算算看!
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
Go Figure!
Go Figure!
回想一下上周选举之前的情况。我们当时都知道些什么?
Think back to just before last week’s election. What did we know?
民调几乎一致预测希拉里·克林顿将以约 3% 的优势赢得普选票。分析网站 FiveThirtyEight 在前两次总统选举中的预测相当准确,它给出克林顿获胜的概率为 71%,而其他几乎所有机构的预测都在 80% 到 90% 之间。克林顿在大多数将决定选举人团结果的“摇摆州”中占据优势,因此预期她能赢得超过 290 张选举人票,留给唐纳德·特朗普的只有 250 张左右。克林顿显然是左右市场的人们的明确选择。这一点从市场表现可见一斑:10 月下旬,当克林顿胜选几率上升时(从维基解密一些不愉快披露中恢复过来),市场随之上涨;而在 10 月 28 日,联邦调查局的詹姆斯·科米宣布发现另一批克林顿邮件,提升了特朗普的胜算后,市场随即下跌。因此,市场几乎普遍认为,特朗普获胜——尽管可能性不大——对市场而言将是坏消息。
The polls were almost unanimous in saying Hillary Clinton would win the popular vote by about 3%. FiveThirtyEight, an analytical website whose forecasts had proved quite accurate in the two prior presidential elections, gave Clinton a 71% probability of winning, and almost everyone else was between 80% and 90%. Clinton was favored in most of the “swing states” that would make the difference in the Electoral College. Thus she was expected to win more than 290 electoral votes, leaving just 250 or so for Donald Trump. Clinton was the obvious choice of the people who move the markets. This could be seen in the fact that the markets went up when Clinton’s odds improved in late October (recovering from some unpleasant Wikileaks disclosures), and then they fell after the FBI’s James Comey announced the discovery of an additional cache of Clinton emails on October 28, lifting Trump’s chances. Thus there was a near-universal belief that a Trump victory – as unlikely as it was – would be bad for the markets.
那么发生了什么?首先,克林顿没有赢。各方都在深刻反思,尤其是预测界人士。理智上,每个人都知道特朗普获胜的概率不是零,但很少有人觉得这事儿真能发生。
其次,美国股市经历了 2014 年以来表现最好的一周!道琼斯工业指数当周上涨近 5%,创下历史新高。上周道指天天都在涨。周一和周二,在人们预期克林顿会赢的时候,它涨了。然后周三、周四和周五,在她落败之后,它又接着涨。
这种表现让我想起自己 1 月份写的那份备忘录《沙发上的病人》,谈的正是市场的非理性。显然,大选是上周最大的事件,所以它必定是股价变动背后的主要推手。可为什么预期克林顿胜选会让股价上涨,而她败选成为现实后,股价反而涨得更厉害?
在那份备忘录里,我配了一幅漫画,画中新闻主播说:“昨天对市场有利的一切,今天都对它不利。”就这次大选而言,也许该改成:“昨天对市场有利的一切,今天它的对立面对它有利。”这实在说不通。
人们拼命从市场行为中寻找逻辑,但其实未必存在什么逻辑。在《沙发上的病人》里,我提到过,市场有时候把一切都解读为利好,有时候又把一切都解读为利空。
So what happened? First Clinton didn’t win. There’s much soul-searching, particularly among the forecasting fraternity. Everyone knew intellectually that Trump had a non-zero chance of winning, but few people thought it could actually happen. And second, the U.S. stock market had its best week since 2014! The Dow Jones Industrials rose almost 5% for the week, taking them to a new all-time high. The Dow was up every day last week. It rose on Monday and Tuesday, when Clinton was expected to win. And then it rose Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, after she had lost. That behavior calls to mind my January memo, “On the Couch,” on the subject of the market’s irrationality. Clearly, the election was the biggest event last week, so it must have been the main influence behind the changes in stock prices. But how could the expectation of a Clinton victory make stock prices rise, and then the reality of her defeat make them rise further? In that memo, I included a cartoon showing a newscaster saying, “Everything that was good for the market yesterday was no good for it today.” In the case of the election, it might have been, “Whatever was good for the market yesterday, its polar opposite was good for it today.” It just doesn’t make sense. While people search the market’s behavior for logic, there really doesn’t have to be any. In “On the Couch,” I mentioned that sometimes the market interprets everything positively, and sometimes it
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以下为上段的中文译文:
市场总是从消极面解读一切。短期内,市场常常无法理性行事,主要原因是主导市场走向的人性因素在起作用。基于上周的发展,可以得出两个关键观察:
interprets everything negatively. The market often fails to act rationally in the short run, primarily because of the role played by people in determining its course. Thus two key observations can be made based on last week’s developments:
首先,没有人真正知道未来会发生什么事件。
其次,也没有人知道市场对这些事件会作何反应。
First, no one really knows what events are going to transpire. And second, no one knows what the market’s reaction to those events will be.
这些观察进一步印证了我的信念:依据宏观经济预测来做投资决策是个错误。不过这一点你们早就知道了。
These observations reinforce my belief that it’s a mistake to base investment decisions on macro forecasts. But you knew that.
对市场的影响
当然,上周市场的上涨有其逻辑,只是这种逻辑与如果克林顿获胜时推动市场上涨的逻辑不同。可供引述的理由如下:
Impact on the Markets Of course there’s logic to the market’s rise last week, just a logic different from that which would have made it go up if Clinton had won. The reasons one might cite are these:
作为商人,特朗普无疑打算成为一位亲商的总统。事实上,他可能会比克林顿更努力地培育商业环境(尤其是在桑德斯和伊丽莎白·沃伦的推动下向左转的情况下),而且我认为他在这方面的努力会超过奥巴马政府时期的表现。
特朗普的竞选承诺包括:税制改革;降低企业和高收入者的所得税率;某种形式的税收假期,使企业能够将滞留海外的利润带回国内;减少商业监管(卡尔·伊坎告诉我这会带来巨大影响);一项大规模基础设施计划(宣布投入 1 万亿美元);停止对银行的抨击;减轻制药和医疗保健公司面临的降价压力;以及废除遗产税。这确实是一份相当亲商的议程。
参议员沃伦的民粹主义影响力将会减弱。
商界人士和华尔街从业者将受到欢迎加入政府,而不会再像近年那样被排斥在外。
As a businessman, Trump doubtless intends to be a pro-business president. In fact, he’ll probably make more of an effort to nurture business than Clinton would have (especially when being pushed to the left by Sanders and Elizabeth Warren), and more than I think characterized the Obama administration. Trump’s campaign promises have included tax reform; reduced income tax rates on corporations and big earners; some form of tax holiday to enable corporations to bring in profits stranded abroad; a reduction of business regulation (Carl Icahn tells me this will be huge); a big infrastructure program ($1 trillion announced); an end to bank-bashing; less pressure on pharmaceutical and health care companies to cut prices; and an end to the estate tax. That’s quite a pro-business agenda. The populist power of Sen. Warren will be reduced. Businessmen and Wall Streeters will be welcome to serve in the administration, not verboten as in recent years.
归根结底——如果一切如承诺所言——将会出现大规模的财政刺激;GDP 增长、企业利润和就业大幅提升;通胀水平高于原本应有的情形;国家债务大幅膨胀;人人所得皆有增加,样样都比以往更多。
安东尼·斯卡拉穆奇是特朗普先生经济顾问委员会成员,他在英国《金融时报》撰文称,这位当选总统将以“历史性低息债务和公私合作模式”为新一轮支出计划融资,并称该计划将通过刺激经济增长来削减赤字。“全球各经济体之所以在对抗通缩,很大程度上是因为危机后转向了财政紧缩。我们可以用财政刺激取代紧急状态的利率水平,从而弥合美国的财富鸿沟。”(英国《金融时报》,11 月 12—13 日)
这里没有紧缩!
特朗普在商业和经济方面的言论确实有一些积极内容,也是他政纲中最出彩的部分……前提是他和他的政府有能力将其付诸实践。
At the bottom line – if everything works as promised – there will be massive fiscal stimulus; big increases in GDP growth, corporate profits and jobs; higher inflation than otherwise would have been the case; a big increase in the national debt; and more of everything for everybody. Writing in the Financial Times, Anthony Scaramucci, a member of Mr. Trump’s economic advisory council, said the president-elect would finance the new spending plan with “historically-cheap debt and public-private partnerships” and said it would cut deficits by stimulating economic growth. “Economies around the world are fighting deflation largely because of a post-crisis move toward fiscal austerity. We can close the wealth gap in America by replacing emergency-level interest rates with fiscal stimulus.” (Financial Times, November 12-13) No austerity here! Trump’s statements regarding business and the economy contain some real positives and are the best part of his platform . . . if he and his administration are up to the task of putting them into practice.
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然而,他的部分承诺可能会考验在经济现实约束下所能实现目标的极限。
而且还存在不利因素,包括:
However, some of his promises may test the limits of what can be accomplished under the limitations imposed by economic reality. And there are negatives, including:
特朗普对珍妮特·耶伦的蔑视毫不掩饰,由此可能削弱美联储的独立性;他对国际贸易协定的立场(这一领域总统拥有异常广泛的单边行动权);他威胁对在中国和墨西哥生产的商品征收进口关税,进而可能引发贸易战;此外,这一切加上他在气候变化、防务条约等问题上的非常规立场,可能对整个国际关系造成不利影响。
Trump’s express disdain for Janet Yellen, and the resulting possibility that Fed independence will be reduced, his stance on international trade pacts (an area in which a president has unusually broad power to take unilateral action), his threat of imposing import duties on goods made in China and Mexico, and the resulting possibility of trade wars, and the possibility that this plus his unconventional positions on things such as climate change and defense treaties bode ill for international relations in general.
这就引出了债券的前景问题。正当美国股市为特朗普当选而欢欣鼓舞时,债券市场却一片低迷。特朗普当选后的上周,利率急速攀升,让债券持有者损失惨重。英国《金融时报》援引亨利·考夫曼的话写道——这位所罗门兄弟公司的首席经济学家,曾在 1970 年代准确预言了债券熊市的到来:
“这是一次地壳板块式的变动”……为期三十年的债券牛市就此终结,原因在于减税缺乏资金支持、基础设施支出以及美联储的彻底重塑。“我要说,长期趋势如今将掉头向上,”他告诉《金融时报》,“长期走势难以预测,但利率长期下行的趋势已经结束,我们即将迎来温和的上行。”
我始终觉得,做股票的拥趸需要几分天生的乐观主义——股票依赖的是市场赋予的推测性回报,而债券带来的是发行人保证的合约性回报。因此,美国股票投资者对特朗普政府表现出的乐观情绪,几乎是一周前无人能预见的。
股票投资者喜欢通胀,因为它能推高利润。债券投资者厌恶通胀,因为它推升利率,压低他们手中债券的价值。但两者不可能永远背道而驰。在某个遥远的时点,利率走高会让债券对涨幅已高的股票形成更强劲的竞争。
最后,关于市场前景这个话题,我想转述斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒的一些观察——他拥有史上最出色的投资纪录之一,而且绝非天生偏向乐观(或任何其他倾向)的人:
That brings us to the outlook for bonds. Just as the U.S. stock market has celebrated Trump’s election, the bond markets have been discouraged. Interest rates rose very rapidly last week following Trump’s election, bringing big losses to bond holders. The FT wrote the following, citing Henry Kaufman, the Salomon Brothers chief economist who correctly called the bond bear market in the 1970s: “It’s a tectonic shift” . . . the end of a three-decade bond bull market, because of the likelihood of unfunded tax cuts, infrastructure spending and a radically reshaped Federal Reserve. “I would say the secular trend is going to be upwards now,” he told the FT. “Secular swings are hard to forecast, but the secular sweep downwards in interest rates is over, and we are about to have a gentle swing upwards.” I always feel it takes a degree of innate optimism to be a devotee of stocks (with their reliance on conjectural returns awarded by the market) as opposed to bonds (which bring contractual returns guaranteed by their issuers). Thus U.S. equity investors have exhibited an optimism regarding the Trump administration that virtually no one foresaw a week ago. Equity investors like inflation because it pumps up profits. Bond investors dislike it because it raises interest rates, reducing the value of the bonds they hold. But the two can’t go in opposite directions forever. At some distant point, higher interest rates can cause bonds to offer stiffer competition against highly appreciated stocks. Finally on the subject of the market outlook, I’ll pass on some observations from Stanley Druckenmiller – the owner of one of the very best investment records in history, and certainly not someone congenitally biased to optimism (or anything else):
亿万富翁投资人斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒周四对 CNBC 表示,特朗普当选后,他对美国经济“相当、相当乐观”。
“我在选举当晚卖掉了所有黄金,”杜肯资本创始人兼前董事长在接受“财经谈”节目采访时说。
Billionaire investor Stanley Druckenmiller told CNBC on Thursday he's "quite, quite optimistic" about the U.S. economy following the election of Donald Trump. "I sold all my gold on the night of the election," the founder and former chairman of Duquesne Capital said in a “Squawk Box” interview.
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他说自己正通过做空全球债券来押注经济增长,同时看好那些随增长而反应的股票。他还看好美元的前景,尤其是对欧元的走势。
这一乐观预期与德鲁肯米勒 5 月在纽约 Sohn 投资大会上发表的言论形成鲜明对比。当时,他告诉与会者应该卖出所持股票。他还曾表示,黄金是他“最大的货币配置”。
尽管德鲁肯米勒此前态度悲观,但他周四表示:“我已经很久没这么满怀希望了。”他补充道:“如果我们现在看到的不是分裂的顶峰,我也不会感到意外。”
“[但]我希望经济政策能交由迈克·彭斯和保罗·瑞安去定夺,”他指的是当选副总统和众议院议长。他指出自己并不支持希拉里·克林顿。(德鲁肯米勒曾支持约翰·卡西奇角逐共和党提名,并表示自己在理念上赞同瑞安的经济政策。)
“我不认为唐纳德·特朗普是罗纳德·里根,”他补充说。
自共和党保住众议院和参议院多数席位并赢得白宫后,德鲁肯米勒表示,这是推动税改和放松监管的“最佳时机”。
“如果不是利率上升与通过[财政]政策带来的更强经济增长之间那场纠结的冲突,我会认为在放松监管和税改方面有太多唾手可得的果实,我们能在约 18 个月里获得 4% 的[增长]提振,”他说。
“我确实认为利率可能把这一数字压回 2% 多的区间,甚至低到 3%,”他继续说道,并补充市场正指向借贷成本大幅上升。“我认为市场会迫使这一切发生。如果我的乐观设想成真,市场会推动他们加息。”(CNBC 在线报道)
我向来对宏观预测和宏观投资大加挞伐,但斯坦是个例外,他证明了我远非百分之百正确。我原封不动地引述他的话,没人应该忽视它们。
为什么预测者错得这么离谱?
特朗普赢了 30 个州,而克林顿赢了 20 个州和哥伦比亚特区。特朗普赢下了三个原本预计倒向克林顿的州,外加评级为“胶着”的三个州中最大的两个,而克林顿在人们预期特朗普会赢的州里一个也没翻盘。特朗普赢下的县远远多于克林顿(尽管显然不包括人口最多的县),其中包括收入低于平均水平和高于平均水平的县。许多结果都出乎意料。
He said he's betting on growth by shorting bonds globally, and he likes stocks that respond to growth. He also likes prospects for the dollar, especially against the euro. This rosier outlook is in sharp contrast to what Druckenmiller said at the Sohn Investment Conference in New York in May. At the time, he told attendees they should sell their stock holdings. He also had said gold was his "largest currency allocation." Despite Druckenmiller's past negativity, he said Thursday: "It's as hopeful as I've been in a long time." He added, "I would not be surprised if we're not looking at the peak of the divisiveness." "[But] I hope economic policy is deferred to Mike Pence and Paul Ryan," he said, referring to the vice president-elect and the speaker of the House. He pointed out he did not support Hillary Clinton. (Druckenmiller had supported John Kasich for the Republican nomination and said he's philosophically in favor of Ryan's economic policies.) "I don't think Donald Trump is Ronald Reagan," he added. Since Republicans maintained control of the House and Senate while winning the White House, Druckenmiller said "this is the greatest chance" to get tax reform and deregulation passed. “If it wasn't for the messy conflict of rates rising with the stronger economic growth through [fiscal] policy, I would think there's so much low-hanging fruit in terms of deregulation and tax reform, we could get a jolt of 4 percent [growth] for about 18 months," he said. "I do think interest rates could cut that back into the high 2s, low 3s [percent]," he continued, adding markets are pointing to the cost of borrowing money going up a lot. "I think the market is going to force this. The market is going to push them to raise interest rates if my hopeful scenario turns out to be right." (CNBC on-line) I usually inveigh against macro forecasting and macro investing, but Stan is the exception who proves I’m far from 100% right. I supply his words unabridged. No one should ignore them. Why Were the Forecasters So Wrong? Trump won in 30 states, whereas Clinton won in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Trump won in three states that were expected to go for Clinton plus the two largest of the three states rated “tossups,” while Clinton didn’t upset Trump in any of the states people expected him to win. Trump won vastly more counties than Clinton (although not the most populated, obviously), including those populated by both below-average and above-average incomes. Many of these things came as surprises.
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我在《选举的启示》中描述的特朗普选民聚合体,如期汇集到了一起,但数量超出预期。他的支持者被极大的热情所驱动,虽然他们可能没有向民调机构承认支持那位被多数媒体和知识界嗤之以鼻的候选人,但他们以惊人的票数投给了他。意外之处包括一些受过大学教育的白人、高收入人群,甚至还有西语裔——此前预计他们绝大多数会投票给克林顿。
最终,整个竞选期间人们都在谈论的“热情赤字”成了克林顿的梦魇。虽然告诉民调机构会投给她的人比投给特朗普的人多,但其中许多人可能是出于对特朗普的反感,而非对克林顿的深厚喜爱。到头来,她的选民缺乏热情,似乎让足够多的人留在了家里,从而改变了结果。佛罗里达、密歇根、宾夕法尼亚和威斯康星的投票率低于预期,而正是这些州的选举结果,在很大程度上造成了这场选举意外。
11 月 12 日至 13 日的《金融时报》发表了一针见血的观察:
在密歇根和威斯康星这两个可以说是左右了选举走向的州,[克林顿夫人]比奥巴马先生少得了约 30 万张选票,这表明他的支持者要么留在了家里,要么把票投给了特朗普或第三方候选人。
归根结底,特朗普几乎拿下了罗姆尼在 2012 年赢得的全部县,外加相当一部分奥巴马赢下的县。克林顿在宾夕法尼亚输掉 1.4%,而两周前人们还以为她领先两位数;在威斯康星输掉 1.5%,那是个她本应赢下的州;在密歇根输掉 0.3%,而奥巴马在 2012 年拿下了该州。
奥巴马的支持者热情高涨,往往是受他激昂的演讲和(或)他成为/保持首位黑人总统的可能性所鼓舞。尽管克林顿有可能成为入主白宫的首位女性,但她与“普通人”难以建立联系,加之私人电子邮件服务器和克林顿基金会的争议,让她麻烦缠身。最后,她从未争取到一些民主党人,尤其是年轻人,这些人曾团结在伯尼·桑德斯更自由的议程之下。于是她的得票数低于预期。
宾夕法尼亚、威斯康星和密歇根三州合计仅差 11.3 万张选票,就让克林顿成了输家。如果她在这三个州多赢 5.7 万张选票(占那里 1360 万张总票数的 0.4%),她就会成为当选总统。
无论出于什么原因,几乎所有人都认为胜算微乎其微的特朗普,成了意外的赢家。经历了这次和英国脱欧公投——同样与预测背道而驰——之后,预测人士未来的言论未必还会像过去那样被认真对待。
我一直说“几乎所有人”都认为克林顿会赢。那是因为有一个显著的例外:南加州大学多恩塞夫分校/《洛杉矶时报》总统选举民调一直预测特朗普会赢得普选。他们最后给出的领先幅度是 3%。
如今,南加州大学民调的阿里·卡普泰恩因预测正确而受到称赞,彭博社报道说他采用了“专家所称的独特且更为复杂的加权模型”。他的成功能否挽回预测行业的颜面?
The amalgamation of Trump voters that I described in “Implications of the Election” came together as expected, but in greater quantity than expected. His supporters were moved by great fervor, and while they may not have admitted to the pollsters that they favored the candidate derided by most of the media and intelligentsia, they voted for him in surprising numbers. The surprises included some college-educated whites, people with higher incomes, and even Hispanics, the vast majority of whom were expected to vote for Clinton. And in the end, the “enthusiasm deficit” people had talked about all campaign came home to haunt Clinton. While more people had told pollsters they would vote for her than for Trump, many of them were probably motivated by aversion to Trump rather than any great love of Clinton. In the end, her voters’ lack of enthusiasm seems to have kept enough from the polls to make the difference. Turnout was below expectations in Florida, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and the results in these states were largely responsible for the election surprise. The Financial Times of November 12-13 made a telling observation: In Michigan and Wisconsin, the two states that arguably swung the election, [Mrs. Clinton] received roughly 300,000 fewer votes than Mr. Obama did, suggesting his supporters either stayed home, or cast their votes for Mr. Trump or a third-party candidate. The bottom line is that Trump won virtually all the counties that Romney won in 2012 plus a fair number of the ones Obama won. Clinton lost Pennsylvania by 1.4%, whereas two weeks ago she was thought to be ahead by double digits; Wisconsin by 1.5%, a state she was expected to win; and Michigan by 0.3%, a state Obama carried in 2012. Obama’s supporters were passionate, often because of his stirring oratory and/or his potential to be/remain the first black president. Despite the possibility of her being the first woman in the White House, Clinton ran into trouble relating to her difficulty connecting with the “common man,” in addition to the controversies relating to her private email server and the Clinton Foundation. Finally, she never picked up some of the Democrats, especially young ones, who had coalesced behind Bernie Sanders’s more liberal agenda. Thus her vote count fell short of expectations. A combined shortfall of just 113,000 votes in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan made Clinton the loser. If she had won just 57,000 of those votes (or 0.4% of the 13.6 million total votes cast there), she would be the president-elect. For whatever reason, Trump, who almost everyone thought had no significant chance, was the surprise winner. After this and the Brexit vote – which also ran counter to forecasts – prognosticators are likely to be followed less assiduously in the future than in the past. I keep saying “almost everyone” thought Clinton would win. That’s because there was one prominent exception: the USC Dornslife/Los Angeles Times Presidential Election Poll consistently predicted a Trump victory in the popular vote. They had him up by 3% at the end. Now the USC poll’s Arie Kapteyn is being lauded for having gotten the outcome right, and Bloomberg reports that he employed “what experts called a unique and more complex weighting model.” Does his success redeem the forecasting profession?
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并不尽然。特朗普并未如 USC 预测那般赢得普选票,他反而输掉了普选票(差距不足半个百分点)。因此,不能说 USC 预测准确。他们错了。或者说,他们虽预测对了特朗普获胜,但理由却错了。(在投资界,这种情况何其常见?)归根结底,谁更正确:是 USC(预测他会赢得普选票),还是其他人(他们正确指出希拉里会赢得普选票——却眼睁睁看着她输掉大选)?这就是我所谓的“塔勒布式问题”。
关键在于,普选票民调虽能登上头条,但总统之位却由选举人团决定。后者让特朗普成为赢家——正如 USC 所言,但并非因其预测的理由。(关于选举人团,稍后详述。)
Not really. Trump didn’t win the popular vote as USC predicted; he lost it (by just under half a percent). Thus you can’t say USC had it right. They were wrong. Or rather, they were right about a Trump victory, but for the wrong reason. (How often do we see that in the investment world?) In the end, who was more right: USC (which said he would win the popular vote) or the others (who were correct in saying Clinton would win it – only to see her lose the election)? That’s what I would call a Talebian question. The bottom line is that popular vote polls get headlines, but the presidency is determined in the Electoral College. The latter made Trump the winner – as USC had said, but not for the reason it had predicted. (More on the Electoral College later.)
特朗普总统任期的前景
选举日当天我在澳大利亚,立刻有人问我未来会怎样。首先,我说,我们不知道的事情远多于所知,不许妄下结论。以下是几个关键悬而未决的问题:
Outlook for the Trump Presidency I was in Australia on Election Day, and right away I was asked what the future holds. First, I said, there’s far too much we don’t know to permit any conclusions. Here are a few of the key open questions:
特朗普竞选期间说的话,有多少是当真的?
他真正想落实的又有几分?
而他想落实的,又能实现多少?
How much of what Trump said while campaigning did he mean? How much of what he actually meant will he try to implement? And how much of what he tries to implement will he be able to effect?
他会寻求建议吗?(竞选期间,他给人的印象是觉得自己最懂行。)
他会任命专业、经验丰富的顾问吗?
他会听取他们的建议吗?
Will he seek advice? (While campaigning he gave the impression he thinks he knows best.) Will he appoint expert, experienced advisors? Will he heed their advice?
其次,我会寻找一些初步的迹象。
Second, I’d look for some initial signs.
他的胜选演讲是释放和解信号,还是宣泄报复情绪?当然,答案是前者。
他的首批人事任命是建设性的,还是不那么尽如人意?是主要奖励忠诚,还是看重专业与经验?
o 迈克·彭斯被选中领导过渡团队,这一主流选择让我们稍感宽慰。
o 不太令人振奋的是,他任命了直言不讳的气候变化否认者迈伦·埃贝尔负责环境保护局的过渡工作。
o 我曾以为,特朗普选择幕僚长会透露出一些端倪,当时传闻的人选是在颇具争议的竞选顾问史蒂夫·班农——前另类右翼媒体布赖特巴特新闻网掌门人——和共和党全国委员会主席赖因斯·普里巴斯之间,后者在华盛顿备受尊重,深谙内部运作之道。周日,普里巴斯被任命为幕僚长,班农出任首席战略师兼高级顾问,这一安排让问题悬而未决,也表明特朗普政府中传统派和局外人都有立足之地。
o 我们还尚未看到的一点是,经验丰富、受人尊敬的政府老臣是否会加入这个难以预测、潜在争议缠身的政府。
特朗普的早期表现会表明,我们在竞选集会上看到的那个他是真实的特朗普,还是那个狂热的民粹主义者和不按常理出牌的形象只是夸大其词、为了制造效果?我
Would his acceptance speech be conciliatory or vindictive? Certainly it was the former. Will his first appointments be constructive or less so? Will they primarily reward loyalty or expertise and experience? o We can take some encouragement from the mainstream choice of Mike Pence to head his transition team. o Less cheering is his appointment of Myron Ebell, an outspoken climate change denier, to lead the transition at the Environmental Protection Agency. o I had thought that Trump’s selection of his chief of staff would be somewhat telling, given the rumored choice between the controversial campaign adviser Steve Bannon, formerly head of the alt-right Breitbart News, and Republican National Committee Chair Reince Priebus, who is respected in Washington and has an insider’s understanding of how it works. Sunday’s appointment of Priebus as chief of staff and Bannon as chief strategist/senior counselor leaves the question unanswered and suggests there’s room in the Trump administration for both traditionalists and outsiders. o One of the things we have yet to see is whether experienced and respected veterans of government will join an unpredictable and potentially controversial administration. Will Trump’s early behavior indicate that the man we saw on the stump was the real Trump, or that the fiery populist and outside-the-box persona was exaggerated for effect? I am
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有一点令人欣慰的是,到目前为止,他表现出的“总统范儿”和我们所能想象的差不多。
第三,特朗普在国会获得多少支持将会很有趣。共和党在众议院净损失了 6 个席位,但他们仍然在 435 个席位中稳稳占据 45 个席位的多数。
但他们在参议院失去了一些地盘,因此现在仅仅在 100 个席位中勉强占多数。
以下是其中的一些关键考量:
somewhat encouraged that, so far, he’s appearing about as “presidential” as we could have thought possible. Third, it will be interesting to see the extent to which Trump is supported in Congress. Republicans lost a net of six seats in the House of Representatives, but they still enjoy a solid majority of 45 seats out of the 435 there. But they lost some ground in the Senate and thus now hold only a bare majority of the 100 seats. Here are some of the key considerations there:
参议院具有特殊的地位,因为条约的批准(需三分之二多数)以及内阁成员、大使和最高法院法官等任命事项,均须经其审议通过。
诚然,今年确有一些候选人竞选参议员并成功当选,他们明确拒绝特朗普,并表示会投票支持克林顿。因此,并非所有共和党参议员都会确定支持特朗普的施政举措;他所拥有的多数优势并非无懈可击。
此外,参议院实行冗长发言(filibuster)的传统,允许议员阻止法案(预算案除外)进入表决,除非通过启动“终结辩论”(cloture)程序来解除这一阻挠。终结辩论需获得参议员表决人数的五分之三(通常为 60 人)支持,但某些行政和司法任命(不包括最高法院大法官提名)除外,这些情况下仅需简单多数即可。因此,共和党在参议院拥有的微弱多数,在大多数情况下并不足以确保法案顺利通过。
The Senate has a special role, as its approval is required for treaties (a two-thirds majority) and for appointments such as those of cabinet members, ambassadors, and judges of the Supreme Court. Certainly some candidates ran for the Senate this year – and won – explicitly rejecting Trump and saying they would vote for Clinton. Thus not all of the Republican senators are sure to support Trump’s initiatives; his majority isn’t bulletproof. Further, the tradition of filibuster in the Senate allows a member to prevent action on a bill (other than a budget) unless the filibuster is lifted through the invocation of “cloture” Cloture requires support from 3/5 of the senators voting (usually 60), with the very new exception of certain executive and judicial appointments (but not Supreme Court nominees), when a simple majority is sufficient. Thus the Republicans’ small majority isn’t enough to ensure smooth sailing in most cases.
基于这些原因,尽管共和党控制着国会两院,我并不认为特朗普一定能拿到空白支票。希望参议院的形势能推动他走向温和。
竞选期间我就感觉,与希拉里·克林顿相比,特朗普政府可能采取的行动和产生的结果范围实在太广,难以预测。我仍然确信,这是我们唯一能确定的事。
多数不说了算
在上周的《选举的影响》中,我谈到了选举人团的缺陷。如今这些缺陷已暴露无遗。如前所述,尽管希拉里·克林顿在普选中以约 0.5% 的优势获胜,但唐纳德·特朗普预计将在下个月正式投票时以 306 票对 232 票的悬殊优势赢得选举人团。因此,他 47.3% 的普选得票率(克林顿为 47.8%,另有 4.9% 投给了所谓“第三方”候选人)转化为了 57.9% 的选举人票。
这种炼金术主要归因于一个事实:除缅因州和内布拉斯加州外,所有州分配选举人票时不按候选人在该州的普选得票比例,而是采用赢者通吃的规则。
克林顿在几个大州以巨大优势获胜——比如纽约州,她以 58% 对 37% 赢得 29 张选举人票;还有最大的彩头,加州,以 62% 对 33% 拿下 55 张选举人票。但由于所有选举人票都归普选得票最高者,超过简单多数的部分都“浪费”了。
For all these reasons, even though Republicans control both houses of Congress, I don’t think Trump necessarily has a blank check. Hopefully circumstances in the Senate will push him toward moderation. I felt during the campaign that, as opposed to Hillary Clinton, the range of possible actions and outcomes in a Trump administration was far too broad to be predicted. I’m still convinced that’s the only thing we know for certain. Majority Doesn’t Rule In “The Implications of the Election” last week, I talked about the shortcomings of the Electoral College. Now they have been made clear. As mentioned earlier, even though Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by about 0.5%, Donald Trump is projected to win in the Electoral College by a big margin, 306 to 232, when it votes officially next month. Thus his 47.3% of the popular vote (Clinton got 47.8%, and 4.9% voted for the candidates of so-called “third parties”) translated into 57.9% of the Electoral votes. This alchemy is attributable primarily to the fact that all of the states other than Maine and Nebraska allocate their electoral votes not in proportion to the candidates’ popular votes in the state, but rather on a winner-take-all basis. Clinton won a few big states by huge margins – like NY’s 29 electoral votes by 58% to 37%, and the top prize, California with its 55 electoral votes, by 62% to 33%. But since all the electoral votes go to the person with the most popular votes, anything in excess of a simple majority is “wasted.” In
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这两个州合计投出 1520 万张选票,克林顿获得 960 万张,比她胜选所需多出 200 万张。这些多余选票拉高了她普选票总数,却对她的总统胜选毫无帮助。
另一边,特朗普赢下更多州——其中许多是中小规模的州——且有 6 个州胜幅低于 5%。但正如我刚才所说,51 比 49 与 70 比 30 的结果相同。因此,尽管特朗普普选票总数少于克林顿,他运用这些选票的效率却高得多(也就是说,他的平均胜幅更小)。他每百万普选票对应 5.1 张选举人票,而克林顿仅为 3.8 张。当然,这本质上并不民主。
这一过程导致的结果,可能让获得更多民意的候选人落选。上周的选举是我国历史上第四次出现这种情况,也是过去 16 年里的第二次。
以下是哥伦比亚广播公司(CBS)报道的一位敏锐观察者 2012 年对这一安排的评论:
these two states combined, with 15.2 million votes cast, Clinton got 9.6 million, which was 2 million more than she needed to win. Those extra votes padded her popular vote total, but they could do nothing to help her win the presidency. Trump, on the other hand, won a larger number of states – many of them small to mid-sized – and in six cases by less than 5%. But, as I said above, 51/49 produces the same outcome as 70/30. So even though Trump received fewer popular votes in total than Clinton, he used them much more efficiently (meaning his average margin of victory was smaller). He got 5.1 electoral votes per million popular votes, whereas Clinton got only 3.8. Of course that’s basically undemocratic. This process translates into outcomes that can deny the election to the candidate for whom more people voted. Last week’s election was the fourth time that has happened in our nation’s history, but also the second time in the last 16 years. Here’s what CBS reports one astute observer to have said about this arrangement in 2012:
那个假选举人团把我们国家变成了笑柄。输家一个!
他输掉了普选票一大截,却赢了选举。我们国家真该来一场革命!
这位评论者是唐纳德·特朗普,他在 2012 年奥巴马连任时错误地发表了这番言论(实际上奥巴马赢得了普选票)。出于某种奇怪的原因,那些推文现在已被删除。
有人试图改变这一程序,让未来的总统根据全国普选票来决定,但均未成功,最近一次尝试在 1969 年。目前又有一项努力正在进行,但道路漫长而艰辛。我希望这一状况能得到修正,也希望我能活着看到那一天。
但与此同时,选举人团的投票才是算数的投票。因此,候选人将时间、精力和资源用于最大化这些选票,而不是普选票。虽然我更倾向于另一种制度,但现行制度就是这样,那些对未获普选票多数却赢得胜利的合法性提出的抱怨,并不能引起我的共鸣。
顺便说一句,一个非常类似的现象也影响了今年共和党提名的争夺战。几年前,该党改变了制度,在早期初选中实行赢家通吃。目的是迅速缩小候选人范围,将竞争集中在那些能够获得可观支持的候选人身上。
因此,当特朗普在初选中面对其他 16 名候选人时,他脱颖而出,凭借通常只有百分之二十几的得票率,赢得了全部待争夺的代表席位。这让他得以在共和党当权派来得及应对他这匹黑马之前,就建立起压倒性的领先优势。在这里,赢家通吃的投票规则同样可能受到审视。
The phoney [sic] electoral college made a laughing stock out of our nation. The loser one! He lost the popular vote by a lot and won the election. We should have a revolution in this country! That observer was Donald Trump, responding erroneously to Obama’s 2012 reelection (Obama actually won the popular vote). For some odd reason, those tweets have now been taken down. There have been unsuccessful efforts to change the process so that future presidents will be chosen on the basis of the national popular vote, including one as recently as 1969. Another is currently underway, but the road is long and arduous. I hope the situation will be revised . . . and that I live to see it. But in the meantime, the vote in the Electoral College is the vote that counts. Thus candidates allocate their time, effort and resources to maximize those votes, rather than popular votes. Although I’d prefer a different system, it’s the one we’ve got, and complaints about the legitimacy of a victory that isn’t accompanied by a popular vote majority don’t resonate with me. As an aside, a very similar phenomenon impacted the battle for this year’s Republican nomination. A few years ago, the party changed the system to winner-take-all in the early primary races. The purpose was to quickly winnow the field to focus the contest on candidates capable of garnering significant support. Thus when Trump was up against 16 other candidates in the primaries, he distinguished himself from the others and was able to win 100% of the delegates at stake with vote percentages generally in the twenties. This enabled him to take a commanding lead before the Republican establishment was able to respond to his insurgent candidacy. Here too, winner-take-all voting may come under examination.
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各党派前景再探讨
在《选举的启示》中,我提到了共和党不确定的未来——特朗普的支持者与不支持的党内当权派之间可能出现分裂。(既然特朗普已经胜出,也许一切都会被原谅。)
现在我想指出民主党内部出现分裂的可能性。
The Outlook for the Parties Revisited In “The Implications of the Election,” I mentioned the uncertain future of the Republican party – with a schism possible between Trump’s followers and the unsupportive party establishment. (Now that Trump has won, it’s possible all will be forgiven.) Now I want to point out the possibility of a schism among Democrats.
初选期间,克林顿的中间派支持者与伯尼·桑德斯明显更自由派的拥趸之间存在着清晰的分界线。
当克林顿获得提名时,许多后者的支持者感到不满,其中一些人很可能在大选中投了弃权票。
有些人可能会将克林顿输给一个本应极易击败的共和党候选人,归咎于她不够自由的政见以及她作为党内老派成员的身份。这可能会导致自由派派系在下一次尝试中付出更多努力,以确保他们属意的候选人获得提名。
There was a clear divide during the primaries between Clinton’s centrist supporters and Bernie Sanders’s considerably more liberal backers. Many of the latter became disgruntled when Clinton received the nomination, and some are likely to have abstained from voting in the general election. It’s possible some will attribute Clinton’s loss to an easily-beatable Republican candidate to her less liberal agenda and membership in the party’s old guard. This may cause the liberal faction to try to exert more effort next time to ensure that their kind of candidate is nominated.
因此,我认为 2016 年的总统选举——以及特朗普在其中起到的催化作用——将在未来多年对我们的政治进程双方都产生影响。然而,这些影响同样是无法预测的。
Thus I think the 2016 presidential election – and Trump’s catalyzing role in it – will have implications on both sides of our political process for years to come. These too, however, are unpredictable. *
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这是我一段时间内最后一篇关于政治的备忘录了,我希望(你们可能也希望如此)。
This is the last memo on politics for a while, I hope (as may you).
November 14, 2016
November 14, 2016
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