2020年回顾

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Memo to:

橡树资本客户专享

Oaktree Clients Only

From:

Howard Marks

Re:

2020 in Review

查尔斯·狄更斯《双城记》的开篇，正好为 2020 年画上句号：

那是最好的时代，那是最坏的时代……那是光明的季节，那是黑暗的季节，那是希望的春天，那是绝望的冬天。

这一年动荡不安，我们眼前浮现一连串令人瞠目结舌的极端事件：

•

The opening lines of Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities offer a fitting coda to 2020: It was the best of times, it was the worst of times . . . it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair. We’re left to contemplate the jaw-dropping list of extremes compiled during this turbulent year: • • • • • • • • •

•

新冠病毒引发了百年一遇的全球大流行病。

在美国，超过 34 万人死于新冠肺炎，这一数字相当于第二次世界大战四年间阵亡人数的 85%。

第二季度，美国实际国内生产总值创下了 74 年有记录以来最大的季度跌幅，年化下降 32.9%。

但到了第三季度，又出现了历史上最大的年化涨幅：33.4%。

初请失业金人数在 3 月的单周内从 25.1 万跃升至近 300 万，两周后达到 620 万的峰值，并在当年剩余时间的每一周都保持在疫情前纪录 69.5 万之上。

通过购买债券，美联储将其资产组合扩大了 2.7 万亿美元，增幅约为 55%，美国财政部则为约 4 万亿美元的拨款和贷款提供了资金。

标普 500 指数在 2 月 19 日触及 3386 点的历史高点后，仅用 32 天便下跌 33.9%，于 3 月 23 日跌至 2237 点。

但从那低点起，该指数在不到五个月内，于 8 月 18 日收复了此前的峰值（涨幅达 51.5%）。到 2020 年底，它较低点上涨了 67.9%，全年整体上涨 18.4%。

与过去许多危机伴随的信贷紧缩不同，这次资本像水一样流动。全年高收益债券发行量为 4500 亿美元，比 2019 年增长 57%，远超 2013 年创下的此前纪录。投资级债券发行总量达 1.9 万亿美元，比 2019 年同样增长约 58%，也超过了 2017 年创下的此前纪录。

在美联储将联邦基金利率目标下调至 0 至 0.25% 之后，债券价格上涨，同时债券收益率下降。到年底，平均 A 级债券收益率仅为 1.52%，高收益债券（不含能源）的平均收益率略低于 4%。

The coronavirus brought on the worst global pandemic in over a century. In the U.S., more than 340,000 people died from Covid-19 – 85% of the number who died in battle in the four years of World War II. In the second quarter, the U.S. experienced the worst quarterly drop in real GDP in 74 years of recorded quarterly history, an annualized decline of 32.9%. But in the third quarter, it saw the biggest annualized gain in history: 33.4%. Initial unemployment claims jumped from 251,000 to almost 3 million in a single week in March, crested at 6.2 million two weeks later, and remained above the pre-pandemic record of 695,000 every week for the remainder of the year. Through bond buying, the Federal Reserve grew its portfolio by $2.7 trillion, or roughly 55%, and the U.S. Treasury funded roughly $4 trillion in grants and loans. After the S&P 500 Index reached an all-time high of 3,386 on February 19, it fell 33.9% in just 32 days to 2,237 on March 23. But from that low, the index regained the previous high in less than five months on August 18 (an increase of 51.5%). It ended 2020 up 67.9% from the low and up 18.4% overall for the year. Unlike the credit crunches that accompanied many past crises, capital flowed like water. High yield bond issuance for the year was $450 billion, up 57% from 2019 and well above the prior record set in 2013. Investment grade debt issuance totaled $1.9 trillion, up a similar 58% from 2019 and also ahead of the previous record, set in 2017. After the Fed cut its federal funds rate target to between zero and 0.25%, bond prices rose as bond yields fell in parallel. At year-end, the average A-rated bond yielded just 1.52%, and the average yield on high yield bonds (ex. energy) was just below 4%.

于是，我们面临了公共卫生危机、经济疲软、史上最慷慨的资本市场，以及强劲的股票和债券市场。疫情与衰退同强劲的资本市场和股市之间看似矛盾的关系，可以用美联储和美国财政部的积极行动来解释。正如上述事件清单所示，2020 年的买入机会转瞬即逝，尤其是对于公开证券和能够进入资本市场的公司而言。违约影响了大量高收益债券，但违约率远未达到此前预测的高点，并很快开始回落。强烈的抛售意愿十分短暂——基本上仅限于 3 月份——我们从未见到过往危机中那种全面恐慌（伴随追加保证金通知、崩盘和强制抛售）。短短几个月内：

So we had a health emergency, an ailing economy, the most generous capital market of all time, and strong stock and bond markets. The seemingly anomalous relationship between the pandemic and recession on one hand and the strong capital and stock markets on the other can be explained by the Fed’s and the U.S. Treasury’s aggressive actions. As suggested by the above catalog of events, the buying opportunity in 2020 turned out to be very brief, especially with regard to public securities and companies with the ability to access the capital markets. Defaults affected a large dollar amount of high yield debt securities, but default rates came nowhere near the highs that had been predicted and soon began to recede. Highly motivated selling was short-lived – essentially limited to the month of March – and we never saw the full-throated panic (accompanied by margin calls, meltdowns and forced selling) witnessed in prior crises. In just a few months:

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

•

• • • • • •

投资者对经济复苏的必然性信心倍增；

对新冠疫苗前景的乐观情绪升温；

接近零的联邦基金利率压低了资本市场线上各点的预期回报；

风险承受力回归，错失恐惧取代了亏损恐惧；

资产价格上涨，市场强劲反弹；

对我们而言，那个绝佳的买入机会早早就戛然而止。

investors grew confident about the inevitability of an economic recovery; optimism developed regarding the outlook for a Covid-19 vaccine; the near-zero fed funds rate brought down prospective returns all along the capital market line; risk tolerance returned, and fear of missing out took over from fear of losing money; asset prices rose, and the markets bounced back; and the exceptional buying opportunity came to what for our purposes was a premature end.

橡树业绩

去年极端且接二连三的事态发展——尤其是其源起于外部且不可预见的事件，即疫情暴发——给投资者带来了巨大挑战。要想充分利用这一局面，人们必须得在二月下旬就做好迎接重大冲击的准备，并在一个月后转为看多。显然，同时做到这两点的投资者寥寥无几。

尽管我们从不对投资组合进行彻底调整，但我认为橡树资本在这些情形下表现得相当出色。多年来，我们一直对市场保持警惕，因为我们认为市场充满了极大的不确定性，资产价格处于高位乃至满位，未来回报率为历史最低，而投资者为在低回报环境中追求高收益而采取偏好风险的行为。在那段时期，我们秉持“稳步前行，但保持谨慎”的信条，在维持市场现实下尽可能高标准的同时，让投资组合尽可能满仓运作。

当 3 月份市场大幅下跌时，我们此前的谨慎态度使我们 14 只开放式策略中的 10 只避免了部分基准指数下跌的冲击（费用前）。这使得我们在炮火之下仍能保持冷静，持有那些值得持有的头寸，并在适当的情况下于边际上提高进攻性。当然，这些都是正确的做法。

一年前，在我 2019 年的回顾中，我附了一张表格，展示我们封闭式基金资本的投资比例有多低，为我们投资组合经理的纪律感到自豪，并写道：

投资者对回报的激进追求——以及由此带来的大量资金流入另类和私募投资——使得在这些领域投入资金变得颇具挑战性……在每一种情况中，我们对良好价值和可控风险的坚持，都导致了适中的投资节奏，这一节奏略低于我们的历史常态。

相比之下，在 2020 年，从 3 月份跌幅最严重的时期开始，我们的许多封闭式策略转为高度激进。这使得它们取得了巨大进展。例如：

Oaktree Performance Last year’s extreme, rapid-fire developments – and especially their origin in an exogenous and unforeseeable event, the virus outbreak – created great challenges for investors. To have taken maximum advantage, one would have had to have gone into late February prepared for a significant shock and then turned bullish a month later. Obviously, few investors did both. While we never radically shift our portfolios, I think Oaktree did a very good job under these circumstances. For years we had been leery of the markets, because of our view that they were characterized by a great deal of uncertainty, full-to-high asset prices, the lowest prospective returns in history, and pro-risk behavior on the part of investors trying for high returns in a low-return world. With our mantra in that period of “move forward, but with caution,” our portfolios were as fully invested as we could make them while maintaining the highest possible standards within the context of the market realities. When the markets fell sharply in March, our prior caution allowed 10 of our 14 open-end strategies to avoid part of their benchmarks’ declines (before fees). This enabled us to remain calm under fire, hold onto positions that warranted doing so, and increase aggressiveness at the margin where appropriate. Of course, these were the right things to do. A year ago, in my 2019 review, I included a table showing how little of our closed-end funds’ capital we had invested, taking pride in our portfolio managers’ discipline, and writing: Investors’ aggressive pursuit of return – and the strong resulting cash flows into alternative and private investments – has made it challenging to put money to work in these fields. . . . In each case, our insistence on good value and controlled risk resulted in a moderate pace of investment that was somewhat below our historic norms. In 2020, in contrast, many of our closed-end strategies turned highly aggressive, starting in the worst of the March declines. This allowed them to make great progress. For example: • • • •

我们的机会集团（Opportunities group）买入了大量公开发行的债券，并通过谈判促成了多起私人救助，规模足以完成机会基金十号（Opportunities Fund Xb）的投资部署，投入超过 70 亿美元，随后又为其后续基金机会十一号（Opps XI）配置了逾 40 亿美元资金。

我们的房地产集团（Real Estate group）也采取同样策略，完成了房地产机会基金七号（Real Estate Opportunities Fund VII）的投资，并转而推进至房地产机会基金八号（ROF VIII）。

我们的特殊情况集团（Special Situations group）所进行的投资，使其特殊情况基金二号（Special Situations Fund II）的投资或承诺比例从 19% 提升至 82%。

总体而言，橡树资本的封闭式基金共部署了近 170 亿美元资金，使 2020 年成为我们在这方面成绩最为卓著的一年。

Our Opportunities group bought public debt and negotiated private rescues in quantities sufficient to complete the deployment of Opportunities Fund Xb by investing over $7 billion and then put over $4 billion to work for its successor, Opps XI. The same was true of our Real Estate group, which finished investing Real Estate Opportunities Fund VII and moved on to ROF VIII. The investments made by our Special Situations group took the invested or committed percentage of its Special Situations Fund II from 19% to 82%. Overall, Oaktree’s closed-end funds deployed nearly $17 billion, making 2020 our best year ever in that regard.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

鉴于我们对风险控制的坚持，橡树资本（Oaktree）的开放式策略在高度看涨的时期并不总能跟上其基准。2020 年第四季度在这方面带来了潜在挑战，因为市场反弹（以及低利率）鼓励了风险承担，导致风险最高的资产飙升。因此，我们很高兴地报告，14 个策略中有 10 个在第四季度超越了基准，其中 9 个在全年度实现了这一目标（所有回报率均指扣除费用前）。此外，我们季度回报的波动表明，我们以低于基准的波动率赚取了回报。总体而言，我们对橡树资本当年的投资表现相当满意。

重申您已知晓的事实，这一切都不基于预测。我们从未试图预测市场何时会从新冠疫情引发的下跌中开始复苏。我们并不比其他人更早知道，3 月底市场出现的新生机是涨势的开端，将推动市场创下历史新高。我们只是在认为市场脆弱时倾向于防御，然后在价格下跌使防御不再适当时转向进取。

长期视角

在我五十多年职业生涯中最动荡的一年结束时，我将把我通常的长期论述部分献給橡树资本的一项策略，它真的会让您觉得 2020 年是最好时光：我们的“电力机会”基金。我先从这些基金的有趣历史讲起。

橡树资本成立仅一年后，一位朋友给我们带来了一个不同寻常的机会。三位长期担任企业员工、后来转型为能源顾问的人，于 1995 年离开了安达信（Arthur Andersen），成立了一家精品投资公司 GFI 能源创投（GFI 代表“勇往直前”）。拉里·吉尔森（Larry Gilson）、理查德·兰德斯（Richard Landers）和伊恩·夏皮罗（Ian Schapiro）基于他们对美国电力基础设施缺陷、修复与扩建需求，以及现有企业在此过程中会投入资金的知识优势，形成了投资理念。他们是没有基金的发起人，每当找到有吸引力的投资标的，就在一小圈投资者中募集资金。但在 1996 年，他们遇到了一个用这种方法无法融资的太大机会，于是被推荐给了我们。

我们对那第一笔投资以及总体理念及其应用非常感兴趣，并与 GFI 达成了一个协议：我们将支付他们的管理费用，获得他们项目流的优先购买权，并共同管理所进行的投资。如果我们继续看好所见，三年后我们将组建一个专门针对他们电力基础设施投资的基金，也将共同管理。在这段时期一切顺利，于是第一只橡树/GFI 电力机会基金于 1999 年成立。

虽然我们试图让 GFI 的人加入橡树资本，但拉里和理查德拒绝了我们的恳求。但当他们在 2009 年退休时，伊恩和他的团队加入了我们，从此我们合作愉快。我们目前正在投资橡树电力机会五号基金。

关于过去 25 年，有几件具体的事情让我印象深刻：

•

Given our insistence on risk control, Oaktree’s open-end strategies don’t always keep up with their benchmarks in highly bullish times. The fourth quarter of 2020 presented a potential challenge in that regard, as the market rally (and the low interest rates) encouraged risk-taking and caused the riskiest assets to soar. Thus, we’re happy to report that 10 of the 14 strategies exceeded their benchmarks in the fourth quarter, allowing 9 of them to do so for the full year (all references to returns are before fees). Further, the ups and downs of our quarterly returns suggest we earned our returns with less volatility than the benchmarks. Overall, we’re quite pleased with Oaktree’s investment performance for the year. To reiterate what you already know, none of this was predicated on forecasts. We never tried to predict when the markets would begin to recover from their Covid-19-induced declines. We didn’t know better than anyone else that the new signs of life in the markets in late March were the beginnings of a rally that would take them to all-time highs. We simply favored defensiveness when we considered the markets vulnerable and then turned aggressive when price declines rendered defensiveness no longer appropriate. A Look at the Long Run At the end of the most turbulent year in my five-plus decades of experience, I’m going to devote my usual section on the long run to an Oaktree strategy that really would make you think 2020 was the best of times: our Power Opportunities funds. I’ll start with the interesting history of these funds. Just a year after Oaktree’s founding, a friend brought us an unusual opportunity. Three long-term corporate-employees-turned-energy-consultants had left Arthur Andersen in 1995 to form an investment boutique, GFI Energy Ventures (with “GFI” standing for “Go For It”). Larry Gilson, Richard Landers and Ian Schapiro had developed an investment thesis based on their knowledge advantage regarding the deficiencies of the U.S. power infrastructure, the need for remediation and expansion, and what the incumbents would spend money on in the process. They were a sponsor without a fund, passing the hat among a small circle of investors whenever they found an attractive investment candidate. But, in 1996, they found an opportunity too large to finance using that approach, and they were referred to us. We were very interested in that first investment, as well as the general thesis and its application, and we entered into a deal with GFI under which we would pay their overhead, get a right of first refusal on their deal flow, and jointly manage the investments made. And, if we continued to like what we saw, in three years we would organize a fund dedicated exclusively to their power infrastructure investments, which would also be run jointly. All went well during the period in question, and so the first Oaktree/GFI Power Opportunities Fund was formed in 1999. While we tried to get the people of GFI to join Oaktree, Larry and Richard resisted our entreaties. But when they retired in 2009, Ian and his team jumped aboard, and we’ve had a great ride ever since. We’re now in the process of investing Oaktree Power Opportunities Fund V. A few specific things stand out to me about the last 25 years: •

•

我和布鲁斯初次结识拉里、理查德和伊恩时，立刻就被他们的投资理念的力度所打动。人人都知道美国电网已经老旧，跟不上国家发展的步伐。频繁的停电等现象告诉我们，电网需要大规模（且代价高昂）的修复和投资。

有意思的是，GFI 投资的不是发电或输电基础设施，而是那些向“下游”参与电力分配、监控和消费的企业销售产品、服务和软件的成功公司。用我们当时的说法，

When Bruce and I first met Larry, Richard and Ian, we were immediately struck by the strength of their thesis. Everyone knew the U.S. power grid was old and hadn’t kept up with the country’s progress. The frequent blackouts, among other things, told us it needed extensive (and expensive) remediation and investment. Interestingly, GFI didn’t invest in power generation or transmission infrastructure, but rather in successful companies that sold products, services and software to firms involved “downstream” in the distribution, monitoring and consumption of power. In the words we used at the time,

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

•

• • •

“他们不会去预测哪个矿工能挖到金子；他们会把铲子和镐卖给所有矿工。”

1999 年，GFI 给我们送来第一只基金营销材料的初稿时，里面用了非常橡树风格的方式，详尽讨论了各种各样他们不会承担的风险，比如技术风险和商品风险。而他们一直坚守着这条纪律。

拉里、理查德和伊恩还根据预期的行业趋势和公司行为，列出了他们要执行的具体策略。二十五年来，这些策略依然指引着 Power 系列基金走向巨大成功。GFI 的创始人极具先见之明。

最后，值得指出的是，Power Opportunities 团队管理的资金规模是逐步增加的。几乎毫无疑问，募资上的克制对投资业绩产生了积极影响。“我找到了一个不可思议的利基市场，能在低风险下持续赚取高回报，而且可以无限扩张”——这话本身就是自相矛盾的。根本说不通。所以，当 10 亿美元的 Power Fund II 录得 59% 的内部收益率净回报——而且组合里的公司并没有用高杠杆——我问团队主管们，下一只基金想要多少钱。答案很简单：10 亿美元。换成一般的管理合伙人，肯定会借 Fund II 的成功为后续基金筹更多的钱，说不定就把那份出色的业绩记录给断送了。

“they won’t try to predict which miners will find gold; they’ll sell picks and shovels to all of them.” When GFI gave us their drafts of the marketing materials for that first 1999 fund, there was extensive discussion, in a very Oaktree-like fashion, of the many types of risk they wouldn’t take, such as technological risk and commodity risk. And they’ve stuck with that discipline. Larry, Richard and Ian also laid out the specific strategies that they would pursue based on the expected industry trends and company behavior. Those strategies are still guiding the Power funds to great success a quarter-century later. The GFI founders were remarkably prescient. Finally, it’s worth observing that the Power Opportunities group has increased its capital under management only gradually. There can be little doubt that discipline in fundraising has had a favorable impact on investment results. It’s simply an oxymoron to say, “I’ve found an incredible niche where great returns can be earned consistently and with little risk, and it’s infinitely scalable.” That just doesn’t make sense. So, when the $1 billion Power Fund II compiled its net IRR of 59% – without its portfolio companies employing high leverage – I asked the group leaders how much capital they wanted for their next fund. The answer was simple: $1 billion. Certainly, the typical GP would have used the success of Fund II to raise far more for subsequent funds, perhaps bringing their record of exceptional performance to an end.

最后，我自豪地汇报，电力机会基金 2020 年的合计回报率为 131.1%（扣除费用、业绩提成和开支后），并在此呈列各子基金截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日的累计业绩：

电力机会基金

Lastly, I’m proud to report that the aggregate 2020 return of the Power Opportunities Funds was 131.1% net of fees, incentive allocation and expenses, and to present the lifetime performance of the constituent funds through December 31, 2020: Power Opps Fund

Year

Formed

Year Formed

Committed

Capital

Committed Capital

Net

IRR

Net IRR

成本倍数

Multiple of Cost

2000

2004

2010

2016

2018

2000 2004 2010 2016 2018

$ 453.8

1,020.6

1,062.1

1,105.7

1,400.0

$ 453.8 1,020.6 1,062.1 1,105.7 1,400.0

13.1%

58.9

13.4

29.9

4.4

13.1% 58.9 13.4 29.9 4.4

1.5x

3.1

1.6

2.5

1.0

1.5x 3.1 1.6 2.5 1.0

26.5%

2.0x

一

二

三

四

五

总计

I II III IV V Total

我们很容易理解为什么对“机遇”投资团队（Power Opportunities group）如此自豪。这些基金的平均内部收益率（IRR）不仅非常高，而且每只基金的表现向来出色，有时甚至高得惊人，却从未有过差劲的记录（实际上，从未有一只成熟的基金净 IRR 低于十几% 的低位）。每只“机遇”基金都有极高的命中率和极低的亏损发生率。2020 年“机遇”基金四号 200% 的总回报是我们有史以来最好的成绩，我们相信，就 MOIC（投资回报倍数）而言，它将成为美国私募股权史上同规模基金中回报最高的，而且没有对持仓进行高度杠杆化。到目前为止，“机遇”基金二号一直占据第二名；它将滑落至第三名。你可以明白为什么我们认为该团队的历史业绩——惊喜显然偏向于上行——最充分地体现了橡树资本的理念。

在这 25 年间，“机遇”投资团队的核心领导层经历了演变和交接，但人才不断再生，回报持续滚滚而来。拉里（Larry）和理查德（Richard）于 2009 年退休，就像我说过的，伊恩（Ian）接任。2016 年，伊恩提升迈克尔·卡迪托（Michael Cardito）和贾森·李（Jason Lee）为联合投资组合经理。贾森将在未来几个月内离开我们，投身教学等活动；虽然对他的离去感到遗憾，但我们很高兴知道他将继续担任非正式顾问。与此同时，伊恩正逐步卸下管理职责，并将日常管理事务移交给了迈克尔。鉴于迈克尔对我们最近几期“机遇”基金的成功贡献良多，而且

It’s easy to see why we’re so proud of the Power Opportunities group. Not only is the average IRR for these funds very high, but individually they’ve always been good, sometimes astronomical, but never poor (in fact, never a mature fund with a net IRR below the low teens). Every Power fund has had a very high batting average and a very low incidence of loss. Power Fund IV’s gross return of 200% in 2020 is the best we’ve ever had, and we believe it will turn out to be the highest returning fund of its size in U.S. private equity history in terms of MOIC, without highly leveraging its holdings. Until now, Power Fund II has held the #2 spot; it’ll be bumped down to #3. You can see why we feel the group’s track record, with the surprises clearly on the upside, represents the Oaktree ideal to the fullest. The leadership of the Power Opportunities group has evolved and transitioned over these 25 years, but the talent keeps being regenerated and the returns roll on. Larry and Richard retired in 2009, as I said, and Ian took over. In 2016, Ian promoted Michael Cardito and Jason Lee to be his co-portfolio managers. Jason will be leaving us in the next few months to devote his energies to activities such as teaching, and while we’re sorry to see him go, we’re delighted to know he’ll remain an informal advisor. At the same time, Ian is stepping back from managerial responsibilities and has passed the day-to-day reins to Michael. Since Michael has been responsible for much of the success of our most recent Power funds and

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

伊恩将全面参与投资流程，我们确信这项策略将继续由卓越的人士掌舵。我们感谢“电力机会”团队多年来的成就，相信他们会继续恪守橡树资本的风险控制和一致性理念，期待未来取得更大成功。

橡树资本动态

管理资产规模——在 2020 年前几年，橡树资本的管理资产规模变化不大，仅从 2014 年底的 910 亿美元增至 2019 年底的 950 亿美元（两者均不含我们应占的双线资本管理资产份额）。鉴于市场状况，我们选择限制资产积累，以最大化我们的选择性能力。此外，橡树资本提升管理资产规模的总体能力很大程度上取决于不良债务市场的状态——这是我们最大规模基金的焦点——而这些年供应量相当有限。因此，我们在该领域——进而对整个橡树资本——的募资活动相当克制。

相比之下，2020 年尽管困难重重（包括市场疲软），却似乎是为我们不良债务策略募集资金的理想时机，我们将“机会基金十一期”的设立时间从原计划的 2021 年提前。鉴于预期投资候选标的供应将显著增加，“机会基金十一期”成为我们认为是史上规模最大的不良债务基金，迄今已获得 145 亿美元的资本承诺。

除“机会基金十一期”外，2020 年我们还为多项策略寻求增量资本，包括持续的开放式和永续型基金，以及已在市场中的封闭式基金。市场反响极为热烈，使我们得以在 2020 年总共募集 294 亿美元，创下橡树资本历史上募资总额的最佳年份，同时也是除“机会基金”外其他策略的最佳年份。这使橡树资本年底的管理资产规模升至 1210 亿美元（不含双线资本；整体为 1480 亿美元）。重要的是，我们确信这一总额——分布于 24 种以上策略——让我们能够保持选择性和灵活性。

疫情期间的运营——我对新冠病毒严重性的最初感知发生在 2 月 26 日，当时我在机场等候航班去拜访一位州养老基金客户。我接到电话，告知客户必须取消我的预约，因为他们已制定禁止访客政策（同时对员工实施禁止出差政策）。这一决定——很快就变得如此普遍——在当时显得刺耳而严重。（不过，这让我得以缩短行程，去参加罗茜学校的祖父母节——这确实是一线光明。）

3 月 5 日，我们决定取消原定于 11 日举行的橡树资本两年一度的有限合伙人会议线下形式，改为直播。南希和我从纽约飞往洛杉矶参加这场会议，当时丝毫不知我们会在那里待上几个月。直播结束后我离开了比弗利希尔顿酒店，和你们许多人一样，自此再没回过办公室。正如读过我备忘录《有价值的东西》的人所知，我儿子安德鲁和他的家人于 3 月 13 日搬来与我们同住了几个月，与他进行的投资讨论在 2020 年极大地提升了我个人的工作效率。

橡树资本的员工很快报告了前两例新冠病例，迄今为止，我们在全球约 1000 名员工中已有 40 多例感染。幸运的是，所有人都顺利康复。我们在 3 月初关闭了所有办公室，此后各办公室的出勤情况各不相同。我们感谢那些坚持到岗的人，也感谢那些居家办公的人。

橡树资本的同仁们在 2020 年付出了巨大努力，表现极为出色。显然，我们对结果感到满意。我们的系统运行无碍，员工们在困难条件下勤奋工作。

Ian will be fully involved in the investment process, we know the strategy continues to be in excellent hands. We thank the members of the Power Opportunities group for their long-term achievement. We’re confident they’ll continue to adhere to the Oaktree ideals of risk control and consistency, hopefully with further great success. Oaktree Developments Assets Under Management – Oaktree’s assets under management changed little in the years leading up to 2020, only rising from $91 billion at year-end 2014 to $95 billion at year-end 2019 (in both cases excluding our share of DoubleLine’s AUM). Given the market conditions, we opted to limit asset accumulation in order to maximize our ability to be selective. Further, Oaktree’s overall ability to increase AUM largely depends on the state of the market for distressed debt, the focus of our largest funds, and supply there was very modest in those years. Consequently, our fundraising for that area – and thus for Oaktree overall – was quite restrained. In contrast, 2020, with its many difficulties (including weak markets), seemed the perfect time to raise capital for our distressed debt strategy, and we brought forward the formation of Opportunities Fund XI from its planned date in 2021. In anticipation of a pronounced increase in the supply of candidates for investment, Opps XI became, we believe, the largest distressed debt fund ever formed, with capital commitments of $14.5 billion thus far. In addition to Opps XI, in 2020, we went out for incremental capital for several of our strategies, including ongoing open-end and evergreen efforts and closed-end funds already in the market. The response was very favorable, permitting us to raise a total of $29.4 billion in 2020, the best year for total fundraising in Oaktree’s history, as well as the best for strategies other than Opps. That lifted Oaktree’s year-end AUM to $121 billion ex. DoubleLine ($148 billion overall). Importantly, we’re confident this total – spread over more than two dozen strategies – allows us to remain selective and flexible. Operations During the Pandemic – My first indication of the severity of the coronavirus came on February 26, when I was at the airport waiting to fly to see a state pension fund client. I received a call telling me that the client had to cancel my appointment, as they had established a no-visitors policy (along with a no-travel policy for their staff). That decision – which soon became so common – seemed jarringly serious at the time. (However, it permitted me to curtail my trip and attend Grandparents Day at Rosie’s school – a real silver lining.) On March 5, we made the decision to cancel the in-person version of Oaktree’s biennial LP conference, scheduled for the 11th, and to livestream it instead. Nancy and I flew from New York to Los Angeles for the session, little knowing that we would be there for several months. I left the Beverly Hilton after the livestreaming sessions and, like many of you, haven’t been back to the office since. As those who’ve read my memo Something of Value know, my son Andrew and his family moved in with us on March 13 for a period of months, and investment discussions with him added greatly to my productivity in 2020. Oaktree employees soon reported our first two cases of Covid-19, and to date we’ve had 40+ cases among our roughly 1,000 staff members around the world. Fortunately, everyone recovered nicely. We closed all of our offices in early March, and the attendance picture since then has varied from office to office. We thank both those who’ve been coming in and those who’ve worked from home. Oaktree’s people made great efforts in 2020 and were extremely effective. And clearly, we’re pleased with the results. Our systems operated without a hitch, and our people worked under difficult

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

在各种情况下都能无缝履行我们对客户的职责。我不觉得我们有过任何闪失。而且我们都掌握了一个最能概括 2020 年的短语：“你静音了。”

确保机会均等——2020 年的标志性事件之一是乔治·弗洛伊德死于明尼阿波利斯警察之手，这个引爆点引发了全国范围的抗议浪潮。许多美国个人和企业都开始认识到存在的种族不平等和不公正，并决心采取行动。我们橡树资本就是其中的一员。

自 2016 年以来，橡树资本一直有一项组织严密的行动，致力于提升我们组织的多元化和包容性，由分别面向女性、有色人种（黑人、西语裔/拉丁裔和多种族）以及 LGBTQ 员工的领导委员会牵头。这些委员会在招聘、培训、指导和留任方面承担重要职责、拥有相当影响力，他们的任务是确保这些关键职能落实到位、避免偏见。在这些议题上，他们是橡树资本高级管理层的重要顾问。这些委员会还指导那些传统上在投资管理领域机会有限的社区的大学生，并大力从这些社区招聘人才。我们期待在取得进展时随时汇报。

作为我们应对这一局面的一部分，我们进一步加大力度，提升弱势群体成员在最高层的存在感。于是，我们寻找并找到了理想人选，担任橡树资本首位有色人种董事会成员。正如先前宣布的，上个月我们有幸请到德佩尔莎·麦格鲁德加入我们的董事会。霍华德大学学历、哈佛 MBA、在维亚康姆担任高管 17 年，目前是福特基金会的首席运营官兼财务官——这样的背景堪称理想，尤其是考虑到她在福特基金会负责管理全球运营、审核投资策略以保值和增值那笔超过 140 亿美元的捐赠基金。我们非常高兴地欢迎德佩尔莎加入董事会，并期待她的贡献。

环境、社会与治理——近年来我们看到的投资界最大变化之一，是对环境、社会与治理（ESG）考量的关注度不断提升。每年都有越来越多的投资者加大对这方面的重视，并通过要求投资管理人展现承诺来付诸行动。这一点在橡树资本流程的演进中得到了充分体现。

虽然我们长期以来一直在投资流程中纳入 ESG 考量，但十年前我们几乎不花力气去记录我们的 ESG 评估。而且，我们的每个投资团队都有自己的 ESG 做法。过去几年里，我们成立了 ESG 治理委员会，帮助改进和统一我们在全球各策略中的 ESG 实践。虽然我们在 ESG 方面取得了巨大进步，但迄今为止我们一直在没有专职资源的情况下做到的。鉴于这一领域格局变化之快，加上我们决定加倍投入承诺，我们设立了全职 ESG 负责人一职，直接向我们的首席投资官、我的联席董事长布鲁斯·卡什汇报。

我很高兴地告诉大家，我们最近宣布任命普里亚·普拉萨德·博维担任该职位。普里亚于 2019 年加入橡树资本，从事信贷业务，她深入参与了全球信贷策略 ESG 框架的设计与实施，包括撰写其气候变化管理战略的开篇部分。今后，普里亚将与橡树资本所有投资团队合作，确保我们对新兴 ESG 风险与机遇有充分的认识和了解，她还将帮助我们加强全球范围内的 ESG 整合、文档记录和参与实践。

除了普里亚，我们很幸运还有一支深厚的行业专家队伍在这一领域提供指导，其中包括我们在布鲁克菲尔德资产管理公司的合作伙伴。其中一位专家是马克·卡尼，布鲁克菲尔德的副主席，也是新上任的 ESG 与影响力基金投资负责人。马克是

circumstances to help us seamlessly acquit our responsibility to our clients. I don’t think we skipped a beat. And we all mastered the phrase that best symbolizes 2020: “you’re on mute.” Ensuring Opportunity – One of the signal events of 2020 was the death of George Floyd at the hands of a Minneapolis policeman, a tipping point that ignited protests across the country. Many American individuals and corporations were moved to recognize the racial inequalities and injustices that exist and to do something about them. We at Oaktree are very much part of that group. Since 2016, Oaktree has had a highly organized effort to improve the diversity and inclusiveness of our organization, led by separate leadership councils for women, people of color (Black, Hispanic/Latino and multi-racial) and LGBTQ employees. The councils have significant responsibility and influence with regard to recruiting, training, mentoring and retention, and they are charged with making sure these key functions are carried out well and bias is avoided. They serve as key advisers to Oaktree’s senior management on these subjects. The councils are also mentoring college students from communities that have traditionally had limited access to opportunities in investment management and making great efforts to hire from those communities. We look forward to reporting on progress as it occurs. As part of our response to the situation, we further ramped up our efforts to increase the presence of under-represented group members at the highest levels. Thus, we sought and found the ideal person to become Oaktree’s first board member of color. As previously announced, we were privileged last month to be able to attract Depelsha McGruder to join our board. Howard University, Harvard MBA, 17 years as an executive at Viacom and presently COO and Treasurer of the Ford Foundation – this is an ideal background, especially given her role at Ford in managing global operations and vetting investment strategies to preserve and grow the $14+ billion endowment. We are excited to welcome Depelsha to our board and look forward to her contributions. Environmental, Social and Governance – One of the biggest changes we’ve seen in the investment community in recent years is the increased attention to environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations. Each year, more and more investors are increasing their emphasis on these matters and doing more about them by requiring investment managers to demonstrate their commitment. This has very much been reflected in the evolution of Oaktree’s processes. While we’ve long taken ESG considerations into account as part of our investment process, a decade ago we made little effort to document our ESG assessments. Moreover, each of our investment teams had its own ESG approach. In the last few years we formed an ESG Governance Committee to help improve and harmonize the ESG practices of our strategies globally. While we’ve made tremendous advances in ESG, to date we’ve done so without any dedicated resources. Given how fast the landscape is evolving, and because we’ve decided to redouble our commitment, we’ve created the position of full-time Head of ESG, reporting to our CIO and my co-chairman, Bruce Karsh. I am pleased to report that we recently announced the appointment of Priya Prasad Bowe to that position. Priya, who joined Oaktree in 2019 to work on our credit businesses, has been integrally involved in the design and implementation of the ESG framework for our Global Credit strategy, including authoring the beginnings of its climate-change-management strategy. Going forward, Priya will work with all Oaktree investment teams to make certain we’re fully aware and educated regarding emerging ESG risks and opportunities, and she will assist us in bolstering our ESG integration, documentation and engagement practices globally. In addition to Priya, we’re fortunate to have a deep bench of industry experts to provide guidance in this area, including our partners at Brookfield Asset Management. One such expert is Mark Carney, Brookfield’s Vice Chairman and newly appointed head of ESG and Impact Fund Investing. Mark is the

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

曾担任英国央行和加拿大央行行长，现任联合国气候行动与金融特使。我们的投资人员已开始与马克合作，逐步深化对气候变化的思考。我们预计随着时间推移，在环境、社会和治理（ESG）方面会有更多成果向各位汇报。

橡树新生代——每年汇报橡树员工生育数量是我的一大乐事。2020 年，员工中迎来了 55 名新生儿，自成立以来的累计“成绩”达到 831 名。我一直把员工决定迎接新生命看作他们对未来抱有积极态度和信心的表现。尤其值得一提的是，在始于九个多月前的居家办公阶段之后，我特别期待 2021 年在这方面会带来什么。

展望 2021 年的布局

由于市场可能正处于关键节点，近期方向争议颇多，我打算花较多篇幅讨论未来的布局。因此，读到最后你可能会觉得，这份备忘录本该叫《2021 年展望》，而不是《2020 年回顾》。

投资者常常想象存在两种截然不同的宏观环境：一种是未来清晰的时期，另一种是未来模糊的时期。但现实中，这些时期其实大同小异，因为对未来所谓“清晰”的认知，事后往往被证明只是幻觉。大多数宏观预测不过是对当前水平和近期趋势稍作调整后的外推。尽管“不变”的预测常常命中——因为延续是常态——但这类预测带来的收益微乎其微。只有偏离趋势的重大判断才能带来丰厚回报，但要做到这一点，预测本身必须正确，而这类预测极少应验。这就是为什么能赚钱的宏观预测（以及成功的预测者）少之又少。这种对预测的怀疑态度是贯穿橡树文化的核心主题，也是我们不把投资建立在宏观预测之上的原因。

大多数投资者认为 2020 年初是前景清晰的时期：经济和股市都被预期继续上行。虽然所有人都知道这种涨势不会永远持续，但似乎没有任何因素能让它停下。接着就来了我们见过的最强外部冲击——新冠病毒——再次证明我们永远不知道会发生什么（而且，即便无法预测，我们也该做好准备——这个后面再谈）。相比之下，当下的环境似乎以不确定性为特征。专家们对美国市场前景的看法分歧极大，看多和看空都有充分论据。

从积极的一面看，最关键的是，美国经济相当长一段时间内保持健康运行的可能性很大，而美联储已释放信号，将通过多年的宽松货币政策来维持这一局面。经济持续重启并从疫情中复苏，随着疫苗接种加速推进，这一进程应该会加快。拜登政府希望提供前所未有的财政支持和刺激，而民主党在国会两院可能拥有足够的控制力来实现这一点。

尤其让我印象深刻的是，消费者支出大幅超出平均水平的潜力。想想过去 12 个月里你没花钱的那些事——度假、外出就餐、演唱会、演出、特殊场合穿的衣物——而数百万美国人同样如此。再看看那些去年收入比前年更高的家庭——首先是那些领了政府补助支票但没有失业的人。这使得实际个人收入增速创下 20 年来最高。哈佛经济学家杰森·弗曼估计，收入高于趋势和支出低于趋势的组合，自疫情暴发以来已累计创造了约 1.8 万亿美元的额外可支配个人收入。最后，再加上去年股市数万亿美元的升值以及房地产更大幅度的上涨所带来的极为正面的财富效应。

former Governor of the Bank of England and Bank of Canada and serves as a United Nations Special Envoy for Climate Action and Finance. Our investment personnel have begun to work with Mark to evolve their thinking on climate change. We expect over time to have much to report to you on ESG. Oaktree Babies – It’s one of my great pleasures each year to report on the progress of the Oaktree baby count. In that connection, 55 children were born to employees in 2020, bringing our since-inception performance to 831. I always take our employees’ decision to bring a new person into this world as a show of their positive attitudes and faith in the future. I’m particularly eager to see what 2021 brings in this regard, following the work-from-home stretch that began just over nine months ago. Positioning for 2021 Because the market is at a possibly critical juncture and its direction is much debated these days, I’m going to spend an unusual amount of time discussing positioning going forward. Thus, you might end up feeling this memo should have been titled Preview of 2021 rather than 2020 in Review. Investors often imagine there are two distinct macro environments: times when the future is clear and times when it isn’t. In reality, though, these periods are all pretty much the same, since perceived clarity regarding the future often turns out to have been illusory. Most macro forecasting consists of extrapolating current levels and recent trends with minor tinkering. While predictions of “no change” are often right – as continuation is the general rule – they give rise to little in terms of profit. Only forecasts of major deviation from trend can be highly profitable. But to be so, they also must be correct, and they rarely are. That’s why profitable macro forecasts (and successful forecasters) are few and far between. This negative view on forecasting is a major theme running through Oaktree’s culture and the reason we don’t base our investments on macro forecasts. Most investors felt that the beginning of 2020 was a time of clarity: the economy and the stock market were both expected to continue advancing. While everyone knew they wouldn’t do so forever, nothing seemed poised to make them stop. And then came the strongest exogenous shock we’ve ever seen – the novel coronavirus – proving once again that we never know what’s going to happen (and that even though we can’t predict, we should prepare – more on this later). Today’s environment, in contrast, seems to be characterized by a lack of clarity. Experts are expressing highly divergent opinions regarding the outlook for U.S. markets, with strong arguments both bullish and bearish. Most important on the positive side of the ledger, we seem highly likely to have a healthy economy for a good while, and the Fed has telegraphed its plan for years of accommodative monetary policy to keep it that way. The economy continues to reopen and recover from the pandemic, and this process should speed up as the vaccine rollout accelerates. President Biden’s administration wants to provide unprecedented levels of financial support and stimulus, and the Democrats probably have enough control of the two houses of Congress to do so. I’m particularly impressed by the potential for well above average consumer spending. Think about all the things you didn’t spend money on in the last 12 months, such as vacations, dinners out, concerts and shows, and clothing for special occasions, and about the millions of Americans of whom the same is true. Now consider the households that made more money last year than they did the year before – starting with those who received support checks but didn’t suffer job losses. This caused real personal income to grow at the fastest rate in 20 years. Harvard economist Jason Furman estimates that the combination of above-trend income and below-trend spending has created roughly $1.8 trillion of extra disposable personal income since the beginning of the pandemic. Finally, add in the very positive wealth effect from last year’s multi-trillion dollar appreciation on stocks and still more on homes.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

额外可支配收入加上漫长隔离期结束、积压需求得到释放，两者叠加，有可能大幅助推短期经济增长。许多经济学家预计今年美国 GDP 增速将远高于平均水平，而前几个月可能偏慢，这意味着后几个月会有大幅增长。以摩根士丹利为例，该机构预测 2021 年第四季度年化 GDP 将比 2020 年第四季度高出 7.6%。虽然疫情封锁引发的衰退令人痛苦，但它为接下来一段时间带来一些非常亮眼的同比数据奠定了基础。

强劲的经济还将得到美联储的助力，后者已承诺多年维持低利率，并继续购买债券。美联储会尽一切努力保持宽松货币政策，以支持经济增长和就业创造。过去一年它已清楚表明，其工具多种多样且威力强大，至少短期内如此。

还有一个相关的利好值得考虑：市场见顶通常发生在经济进入上升周期数年后、且易受衰退冲击之时。但这一次，我们是在可能漫长经济复苏的起点迎来了强势市场。复苏如此早期就看到资产价格全线上涨，这本身是风险来源；但另一方面，经济可能持续增长数年，这一事实令人鼓舞。

在利好因素中，最后一点是我认为美国政治不确定性有所下降，极端事件的可能分布尾部被削薄。中间偏左的总统加上国会两院民主党以微弱多数掌控，我相信激进立法不太可能通过。

与对经济和抗疫这两件头等大事的乐观展望相对，还有一系列担忧。最短期的风险是第一季度 GDP 数据可能平淡无奇。最近一波严重疫情让美国单日新增病例创下纪录，可能拖慢了当前经济活动（迄今为止经济数据好坏参半）。但所有人都知道这一点，过去十一个月里投资者一直愿意“放眼谷底之外”，而强劲增长近在眼前，他们不太可能现在停下脚步。

最大的风险是利率可能上升。过去 40 年利率一直稳步下行。这对投资者来说是巨大的顺风，因为利率下行环境降低了资产的要求回报率，推高了资产价格。利率下降与资产估值上升之间的联动，在很大程度上解释了为何股票市盈率高于平均水平、债券收益率处于历史最低（这等于说债券价格处于历史最高）。

但利率下行趋势已经结束（前提是我们相信美联储保证不会让名义利率进入负区间的承诺）。因此，虽然利率可能从此处上升——意味着所有资产的要求回报率提高、资产价格下跌——却不可能下降。这就形成了一种负向不对称的局面。

所以，今天的资产高价在今天的利率水平下也许合理，但如果利率上行，这显然是脆弱点。（请注意，当前 10 年期美债收益率 1.40%，高于 2020 年 8 月低点时的 0.52%，也高于仅七周前的 0.93%。）

美联储说利率会多年保持低位，但它实现这一承诺的能力有没有限制？美联储能把利率人为压低到永远吗？对较长期债券呢？还有通胀呢？如果通胀达到 3%，10 年期美债还能维持 1.40% 的收益率吗？人们会在实际收益率为负时买入吗？还是价格会下跌、推高收益率？通胀可能从哪里来？

The combination of this extra disposable income with the ending of a prolonged period of isolation and release of pent-up demand has the potential to add substantially to short-term economic growth. Many economists expect U.S. GDP to rise at a well above average rate this year, and with the early months likely to be slow, that implies big gains later in the year. Morgan Stanley, to pick one source, predicts that 4Q2021 annualized GDP will be 7.6% above 4Q2020. While the lockdown-related recession was painful, it set the stage for some very positive year-over-year comparisons in the period immediately ahead. The strong economy will be abetted by a Fed that has promised to keep interest rates low for years and to continue buying bonds. The Fed will make every effort to keep monetary policy accommodative to support economic growth and job creation. It clearly demonstrated in the last year that its tools are varied and powerful, at least in the short run. A related positive to consider is that market tops usually occur with the economy several years into the up-leg of the cycle and vulnerable to recession. This time, however, we have strong markets at the beginning of what may prove to be a long economic recovery. The fact that we already see full asset prices so early in the recovery is a source of risk. But on the other hand, the fact that the economy is likely to grow for several years is very encouraging. Finally among the positives, I believe U.S. political uncertainty has declined somewhat, truncating the extreme tails of the distribution of possible events. With a center-left president and tiny Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, I believe radical legislation is unlikely to be enacted. Arrayed against the optimistic outlook regarding the two most important things, the economy and the fight against the pandemic, are a number of concerns. The shortest-term risk is the possibility of unimpressive first quarter GDP data. The latest severe wave of the virus, which took daily cases in the U.S. to record levels, may have slowed current economic activity (so far, the economic data are very mixed). But everyone knows this, and investors have been willing to “look across the valley” for the past eleven months and are unlikely to stop now, when strong growth is right around the corner. The biggest risk of all is the possibility of rising interest rates. Rates have declined quite steadily for the last 40 years. This has been a huge tailwind for investors, since a declining-rate environment lowers the demanded returns on assets, making for higher asset prices. The linkage between falling interest rates and rising asset valuations is a good part of the reason why p/e ratios on stocks are above average and bond yields are the lowest we’ve ever seen (which is the same as saying bond prices are the highest). But the downtrend in rates is over (if we can believe the Fed’s assurance that it won’t take nominal rates into negative territory). Thus, while interest rates can rise from here – implying higher demanded returns on everything and thus lower asset prices – they can’t decline. This creates a negatively asymmetrical proposition. So today’s high asset prices may be justified at today’s interest rates, but that’s clearly a source of vulnerability if rates were to rise. (Note that today’s 1.40% yield on the 10-year Treasury note is up from 0.52% at the low in August 2020 and from 0.93% in just the last seven weeks.) The Fed says rates will be low for years to come, but are there limitations on its ability to make that happen? Can the Fed keep rates artificially low forever? On longer-maturity bonds? And what about inflation? Can the 10-year Treasury note still yield 1.40% if inflation reaches 3%? Will people buy it at a negative real yield? Or will the price fall so that it yields more? Where could inflation come from?

2021 年橡树资本管理公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

原件此处是表格，PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失，下面只剩按列读出的数字，行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

商品价格未必以美元金额上涨，但美元信誉下降（或流通中的美元数量增加）可能使其相对商品价格贬值：结果殊途同归。2 月 7 日，财政部长珍妮特·耶伦在电视上回应关于拟议新冠纾困方案带来的通胀风险问题时，长篇大论地强调为受苦的美国人提供救助的重要性。这个前提很少有人反对。她还明确表示，她认为救助过多比救助不足更好。这同样没错。但这并不意味着（a）救助越多越好，或者（b）不存在风险。两党的专家都在质疑正在讨论的 1.9 万亿美元纾困方案是否规模过大或方向有误；进步派经济学家拉里·萨默斯于 2 月 4 日在《华盛顿邮报》撰文表达了这一观点：

……将 2009 年的刺激措施与当前提议进行对比，颇有启发。2009 年，实际产出与潜在产出的估计缺口约为每月 800 亿美元，且仍在扩大。2009 年的刺激措施在当年提供了每月 300 亿至 400 亿美元的增量——相当于产出缺口的一半左右。

相比之下，国会预算办公室最近的估计显示，在已经颁布的 9000 亿美元方案之下——但没有任何新的刺激——实际产出与潜在产出的缺口将从年初的每月约 500 亿美元下降到年末的每月 200 亿美元。拟议的刺激措施总额将接近每月 1500 亿美元，甚至还没考虑任何后续措施。这至少是产出缺口的三倍。

换句话说，奥巴马的刺激规模约为产出缺口的一半，而拟议的拜登刺激规模则是预期缺口的三倍。相对于所应对的缺口规模而言，它大了六倍……

另一种评估财政计划规模的方式是观察家庭收入损失，并将其与福利增加和税收抵免进行比较。目前工资和薪金收入比疫情前预测每月低约 300 亿美元，这一缺口在 2021 年可能缩小。然而，在拟议刺激措施下，2021 年的福利支付增加和税收抵免总额将达到约 1500 亿美元——比例为 5 比 1。考虑到刺激措施的针对性，对低收入个人和家庭而言，这一比例可能更高。

……虽然存在巨大的不确定性，但规模更接近二战时期而非正常衰退期的宏观刺激，有可能引发一代人未曾见过的通胀压力，对美元价值和金融稳定造成影响。（强调为后加）

通常人们会预期，如此大量的额外流动性注入经济会导致通胀加速，但美联储说不。当然，尽管央行可能希望看到通胀上升（因为这会降低偿债成本），但它们必须劝阻这种言论，以免助长通胀预期。另一方面，自 2008 年以来，我们一直有巨额赤字和宽松的货币政策，却没有出现严重通胀。我们看到失业率降至 50 年低点，却仍未出现菲利普斯曲线所预测的通胀。日本和欧洲多年来一直试图实现 2% 的通胀却未成功。通胀近期内会成为威胁吗？答案很清楚：谁知道呢？

除了这些重大风险之外，还有其他一些风险——虽然可能较小、影响较轻或没那么迫近——但仍应予以考虑：

The price of goods may not rise in dollar terms, but reduced respect for the dollar (or increased quantities of dollars in circulation) could cause it to depreciate relative to the price of goods: same result. On TV on February 7, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen responded to a question about inflation risk posed by the proposed Covid-19 relief package with a long discourse on the importance of delivering relief to Americans who are suffering. Few would argue with that premise. She also made clear that she believes it’s better to provide too much relief than too little. True as well. But that doesn’t mean (a) the more relief the better or (b) there aren’t risks attached. Experts from both sides of the political aisle have questioned whether the $1.9 trillion relief package under discussion is too much and/or misdirected; Larry Summers, a progressive economist, wrote to that effect in The Washington Post on February 4: . . . a comparison of the 2009 stimulus and what is now being proposed is instructive. In 2009, the gap between actual and estimated potential output was about $80 billion a month and increasing. The 2009 stimulus measures provided an incremental $30 billion to $40 billion a month during 2009 — an amount equal to about half the output shortfall. In contrast, recent Congressional Budget Office estimates suggest that with the already enacted $900 billion package — but without any new stimulus — the gap between actual and potential output will decline from about $50 billion a month at the beginning of the year to $20 billion a month at its end. The proposed stimulus will total in the neighborhood of $150 billion a month, even before consideration of any follow-on measures. That is at least three times the size of the output shortfall. In other words, whereas the Obama stimulus was about half as large as the output shortfall, the proposed Biden stimulus is three times as large as the projected shortfall. Relative to the size of the gap being addressed, it is six times as large. . . . Another [way of assessing the scale of a fiscal program] is to look at family income losses and compare them to benefit increases and tax credits. Wage and salary incomes are now running about $30 billion a month below pre-Covid-19 forecasts, and this gap will likely decline during 2021. Yet increased benefit payments and tax credits in 2021 with proposed stimulus measures would total about $150 billion — a ratio of 5 to 1. The ratio is likely even greater for low-income individuals and families, given the targeting of stimulus measures. . . . . . . while there are enormous uncertainties, there is a chance that macroeconomic stimulus on a scale closer to World War II levels than normal recession levels will set off inflationary pressures of a kind we have not seen in a generation, with consequences for the value of the dollar and financial stability. (Emphasis added) Normally one would expect such a flood of additional liquidity into the economy to cause inflation to accelerate, but the Fed says no. Of course, although central banks might like to see inflation increase (as it makes it cheaper to repay debt), they have to discourage such talk for fear of fueling inflationary expectations. On the other hand, we’ve had substantial deficits and accommodative monetary policy ever since 2008 and no serious inflation. We’ve seen a 50-year-low in the unemployment rate and yet not the inflation the Phillips Curve would have predicted. And Japan and Europe have been trying for 2% inflation for years without success. Is inflation a threat anytime soon? The answer’s clear: who knows? In addition to these major risks, there are others that – although perhaps smaller, less consequential or less imminent – should nevertheless be considered:

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

•

对经济的乐观情绪，建立在几个正面假设之上：疫苗有效、能顺利接种到人群、且能长期抵御新变种。我个人的猜测是，美国将在第三季度达到群体免疫，此后生活将逐步回归疫情前的常态。若疫苗接种的速度或效果令人失望，则可能拖延并复杂化经济复苏的进程。

美联储和美国财政部的行动，可能正引导投资者在当前低回报的世界里激进追逐高收益，把风险规避换成了风险容忍。过去预示股市和债市过度乐观与自满的种种迹象，如今已显现出来：

Optimism regarding the economy is based on positive assumptions about vaccines being efficacious, getting into arms, and holding up over time and against new variants. My own guess is that the U.S. will reach herd immunity in the third quarter, with life thereafter moving back in the direction of pre-pandemic norms. Disappointment regarding the speed or efficacy of vaccinations could delay and complicate the rekindling of economic growth. The actions of the Fed and U.S. Treasury may be leading investors to aggressively pursue high returns in today’s low-return world, replacing risk aversion with risk tolerance. Signs that in the past indicated excessive optimism and complacency in stock and bond markets are present today: o o o o o

•

• • • •

投机性证券和“迷因股”的强劲表现；

散户对股票、期权和杠杆交易的热烈买入；

债券发行竞标火爆、收益率偏低、契约保护薄弱；

巴菲特指标（股市总市值与国内生产总值之比）远超此前高点；

大量首次公开募股（IPO），包括亏损公司的上市，以及首日股价暴涨数十甚至数百个百分点。

the strong performance of speculative securities and “meme” stocks; heavy retail buying of stocks, options buying, and buying on margin; heated bidding for bond deals, low bond yields and weak contractual protections; the Buffett Indicator (the ratio of total equity market capitalization to GDP) far above its previous high; and large numbers of IPOs, including IPOs by unprofitable companies, and first-day share price jumps of tens or hundreds of percent.

过去 20 年间，许多投资者认定，在传统股票和债券上无法获得想要或需要的回报，于是资金涌向另类资产，令那里的投资者也陷入更复杂的处境。失业率短期内或许不会回落到疫情前的水平，经济的长期增长也可能依旧平淡无奇。中美关系恐将继续磕磕绊绊，时不时爆发摩擦；全球化——尽管给整个世界带来经济利益——也可能不如往昔强劲。美国的社会与政治裂痕短期内难以弥合，机会不均与待遇不平等的问题，恐怕也不易化解。

Since many investors have concluded over the last 20 years that they can’t achieve the returns they want or need in traditional stocks and bonds, capital has flooded into alternative assets, complicating life for investors there, too. The unemployment rate may not soon fall to pre-Covid-19 levels, and the secular growth of the economy could remain unimpressive. U.S. relations with China are likely to continue to be thorny, flaring up from time to time, and globalization – with its economic benefits for the world overall – may be weaker than in the past. America’s social and political divides are unlikely to close anytime soon, and the country may not easily resolve questions of unequal opportunity and treatment.

上述清单遗漏了两个长期担忧，它们看似遥远且理论化，但我认为其潜在影响重大：

The above list omits two long-term worries that may seem theoretical and far off but I think are potentially significant: •

•

美联储真的能把资产负债表扩大数万亿美元，而美国在 2020 年及未来几年每年出现数万亿美元的财政赤字，却不会带来负面后果，比如美元贬值？如果美元表现不佳，它还能继续作为世界储备货币，并让美国维持无限借款以弥补赤字的能力不变吗？如果最后一个问题的答案是“否”，又会发生什么？

我们如何为那些因技术和自动化而失业、又缺乏参与信息经济所需技能的人找到工作？那些被新经济排除在外的地区又会怎样？

Can the Fed really increase its balance sheet by trillions of dollars and the U.S. run annual deficits in the trillions – in 2020 and in coming years – without negative consequences, like a decline in the dollar’s value? If the dollar performs poorly, will it remain the world’s reserve currency and leave unchanged the U.S.’s ability to borrow unlimited amounts of money to cover deficits? And what happens if the answer to that last question proves to be “no”? How will we find jobs for all the people who are displaced by technology and automation and lack the skills required to participate in the information economy? What happens to parts of the country that are left out of the new economy?

最后，关于我们是否处于泡沫之中的诸多担忧，都与估值有关。以标普 500 指数为例，当前价格与 2021 年预期盈利的比率大约为 22 倍（具体取决于你采用哪套盈利预测）。与 15 至 16 倍的历史平均水平相比，这看起来似乎不便宜。但仅凭当前估值与历史均值的对比就仓促下结论，过于简单化，不足为凭。在评判标普 500 指数今天的估值之前，必须考虑几个因素：（a）利率环境，（b）指数成分股构成向高估值、快速增长科技公司的倾斜，（c）指数各成分股（包括这些科技公司）的估值水平，以及（d）经济前景。综合这些因素来看，我认为当今多数资产估值并未到疯狂的地步。当然，投机性股票若大幅回调，可能对眼下乐观的投资者心理造成负面冲击。

Finally, much of the worry about whether we’re in a bubble relates to valuations. For the S&P 500, for example, the current ratio of price to projected 2021 earnings is roughly 22 (depending on which earnings estimates you use). This seems expensive compared to the historic average in the range of 1516. But knee-jerk judgments based on the relationship between current valuations and historic averages are too simplistic to be dispositive. Before making a judgment about today’s valuation of the S&P 500, one must consider (a) the context in terms of interest rates, (b) the shift in its composition in favor of rapidly growing technology companies, with their higher valuations, (c) the valuations of the index’s individual components, including those tech companies, and (d) the outlook for the economy. With these factors in mind, I don’t think most of today’s asset valuations are crazy. Of course, a big correction in speculative stocks could have a negative impact on today’s bullish investor psychology.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

特别地，就上述第一点而言，我们可以看看当前标普 500 指数 4.5% 的盈利收益率*与 10 年期美国国债 1.4% 收益率之间的关系。隐含的“股权风险溢价”为 310 个基点，与过去 20 年 300 个基点的平均水平非常吻合。估值也可以参照短期利率来看。目前标普 500 指数的市盈率为 22 倍，略低于 2000 年 3 月（科技泡沫顶峰时期）的 24 倍，而当时联邦基金利率约为 6.5%，如今则接近零。因此，2000 年时标普 500 指数的盈利收益率为 4.2%，比联邦基金利率低 230 个基点，而今天则高出 450 个基点。换句话说，相对于短期利率，如今标普 500 指数比 21 年前便宜得多。

信贷市场的情况也类似。例如，高收益债券与国债之间的收益率利差低于历史区间，尽管可能仍足以弥补可能的信贷损失。因此，与当今大多数其他资产一样，高收益债券的价格绝对值偏高，相对值还算合理，并且在很大程度上依赖于利率保持在低位。

那么这让我们处于何种境地？在许多方面，我们又回到了 2020 年前几年所面临的投资环境：一个不确定的世界，提供了我们所见过的预期回报率最低的机会，资产价格至少是充分到偏高，人们为了寻求更高回报而采取冒险行为。这暗示我们应该回到橡树资本在新冠疫情前的格言：向前迈进，但保持谨慎。但一两年前，我们处于一个已持续十年的经济复苏中——这是历史上最长的一次。相反，现在看起来我们正处于一个可能持续数年的经济上升周期的起点。

在我的职业生涯中，有几次我觉得呼吁顶部（或底部）的逻辑令人信服，成功概率很高。这次不是其中之一。基于对估值、联邦政府支出、通胀和利率的担忧，关于可能形成泡沫的讨论越来越多，但我看到太多的积极因素，以至于答案不可能是非黑即白的。

为了走向结论，我将简要总结支持、反对及反方论点：

•

In particular, as to item (a) above, we can look at the relationship between today’s 4.5% earnings yield* on the S&P 500 and the yield on the 10-year Treasury note of 1.4%. The implied “equity risk premium” of 310 basis points is very much in line with the average of 300 bp over the last 20 years. Valuations can also be viewed relative to short-term interest rates. The current p/e ratio on the S&P 500 of 22 is slightly below the reading of 24 in March 2000 (the height of the tech bubble), and the fed funds rate is around zero today versus 6.5% back then. Thus, in 2000, the earning yield on the S&P 500 was 4.2%, or 230 basis points below the fed funds rate, while today it’s 450 bp above. In other words, the S&P 500 is much cheaper today relative to short-term rates than it was 21 years ago. The story is similar in the credit market. For example, the yield spread on high yield bonds versus Treasurys is below the historic range, although probably still more than adequate to offset likely credit losses. Thus, as with most other assets today, the price of high yield bonds is high in the absolute, fair-ish in relative terms, and highly reliant on interest rates staying low. So where does that leave us? In many ways, we’re back to the investment environment we faced in the years immediately prior to 2020: an uncertain world, offering the lowest prospective returns we’ve ever seen, with asset prices that are at least full to high, and with people engaging in pro-risk behavior in search of better returns. This suggests we should return to Oaktree’s pre-Covid-19 mantra: move forward, but with caution. But a year or two ago, we were in an economic recovery that was a decade old – the longest in history. Instead, it now appears we’re at the beginning of an economic up-cycle that’s likely to run for years. Over the course of my career, there have been a handful of times when I felt the logic for calling a top (or bottom) was compelling and the probability of success was high. This isn’t one of them. There’s increasing mention of a possible bubble based on concerns about valuations, federal government spending, inflation and interest rates, but I see too many positives for the answer to be black-or-white. In the interest of moving toward a conclusion, I’m going to briefly recap the pros, cons and counterarguments: • • • • • • • •

经济前景是积极的，尽管鲍威尔主席警告说复苏仍然“不均衡且远未完成”，就业创造不足。因此他表示美联储将在多年内维持低利率。但随着财政和货币政策极度宽松，利率已经开始上行，并且容易受到通胀加剧的影响。

2010 年代，尽管经济复苏持续时间、赤字和低失业率都创下了纪录，通胀却一直保持低位。然而，通胀能否继续保持这种状态是不确定的。

市场温度已经升高，有迹象表明存在狂热和冒险行为。估值相对于历史水平偏高，因为证券价格已经跑赢了经济增长。高倍数是当前低利率所支撑的，但依赖利率持续走低。风险补偿不足，这一点从热门公司的溢价估值和信贷利差处于历史低位中可见一斑。

华盛顿构成风险，因为一党控制国会，且其最激进的成员推行反资本主义政策。我的希望是，微弱的多数席位使得激进立法不太可能通过。

至于外部风险，拜登总统将追求更大的和谐，但与中国和伊朗的紧张关系以及国内种族和社会分歧继续给前景蒙上阴影。

The economic outlook is positive, although Chairman Powell warns that the recovery remains “uneven and far from complete,” with inadequate job creation. Thus he says the Fed will keep interest rates low for years. But with fiscal and monetary policy extremely accommodative, rates are already on the move up and vulnerable to increased inflation. Inflation stayed low in the 2010s despite records being set in terms of duration of the economic recovery, deficits and low unemployment. However, inflation’s ability to remain so is uncertain. The temperature of the market is elevated, and there are signs of euphoria and risky behavior. Valuations are high relative to history, as security prices have run ahead of economic gains. High multiples are justified by today’s low interest rates but dependent on continued low rates. Risk compensation is skimpy, as seen in the premium valuations of favored companies and in historically narrow yield spreads on credit. Washington poses a risk because of one party’s control and the anti-capitalist policies of its most progressive members. My hope is that the narrow majorities render radical legislation less likely. As to exogenous risks, President Biden will pursue greater harmony, but tension with China and Iran and the racial and social divisions at home continue to cloud the outlook.

-- 股票或股票指数的盈利收益率，为其盈利与价格的比率。即 e/p 比率：市盈率的倒数，或 1 除以市盈率。前瞻市盈率为 22，相当于盈利收益率 1 ÷ 22，即 4.5%。

-- The earnings yield on a stock or stock index is the ratio of its earnings to its price. Thus it’s the e/p

ratio: the inverse of the p/e ratio, or 1 divided by the p/e ratio. A forward-looking p/e ratio of 22 equates to an earnings yield of 1 ÷ 22, or 4.5%.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

两种观点各执一词，我觉得多数资产的价格都处在一个灰色地带——肯定不算低，多半略高于合理水平，但也没有高到离谱的地步。

说到底就是这个意思：鉴于当前形势，投资者是该维持常规的风险仓位，还是更偏防守，抑或更趋激进？虽然多数资产类别经风险调整后的回报彼此大致处于均衡状态，但所有绝对回报都处于极低水平，与当下同样低的利率相匹配。总体来看，我认为维持常规姿态比较合适，或许可以略微偏向防守。既然沿着风险曲线向外走——比如赚取收益率利差——的回报并不丰厚，我很难把这看作一个该激进追逐高回报的时机。更何况，一个人越是笃定利率很快就会明显上行，今天就该越发谨慎。

由于主要风险在于通胀上升的可能性以及随之而来的更高利率，我认为投资组合必须留出缓冲：哪怕我们无法预测，也要做好准备。这种可能性意味着，（a）久期明显超过十年的债券是显而易见的低配对象，（b）通胀受益品种则应考虑超配，包括浮动利率债务、能够上调租金的房地产，以及有能力转嫁价格上涨和（或）盈利增长潜力迅速的公司的股票。

想在这种环境里找到像样的回报，选择寥寥无几。投资者已把资金大量投入主流公开市场的“贝塔”领域，结果就是预期回报已经下降——充分反映了利率的走低——市场也变得相当有效。多数情况下，价格已与内在价值趋同，甚至跑在了前面。这意味着想跑赢大盘比以往任何时候都难，除非是承担额外风险，并且幸运地赶上这种冒险能获回报的环境。

虽说眼下没有哪个市场缺资金，但或许存在另类的“阿尔法”市场，投资技能能在那里贡献回报，但愿不会伴随着整体风险的同步上升。这部分超额回报中，有一些不过是承受缺乏流动性所获得的溢价，而 2008-09 年危机期间一些机构所承受的痛苦，恰恰说明了正确评估自己承受非流动性的能力有多重要。还有一部分回报增量将来自聘用具备阿尔法能力的经理人，也就是那些能在不相应提高风险的情况下贡献回报的人。然而，依赖正阿尔法会让投资者暴露在经理人风险之下，也就是可能聘到最终展现负阿尔法的经理人。

过去这一年考验了人们对经济、市场和政策的许多先入之见——甚至改变了我们的生活方式。但投资中那条无法回避的真理依然未变：没有什么神奇答案，也没有哪条捷径（除了超凡的技能之外）能让投资者安全而稳妥地赚取高回报。在如今这个低回报的世界里，这一点尤其真切。

With arguments on both sides, I feel the prices of most assets are in a gray area – certainly not low, mostly on the high side of fair, but not so high as to be unreasonable. The bottom line is this: given current conditions, should investors be at their usual risk position, more defensive or more aggressive? While the risk-adjusted returns of most asset classes seem to be at rough equilibrium relative to each other, all absolute returns are ultra-low, commensurate with today’s equally low interest rates. On balance, I think it’s appropriate to be in one’s normal stance, perhaps with a modest bias toward defense. Since the rewards for moving further out on the risk curve – such as yield spreads – aren’t lavish, I have trouble seeing this as a time to aggressively chase high returns. Moreover, the surer one is that rates will soon rise meaningfully, the more cautious one should be today. Because the primary risk lies in the possibility of rising inflation and the higher interest rates that would bring, I think portfolios have to make allowances: even though we can’t predict, we should prepare. This possibility means (a) bonds with maturities much above ten years are obvious candidates for underweighting and (b) inflation beneficiaries should be considered for overweighting, including floating-rate debt, real estate capable of seeing rent increases, and the stocks of companies with the power to pass on price increases and/or the potential for rapid earnings growth. When it comes to finding decent returns in this environment, the options are slim. Investors have plowed capital into the mainstream public “beta” markets. As a result, prospective returns have come down – fully reflecting the reduction in interest rates – and markets have become quite efficient. In most cases, price has converged with – if not run ahead of – intrinsic value. That means it’s harder than ever to outperform, other than by taking on additional risk and being lucky enough to do so in an environment where such action is rewarded. Although no markets are starved for capital these days, there may be alternative “alpha” markets where investment skill can add to returns, hopefully without a commensurate increase in overall risk. Some of this additional return is simply a premium for bearing illiquidity, and the pain suffered by some institutions during the 2008-09 crisis shows how important it is to correctly assess one’s ability to live with illiquidity. And some of the return increment will come from employing managers with alpha, or the ability to add to return without a corresponding increase in risk. However, relying on positive alpha exposes investors to manager risk, or the possibility of hiring managers who turn out to have negative alpha. This past year challenged many preconceived notions about the economy, markets and policy – and even changed the way we live. But the inescapable truth of investing remains unchanged: there is no magic answer, no solution (other than superior skill) that will enable an investor to earn a high return safely and dependably. And that’s especially true in today’s low-return world. *

祝各位 2021 年一切顺利，橡树资本的每一位成员都期待与大家继续携手合作。

I wish you all the very best in 2021, and everyone at Oaktree looks forward to continuing our work together. March 4, 2021

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.