你打赌!

2020 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 7396 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

You Bet!

You Bet!

正如我在过去的备忘录中写过的,1963 年,我作为沃顿商学院新生读的第一本书给我留下了难以磨灭的印象。那本书是 C. 杰克逊·格雷森(C. Jackson Grayson, Jr.)所著的《不确定条件下的决策:油气经营者的钻井决策》(Decisions Under Uncertainty: Drilling Decisions by Oil and Gas Operators)——此人 1971 年出任尼克松政府抑制通胀努力中的“价格沙皇”一职。

我从格雷森的书里得到的最大、最持久的收获——也是我上大学时记住的第一件事——是一个观察:你无法从结果来判断决策的质量。这个领悟对 17 岁的我产生了深远影响,也是我理解世界运行方式的第一块关键基石。

正如格雷森所解释的,你根据自己已知的信息做出尽可能好的决策,但决策的成败会受到(a)你可能缺少的相关信息,以及(b)运气或随机性的严重影响。由于这两个因素,深思熟虑的决策可能失败,而糟糕的决策可能成功。虽然看起来有违直觉,但最好的决策者未必是成功次数最多的人,而是拥有最佳流程和判断力的人。这两者可能相去甚远,尤其是在少数几次试验中,可能根本无法分辨谁是谁。

到了我人生的这个阶段——如果不是更早的话——一个人应该已经认清自己的优势和劣势,并把活动向优势倾斜。我得出结论,我的优势包括以下能力:

As I’ve written in past memos, I have an indelible recollection of the first book I read as a Wharton freshman in 1963. The book was Decisions Under Uncertainty: Drilling Decisions by Oil and Gas Operators by C. Jackson Grayson, Jr. (who in 1971 would take on the role of “price czar” in the Nixon administration’s efforts to get inflation under control). The best and most lasting thing I took away from Grayson’s book – and the first thing I remember learning in college – was the observation that you can’t tell the quality of a decision from the outcome. This revelation had a profound influence on me as a 17-year-old and represented the first critical building block in my understanding of how the world works. As Grayson explained, you make the best decision you can based on what you know, but the success of your decision will be heavily influenced by (a) relevant information you may lack and (b) luck or randomness. Because of these two factors, well-thought-out decisions may fail, and poor decisions may succeed. While it might seem counterintuitive, the best decision-maker isn’t necessarily the person with the most successes, but rather the one with the best process and judgment. The two can be far from the same, and especially over a small number of trials, it can be impossible to know who’s who. By my stage in life – if not well before – one should have figured out his strengths and weaknesses and tilted his activities toward the former. I’ve concluded that my strengths include the ability to:      

学会如何提问,

有条理地整理信息,权衡利弊,

清楚自己不懂什么,

接受未来结果无法预知这一事实,

用概率思维思考未来,

并综合以上这些做出决策(尽管远非每次都正确)。

frame questions, logically organize data and weigh pros and cons, know what I don’t know, accept that future outcomes aren’t predictable, think about the future probabilistically, and make decisions incorporating all of the above (although far from always correctly).

同样极为重要的是,我成功内化了格雷森关于决策质量的观点(从而偶尔能与自己不成功的决策和平共处)。这一系列特质为我从事投资事业做好了准备……也让我在概率游戏中找到乐趣。

Also very important has been the ability to internalize Grayson’s point about decision quality (and thus live with my unsuccessful decisions from time to time). This set of attributes equipped me for a career in investing . . . and for finding enjoyment in games of chance.

我作为赌徒的一生

虽然在过去的一些备忘录里提到过赌博,但游戏在我生活中扮演的角色可能远超你所了解。由于投资与赌博之间存在诸多关联,我尊敬的许多投资者都爱玩二十一点、扑克或双陆棋。你或许会乐于了解我在这一方面的过去。

My Life as a Gambler Although I’ve made reference to them in some past memos, games have played a bigger part in my life than you probably know. Because of the many connections between investing and gambling, many of the investors I respect play blackjack, poker or backgammon. You might enjoy learning about my past in this regard.

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

和大多数同龄人一样,我小时候花了不少时间玩纸牌游戏,比如“战争”和“老处女”(那时候没有视频可看,也没有电子游戏可玩,而我父母认为电视是有害的影响,必须严格控制)。我第一次接触“成人”游戏和赌博,是在大约 12 岁时玩金拉米牌。和三个最铁的哥们儿打牌打了好几个小时,这为我一生的生活方式定下了基调。

大学二年级(1964-65 年)时,兄弟会宿舍里的牌局占掉了我多得让人不好意思的时间。每个学期下午玩不同的游戏,包括金拉米、皮诺克、克里比奇、红心、卡西诺、叫价惠斯特、黑桃和汤克(其中很多后来都进了休闲娱乐史的垃圾堆)。大多数晚上则用来打扑克。(你完全有理由怀疑我什么时候学习。实际上我也想不起来那一年学了什么。)后来到了高年级,我终于认真学习时,又迷上了同样需要严肃对待的桥牌。

下一个大跨步发生在 1970-72 年,我开始滑雪,并在山间小屋认识了双陆棋。虽然不玩棋的人大概会觉得双陆棋不值一提,但和桥牌一样,它需要大量思考,而且通过学习和练习,可以练出很高的水平。后面再细说。

你可能知道,1980 年我让花旗银行把我调到了洛杉矶。这件事改变我人生的一个重要方面是,让我结识了好友布鲁斯·纽伯格,他的头脑天生适合处理游戏中的赔率和策略(投资上也是如此)。过去 40 年,布鲁斯和我打双陆棋和金拉米,享受了成千上万小时的乐趣。这么多年下来,我们的输赢大概差不多扯平,就算有赢家,赚到的时薪也按便士算。我们从中得到的只有乐趣。我们的座右铭是:“唯一比输更糟的事,是不玩。”

我也喜欢偶尔去赌场玩几把,有机会就打打二十一点。二十一点里,你和庄家各发两张牌。你可以按自己的意愿“要牌”或“停牌”——从牌堆里继续要牌,或者不要。庄家没有选择权,他必须根据自己牌的总点数来决定是要牌(或被迫停牌)。最后,谁的点数更接近 21 且不超过 21,谁就赢。

每年都有很多人去赌场玩二十一点输钱,却对怎么打好一窍不通。他们只靠运气和直觉,还说自己“就是图个乐子”。但其实有些操作是可以学着做的——主要是关于什么时候要牌、什么时候停牌——这能改善你的结果。这些操作被整理成了所谓的“基本策略”。除此之外,进一步提高胜率的关键在于,和大多数碰运气的游戏不同,二十一点里未来各手的结果并不独立于过去各手的结果。之所以如此,是因为庄家会连续发好几手牌,而打过的牌不会放回他发牌用的“牌靴”。因此,哪些牌已经打出去,直接决定了接下来还剩下哪些牌。如果你能通过“算牌”记住前者,就能对后者有所掌握。但由于庄家的牌靴里可能装着六副或八副 52 张的牌,记住打过的牌本身就需要非常高超的技巧。

Like most people my age, I spent time as a child playing card games like “War” and “Old Maid” (there were no videos to watch or video games to play, and my parents considered television a pernicious influence that had to be strictly rationed). My first brush with “grown-up” games and betting involved gin rummy starting around age 12. Hours spent playing with my three closest buddies established a pattern for life. When I was a sophomore in college (1964-65), card games at the fraternity house took up an embarrassingly large fraction of my time. A different game occupied our afternoons each semester, including gin, pinochle, cribbage, hearts, casino, bid whist, spades and tonk (many of these have since been relegated to the dustbin of leisure-time history). Most evenings were devoted to poker. (You’re right to wonder when I studied. I actually can’t remember doing much of it that year.) And when I eventually got serious about my studies as an upper-classman, I took up the commensurately serious game of bridge. The next big step came in 1970-72, when I began to ski and was introduced to backgammon back at the lodge. Although probably dismissed by non-game players as trivial, backgammon, like bridge, is a game that requires a great deal of thought and one where study and practice can lead to a very high level of skill. More on it later. As you may know, I got Citibank to move me to Los Angeles in 1980. One of the big ways this changed my life was that it led me to meet my great friend Bruce Newberg, whose mind is perfect for handling the odds and strategies involved in games (as it is for investing). Bruce and I have had thousands of hours of enjoyment playing backgammon and gin over the last 40 years. We’re probably about even financially after all that time, and if not, the winner’s hourly rate of pay is in pennies. All we get out of it is fun. Our motto is, “The only thing worse than losing is not playing.” I also enjoy visiting a casino once in a while, and the opportunity to play blackjack. In blackjack, you and the dealer are each dealt two cards. You can “hit” or “stay” as you choose – take additional cards from the deck or decline to do so. The dealer has no choice; he’s required to hit (or forced to stay) depending on his card total. In the end, whoever’s total is closer to 21 without going over is the winner. Lots of people go to casinos every year and lose money at blackjack without knowing the first thing about how to play successfully. Instead, they count on luck and hunches and say they “just play to have fun.” But there are actions you can learn to take in blackjack – mostly regarding when to hit or stay – that will improve your results. These have been codified into what’s called “basic strategy.” Beyond that, the key to further improving your probability of winning lies in the fact that, unlike most games of chance, in blackjack the outcomes of future hands aren’t independent of the outcomes of past hands. This is so because in blackjack the dealer deals several hands in succession without returning the cards that have been played to the “shoe” from which he deals. Thus, which cards have already been dealt directly determines which cards remain to be dealt. If you can track the former through “card-counting,” you can have an idea about the latter. But since the dealer’s shoe can contain six or eight 52-card decks, keeping track of the cards played in itself requires exceptional skill.

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

爱德华·索普写了一本划时代的著作,书名是《击败庄家》。由于赢的钱太多,他被赌场下了禁入令,只好转向“正经”营生。于是,他研究起日本股票的认股权证,并开创了套利这门技艺。我最后一次见到埃德时,他住在纽波特海滩,过着田园般的生活,即使没有西装领带,也不用按时坐班,照样风生水起。

但让我们回到双陆棋。在这项游戏中,两位对手——一位顺时针移动,另一位逆时针——试图将自己的棋子绕过棋盘,同时阻止对方前进,并率先将棋子全部移出棋盘。每位玩家前进的步数由掷出的一对骰子决定。如果你对骰子点数的概率分布一无所知,而是依靠运气、直觉或自以为的天赋,那将是彻底的灾难。(事实上,双陆棋中最重要的技巧,就是掌握这些概率,并据此根据你的局面做出正确的行动。)

最近,布鲁斯通过钻研,在双陆棋上已经远超我,所以我们现在主要改玩金拉米。在金拉米中,每位玩家发 10 张牌,通过轮流从牌堆抓牌和弃牌,你试图将它们组成“组合”——三张或四张同点数的牌(比如 9-9-9),或者同花色的顺子(比如黑桃 4-5-6-7)。随着牌局进行,你可以选择“敲牌”(如果未组合的牌点数之和小于某个数),或者尝试“金拉米”(10 张牌全部组合),后者得分更高——除非你的对手先敲门或先成金。

顺带一提:当我对学生讲话时,我常说:“对我来说,让投资变得迷人的地方在于,没有任何一个动作是保证有效的,也没有哪一种策略永远稳赢。”为了说明这一点,我接着讲:“就像金拉米,有时敲牌是最佳选择,有时你该追求成金。”而回应我的只有一脸茫然。如今很少有年轻人玩牌了,听说过金拉米的人更是少之又少。

再顺带一提。虽然我不认为这些是刻意为之的结果,但我作为赌徒的一生总是表现出两个特点:

Edward Thorp wrote the definitive book on this, called Beat the Dealer. When he won too much money, Ed was banned from the casinos and had to turn to “straight” pursuits. As a result, he studied warrants on Japanese stocks and developed the art of arbitrage. When I last saw Ed he was living an idyllic life in Newport Beach, prospering even in the absence of suits, ties or regular office hours. But let’s return to backgammon. In this game, two opponents – one moving clockwise and the other counter-clockwise – try to bring their pieces around the board while simultaneously preventing the other from doing so, and then be the first to take them off the board. Each player’s ability to move forward is determined by rolling a pair of dice. It’s a total disaster if you’re ignorant of the probabilities governing rolls of the dice and instead rely on luck, gut instinct or what you think is your innate skill. (In fact, the most important skill in backgammon consists of knowing these probabilities and thus what actions to take given your position.) More recently, through study Bruce has gotten too good for me at backgammon, so now we’re mostly down to gin. In gin, each player is dealt 10 cards, and by alternatingly picking from the deck and discarding, you try to form them into “melds” of three or four cards of the same kind (such as 9-9-9) or in a run of the same suit (such as 4-5-6-7 of spades). As the hand goes on, you can opt to “knock” (if your un-melded cards add up to less than a certain number) or try to get “gin” (all 10 cards melded), which pays off in more points – unless your opponent knocks or gets gin first. An aside: when I speak to students, I often say, “For me, the thing that makes investing fascinating is the fact that there’s no action you can take that is sure to work, no strategy that’s always a winner.” To illustrate, I go on: “It’s like gin. Sometimes knocking is the best thing to do, and sometimes you should play for gin.” And all I get are blank stares. Few young people play cards anymore, and even fewer have ever heard of gin. Another aside. While I don’t think they’re the result of conscious decisions, my life as a gambler has always exhibited two characteristics:  

First, I haven’t made a serious study of the games I play. I feel if I want to work, I can go to

the office.

And second, I only play for small stakes. Some people dream of big killings, and some like

the frisson attached to risking large sums. I’ve never felt that my enjoyment increased with

the amount of money on the table. I play for fun and to test my decision-making, not to win

big money. (Point of reference: back around 1990, I was visiting Ric Kayne at Lake Tahoe

and he said, “Tonight I’m going to take you to the casino and make a man of you. We’re

going to play until you win or lose real money!” So he called the casino host and asked him

to arrange a $25,000 line of credit for me. The host called back a few minutes later and said,

“Sorry, Ric, I can’t justify a $25,000 line for someone whose average bet is $11.”)

First, I haven’t made a serious study of the games I play. I feel if I want to work, I can go to the office. And second, I only play for small stakes. Some people dream of big killings, and some like the frisson attached to risking large sums. I’ve never felt that my enjoyment increased with the amount of money on the table. I play for fun and to test my decision-making, not to win big money. (Point of reference: back around 1990, I was visiting Ric Kayne at Lake Tahoe and he said, “Tonight I’m going to take you to the casino and make a man of you. We’re going to play until you win or lose real money!” So he called the casino host and asked him to arrange a $25,000 line of credit for me. The host called back a few minutes later and said, “Sorry, Ric, I can’t justify a $25,000 line for someone whose average bet is $11.”)

那兜兜转转回到原点又怎么说呢?我这辈子做得最对的一件事,就是从小教儿子安德鲁玩牌。这下我打金拉米和双陆棋可有固定对手了。最甜美的回忆莫过于 1992 年他五岁时,我们坐在大熊州立公园的木头上玩“打仗”牌。这传统还延续着;我那五岁的孙女罗茜,现在成了我玩“打仗”的新对手。再美好不过了!

What about coming full circle? One of the best things I ever did was to teach my son Andrew to be a game player at an early age. I now have a built-in opponent for gin and backgammon. There can be few sweeter memories than sitting on a log with him at Big Bear State Park playing War in 1992, when he was five. And it continues; my five-year-old granddaughter, Rosie, is my new opponent at War. There’s nothing better!

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

3

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版权所有,保留一切权利。

All Rights Reserved

《下注思维》

在以前的一份备忘录里,我讲过一段我担任买方分析师时的往事,当时我在第一国民城市银行跟踪商业设备行业。1970 年,银行里一位投资组合经理问我,我认为哪家券商的施乐公司分析师最出色。“嗯,”我回答,“最认同我观点的那个人,是某某。”

换句话说,我们往往尊重那些和我们想法一致的人。你听过有人说“我觉得鲍勃是个天才,他觉得我的观点全错”吗?很少有人会这么说。不,我们总是高估那些观点与我们如出一辙的人。

这让我想到这份备忘录的灵感来源:一本叫《下注思维:在没有全部事实时做出更明智决策》的书,作者是安妮·杜克。(这本书 2018 年出版时,我为封底写了推荐语。)杜克完成了宾夕法尼亚大学心理学博士的课程和论文,但没拿到学位。之后很多年,她是最知名的女性职业扑克选手,锦标赛奖金超过 400 万美元。我度假时重读杜克的书,发现她关于扑克和一般决策的许多想法和我不谋而合,于是动了笔,写你现在读的这份备忘录。下面摘录几段,让你明白我为什么被它吸引(着重号为我所加):

随着时间推移,那些世界级扑克选手教会我理解下注究竟是什么:对一个不确定未来的决策。……

下注思维始于认识到只有两件事决定我们人生的走向:决策的质量和运气。学会区分这两者,正是下注思维的全部要义。……

每一手牌的结果都即时反馈你的决策表现如何。但这是种棘手的反馈,因为输赢只是决策质量的粗略信号。你可能靠运气赢牌,也可能因运气输牌。……

一个决策伟大,不在于它有伟大的结果。伟大的决策来自良好的过程,而这个过程必须包含如实呈现我们自身认知状态的尝试。这种认知状态,归根结底是某种“我不确定”的变体。……

……我们必须承认,没有哪种策略能让我们变成完全理性的行动者。此外,我们尽可以做出最好的决策,仍然得不到想要的结果。提升决策质量,是提高好结果发生的概率,而不是保证它们。……

[在生活中]我们被劝阻说“我不知道”或“我不确定”。我们把这些话看作含糊、无用甚至逃避。但坦然接受“我不确定”,是成为更优秀决策者的关键一步。我们必须学会与“不知道”和平相处。……

Thinking in Bets In a past memo, I told a story from my days as a buy-side analyst following the business equipment industry for First National City Bank. In 1970, one of the bank’s portfolio managers asked me whom I considered to be the best brokerage-house analyst on Xerox. “Well,” I answered, “the one who most agrees with me is so-and-so.” In other words, we tend to respect people who think like we do. Did you ever hear someone say, “I think Bob’s a genius, and he thinks my views are all wrong”? That’s something few people would ever say. No, we tend to think highly of people whose opinions mirror ours. And that brings me to the source of the inspiration for this memo: a book called Thinking in Bets: Making Smarter Decisions When You Don’t Have All the Facts by Annie Duke. (I provided a blurb for the dust jacket when it was published in 2018.) Duke completed the coursework and dissertation for a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania but stopped short of receiving her degree, and for many years she was the best-known female professional poker player (with over $4 million of tournament winnings). I was rereading Duke’s book while on vacation, and so many of her thoughts on poker and on decision-making in general agreed with mine that I became motivated to start on the memo you’re reading now. Here are some excerpts that will show you why I was drawn to it [emphasis added]: Over time, those world-class poker players taught me to understand what a bet really is: a decision about an uncertain future. . . . Thinking in bets starts with recognizing that there are exactly two things that determine how our lives turn out: the quality of our decisions and luck. Learning to recognize the difference between the two is what thinking in bets is all about. . . . The result of each hand provides immediate feedback on how your decisions are faring. But it’s a tricky kind of feedback because winning and losing are only loose signals of decision quality. You can win lucky hands and lose unlucky ones. . . . What makes a decision great is not that it has a great outcome. A great decision is the result of a good process, and that process must include an attempt to accurately represent our own state of knowledge. That state of knowledge, in turn, is some variation of “I’m not sure.” . . . . . . we must recognize that no strategy can turn us into perfectly rational actors. In addition, we can make the best possible decisions and still not get the result we want. Improving decision quality is about increasing our chances of good outcomes, not guaranteeing them. . . . We are discouraged [in life] from saying “I don’t know” or “I’m not sure.” We regard these expressions as vague, unhelpful and even evasive. But getting comfortable with “I’m not sure” is a vital step in being a better decision-maker. We have to make peace with not knowing. . . .

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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优秀的扑克玩家与优秀的决策者有一个共同点:他们坦然接受世界充满不确定性和不可预测性。他们明白,自己几乎永远无法确切预知事情的结果。他们拥抱这种不确定性,不执着于追求肯定,而是努力弄清自己有多不确定,对不同结果发生的概率做出最佳猜测……

任何领域的专家相比新手都会占有优势。但无论是老手还是新手,都无法确定下一张翻牌会是什么样子。老手只是猜得更准罢了……

读安妮·杜克的《对赌》没多久,你就会清楚她与杰克·格雷森一样,都对不确定性下的决策感兴趣。杜克在扑克桌上寻找实际应用场景,而格雷森则在油田中探索。但两人都在研究同一个问题:面对不完整的信息和不确定的结果,该如何做出决策。这就引出了我接下来要谈的投资话题……以及这份备忘录。

What good poker players and good decision-makers have in common is their comfort with the world being an uncertain and unpredictable place. They understand that they can almost never know exactly how something will turn out. They embrace that uncertainty and, instead of focusing on being sure, they try to figure out how unsure they are, making their best guess at the chances that different outcomes will occur. . . . An expert in any field will have an advantage over a rookie. But neither the veteran nor the rookie can be sure what the next flip will look like. The veteran will just have a better guess. . . . You don’t have to read far in Thinking in Bets before it becomes clear that Annie Duke shares Jack Grayson’s interest in decision-making under uncertainty. Duke looked for real-world applications at the poker table, and Grayson in the oil patch. But both worked on how to make decisions when faced with imperfect information and uncertain outcomes. That brings me to the subject of investing . . . and this memo.

解析赌博的世界

不太熟悉游戏、或者从不琢磨游戏的人,多半以为它们全是同一主题的变体。但事实上,差异非常大。我想点出这些差异,以便接下来在赌博和投资之间建立一个有效的类比。关键是,游戏在三个基本维度上各不相同:信息的可得性、运气和技巧。

有些游戏(并非全部)要求玩家面对不确定性。你或对手谁会赢——或者你该采取什么行动——可能取决于你无从得知的信息,对这类信息你至多只能推测或猜测。因此,有些游戏里存在关键的“隐藏信息”,有些则没有。在扑克、二十一点和金拉米中,你看不到对手手里攥着什么牌。但下棋和玩双陆棋时,一切都明摆着:棋盘上棋子的位置。什么都没有隐藏。这显然是个重大差异。在没有隐藏信息的地方,游戏就只剩下另外两个要素。

条件设定好之后(牌已发好,或棋子已摆在棋盘上),还有另一个不确定性来源。有些游戏中,后续发展受运气左右,有些则不受。拿我刚才说的两种不含隐藏信息的游戏——国际象棋和双陆棋——来举例。在国际象棋里,没有运气这回事——没有骰子可掷,也没有牌可抽;关键变量是对手选择走的每一步。(我猜倒是有一个运气成分:你碰上的对手水平有多高?)

双陆棋则不同,玩家能走的步数完全由他掷出的骰子点数决定。而在牌类游戏中,他和对手抽到什么牌也全凭运气。有时这些事情完全是未知数——纯属随机——而另一些时候,虽然结果无法确定预测,却能估算出概率。

Parsing the World of Gambling People who aren’t very familiar with games or who don’t dwell on them probably think they’re all variations on the same theme. But actually there are big differences. I want to touch on them so I can go on to create an effective analogy between gaming/gambling and investing. Importantly, games vary in three primary dimensions: information availability, luck and skill. Some games (but not all) require players to deal with uncertainty. Whether you or your opponent will win – or what action you should take – might hinge on information that’s not available to you, and about which you can make inferences or guesses at best. Thus in some games, there’s important “hidden information,” and in others there isn’t. In poker, blackjack and gin you don’t know what cards your opponent is holding. But in chess and backgammon, everything’s plain to see: the position of the playing pieces on the board. Nothing is hidden. Obviously this is a big difference. Where no information is hidden, the game is reduced to the other two elements. After the conditions have been set (the cards have been dealt or the pieces are in their positions on the board), there’s another source of uncertainty. In some games subsequent developments will be influenced by luck, and in some they won’t. Take the two games I said don’t involve hidden information: chess and backgammon. In chess, there’s no such thing as luck – no dice to throw or cards to draw; the key variable is the moves your opponent chooses to make. (I guess there is one element of luck: how skillful is the opponent you’ve drawn?) In backgammon, on the other hand, the moves a player gets to make are entirely determined by what numbers come up when he rolls the dice. And in card games, what cards he and his opponent draw is subject to luck. Sometimes these things are total unknowns – a matter of sheer randomness – and in others, while the outcome can’t be predicted with certainty, probabilities can be assigned. 

打个比方,玩二十一点时,只要我们记下已经出过的牌,就能对接下来会出现的牌有些了解。

In blackjack, for example, we can know something about the cards that will come out in the future if we can keep track of the ones that already have been played.

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而在双陆棋中,我们确切知道掷骰子每一种可能结果的概率:在大量掷骰次数下,数字七出现的概率为 16.7%(掷骰子所有 36 种可能结果中有 6 种),而数字十二出现的概率仅为 2.8%(36 种结果中有 1 种)。当然,即使我们知道这些概率,我们依然无法预知任何单次掷骰会出现哪个数字。

And in backgammon, we know with absolute certainty the probability of every possible result of rolling the dice: over a large number of rolls, the number seven will come up 16.7% of the time (six of the 36 possible outcomes on a roll of the dice), and the number twelve will come up only 2.8% of the time (one out of the 36). Of course, even if we know the probabilities, we still don’t know which number will come up on any one roll.

最后,在某些游戏中技巧很重要,而在另一些游戏中则不然。在我目前讨论的所有游戏中——国际象棋、双陆棋、扑克和 gin——都涉及技巧(尽管难度各异)。包含或不包含隐藏信息的游戏都可能涉及技巧,受到运气影响或不受影响的重要比赛也可能涉及技巧。

但技巧并非在所有游戏或赌博中都起作用。轮盘赌和幸运转盘是纯粹靠运气或机会的游戏。结果完全由根本无法预测的随机事件决定,比如轮盘停止旋转时小球会落入哪个格子。由于无法预测未来走向,这里就无技巧可言:只有运气。

Finally, in some games skill is important, and in others it isn’t. There’s skill (albeit with varying degrees of difficulty) in all the games I’ve discussed so far: chess, backgammon, poker and gin. Games with and without hidden information can entail skill, and games affected and unaffected by luck can entail skill. But the role of skill isn’t universal in games/gambling. Roulette and wheel-of-fortune are games of pure chance or luck. The outcome is entirely a matter of random events that can’t be predicted at all, like which slot in a roulette wheel the ball will fall into when the wheel stops spinning. And since there’s no ability to predict future developments, there’s no such thing as skill: only luck. 

1980 年代初,我常和一位已故的朋友去拉斯维加斯。他在轮盘赌上花费了大量时间(和金钱),那玩意儿其实就是竖着的轮盘。我常对他说,他是“全世界最厉害的轮盘赌高手”。因为他真觉得玩这个有技巧可言,所以始终没听懂我在开玩笑。

有个更妙的例子是 punto banco,百家乐的一种玩法。维基百科上说,“在 punto banco 中,每位玩家的每一步都由发到的牌决定。”也就是说,玩家根本不用做任何决策,自然谈不上什么决策技巧。你坐下,下注,拿牌,然后就是赢或输。有一种说法是,百家乐是为一个笨到学不会任何游戏的国王发明的,所以特意设计成无需决策……也因而毫无技巧可言。

In the early 1980s, I used to go to Las Vegas with a now-departed friend. He spent a lot of time (and money) on wheel-of-fortune, which is nothing but vertical roulette. I used to tell him he was “the world’s greatest wheel-of-fortune player.” Since he thought there actually was such a thing as playing the game well, he never got the joke. There’s a very interesting example in punto banco, a form of baccarat. As Wikipedia says, “In punto banco, each player’s moves are forced by the cards the player is dealt.” That is, there are no decisions to make, so clearly no such thing as skill in decision-making. You sit down, place your bet, receive your cards, and either win or lose. One version of history says baccarat was invented for the enjoyment of a king who wasn’t smart enough to learn to play games; thus one was developed that required no decisions . . . and thus entailed no skill.

注意以上所述的不同类型的博弈:

Note from the above the different types of games:    

无隐藏信息,无运气,靠技巧。(国际象棋)

无隐藏信息,靠运气,靠技巧。(双陆棋)

无隐藏信息,靠运气,无技巧。(轮盘赌)

有隐藏信息,靠运气,靠技巧。(二十一点、扑克)

No hidden information, no luck, skill. (Chess) No hidden information, luck, skill. (Backgammon) No hidden information, luck, no skill. (Roulette) Hidden information, luck, skill. (Blackjack, poker)

现在我们可以深入分析了。以下几点观察很重要:

Now we can drill down. Here are some important observations:    

没有技能涉足的地方,结果只能完全依赖运气。但即便有技能参与,运气仍可能发挥作用。运气的存在并不必然排除技能的角色。实际上,在未来的不确定性中做出明智决策,正是技能的最高境界之一。这正是格雷森和杜克著作所探讨的核心。同样,巧妙处理隐藏信息的能力,也必须建立在技能之上。

Where there’s no skill involved, the outcome has to depend entirely on luck. But even if skill is involved, luck can still play a role. The presence of luck doesn’t necessarily preclude a role for skill. In fact, making intelligent decisions when future events are uncertain is one of the greatest forms of skill. It’s what Grayson’s and Duke’s books are all about. Likewise, the ability to deal intelligently with hidden information has to be based on skill.

构建这套分类框架,不仅让我有机会给不玩游戏的人做点科普,也顺带为对比投资提供了一个参照系(你要是还没看出来,我这话就是冲着这个说的)。

Creating this taxonomy, or “scheme of classification,” not only allows me a chance to educate nongame-players, but it also provides a framework for a comparison to investing (if you hadn’t noticed).

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投资与赌博有何相似之处?

隐藏信息、运气和技巧都可能影响投资结果。以涉及上市公司的主动投资为例,这三者都会参与其中。

How Is Investing Like Gambling? Hidden information, luck and skill can play a part in investing. In active investing involving public companies, for example, all three are involved. 

显然,没人能掌握所有相关事实。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)力求确保所有投资者能平等获取信息,但不一定是完整的信息。比如,投资者要等到公司 5 月份公布业绩,才能知道其第一季度的发展情况。而在药物试验和测试结果公之于众之前,任何人都不该事先知晓。

运气——随机、难以预测、常常来自外部的因素——无时无刻不在影响公司和它们的股票。许多方面的企业表现和盈利能力都可能受天气等影响。比如,转播世界大赛的电视台,如果对阵双方来自大城市而非小市场,广告收入往往会更高。

最后,卓越的投资者具备更出色的技能,能更好地评估收入和利润潜力、判断我们所处的周期位置、衡量资产价格的合理性及其提供的安全边际。没有人能永远判断准确,但卓越的投资者比大多数人更常做到。

Clearly, no one knows all the relevant facts. The SEC tries to make sure all investors have equal access to information, but not necessarily complete access. For example, investors won’t know about first-quarter developments at a company until it reports earnings in May. And no one is supposed to know the results of drug trials and beta tests until they’re made public. Luck – random, unpredictable, often-exogenous events – affects companies and their stocks all the time. Many aspects of corporate performance and profitability can be influenced by weather, for example. And the TV network carrying the World Series is likely to enjoy much greater ad revenue if the teams playing come from major markets rather than small ones. Finally, the superior investor has the skill required to better assess revenue and profit potential, where we stand in the cycle, the fairness of an asset’s price and the margin of safety it affords. No one gets these things right all the time, but the superior investor does so more often than most.

并非所有投资都需要同时具备这三要素,甚至都不需要具备其中任何一个。以指数投资为例。指数基金经理的职责,就是让收益与所跟踪的指数保持一致。

Not all investing, however, entails all – or necessarily any – of the three elements. Take, for example, index investing. The index fund manager’s job is to produce the same return as the relevant index.   

不存在所谓隐藏信息。投资者要取得成功,唯一需要掌握的信息,就是所投指数的构成,而这方面毫无神秘可言。

同样,也不存在运气。影响指数中证券的力量,对一只构建得当的指数基金,会产生完全相同的效应。

最后,也谈不上技巧。只要一台程序编写得当的电脑,就能让基金组合紧跟指数,这样的电脑并不难找。

There’s no such thing as hidden information. The only information the investor needs to succeed at his job relates to the composition of the index in question, and there’s no mystery in that regard. Likewise, there’s no luck. The forces that influence the securities in the index will have exactly the same influence on a properly constructed index fund. And finally, there’s no skill. All it takes is a well-programmed computer to keep the fund’s portfolio in line with the index, and that isn’t hard to find.

值得深入探讨投资技能这个问题。有效市场假说认为:(a)市场是“有效的”,(b)因此资产定价合理,既没有便宜货,也没有被高估的资产,(c)结果就是,不存在技能或“阿尔法”发挥的空间——阿尔法被定义为利用定价错误实现超额收益的能力。传统主动投资的观念无视这一假说,认为投资就像玩二十一点,也就是说,有些人可能比其他人玩得更好。但如果有效市场假说成立,投资就像轮盘赌,投资者的回报不受自己控制,完全取决于运气,或者说是市场的表现。(当然,投资组合相对市场的回报可以被放大或缩小,这取决于组合对市场的相对敏感度,也就是“贝塔”。这就引出了另一个问题:投资者是否有能力及时地调高或调低贝塔。)

在大多数市场中,效率的概念既不是绝对真理,也不是完全不适用的。有些市场可能比别的市场效率更低,因此技能在有些市场可能比在别的市场更为重要。在技能高度重要的市场,人们称之为“阿尔法”市场。而在

It’s worth delving into the matter of investing skill. The efficient market hypothesis posits that (a) markets are “efficient,” (b) thus assets are priced fairly and there are no bargains or overpriced assets, and (c) as a result, there’s no scope for skill or “alpha,” defined as the ability to outperform by capitalizing on mispricings. The traditional view of active investing, which ignores this hypothesis, is that investing is like blackjack, meaning it’s possible for some people to be better at it than others. But if the efficient market hypothesis is right, investing is like roulette, with investors’ returns beyond their control and solely a function of luck, or what the market does. (Of course, a portfolio’s return can be amplified or diminished relative to the market’s return by the portfolio’s relative sensitivity to it: the “beta.” And that leads to the question of whether investors have the skill to move beta up and down in a timely fashion.) In most markets, the concept of efficiency is neither an absolute truth nor completely inapplicable. Some markets may be less efficient than others; thus skill may be more relevant in some markets than in others. Where skill is highly relevant, markets are called “alpha” markets. Where

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不是这样——投资组合的回报,很大程度上取决于市场的回报,以及组合对市场波动的敏感度——这类市场叫“贝塔”市场。显然,搞清楚你身处哪一类市场,至关重要。

多年来,人们(不管有意无意)把股市当成“阿尔法”市场来对待,股票组合基金经理因此能凭自己的努力收取可观的管理费。但久而久之,人们越来越发现,大多数主动型投资者都没法持续跑赢市场指数(尤其是扣除费用之后)。这说明缺乏技巧:被动模仿指数,也能拿到同样甚至更好的结果。投资者由此认定,在贝塔市场里不再为阿尔法买单,这正是被动投资壮大的主因。在一个根本不存在技巧可言的游戏里,何必花钱请人替你玩?

说到底怎么看?在我看来,我感兴趣的主动投资——最好是在效率较低的市场里——恰恰包含前面讨论的全部三个要素:隐藏信息、运气和技巧。因此它更像扑克和二十一点,而不是国际象棋。我正是沿着这条思路往下讲的。

it’s not – and the portfolio return is mostly a function of the market’s return and the portfolio’s sensitivity to market movements – they’re called “beta” markets. Obviously it’s important to figure out which type of market you’re working in. For years, people (whether consciously or not) treated the stock market as an “alpha” market, and equity portfolio managers were able to charge substantial management fees for their efforts. But over time, it was increasingly observed that most active investors were incapable of consistently outperforming the market indices (especially after fees). That meant skill was lacking: you could get the same result or better by passively emulating an index. Investors concluded that they would no longer pay for alpha in a beta market, and that’s the main reason for the growth of passive investing. Why pay someone to play for you in a game where there’s no such thing as skill? What’s the bottom line? In my view, the active investing I’m interested in – hopefully in markets that are less efficient – involves all three of the ingredients under discussion: hidden information, luck and skill. Thus it’s most like poker and blackjack, not chess. It’s in that vein that I’ll proceed.

本质

赌博技艺中最重要的方面之一,在于判断该押注哪种可能的结果,何时重注,何时不押。这正是决策的所有层面汇聚之处。

评估可能的结果——某位参与者(你?)赢的可能性有多大,而其他人赢的可能性又有几何?无论是在牌局、双陆棋还是体育博彩中,都有诸多因素需要考虑。其中最为关键的有这些:

The Essence One of the most important aspects of skill in gambling consists of figuring out which possible outcome to bet on, and when to bet heavily and when not to. This is where all facets of the decision come together. Gauging the likely outcome – How likely is one participant (you?) to win, and how likely is someone else? Whether in card games, backgammon or sports betting, there are a number of factors to consider. The most important are these:   

你现在的处境有多好?

通向胜利(和失败)的路有多少条?

要赢,你在掷骰子或摸牌上需要多大程度的好运?而你的对手有多大概率会拿到足够好的牌局,最终反败为胜?

How good is your current position? How many paths do you have to winning (and to losing)? To what extent would it require good luck regarding throws of the dice or draws of the cards for you to win? And what’s the probability your opponent will enjoy good-enough outcomes for him to be the winner instead?

这里要做的是给结果“定赔率”。韦氏词典对此的定义是“评估(参赛者)相对的获胜几率,或(某场比赛)可能的胜者”。哪一位扑克玩家的牌最好?双陆棋棋盘上谁的占位更有利?对下注的人来说,哪匹马可能赢下比赛,或哪支球队可能胜出?说白了,谁是热门?

很多人以为,只要算出谁最可能赢,就能在纸牌、双陆棋或体育赛事上下注稳赚。他们漏掉了这件事里很大的一块,也许还是远为重要的一块。

评估下注本身——判断热门通常没什么神秘可言。双陆棋里谁领先,一目了然。纸牌游戏里挑战更大,因为玩家手里攥着别人不知道的牌,但一个人手里的牌好不好,还是能有个大概感觉的。

The job here is to “handicap” the outcome, defined by Merriam-Webster as “to assess the relative winning chances of (contestants) or the likely winner of (a contest).” Which poker player has the best hand? Who’s in the better position on the backgammon board? Or for the bettor, which horse is likely to win the race, or which team is likely to win the game? To put it simply, who’s the favorite? Many people think figuring out who’s most likely to win is all you have to do to successfully bet on card games, backgammon or sports. They’re missing a huge part of the matter, and perhaps the far more important part. Assessing the proposition – There’s usually not much mystery involved in identifying the favorite. It’s pretty clear who’s ahead in backgammon. It’s more of a challenge in card games, where players hold cards the others don’t know about, but still it’s possible to have a sense for how good one’s

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筹码在绝对数额上是明确的。在大多数情况下,人们对哪匹马或哪支队伍最有可能获胜有着相当一致的共识。

但关于赌博,最需要了解的一点是:人人都能获取的信息,不太可能带来赢利。既然大多数人都知道一手牌、一局正在进行中的双陆棋或一场体育博彩中谁更可能赢,那这就称不上有价值的信息。也许人人都想押注热门,但这意味着他们不太可能找到愿意接下相反一方赌注的人:在没有诱因的情况下,没人会跟热门对赌。

这种诱因就体现为“让局条件”。拿一场橄榄球赛来说,假设 A 队被认为获胜可能性是 B 队的两倍。换句话说,A 队被视为每三场赢两场,而 B 队每三场只赢一场。如果众所周知 A 队强出这么多,没人会押 B 队,除非看好 A 队的人愿意“让赔率”。也就是说,乔可能会告诉埃德:“我给你 2 比 1 的赔率;我押 10 美元赌 A 队赢 B 队,你出 5 美元。”假设比赛结果符合预期,乔三场里有两场赢 5 美元,一场输 10 美元。那么三场下来,两个赌客打个平手。这意味着在这种情况下,2 比 1 的赔率是“公平”的。

所以结论是:目标不是弄清楚谁是热门然后押注。相反,目标是弄清楚谁是热门,以及赔率是否公平。

hand is in absolute terms. And in most cases there’s a solid consensus around which horse or team is most likely to win. But one of the most important things to know about gambling is that information that’s available to everyone isn’t likely to produce winnings. Since most people know who the likely winner is in a hand of cards, a backgammon game that’s underway or a sports bet, that isn’t valuable information. Everyone might like to bet on a favorite, but that means it’s unlikely they’ll be able to find someone to take the other side of the wager: to bet against the favorite without an inducement. That inducement takes the form of a “proposition.” Consider a football matchup in which Team A is considered twice as likely to win as Team B. Stated another way, Team A is viewed as likely to win two times out of three, and Team B only once. If it’s common knowledge that Team A is that much better, no one will bet on Team B unless the person who favors Team A is willing to “lay odds.” That is, Joe might tell Ed, “I’ll give you 2-to-1 odds; I’ll bet $10 against your $5 that Team A will beat Team B.” Assuming the outcomes go according to expectations, Joe wins $5 two times out of three and loses $10 one time. Over three games, then, the two bettors come out even. That means 2-to-1 odds are “fair” in this situation. So here’s the bottom line: the goal isn’t to figure out who the favorite is and bet on it. Rather, the goal is to figure out who the favorite is and whether the odds are fair or not.  

如果赔率是公平的,如上所示,那么除了感情因素外,没有理由押注任何一方。

如果赔率没有对热门方施加足够的惩罚——比如上述对阵的赔率仅为 6 比 5——你应该押注热门方。A 队有三分之二的概率获胜。在三次中他们输掉的那一次,你付出的 6 美元不会抵消他们两次胜出时你赢得的共 10 美元。

但如果赔率对热门方不利——赔率“太长”,比如 4 比 1——最好押注冷门方。你仍然会在三次中输掉两次(共损失 2 美元),但当你赢的那一次,4 美元的赔付足以弥补损失。

If the odds are fair, as illustrated above, there’s no reason (other than sentiment) to bet on one team or the other. If the odds don’t penalize the favorite enough – let’s say the odds on the above matchup are only 6-to-5 – you should bet on the favorite. Team A will win two-thirds of the time. The one time out of three when they lose, the $6 you pay won’t offset the total of $10 you win on the two occasions when they come out ahead. But if the odds are tilted against the favorite – the odds are “too long,” maybe 4-to-1 – it’s better to bet on the underdog. You’ll still lose $1 two times out of three (for a total of $2), but on the one game you win, the $4 payoff will more than compensate.

双陆棋的世界里有一个绝佳的例子。领先的棋手可以通过“翻转骰子”把赌注从 5 美元翻倍到 10 美元,此时落后的一方必须在认输损失 5 美元和继续下注 10 美元之间做出选择。因为领先者提出翻倍是因为他处于优势,那么落后一方接受翻倍就意味着犯错吗?未必。

A great example can be seen in the world of backgammon. The player who’s ahead can offer to double the stakes from $5 to $10 by “turning the cube,” in which case the other player has to choose between surrendering for $5 or playing on for $10. Since the leader offers to double because he’s ahead, does that mean it’s a mistake for the player who’s behind to accept? Not necessarily.  

显然,如果落后方认输,他就输掉 5 美元。

但如果,比如说,他有 25% 的胜算,继续玩下去赌 10 美元呢?那样的话,他的预期结果是(亏损 10 美元 × .75)+(盈利 10 美元 × .25),算下来同样是亏损 5 美元。

Clearly, if the laggard surrenders, he loses $5. But what if, let’s say, he has a 25% chance of winning and plays on for $10? In that case, his expected outcome is ($10 loss x .75) + ($10 gain x .25), which works out to the same $5 loss.

上述案例带来的启示是:当落后者的胜算超过 25% 时,他就应接受加倍赌注,因为此举带来的预期损失要优于直接认输损失 5 美元。有时,即便下注劣势局面多半会以亏损告终,却仍不失为明智之举……关键在于具体的赌局条件。

The lesson from the above is that a player who is behind should accept a double whenever his chance of winning exceeds 25%, which would give him an expected loss that’s less bad than surrendering for $5. Sometimes it’s a good idea to bet on an inferior position . . . even though doing so is expected to result in a loss most of the time. It all depends on the proposition.

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我的好友马特·本森和科里·罗宾逊给我摘录了查理·芒格一篇题为《选股艺术》的演讲中的一段精彩内容。在那篇演讲里,查理把投资比作赛马场上的帕里-穆切尔博彩系统,每匹马获胜的赔率取决于下注的人数:

如果你停下来想一想,帕里-穆切尔系统就是一个市场。每个人去那里下注,赔率随着下注情况而变化……任何一个傻瓜都能看出来,一匹负磅轻、胜率高、闸位好的马,比一匹战绩糟糕、负重又高的马赢面大得多,如此等等。但如果你看赔率,那匹差马赔 100 比 1,而那匹好马只赔 3 比 2。这样一来,从统计上看哪边更划算就不那么清楚了……赌博的成功不属于那些能选出赢家马的人,而属于那些有能力识别出更优赌局的人。目标是找到那些赔率对某一方格外慷慨的情况,不管这一方是热门还是冷门。换句话说,就是找到定价错误。

投资里也完全一样。人们常对我说,“某某公司是一家了不起的公司,前景光明,所以我买了它的股票。”他们是在挑选热门,却忽略了赌局本身。光有前者还不够,他们也应该考虑后者。

同样,有人可能会说,即使是最优秀的风险投资人也不擅长挑赢家,因为他们很多投资都以亏损告终。但那些成功的项目回报如此之高,足以弥补多次亏损还绰绰有余,让整个努力成为一场巨大的成功。

虽然在投资中我们通常拿不到明确的赔率,但赌局的吸引力是由资产价格、潜在回报与所冒风险的比率,以及我们判断的输赢概率来确定的。

优秀的投资者之所以优秀,也许是因为他们能判断出哪些公司可能成为赢家。但我认识的最好的投资者,对赌局是否相对于基本面过于有利,也有一种感觉——也许是天生的、本能的直觉。这可能是一家公司,其证券便宜到足以充分补偿它黯淡的前景;也可能是一家公司,未来格外光明,但证券价格还没高到把那份潜力充分算进去。

1968 年 5 月,我到第一国民城市银行的投资研究部门做暑期工,当时这家银行(以及许多其他银行)主要投资于“漂亮五十”。这些股票被认为是美国最优秀、增长最快的公司:好到“什么价格都不算高”。如果你在我到岗那天买了那些股票,并且坚定持有五年,你会几乎亏光所有的钱……而投的却是美国最优秀的公司。

所有这些公司当时都被视为未来的赢家。有些确实是,但远非全部。(柯达、宝丽来,还有我最喜欢的 Simplicity 服装纸样公司,后来都怎么了?)赌局本身是错的:它们被定价为不可能输,结果好几家都输了。

然后,1978 年,我转到花旗的债券部门,被要求创立一只高收益债券基金。这时候我投的是美国最差上市公司的债券——全部是投机级评级,也就是“垃圾债”。而我却安全而稳定地赚着大钱。不是因为那些公司

My friends Matt Bensen and Corey Robinson provided an apt excerpt from a speech titled “The Art of Stock Picking” by Charlie Munger. In it, Charlie compares investing with the pari-mutuel betting system at the racetrack, where the payoff for each horse winning is determined by how many people bet on it: If you stop to think about it, a pari-mutuel system is a market. Everybody goes there and bets and the odds change based on what’s bet. . . . Any damn fool can see the horse carrying a light weight with a wonderful win rate and a good post position etc., etc. is way more likely to win than a horse with a terrible record and extra weight and so on and so on. But if you look at the odds, the bad horse pays 100 to 1, whereas the good horse pays 3 to 2. Then it’s not clear which is statistically the best bet . . . Success in gambling doesn’t go to those who pick winners, but to those with the ability to identify superior propositions. The goal is to find situations where the odds are generous to one side or the other, whether favorite or underdog. In other words, a mispricing. It’s exactly the same in investing. People often say to me, “XYZ is a great company with a bright future, so I bought the stock.” They’re picking a favorite but ignoring the proposition. The former alone isn’t enough; they should consider the latter as well. Likewise, one might say that even the best venture capitalists are poor at picking winners, since a lot of their investments result in losses. But the payoff on the ones that succeed is so large, it’s sufficient to pay for the losers many times over and make the overall effort a great success. While in investing we generally aren’t offered explicit odds, the attractiveness of the proposition is established by the price of the asset, the ratio of the potential payoff to the amount risked, and what we perceive to be the chance of winning versus losing. Superior investors may be superior because they can figure out which companies are likely to be winners. But the best investors I know also have a sense – perhaps innate and instinctive – for situations where the proposition is too favorable relative to the underlying fundamentals. It might be a company whose securities are cheap enough to more than compensate for its poor prospects, or one where the future is exceptionally bright, but its securities aren’t priced high enough to charge fully for that potential. In May 1968, when I showed up at First National City Bank for a summer job in the investment research department, the bank (and many other banks) invested primarily in the “Nifty Fifty.” These were considered to be the best and fastest-growing companies in America: companies so good that there was “no price too high.” And if you bought those stocks the day I arrived and held them firmly for five years, you lost almost all of your money . . . investing in the best companies in America. All the companies were considered future winners. Some actually were, but far from all. (What happened to Kodak, Polaroid and my favorite, Simplicity Pattern?) The proposition was wrong: they were priced as if they couldn’t lose, and it turned out several would. Then, in 1978, I switched to Citi’s bond department, and I was asked to start a high yield bond fund. Now I was investing in the bonds of the worst public companies in America – all rated speculative grade, or “junk.” And I was making good money safely and steadily. Not because the companies

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这些交易并非无懈可击——事实上,按金额计算,每年平均约有 4% 的债券最终违约——但“价格”对那些押注于它们的人来说太过有利。这段经历让我产生了两个最重要的观察:

were flawless – in fact, about 4% by dollar amount would go on to default each year on average – but because “the price” was too favorable to those who bet on them. This experience produced two of my most important observations:  

投资上的成功,不在于买好东西,而在于买得好,搞清楚两者的区别至关重要。买什么不是关键,关键是你为它付了多少钱。

Success in investing doesn’t come from buying good things, but from buying things well, and it’s essential to know the difference. It’s not a matter of what you buy, but what you pay for it.

“漂亮五十”的投资者们把所有时间都花在挑选心仪股票上,却完全没注意到自己支付的价格已经高得离谱。赢家公司占了大多数,但投资结果却很糟糕。

而由于当时舆论对高收益债券的反对声浪极为强烈,那些投资于此类债券的人因为承担相应风险而获得了过高的回报:这笔交易简直太划算了。穆迪将 B 级债券定义为“不具备理想投资特征”的债券。换句话说,穆迪对这些债券嗤之以鼻,是因为它们是“落水狗”,却从未质疑过它们的价格。正是诸如此类不客观、过于乐观或过于悲观的态度,才造就了对买方来说要么好得离谱、要么糟得离谱的交易机会。作为投资者,这正是我们应当寻找的。

Nifty Fifty investors spent all of their time picking favorites and failed to notice that the prices they paid were too high. Mostly winning companies, but poor investments. And because popular opinion was stacked so heavily against high yield bonds, those who invested in them received excessive compensation for taking the associated risk: the proposition was too good. Moody’s defined a B-rated bond as one that “fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment.” In other words, Moody’s panned those bonds because they were underdogs but never asked about the price. It’s usually non-objective, too-positive or too-negative attitudes like these that give rise to propositions that are too good or too bad for the takers. That’s what we should search for as investors.

特邀撰稿人

正如我在第三页提到的,我做过的最棒的事情之一就是鼓励儿子安德鲁培养对游戏的喜爱。安德鲁把对待投资和其他爱好的那股认真劲儿,同样用在了游戏上。这让他养成了赌徒式的思维方式,也使他能提出以下这些赌博与投资的相通之处:

Guest Contributor As I mentioned on page three, one of the best things I ever did was to encourage my son Andrew to develop a love of games. In Andrew’s case, he applied the same seriousness to games that he does to investing and his other pursuits. This gave him the thought process of a gambler and enables him to suggest the following ways in which gambling has parallels to investing: 

选局与技艺——在考虑投资去向时,关键要弄清楚两点:你本身具备多少所需技能,以及对手的水平如何。在一群顶尖赌徒中间,或是在竞争最激烈的市场里,想持续胜出极其困难。与其硬拼,不如把精力花在寻找效率较低的细分领域上。可惜,如今找到这样的地方比几十年前难多了。

效率提升与市场自我适应——在线扑克刚兴起那阵子,有点水平的玩家很容易赢钱,不少业余玩家看到新手拿下世界扑克系列赛冠军,也被吸引入局。可过了一段时间,游戏变难了,因为职业玩家涌了进来,业余玩家纷纷输光。新一代更精明的竞争者摸清了前辈的打法,改进策略,反手把他们打败。就这样,赛场的变化和参与者行为的演变,会让几年前还管用的招数在今天失效。

能力圈——你在金罗美牌上很厉害,不代表就该跟职业选手去玩德州扑克。看清自己的长处,守住自己的长处,这一点很重要。

不必每把都下注——没人逼你场场都赌、每手牌都跟。你可以等到真正有吸引力的机会,那种你觉得特别有把握分析、看得懂,而且赔率站在你这一边的机会。在那之前,最好的选择是坐在场外,守住你的本金。

Game selection versus skill – When considering where to invest, it’s important to understand both how much of the requisite skill you possess and the quality of the competition. Being a consistent winner among the best gamblers or in the most intensely competitive markets can be very difficult. Instead, your energy might be better spent looking for less-efficient niches. Unfortunately, it’s harder to find them than it was decades ago. Increasing efficiency/the tendency of markets to adapt – In the early days of online poker, it was easy for decent players to win, and a lot of amateurs were enticed to play by seeing a newcomer win the World Series of Poker. After some time, however, the games became tougher as they attracted professional players, and the amateurs lost their money. The new, more sophisticated generation of competitors learned their predecessors’ tendencies, improved on their strategies and started beating them. In this way, changes in the arena and in participants’ behavior can cause what worked years ago to not work today. Circle of competence – Just because you’re great at gin rummy doesn’t mean you should play Texas Hold’em against a professional poker player. It’s important to know your strengths and stick to them. Not having to play every hand – There’s no requirement to bet on every game or every hand. You can wait until you get a particularly attractive proposition, one that you feel particularly capable of analyzing and understanding, and where the odds are on your side. In the interim, it’s better to sit out and protect your bankroll.

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重要的是不仅在于赢和输,更在于让赢的更多、输的更少——关键在于,当你拥有巨大优势时下重注,优势较小时下小注……并且要能分辨两者的区别。正如查理·芒格所说:“智者会在世界给他们机会时重仓下注。他们在胜算占优时下大注。其余时候,他们按兵不动。就这么简单。”每个人都会有赢有输。各种因素决定输赢的比例。但评估局势的能力,能让你在赢的时候赚得比输的时候亏得更多。你的下注规模,既要考虑你对胜负判断的准确概率,也要考虑潜在回报的不对称性。在牌好时“把钱押进去”,是玩扑克制胜的关键之一。好牌不常来,所以一旦拿到,就必须确保充分利用。

能够挺过低迷期——拿资本冒险时必须有纪律,这样才能熬过不利时期,等到赢家出现时你还在场。你必须避免灭顶之灾的风险,这需要坚实的纪律(你“绝不能忘记那个身高六英尺的人,却淹死在平均水深五英尺的河里”)。为此,好的打法不仅依赖于对持仓期望值的判断和纯粹的数学计算,还要从更广的角度思考风险。你会把全部身家押在一个胜率八成的赌注上吗?

根据环境调整打法——在扑克牌局中,如果对手水平弱,你可能会决定多玩几手牌而不论牌力强弱,并且下注更激进;而面对强手时,你可能会收紧范围,只玩好牌。

克服情绪和偏见——人性的弱点会让赌徒在扑克中“追牌”(死守一手牌指望来张幸运牌),在“上头”时打得松散(输钱后情绪失控、下注过猛),还会在双陆棋中打出糟糕的加倍。希望、情绪和乐观是赌徒的敌人。

第二层思维——关键不只是你手里的牌好不好。远不止如此。你的对手认为你的牌有多好?你觉得对手的牌有多好?他觉得你认为他的牌有多好?这些判断如何驱动他的行动?持续赢家必须能比其他人想得更深一层、更复杂一层。

The importance of not just winning and losing, but of maximizing wins and minimizing losses – The key is to bet big when you have a big edge and small when you have less of an edge . . . and to know the difference. As Charlie Munger puts it, “The wise ones bet heavily when the world offers them that opportunity. They bet big when they have the odds. And the rest of the time, they don’t. It’s just that simple.” Everyone will have both winners and losers. Various factors will determine the ratio. But the ability to assess propositions can enable you to win more on your winners than you lose on your losers. The size of your bet should take into account both the probability you are correct about who’s going to win and the asymmetry of the potential payout. “Getting your money in” when you have a great hand is one of the most important keys to winning at poker. You don’t get many great hands, so when you do, you have to be sure to take maximum advantage. Being able to make it through downturns – It’s important to have discipline when risking your capital, so that you can survive unfavorable periods and still be around when the winners show up. You have to avoid the risk of ruin, and this requires solid discipline (you must “never forget the six-foot-tall man who drowned crossing the river that was five feet deep on average”). To that end, good play isn’t just a function of relying on the expected value of your holdings and pure math, but also of thinking broadly about risk. Would you bet all your money on an 80/20 favorite? Adjusting your play based on the environment – In poker, if your competition is weak, you may decide to play more hands regardless of their strength and bet more aggressively, while against strong players you may tighten up and only play premium hands. Overcoming emotion and biases – Human failings can cause gamblers to “chase” in poker (overstay in a hand in the hope of getting a lucky card), play loose (bet too much) when they’re “steaming” (smarting from losses and thus driven by heated emotion), and take bad doubles in backgammon. Hope, emotion and optimism are the gambler’s enemies. Second-level thinking – It’s not just how good your hand is. There’s much more. How good does your opponent think your hand is? How good do you think your opponent’s hand is? How good does he think you think his is? How is that motivating his actions? The consistent winner has to be able to think at a higher, more complex level than the rest.

上面讨论的所有想法在投资中都很重要,就像在赌博中一样。在这两项活动中,归根结底都是杰克·格雷森书名所说的:不确定性下的决策。自从我 56 年前第一次读到他的书以来,我学到的是:

All the ideas discussed above are important in investing, just as they are in gambling. In both pursuits, it all comes down to Jack Grayson’s title: Decisions Under Uncertainty. As I’ve learned in the 56 years since first reading his book:     

你必须能够判断哪些公司或资产受到青睐,以及这一投资主张的吸引力如何。

你需要判断自己持有的标的是否优质,还要评估竞争对手——也就是你正面对的市场——是否可能更具优势。

你需要遵守一套流程的纪律,同时也要有智慧接受一点:没有任何流程能保证产生好结果。

你必须理解自己掌握的信息的重要性,也要理解自己尚未掌握的信息的分量。你需要有魄力,基于自己认为已知的东西重注押下,同时对你可能不知道的东西保持充分的敬畏。

你需要克制贪婪与恐惧、希望与沮丧。你必须抵制那种不明智的押注,哪怕它可能让你追上指数或竞争对手。

You have to be able to understand which companies or assets are favored and the attractiveness of the proposition. You need a sense for whether your holding is a good one and for the chance the competition – the market, which you’re playing against – might have better. You need the discipline to follow a process and the wisdom to accept that no process is sure to produce good results. You have to understand the significance of the information you have, as well as that which you don’t have. You need the nerve to bet heavily based on what you think you know and a healthy respect for what you may not know. You need to control greed and fear, hopefulness and despondency. You have to resist making an unwise bet just because it could enable you to catch up with the indices or the competition.

2020 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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既然她的书促成了这份备忘录,我就让安妮·杜克来做个总结。她讲的是扑克,但听起来和投资很像【重点为后加】:

当我们用概率思维看问题时,就不太会把糟糕的结果单独当作决策错误的证据,因为我们认识到一种可能性:决策本身也许是对的,只是运气和/或信息不完整(而且样本量只有一个)插手干预了。

也许我们是在一堆不讨喜的选择里做了最好的决定,而这些选择没有一个大概率会落得好结果。

也许我们把资源押在了一个冷门上,因为回报足以补偿风险,但这次冷门没中。

也许我们基于手头可得的信息做了最佳选择,但关键信息被隐藏了,我们根本无从知晓。

也许我们选了一条成功概率极高的路,却碰上了坏运气……

但这也意味着我们必须重新定义“对”。如果我们不会仅仅因为结果不好就说自己错了,那也不该仅仅因为结果不错就说自己对了……

首先,这个世界相当随机。运气的影响让人无法精准预判事情会如何发展,而那些隐藏的信息让情况更糟。如果我们不转变心态,就得经常面对自己错了这件事……

扑克教会了我们这一课。一位伟大的扑克玩家,如果对桌上其他玩家有相当大的优势,做出的战略决策明显更优,打了八个小时下来,仍然有超过 40% 的时间在输。那可是大量的“错”。而且这不只限于扑克……

我们怎么能确定自己选的就是最适合自己的那个选项?万一另一个选项能带来更多幸福、满足或金钱呢?答案当然是:我们无法确定。我们控制之外的因素(运气)会影响结果。我们想象的未来只是种种可能性,它们还没发生。我们只能基于自己知道的和不知道的,对未来做出最好的猜测……当我们做决定时,我们是在拿自己珍视的一切……押注在众多可能而不确定的未来之一上。风险就在这里。

投资是一场讲技巧的游戏——意思是水平差的玩家别指望长期成为跑赢平均的赢家。但它也包含运气的成分——意思是技巧不会每次都赢。长期来看,更优的技巧会压过坏运气的影响。但在短期内,运气可能压过技巧,而且两者往往难以分辨。

Since her book provided the impetus for this memo, I’ll let Annie Duke sum up. She’ll be talking about poker, but it’ll sound a lot like investing [emphasis added]: When we think probabilistically, we are less likely to use adverse results alone as proof that we made a decision error, because we recognize the possibility that the decision might have been good but luck and/or incomplete information (and a sample size of one) intervened. Maybe we made the best decisions from a set of unappealing choices, none of which were likely to turn out well. Maybe we committed our resources on a long shot because the payout more than compensated for the risk, but the long shot didn’t come in this time. Maybe we made the best choice based on the available information, but decisive information was hidden and we could not have known about it. Maybe we chose a path with very high likelihood of success and got unlucky. . . . But it also means we must redefine “right.” If we aren’t wrong just because things didn’t work out, then we aren’t right just because things turned out well. . . . First the world is a pretty random place. The influence of luck makes it impossible to predict exactly how things will turn out, and all the hidden information makes it even worse. If we don’t change our mindset, we’re going to have to deal with being wrong a lot. . . . Poker teaches that lesson. A great poker player who has a good sized advantage over the other players at the table, making significantly better strategic decisions, will still be losing over 40% of the time at the end of eight hours of play. That’s a whole lot of wrong. And it’s not just confined to poker. . . . How can we be sure that we are choosing the alternative that is best for us? What if another alternative would bring us more happiness, satisfaction, or money? The answer, of course, is we can’t be sure. Things outside our control (luck) can influence the result. The futures we imagine are merely possible. They haven’t happened yet. We can only make our best guess, given what we know and don’t know, at what the future will look like. . . . When we decide, we are betting whatever we value . . . on one of a set of possible and uncertain futures. That is where the risk is. Investing is a game of skill – meaning inferior players can’t expect to be above average winners in the long run. But it also includes elements of chance – meaning skill won’t win out every time. In the long run, superior skill will overcome the impact of bad luck. But in the short run, luck can overwhelm skill, and the two can be indistinguishable.

2020 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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正是这些东西,让投资既有挑战性又充满刺激。也正是因为这些,我对自己选择的职业生涯感到欣慰。

These are the things that make investing both challenging and stimulating. They’re the reason I feel good about the way I chose to spend my career.

January 13, 2020

January 13, 2020

2020 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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