不确定性II
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
Uncertainty II
Uncertainty II
我在之前的备忘录里多次提到,往往在定稿前一刻,我总会发现一些补充性的内容。这次我没那么幸运:我的妻子南希在我那篇《不确定性》发表两周后,才把一篇重要文章拿给我看。这篇文章的刊出,加上另一处可能的补充,促使我写下这份补充说明。我有几点想法要加进去,大体上都和“预知”这个话题相关。
没人知道会发生什么
上面这个标题,是哥伦比亚大学人文学科教授马克·里拉一篇精彩文章的题目,文章刊登在上周日的《纽约时报》上。(你可能还记得我之前讨论过,我们倾向于高估那些与我们观点一致的人。我坦率承认,我之所以这么喜欢这篇文章,可能正是因为它印证了我在《不确定性》里说的很多话。)以下是那篇文章的几段摘录:
托马斯·霍布斯曾写道,最好的先知,就是最好的猜谜者。这似乎是对我们预测未来能力的定论:我们做不到。
但人类始终无法接受这个事实。身处迫在眉睫的危险中的人,渴望听到一个权威的声音,从中汲取安心;他们想被告知会发生什么、该如何准备、一切都会好起来。我们似乎天生就不适合活在不确定性里。卢梭说,当事关重大时,我们宁愿犯错也不愿什么都不信——这话只夸张了一点点……。
除了新冠病毒本身的生物学特性——我们才刚刚开始了解——没有任何事情是注定的。有多少人染病,取决于他们如何行动、我们如何检测、如何治疗,以及我们在研发疫苗上有多走运。
这些决策的结果,又会反过来限制雇主、市长、大学校长和体育俱乐部老板在重启问题上的选择。他们的决策又会传导回我们自己的决策,包括今年 11 月我们选谁当总统。而那场选举的结果,将决定未来四年的大局走向。
这场大流行让我们深切体会到,我们对未来肩负着多么重大的责任,同时我们的知识在做出明智决策和预判后果方面又是多么不足。也许正因为如此,我们的预言家和占卜师才供不应求。
I’ve written a few times about the frequency with which I come across something additive just before finalizing a memo. This time I wasn’t so lucky: my wife Nancy brought an important article to my attention two weeks after the publication of Uncertainty. The article’s appearance, along with a second potential addition, prompts me to write this post-script to that memo. I have a few thoughts to add, all generally related to the topic of foreknowledge. No One Knows What’s Going to Happen The above heading was the title of an excellent article by Mark Lilla, a professor of humanities at Columbia University, which appeared in The New York Times this past Sunday. (You may remember my previous discussion of our tendency to think highly of people who agree with us. I readily admit that the reason I like this article so much may lie in the fact that it confirms a great deal of what I said in Uncertainty.) Here are some excerpts from that article: The best prophet, Thomas Hobbes once wrote, is the best guesser. That would seem to be the last word on our capacity to predict the future: We can’t. But it is a truth humans have never been able to accept. People facing immediate danger want to hear an authoritative voice they can draw assurance from; they want to be told what will occur, how they should prepare, and that all will be well. We are not well designed, it seems, to live in uncertainty. Rousseau exaggerated only slightly when he said that when things are truly important, we prefer to be wrong than to believe nothing at all. . . . Apart from the actual biology of the coronavirus – which we are only beginning to understand – nothing is predestined. How many people fall ill with it depends on how they behave, how we test them, how we treat them and how lucky we are in developing a vaccine. The result of those decisions will then limit the choices about reopening that employers, mayors, university presidents and sports club owners are facing. Their decisions will then feed back into our own decisions, including whom we choose for president this November. And the results of that election will have the largest impact on what the next four years will hold. The pandemic has brought home just how great a responsibility we bear toward the future, and also how inadequate our knowledge is for making wise decisions and anticipating consequences. Perhaps that is why our prophets and augurs can’t keep up with the demand for foresight.
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在某种程度上,人们一定在想,他们对既定之事了解得越多,他们能掌控的就越多。这是一种错觉。人类希望感觉自己正意气风发地走向未来,而事实上,我们始终只是在迷雾中用拐杖敲打着路面前行。
当下,一点谦逊对我们大有裨益。它或许还能帮助我们接受始终笼罩着我们的那种根本性的不确定性。让我们告别那些预言家和占卜师吧。[强调为后加]
利拉的文章将《不确定性》及其他近期备忘录中的几个主题汇集于一处:
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•
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At some level, people must be thinking that the more they learn about what is predetermined, the more control they will have. This is an illusion. Human beings want to feel that they are on a power walk into the future, when in fact we are always just tapping our canes on the pavement in the fog. A dose of humility would do us good in the present moment. It might also help reconcile us to the radical uncertainty in which we are always living. Let us retire our prophets and augurs. [Emphasis added] Lilla’s article pulls together in one place several themes from Uncertainty and other recent memos: • • • • • • •
人类对预测的渴望,源于指引我们穿越未来的天性,
而未来又取决于诸多未来的发展变化,
我们能通过自身决策影响未来,
每一个发展都难以预料,
因此预测往往徒劳无功,
重要的是承认自己对未来的无知,进而
普遍重视智识上的谦逊。
the very human hunger for forecasts to help us navigate the future, the conditionality of the future on multiple future developments, our own ability to influence the future through the decisions we make, the unpredictability of each development, thus the futility of forecasting, the importance of accepting our ignorance of the future, and thus the general importance of intellectual humility.
像这篇文章以及我上一份备忘录中引用的那些文章,应该足以让每个人信服这些要点。但人们很少会完全接受,我们必须在不知道未来的情况下做出关于未来的决策。
Articles like this one and those cited in my last memo should drive home these points to everyone’s satisfaction. But rarely will people fully accept that we must make decisions regarding the future without knowing it.
未来是路径依赖的
预测者似乎把未来当作已经存在的事物,仿佛我们只要足够聪明,就能把它看清。但这一看法忽略了一个事实:我们所有人——以及诸多其他影响力量——都在通过集体行动,一刻不停地创造着未来。
利拉在文章中说:“……新冠疫情之后的未来并不存在。只有等我们亲手把它创造出来,它才会存在。”我认为这是一个非常重要的概念。我们今天或许可以预测未来,甚至也许能准确判断今天的条件和行动在未来会催生出什么结果。但这一预测只有在一种情况下才算是正确的:从现在到未来降临的那一天之间,没有任何人、任何事让未来偏离轨道。因此,我要再重复一遍之前引用的利拉的话:
有多少人感染新冠病毒,取决于他们如何行动、我们如何检测、如何治疗,以及我们在研发疫苗上有几分运气。
病毒会怎样表现、变异、传播、对炎热天气作何反应、感染能力如何,这些都是未知数;但同样未知的还有:我们以多快的速度重启经济,重启之后人们会如何行事,而那时病毒又会有什么动向?胡佛研究所经济学家、社会理论家托马斯·索维尔(Thomas Sowell)在另一个领域给我们展示了一幅类似的图景:
The Future as Path-Dependent Forecasters seem to act as if the future already exists, and all we have to do is be smart enough to discern it. But that ignores the fact that all of us – and many other influences – are constantly creating the future through our collective activity. In his article, Lilla stated, “. . . the post-Covid future doesn’t exist. It will exist only after we have made it.” I think this is a very important concept. We might predict the future today, and we might even correctly assess what today’s conditions and actions are likely to produce in the future. But that prediction will be shown to have been right only if no one and nothing causes the future to become different between now and the day it arrives. Thus I’ll repeat what I quoted from Lilla earlier: How many people fall ill with [the coronavirus] depends on how they behave, how we test them, how we treat them and how lucky we are in developing a vaccine. Not only how will the virus behave, morph, travel, react to warm weather and infect, but also how fast will we reopen the economy, how will people behave when we reopen it, and what will the virus do at that time? Thomas Sowell, a Hoover Institution economist and social theorist, provided a glimpse at how these things work in another field:
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经济学家经常被问及对经济走势的预测。然而,经济预测需要预判政治家的举措——而没有什么比这更难以预测了。政治家的多变只是如今令未来更加复杂的众多变量之一。我们既无法预知人们的行为,以及那些决定病毒传播轨迹及其对经济影响的其他种种因素,也肯定无法预料他们何时会采取这些行动——而这同样至关重要。
Economists are often asked to predict what the economy is going to do. But economic predictions require predicting what politicians are going to do – and nothing is more unpredictable. The unpredictability of politicians is only one of the many variables complicating the future today. Not only can’t we predict people’s actions and the many other things that will determine the course of the virus and its impact on the economy, but we also certainly can’t predict when they’ll take those actions – and that will count just as much.
该听哪位专家的?
在《不确定性》那篇备忘录里,我大段引用了埃里克·昂纳的一篇文章。其中最有意思的一点是这样的:
缺乏完成某项任务所需认知技能的人,通常也缺乏评估自身表现所需的元认知技能。无能者处于双重劣势——他们不仅能力不足,而且很可能对此毫无察觉。(《行为科学家》杂志,4 月 13 日)
按定义来说,在某个领域缺乏做出卓越判断所需专业知识的人,同样缺乏评估自身专业水平所需的能力。正如我之前提到的,他们符合约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷思所说的那种“不知道自己不知道”的预测者。
重读备忘录时,我意识到自己漏掉了一个重要的深层推论。大多数人不仅不具备卓越的专业知识——也没有识别这种知识的能力——他们同样缺乏判断谁才真正拥有这种知识的能力。这才是问题的关键:你或许得先成为某个领域的专家,才能分辨出谁才是真正的专家。正因如此,大多数领域的研究都要经过“同行评审”,也就是由专家来评审(这跟“由同侪组成的陪审团”不是一回事,后者指的是普通公民)。
然而,面对今天这种最重大的问题时,最终的责任该落到谁头上?答案不能是“专家”。《华尔街日报》有篇文章点出了这个两难:
治国理政,至少到了总统这个层面,就是在信息不全的情况下,在相互竞争的选项之间做艰难抉择。较为简单的问题在到达总统办公室之前就已经解决了。无论是科学数据还是公众情绪,都无法真正回答民选官员面临的问题。两者都很重要,也必须融入政治领袖所做的判断之中。但两者都不能替代那个关键的判断行为……
总统的工作,不仅仅是在危机时期,常常包括听取专家们相互争执、承担起从中取舍的责任,在机遇与危险之间规划航向。把这件事做好,需要一种独特的实践智慧,一种评判专业能力的专业能力……(《光有专家不够》,5 月 16-17 日,着重号为后加)
Which Expert to Follow? In the memo Uncertainty, I quoted at considerable length from an article by Erik Angner. One of its most interesting points was as follows: People who lack the cognitive skills required to perform a task typically also lack the metacognitive skills required to assess their performance. Incompetent people are at a double disadvantage, since they are not only incompetent but also likely unaware of it. (Behavioral Scientist, April 13) By definition, people who lack the expertise in a given field required for superior judgments also lack the expertise required to assess their level of expertise. As I mentioned, they qualify as John Kenneth Galbraith’s forecasters “who don’t know they don’t know.” While re-reading my memo, I realized I had left out an important further ramification. Not only do most people fail to possess superior expertise – as well as the ability to know it – but they also lack the ability to figure out who does have it. That’s the catch: you may have to be an expert in a field in order to be able to figure out who the true experts are. That’s why research in most fields is subjected to “peer review,” meaning a review by experts (not to be confused with “a jury of one’s peers,” meaning other lay citizens). And yet, where does the buck stop on the biggest of questions, like those of today? The answer can’t be “with the experts.” An article in The Wall Street Journal set out the dilemma: To govern, at least at the level of the presidency, is to make hard choices among competing options with incomplete information. Easier problems are resolved before they ever reach the Oval Office. Neither scientific data nor public sentiments can properly answer the questions that face elected officials. Both are important and must be integrated into the judgments that political leaders make. But neither can substitute for that crucial act of judgment. . . . The president’s job, and not only in times of crisis, frequently involves listening to experts disagree with one another and taking responsibility for choosing among them, plotting a course through opportunities and dangers. The capacity to do this well involves its own sort of practical wisdom, an expertise in judging expertise. . . . (“Experts Aren’t Enough,” May 16-17, emphasis added)
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如今,和所有人一样,各种关于美国经济应否迅速重启的争议观点,也不断涌向我。但我明白,不仅我对此话题的看法没什么价值,而且我也没有足够的专业能力去确知究竟谁的看法才靠谱。我所确知的是,我最不该做的就是因为某个专家的观点与我一致而选他,让确认偏误左右我的决策。
再者,谈到专业能力,我们必须警惕社会中一些危险倾向:
Nowadays, like everyone else, I’m bombarded with conflicting views regarding the wisdom of rapidly reopening the U.S. economy. Yet I recognize that not only is my opinion on that topic of little value, but I also don’t have the expertise required to know for sure whose opinion does count. What I do know is that the last thing I should do is choose an expert because his or her opinions agree with mine, and allow confirmation bias to affect my decision. Further, in considering expertise, we must be leery of some dangerous tendencies in our society: • • • • •
把通用智力误认为对某一领域相关事实的掌握,
把事实性知识误认为深刻洞见,
把专业能力与洞见混同于预测未来的能力,
把某一领域的专家当作通晓其他一切的行家,
并把富有且成功的人士视为兼具以上所有品质。
to confuse general intelligence with knowledge of the facts relative to a given field, to confuse factual knowledge with superior insight, to conflate expertise and insight with the ability to predict the future, to treat experts in one field as if they’re knowledgeable about all others, and to credit rich and successful people with all of the above.
因此,正如我在以前的备忘录中描述的那样,当我出国旅行时,经常有人问我对东道国的经济及其潜力有何看法。“为什么问我?”我回答,“你们生活在这里。”仅仅因为我对投资和美国有所了解,为什么我就一定对其他领域和国家有深刻的见解呢?
我们在电视上看到医生或公共卫生官员强烈反对过快重启经济。他们对新冠病毒的医学和公共卫生方面及其应对方法的了解,很可能比大多数人要多,他们的建议很可能能挽救最多人的生命。但另一方面,既然他们不是经济学家,我们应该假定他们只是从尽量减少死亡人数的角度来回答。他们可能没有考虑到重启经济的重要性,或者如何在这两个考量之间取得平衡。
另一方面,我们看到商界人士和经济学家在谈论重启的必要性,以尽量减少经济因深度冻结而遭受的损害。但他们又对人命代价了解多少呢?而且,确实不存在任何算法或公认的流程来在这两者之间做出抉择。这关乎判断力,而非专业知识。
我最近读到一篇文章,讲的是一位经常被引用的自由意志主义律师兼法律学者(此处不具名,因为我的一贯做法是不批评个人),他在 3 月中旬曾预测,美国死于新冠肺炎的人数不会超过 500 人(后来他在自己的分析中发现了一个统计错误,将预测上调至 5000 人)。虽然他承认自己没有医学专业知识,但他表示,关于进化论及其对病毒的适用性,他确实比医生懂得多。他的观点在当时显然在保守派圈子里很有分量。
记者们自身并非专家,为了写报道,他们不得不咨询专家。但他们是怎样挑选和审查所引用的专家的呢?他们的选择又在多大程度上取决于我们都倾向于确认的偏见,以及他们想要论证的结论呢?以我的经验,我对某个主题了解得越多,就越不佩服相关的媒体报道。
同样,民选官员在他们必须做出决策的领域里,也很少是专家。他们也别无选择,只能依赖专家。但他们是如何选择自己的专家的呢?他们会去咨询属于另一个党派的专家吗?我最近读到一篇《华尔街
Thus, as I’ve described in previous memos, when I travel abroad, I’m often asked what I think of my host countries’ economies and their potential. “Why ask me?” I respond, “you live here.” Just because I know something about investing and the U.S., why should I necessarily have meaningful insight into other fields and countries? We see doctors or public health officials on TV who inveigh against quickly reopening the economy. They may well know much more than most about the medical and public health aspects of the coronavirus and how it should be dealt with, and their advice is likely to keep the most people alive. But on the other hand, since they’re not economists, we should assume they’re only answering from the standpoint of minimizing deaths. They may not take into consideration the importance of restarting the economy or how to balance the two considerations. On the other hand, we see businesspeople and economists talking about the need to reopen in order to minimize the damage done to the economy by keeping it in a deep freeze. But what do they know about the cost in human lives? And certainly there is no algorithm or accepted process for deciding between the two. It’s a matter of judgment, not expertise. I recently read an article about an often-cited libertarian lawyer and legal scholar (unnamed here because of my general practice of not criticizing individuals) who predicted in mid-March that no more than 500 people would die from Covid-19 in the U.S. (revised upward to 5,000 when he later found a statistical error in his analysis). While he admitted to having no medical expertise, he said he did know more than the doctors about evolutionary theory and its applicability to the virus. His opinion apparently carried great weight at the time in conservative quarters. Reporters, not being experts themselves, have to consult experts in order to write their stories. But how do they choose and vet the experts they cite? And to what extent are their selections a function of the biases we all tend to confirm and the conclusions they want to justify? In my experience, the more I know about a subject, the less I’m impressed with related media coverage. And likewise, elected officials are rarely expert in the fields about which they have to make decisions. They, too, have no choice but to depend on experts. But how do they choose their experts? Would they ever consult an expert who belongs to the other party? I recently read a Wall
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《华尔街日报》上一位保守派参议员的专栏文章,断言保守派和自由派在权衡重启经济与减少感染风险时存在本质差异。这样笼统(而且很可能不科学)的概括,更可能是合理的观察,还是源于意识形态分歧的智识偏见?
所以,(a)真正的专长稀缺且范围有限,(b)专长和预测能力是两回事,(c)我们都应谨慎选择倾听的对象,并掂量他们言论的分量。
还有一点:正如利拉所写,“面临迫在眉睫危险的人,想听到权威的声音……”因此,他们倾向于对流行的“预言家”寄予过分的信任。而当这位预言家被证明并非完美的预测者,终究只是凡人时,他们又去寻找下一位值得追捧的对象。他们从不会说:“我猜预测这回事根本没用。”我对所有人都是这么看的,包括那些寻求不冒风险、不费力气就能赚钱之道的人。
Street Journal op-ed piece by a conservative senator suggesting categorically that conservatives and liberals are different in how they weigh re-opening the economy versus minimizing infections. Is such a sweeping (and probably unscientific) generalization more likely to be an appropriate observation or an example of intellectual bias stemming from ideological division? So (a) true expertise is scarce and limited in scope, (b) expertise and predictive ability are two different things, and (c) we all should be careful about whom we listen to and how much weight we give to their pronouncements. And one other thing: As Lilla wrote, “People facing immediate danger want to hear an authoritative voice . . .” Thus they tend to put inordinate faith in a popular “prophet.” And when he or she turns out to be a less-than-perfect forecaster, and thus only human, they go looking for the next one to anoint. They never say, “I guess forecasting doesn’t work.” I would say the same about people in general, including those looking for help making money without risk or effort.
活生生的例子
最后,顺着这个话题,我想提一下合作基金(Collaborative Fund)的摩根·豪塞尔(Morgan Housel)5 月 19 日发表的一篇文章。他是一位见解深刻的评论员,其哲学和行为学观察常常引起我的共鸣。文中他讲述了自己与两位朋友的故事:少年时,他们常去一个滑雪场,喜欢冒险滑出规定区域。有一天,他的两位朋友又去滑了一趟,而他没去,也说不上什么特别理由,结果一场突如其来的雪崩夺走了他们的生命。他是这样总结的:
我不知道布伦丹和布莱恩的死是否真的影响了我投资的方式。但它让我看清了一个事实:风险有三个截然不同的方面:
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A Living Example Finally, in a related vein, I want to mention a May 19 article by Morgan Housel of Collaborative Fund, an insightful commentator whose philosophical and behavioral observations tend to resonate with me. In it, he told the story of two friends with whom he regularly took the risk of skiing out of bounds at the resort they frequented as teens. One day, his friends went out for a second run while he begged off for no particular reason, and a freak avalanche took their lives. Here’s his summation: I don’t know if Brendan and Bryan’s death actually affected how I invest. But it opened my eyes to the idea that there are three distinct sides of risk: • • •
你会被打中的概率。
被打中的平均后果。
被打中的尾部后果。
The odds you will get hit. The average consequences of getting hit. The tail-end consequences of getting hit.
前两条容易理解。第三条最难学会,往往只能靠亲身经历才能悟到。
我们滑雪时知道自己是在冒险。我们清楚越界不对,可能会被抓到。但 17 岁的我们觉得,冒险的后果顶多是教练吼我们几句,也许今年滑雪季的通行证会被吊销。
从来没有,一次都没有,想过我们会付出生命的代价。
但一旦经历过那样的事,你就会明白,尾部后果——那些低概率、高冲击的事件——才是唯一要紧的。
在投资里,风险的通常后果构成了每天新闻头条的绝大部分。但风险的尾部后果——比如疫情、大萧条——才真正写进历史书。它们才是唯一要紧的。它们才是你该专注的全部。过去十年我们一直在争论,经济风险是否意味着
The first two are easy to grasp. It’s the third that’s hardest to learn, and can often only be learned through experience. We knew we were taking risks when we skied. We knew that going out of bounds was wrong, and that we might get caught. But at 17 years old we figured the consequences of risk meant our coaches might yell at us. Maybe we’d get our season pass revoked for the year. Never, not once, did we think we’d pay the ultimate price. But once you go through something like that, you realize that the tail-end consequences – the low-probability, high-impact events – are all that matter. In investing, the average consequences of risk make up most of the daily news headlines. But the tail-end consequences of risk – like pandemics, and depressions – are what make the pages of history books. They’re all that matter. They’re all you should focus on. We spent the last decade debating whether economic risk meant the
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美联储把利率定在 0.25% 或 0.5%。接着 3600 万人因为一场病毒在两个月内丢了工作。这太荒谬了。
尾端事件才是唯一要紧的。
这引出了投资中一个巨大的难题。既然我们对未来一无所知,就别无选择,只能依赖对过去模式的 extrapolation(外推)。所谓“过去模式”,我们指的是过去通常发生什么,以及严重程度如何。然而,没有理由认为(a)不会发生与过去不同的事情,(b)未来事件在严重性及后果上不会超过过去。虽然我们向过去寻求“最坏情况”的指引,但也没有理由让未来的经历局限于过去。可若是不依赖过去来告诉我们最坏情况是什么,我们就很难知道该如何配置资本,或如何过好人生。
多年前,我的朋友里克·凯恩指出,“所有金融历史中 95% 都发生在正常范围的两个标准差之内,而一切有趣的事都发生在两个标准差之外。”可以说,泡沫和崩盘落在两个标准差之外,但正是这些事件创造了财富,也摧毁了财富。我们无法提前了解它们的性质或规模,也难料像疫情这样罕见的外生事件。
2001 年,我写了一份备忘录,题为《你无法预测,但可以准备》。乍看之下,这像是自相矛盾。如果无法预测,又怎么能准备呢?反过来想,如果最极端的、最具影响力的外生事件都无法预测,我们又如何为之准备?我们可以通过认清它们终将发生,并在经济走势和投资者行为让市场更容易受到不利事件冲击时,让投资组合更加谨慎,来做到这一点。
这种思路透露出一丝好消息:我们也许无法预测未来,但这不意味着我们面对它时无能为力。
Federal Reserve set interest rates at 0.25% or 0.5%. Then 36 million people lost their jobs in two months because of a virus. It’s absurd. Tail-end events are all that matter. This introduces one of the great conundrums associated with investing. Since we know nothing about the future, we have no choice but to rely on extrapolation of past patterns. By “past patterns,” we mean what has normally happened in the past and with what severity. And yet, there’s no reason why (a) things can’t happen that differ from those that happened in the past and (b) future events can’t be worse than those of the past in terms of severity and thus consequences. While we look to the past for guidance as to the “worst case,” there’s no reason why future experience should be limited to that of the past. But without reliance on the past to inform us regarding the worst case, we can’t know much about how to invest our capital or live our lives. Many years ago, my friend Ric Kayne pointed out that “95% of all financial history happens within two standard deviations of normal, and everything interesting happens outside of two standard deviations.” Arguably, bubbles and crashes fall outside of two standard deviations, but they are the events that create and eliminate the greatest fortunes. We can’t know much in advance about their nature or dimensions. Or about rare, exogenous events like pandemics. In 2001, I wrote a memo titled You Can’t Predict. You Can Prepare. At first glance, that seems like an oxymoron. How can we prepare for something if we can’t predict it? Turned around, if the greatest extremes and most influential exogenous events are unpredictable, how can we prepare for them? We can do so by recognizing that they inevitably will occur, and by making our portfolios more cautious when economic developments and investor behavior render markets more vulnerable to damage from untoward events. That line of reasoning suggests a glimmer of good news: we may not be able to predict the future, but that doesn’t mean we’re powerless to deal with it.
May 28, 2020
May 28, 2020
2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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All Rights Reserved