. They see consumers emerging from the punishing downturn with a new mindset: careful, practical, more socially conscious and embarrassed by flashy shows of wealth. Prudence dictates that people should have savings. But I hasten to point out that “should” isn’t the same as “will.” There’s a maxim that “No one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American consumer.” I’d prefer to see consumers save rather than return to over-spending – it’s healthier for families and for the economy in the long run, providing reserves in case of emergency and capital for investment. But I won’t be shocked if they don’t.
房地产展望
与住宅市场一样,商业房地产在危机爆发前的几年里也经历了过度膨胀。投资者和基金——或许是信奉房地产无论价格高低都是抵御通胀的良策这一迷思——成为激进的买家。
资本化率,或称“上限利率”(要求的净营业收入与价格之比),跌至 4%,有时甚至更低,意味着市盈率达到 25 倍或以上。物业买家将这些比率应用于峰值营业收入,并用大量债务为购买融资。
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The Outlook for Real Estate Just as happened in homes, commercial real estate saw an explosion of excesses in the years leading up to the crisis. Investors and funds – perhaps pursuing the myth that real estate is a good inflation hedge regardless of the price paid – were aggressive buyers. Capitalization rates or “cap rates” (the demanded ratio of net operating income to price) fell to 4% and sometimes less, implying price/earnings ratios of 25 or more. Property buyers applied those ratios to peak operating income and financed their purchases with copious amounts of debt. 2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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目前,大多数借款人都在避免违约,有时甚至有贷款机构助长“假装与延期”的做法。他们假装的是,商业房地产贷款到期时会被偿还。
在未来几年里,似乎不可避免的是:
Right now, most borrowers are avoiding default, sometimes abetted by lenders practicing “pretend and extend.” What they’re pretending is that commercial real estate loans will be repayable upon maturity. It seems inescapable that over the next few years:
更高的空置率和更低的租金将使净营业收入无法回到上一个周期的峰值水平,
物业买家不会再回到危机前的资本化率中寻找足够的风险补偿,
金融机构也不会再像三四年前那样,为物业购买价格提供同样高比例的贷款。
higher vacancy rates and lower rents will keep net operating income from returning to the peak levels of the last cycle, property buyers won’t go back to finding sufficient risk compensation in pre-crisis cap rates, and financial institutions aren’t going to lend the same high percentage of property purchase prices as they did 3-4 years ago.
这些因素中的任何一项,都会让商业地产难以重新回到危机前的价格水平,也难以按那些价格获得融资或再融资。三者叠加,意味着如今许多地产处于“倒挂”状态——即其市场价值低于其背负的债务。
一栋价值 8000 万美元的建筑,却抵押着 1 亿美元的贷款,这笔贷款还能偿还或再融资吗?可能性不大。而当前大量商业地产正是这种情况,因此许多房地产贷款到期时将无法偿付。这意味着投资者将普遍蒙受损失,银行则要计提减值。
许多中小型银行的资产组合中,本地房地产和建筑贷款占比过高。它们轻信了房地产安全的迷思,忘了分散地域风险的必要性。因此,除了房地产破产潮,未来几年还可能看到众多小银行倒闭。
Any one of these factors would make it hard for commercial real estate to again command its pre-crisis prices, or for it to be financeable or refinanceable at those levels. Together, the three elements mean many properties are “upside-down” today. That is, their market value is less than the debt against them. Will a $100 million loan secured by an $80 million building be repaid or refinanced? Unlikely. And since that description covers a great deal of commercial real estate today, many real estate loans will go unpaid at maturity. That implies widespread losses for investors and write-downs for lenders. Many small and medium-sized banks have too much local real estate and construction loans in their portfolios. They fell for the myth of safety in real estate and forgot about the need for geographic diversification. Thus, in addition to real estate bankruptcies, the next few years may see numerous small bank failures.
州与地方政府
如今关于地方财政的报道之少,让我颇感意外。除了经常性地入不敷出(这要归功于借贷的奇迹),许多州和地方政府还养成了在经济景气时逐年加码预算的习惯,确立或扩大不可逆的支出项目。因此,如今销售税、所得税和房产税收入大幅下滑,却无法以相应的支出削减来应对。
于是,纽约和加利福尼亚等地出现了巨额赤字——这是收入疲软时期支出强劲的结果。后者,也就是我的家乡加州,情况更加复杂,原因有三:(a)选民有权通过公投推行新的支出项目,而不必操心钱从何来;(b)其中最著名的公投——第 13 号提案——实质上阻止了房屋按升值幅度重新评估;(c)年度预算须经两院各三分之二议员通过,这几乎排除了任何不受欢迎的苦药。正因如此,加州才 resort 到用代金券支付账单(这一做法现已中止)以及让州政府雇员强制休假。
State and Local Governments I’m surprised how little we read today about municipal finances. In addition to regularly spending more than they took in (thanks to the miracle of borrowing), many state and local governments got into the habit of ratcheting up budgets in good times, establishing or expanding irreversible spending programs. Thus, today’s substantial declines in sales, income and property tax revenues can’t be met with corresponding cuts in spending. So now we have massive deficits in places like New York and California – the result of strong spending at a time of soft income. The situation in the latter, my home state, is further complicated by (a) the ability of voters to enact new spending programs through referendums without having to worry about where the money will come from, (b) the fact that the most famous referendum of them all – Proposition 13 – essentially prevents homes from being reassessed to reflect appreciation and (c) the requirement that the annual budget be approved by two-thirds of the legislators in each house, virtually ruling out any unpleasant medicine. It’s for that reason that California resorted to paying its bills in scrip (a practice since discontinued) and furloughing state employees.
2010 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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未来几年,各州和地方政府会破产吗?这对它们的债券持有人以及整个市政债券市场会有什么影响?破产又将如何与市政债券发行人承诺以全部信用和信用担保支付利息和本金(从而隐含地承诺无限制增税)相协调?联邦政府会作何反应?如果它打开金库救助挥霍无度的州,那些谨慎避开麻烦的州又会怎么想?这里没有答案,但麻烦已经显而易见。
Will states and cities go bankrupt in coming years? What will be the effect on their bondholders, and on the municipal bond market as a whole? How will bankruptcy be reconciled with municipal bond issuers’ promises to dedicate their full faith and credit to paying interest and principal (and thus, implicitly, to raise taxes without limitation)? How will the federal government respond? If it opens its coffers to bail out profligate states, what will that say to states that were prudent enough to stay out of trouble? No answers here, but lots of trouble in sight.
我们与中国共舞的历程
事实如下:
Our Dance with China Here are the facts:
中国资源丰富,无论是人力还是其他方面。它的产品比发达国家更便宜。人民币可能被低估,这增强了其作为出口国的竞争力。美国从中国购买的商品比卖给中国的多。这意味着美元不断在中国累积。美国不得不借回这些美元,以填补其财政和贸易赤字。我们更希望低利率,以减少利息支出,以及弱势美元,这样我们就能用贬值货币偿还债务(好像有这好事!)。中国外汇储备不断增长,必须大量投资美元资产。中国希望高利率和强势美元,以最大化我们未来向其支付的价值。中国大概想把储备投资从美元上分散出去,但(a)很难找到更好的投资去处,(b)这样做会进一步削弱美元,而中国已经持有大量美元。
China has vast resources, human and otherwise. It produces goods cheaper than the developed countries. China’s likely undervalued currency aids its competitiveness as an exporter. The U.S. buys more from China than it sells to China. That means dollars keep piling up in China. The U.S. has to borrow back those dollars to fund its fiscal and trade deficits. We’d prefer low interest rates in order to minimize our interest payments, and a weak dollar so we can repay our debts (as if!) in devalued currency. China, with its reserves growing, has to invest large amounts of dollars. China wants high rates and a strong dollar in order to maximize the value of our future payments to them. China would probably like to diversify the investment of its reserves away from the dollar, but (a) it’s hard to figure out where to better invest them and (b) doing so would further weaken the dollar, of which China already owns so many.
不懂经济学有个好处,就是我不需要对这一切将会如何演变发表看法。但我敢肯定,这背后意味着相当大的不确定性。
The great thing about not being an economist is that I don’t have a view on how all of this will play out. But I’m sure it implies considerable uncertainty.
工作从何而来?
我很好奇,未来什么工作会填满数百万美国人的双手——他们迄今还靠“体力”工作维生。十九世纪末,农业机械化了,许多人离开南方,去中西部找制造业的活计。后来,制造业又逐步自动化,经济走上全球化,美国工厂工人需求骤降。如今,成本高昂的美国已鲜有制造业。现在,越来越多的就业机会集中在服务业、政府、医疗、零售、知识产权和资讯行业。
在《我忧虑什么》那篇文章里,我表达了对美国经济制造业占比日益萎缩的担忧,以及对这一后果的困惑。人口持续增长,制造业继续收缩,工作将从哪里来?
Wherefore Jobs? I wonder what will occupy the millions of Americans dependent until now on “physical” jobs. In the late nineteenth century, agriculture became mechanized and many people left the South to find manufacturing jobs in the Midwest. Then manufacturing was automated over time, and the economy went global, reducing the need for American factory workers. Today, relatively little manufacturing takes place in the high-cost U.S. Increasing percentages of our jobs are now in services, government, healthcare, retailing, intellectual property and information. In “What Worries Me,” I expressed concern about an American economy that manufactures less and less, as well as puzzlement regarding the consequences. Where will jobs come from as the population grows and manufacturing continues to shrink?
2010 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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除了要填补自 2007 年 12 月经济衰退开始以来流失的 720 万个就业岗位外,美国经济每月还需要新增 10 万个岗位才能跟上人口增长。罗格斯大学经济学家约瑟夫·塞尼卡估计,如果就业市场能回到 1990 年代的快速扩张节奏——私营部门每年新增 125 万个就业岗位,是 2001 至 2007 年期间增速的两倍——美国失业率要到 2017 年底才能重回 5%。(《华尔街日报》,2009 年 10 月 5 日)
上届总统竞选中似乎流传着“我们给每个人发一张文凭和一台笔记本电脑”的说法,但我不觉得这能多大程度上解决问题,因为(a)并非每个强壮的人都能转去做案头工作,尤其是考虑到我们的公共教育体系正陷入危机,(b)信息经济的一个优势本该是完成业务所需工人更少。
简而言之,我担心复苏期间就业增长缓慢,失业和就业不足率将顽固地高于以往水平。这对短期周期性复苏或长期前景都不是好兆头。
In addition to replacing 7.2 million lost jobs [since the recession began in December 2007], the economy needs an additional 100,000 a month to keep up with population growth. If the job market returns to the rapid pace of the 1990s – adding 1.25 million private-sector jobs a year, double the 2001-2007 pace – the U.S. wouldn’t get back to a 5% unemployment rate until late 2017, Rutgers University economist Joseph Seneca estimated. (The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2009) “We’ll give each person a diploma and a laptop” seems to resonate from the last presidential campaign, but I don’t see that as much of an answer to the problem since (a) not every strong back can be redirected to a desk job, especially given that our system of public education is in crisis, and (b) one of the advantages of an information economy is supposed to be that it needs fewer workers to get business done. In short, I worry that the growth in jobs in the recovery will be slow, and that unemployment and underemployment will remain stubbornly at higher levels than in the past. That doesn’t bode well for either the short-term cyclical recovery or the long-term outlook.
全球竞争力
如今世界已是统一大市场,消费者可以从全球任何地方挑选商品,生产和销售的成功在很大程度上取决于成本竞争力。多年来,美国产品的优越性等因素削弱了外国竞争。其结果之一是,美国工人享受着全球最高的工资和生活水平。但现在,中国、韩国等国家已大幅超越了我们的制造优势,它们生产的产品不仅更便宜,有时甚至更优质。
显而易见,如今用高成本投入生产的商品无法在竞争中胜出。为了让美国商品具备竞争力,我们的成本必须下降,随之而来的还有我们相对的生活水平。如果别国工人生产的商品并不明显逊色,凭什么我们国家的工人就能享有更高的生活水平?
这些趋势已在航空和汽车等“传统行业”中显现。例如,汽车业破产重组的主要目标之一就是限制退休人员的终身福利。我认为,我们将继续看到美国相对成本下降,这有利于我们的竞争力,却损害了工人的利益。
Global Competitiveness Now that the world is one big market and consumers have their choice of goods from anywhere in it, success in producing and selling is largely a function of cost competitiveness. For years, things like the superiority of American products blunted foreign competition. One of the results was that the American worker enjoyed the highest wages and standard of living in the world. But now China, Korea and other nations have eclipsed much of our manufacturing advantage, allowing them to produce goods that are not just cheaper but at times better. It stands to reason that today, goods produced with high-priced inputs will not compete successfully. In order for U.S. goods to be competitive, our costs will have to come down, and with them our relative standard of living. Why should any country’s workers be able to command a higher standard of living if the goods they produce aren’t demonstrably superior? These trends have already taken effect in “legacy industries” like airlines and autos. For example, one of the main goals of the auto bankruptcies was to limit retirees’ lifetime benefits. I think we’ll continue to see declining relative costs in the U.S., to the betterment of our competitiveness but the detriment of our workers.
通货膨胀、汇率与利率
我最常被问到的宏观问题,就是通胀前景。作为一个经历过 1970 年代滞胀、为贷款付过 22.75% 利息的人,我认为这个问题非常值得认真思考。
1970 年代的超高通胀,导火索是 1973 年的石油禁运。劳动合同和福利计划里包含的生活成本调整条款,在此基础上层层加码,形成了一种成本加成循环,最终把物价推上了天。
Inflation, Exchange Rates and Interest Rates The macro question I get most often concerns the outlook for inflation. And as someone who lived through stagflation in the 1970s and paid interest at 22-¾%, I think it’s very much worth considering. The hyperinflation of the ’70s was sparked by the Oil Embargo of 1973. Labor contracts and benefit plans containing cost-of-living adjustments built on that to create a cost-plus cycle in 2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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通胀推动工资上涨,工资又进一步加剧通胀,如此循环往复。物价上涨让民众心生恐慌,纷纷囤积商品以避开日后更高的价格,由此引发需求拉动型通胀。人们还借钱投资土地等资产,因为他们相信,无论为融资支付多高的利率,资产价格的涨幅都会更快(通胀思维的典型表现)。
没人知道怎么解决这个问题。我常去听“悲观博士”和“末日博士”的演讲(分别是第一波士顿的经济学家阿尔·沃伊尼洛沃和所罗门兄弟的亨利·考夫曼),看他们俩谁更令人沮丧。他们大谈要把通胀压到“可接受水平”有多难。有一天,我听到有人问“可接受水平”的定义,得到的回答是“比当下水平低三分之一”。
不过,最终在 20 世纪 80 年代初,保罗·沃尔克和美联储实施了痛苦的解决方案——大幅提高利率,通胀随之回落,股市一飞冲天。此后 25 年里,通胀攀升和利率上行作为潜在风险源被人遗忘。
如今,美国劳动力缺乏要求大幅加薪或生活费用调整的能力。此外,宏观经济疲软也不支持需求拉动型通胀。强劲通胀通常伴随更高水平的繁荣和比我预期的更强劲的商品需求。最后,通胀往往以制造商拥有定价权为前提,而我也看不到这一点。
这些因素都不支持通胀上升。然而,由于其他力量——主要是金融和国际层面的——我们购买那些已严重依赖的进口商品,可能需要花越来越多的美元(也就是通胀)。
which inflation lifted wages, contributing further to inflation, and so forth. Rising prices frightened people into demand-pull inflation by convincing them to stock up on goods to avoid higher prices later. And people borrowed to invest in assets like land out of a belief that no matter what interest rate they paid to finance their purchase, the asset’s price would increase at a faster rate (the epitome of inflationary thinking). No one knew how to solve the problem. I used to go to hear “Dr. Gloom” and “Dr. Doom” (economists Al Wojnilower of First Boston and Henry Kaufman of Salomon Brothers) compete to be more depressing. They talked about how hard it would be to get inflation down to “an acceptable level.” One day, I heard someone ask for the definition of “an acceptable level.” He was told “one-third less than whatever it is at the time.” Finally, however, in the early 1980s Paul Volcker and the Fed implemented the painful solution of significantly higher interest rates, inflation subsided, and the stock market took off. Over the next 25 years, rising inflation and interest rates were forgotten as possible sources of risk. Today, labor in the U.S. lacks the power to demand strong wage increases or COLAs. Further, the sluggish macro picture argues against demand-pull. Strong inflation is usually associated with higher levels of prosperity and stronger demand for goods than I foresee. Finally, inflation often presupposes pricing power on the part of manufacturers, which I also don’t see. Those are the factors that argue against an increase in inflation. However, because of other forces – primarily financial and international – it could take increasing numbers of dollars to buy a given quantity of the imported goods on which we’ve become so dependent (a.k.a. inflation).
如我之前所说,债务人希望出现通胀,这样他们就能用贬值后的货币偿还债务。为达到这个目的,债务国有能力通过增发货币来贬低本币。最明显的例子,请看 2008 年 10 月 15 日《消极主义的限度》一文,讲的是魏玛共和国。一战后,德国被课以无力承担的战争赔款,于是干脆把 1000 马克的纸币加盖成“100 万马克”。转眼间,它造出了足够的马克来还清对全世界的债务……却也摧毁了自己货币的购买力。
美元若因需求减少而走弱(例如作为中国储备资产的投资工具),同样意味着从国外买入每件商品要花更多美元。
最后,黄金这类“价值储存手段”之所以有价值,仅仅因为人们一致认可。货币也是如此。挥霍无度的开支、失控的赤字以及国际地位的下降,都可能削弱美元作为储备货币的角色,进一步侵蚀其购买力。
As I mentioned earlier, debtors want there to be inflation so they can repay their debts with currency that’s worth less. To accomplish this, debtor nations have the ability to debase their currencies by printing more of it. For the clearest example, see “The Limits to Negativism” (October 15, 2008) on the subject of the Weimar Republic. Post-World War I Germany was assessed war reparations it couldn’t afford, so it simply over-stamped its 1,000 mark notes “1 million marks.” All of a sudden it had created enough marks to pay its debt to the world . . . and destroyed the purchasing power of its currency. A dollar weakened by reduced demand for it (e.g., as a vehicle for the investment of China’s reserves) would, likewise, equate to more dollars per item bought from abroad. Finally, “stores of value” like gold hold value only because people agree they will. The same goes for currencies. Profligate spending, runaway deficits and declining world position could reduce the role of the dollar as a reserve currency, again cutting into its purchasing power.
我自然没有能力预测美元购买力的下降(也就是一波强劲的通货膨胀)。不过,我确实觉得这件事非常值得担忧。
1987 年保罗·沃尔克离开美联储时,在首次公开露面中被人问道:“利率会升还是降?”他颇有先见之明地回答:“会。”当然,他的答案至今仍然成立。但从今天的水平看,我认为利率更可能上升而不是下降(后者几乎没有空间)。
I’m certainly in no position to predict a decline in the purchasing power of the dollar (that is, a bout of strong inflation). However, I do think it’s very much worth worrying about. When Paul Volcker left the Fed in 1987, he was asked at his first public appearance, “Will interest rates go up or down?” He answered presciently: “Yes.” Of course, his answer is still the right one. But from today’s levels, I think rates are more likely to go up than down (there’s so little room for the latter).
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对美元的信心下降,意味着要吸引非美国买家投资美元资产,就得提高利率。而且,即便在国内,(a)总有一天政府会不再压低利率,(b)更高的通胀会要求利率上升,以补偿债务偿还时美元购买力下降的事实。基于这些原因,我认为投资者必须考虑通胀上升、美元走弱和利率升高的前景。该怎么应对?可能的选项很多:
Reduced faith in the dollar means it would take higher interest rates to attract non-U.S. buyers to dollar investments. And, even domestically, (a) one of these days the government will stop holding rates down and (b) higher inflation would require rates to rise to compensate for the fact that the dollars with which debts are repaid will buy less. For all these reasons, I think investors must consider the prospect of higher inflation, dollar weakness and higher interest rates. What to do about them? The list of possibilities is long:
买 TIPS。
买浮动利率债券。
买黄金(但只能在“合适”的价位买,而那个价位是多少?)
买实物资产,比如大宗商品、石油和房地产(同理)。
买外币。
做以外国货币计价的投资。
买那些能把上涨成本转嫁出去的公司的证券。
买那些持有大宗商品或外币计价资产的公司的证券。
买那些利润来自美国以外地区的公司的证券。
持有现金(等利率上升后再投资)。
卖出长期债券(甚至可能做空)。
Buy TIPS. Buy floating rate debt. Buy gold (but only at the “right” price, and what’s that?) Buy real assets, such as commodities, oil and real estate (ditto). Buy foreign currencies. Make investments denominated in foreign currencies. Buy the securities of companies that will be able to pass on increased costs. Buy the securities of companies that own commodities, or that own assets denominated in foreign currencies. Buy the securities of companies that earn their profits outside the U.S. Hold cash (to invest once interest rates have risen). Sell long-term bonds (and possibly go short).
这些行动能够从通胀加剧、美元贬值和利率上升中获利——或者提供调整的灵活性——这三者环环相扣。其中最重要的一条是最后一条:在通胀和利率走高的环境下,长期债券可能受伤最重,尤其是考虑到当前起点收益率已经很低。
最后一点:当我在回答关于通胀的常见问题时,我会问人们是否同意我的看法。通常他们都同意。然后我问他们愿意拿出投资组合的多大比例来对冲这些宏观力量。如果答案是 5%、10% 或 15%,我会指出这跟什么都不做差不多。问题在于你是否愿意投入至少 30% 到 40% 的比例。很少有人愿意。
但关键就在这里:说“我担心通胀”很容易,说“我对通胀担心到愿意采取切实行动的地步”则完全是另一回事。等你决定愿意投入多少比例时,请告诉我。
These are the actions that can profit from – or that provide the flexibility to adjust to – increased inflation, a decline in the dollar and increased interest rates, all of which are interconnected. The most important one is the last one: long-term bonds could suffer worst in an inflationary, higher-rate environment, especially given today’s low starting yields. One final point: When I provide this answer to the frequent question about inflation, I ask people whether they agree. Usually they do. Then I ask how much of their portfolio they’re willing to devote to protecting against these macro forces. If their answer is 5%, 10% or 15%, I point out that that’s pretty close to doing nothing. The question is whether you’re willing to devote at least 30-40%. Few people are. But that’s the thing: It’s easy to say, “I’m worried about inflation.” It’s something very different to say, “I’m worried enough about inflation to do something meaningful about it.” Let me know when you decide how much you’re willing to devote.
商业环境
把时间尺度拉到最远,我想谈谈几个我最宏观层面的担忧。我担心那些长期得不到治理的问题,比如我们庞大的财政赤字,以及资金严重不足的社会保障、医疗保险和教育体系。
The Environment for Business Moving all the way out on the timescale, I’d like to say a few words about some of my biggestpicture concerns. I worry about long-term problems that are being left untreated, such as our massive deficits and our under-funded Social Security, Medicare and education systems.
2010 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我担心政府干预企业决策的长期影响:比如,规定公司高管薪酬上限,或设定健康保险公司必须将保费收入的一定比例用于理赔。根据 11 月 24 日《福布斯》杂志的报道,奥巴马政府内阁部长中具有私营企业背景的比例,是自西奥多·罗斯福总统以来最低的。行政部门和立法机构里那些毫无商业经验的人,却在教企业如何经营。
最后,我担心民粹主义和反商情绪的高涨。我从未见过像如今这样对金融机构的负面态度。有华尔街背景的政府成员遭到猜疑;高收入被视为不义之财;银行和投资银行被看作在坑害美国,而非促进美国繁荣。幸灾乐祸之风盛行,人们巴不得成功的银行家倒霉。政客们火上浇油,逢迎民粹。选举在即,我预计候选人会争相比拼谁对华尔街更狠。
我在“让我担忧的事”中提到过,几十年前,当英国工会运动呈社会主义倾向、势头正盛时,我读到一段对美国商业成功原因的精妙解释:
英国工人看到老板开着劳斯莱斯驶出工厂,会说:“我真想在那辆车底下放颗炸弹。”美国工人看到老板开着凯迪拉克驶出工厂,会说:“总有一天我也要拥有一辆那样的车。”
更近一些,2005 年,托马斯·弗里德曼是这样对比新旧经济的:
法国选民试图在印度工程师准备一天工作 35 小时的世界里,保住一周 35 小时的工作制。祝他们好运……
“旧欧洲”的选民——法国、德国、荷兰和意大利——似乎在对他们的领导人说:让世界停下来,我们想下车;而印度选民则一直在对领导人说:让世界停下来,给我们造个垫脚凳,我们想上车……
几周前,德国社民党主席弗朗茨·明特费林将私人股本机构——它们收购陷入困境的企业,裁员重组后再卖掉——比作“蝗虫群”。
一位德国重量级政治家竟然靠攻击资本主义来拉票,这足以说明西欧未来十年会有多么动荡,因为这些日益老化、僵化的经济体——已经习惯了六周假期和几乎等同于就业的失业保障——在一个不断平坦化的世界中,正与东欧、印度和中国越来越紧密地融为一体。(《逐顶竞赛》,《纽约时报》,2005 年 6 月 3 日——着重号为原文所加)
资本主义、自由企业、亲商政策、适应能力、职业道德和利润——正是这些概念推动了世界上大多数物质进步。
2010 年橡树资本管理有限公司
I worry about the long-term impact of government involvement in business decisions: telling companies what they should pay top employees and setting minimums for the percentage of premium revenue that a health insurer should pay out in benefits, for example. The Obama administration has the smallest percentage of Cabinet secretaries with backgrounds in the private sector of any president since Teddy Roosevelt, according to the November 24 issue of Forbes. People in the executive and legislative branches with no experience in business are telling business how to operate. Lastly, I worry about the rising tide of populism and anti-business sentiment. I’ve never seen negative attitudes like those toward financial institutions today. Administration members with Wall Street backgrounds are regarded with suspicion; high incomes are considered wrongful; and banks and investment banks are seen as victimizing America, not rendering it prosperous. Schadenfreude is in the ascendancy, with people wishing ill for successful bankers. Politicians pander by throwing gasoline on the fire. With an election coming up, I expect candidates to compete to see who can be tougher on Wall Street. I mentioned in “What Worries Me” that decades ago, when a socialist-leaning labor movement was ascendant in the U.K., I came across a good explanation for the success of U.S. business: When the worker in England sees the boss drive out of the factory in his Rolls Royce, he says, “I’d like to put a bomb under that car.” When the American worker sees the boss drive out in his Cadillac, he says “I’d like to own a car like that someday.” More recently, in 2005, Thomas Friedman compared old and new economies as follows: French voters are trying to preserve a 35-hour work week in a world where Indian engineers are ready to work a 35-hour day. Good luck. . . . Voters in “old Europe” – France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy – seem to be saying to their leaders: stop the world, we want to get off; while voters in India have been telling their leaders: stop the world and build us a stepstool, we want to get on. . . . A few weeks ago Franz Müntefering, [then] chairman of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, compared private equity firms – which buy up failing businesses, downsize them and then sell them – to a “swarm of locusts.” The fact that a top German politician has resorted to attacking capitalism to win votes tells you just how explosive the next decade in Western Europe could be, as some of these aging, inflexible economies – which have grown used to six-week vacations and unemployment insurance that is almost as good as having a job – become more intimately integrated with Eastern Europe, India and China in a flattening world. (“A Race to the Top,” The New York Times, June 3, 2005 – emphasis added) Capitalism, free enterprise, pro-business policies, adaptability, work ethic and profit – these are the concepts that have generated most of the material progress in this world. 2010 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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这些特质助力美国在二十世纪取得相对优势,如今它们同样为 中国、印度和巴西 带来巨大希望。对比具备这些特质与不具备这些特质的国家,看它们的增长记录和前景如何。未来的美国会成为哪种国家?
如今,人们似乎把高盛和摩根大通这类公司视为敌人而非朋友——希望它们失败而非成功(非金融领域也有这样的例子)。我想请这些人告诉我,什么进步引擎能推动美国在二十一世纪继续领先。不会是那些理发店和快餐店。必须是大型的、世界领先的企业,为它们的投资者股东效力。
我们是个大国,最好支持大企业,而不是反对它们。我们最好记住,“对企业有利的,对美国也有利。”如果我们做不到这一点,如果大企业无法蓬勃发展,那么纠结于经济复苏的形态或 2010 年证券价格的前景,不过是“在泰坦尼克号上重新摆弄甲板上的躺椅”罢了。
单一年份的投资表现,主要应该关乎那些打算在年底清仓的人。我们大多数人预期自己的持有期会远远超出 2010 年。所以,我们最好祈盼一个有利于长期持有的良好环境。
They were behind much of America’s relative gains in the twentieth century, just as they now hold great promise for China, India and Brazil. Compare the growth records and prospects of countries that exhibit them against countries that don’t. Which kind of country will the U.S. of the future be? Today people seem to think of companies like Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase as enemies, not friends – companies to be rooted against, not for (and there are non-financial examples as well). I’d like those people to tell me what engine of progress will propel America ahead in the twenty-first century. It’s not going to be the barbershops and fast-food outlets. It has to be big, world-leading businesses, working on behalf of their investor-owners. We’re a big country, and we’d better pull for big business – not against it. We’d better remember that “what’s good for business is good for America.” If we don’t, and if big business isn’t allowed to thrive, wondering about the shape of the coming recovery or the outlook for security prices in 2010 will amount to nothing more than “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.” Investment performance in a single year should matter principally to people who’re going to liquidate their portfolios at the end of that year. Most of us expect our holding periods to go on well beyond 2010. So we’d better hope for a salutary long-term environment in which to hold.
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我写这些,不是想唱衰或让读者泄气。而且,正如我之前所说,我并不声称呈现了全貌。不过,我希望自己提供了一些价值。
问题不在于会不会复苏,而在于复苏是哪种类型。事实上,就在我写这封信时,复苏无疑已经开始了。但基于上述种种原因,我认为复苏将乏力,甚至可能断断续续,而不是强劲的“V”形反转。
I’m not writing to be negative or to depress readers. And as I said earlier, I don’t claim to be presenting the whole picture. Nevertheless, I hope I’m providing a service. The question isn’t whether there’ll be a recovery, but what type. In fact, a recovery is doubtless underway as I write. But for the reasons enumerated above, I think it’ll turn out to be anemic and possibly marked by fits and starts, not a powerful “V.”
经济复苏将遭遇逆风,表现为制造业下滑与就业增长乏力。
就业增长缓慢、收入疲软、支出增速低于收入,加之消费信贷稀缺,这些因素叠加,将限制消费者为经济注入活力的能力。
撤除政府高额支出、债务担保及人为压低利率这些支撑后,经济活力将受制约。
我们仍将持续面临房地产亏损、银行减记以及财政与贸易赤字方面的挑战。
The recovery will face headwinds in the form of declining manufacturing and weak job creation. Slow job growth, sluggish incomes, spending that grows slower than incomes, and scarcer consumer credit likely will combine to limit the consumer’s ability to energize the economy. Removing the props of elevated government spending, debt guarantees and artificially low interest rates will limit its vibrancy. We’ll continue to face challenges in terms of real estate losses, bank write-downs and fiscal and trade deficits.
另一方面,近期的经济统计数据将受益于以下几点:
On the other hand, near-term economic statistics will benefit from the following:
与去年低迷水平相比的轻松比较,
为满足复苏需求而进行的库存重建和管道补货,以及
easy comparisons against depressed prior levels, the rebuilding of inventories and refilling of pipelines to meet recovering demand, and
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大公司持有大量现金,资产负债表去杠杆化,并且急于回应增加的订单。
big companies’ large cash holdings, delevered balance sheets and eagerness to respond to increased orders.
当人们问我何时才能恢复正常时,我会反问他们所说的正常是什么意思。如果指的是 1992 年到 2007 年那样的环境,我会告诉他们,那是非同寻常的好时光,未来所谓的“正常”不会是那个样子。
信贷危机之前的十五(或者说二十五年)年间,消费驱动的强劲增长、信贷使用的迅速扩张、美国在媒体、软件、科技和金融产品领域的领先地位,以及强烈的看多情绪和扩张冲动,构成了鲜明的时代特征。我怀疑未来几年能否同样乐观。
我写这份备忘录的目的不是表达预测。我知道任何预测——更别说我自己的——都很难准确。我想做的是提醒大家,我所看到的重大风险,可能并未被今天定价资产的人充分认识。最大的市场风险在于宏观经济无法达到当前价格所蕴含的预期。如果你认为我因为上述因素而偏向谨慎是错的,请告诉我。事实上,我巴不得你跟我说我的担忧毫无根据,我们的经济和商业前景会彻底回归好时光。
多数人认为未来会重复过去的模式,而未来未必如此。他们倾向于用单一情景来思考未来,但实际上未来是一系列广泛可能性的集合。(还记得埃尔罗伊·迪姆森那句精辟的观察:“风险意味着实际发生的事,比可能发生的事要少。”)即便他们确实考虑了多种可能性,也很少有人会把最近经验之外的情况纳入考量。
上面讨论的不确定性告诉我,今天可能性的分布带有相当可观的左尾(即负面尾部),可能比过去大多数时候都要厚实。恰当的回应应该是压低资产价格,留出充足的安全边际。预测应当保守,收益率利差应当包含充分的风险溢价,估值参数应当低于长期常态,投资者行为应当审慎。
然而,2009 年的强劲反弹在许多资产类别上已经不止抵消了 2008 年的下跌。由此产生的估值如果蕴含了乐观情绪,我认为今天应该谨慎。去年赚了不少“轻松钱”;事后回想,你只需要有资本,有胆量在 2008 年底 2009 年初那种荒谬的低价时投进去,然后在疯狂的复苏中拿住就行。当然,当时要做到这些绝非易事。
未来的利润不会是轻松钱。它们需要精挑细选、恰当的高度风险意识、对安全边际的坚持,以及决定结果的那些力量(比如运气)的配合。今天大多数资产的估值大致公允,谨慎、辨别力和纪律——2009 年几乎用不上的东西——已经取代胆量,成为盈利投资的核心要素。
2010 年 1 月 22 日
When people ask me when we’ll get back to normal, I ask what they mean by normal. If they mean an environment like 1992-2007, I tell them those were unusually good times, not what the “normal” of the future is going to look like. The fifteen (or 25) years just prior to the credit crisis were marked by strong, consumer-led growth; rapidly increasing use of credit; American leadership in media, software, technology and financial products; and powerful bullishness and expansiveness. I doubt the years just ahead will be equally positive. My goal in this memo isn’t to express a forecast. I know no forecast – and certainly not mine – is likely to be correct. What I do want to do is caution that the considerable risks I see may be less than fully appreciated by those setting asset prices today. The greatest market risks lie in failure of the macro economy to live up to the expectations embodied in today’s prices. Please tell me if you think I’m wrong in letting the factors described above push me toward caution. In fact, I’d love it if you told me my worries are unfounded, and that our economic and business future will see a complete return to good times. Most people view the future as likely to repeat past patterns, which it may or may not do. They tend to think of the future in terms of a single scenario, whereas it really consists of a wide range of possibilities. (Remember Elroy Dimson’s trenchant observation that “risk means more things can happen than will happen.”) And to the extent they do consider a variety of possibilities, few people include ones that haven’t been part of recent experience. The uncertainties discussed above tell me today’s distribution of possibilities has a substantial left-hand (i.e., negative) tail, probably greater than at most times in the past. The proper response should be to discount asset prices, allowing a substantial margin for error. Forecasts should be conservative, yield spreads should incorporate ample risk premiums, valuation parameters should be below the long-term norms, and investor behavior should be prudent. And yet, the powerful rally of 2009 has more than offset the decline of 2008 in many asset classes. To the extent that the resultant valuations incorporate optimism, I would argue for caution today. A lot of “easy money” was made last year; in retrospect, all you had to do was have access to capital and the guts required to invest it at the absurd low prices of late 2008/early 2009 and hold on during the wild recovery. Of course, those things were far from easy at the time. The profits ahead won’t be easy money. They’ll require careful selection, appropriately high risk consciousness, insistence on margin for error, and cooperation from the forces that determine outcomes (such as luck). With most assets valued about fairly today, caution, discernment and discipline – not much needed in 2009 – have replaced guts as the essential elements in profitable investing. January 22, 2010
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