选举的影响

2016 (inferred) · memo · 原文约 5762 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

选举结果的影响

Implications of the Election

我在选举日一周前开始写这份备忘录。我保证尽量避开候选人的优劣和谁将胜出的问题,只谈选举带给我们的重要启示,以及我们因此应该推动的行动。就我而言,明天选举的结果不会改变这些事情。

I’m starting this memo a week before Election Day. I promise to try to stay away from the merits of the candidates and the question of who will win, and instead confine myself to the important messages that we should take away from the election and the actions we should push for as a result. The outcome of tomorrow’s election won’t change these things as far as I’m concerned.

愤怒的选民

当然,这个选举年的大新闻是唐纳德·特朗普史无前例、不走寻常路的崛起。特朗普完全没有任何民选公职或其他公共服务经验,也没有成熟的竞选组织,就这样把帽子扔进了擂台。实际上,他连既定政党的意识形态都没有。他采纳了共和党的一些主张,却抛弃了另一些。然而,他却吸引了一大群选民,人数恐怕有 5000 万之众。

他做到这一点,靠的是把各种成分异常多元的力量凑到一起。其中包括:那些绝不会把票投给其他党候选人的死忠共和党人;那些恨克林顿恨了 24 年、从比尔首次就职以来怨气一直没散的人;那些被特朗普的名人光环、商业成功口碑、口无遮拦和花哨做派吸引的人;还有右翼支持者。但这只讲了故事的一半。

我认为对未来最重要的一个方面,跟特朗普的支持者有关——尤其是那些最活跃、嗓门最大的一批人——他们被对“体制”的愤怒所驱动,这种愤怒既不是纯粹的情绪宣泄,也并非站不住脚。

很多人是年纪较大、白人、没上过大学的男性,可以形容为“人口结构上被甩下的人”。这些人出生的时候,白人男性统治着美国;他们的社区不是混居的,而且正在变得越来越混居;民权运动、女权运动带来的文化变迁,技术变革和大规模移民,当时都是无法想象的。没错,对我说的这些人来说,向今天的美国——上述一切都面目全非——的转变,确实可能让人不安、让人难受。

与此同时,很多美国人——而且往往是同一批人——正在经历失业和经济前景黯淡的打击。50 年前,甚至 30 年前,没有大学学历的男人可以轻松找到收入不错的工作,还享有养家糊口、维持体面生活的自豪感。一户家庭一个养家人就够了,一个养家人一份工作就够。强大的工会保证了像样的工资和福利,还保护工人免受工作规则和流程过快变化的冲击。

如今,非技术性岗位被自动化、海外制造和贸易的日益全球化削减了。工会在私营部门的力量弱了很多(你想想,今天能叫得上名号的强大工会领袖是谁?)。上面说的那种男人——年纪大、白人、没上过大学的——很可能自己丢过工作,认识丢过工作的人,或者在社区里亲眼见过这种冲击。

Angry Voters Of course, the big story of this election year has been the unprecedented, unconventional rise of Donald Trump. Trump threw his hat into the ring with a complete lack of experience in elected office or other public service, and without an established campaign organization. In fact, he had no established party’s ideology. He adopted some Republican elements but rejected others. And yet he has been able to attract a large group of voters, probably about 50 million strong. He did this by assembling backing from an unusually diverse mix of elements. These included dedicated Republicans who weren’t about to vote for a candidate of another party; the many Clinton haters who’ve had 24 years to gel since Bill’s first inauguration; people who were attracted to Trump’s celebrity, reputation for business success, outspokenness and colorful manner; and supporters of the right. But this tells only part of the story. The aspect I consider most important for the future relates to the Trump supporters – and some of the most active and vocal ones – who are motivated by an anger regarding “the system” that is neither purely emotional nor illegitimate. Many are older, white, non-college-educated men who might be described as “demographically dislocated.” When these men were born, white males ran America; their communities weren’t mixed and becoming more so; and the cultural shifts occasioned by the civil and women’s rights movements, technological change and mass immigration were unimagined. Certainly the shift to the America of today – with all these things quite different – might be jarring and unpleasant to the people I describe. At the same time, many Americans – and often the same ones – are experiencing the effects of job loss and diminished economic prospects. Fifty or even thirty years ago, men without college degrees could easily obtain good-paying jobs and the pride associated with being able to maintain their families at a good standard of living. One earner per household was enough, and one job per earner. Strong labor unions ensured adequate pay and benefits and protected workers from too-rapid changes in work rules and processes. Now the number of unskilled jobs has been reduced by automation, foreign manufacturing and increased globalization of trade. Unions are much less powerful in the private sector (name a powerful union leader of today who comes to mind). Men of the sort described above – older, white and non-collegeeducated – are likely to have lost jobs, know someone who has, or seen the impact on their communities.

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重要的是,直到 2000 年,大多数美国人还觉得自己的子女会过得比自己好。如今,这已不再成立:

当被问及“我们子女这一代的生活是否会比我们这代更好”时,足足 76% 的人表示他们没有这种信心。只有 21% 的人有信心。这是该民调有史以来最差的结果;2001 年时,49% 的人有信心,43% 的人没有……几乎所有民调都显示,自 1990 年代末和 2000 年代初以来,乐观情绪急剧下滑。(《华盛顿邮报》,2014 年 8 月 12 日)

这里有一段托马斯·弗里德曼在 6 月 30 日《国际纽约时报》上的话,我曾用它来总结“政治现实”(2016 年 8 月)。我在那篇文章里写道,我认为它很好地捕捉了当下的局面:

这是我们这个时代的故事:技术、全球化和气候变化的步伐,已开始超越我们的政治体制构建社会、教育、社区、职场和政治创新的能力,而这些创新正是让部分公民跟上变化所必需的。

我们将贸易和制造业全球化,并引入机器人和人工智能系统,速度远远快于我们设计社会保障网、贸易冲击保护和教育提升途径——这些本可以让被这场转型裹挟的人拥有时间、空间和工具去蓬勃发展。结果让很多人头晕目眩、无所适从。

我们面临的现状是——一个国家,实际上是一个世界——正在迅速变化,而这些变化对庞大的人群来说是令人不快和迷失方向的。当下不同于过去,未来看起来比以往更糟。经济增长放缓从整体上减少了机会,而多种力量又在加剧增长放缓对前景的侵蚀。收入不平等加剧,正把越来越多的收益引向高收入者。缺乏高等教育的老一代人尤其没有能力应对这些变化。

Importantly, until 2000, most Americans felt their children would live better than they did. Now this is no longer true: When asked if “life for our children’s generation will be better than it has been for us,” fully 76 percent said they do not have such confidence. Only 21 percent did. That was the worst ever recorded in the poll; in 2001, 49 percent were confident and 43 percent were not. . . . virtually all polling shows a steep decline in optimism since the late 1990s and early 2000s. (The Washington Post, August 12, 2014) Here’s a quote from Thomas Friedman in The International New York Times of June 30 that I used to sum up in “Political Reality” (August 2016). As I wrote there, I think it does a great job of capturing the situation: It’s the story of our time: The pace of change in technology, globalization and climate have started to outrun the ability of our political systems to build the social, educational, community, workplace and political innovations needed for some citizens to keep up. We have globalized trade and manufacturing, and we have introduced robots and artificial intelligent systems, far faster than we have designed the social safety nets, trade surge protectors and educational advancement options that would allow people caught in this transition to have the time, space and tools to thrive. It’s left a lot of people dizzy and dislocated. What we have is a country – in fact, a world – that is changing rapidly and in ways that are unpleasant and disorienting for large segments of the population. The present is different from the past, and the future looks worse than it used to. Slower economic growth is producing less opportunity overall, and a number of forces are supplementing slow growth in diminishing the outlook. Rising income inequality is directing an increasing share of the gains to top earners. Older people lacking higher education are particularly ill-equipped to deal with the changes. I think this is an apt description of conditions in the U.S., but it seems equally applicable to much of the developed world. In an opinion piece on October 26, starting from the German point of view, Jochen Bittner of the International New York Times described a broad group he called Wutbürgers, or “angry citizens.” I think they’re rising everywhere: It is a relatively new expression, with a derogatory connotation. A Wutbürger rages against a new train station and tilts against wind turbines. Wutbürgers came out in protest after the Berlin government decided to bail out Greece and to accept roughly one million refugees and migrants into Germany. Wutbürgers lie at both ends of the political spectrum; they flock to the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland and the socialist Linke (Left) Party. The left wing has long had a place in German politics, and the Linke has deep roots in the former East Germany’s ruling party. And we’ve had a fringe right wing since the postwar period began. But the populist anger of the A.F.D. is something new: Anti-establishment, antiEuropean Union and anti-globalization. . . . The same thing is happening elsewhere in Europe: Many British Wutbürgers voted for Brexit. French Wutbürgers will vote for Marine Le Pen’s National Front. Perhaps the most powerful Wutbürger of them all is Donald J. Trump.

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这就引出了一个问题:愤怒是如何被劫持的?

就其纯粹形态而言,愤怒是一种推动变革的奇妙力量。想象一个没有愤怒的世界:在德国,若没有工人运动的愤怒,我们至今仍会实行偏袒富人的阶级投票制度,工人仍将每天劳作 16 小时而没有养老金权。英国和法国仍将处于专制君主统治之下。铁幕仍将分裂欧洲,美国仍将是英国殖民地,其奴隶只能梦想在 11 月 8 日投出一票。

卡尔·马克思就是一位“愤怒公民”。孟德斯鸠(他阐述了政府内部分权理念)、威廉·威尔伯福斯(英国废奴运动领袖)、马丁·路德·金牧师博士,以及 1989 年推倒柏林墙的东德数万名抗议者,皆是如此。……

现在,不妨把这些精神与当前声称代表必要变革的政党相比。……遗憾的是,当今“愤怒公民”运动的领导人从未理解正义驱动的愤怒与仇恨驱动的愤怒之间的区别。

愤怒如同汽油。如果你明智地、有控制地使用它,就能推动世界前行,这被称为进步。或者,你只是把它泼洒出去并点燃,制造绚烂的爆炸,这被称为纵火。

不幸的是,这种成熟与审慎的缺失如今不仅存在于新兴民粹主义阶层,也存在于部分政治建制派中。执政阶层需要明白,人们心怀怨恨和偏执,并不意味着他们没有道理。越来越多的选民正在崩溃,因为他们认为政客——以及记者——看不到他们所看到的东西。……

大西洋两岸的白人、往往受教育程度较低的选民的怨愤,常被斥为仇外、粗俗的乡巴佬行径。但这样做是有代价的。欧洲社会变革的传统源泉——其社会民主党人——似乎根本不明白这一点。当希拉里·克林顿称特朗普先生一半的选民是“可悲之徒”时,她的语气之冷傲,堪比玛丽·安托瓦内特告诉没有面包的法国臣民“去吃蛋糕”。

……在互相指责中,无论是民粹主义政党还是建制派政党,都不承认双方都在浪费人们的愤怒——要么把这种愤怒转化为适得其反的仇恨,要么对其加以谴责和鄙弃。克林顿夫人(她假定自己会获胜,这在 10 月 26 日看来已显而易见)有机会改变现状,引领一个审视和处理愤怒、而非仅仅制造和摒弃愤怒的政治建制。如果她这样做,我们希望欧洲再次以美国为民主的楷模。(强调为原文所加)

这一切的重点在于,特朗普得到了大量迷失方向、无所适从的选民的重要支持,他们对一系列无疑影响自身及其社区的重大趋势感到愤怒。无论选举结果如何,这些人和他们的情绪仍将是一股强大的力量。

Which raises the question: How was anger hijacked? In its pure form, anger is a wonderful force of change. Just imagine a world without anger. In Germany, without the anger of the labor movement, we would still have a class-based voting system that privileged the wealthy, and workers would still toil 16 hours a day without pension rights. Britain and France would still be ruled by absolute monarchs. The Iron Curtain would still divide Europe, the United States would still be a British colony and its slaves could only dream of casting a vote this Nov. 8. Karl Marx was a Wutbürger. So were Montesquieu [who articulated the concept of separation of powers within a government], William Wilberforce [the leader of the abolitionist movement in Britain], the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and the tens of thousands of Eastern German protesters who brought down the Berlin Wall in 1989. . . . Now: Compare these spirits to the current parties claiming to stand for necessary change. . . . Sadly, the leaders of today’s Wutbürger movements never grasped the difference between anger driven by righteousness and anger driven by hate. Anger works like gasoline. If you use it intelligently and in a controlled manner, you can move the world. That’s called progress. Or you just spill it about and ignite it, creating spectacular explosions. That’s called arson. Unfortunately, this lack of maturity and prudence today exists among not just the new populist class, but parts of the political establishment. The governing class needs to understand that just because people are embittered and paranoid doesn’t mean they don’t have a case. A growing number of voters are going into meltdown because they believe that politicians – and journalists – don’t see what they see. . . . The grievances of white, often less-educated voters on both sides of the Atlantic are often dismissed as xenophobic, simplistic hillbillyism. But doing so comes at a cost. Europe’s traditional source of social change, its social democrats, appear to just not get it. When Hillary Clinton calls half of Mr. Trump’s voters a “basket of deplorables,” she sounds as aloof as Marie Antoinette, telling French subjects who had no bread to “eat cake.” . . . Amid their mutual finger-pointing, neither populist nor established parties acknowledge that both are squandering people’s anger, either by turning this anger into counter-productive hatred or by denouncing and dismissing it. Mrs. Clinton [making the presumption that she would win, as seemed clear on October 26] has the chance to change, by leading a political establishment that examines and processes anger instead of merely producing and dismissing it. If she does, let’s hope Europe once again looks to America as a model for democracy. (Emphasis added) The point of all of this is that Trump is importantly supported by dislocated, disoriented voters who are angry about a number of unquestionably significant trends that are impacting them and their communities. Regardless of the outcome of the election, they and their sentiments will remain a powerful force.

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《政治现实》一文相关章节,我是这样收尾的。在这里,也让它来完成同样的任务:

那么,如果真要做些什么来遏制上述趋势,究竟该做什么?如果我们不作为,收入与财富差距很可能会继续扩大;全球化的负面影响将持续显现;我们的政治进程将继续因普遍不满而四分五裂。

经济学专栏作家爱德华多·波特在 5 月 25 日的《纽约时报》上言简意赅地总结道:

我们不应该试图阻止全球化,哪怕我们能做到。但如果我们不能更好地管理这个不断变化的世界经济,结局显然不会好……

上述趋势——以及人们对经历这些趋势的不满、对未来的恐惧,还有看到它们在社区里起作用时的愤怒——在过去一年里,极大地助推了特朗普的人气,也帮助桑德斯赢得了大量民主党初选选民的支持。类似的情绪在英国脱欧公投中发挥了重要作用,在欧洲也在抬头。这些问题不会随着今年的总统大选而消失。相反,我认为它们很可能长期存在且难以解决。这些问题,加上本次选举中起作用的非经济力量,很可能会在未来几年对美国政治产生重大影响。

Here’s how I concluded the relevant section of “Political Reality.” I’ll let it do the same here: What, then – if anything – should be done to arrest the trends described above? If we don’t do something, it’s likely that the income and wealth gap will continue to grow; the downside of globalization will continue to be felt; and our political process will continue to be riven by widespread dissatisfaction. Eduardo Porter, an economics columnist, summed up succinctly in The New York Times of May 25: We shouldn’t try to stop globalization, even if we could. But if we don’t do a better job managing a changing world economy, it seems clear that it will end badly . . . The trends discussed above – and resentment over experiencing them, fear of doing so, and anger upon seeing them at work in one’s community – have been big contributors to Trump’s popularity over the last year, and also to Sanders’s appeal to large numbers of Democratic primary voters. Similar sentiment played a big part in the Brexit vote to Leave and is on the rise in Europe. The issues won’t end with this year’s presidential election. Rather, I believe they are likely to prove longlasting and difficult to resolve. They and the non-economic forces at play in this election are likely to have significant influence on U.S. politics for years to come.

行动号召

正如比特纳所写,选民的愤怒可以成为推动变革的强大力量。我希望这种愤怒的存在,能让我们的民选领导人明白,变革是必需的,而不是让他们进一步固守立场、与对立党派死磕到底。

据我回忆,上世纪 80 年代,民主党与共和党之间出现了巨大的意识形态鸿沟,卡特在任期间(1976-80 年)所秉持的自由派观点,与里根执政期间(1980-88 年)所推行的严格保守主义哲学形成了鲜明对比。在老布什较为平静的总统任期之后,比尔·克林顿于 1992-2000 年执政,而右翼对其态度近乎厌恶——无论是基于他的自由派议程,还是他的个人品行。乔治·W·布什在 2000-08 年(最高法院裁决选举结果后他就任总统,并将我们拖入中东战争)以及巴拉克·奥巴马在过去八年(右翼认为其医改计划越权)也遭遇了极其负面的情绪。

因此,在过去 36 年里,政客们变得更加好斗,更不愿妥协——当然,如果白宫的主人来自对立党派,他们也绝不愿听命于他。两党成员似乎常常把主要精力放在否认对方的任何成就上。而在我们的政府体系中——国会两院和总统职位可能由不同党派掌控,参议院要通过立法需要 100 票中的 60 票(而非 51 票)——阻碍进步是轻而易举的事。结果就是僵局丛生,毫无前进动力。

有些人——尤其是认为政府规模和角色应受限制的保守派,以及普遍反对“强制性机构”的自由意志主义者——认为僵局是好事。他们认为政府管得越少越好。这种情绪在里根总统任期前后尤为流行,当时保守主义意识形态正值鼎盛。

A Call to Action As Bittner wrote, voter anger can be a potentially-powerful force for change. It is my hope that the presence of this anger will make it clear to our elected leaders that change is needed, rather than that they should dig in their heels further to fight the opposing party. As I recall, it was in the 1980s that a massive ideological gulf opened between the Democrats and Republicans, with the liberal views Carter had espoused while in office (1976-80) contrasting sharply with the strict conservative philosophy Reagan brought to his presidency (1980-88). After the quieter presidency of Bush the Elder, Bill Clinton held office in 1992-2000, and the attitude of the right approached revulsion, whether based on his liberal agenda or his personal conduct. Very negative feelings also befell George W. Bush in 2000-08 (who was named president after an election decided by the Supreme Court, and who took us into war in the Middle East) and Barack Obama in the last eight years (with what the right considered his overreaching plan for health care). Over the last 36 years, then, politicians have become more combative and less willing to compromise – and certainly unwilling to take their lead from the occupant of the White House if he’s from the other party. It often seems the members of both parties have devoted themselves primarily to denying the other any accomplishment. And in our system of government – where the two houses of Congress and the presidency can be under the control of different parties, and where in the Senate it can take 60 votes out of 100 (not 51) to advance legislation – it’s easy to prevent progress. The result has been gridlock and a total lack of forward movement. Some people – and especially conservatives who think the size and role of government should be limited, and libertarians who generally oppose “coercive institutions” – think gridlock is a good thing. They think the less government does, the better. This was a particularly popular sentiment around the time of the Reagan presidency, when conservative ideology was in its heyday.

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然而,在这个复杂多变的世界里,没有解决方案我们寸步难行。无所作为不可能永远奏效,何况我们并非从零起步,面对的不是一片处女地。政府过去曾采取过行动——比如为社会保障体系制定规则——当形势变化时,比如每位退休人员对应的在职人数减少,或者人们寿命延长,政府理应重新修订那些规则。你不能说“我宁愿僵局”就指望制度继续维持下去。

我们需要做出好的决策并付诸行动,不仅涉及社会保障和其他福利项目,还包括医疗体系、贸易协定、基础设施支出和其他财政刺激措施、国防姿态,以及——没错——最高法院大法官的任命。今年,共和党人拒绝处理奥巴马总统填补最高法院空缺的提名人选。这个空缺将留给新总统来填补,未来四年还很可能再出现两到三个空缺。无论哪个党派不占据白宫,他们都会建设性地处理这些问题吗?还是继续阻挠、继续不做决策?

前面引用的那篇 2014 年《华盛顿邮报》文章谈的是乐观情绪的消退,作者将部分原因归咎于 2008 年金融危机以来经济复苏的缓慢,部分归咎于不平等日益加剧——越来越多的人享受不到增长的红利。接着她又提到另一个可能的原因:

失去的乐观情绪,[民主党民调专家弗雷德·杨]说,“在很大程度上说明,我们的政治体系连看似简单的问题都解决不了,这让我们深受震动,也让我们对前途忧心忡忡。”

杨认为,即使经济好转,这种局面也不会有太大改观。“公众的不安定感如今已成常态,”他说,“在我看来,这与其说是经济现实的问题,不如说是政治制度的问题——我们缺乏信心,不相信我们的政治领袖,无论属于哪个党派,有能力应对未来。”

因此我认为,公民的愤怒不仅源于最近的趋势,还因为政府没有采取足够措施来遏制这些趋势或减轻其影响。即便是主张政府职能有限的“保守派”,如果因为全球化或自动化而丢了饭碗,也可能希望政府有所作为。特朗普承诺会帮忙,这为他赢得了大量选票。

我希望建设性的行动能够发生。黑石集团创始人、前商务部长皮特·彼得森在他的书《空转》中这样写道:

……我们的问题虽然尚未到不可收拾的地步,但两个政党都越来越不可救药。他们没有直面问题,而是在逃避问题。他们陷入了一种否认、分心、自我放纵的政治,只有像你这样的读者把这国家从左派和右派的原教旨主义者和舆论操纵者手中夺回来,这种政治才能被克服……

两个政党都抱着基本不受分析和证据影响的、信仰驱动的教条,似乎与任何严肃的政治道德都格格不入,它们结成了某种邪恶的同盟——一场不宣而战的未来之战。也就是说,一场对我们的孩子不宣而战的战争。我们听不到任何一方政党谈论为更好的明天而牺牲今天。在某些方面,我们最艰巨的挑战可能是我们的领导人对财政问题的恶性扩散令人费解地漠不关心。正如前财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯所言:“我们唯一需要恐惧的,就是缺乏恐惧本身。”

(强调为原文所加)

But we cannot cope in this complex, rapidly changing world without some solutions. Inaction can’t always be depended on, especially given that we’re not starting from the ground zero of virgin territory. Government has taken action in the past – for example, setting the rules for Social Security – and it legitimately may have to rewrite those rules when circumstances change: when there are fewer people working per retiree, or when people live longer. You can’t say “I prefer gridlock” and assume the system will remain solvent. We need good decisions made and action taken on not just Social Security and other entitlements, but also the health care system, trade agreements, infrastructure spending and other fiscal stimulus, our defense posture and – yes – appointments to the Supreme Court. This year, Republicans refused to deal with President Obama’s nominee to fill a Court vacancy. That vacancy will remain for the new president to fill, and two to three more are likely to open up in the next four years. Will they be dealt with constructively – by whichever party doesn’t occupy the White House? Or will there be continued obstructionism and a lack of decision making. The writer of the 2014 Washington Post piece cited above, regarding diminished optimism, attributes some of this to the slowness of the economic recovery since the financial crisis of 2008, and some to increasing inequality, meaning fewer and fewer people are participating in the gains. And then she goes on to cite another possible reason: The lost optimism, [Fred Yang, a Democratic pollster] said, “says a lot about how shaken we are by the inability of our political system to address seemingly easy issues, and it leaves us worried about the future.” Yang doesn’t see that improving much, even as the economy does. “The unsettledness of the public is what is normal now,” he said. “To me, this is less about economic reality than about our political system — our lack of confidence that our political leaders, regardless of party, are equipped to deal with the future.” Thus I believe that citizens are angry not just because of recent trends, but also because the government hasn’t done enough to stem them or lessen their impact. Even a “conservative” who favors a limited role for government may want some action taken if he has lost his job due to globalization or automation. Trump promised to help, and it has won him a lot of votes. It is my hope that constructive action will be taken. Here’s what Blackstone founder and former Secretary of Commerce Pete Peterson wrote in his book Running on Empty: . . . while our problems are not yet intractable, both political parties are increasingly incorrigible. They are not facing our problems, they are running from them. They are locked into a politics of denial, distraction, and self-indulgence that can only be overcome if readers like you take back this country from the ideologues and spin doctors of both the left and the right. . . . With faith-driven catechisms that are largely impervious to analysis or evidence, and that seem removed from any kind of serious political morality, both political parties have formed an unholy alliance – an undeclared war on the future. An undeclared war, that is, on our children. From neither party do we hear anything about sacrificing today for a better tomorrow. In some ways, our most formidable challenge may be our leaders’ baffling indifference to our fiscal metastasis. As former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers puts it, “The only thing we have to fear is the lack of fear itself.” (Emphasis added)

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两党合作的重要性

我觉得我们正在通往一个几何证明的路上(还记得高中吗?)。

The Importance of Bipartisanship I think we’re on the way to a geometry proof (remember high school?).  

选民们对政府不作为的程度感到愤怒。

要解决当今紧迫的问题,必须采取积极措施。

The voters are angry about the level of government inaction. Positive steps must be taken if we’re to solve today’s pressing problems.

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

那么下一步是什么,下一个必不可少的要素是什么?在我看来,就是两党妥协。

我小时候,国会两党的领袖与总统合作解决问题,达成立法妥协。2012 年上次大选后,我在《新起点(但愿如此)》一文中就此写过这样一段话:

僵局的反面是妥协。这正是我们今天需要的。然而,妥协并不意味着一个政党说“我们要的全部拿走,你们想要的半点不给”。这种交易只有在一方手握全部筹码时才能达成:要么是白宫加上参议院多数席位(最好达到阻止冗长辩论所需的 60 票)和众议院多数席位,要么至少是国会两院都占多数,且有足够票数推翻总统否决。今天两党都远未达到这个局面,这种情况可能还会持续很长时间。

不,妥协意味着“我们得到一些想要的,你们也得到一些想要的”。实际上,这意味着当选官员必须投票支持他们曾承诺要反对的事情,放弃他们曾发誓要兑现的诺言。除非你这么做,否则对方什么都得不到——也就是说,他没有理由配合。这是我们的政治领袖一直未能正视和接受的一个现实。

虽然妥协有代价,但僵局的代价更高。去年,在联邦债务上限问题上的一场特别难看的争斗之后,部分美国长期债务遭到降级。这与其说是因为我们的财政状况,不如说是因为我们运转失灵的政治体制表明自己无力应对挑战、解决问题……

11 月 7 日,《纽约时报》刊登了托马斯·弗里德曼一篇题为《希望与变革,第二部分》的精彩文章。弗里德曼在文中出色地列出了华盛顿为了改善前景必须做的一些事情。

下一代人将需要来自印度、中国和拉丁美洲的高智商冒险者移民,美国才能保持在信息技术革命的最前沿,才能负担得起我们想要的政府……

……我的预测是,未来四年最大的国内议题将是我们如何应对技术、全球化和市场的变化——这些变化在极短的时间内让体面工资的中等技能岗位——中产阶级的脊梁——日益过时。唯一能提供体面工资的岗位将是高技能岗位。

应对这一挑战需要更高层次的政治想象力——将教育改革与企业、学校、大学和政府之间前所未有的合作结合起来,以改变工人的……

So what’s the next step, the next essential ingredient? To me, it’s bipartisan compromise. When I was a kid, the leaders of the two parties in Congress worked with the president to solve problems and achieve legislative compromise. Here’s what I wrote on this subject in “A Fresh Start (Hopefully),” after the last election in 2012: The opposite of gridlock is compromise. That’s what we need today. Compromise, however, doesn’t mean one party saying “We get all we want and you get none of what you want.” Deals like that can only be inked if one party holds all the cards: either the White House plus majorities in both the Senate (and preferably the 60 votes required to stop a filibuster) and the House of Representatives or, at minimum, majorities in both houses of Congress and enough votes to override a presidential veto. Both parties are far from that today, and that may remain the case for a long time. No, compromise means, “We get some of what we want and you get some of what you want.” In practice, it means elected officials have to vote for things they promised to fight and give up on things they swore to deliver. Unless you do that, the other guy doesn’t get any of what he wants – meaning he has no reason to go along. This is a reality that our political leaders have failed to confront and accept. While compromise comes at a cost, gridlock can cost more. Last year, some long-term U.S. debt was downgraded after a particularly unseemly battle over the federal debt ceiling. This occurred not so much because of our fiscal situation, but because our dysfunctional government showed itself to be unable to rise to the occasion and solve problems. . . . On November 7, The New York Times carried an excellent article by Thomas L. Friedman entitled “Hope and Change, Part II.” In it, Friedman did a great job of outlining some of the things Washington will have to do in order for the outlook to improve. The next generation is going to need immigration of high-I.Q. risk-takers from India, China and Latin America if the United States is going to remain at the cutting edge of the Information Technology revolution and be able to afford the government we want. . . . . . . my prediction is that the biggest domestic issue in the next four years will be how we respond to changes in technology, globalization and markets that have, in a very short space of time, made the decent-wage, middle-skilled job – the backbone of the middle class – increasingly obsolete. The only decentwage jobs will be high-skilled ones. The answer to that challenge will require a new level of political imagination – a combination of educational reforms and unprecedented collaboration between business, schools, universities and government to change how workers are

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训练并获得持续学习的赋能。这需要税收改革与移民改革。当今的美国迫切需要一个中右翼的共和党,为所有这些问题提供基于才能、以市场为导向的解决方案——并愿意与对方阵营各让一步。这个国家渴望切实可行的两党合作,它将奖励那些实现这一目标的政客,惩罚那些未能做到的。……

当我看到两党美国人未能惩罚——甚至鼓励——他们当选官员那种好斗、党派化、意识形态化且拒绝妥协的行为时,我感到沮丧。僵局与不作为无法解决我们的问题。合作、适应能力以及弗里德曼所说的“想象力”,必须成为未来几年的关键词。

我们需要建设性的行动来解决我们面临的诸多问题,而实现这一点只有一条路:两党合作。

trained and empowered to keep learning. It will require tax reforms and immigration reforms. America today desperately needs a center-right Republican party offering merit-based, market-based approaches to all these issues – and a willingness to meet the other side halfway. The country is starved for practical, bipartisan cooperation, and it will reward politicians who deliver it and punish those who don’t. . . . I’m frustrated when I see Americans of both parties failing to punish – or even encouraging – behavior on the part of their elected officials that is fractious, partisan, ideological and non-compromising. Gridlock and inaction won’t solve our problems. Cooperation, adaptability and Friedman’s “imagination” must be the watchwords for the years ahead. We need constructive action to solve the many problems we face, and there’s only one way for it to materialize: bipartisanship.

我们民主制度的缺陷

今年的选举结果很有可能暴露出一些因素,足以让我们的选举变得不那么完美地民主。罪魁祸首就是选举人团制度。以下是 2012 年《全新开始》中的更多论述:

选举前几天铺天盖地的“胜负难分”头条,怎么就在一夜之间变成了一场压倒性胜利,让民主党人声称获得了执政的授权?

奥巴马在普选票上的微弱优势,怎么就在决定胜负的选举人票上变成了 62% 对 38% 的悬殊差距?答案就藏在我们选举人团制度的种种怪癖之中。

选举期间我正在亚洲和中东旅行,发现自己不得不向人解释这样一种制度,其中:

Flaws in Our Democracy There’s a good chance that this year’s election result will demonstrate the presence of elements capable of rendering our elections less than perfectly democratic. The main culprit is the Electoral College. Here’s more from “A Fresh Start” in 2012: How did the “too close to call” headlines of the days just before the election turn into a resounding victory, which the Democrats will argue has given them a mandate to lead? How did Obama’s small edge in the popular vote turn into a 62%-38% margin in terms of the electoral votes that determine the winner? The answer lies in the peculiarities of our electoral college. I was traveling in Asia and the Middle East at election time, and I found myself having to explain a system in which:  

除极少数州外,其余各州的选举人票全部归该州普选获胜者所有,无论胜出幅度多大。50 个州中大多数——今年大约有 43 个——被视为“无悬念州”,意味着某一政党享有压倒性且稳定的多数支持。正因如此,在加利福尼亚这样的民主党州投共和党一票毫无意义,在共和党主导的犹他州投民主党票同样如此。另一方面,选举制度赋予少数几个州的选民不成比例的影响力。由于无悬念州的选举人票不会发生变动,大选最终仅由少数几个所谓“摇摆州”或“关键战场州”决定。事实上,今年许多人认为选举结果可能主要取决于一个州:俄亥俄州。或许最刺眼的是,候选人即便普选票数落后于对手,仍可能凭借多数选举人票当选总统。

In all but a few states, 100% of the electoral votes go to whoever wins the popular vote there, regardless of the margin. Most of the 50 states – this year it was roughly 43 – are considered “uncompetitive,” meaning one party or the other enjoys a substantial, dependable majority. For that reason, a vote for a Republican is totally meaningless in a Democratic state like California, as is a vote for a Democrat in Republican Utah. On the other hand, the electoral system gives voters in a few states disproportionate influence. Since the uncompetitive states’ electoral votes are not in play, elections are determined by only the few so-called “swing” or “battleground” states. In fact, this year many people thought the election might be determined largely by who won in just one state: Ohio. Perhaps most glaringly, a candidate can be elected president with a majority of electoral votes despite having received fewer popular votes than another.

我们的制度设计于十八世纪,意在将遴选总统的重任集中于少数贤达之手,规避因民众广泛却信息闭塞、沟通困难所带来的不确定性。

Our system was designed in the eighteenth century to centralize the job of choosing a president in the hands of a few wise leaders and avoid the uncertainties associated with a widespread and uninformed populace with which it was hard to communicate.

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但在二十一世纪,通往一场有意义的全民选举的障碍已大为减少,是时候重新评估选举人团的利弊了——很难说它有什么好处——而它的代价则可能体现在一些匪夷所思的结果上。就在大选前几天,看起来十二年内我们可能第二次出现一位输掉普选的总统。这告诉我,是时候重新审视我们的投票制度了。

选举人团的存在还可能引发其他复杂情况。在八月的《政治现实》一文中,我曾提出一个问题:如果没有任何候选人获得 538 张选举人票中的多数,会发生什么?

我来告诉你答案:在没有选举人多数的情况下,总统将由众议院投票选出,每个州只有一票。因此,理论上,人口最少的 26 个州——仅占美国人口的 17%,而且按定义几乎不含任何大城市——就能选出总统。对我来说,无论众议院的政治构成如何,比例选举的缺失都令人极为担忧……

最后在这一标题下,我想谈谈金钱的作用。在我们的选举中,(a)绝大部分竞选资金由私人而非公共提供,(b)最高法院实际上已裁定,捐款金额在很大程度上不能设限。在我看来,其结果接近于摧毁“一人一票”原则。虽然每个人的实际投票权相同,但他们对选举结果的影响力却不同。仅举几个数据点,据《商业内幕》10 月 31 日报道:

But in the twenty-first century, with the impediments to a meaningful popular election much reduced, it’s time to reassess the benefits of the electoral college – it’s hard to say what they are – versus the costs in terms of potentially weird outcomes. In the days just before the election, it seemed that for the second time in twelve years we could have a president who’d lost the popular vote. That tells me it’s time to reassess our system of voting. The existence of the Electoral College can lead to other possible complications. In “Political Reality” in August, I raised the question of what happens if no candidate receives a majority of the 538 electoral votes: I’ll give you the answer: in the absence of an electoral majority, the president is chosen through a vote of the House of Representatives, with each state having one vote. Thus, theoretically, the 26 least-populous states – containing just 17% of America’s people and, by definition, almost none of its big cities – could choose the president. For me, regardless of the political makeup of the House, the loss of proportional election is of great concern . . . Lastly under this heading, I want to touch on the role of money. In our elections (a) the vast bulk of campaign funding is provided privately, not publicly, and (b) the Supreme Court has ruled, in effect, that the amounts donated largely cannot be limited. The result, in my view, approaches the undoing of “one man, one vote.” While each person’s actual vote is the same, his or her influence on the outcome is not. Here are just a few data points, according to Business Insider (October 31): 

 

响应政治中心在其网站 OpenSecrets.org 上估算,2016 年选举周期中,候选人、政党及外部团体为左右局势所筹集和支出的资金高达近 66 亿美元。这创下了新纪录,经通胀调整后,比同样创纪录的 2012 年总统选举周期高出 8650 万美元。

与 2012 年相比,资金流动的最大增长来自“据称独立于候选人运作的”外部资金团体。报告称,这些团体迄今(截至 10 月 24 日)已向本次选举投入 13 亿美元,比 2012 年同期多出 1.9 亿美元,占总开支的 26.8%。

资金集中度也在上升:“前 100 个家族”迄今已向候选人、政党和外部团体捐款 6.54 亿美元,占筹资总额的 11.9%,高于 2012 年选举周期的 5.6%。

今年迄今,排名前十的家族捐款总额已达 2.81 亿美元。

Nearly $6.6 billion is the amount candidates, parties, and outside groups are raising and spending in trying to move things their way in the 2016 election cycle, the Center for Responsive Politics estimates on its website, OpenSecrets.org. It’s a new record. It’s up by $86.5 million, adjusted for inflation, from the 2012 presidential cycle, which had also been a record. The biggest increases in money flows, compared to 2012, came from outside money groups “that purportedly work independently from candidates,” the report said. They’ve greased this election with $1.3 billion so far (through October 24), $190 million more than at this point in 2012, accounting for 26.8% of total spending. And it’s getting more concentrated: “The top 100 families” contributed $654 million to candidates, political parties, and outside groups so far, or 11.9% of the total raised, up from 5.6% in the 2012 election cycle. The top ten families have given a total of $281 million so far this year.

几年前,政治献金还限制在每位候选人每场竞选几千美元。如今,10 万美元的请求已不罕见,甚至有合法(但或许有些 cynical)的途径捐出数百万美元。考虑到涉及的金额和私人资金来源,我很难相信当选官员在履职时能完全无视捐助者的利益和偏好。我不是在谈腐败,只是说这个竞技场并不完全公平。这一领域亟待变革。但鉴于最高法院裁定政治捐款属于“言论”,因而不能加以限制,变革需要宪法修正案或最高法院作出不同裁决。

It wasn’t many years ago that contributions were limited to a couple of thousand dollars per candidate per race. Now $100,000 isn’t an uncommon ask, and there are legitimate (but possibly cynical) ways to donate millions. Given the amounts involved and the private sourcing, I find it hard to believe that elected officials are able to entirely ignore donors’ interests and preferences when they do their jobs. I’m not talking about corruption, just a not-quite-level playing field. This area is ripe for change. But given that the Supreme Court ruled that political donations are “speech” and thus can’t be regulated, change would require a constitutional amendment or a different decision from the Supreme Court.

两党的前景

展望未来,一个不确定的因素是两大政党未来的走向。

The Outlook for the Parties One thing that’s uncertain as we move forward from here is what the future holds for the two main parties.

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在这次竞选中,许多选民跨越了长期固守的党派界限:

Many voters crossed long-standing party lines during this campaign:   

传统上支持民主党的美国工薪阶层,被特朗普反建制、非政治正确、“让美国再次伟大”的主张所吸引。

传统上支持共和党的大企业未能支持特朗普,或许是因为他的反贸易立场——尽管他很可能比克林顿更亲商。

受过大学教育的白人共和党人——尤其是其中的女性——支持克林顿,大概是因为特朗普的争议性行为以及克林顿作为首位女性候选人的角色。

Working class Americans, traditionally Democrats, were attracted to Trump by his antiestablishment, non-politically-correct, “Make America Great Again” approach. Big business, traditionally Republican, failed to support Trump, perhaps because of his anti-trade positions – even though he might well be a more pro-business president than Clinton. College-educated white Republicans – and especially women among them – backed Clinton, presumably because of Trump’s controversial behavior and Clinton’s role as the first woman candidate.

这些新的党派忠诚会持续下去吗?或者,如果它们主要是源于选民对 2016 年某位候选人的吸引或反感,那么当候选人换人时,这些变化是否会部分或全部逆转?

今年,两党领导人都受到了愤怒成员的挑战。这些成员会留在党内,还是未来根基不牢、变得“摇摆不定”?两党的构成和凝聚力都在变动之中,因此下一次选举可能又会偏离常规路径。

民主党有自己的问题。特朗普有一个论断是,民主党一直把工人阶级成员视为理所当然,选举时大谈与他们联系,却未能拿出解决方案,尤其是针对失业工人。(民主党人会反驳说,这是因为共和党人成功地制造僵局,阻挠了再培训之类的计划。)温和派和自由派之间争夺民主党控制权的斗争——从克林顿和桑德斯分散的初选结果中可见一斑——远未结束。桑德斯的支持者可能会认为党的领导层还不够自由化。

但我认为是共和党面临更大的挑战。过去几十年里,该党是由许多基本不相关、互不衔接的元素拼凑而成的。正如我在《政治现实》中所述,60 年前的传统共和党人——财政负责、亲商、社会立场温和、国防强硬——近年来又加入了保守派、茶党、福音派基督徒、反枪支管制选民、反堕胎团体,现在还有经济上失落的群体。粘合剂很薄弱;与其说他们靠意识形态团结,不如说主要靠对抗民主党来维持统一。

所有这些群体会留在党内吗?也许最后加入的某些群体会对众议院议长和党领袖保罗·瑞安“用脚投票”。瑞安先是拒绝支持特朗普,然后支持了他,接着又形容特朗普 2005 年的粗俗视频“令人不安”,并说自己不会为他助选或支持他,后来他又投票支持特朗普并表达支持——但这样做时,是否刻意没有提他的名字?瑞安在回应视频时取消了特朗普在其家乡威斯康星州联合竞选活动的出席,结果遭到一些人群中人的嘘声。如果瑞安继续领导共和党,特朗普的支持者还会留在共和党内吗?当选众议员的特朗普支持者会支持瑞安领导他们的党团吗?

瑞安的经历并不独特:许多共和党政客对特朗普的政策或行为有意见,但又需要他的支持者——这些人构成共和党选民的一大部分。原则与务实之间的冲突非常真实,他们进退两难的痛苦也显而易见。这导致了反复无常和令人困惑的立场(引发了一个问题:是否可能支持一位候选人却不公开背书他)。

Will these new party allegiances hold? Or, if they arose largely because voters felt either attracted to or repelled by one of the 2016 candidates, will some or all of these developments reverse when the candidates are different? The leaders of both parties were challenged this year by angry members. Will those members stay with their parties, or will they be less rooted in the future and “up for grabs”? The make-up – and the cohesiveness – of both parties is in flux, and thus the next election may be another that deviates from the usual path. The Democrats have their issues. It’s one of Trump’s assertions that the Democratic party has been taking its working class members for granted, talking up the connection at election time but failing to come through with solutions, especially for displaced workers. (Democrats will counter that it’s because Republicans have been successful in implementing gridlock so as to stymy programs like retraining.) The fight between moderates and liberals for control of the Democratic party – made clear in the divided primary results between Clinton and Sanders – is far from over. Sanders supporters may decide that the party leadership isn’t liberal enough. But I think it’s the Republican party that faces greater challenges. Over the last few decades, the party has been thrown together from largely unrelated and disjointed elements. As I described in “Political Reality,” the traditional Republicans of 60 years ago – fiscally responsible, pro-business, socially moderate and strong on defense – have been joined more recently by conservatives, the Tea Party, Evangelical Christians, anti-gun-control voters, anti-abortion groups, and now the economically dislocated. The glue is weak; rather than by ideology, they have been unified primarily by the fight against Democrats. Will all these groups stay within the party? Perhaps some of the last will “vote with their feet” with regard to House Speaker and party leader Paul Ryan, who first refused to endorse Trump, then did endorse him, then described Trump’s raunchy 2005 video as “troubling” and said he wouldn’t campaign for him or support him, and then voted for him and expressed support but did so – pointedly? – without mentioning his name. After Ryan responded to the video by disinviting Trump from a joint campaign event in his home state of Wisconsin, he was booed by some in the crowd. Will Trump supporters remain Republicans if Ryan continues to lead the party? Will Trump supporters elected to the House support Ryan in his leadership of their caucus? Ryan’s experience wasn’t unique: numerous Republican politicians had problems with Trump’s policies or actions but needed his supporters, who constitute a large part of Republican voters. The conflict between principle and pragmatism is very real, and the painfulness of their dilemma has been clear. It has produced flip-flopping and confusing stances (raising the question of whether it’s possible to support a candidate but not endorse him).

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如果特朗普的支持者因为对其领导人行为的不满而抛弃共和党(或整个政治进程),那么该党在未来的选举中可能难以凝聚起有意义的追随者群体。

“特朗普基本上是以局外人身份参选,对共和党实施了一场敌意收购。如果他如预期般落败,他仍将赢得约 5000 万或更多选民的支持,这些人将成为一股持续而强大的力量,满怀怨愤地搅动局势,”曾担任四任总统(其中三任为共和党人)顾问的戴维·格根表示。“在唐纳德·特朗普把大锤砸向共和党之前,人们或许会认为,共和党在又一次选举失利后仍有可能团结起来。但特朗普众多丑陋遗产之一是,该党丧失凝聚力——甚至分裂——的概率,现在似乎超过五成。(《金融时报》,10 月 29/30 日——显然不是民主党刊物,甚至不是美国刊物)

共和党在 2012 年米特·罗姆尼败选后的计划,核心是增强对女性、西语裔及其他少数族裔的吸引力。但在这次竞选中,这一努力很可能出现了倒退。

我认为共和党面临实实在在的问题。而我想强调的是,我们的国家需要两个强大的政党,而不是民选独裁。有了两个强大的政党,才能有活跃的思想辩论,任何一方都无法在缺乏有效制衡的华盛顿为所欲为。与僵局完全相反的放任自流,也同样不可取。

If Trump’s supporters desert the Republican party (or the political process) due to disenchantment with the behavior of its leaders, the party may have a hard time pulling together a meaningful following in future elections. “Trump has essentially run as an outsider who staged a hostile takeover of the Republican party. If he loses, as is expected, he will still have won the votes of some 50 million voters or more, and they will represent a continuing, potent force, roiling with resentments,” said [David Gergen, an adviser to four presidents – three of them Republicans]. “Before Donald Trump brought his wrecking ball to the party, one might have thought it highly likely that Republicans could unite after yet another losing election. But one of Trump’s many ugly legacies is that the chances of the party losing its coherence – or even breaking up – now seems better than 50:50. (Financial Times, October 29/30 – clearly not a Democratic, or even an American, publication) The Republicans’ plan after the defeat of Mitt Romney in 2012 centered around increasing its appeal to women and Hispanics and other minorities. In this campaign, however, that effort probably went into reverse. I think the Republican party faces real issues. And my point here is that our country needs two strong parties, not an elected dictatorship. With two strong parties there can be an active debate of ideas, and neither is able to operate unopposed in a Washington devoid of meaningful resistance. The complete opposite of gridlock – free rein – isn’t desirable either.

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11 月 2 日,约翰·卡西迪在《纽约客》中写道:

……一个因阶级、种族和文化界限而严重分裂的美国。引用 19 世纪英国政治家本杰明·迪斯雷利的话,我们如今有“两个民族,彼此之间没有交往,也没有同情;他们对彼此的习惯、思想和情感一无所知,仿佛他们居住在不同的地带,或是生活在不同的星球上。”

迪斯雷利写的是 19 世纪 40 年代迅速工业化的英格兰,他所说的两个民族指的是富人和穷人。在美国,由于奴隶制、内战和大规模移民的历史,这种分裂从来没那么简单:沿种族、民族和地区界限的纵向裂痕,往往压过了横向的阶级鸿沟。但克林顿的美国与特朗普的美国之间的鸿沟,哪怕不能完全归因于经济因素,如今也已是一道巨大的深渊。

非常值得注意的是,那张显示谁预计赢得哪些州的选举地图上,西海岸、东北部和中西部偏北地区对克林顿颇为稳固,而中部的一大片广阔地带则属于特朗普。各地区之间的差异非常显著,特朗普势力范围的人们更可能过着乡村生活,更可能在美国出生(而且往往就出生在他们现在居住的同一个城镇),也更可能从事制造业工作。这些差异加剧了上述的分裂。

On November 2, John Cassidy wrote in The New Yorker of: . . . an America bitterly divided along class, racial, and cultural lines. To quote Benjamin Disraeli, the nineteenth-century British statesman, we now have “two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.” Disraeli was writing about the rapidly industrializing England of the eighteen-forties, and the two nations he referred to were the rich and the poor. In the United States, because of its history of slavery, the Civil War, and mass immigration, the divisions have never been that simple: vertical cleavages along racial, ethnic, and regional lines have often trumped the horizontal class divide. But the gulf between Clinton’s America and Trump’s America, even though it can’t be traced entirely along economic lines, is now a yawning chasm. It’s very much worth noting that the electoral map showing who’s expected to win which states has the West Coast, the Northeast and the Upper Midwest quite solid for Clinton and a broad swath down the middle of the country for Trump. The regions’ differences from each other are very significant, with the people in Trump country more likely to live rural lives, to have been born in the U.S. (and often in the same town in which they now live), and to have worked in manufacturing. These differences contribute to the divide described above.

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今年的政治舞台像战场,分裂程度远超往常,充斥着对抗、无礼、愤怒和彻骨的仇恨。精英、建制派、专家、当权者、圈内人、国际主义者和政治正确统统遭到攻击,无人替他们辩护。经济增长缓慢——自动化和国际贸易的持续推进又加重了这个问题——很可能继续让工人阶级心怀不满。而且,在首场 X 级竞选把行为规范撕得粉碎、联邦调查局的公正性甚至选举的公平性都遭到质疑之后,大批人可能感到被疏离。选举结束后,这些状况很可能会继续存在。

但展望未来,我看到的是建设性的、两党合作的政府行动的需要。这是痴心妄想吗?赢得未来的选举可能会变成拿出解决方案的能力,而这反过来可能促使两党合作与妥协。我要用一个罕见的词来形容我的梦想:礼让(comity)。它的定义恰好符合这个用途:“对他人礼貌、体谅的行为。”

上面描述的环境,不像是一个鼓励礼让的环境,也不像是一个两党能在内部运作并携手合作的环境。因此,我们或许只能寄望政客们得出结论:不仅国家的未来需要两党合作,他们自己的成功也需要。不太可能?也许吧。但 2012 年大选后的备忘录被证明过于乐观之后,我要说:“何不坚持到底?”

The political arena this year seems like a battlefield, divided much more than usual by antagonism, incivility, anger and downright hatred. Elites, establishments, experts, incumbents, insiders, internationalists and political correctness all came under attack, with no one to defend them. Slow economic growth – accentuated by continuing automation and international trade – is likely to continue to leave dissatisfaction within the working class. And after having seen behavioral norms wiped away in the first x-rated campaign – and doubts raised about the impartiality of the FBI and even the fairness of our elections – large numbers of people may be left alienated. When the election is over, these things are likely to remain the case. But as I look forward, I see the need for constructive, bipartisan governmental action. Is that wishful thinking? Winning future elections could become a function of producing solutions, and that in turn could lead to cooperation and compromise between the two parties. I’ll use a rarely seen word to describe my dream: comity. Its definition makes it perfect for this use: “courtesy and considerate behavior toward others.” The environment described above doesn’t feel like one that encourages comity or one in which the parties can function internally and work together. Therefore we might have to hope that politicians will conclude not only that the future of the country requires bipartisanship, but that their own success does as well. Unlikely? Perhaps. But after a post-election memo in 2012 that proved far too optimistic, I say, “why quit now?”

November 7, 2016

November 7, 2016

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