不确定性
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
我从 3 月 3 日起连续六周每周写一份备忘录,但最近三周没写。第一,这个系列总得有个结束的时候。第二,我尽量遵循一个原则:如果没有什么增量的东西可说,我就不动笔。希望这份备忘录值得你一读。
我们无法预知未来,这个主题我在过去多年里反复提及,但这次我决定用整份备忘录来探讨它。在家待了将近两个月,我和所有人一样,手头时间充裕。这倒也是好事,因为把哲学层面的思考落到纸面上,远比写时事评论和应对建议要难得多。
趁着我在这里解释,先向各位道歉,本备忘录引文偏多、篇幅偏长——但我实在太想分享这些智慧了。
我们所不知道的一切
众所周知,眼下我们在四个方面正经历前所未有的(或者说至少是极其异常的)事态:疫情、经济收缩、油价崩盘,以及美联储和政府层面的应对。因此,诸多因素叠加,让近期的未来显得格外难以预测:
I wrote a memo a week for six weeks starting on March 3, but I’ve skipped the last three weeks. First, the string had to end sometime. And second, I try to adhere to the principle that if I don’t have anything additive to say, I don’t write. Hopefully you’ll find this one worth reading. Our inability to know the future is a theme I’ve touched on repeatedly over the years, but now I’ve decided to devote an entire memo to it. Being at home for nearly two months means I’ve had a lot of time on my hands, like everyone else. And it’s a good thing, because getting philosophical musings down on paper is a lot harder than writing about current events and what to do about them. And while I’m explaining myself, I’ll apologize up front for the number of citations and their length – but there’s so much wisdom I want to share. All We Don’t Know As everyone knows, today we’re experiencing unprecedented (or at least highly exceptional) developments in four areas: the pandemic, the economic contraction, the oil price collapse and the Fed/government response. Thus a number of considerations make the future particularly unpredictable these days: •
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经济学这个领域混乱而粗糙,被人称为“沉闷的科学”自有其道理。不像物理学那样的“真正”科学,经济学里没有任何规则能让人指望稳定地产出某个结果,比如“若 a,则 b”。只有倾向于反复出现的模式,即便这些模式有历史依据、合乎逻辑、屡屡被观察到,它们终究只是倾向。
在最近几份备忘录里,我提到过哈佛大学陈曾熙公共卫生学院流行病学教授马克·利普西奇。在我对他那套层级结构的理解里,分为(a)事实,(b)从过往经验推出的逻辑推论,以及(c)猜测。正因经济学的粗糙,关于经济未来当然谈不上什么事实。经济学家和投资者从过去的模式里做推断,但这些推断充其量靠不住,我觉得很多情况下他们的判断都该归入“猜测”一类。
这些天我常被问到这样的问题:“复苏会是 V 形,还是 U 形、W 形或 L 形?”以及“你经历过的哪场危机和这次最像?”回答这类问题需要历史视角。
然而,考虑到上面列出的那些非同寻常的事态,和今天相关的历史经验少得可怜,甚至几乎为零。也就是说,我们没有现成的过往模式可以依靠或外推。正如我说过的,要是你从没经历过某件事,你就不能说你知道它会怎么收场。
今天这样独一无二的事态让预测变得格外困难,而四个因素同时出现大概更让预测成了不可能之事。除此之外——
The field of economics is muddled and imprecise, and there’s good reason it’s called “the dismal science.” Unlike a “real” science like physics, in economics there are no rules that one can count on to consistently produce a given outcome, as in “if a, then b.” There are only patterns that tend to repeat, and while they may be historical, logical and often-observed, they’re still only tendencies. In some recent memos, I’ve mentioned Marc Lipsitch, Professor of Epidemiology at Harvard’s T.H. Chan School of Public Health. In my version of his hierarchy, there are (a) facts, (b) logical inferences from past experience and (c) guesses. Because of the imprecision of economics, there certainly are no facts about the economic future. Economists and investors make inferences from past patterns, but these are unreliable at best, and I think in many cases their judgments fall under the heading of “guesses.” These days I’m often asked questions like “Will the recovery be V-shaped, or a U, W or L?” and “Which of the crises you’ve lived through does this one most resemble?” Answering questions like those requires a historical perspective. Given the exceptional developments enumerated above, however, there’s little or no history that’s relevant to today. That means we don’t have past patterns to fall back on or to extrapolate from. As I’ve said, if you’ve never experienced something before, you can’t say you know how it’s going to turn out. While unique developments like those of today make forecasting unusually difficult, the presence of all four elements at once probably renders it impossible. In addition to the
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因为四个问题各自本身已经难以理解,我们更无法确定它们会如何相互作用。比如说:
- 美联储和财政部推出的贷款、救助、刺激计划及债券购买规模庞大、形式多样,能否足以抵消抗击新冠疫情给经济造成的空前损害?
- 经济重启能在多大程度上恢复经济活动,而这是否又会引发疫情卷土重来,导致封锁措施再度实施?
对投资者而言,未来由成千上万的因素决定,比如经济体的内部运行机制、参与者的心理、外部事件、政府行动、天气以及其他各种随机因素。所以问题极其复杂多变。就拿眼下来说,有四大要素(新冠疫情、经济、油价和美联储),光看其中一个:疫情。再想想围绕疫情的所有问题:
difficulty of understanding each of the four individually, we can’t be sure how they’ll interact. For example: o Will the massive, multi-faceted Fed/Treasury program of loans, grants, stimulus and bond buying be sufficient to offset the unparalleled damage done to the economy by the fight against Covid-19? o To what extent will reopening bring back economic activity, and to what extent will that cause the spread of the disease to resume, and the renewal of lock-downs? For investors, the future is determined by thousands of factors, such as the internal workings of economies, the participants’ psyches, exogenous events, governmental action, weather and other forms of randomness. Thus the problem is enormously multi-variate. Take the current situation, with its four major components (Covid-19, the economy, oil and the Fed), and consider just one: the disease. Now think about all the questions surrounding it: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
有多少人感染了病毒,包括无症状感染者?
接触感染者后,有多大可能引发新病例?
保持社交距离和佩戴口罩能在多大程度上阻止病毒传播?
病例会是重症、轻症还是无症状?原因是什么?
医护人员的防护装备、医院病床和呼吸机供应是否充足?
会开发出治疗方法吗?它在多大程度上能加速康复、降低死亡?
病死率会因年龄、性别和基础疾病呈现何种差异?病毒对年轻人的影响会加重吗?
感染后康复的人会产生免疫力吗?免疫力是永久的吗?
病毒会发生变异吗?免疫力能否覆盖新变种?
能否通过注射抗体来预防感染?
需要多少人具备免疫力,才能形成群体免疫,有效阻断病毒进一步传播?
社交距离会推迟群体免疫的实现吗?瑞典的做法是否更优?
疫苗会被研发出来吗?什么时候?生产并交付所需剂量需要多长时间?美国要排在队列的什么位置?
有多少人会拒绝接种疫苗?会带来什么影响?
疫苗是否需要每年重新接种?
病毒会因温暖潮湿的天气而减弱吗?
病毒会永久伴随我们吗?它会不会像“又一种季节性流行病”一样可控?
How many people have it, including those who are asymptomatic? How likely is contact with someone who’s infected to create another case? To what degree will distancing and masks deter its spread? Will the cases be severe, mild or asymptomatic? Why? Will the supply of protective gear for medical personnel, hospital beds and ventilators be adequate? Will a treatment be developed? To what extent will it speed recovery and prevent fatalities? What will the fatality rate be relative to age, gender and pre-existing conditions? Will the impact of the disease on young people worsen? Will people who’ve had it and recovered be immune? Will their immunity be permanent? Will the virus mutate, and will immunity cover the new forms? Will it be possible to inject antibodies to prevent infection? How many people have to be immune for herd immunity to effectively stop the further spread? Will social distancing delay the achievement of herd immunity? Is the Swedish approach better? Will a vaccine be invented? When? How long will it take to produce and deliver the needed doses? Where will the U.S. stand in the line to get it? How many people will refuse to be vaccinated? With what effect? Will vaccination have to be renewed annually? Will the virus succumb to warm weather and humidity? Will the virus be with us permanently, and will it be controllable like “just another seasonal disease”?
我到底想说什么?我的意思是,很少有人能把所有这些因素权衡清楚,从而算出我们集体面临的风险。而这还只是新冠疫情这一件事。现在再想想另外三大因素各自牵出的无数问题。谁能应对这么多问题、得出站得住脚的答案、考虑它们之间的相互作用,再按重要性给各种考量排好权重,最终对病毒的影响得出有用的结论?恐怕得有一颗非凡的头脑,才能同时处理所有这些因素,并且得出比大多数人更靠谱的判断。(我认为电脑也做不到,尤其是在没有历史先例可循、处处需要主观决断的情况下。)
Where am I going with this? My point is that very few people can balance all these considerations to figure out our collective risk. And that’s just Covid-19. Now think about the many questions that pertain to each of the three other factors. Who can respond to this many questions, come up with valid answers, consider their interaction, appropriately weight the various considerations on the basis of their importance, and process them for a useful conclusion regarding the virus’s impact? It would take an exceptional mind to deal with all these factors simultaneously and reach a better conclusion than most other people. (I believe a computer couldn’t do so either, especially given all the subjective decisions required in the absence of historic precedent.)
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挑战在于,试图在评估未来方面做到高出平均水平。为什么这么难?
首先,预测本身就是一个竞争激烈的领域。认为在预测上胜过他人很难的论点,与市场有效性(以及主动管理局限性的由来)的论点如出一辙。成千上万的人也在努力,他们可不是“摆设”。其中许多人受过良好教育、聪明、精于数字、工作勤奋、动力十足,并且能接触到海量数据和算力。所以,想做到比平均水平更好,按定义就不该是件容易的事。
此外,如上所述,既然经济学运作起来不精确、不科学、且前后不一贯,就不可能存在一种始终有效的预测方法或流程。为了说明随机性,打个比方:如果我商学院毕业时,有人给我一笔巨额预算、一支博士大军和丰厚的金钱激励,让我在每周日橄榄球赛开赛前预测掷硬币的结果,我肯定会一败涂地。没人能成功预测那些深受随机性影响、且在其他方面也毫无规律的事情。
现在再想想另一种可能性:在像今天这样的压力时期,得出结论尤其困难:
【神经科学的最新进展】表明,我们不过是“推理机器”,在解释自身想法时,只是精细程度各有不同。换句话说,在日常生活或填补不完整叙事的空白时,我们大量依赖基于模式的猜测。
在压力时期尤其如此,因为许多支配我们反应的心理过程,都伴随着对模式的急切搜寻,以决定我们的下一步行动。这就是我们在经济或金融危机中的本能反应,也是我们紧紧抱住 V 形、U 形或 L 形复苏曲线等种种图表不放的原因。
但在极度混乱的环境中,我们会发现这种方法有严重的局限性。看看当前的环境——供应、需求、健康和流动性都受到冲击——我们或许可以拼凑出一个集合体,比如把西班牙流感、福岛地震和 2008 年危机的某些成分揉在一起。但鉴于每个事件的具体背景极其特殊,我们可能会陷入从这些事件中汲取的教训的无穷组合之中。
事实上,把许多经济预测放在一起逐一对比,就会发现,即便是相似的假设,也会推导出关于这场危机将如何发展的截然不同的结果。这或许就是麻省理工学院约瑟夫·谢菲教授提出的“安娜·卡列尼娜原则”的一个案例。套用托尔斯泰的话来说,幸福的经济都是相似的,不幸的经济各有各的不幸。我们不能假定,在截然不同的背景下,对公共卫生或金融干预措施的反应会是一样的。这个错误的根源,在于盯着过去事件的平均反应。但现实并非如此。(瑞银 Evidence Lab 与分析研究主管胡安-路易斯·佩雷斯,《金融时报》,4 月 22 日,强调为原文所加)
The challenge lies in trying to be above average in assessing the future. Why is that so hard? First of all, forecasting is a competitive arena. The argument for the difficulty of out-forecasting others is similar to the argument for market efficiency (and thus the limitations of active management). Thousands of others are trying, too, and they’re not “empty suits.” Many of them are educated, intelligent, numerate, hard-working, highly motivated and able to access vast amounts of data and computing power. So by definition it shouldn’t be easy to be better than the average. In addition, since economics is imprecise, unscientific and inconsistent in its functioning, as described above, there can’t be a method or process for forecasting that works consistently. To illustrate randomness, I say that if, when I graduated from business school, I was offered a huge budget, an army of PhDs and lavish financial incentives to predict the coin toss before each Sunday’s football games, I would have been a flop. No one can succeed in predicting things that are heavily influenced by randomness and otherwise inconsistent. Now consider the possibility that reaching conclusions is especially difficult in times of stress like today: [Recent advances in neuroscience] suggest that we are no more than “inference machines” with various degrees of sophistication in how we explain our thoughts. In other words, we use a lot of pattern-driven guesswork as we go about our daily lives or to fill in the gaps in an incomplete narrative. This is especially true in times of stress, as many of the mental processes that govern our reactions are associated with an urgent search for patterns to determine our moves. That is our snap reaction in economic or financial crises and why we cling to our repertoire of charts of V, U or L-shapes of recovery, among many. But, in very dislocated environments, we find serious limitations to this approach. Looking at the current environment, with disruptions to supply, demand, health and liquidity tensions, we could build an ensemble of the Spanish flu, the Fukushima earthquake and components of the 2008 crisis, for example. But given the very specific contexts of each event, we may run into endless combinations of the lessons learnt from these events. As a matter of fact, in a side-by-side comparison of many economic forecasts, even similar assumptions drive very different outcomes on how this crisis will play out. This may be a case of the “Anna Karenina principle” coined by Professor Yossi Sheffi at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Paraphrasing Tolstoy, while happy economies are all alike, every unhappy economy is unhappy in its own way. We can’t assume that the response to public health or financial interventions will be similar across vastly different contexts. The root cause of this mistake is to look at average responses from past events. But the reality is not like that. (Juan-Luis Perez, head of research, Evidence Lab and Analytics, at UBS, the Financial Times, April 22, emphasis added)
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由于大量原因,预测变得困难重重,包括我们对孕育未来的各种进程理解有限、这些进程本身的不精确性、历史先例的缺乏、人们行为与随机性作用下的不可预测性,而当今非同寻常的环境更是加剧了这些难题。
我们的资深经济顾问尼尔·欧文在 4 月 16 日的《纽约时报》上将这一点阐述得极为透彻:
世界经济是一张无限复杂的互联之网。我们每个人都能看到一系列直接的经济联系:我们购物的商店、支付薪水的雇主、提供房屋贷款的银行。但一旦你深入两三个层面之后,就真的无法自信地弄清这些联系是如何运作的了。
而这恰恰揭示了伴随新冠病毒蔓延而来的经济灾难为何令人不安。
未来几年,我们将看到这张网被撕裂、数百万条联系同时被摧毁时会发生什么。这开启了一种可能性:全球经济的样貌可能完全不同于近几十年来占据主导的形式。
我对欧文的观点再认同不过了。或者,借用约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思那句我一直以来最爱的话:
我们有两类预测者:一类是无知者——另一类是无知却不知自己无知者。
既然谈到了钟爱的名言,我就借此机会分享一些多年来积累的相关言论(我想第一句可能是史上最精辟的):
再多的老练也无法消弭这样一个事实:你的全部知识都关乎过去,而你的所有决策都关乎未来。
伊恩·威尔逊(通用电气前高管)
有知者不预测,预测者无知。
老子
So forecasting is difficult for a large number of reasons, including our limited understanding of the processes that will produce the future, their imprecise nature, the lack of historical precedent, the unpredictability of people’s behavior and the role of randomness, and these difficulties are exacerbated by today’s unusual circumstances. Senior economics consultant Neil Irwin put it together very well in The New York Times on April 16: The world economy is an infinitely complicated web of interconnections. We each have a series of direct economic interrelationships we can see: the stores we buy from, the employer that pays our salary, the bank that gives us a home loan. But once you get two or three levels out, it’s really impossible to know with any confidence how those connections work. And that, in turn, shows what is unnerving about the economic calamity accompanying the spread of the novel coronavirus. In the years ahead we will learn what happens when that web is torn apart, when millions of those links are destroyed all at once. And it opens the possibility of a global economy completely different from the one that has prevailed in recent decades. I couldn’t agree more with what Irwin says. Or, to use one of my all-time favorite quotes, from John Kenneth Galbraith: We have two classes of forecasters: Those who don’t know – and those who don’t know they don’t know. While I’m in the subject of favorite quotes, I’ll take advantage of the occasion to share some others on this subject that I’ve stored up over the years (I think the first one may be the greatest ever): No amount of sophistication is going to allay the fact that all of your knowledge is about the past and all your decisions are about the future. Ian Wilson (former GE executive) Those who have knowledge don’t predict; those who predict don’t have knowledge. Lao Tzu
只有当未来与人们自己的愿望相吻合时,他们才能预见未来;而那些最显而易见的事实,一旦不受欢迎,就可能被视而不见。
——乔治·奥威尔
People can foresee the future only when it coincides with their own wishes, and the most grossly obvious facts can be ignored when they are unwelcome. George Orwell
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预测制造了未来可知的幻象。
彼得·伯恩斯坦
我从不去想未来——它来得已经够快了。
阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦
Forecasts create the mirage that the future is knowable. Peter Bernstein I never think of the future – it comes soon enough. Albert Einstein
未来之事,待到临头方可知晓;在那之前,毋须挂怀。
埃斯库罗斯
The future you shall know when it has come; before then forget it. Aeschylus
预测通常更多地反映预测者自身,而非未来本身。
沃伦·巴菲特
Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. Warren Buffett
我想你应该明白我的意思了。在认为未来不可知这一点上,我似乎并不孤单。不过既然这么说了,我也得承认,这种说法过于简单化,并非完全准确。实际上,我们对宏观未来确实知道一些事情。问题在于,这些事大多是众所周知的。比如,美国 GDP 平均每年增长约 2%;冬季取暖油消费量上升;大量购物正在转向线上。但既然这些事大家都知道,它们不太可能对追求超额回报有多大帮助。正如我以前说过的,大多数人所预期的事情——也就是共识预测——按定义在任何时点都已反映在资产价格中。由于未来通常与过去颇为相似,大多数预测——尤其是宏观预测——不过是对近期趋势和当前水平的外推,而这些都已计入价格。因为外推在大多数时候是恰当的,所以大多数人的预测大致正确。但既然这些预测已反映在证券价格中,多数外推就构不成超额回报的来源。能带来丰厚利润的预测,是那些有先见之明、预见到与过去截然不同的剧变的预测。但这类预测,第一,极难做出;第二,很少正确。因此,大多数对偏离趋势的预测同样不是超额回报的来源。
所以让我总结一下:(a)只有对未来极为不同的正确预测才有价值,(b)做出这样的预测很难,(c)这种非常规预测很少正确,(d)因此要成为一名超越平均的预测者很难,(e)只有超越平均的预测才能带来超越平均的回报。所以这便是一个难题:
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I think you get the point. I seem to be in good company in my belief that the future is unknowable. Having made that assertion, I’ll admit that it’s an extreme oversimplification and not entirely correct. There actually are things we know about the macro future. The trouble is that, mostly, they’re things everyone knows. Examples include the fact that U.S. GDP grows about 2% per year on average; heating oil consumption increases in winter; and a great deal of shopping is moving on-line. But since everyone knows these things, they’re unlikely to be much help in the pursuit of above average returns. As I’ve described before, the things most people expect to happen – consensus forecasts – are by definition incorporated into asset prices at any point in time. Since the future is usually a lot like the past, most forecasts – and especially macro forecasts – are extrapolations of recent trends and current levels, and they’re built into prices. Since extrapolation is appropriate most of the time, most people’s forecasts are roughly correct. But because they’re already reflected in security prices, most extrapolations aren’t a source of above average returns. The forecasts that produce great profits are the ones that presciently foresee radical deviations from the past. But that kind of forecast is, first, very hard to make and, second, rarely right. Thus most forecasts of deviation from trend also aren’t a source of above average returns. So let me recap: (a) only correct forecasts of a very different future are valuable, (b) it’s hard to make forecasts like that, (c) such unconventional predictions are rarely right, (d) thus it’s hard to be an above average forecaster, and (e) it’s only above average forecasts that lead to above average returns. So there’s a conundrum: • •
投资的艺术,在于把资本摆对位置,好从未来的发展中获利。多数职业投资人追求超过平均水平的回报,说白了,就是跑赢市场,对得起自己收的那份管理费。
Investing is the art of positioning capital so as to profit from future developments. Most professional investors strive for above average returns (i.e., they want to beat the market and earn their fees).
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然而,按照上述逻辑,宏观预测本不应被期待带来超越平均水平的回报。
尽管如此,极少有人满足于在对宏观未来持不可知论的态度下进行投资。他们或许在某种程度上理解预测所涉及的困难,但不愿承认自己对未来的无知(尤其是对自己承认)往往轻易压倒了那份理解。
于是,他们不断尝试预测未来事件——投资行业也因此产出了大量预测。
However, according to the above logic, macro forecasts shouldn’t be expected to lead to above average returns. Yet very few people are content to invest while practicing agnosticism with regard to the macro future. They may on some level understand the difficulty entailed in forecasting, but their reluctance to admit their ignorance of the future (especially to themselves) usually overcomes that understanding with ease. And so they keep trying to predict future events – and the investment industry produces a large volume of forecasts.
正如我在最近的备忘录中所表达的,我觉得我们大多数人对未来的看法,其形成过程高度反映了我们自身的偏见。鉴于当前乐观与悲观情形之间存在着异常巨大的鸿沟——且无法依据事实和历史先例(因为没有先例)在两者之间做出选择——我持续思考偏见所扮演的角色。投资者可能犯下的最大错误之一,就是忽视或否认自身的偏见。如果存在某些影响使我们思考过程不够客观的因素,我们就应该正视这一事实,以免被其束缚。
我们的偏见可能难以察觉,但它们的影响力极为强大。当我读到关于为新冠病毒提供充分检测或为小企业提供支持何等艰难的文章时,看到自己谨慎的观点得到印证,我感到欣慰,并且发现将这些内容纳入思考轻而易举。但当我听到重新开放经济的好处或群体免疫的可能性时,我同样轻松地提出反驳论点,而这些质疑丝毫未损我原有的担忧。这正是“确认偏误”在起作用的鲜明例证:
一旦我们形成了某种观点,我们就会接纳那些印证该观点的信息,同时忽视或排斥那些对其提出质疑的信息。确认偏误表明,我们并非客观地感知现实。我们挑选那些让我们感觉良好的数据,因为它们印证了我们的成见。于是,我们可能成为自己假设的囚徒。(沙赫拉姆·赫什马特,《今日心理学》,2015 年 4 月 23 日)
正如保罗·西蒙 50 年前为歌曲《拳击手》所写的歌词:“……一个人只听他想听的,其余一概不理。”
As I’ve expressed in recent memos, I feel the process through which most of us arrive at our view of the future is highly reflective of our biases. Given the unusually wide chasm between the optimistic and pessimistic cases at this time – and the impossibility of choosing between them based on facts and historical precedents (since there are none) – I continue to think about the role of bias. One of the biggest mistakes an investor can make is ignoring or denying his or her biases. If there are influences that make our processes less than objective, we should face up to this fact in order to avoid being held captive by them. Our biases may be insidious, but they are highly influential. When I read articles about how difficult it will be to provide adequate testing for Covid-19 or to get support to small businesses, I’m pleased to see my wary views reinforced, and I find it easy to incorporate those things into my thinking. But when I hear about the benefits of reopening the economy or the possibility of herd immunity, I find it just as easy to come up with counter-arguments that leave my concerns undented. This is a clear example of “confirmation bias” at work: Once we have formed a view, we embrace information that confirms that view while ignoring, or rejecting, information that casts doubt on it. Confirmation bias suggests that we don’t perceive circumstances objectively. We pick out those bits of data that make us feel good because they confirm our prejudices. Thus, we may become prisoners of our assumptions. (Shahram Heshmat, Psychology Today, April 23, 2015) As Paul Simon wrote 50 years ago for the song The Boxer, “. . . a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest.”
虽然当时我并不清楚这个现象叫什么名字,但很久以前我就意识到自己有这种偏倚。在最近的一份备忘录里,我讲了一个 50 年前的故事,那时我还是花旗银行的办公设备分析师,有人问我,施乐公司最优秀的卖方分析师是谁。我的回答很简单:“最认同我看法的那位某某某。”大多数人不太可能高度评价与自己意见相左的人。所以,当我们思考自己引用哪些经济学家的观点、尊重哪些投资者、从哪里获取信息时,这些人的看法很可能与我们如出一辙。
当然,这种倾向走向极端,就造成了今天美国这种令人遗憾的两极分化局面。新闻机构早在几十年前就意识到,人们更愿意消费那些印证自己观点的报道,而不是那些挑战他们看法(或者枯燥乏味、不偏不倚)的内容。很少有人会去关注那些呈现多元观点的媒体。大多数人只锁定一份报纸、一个有线新闻频道或一个政治网站。而这些媒体中,能公允呈现双方立场的寥寥无几。因此,大多数人听到的新闻版本,与站在对立面的人所听到的截然不同。
While I didn’t know the name for it, I’ve long been aware of my bias. In a recent memo, I told the story from 50 years ago, when I was Citibank’s office equipment analyst, of being asked who the best sell-side analyst on Xerox was. My answer was simple: “The one who agrees with me most is so-and-so.” Most people are unlikely to think highly of anyone whose views they oppose. So when we think about which economists we quote, which investors we respect, and where we get our information, it’s likely that their views will parallel ours. Of course, taken to an extreme, this has resulted in the unfortunate, polarized state in which we find the U.S. today. News organizations realized decades ago that people would rather consume stories that confirm their views than those that challenge them (or are dully neutral). Few people follow media outlets that reflect a diversity of opinion. Most people stick to one newspaper, cable news channel or political website. And few of those fairly present both sides of the story. Thus most people hear a version of the news that is totally unlike the one heard by those on the other side of the
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辩论。当你听到的所有事实和观点都印证了自己的信念时,心智生活确实很轻松,但没什么长进。
理想状态是什么?一颗平静、开放的头脑,加上一套客观的流程。如果人人都能做到这些,我们岂不是都会好得多?
debate. When all the facts and opinions you hear confirm your own beliefs, mental life is very relaxed but not very enriching. What’s the ideal? A calm, open mind and an objective process. Wouldn’t we all be better off if those things were universal?
赞颂怀疑
我另一个钟爱的主题——对于它在这些备忘录中反复出现,我略感歉意——是承认自身无知有多么重要。
首先,若要超越其他投资者,我们需要一套作战计划。通往成功之路有许多可选方案,可供你作为策略基础:对公司、行业和证券的深度研究;套利;算法投资;因子投资;甚至指数化投资。但若我对宏观预测之难判断无误,对大多数人而言,那都不该是正途。
其次,或许也是更重要的一点,对预测的过度信任可能危及你的财务健康。这句话说得再好不过,常被归于马克·吐温名下,但也有其他归属版本:
让你陷入麻烦的,不是你不知道的事,而是你确信不疑、偏偏并非如此的事。
寥寥数语,却蕴含大智慧。没有哪句话以“我不知道,但……”或“我可能错了,但……”开头,会让人惹上大麻烦。若承认不确定性,我们会在投资前深入研究,反复核验结论,谨慎行事。顺境时也许做不到最优,但绝无可能爆仓或崩盘。反之,笃定之人往往省去这些步骤,而若他们既自信又错了,正如那句引言所示,后果可能是灾难性的。
投资在这一方面,正如在许多其他方面一样,充满挑战。主动投资者必须有自信。耶鲁大学的戴维·斯文森把这一点说得再透彻不过(正因如此,我才在备忘录和书中反复引用这段话):
建立并维持一种非传统的投资风格,需要接受令人不适的另类投资组合,这些组合在传统智慧眼中常常显得颇为鲁莽。(《机构投资与基金管理的创新》)
想做得比大多数人出色,就必须与众有别。正如我在 4 月 6 日《校准》备忘录中所说,呼应斯文森的观点,所有伟大的投资都始于不适,因为人人喜爱、感觉良好的东西,不太可能出现在打折货架上。但投资于不受待见的标的——冒着鹤立鸡群、看起来犯下大错的风险——需要信心和决心。在持仓下跌时坚持持有——或许还在更低价位加仓——直到你的判断被证实、标的转为赢家,同样需要信心。而在你认为某只大涨的标的仍有上行空间时继续持有,甘愿冒着可能放弃部分既有收益的风险,也需要信心。
In Praise of Doubt Another favorite theme of mine – and I’m mildly apologetic for its repetition in these memos – is how important it is to acknowledge what we don’t know. First of all, if we’re going to out-invest the rest, we need a game plan. There are a lot of possible routes to success on which to base your process: in-depth research into companies, industries and securities; arbitrage; algorithmic investing; factor investing; even indexation. But if I’m right about the difficulty of macro forecasting, for most people that shouldn’t be it. Second, and probably more importantly, excessive trust in forecasting can be dangerous to your financial health. It’s never been put better than in the quote that’s often attributed to Mark Twain, but also to several others: It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so. Just a few words, but a great deal of wisdom. No statement that starts with “I don’t know but . . .” or “I could be wrong but . . .” ever got anyone into big trouble. If we admit to uncertainty, we’ll investigate before we invest, double-check our conclusions and proceed with caution. We may suboptimize when times are good, but we’re unlikely to flame out or melt down. On the other hand, people who are sure may dispense with those things, and if they’re sure and wrong, as the quote suggests, the outcome can be catastrophic. Investing is challenging in this way, as in so many others. Active investors have to be confident. Yale’s David Swensen said it as well as it can be said (that’s why I go back to this quote so often in my memos and books): Establishing and maintaining an unconventional investment profile requires acceptance of uncomfortably idiosyncratic portfolios, which frequently appear downright imprudent in the eyes of conventional wisdom. (Pioneering Portfolio Management) To do better than most, you have to depart from the crowd. As I said in my April 6 memo Calibrating, echoing Swensen, all great investments begin in discomfort, since the things everyone likes and feels good about are unlikely to be on the bargain counter. But to invest in things that are out of favor – at the risk of standing out from the crowd and appearing to have made a big mistake – takes confidence and resolve. It also requires confidence to hold onto a position when it declines – and perhaps add to it at lower prices – in the period before one’s wisdom becomes clear and it turns into a winner. And it takes confidence to continue holding a highly appreciated investment you think still has upside potential, at the risk of possibly giving up some of the gains to date.
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但基于理性的信心何时会变成傲慢与固执?这才是关键问题。持有并加码下跌中的仓位,只有当基本假设最终被证明正确、事情如预期发展时,才算好主意。换句话说,你何时才允许自己考虑可能错了?
从投资生涯一开始,我就始终怀有某种不确定感。但我不认为这是坏事:
But when does reason-based confidence turn into hubris and obstinateness? That’s the key question. Holding and adding to declining positions is only a good idea if the underlying thesis turns out to be right and things eventually go as expected. In other words, when do you allow for the possibility that you’re wrong? From the very beginning of my investing career, I’ve felt a sense of uncertainty. But I don’t think that’s a bad thing: •
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“带着恐惧投资”——这个词远不如“实施恰当的风险规避”来得体面——却会迫使你去做扎实的尽职调查,采用保守的假设,坚持在事态出错时有足够的安全边际,并且只在潜在回报至少与风险相称时才出手。事实上,我认为忧虑能让你眼光更敏锐。带着恐惧投资,会少犯错误(尽管代价可能是未能充分抓住牛市的最大机会)。
1978 年我开始投资高收益债券,1988 年我和布鲁斯·卡什第一次瞄准不良债务时,我就清楚地看到,在这样充满不确定性的领域里,长期成功的路子在于控制亏损,而不是追求最大收益。这种打法让我们活到了今天,而当年许多对手早已不见踪影。
我可以告诉你,在全球金融危机中,雷曼兄弟破产之后,我们感受到了巨大的不确定性。你要是没感觉,那才不正常,因为当时金融体系确实存在崩溃的可能。我们开始买入时,布鲁斯常常跑来找我说:“我觉得咱们买得太慢了。”第二天又说:“我觉得咱们买得太快了。”但这并不妨碍他在 2008 年最后 15 周里,平均每周投入 4.5 亿美元。我觉得,布鲁斯能与自己的疑虑较劲,正是这种能力让他找到了合适的投资节奏。
“Investing scared” – a less glamorous term than “applying appropriate risk aversion” – will push you to do thorough due diligence, employ conservative assumptions, insist on an ample margin of safety in case things go wrong, and invest only when the potential return is at least commensurate with the risk. In fact, I think worry sharpens your focus. Investing scared will result in making fewer mistakes (although perhaps at the price of failing to take maximum advantage of bull markets). When I started investing in high yield bonds in 1978, and when Bruce Karsh and I first targeted distressed debt in 1988, it seemed clear that the route to long-term success in such uncertain areas lay in limiting losses rather than targeting maximum gains. That approach has permitted us to still be here, while many one-time competitors no longer are. I can tell you that in the Global Financial Crisis, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, we felt enormous uncertainty. If you didn’t, there was something wrong with you, since there was a meaningful possibility the financial system would collapse. When we started buying, Bruce came to me often saying, “I think we’re going too slow,” and then the next day, “I think we’re going too fast.” But that didn’t keep him from investing an average of $450 million per week over the last 15 weeks of 2008. I think Bruce’s ability to grapple with his doubts helped him arrive at the right pace of investment.
“如何应对自己不懂的事”,这个话题让我想起几年前读到的一个说法,我觉得非常重要:智识谦逊。
第一次让我注意到这个说法的文章里有这么一段:
“在人格特质中,‘智识谦逊’一直像个不起眼的角落角色,受到的学术关注远不如自负、敌意这类张扬的特质。但杜克大学的新研究表明,这种少人研究的特质,可能会影响人们在政治、健康等领域的决策能力……作者给出的定义里,智识谦逊是智识傲慢或自负的反面。用大白话说,它接近于思想开明。智识谦逊的人可以有坚定的信念,但他们清楚自己会犯错,也愿意在或大或小的事情上被证明不对,利里说。”(艾莉森·琼斯,《杜克今日》,2017 年 3 月 17 日,着重号为后加)
再说得技术性一点,上面那篇论文的讨论里有几段很有用:
“智识谦逊(IH)这个词有多种定义,但大多数定义都指向同一个核心:它意味着认识到自己的信念……”
The topic of dealing with what you don’t know brings me to a phrase I came across a few years ago and think is very important: intellectual humility. Here’s part of the article that first brought it to my attention: “Intellectual humility” has been something of a wallflower among personality traits, receiving far less scholarly attention than such brash qualities as egotism or hostility. Yet this little-studied characteristic may influence people’s decision-making abilities in politics, health and other arenas, says new research from Duke University. . . . As defined by the authors, intellectual humility is the opposite of intellectual arrogance or conceit. In common parlance, it resembles open-mindedness. Intellectually humble people can have strong beliefs, but recognize their fallibility and are willing to be proven wrong on matters large and small, Leary said. (Alison Jones, Duke Today, March 17, 2017, emphasis added) To get a little more technical, here are a couple of useful paragraphs from a discussion of the paper cited above: The term, intellectual humility (IH), has been defined in several ways, but most definitions converge on the notion that IH involves recognizing that one’s beliefs and
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观点可能是错的……对智识谦逊的一些定义还包含其他特征或特质——如低防御性、欣赏他人的智识长处,或亲社会取向……
一种概念化将智识谦逊定义为:认识到某一特定个人信念可能是可错的,同时对该信念证据基础的局限性,以及自身在获取和评估相关信息方面的局限,保持适当的警觉。这一定义为核心特征(认识到自己的信念可能是错的)附加了限定条件,从而将智识谦逊与单纯对自己知识或理解缺乏信心区分开来。智识谦逊与不确定性或低自信的不同之处在于:人们之所以对信念保持试探性态度,恰恰是因为他们意识到支撑这些信念的证据可能有限或有缺陷,他们可能缺乏相关信息,或者他们可能不具备理解和评估证据的专业知识或能力。(《智识谦逊的心理学》,马克·利里,杜克大学,着重号为原文所加)
“对证据基础的局限性保持警觉”(或对未来不确定性所施加的限制保持警觉)是一个非常重要的延伸概念。我在《掌握市场周期》一书中是这样讨论的:
大多数人认为应对未来的方式是就将会发生什么形成一种意见,也许是通过概率分布的方式。我认为实际上有两个要求,而不是一个。除了对将会发生什么持有看法之外,人们还应该对自己看法被证明正确的可能性有一个判断。有些事件可以以相当高的置信度进行预测(例如,某只投资级债券是否会支付其承诺的利息?),有些事件则是不确定的(亚马逊十年后是否仍是在线零售的领导者?),还有些事件完全不可预测(下个月股市是涨还是跌?)。我在这里要表达的是,并非所有预测都应被视为同样可能正确,因此也不应被同等依赖。我认为大多数人对这一点的认识没有达到应有的程度。
简而言之,在选择行动方案并决定下多大注之前,我们必须对自己正确的概率有一个现实的判断。任何对世界、经济或市场将会发生什么确信不疑的人,很可能是在自欺欺人。
这一切归根结底是如何应对不确定性。在我看来,这始于承认不确定性,并对其保持适度的尊重。正如我在今年一月的备忘录《你下注!》中引述安妮·杜克的话:
优秀扑克玩家和优秀决策者的共同之处在于,他们坦然接受世界是一个不确定、不可预测的地方。他们明白自己几乎永远无法确切知道某件事会如何收场。他们拥抱这种不确定性,而不是专注于追求确定,他们试图弄清楚自己有多不确定,对不同结果出现的概率做出最佳猜测。(《下注思维》)
opinions might be incorrect. . . . Some definitions of IH include other features or characteristics – such as low defensiveness, appreciating other people’s intellectual strengths, or a prosocial orientation . . . One conceptualization defines intellectual humility as recognizing that a particular personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to one's own limitations in obtaining and evaluating relevant information. This definition qualifies the core characteristic (recognizing that one’s belief may be wrong) with considerations that distinguish IH from mere lack of confidence in one’s knowledge or understanding. IH can be distinguished from uncertainty or low self-confidence by the degree to which people hold their beliefs tentatively specifically because they are aware that the evidence on which those beliefs are based could be limited or flawed, that they might lack relevant information, or that they may not have the expertise or ability to understand and evaluate the evidence. (The Psychology of Intellectual Humility, Mark Leary, Duke University, emphasis added) “Attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis” (or to the limitations imposed by future uncertainty) is a very important further concept. Here’s how I discussed it in my book Mastering the Market Cycle: Most people think the way to deal with the future is by formulating an opinion as to what’s going to happen, perhaps via a probability distribution. I think there are actually two requirements, not one. In addition to an opinion regarding what’s going to happen, people should have a view on the likelihood that their opinion will prove correct. Some events can be predicted with substantial confidence (e.g., will a given investment grade bond pay the interest it promises?), some are uncertain (will Amazon still be the leader in online retailing in ten years?) and some are entirely unpredictable (will the stock market go up or down next month?) It’s my point here that not all predictions should be treated as equally likely to be correct, and thus they shouldn’t be relied on equally. I don’t think most people are as aware of this as they should be. In short, we have to have a realistic view of the probability that we’re right before we choose a course of action and decide how heavily to bet on it. And anyone who’s sure about what’s going to happen in the world, the economy or the markets is probably deceiving himself. It all comes down to dealing with uncertainty. To me, that starts with acknowledging uncertainty and having an appropriate degree of respect for it. As I quoted Annie Duke this past January, in my memo You Bet!: What good poker players and good decision-makers have in common is their comfort with the world being an uncertain and unpredictable place. They understand that they can almost never know exactly how something will turn out. They embrace that uncertainty and, instead of focusing on being sure, they try to figure out how unsure they are, making their best guess at the chances that different outcomes will occur. (Thinking in Bets)
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简单来说,智识谦逊意味着说出“我不确定”、“对方可能是对的”,甚至“我可能错了”。我认为这是投资者必备的特质;我知道,在我喜欢交往的人身上,这确实是常见的品质。
正如我思考备忘录时常遇到的情况,最近我收到了芝加哥大学的朋友莱斯利·利希滕斯坦一封极其有帮助的来信,将谦逊的概念与当前事件联系起来。她写道:
今天早上,我读了一篇《行为科学家》杂志上由埃里克·安格纳(斯德哥尔摩大学实践哲学教授)撰写的文章,题为《认知谦逊——在疫情中知晓你的极限》,这篇文章让我想到了你和你最近的几篇备忘录。文章以查尔斯·达尔文 1871 年的一句名言开头——“无知比知识更容易滋生自信。”接着写道,“真正的专家不仅了解世界的知识,还知晓自身知识和专长的边界。”(这是莱斯利信中强调的)
我完全同意。总是确定无疑的人并不比永远不确定的人更有帮助。真正的专家,其自信基于理性,与证据的分量相称。
莱斯利的信促使我找到了她引用的原文,发现其中有太多值得分享的内容:
在疫情肆虐之际,知识十分匮乏。我们不知道有多少人感染,也不知道将会有多少人感染。关于如何治疗患者以及如何帮助未感染者预防感染,我们还有许多需要学习。在最佳政策的追求上——无论是医疗、经济还是物资分配——都存在着合理的分歧。尽管全世界的科学家正齐心协力地努力解决这些问题,但最终答案仍遥遥无期。
另一项稀缺的资源,是认识到我们知之甚少……面对新威胁时频频表现出极度自信,在我们显而易见且必然无知的情况下,似乎显得古怪。尽管如此,过度自信的困扰往往在很多时候影响着我们大多数人。这是认知心理学家们的结论,他们已经对这一现象进行了半个世纪系统性的研究。过度自信被称为“所有心理偏见之母……”
重点不在于真正的专家应隐藏他们的信念,或永远不要自信地发言。毕竟,有些信念比其他的更有证据支持,我们不应犹豫,应当直说。关键在于,真正的专家表达自我时带有适度的自信——即基于证据的合理自信……
[将你在电视上听到的与医学统计学家罗伯特·格兰特的一条推文对比]:“我在大学学过这些内容,从事数据分析数十年,撰写了多项 NHS 指南(包括一份针对传染病的),并将这些知识传授给健康专业人士。这正是为什么你们看不到我做任何关于新冠病毒的预测……”
To put it simply, intellectual humility means saying “I’m not sure,” “The other person could be right,” or even “I might be wrong.” I think it’s an essential trait for investors; I know it is in the people I like to associate with. As so often happens when I’m thinking about a memo, I recently got an incredibly helpful note from my friend Leslie Lichtenstein at the University of Chicago, connecting the concept of humility to the current episode. Here’s what she wrote: This morning I read an article from Behavioral Scientist by Erik Angner [professor of practical philosophy at Stockholm University] called “Epistemic Humility – Knowing Your Limits in a Pandemic,” which made me think of you and several of your recent memos. The article opens with a quote from Charles Darwin in 1871 – “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge.” It goes on to say, “Being a true expert involves not only knowing stuff about the world but also knowing the limits of your knowledge and expertise.” (Emphasis in Leslie’s note) I couldn’t agree more. People who are always sure are no more helpful than people who are never sure. The real expert’s confidence is reason-based and proportional to the weight of the evidence. Leslie’s note sent me to the original of the article she cited, and I found so much to share: In the middle of a pandemic, knowledge is in short supply. We don’t know how many people are infected, or how many people will be. We have much to learn about how to treat the people who are sick – and how to help prevent infection in those who aren’t. There’s reasonable disagreement on the best policies to pursue, whether about health care, economics, or supply distribution. Although scientists worldwide are working hard and in concert to address these questions, final answers are some ways away. Another thing that’s in short supply is the realization of how little we know. . . . Frequent expressions of supreme confidence might seem odd in light of our obvious and inevitable ignorance about a new threat. The thing about overconfidence, though, is that it afflicts most of us much of the time. That’s according to cognitive psychologists, who’ve studied the phenomenon systematically for half a century. Overconfidence has been called “the mother of all psychological biases. . . .” The point is not that true experts should withhold their beliefs or that they should never speak with conviction. Some beliefs are better supported by the evidence than others, after all, and we should not hesitate to say so. The point is that true experts express themselves with the proper degree of confidence – meaning with a degree of confidence that’s justified given the evidence. . . . [Compare what you hear on TV against a tweet from medical statistician Robert Grant]: “I’ve studied this stuff at university, done data analysis for decades, written several NHS guidelines (including one for an infectious disease), and taught it to health professionals. That’s why you don’t see me making any coronavirus forecasts. . . .”
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认知谦逊这个概念……是一种智识上的美德。它植根于这样的认识:我们的知识总是暂时且不完整的,并且可能根据新证据而需要修正。格兰特在这种艰难条件下意识到了我们无知的广度;其他角色没有。缺乏认知谦逊是一种恶习,它可能在我们的私人生活和公共政策中造成巨大损害。
校准你的自信程度可能很棘手。正如贾斯汀·克鲁格和戴维·邓宁所强调的,我们的认知技能和元认知技能是交织在一起的。缺乏执行任务所需认知技能的人,通常也缺乏评估自身表现所需的元认知技能。无能者处于双重劣势,因为他们不仅无能,而且很可能对此毫无察觉[加尔布雷思笔下的预测者“不知道自己不知道”]!
这对业余流行病学家有直接启示。如果你自己不具备进行高级流行病学建模所需的技能,你就应该假设自己分不清好模型和坏模型。
……学会区分良莠从未像现在这样重要——从那些除了误导之外几乎什么也不提供的江湖骗子中,分辨出提供有据可查信息的真正专家。可悲的是,后者(江湖骗子)很常见,部分原因是他们在电视和政治中更受欢迎。很难分辨谁是谁。但留意他们的自信程度提供了一个线索。那些在没有获取相关信息以及处理这些信息所需的经验和训练的情况下,却以极度自信表达自己的人,可以稳妥地归类为江湖骗子,直到另行通知为止……
再说一遍,拥有观点并在公开场合表达出来——甚至带着强烈信念——是好的。关键在于,真正的专家与江湖骗子不同,他们表达自己的方式会反映出自身的局限。我们所有希望被认真对待的人,最好都展现出认知谦逊这一美德。(埃里克·安格纳,《行为科学家》,4 月 13 日,强调为原文所加)
我越想越清楚,底线是明确的:
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The concept of epistemic humility is . . . an intellectual virtue. It is grounded in the realization that our knowledge is always provisional and incomplete – and that it might require revision in light of new evidence. Grant appreciates the extent of our ignorance under these difficult conditions; the other characters don’t. A lack of epistemic humility is a vice – and it can cause massive damage both in our private lives and in public policy. Calibrating your confidence can be tricky. As Justin Kruger and David Dunning have emphasized, our cognitive and metacognitive skills are intertwined. People who lack the cognitive skills required to perform a task typically also lack the metacognitive skills required to assess their performance. Incompetent people are at a double disadvantage, since they are not only incompetent but also likely unaware of it [Galbraith’s forecasters “who don’t know they don’t know”!]. This has immediate implications for amateur epidemiologists. If you don’t have the skill set required to do advanced epidemiological modeling yourself, you should assume that you can’t tell good models from bad. . . . it’s never been more important to learn to separate the wheat from the chaff – the experts who offer well-sourced information from the charlatans who offer little but misdirection. The latter are sadly common, in part because they are in greater demand on TV and in politics. It can be hard to tell who’s who. But paying attention to their confidence offers a clue. People who express themselves with extreme confidence without having access to relevant information and the experience and training required to process it can safely be classified among the charlatans until further notice. . . . Again, it is fine and good to have opinions, and to express them in public – even with great conviction. The point is that true experts, unlike charlatans, express themselves in a way that mirrors their limitations. All of us who want to be taken seriously would do well to demonstrate the virtue of epistemic humility. (Erik Angner, Behavioral Scientist, April 13, emphasis added) The more I think about it, the bottom line is clear: • • • • • • • •
世界充满不确定性。
如今的不确定性,比我们这辈子任何时候都更甚。
没人敢说自己对未来的把握远超旁人。
可投资偏偏完全押注未来,投资者躲不开要为此做决定。
信心在投资里不可或缺,但信心过了头,能致命。
话题越大(世界、经济、市场、货币、利率),想获得高人一等的认知就越不可能。
就连我们对小事(公司、行业、证券)的判断,也得受制于对大事的假设,所以同样充满变数。
从容应对不确定性的能力,是最要紧的本事之一。
The world is an uncertain place. It’s more uncertain today than at any other time in our lifetimes. Few people know what the future holds much better than others. And yet investing deals entirely with the future, meaning investors can’t avoid making decisions about it. Confidence is indispensable in investing, but too much of it can be lethal. The bigger the topic (world, economy, markets, currencies and rates), the less possible it is to achieve superior knowledge. Even our decisions about smaller things (companies, industries and securities) have to be conditioned on assumptions regarding the bigger things, so they, too, are uncertain. The ability to deal intelligently with uncertainty is one of the most important skills.
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这样做时,我们应明白自身远见的局限,以及某项预测相对多数而言是否更加可靠或更不可靠。凡是不这么做的人,多半难逃栽跟头的命运。
In doing so, we should understand the limitations on our foresight and whether a given forecast is more or less dependable than most. Anyone who fails to do so is probably riding for a fall.
正如尼尔·欧文在第 4 页所引用的文章中写道:在这样的不确定性中,对五年后甚至五个月后的世界经济秩序做出过于自信的预测,实属愚蠢。或许 250 年前伏尔泰说得最透彻:怀疑并非愉快的状态,但确定无疑则是荒谬的。
As Neil Irwin wrote in the article cited on page 4: It would be foolish, amid such uncertainty, to make overly confident predictions about how the world economic order will look in five years, or even five months. Or maybe Voltaire said it best 250 years ago: Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd.
May 11, 2020
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