信心的作用

2013 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 5372 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

信心的作用

The Role of Confidence

信心通常被定义为对自己选定行动方向并付诸执行的能力的信念。尽管我查阅过的定义中并未包含这一项,但我认为信心也隐含着乐观(至少对投资者而言是这样)。最后,还有确定性的成分:除了对未来的乐观预期,还坚信这种看法是正确的。综合来看,我在信心中看到的要素——信念、乐观和确定性——融合在一起,营造出一种安心的感觉。满怀信心的投资者确信丰厚的回报就在前方。

Confidence is generally defined as belief in one’s ability to choose a course of action and execute on it. Although it’s not part of the definitions I’ve consulted, I think confidence also connotes optimism (at least it does among investors). Finally, there’s an element of certainty: beyond an optimistic view of the future, there’s conviction that view is correct. Taken together, the ingredients I see in confidence – belief, optimism and certainty – combine to create a feeling of well-being. Confident investors are sure big returns lie ahead.

信心的效应

所谓的“财富效应”在经济运行中扮演着重要且广为人知的角色。简而言之,当资产升值时,资产所有者会将增加财富转化为更多消费。乍一看这并不令人意外,但值得注意的是,即便升值尚未兑现,增加财富仅停留在纸面上,这一效应依然成立。这种关系可以简单概括为:人们感觉越富有,支出就越多。

信心的变化对行为的影响与财富效应类似。这正是本备忘录要探讨的主题。

长期以来,我一直对信心在经济中的作用印象深刻。事实上,我过去曾写过——仅略有夸张——有时我觉得信心才是唯一重要的东西。我认为其影响深远、无处不在、自我强化且自我实现。

信心对经济的主要影响很简单。如果人们认为经济前景向好,他们就会消费和投资……于是经济确实会向好。

The Confidence Effect The so-called “wealth effect” plays an important and well recognized part in the functioning of an economy. In short, when assets appreciate in value, the owners of those assets translate their increased wealth into increased spending. While at first glance this is unsurprising, it should be noted that this is true even if the appreciation is unrealized, and thus the increased wealth exists solely on paper. The relationship can be simply stated as follows: the richer people feel, the more they spend. Changes in confidence have an impact on behavior similar to the wealth effect. That’s what this memo is about. I have long been impressed by the role of confidence in an economy. In fact, I’ve written in the past – exaggerating only slightly – that sometimes I think confidence is all that matters. I consider its impact to be significant, pervasive, self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling. The primary impact of confidence on the economy is simple. If people think the economic future will be good, they’ll spend and invest . . . thus things will be good.     

消费者的乐观情绪会转化为对商品的增量需求,从而推高国内生产总值。消费者购买行为将说服企业投资扩建设施、增雇员工,以应对不断增长的需求。企业在厂房和人力上的投资会为国内生产总值添砖加瓦。新入职的工人手头有了钱可花,他们的消费又为这一循环再添一把火。媒体上关于信心提振带动国内生产总值增长以及经济正面的报道,会进一步强化这一乐观的良性循环:回到第一步。

Consumers’ optimism will translate into incremental demand for goods, adding to GDP. Consumer buying will convince businesses to invest in expanded facilities and additional workers in order to keep up with growing demand. Businesses’ investment in plant and workers will add to GDP. Newly hired workers will have money to spend, and their buying will add further to the cycle. The reports of confidence-fueled increases in GDP and other positive mentions of the economy in the media will reinforce this virtuous circle of optimism: back to step one.

因此,就像财富效应一样,信心的增强会让人们和企业增加支出,而这又反过来循环回到经济中。信心带来支出;支出

So, just like the wealth effect, increased confidence makes people and businesses spend more, and this in turn cycles back into the economy. Confidence leads to spending; spending

2013 年橡树资本管理有限公司

2013 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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提振经济;经济向好又支撑信心。这是个循环,自我应验的预言。

信心也能推动市场走势。相信某资产价格会上涨,人们就会买入该资产……从而推高其价格。这是信心自我应验的另一种方式。

当然,支撑经济增长和价格上涨的信心,只要存在就有影响。一旦信心消失,其效果便远非持久。正如经济学家赫布·斯坦所言:“如果某件事无法永远持续,它终将停下。”对信心及其影响而言,这话千真万确。

strengthens the economy; and economic strength buttresses confidence. It’s a circular, selffulfilling prophesy. Confidence can also fuel market movements. Belief that the price of an asset will rise causes people to buy the asset . . . making its price rise. This is another way in which confidence is selffulfilling. Of course, the confidence that underlies economic gains and price increases only has an impact as long as it exists. Once it dies, its effect turns out to be far from permanent. As the economist Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” This is certainly true for confidence and its influence.

当今的信心

去年九月,我写过一份备忘录,题为《站在不确定的土地上》。开头是这样写的:“当今世界的不确定性,似乎比我一生中任何时候都更甚。”接着我梳理了造成这种不确定性的诸多因素。为了完整起见,我在此重申并更新这份清单。这些都是大家时常问起的问题。我不记得还有哪次清单会有这么长:

在美国:

Confidence Today Back in September, I wrote a memo entitled “On Uncertain Ground.” It began as follows: “The world seems more uncertain today than at any other time in my life.” I went on to review the many elements contributing to uncertainty. For the sake of completeness, I’m going to restate and update my list. These are things I’m asked about all the time. I don’t recall another time when the list was as long: In the U.S.: 

   

2008 年经济衰退的复苏——虽已历时甚久,却仍步履蹒跚、摇摇晃晃——能否最终焕发活力?如今看来,我们正经历“进两步、退一步”,利好消息总是与失望消息交织。再者,即便是那些改善之处——如就业创造、消费者信心和制造业产出——也显得温吞而非亮眼。这与过去几十年的复苏景象大不相同。

复苏将在多大程度上受到近期增税和“自动减支”强制预算削减的拖累?

销售额增长何时才能克服企业在厂房和人员开支上的抵触?

美联储还会把利率维持低位多久?三个月?三年?还是永远?

一旦不再维持,会发生什么?利率会上升吗?升多少?利率上升对融资购买和投资成本的影响,是否足以拖慢经济?而利率上升对政府融资成本、进而对赤字的影响又是什么?

美联储资产负债表膨胀至超过 3 万亿美元,这一事实意味着什么?美联储通过量化宽松买入债券,钱从哪来?它是否需要偿还这笔钱?国债到期时,财政部是否要偿付美联储?钱从哪来?又流向何处?(不妨想一想:你觉得自己理解这一过程的运作吗?你认识哪个懂行的人吗?)

我们的经济能否重回二十世纪末的高速增长,还是将困在缓慢增长的模式里?

Will the recovery from the recession of 2008 – long in the tooth but still halting and unsteady – ever gain vitality? Today it seems we’re experiencing “two steps forward, one step back,” as positive reports are regularly mixed with disappointments. Further, even the improvements – in areas like job creation, consumer confidence and manufacturing output – seem tepid rather than eye-popping. This is quite different from the recoveries of the last few decades. To what extent will the recovery be impaired by recent tax increases and the budget cuts mandated by “sequestration”? When will sales increases overcome businesses’ resistance to spending on plant and personnel? How much longer will the Fed keep interest rates low? Three months? Three years? In perpetuity? What will happen when it no longer does? Will rates rise? How much? Will the effect of higher rates on the cost of financing purchases and investments be enough to slow the economy? And what will be the impact of higher rates on the government’s cost of financing, and thus on the deficit? What are the implications of the fact that the Fed’s balance sheet has swelled to over $3 trillion? How does the Fed pay for the bonds it buys under QE? Will it have to pay that money back? Will the Treasury have to pay off the Fed when the debt matures? Where will it get the money? And where will the money go? (Think about this for a minute: do you feel you understand the workings of this process? Do you know anyone who does?) Will our economy ever get back to the higher growth rates of the late twentieth century, or will we be stuck in a slow-growth mode?

2013 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2013 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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     

未来的“结构性失业”是否会顽固地保持在高于过去几十年约 5% 的水平?

利润率是否会从当前创纪录的高位回落,若如此,对企业利润将有何影响?

长期来看,削减预算赤字和减少无资金准备的福利义务能否取得进展?

增长缓慢、高失业率和收入差距扩大将带来哪些社会后果?

美国是否会像通常处理过度国家债务那样,让美元贬值?

增长缓慢是否会导致日本式的通缩?还是说,为减轻偿债压力而大规模印钞会引发长期通胀?(仅凭聪明人同时担忧这两个截然相反的极端情况,就足以表明当前不确定性之高。)

Will “structural unemployment” in the future remain stubbornly above the 5% or so of the last few decades? Will profit margins retreat from their current record levels, and if so, what will be the effect on corporate profits? Longer term, can progress ever be made on cutting the budget deficit and reducing the unfunded entitlement obligations? What will be the social ramifications of slow growth, high unemployment and increased income disparity? Will the U.S. devalue the dollar, the usual path to dealing with excessive national debt? Will slow growth lead to Japan-style deflation? Or will high-volume money printing to make it easier to repay the debt bring on chronic inflation? (The mere fact that intelligent people worry simultaneously about both these polar opposites is in itself an indicator of the high level of uncertainty that is present.)

In Europe:

In Europe:         

欧洲外围经济体看似螺旋式下滑的态势能否被遏制?

欧洲过度的债务负担能否降下来,以及导致这种债务水平的长期赤字能否通过紧缩措施削减?

较富裕的国家是否会继续支持较贫穷的国家,而不坚持后者实施痛苦的紧缩政策?

实际操作中,在经济疲软时期能否推行紧缩?如果紧缩持续,衰退、苦难和动荡是否不可避免?

难道选民不会在较富裕国家要求孤立主义,在较贫穷国家要求摆脱紧缩之痛?难道提供其他方案的当选领导人不会被赶下台?

高度限制性的监管和劳动法规是否会放宽,使欧洲能与世界其他地区平等竞争?

长远来看,欧洲各国是否会赋予一个中央机构控制经济和金融机构的权力,以建立有效的经济联盟?

英国选民在即将到来的公投中会投票留在欧盟还是离开?

欧盟能否保持完整?要求行动一致同意的政治联盟是否可行?治理和协调能否改善?

Can the seeming downward spiral in peripheral Europe’s economies be arrested? Can Europe’s excessive indebtedness be brought down, and can the chronic deficits that led to that level of indebtedness be trimmed through austerity? Will richer nations continue to support poorer without insisting on the latter applying painful austerity? In practical terms, can austerity be undertaken at a time of economic weakness? If austerity is continued, are recession, suffering and unrest unavoidable? Won’t voters demand isolationism in the richer nations and relief from the pain of austerity in the poorer nations? Won’t elected leaders offering anything else be ousted? Will the highly restrictive regulations and labor laws be eased so as to enable Europe to compete on an equal footing with the rest of the world? Longer term, will the nations of Europe give a central body the control over economies and financial institutions required for an effective economic union? Will UK voters vote in the coming referendum to stay in the European Union or leave? Will the EU remain intact? Is a political union in which actions require unanimous support practical? Can governance and coordination be improved?

Regarding Leadership:

Regarding Leadership:    

世界上是否存在足够分量、足以带领我们渡过这些不确定时期的领袖?

那些把连任放在首位的官员,能否在关键时刻挺身而出,做出艰难抉择,对问题施以不受欢迎的良方,而不是贴止痛膏式的权宜之计?

盖特纳和伯南克的继任者,能否在让经济摆脱超低利率的同时,继续推进复苏?

美国的民选领袖,有没有可能创造一个环境,让税收、监管和医疗成本的不确定性不再妨碍企业投资于工厂和员工?

Are there leaders – anywhere in the world – of the caliber we need to see us through these uncertain times? Can officials who seek re-election first and foremost rise to the occasion and make the tough decisions needed to apply unpopular solutions to problems, rather than palliative Band-Aids? Will the successors to Geithner and Bernanke prove up to the task of continuing the recovery while weaning the economy from ultra-low interest rates? Is it conceivable that America’s elected leaders will create an environment in which uncertainty over taxation, regulation and healthcare costs no longer discourages businesses from investing in plant and personnel?

2013 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2013 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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Miscellany:

Miscellany:     

中国靠信贷推动的经济,会硬着陆还是软着陆?

如果中国增速放缓,对巴西、澳大利亚、加拿大这些靠向中国供应大宗商品而繁荣的国家,会有什么影响?大宗商品价格又会怎样?

安倍首相的货币和财政计划,能否足够唤醒日本经济的沉睡状态?

水力压裂技术能否让美国实现能源自给?如果能,这对美国的制造业竞争力和油价又会带来什么?

中东、伊朗、朝鲜这些热点地区,会有什么变数?

Will China’s credit-abetted economy experience a hard landing or a soft one? If China’s growth slows, what will be the effect on nations such as Brazil, Australia and Canada that have prospered by supplying it with commodities? What will happen to commodity prices? Will Prime Minister Abe’s monetary and fiscal program be enough to wake Japan’s economy from its lethargy? Will fracking allow the U.S. to achieve energy self-sufficiency? If so, what will that do to its manufacturing competitiveness and to the price of oil? What will happen in hot spots such as the Middle East, Iran and North Korea?

显著的不确定性是当今投资环境的一个突出特征。它抑制了对未来的乐观情绪,并削弱了投资者对未来可知可控的信心。换言之,它侵蚀了信心。这与危机前几年的状况形成了重大差异。

Significant uncertainty is one of the outstanding characteristics of today’s investing environment. It discourages optimism regarding the future and limits investors’ certainty that the future is knowable and controllable. In other words, it saps confidence. This is a major difference from conditions in the pre-crisis years.

对 2007 年的信心

当我思考当今投资环境与早前时代有何不同时,最大的变化跃然眼前。让我们回到 2007 年中次贷危机爆发前不久。我认为那时候大多数人百分百确信自己知道:

Confidence in 2007 When I think about how the investment environment of today differs from earlier times, the greatest change of all jumps out at me. Let’s go back to just before the onset of the subprime crisis in mid-2007. I think in those days most people were 100% certain they knew:   

全球经济靠什么运转,

未来五年或十年,经济和商业世界会是什么样子,以及

出了问题时需要怎样去修复。

what made the global economy tick, what the economic and business world would look like in five or ten years, and what it would take to fix something that went wrong.

对上述事项的深信不疑,在很大程度上消除了对未来的不确定性,并催生了极高的信心。如今,没有人会这样想了。

Belief in the things listed above largely eliminated uncertainty regarding the future and contributed to an extremely high level of confidence. No one thinks that way today.

信心:好还是坏?

假设我准确描述了 2007 年信心、乐观和确定性高涨,而 2013 年低落的情形。这里有一个我一直在思考的关键问题:哪种状态更可取?

答案很大程度上取决于你的时间框架。2007 年的高信心水平——与 1990 年代颇为相似——带来了极大的幸福感。那种一切都不会出错的感觉——仿佛一台永动机可以指望永远推动事物向上发展——助长了消费者普遍的乐观情绪、激进的消费支出、不断上升的经济总量、宽松的资本市场和强劲的资产价格。那时的感觉确实很好。

Confidence: Good or Bad? Let’s say I have accurately described that confidence, optimism and certainty were high in 2007 and low in 2013. Here’s a key question that I’ve been wrestling with: which is more desirable? The answer is largely a function of your timeframe. The high level of confidence in 2007 – not unlike that of the 1990s – contributed to a feeling of great well-being. The feeling that nothing would go wrong – that a perpetual-motion machine could be counted on to keep things on an upward course forever – contributed to rampant consumer optimism, aggressive spending, rising economic aggregates, accommodative capital markets and strong asset prices. It sure felt good.

2013 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2013 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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但这样做可取吗?在我看来,并不可取,因为事后看来,当时的认知与现实严重失衡,因而潜伏着危险:

But was it desirable? It was not, in my view, because hindsight shows perception to have been very much out of proportion with reality, and thus dangerous:   

消费信心过高,超出收入水平,由此带动的支出自然也就偏高。

过度支出——遍布全球、横跨各经济层级——导致信贷被过度使用,整个世界杠杆高企。

由信心与杠杆推动的购买行为,使得资产价格攀升,与价值严重脱节。

Consumer confidence, and thus spending, was too high relative to incomes. Excessive spending – all around the world, at all economic levels – led to excessive use of credit, making the world highly overleveraged. Buying fueled by confidence and leverage caused asset prices to rise out of proportion to value.

我常说,世界上最危险的事情,莫过于大家都普遍相信没有风险。2005 年至 2007 年危机前的岁月,以及 1990 年代末的科技泡沫时期,无疑都是这种状况。这两次,“美好时代”之后都跟着一场显著的经济放缓和市场下跌。

信心高涨、感觉良好的环境,能带来当下愉悦的局面,却也会助长危险行为,推动经济和市场节节攀升,到头来回调在所难免。如此一来,2013 年那种信心不足反倒营造出一个平淡乏味、不那么惬意的大环境,但同时也为未来打下了更可取、更审慎的基础。(变数在于,正如 2013 年 1 月 7 日《老调重弹》一文所述,央行降息之举让即便信心不足的投资者也投身于偏好风险的行为,为 6 月那场市场下跌埋下伏笔,或许也为日后更多阵痛埋下伏笔。)

我之前讲过,9·11 那天我人在纽约,花了好几天才回到洛杉矶。等我终于到家,儿子安德鲁问我:“爸,这个世界是不是比以前更不安全了?”我的回答是:“也许比以前更不安全,也许它从来就没有大家以为的那么安全。”显然,承认并接受不确定性,要比明明不安全却装作天下太平来得更健康。放到投资的世界里,这一点更是加倍成立。

I often say the riskiest thing in the world is widespread belief that there’s no risk. And certainly that was the prevailing condition in the pre-crisis years of 2005-07, as well as during the tech bubble of the late 1990s. In both instances the “era of well-being” was followed by a significant economic slowdown and market decline. A feel-good environment characterized by strong confidence creates pleasant current conditions but encourages dangerous behavior and an ascent (in the economy and the markets) from which a correction becomes inevitable. In that way, the less confident attitudes of 2013 create a lackluster, less enjoyable environment, but also a preferable and more prudent base for the future. (The wild card, as described in “Ditto,” January 7, 2013, is that the actions of central banks to lower interest rates have caused even unconfident investors to engage in pro-risk behavior, setting the stage for the market declines of June and perhaps for additional pain in the future.) I’ve previously told the story of having been in New York on 9/11, and of requiring several days to get back to Los Angeles. When I eventually reached home, my son Andrew asked me, “Dad, is the world less safe than it used to be?” My answer was, “Maybe it’s less safe than it used to be, or maybe it was never as safe as everyone thought it was.” Certainly it’s healthier to recognize and accept uncertainty than to act as if the world is a safe place if it’s not. That goes double for the world of investing.

信心的钟摆

我写的东西里,关于投资者心理钟摆的内容大概比其他任何话题都多。1991 年我的第二份备忘录就是讲这个的,而且从那时起,我对它影响力的信念一直在不断加深。

钟摆的摆动牵涉市场的方方面面,而且常常摆向极端:

The Pendulum in Confidence I probably write more about the pendulum of investor psychology than I do anything else. It was the subject of my second memo, in 1991, and my belief in its impact has grown unabated ever since. The pendulum swings with regard to many facets of the market, and it often swings to extremes:      

在乐观与悲观之间,

在贪婪与恐惧之间,

在狂喜与沮丧之间,

在轻信与怀疑之间,

在风险承受与风险规避之间,从而

在鲁莽激进与过度谨慎之间。

between optimism and pessimism, between greed and fear, between euphoria and depression, between credulousness and skepticism, between risk tolerance and risk aversion, and thus between reckless aggressiveness and excessive caution.

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当所有这些事情的钟摆来回摆动时,摆动幅度和偏差都反映了共同的主题。正如马克·吐温所说,历史不会重演,但总会押韵,这些现象皆是如此。

以钟摆摆动的其中一个领域为例:投资者对新兴市场的态度。有时它们被视为充满风险、遥远陌生的地方,有时又成为取代停滞不前的发达世界、增长迅猛的优选之地。当人们对新兴市场满怀信心、只看到其优点时,这些股票便以美国式的市盈率出售(并被认为鉴于其更高的增长率而显得便宜)。但一旦问题浮现、信心动摇,投资者便只愿在折价的市盈率水平买入新兴市场股票,以获取他们认为必要的风险溢价。这种摆动,我已目睹过无数次——正如其他种种一样。

回想 1994 年,《北美自由贸易协定》生效,北美贸易壁垒得以放宽。当时人们对墨西哥满怀敬畏:“它就像美国,但增长快得多。”于是资金涌入墨西哥股市,股价随之飙升。但紧接着,恰帕斯州爆发叛乱、总统候选人遇刺、墨西哥比索贬值,触发了所谓的“龙舌兰危机”。钟摆随即摆回忧虑:“哦,对——还是有差别的。”

而就在几年前,投资者共识还认为发达世界已无望,唯有中国经济潜力无穷,因为它有不断增长的人口、低廉的劳动力成本和日益壮大的消费群体。结果是对中国的信心过度,对世界其他地区的信心不足。中国确实拥有诸多优势,发达世界的问题也并非凭空想象。但这并不意味着中国股票价值连城,而发达世界的股票分文不值。因此,在 2009 年中国股市表现远好于发达世界股市之后,它们便注定要在随后的日子里落后。

如今,随着中国增长放缓,加上美联储缩减购债的威胁拖累全球增长预期(从而也影响对中国出口的需求),对中国的信心已经消退。正如一位对冲基金策略师 7 月 15 日在《华尔街日报》上所言:“新兴市场不再是阳光普照。”

总而言之,我认为可以公允地说,投资钟摆最关键的摆动之一,就是在信心过度与信心不足之间来回摇摆。

While the pendulum moves with regard to all these things, the swinging movement, the extent and the error all reflect common themes. They’re all examples of the ways in which, as Mark Twain said, history rhymes. Let’s take for an example one regard in which the pendulum swings: investor attitudes toward emerging markets. Sometimes they’re considered scary and exotic places, and sometimes they’re the attractive high-growth alternative to the stagnant developed world. When people have confidence in the emerging markets and see only their virtues, the stocks sell at U.S.-style p/e ratios (where they’re described as being cheap given the superior growth rates). But when problems emerge and confidence falters, investors will only buy emerging market stocks at discount p/e’s so as to have the benefit of the risk premiums they consider necessary. I’ve seen this swing – just like the others – numerous times. I’m thinking back to 1994, when NAFTA was enacted, easing trade in North America. People were in awe of Mexico: “It’s just like the U.S., but it grows much faster.” So money flowed to Mexican stocks, and they boomed. But then, in short order, there occurred a revolt in the state of Chiapas, the assassination of a presidential candidate, and the devaluation of the Mexican peso, triggering the so-called “Tequila Crisis.” And the pendulum swung back toward concern: “Oh, right – there are differences.” And just a few years ago, the consensus of investors held that it was all over for the developed world, and China was the only economy with potential thanks to its growing population, low labor costs and expanding consumer class. As a result there was too much confidence in China and too little in the rest of the world. China does have many advantages, and the problems of the developed world aren’t imaginary. But that doesn’t mean Chinese equities are worth the moon and developed world equities are without value. So after Chinese stocks did much better than developed world stocks in 2009, they were primed for subsequent underperformance. Now with China reporting slower growth – and with the threat of reduced bond buying by the Fed eating into expectations for growth worldwide (and, with it, demand for China’s exports) – confidence in China has receded. As a hedge fund strategist said in The Wall Street Journal on July 15, “It’s not all sunshine in emerging markets anymore.” Summing up, I think it’s fair to say one of the key swings of the investment pendulum is between too much confidence and too little. 

在乐观的极端,人们只相信好结果可能出现,并认为他们(或其基金经理)有能力打造出既能分享市场全部上涨、又几乎不受损失的投资组合,能挑中赢家、避开输家,能在市场上涨时一路持有,并在市场见顶时及时离场。

At the positive extreme, people believe only good outcomes are possible, and that they (or their managers) are competent to fashion portfolios that will expose them to all of the market’s gains and few of its losses, to pick the winners and avoid the losers, and to ride the market’s rise and get out just as it crests.

而在极端悲观的一端,他们认定只可能出现糟糕的结果,认为无论是他们自己还是那些已遭免职的管理者,任何试图创造价值或应对市场波动的努力都将彻底徒劳无功。

And at the negative extreme, they conclude only bad outcomes are possible, and that any efforts to add value or cope with the market’s vicissitudes on their part or the part of their now-defrocked managers will be utterly unavailing.

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我们无数次见过这样的情形:当市场顺风顺水一阵子,价格已经大幅上涨之后,投资者就会进入过度自信的状态。反过来,当泡沫被刺破、消息面持续恶化、价格崩盘之后,那种绝望的状态也必然会出现。

正是这种模式,让羊群在极端关头屡屡犯错,也让逆向思维获得回报。这也是我最喜欢的一句沃伦·巴菲特名言的由来:“别人越是不谨慎地打理自己的事务,我们就越应该谨慎地打理我们自己的事务。”当大多数投资者被过度的自信冲昏头脑、丢掉谨慎时,我们应该感到恐惧。同样,当大多数投资者丧失信心、纷纷逃离市场时,我们应该变得激进。

As we’ve seen endless times, investors reach the overconfident state when things have been going well for a while, meaning prices have already soared. And, alternatively, the latter hopeless state is inevitably reached after a bubble has been punctured, the news has turned unremittingly negative, and prices have collapsed. This is the pattern that makes the herd wrong at the extremes and creates the rewards for contrarianism. And it’s behind my favorite Warren Buffett quote: “the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs.” When most investors are driven to drop their prudence by an excess of confidence, we should be terrified. In the same way, when most investors become devoid of confidence and flee the market, we should turn aggressive.

全好或全坏?

信心波动的一个值得注意之处,不仅在于它会起落,还在于它常常被"全好"或"全坏"的思维所标记。简言之,当投资者对未来乐观时:

All Good or All Bad? One of the things worth noting about the swing in confidence is not merely that it rises and falls, but that it is often marked by “all-good” or “all-bad” thinking. In short, when investors are optimistic regarding the future:   

他们往往只看到积极的一面,对此印象深刻至极,而对消极面则视而不见。

即便他们真考虑消极面,也会陷入种种合理化解释,自欺欺人地加以否定。其中最常用的老调便是:“这次不一样了。”孤立的积极进展,往往是偶然或侥幸所致,却被放大为不可阻挡的良性循环。巧合被当作天衣无缝的因果链条中的一环。

They tend to see the positives, by which they’re incredibly impressed, and overlook the negatives. If they consider negatives at all, they fall for rationalizations that refute them. Foremost here is the old standby: “It’s different this time.” Isolated positive developments, often random or fortuitous, are generalized into an irresistible virtuous circle. Coincidences are accepted as part of a bullet-proof cause-andeffect process.

这种不客观的过程摒弃了全面均衡的分析,催生出毫无依据的过度自信,进而推高了投资风险。2008 年金融危机之前的几年,是我所见过的“全盘看好”思维最极端的时期。事实上,当《纽约时报》请我就危机成因撰文时,我写的那篇文章标题正是《太多信任,太少担忧》。我当时指出,过度的信心导致 2005 至 2007 年间的投资者:

This unobjective process eliminates balanced analysis and leads to dangerously unwarranted levels of confidence, and thus of investment risk. The years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 were marked by the most extreme all-good thinking I’ve ever seen. In fact, when The New York Times asked me to write an article on the cause of the crisis, the one I wrote was titled “Too Much Trust; Too Little Worry.” I said an excessive level of confidence had caused investors in 2005-07 to:       

摒弃怀疑,

不再忧虑亏损,

放弃详尽尽调,

抛开保守假设,

卸下风险规避,

拒绝为冒险计划融资,

不再索求合理风险溢价。

stop applying skepticism, stop worrying about losing money, stop doing thorough due diligence, stop factoring in conservative assumptions, stop applying risk aversion, stop denying capital to risky schemes, and stop demanding adequate risk premiums.

2007 年年中,我正着手写一份备忘录,暂定标题为“周期之母”。但后来我担心借用萨达姆·侯赛因的话会引发不良反应,于是

In mid-2007 I was working on a memo with the projected title “The Mother of All Cycles.” But I got worried about how people would react to my borrowing a phrase from Saddam Hussein, so

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7 月 16 日发布时,我把标题改成了《一切都好》。在那份备忘录里,我抱怨说,每一类资产、每一项资产、每一个地区都在上涨。就幅度、广度和潜在影响而言,我认为这是我经历过的最强劲、最狂热的升势。很大一部分原因在于,人们似乎觉得一切都好,而且很可能一直好下去。在我看来,过度自信的投资者忽略了下跌和上涨同样可能发生,轻信了无限潜力的承诺,放弃了怀疑,把金融创新当作必然奏效的东西,还拥抱了杠杆不断上升的趋势。当然,这座纸牌屋很快便土崩瓦解。于是在那份备忘录之后,两周后的 7 月 30 日又有了《一切都好……真的吗?》,接着是 9 月 10 日的《现在一切都糟了吗?》。仅仅八周时间,信心便蒸发殆尽,取而代之的是普遍的悲观情绪。又过了一年,我们目睹了雷曼兄弟破产,以及 80 年来最严重的金融危机爆发。这提醒我们,当信心过高、人们过于安逸时,这个世界有多危险。而且,事情逆转的速度,正如我的合伙人谢尔登·斯通所说,气球泄气远比充气快得多。信心通常需要多年才能达到危险的顶峰,但崩塌只需几周或几个月。

when it was published on July 16, I changed the title to “It’s All Good.” In the memo I complained that every asset class, every asset and every region was appreciating. In terms of amplitude, breadth and potential ramifications, I consider it the strongest, most heated upswing I’ve witnessed. A lot of this is because people seem to think everything’s good and likely to stay that way. As I saw it, overconfident investors were ignoring the possibility of things going down as well as up, swallowing promises of limitless potential, suspending disbelief, accepting financial innovation as sure to work, and embracing the trend toward increased leverage. Of course, this house of cards fell apart in short order. Thus that memo was followed by “It’s All Good . . . Really?” two weeks later, on July 30, and then by “Now It’s All Bad?” on September 10. In just eight weeks, confidence had evaporated and been replaced by widespread pessimism. And just a year after that, we witnessed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the worst financial crisis in 80 years. What this reminds us is how dangerous the world can be when confidence is too high and people are too comfortable. Also, the speed with which things can reverse demonstrates, as my partner Sheldon Stone says, that the air goes out of the balloon much faster than it goes in. It usually takes years for confidence to reach a dangerous zenith, but then only weeks or months for it to collapse.

当人们判定论据的正面或负面一方占据了全部优势时,他们就会对未来走向形成极端坚定的看法,并确信自己已洞悉一切。

When people conclude that all the merit is on either the positive or negative side of the argument, they reach extreme conviction regarding their view of the future and become certain they know

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该怎么办。但全好或全坏的态度很少正确,因为双方总有其合理之处,而且这些合理之处不容忽视。马克·吐温说过:“让你陷入麻烦的不是你不知道的事,而是你自以为确定无疑、实则并非如此的事。”大多数时候,对信心设限比过分笃定更可取。对自己的判断过度自信,非常危险。

what to do. But all-good or all-bad attitudes are rarely right, since there are invariably valid points on both sides and they mustn’t be ignored. Mark Twain said, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” Most of the time, limits on confidence are more desirable than cocksureness. Over-confidence in one’s judgment is very dangerous.

多头/空头周期

2008 年 3 月,在《潮水退去》一文中,我重提了我最为信奉的一句格言——对牛市三阶段的描述:

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The Bull/Bear Cycle In March 2008, in “The Tide Goes Out,” I repeated one of the most helpful of all the adages to which I hold – the description of the three stages of a bull market:   

第一阶段,少数有远见的人开始相信情况会好转;

第二阶段,大多数投资者意识到改善确实在进行之中;

第三阶段,所有人都确信情况会永远好下去。

the first stage, when a few forward-looking people begin to believe things will get better, the second, when most investors realize improvement is actually underway, and the third, when everyone’s sure things will get better forever.

这到底意味着什么?牛市的核心原料是廉价,而这种廉价在阶段一恰恰存在,因为信徒寥寥,几乎没人相信前景光明、好日子就在眼前。因此,阶段一为牛市提供了发射台。

同样地,在阶段三,牛市已蓄势待发准备终结——泡沫破裂、下行周期降临——原因很简单:信徒太多(怀疑者太少)。简言之,信心过满,廉价不再。正是这种失衡造就了市场顶部。牛市上涨的极端程度——正如其对应的熊市下跌一样——向投资者发出了本应重要的信号。

What does it really mean? The essential raw material for a bull market is cheapness, and that cheapness exists in stage one precisely because there are so few believers and so little confidence that favorable developments and good times lie ahead. Thus stage one provides the launching pad for a bull market. Equally, in the third stage the bull market is primed to end – with the bubble popping and a down-cycle setting in – for the simple reason that there are too many believers (and too few skeptics). In short, there’s too much confidence and too little cheapness. It’s this imbalance that creates market tops. The extremeness of the bull-market upswing – just like the downswing of its bear-market counterpart – gives investors what should be an important signal.

铁定稳赢

投资者或许嘴上说有信心应对未来,但内心深处,不少人清楚自己有几斤几两,感到茫然无措。于是,他们成了那些号称“稳赚不赔、风险不成比例”的新出炉“银弹”的绝佳猎物。他们对这东西信心爆棚,尤其是一开始真出了期望中的效果时。这类玩意儿最诱人的往往带有机械性,因为它们的完美源于一台可靠的机器,而非某个神乎其神的先知。

The Sure Thing Investors may profess confidence in their ability to grapple with the future, but deep down many sense their own limitations and feel at sea. Thus they’re prime targets for the newly minted “silver bullet” that’s touted as sure to deliver return without commensurate risk. They develop outsized confidence in it, especially if at first it provides the hoped-for results. The most attractive of these are often mechanical, since their perfection stems from a dependable machine rather than a mysterious swami. 

1987 年,投资者迷上了“投资组合保险”,该策略让他们可以承担不成比例的高股票仓位,笃信一旦市场开始下跌,这种技术会自动下达卖出指令。然而,当道琼斯工业平均指数在黑色星期一(10 月 19 日)下跌 22.6% 时,许多券商拒绝接听电话,卖出指令未能执行,那个“稳赢的招数”结果并不稳。

In 1987, investors fell for “portfolio insurance,” under which they could take on disproportionately large equity allocations, secure in the knowledge that if the market started down, the technique would automatically enter sell orders. But when the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 22.6% on Black Monday (October 19), many brokerage firms refused to answer their phones, the sell orders weren’t executed, and the “sure thing” turned out not to be.

在 2000 年代初期,“可转移阿尔法”策略承诺通过将股票期货叠加于对冲基金之上来获得高回报。但当股市下跌时,此前的高回报便暴露出其脆弱性。

In the early 2000s, “portable alpha” promised high returns by overlaying hedge funds with equity futures. But when stocks fell, it became clear that the previous high returns

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这些收益并非来自可靠流程所创造的价值,而在于期货本质上让人们能够在上涨的市场中投入超过 100% 的资金。

had come not from the value added by a dependable process, but from the fact that in essence the futures had allowed people to be more than 100% invested in a rising market. 

再往后,“风险平价投资”在动荡时期表现不错,因为它给追随者提供了比大多数其他投资者更多的战略分散、防御性和债券敞口。但和其他大多数策略一样,当本·伯南克威胁要缩减债券购买并让利率上升而惊扰市场时,它也没能避免损失。今年风险平价策略的成绩说明,没有哪种方法能时时奏效。

And more recently, “risk parity investing” worked through volatile times because it gave its followers greater strategic diversification, defensiveness and bond exposure than most other investors had. But it, like most other things, failed to prevent losses when Ben Bernanke spooked the market by threatening to ease off bond buying and let interest rates rise. This year’s results for risk parity show that nothing works all the time.

关键在于,没有任何机械化的工具能让投资者在所有情况下都稳赚不赔。它们或许能带来一些倾斜或降低风险敞口,但那种承诺既能有好结果又有极佳结果、却绝无坏结果可能的工具,好得令人难以置信。一旦人们对这类东西过度自信,投资者就离麻烦不远了。

格林斯潘看跌期权及其继任者伯南克看跌期权同样如此。艾伦·格林斯潘担任美联储主席期间,其政策特点是通过注入流动性和降息来避免问题。投资者极度相信他能让市场一路向上。他的政策确实避免了中途偶尔的调整,但付出的代价是巨大的:2008 年的金融危机。那些曾相信格林斯潘无所不能的人,对后果毫无准备。本·伯南克接替了格林斯潘,他自己的继任者可能很快就要公布。我们必须警惕对任何个人能力抱持同样过度的自信。

没有神奇的解决方案。任何事物、任何人都无法让经济、市场或投资组合只涨不跌。明白这一点是明智的,反之则危险。

The point is that no mechanical tools can enable investors to prosper under all circumstances. They can provide tilts or reduce exposures, but the tool that promises a mix of good results and great results without the possibility of bad results is too good to be true. And when excessive confidence develops in such things, investors are heading for trouble. The same is true for the Greenspan put and its successor, the Bernanke put. Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Fed chairman was marked by efforts to avoid problems by injecting liquidity and lowering interest rates. Investors put great stock in his ability to keep things moving ever upward. His policies prevented occasional corrections along the way, but the price paid was a big one: the financial crisis of 2008. Those who had believed in Greenspan’s omnipotence were unprepared for the consequences. Ben Bernanke succeeded Greenspan, and his own successor is likely to be announced soon. We must beware of equally excessive confidence in any individual’s abilities. There is no magic solution. Nothing and no one can render economies, markets or portfolio results capable of rising but never falling. Awareness of that is wise. Belief to the contrary is dangerous.

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如前面所述,我认为近来许多投资者持有比自身习惯更高风险的头寸,主要是因为美联储的低利率政策,使得他们原本可能青睐的低风险资产回报寥寥。因此,他们的投资行为是被迫而为,而非建立在基本面信心之上。

过去几年存在的不确定性本应对环境产生积极影响,促使人们高度审慎……如果美联储任其发挥作用的话。但相反,美联储迫使人们冒险,而冒险与意志薄弱相结合,在最初的疑虑浮出水面时,便产生了可以预见的效果。

五月份,伯南克主席表示,在经济表现可接受的情况下,美联储的购债行动可能很快缩减,暗示更高的利率是可以接受的。这本不应令人意外,因为经济复苏时,减少刺激措施应是预料之中的事。股市和债市随后的剧烈下跌表明,投资者持有风险资产所依据的基本面信心一直是薄弱的,而且

As mentioned above, I think recently many investors have been holding riskier positions than are natural for them, largely because, thanks to the Fed’s low-rate policies, the lower-risk things they might have preferred offered so little return. Thus their investing actions were coerced, rather than being undergirded by confidence in the fundamentals. The uncertainty that has been present in the last few years should have had a healthy effect on the environment by calling for a high level of prudence . . . if the Fed had let it take effect. But instead the Fed forced people into risk taking, and the combination of risk taking and weak resolve had the anticipatable effect when the first doubts reared their heads. In May, Chairman Bernanke indicated that with the economy performing acceptably, the Fed’s bond buying might soon taper off, implying that higher interest rates were acceptable. This shouldn’t have come as a surprise, since when recovery occurs, a reduction of stimulus should be anticipated. The stock and bond markets’ subsequent dramatic swoons showed that the fundamental confidence underlying investors’ holdings of risk assets had been weak and

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市场脆弱,且过度依赖美联储维持低利率。突然间,投资者对世界是否正常、未来如何、以及如何从中获利不再那么确定。

投资者仍心怀不安,这其实是好事。经历了一轮担忧之后,信贷市场比两个月前更健康了(比如,回报率更高了)。

如果经济持续复苏,美联储的债券购买放缓,利率很可能会进一步上行。但鉴于当前信心水平温和,市场应该不会变得危险。大多数资产既没有危险地高企(长期国债和高等级债券可能除外),也没有吸引人的便宜。在极端情况下判断该怎么做,比在中间地带容易得多,而我认为我们现在就处在中间地带。正如我在书里写的,当没有聪明事可做时,错误就在于试图耍聪明。如今看来,未来几个月我们能做的最好的事就是谨慎投资,避免激进,记住保持警惕。

vulnerable, and that there had been too much reliance on the Fed keeping rates low. All of a sudden investors were less sure the world looked right, what the future held, and how to make money in it. Investors remain uncertain, and that’s good. Now that a bout of worry has been experienced, the credit markets are healthier (e.g., offering higher returns) than they were two months ago. If the economy continues to recover and the Fed’s bond buying eases off, interest rates are likely to go further on the upside. But given the modest level of confidence at play, the markets should not turn out to be perilous. Most assets are neither dangerously elevated (with the possible exception of long-term Treasury bonds and high grades) nor compellingly cheap. It’s easier to know what to do at the extremes than it is in the middle ground, where I believe we are today. As I wrote in my book, when there’s nothing clever to do, the mistake lies in trying to be clever. Today it seems the best we can do is invest prudently in the coming months, avoiding aggressiveness and remembering to apply caution.

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说一下长期情况:虽然当前的环境、信心和资产价格看上去都还算平稳,也就是说,短期前景没什么特别可说的,但长期仍然令人担忧。由于美国还能从海外吸引资金,又能印钞票,我们的财政问题眼下并不紧迫。但难以收拾的赤字支出、不可持续的福利承诺,加上华盛顿方面完全缺乏负责任的行动,这几点加在一起,确实给未来敲响了警钟。

既然我尊重的人说过比我说得更好的话,我也没必要另起炉灶,那就用塞思·克拉曼的几句话来收尾吧(着重号为原文所加)。塞思在他讨论的那些事情里找不到多少能让人乐观的东西,而我也同意他的看法:

经济学里没有免费的午餐:如果政府可以天文数字般地印钞或借钱,而不带来任何重大不良后果,那它们为什么不永远这么做,让国家沐浴在无限繁荣的阳光里,永远躲开经济衰退?事实上很清楚,先前对美联储的错置信心,极大地助长了多年的自满情绪,把 2008 年的衰退演变成了一场全面危机。当然,今天的政策过度是要付出代价的——作用力必然带来反作用力。只是我们还没看到而已。它会表现为美元崩盘、美元霸权终结,高利率、美国国债拍卖流拍、通胀失控,还是一场需要做出非凡牺牲的痛苦而漫长的衰退,或者别的什么?我们很快就能知道了。

在经济的大多数部门——政府、个人,也包括企业——美国都靠大量借贷来支撑超出自身能力的生活方式;我们一直在靠宽松信贷消费那些本来得等到以后才买得起的东西。用迈克尔·刘易斯的话说,“杠杆让你得以一瞥某种繁荣,而这种繁荣……”

A word about the long run: While conditions, confidence and asset prices all seem moderate today, meaning there’s nothing brilliant to say about the short-term outlook, the long term remains worrisome. Because the U.S. is still able to attract capital from abroad and print money, our financial problems aren’t pressing at the moment. But the combination of intractable deficit spending, unsustainable entitlement promises and a total dearth of responsible action in Washington certainly raises alarms regarding the future. Since I see no reason to reinvent the wheel when someone I respect has said something better than I could, I’ll close with a few words from Seth Klarman (emphasis added). Seth doesn’t find much in the things he discusses to inspire confidence, and I agree: There is no free lunch in economics: if governments could print or borrow money in astronomical amounts without any major adverse consequences, why wouldn’t they always do this, forever avoiding downturns while their countries bask in the sunshine of limitless prosperity? Indeed it seems clear that prior misplaced confidence in the Fed contributed greatly to years of complacency that turned the 2008 downturn into a full-blown crisis. Of course there will be a price to pay for today’s policy excesses – an equal and opposite reaction. We just haven’t seen it yet. Will it take the form of a collapse of the dollar and the end of dollar hegemony, high interest rates, failed auctions of U.S. government securities and runaway inflation, a wrenching and protracted downturn requiring exceptional sacrifice, or something else? We will find out soon enough. In most sectors of the economy – government, individual but also corporate – the U.S. has borrowed heavily to live beyond its means; we have been consuming through easy credit what we otherwise would have had to wait to buy. In the words of Michael Lewis, “Leverage buys you a glimpse of a prosperity you

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其实并未真正赚到。”资产价值具有条件性,正如吉姆·格兰特曾说过的。但债务是永恒的。面对危机,政府的回应不是削减杠杆、整顿内务,而是将难以负担的债务从个人资产负债表转移到国家账本上,如今我们每一天所欠的都比以往任何时候更多……

我认为,普通公民对国家财政状况的理解,很可能比许多政客或知名经济学家更为透彻。大多数人似乎本能地意识到,没有迫在眉睫的危机并不意味着最终不会面临危机。他们对那些未能预见房地产及高杠杆金融机构危机的人的承诺心存警惕。他们对那些不承认我们有债务问题、或坚称通胀将保持可控的人持怀疑态度。(事实上,他们知道通胀并未得到良好控制,因为他们去超市或加油站时,深知美元购买力已跌了多少。)他们相当确定,自己所缴纳的税款并未换来合理的价值。

当经济学家告诉他们,过去 12 年国债从 6 万亿美元增至 16 万亿美元并非问题,再翻一倍仍然不是问题时,这实在令人难以理解。他们清楚我们所走的轨迹,也知道世界历史上最成功的国家,若变得傲慢或自满,也可能走向衰落。当政客宣称某项增税或减支将在未来十年带来数万亿美元收益时,他们对是否真有人能预知明年之事、更不用说十年或更久之后的局势,持合理怀疑。他们对那些多年后才起效的宏大协议心存警惕,深知无法做出艰难抉择正是我们陷入今日困境的原因……

当你告诉民众,我们都能享受到极低利率的免费午餐、美联储大规模购买不断增加的国债发行、美联储资产负债表扩张数万亿美元,以及远至未来的巨额赤字时,他们深表怀疑,并非因为他们确切知道会发生什么,而是因为他们确信,没有其他人——即便是、或者说尤其是决策者——也不清楚。

haven’t really earned.” Asset values are contingent, as Jim Grant once said. But debt is forever. Instead of cutting back on leverage and getting our house in order, government response to the crisis has been to shift unaffordable debt from individual balance sheets onto the national ledger, where every day we owe more than ever before. . . . I believe it is possible that the average citizen understands our country’s fiscal situation better than many of our politicians or prominent economists. Most people seem to viscerally recognize that the absence of an immediate crisis does not mean we will not eventually face one. They are wary of believing promises by those who failed to predict previous crises in housing and in highly leveraged financial institutions. They regard with skepticism those who don’t accept that we have a debt problem, or insist that inflation will remain under control. (Indeed, they know inflation is not well under control, for they know how far the purchasing power of a dollar has dropped when they go to the supermarket or service station.) They are pretty sure they are not getting reasonable value from the taxes they pay. When an economist tells them that growing the nation’s debt over the past 12 years from $6 trillion to $16 trillion is not a problem, and that doubling it again will still not be a problem, this simply does not compute. They know the trajectory we are on, and that the most successful country in the history of the world can go into decline if it becomes arrogant or complacent. When politicians claim that this tax increase or that spending cut will generate trillions over the next decade, they are properly skeptical over whether anyone can truly know what will happen next year, let alone a decade or more from now. They are wary of grand bargains that kick in years down the road, knowing that the failure to make hard decisions is how we got into today’s mess. . . . And when you tell the populace that we can all enjoy a free lunch of extremely low interest rates, massive Fed purchases of mounting treasury issuance, trillions of dollars of expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet, and huge deficits far into the future, they are highly skeptical not because they know precisely what will happen, but because they are sure that no one else – even, or perhaps especially, the policymakers – does either.*

2013 年 8 月 5 日

  • 塞思请我提醒各位,他的发言版权归 © 2013 鲍波斯特集团有限责任公司(The Baupost Group, L.L.C.)所有,经许可转载,仅供橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)内部使用。未经许可,禁止以电子或纸质形式进一步传播或分发。

August 5, 2013

  • Seth has asked me to point out that his remarks are copyright © 2013 The Baupost Group,

L.L.C. Reprinted with permission for sole use by Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. Further dissemination or redistribution is prohibited, whether electronically or in paper form.

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