思考宏观
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
思考宏观
Thinking About Macro
一条信息要称得上可取,必须满足两个标准:它必须重要,而且必须可知。——沃伦·巴菲特
经常阅读我备忘录的读者都知道,橡树资本和我本人对宏观预测持高度怀疑态度。事实上,橡树资本投资哲学的六条基本原则之一就明确表示,我们不基于宏观预测来做投资决策。橡树资本不雇用任何经济学家,也很少邀请他们到办公室来分享观点。
原因很简单:用巴菲特的话说,我们确信宏观未来是不可知的。或者更确切地说,宏观预测是另一个领域——正如投资总体上一样——做到与共识一样正确很容易,但要比共识更正确却很难。共识预测带不来任何优势;只有比他人更正确——拥有知识优势——投资者才能指望稳定地获得超越平均的回报。
许多投资者认为,他们的工作职责就是形成宏观观点并据此进行投资。成功的选股者或房地产买家常常对宏观前景发表看法,即便没有证据表明他们的投资成功与准确的宏观预测相关。尽管如此,由于宏观变化影响巨大,许多人认为投资时忽视这些因素简直是不负责任的。然而:
For a piece of information to be desirable, it has to satisfy two criteria: it has to be important, and it has to be knowable. – Warren Buffett Regular readers of my memos know that Oaktree and I approach macro forecasts with a high degree of skepticism. In fact, one of the six tenets of Oaktree’s investment philosophy states flatly that we don’t base our investment decisions on macro forecasts. Oaktree doesn’t employ any economists, and we rarely invite them to our offices to share their views. The reason for this is simple: to use Buffett’s terminology, we’re convinced the macro future isn’t knowable. Or, rather, macro forecasting is another area where – as with investing in general – it’s easy to be as right as the consensus, but very hard to be more right. Consensus forecasts provide no advantage; it’s only from being more right than others – from having a knowledge advantage – that investors can expect to dependably earn above average returns. Many investors think their job requires them to develop a macro outlook and invest according to its dictates. Successful stock pickers or real estate buyers often make pronouncements regarding the macro outlook, even in the absence of evidence linking their investment success to accurate macro forecasts. Nonetheless, since macro developments are so influential, many people think it’s downright irresponsible to ignore them when investing. Yet: • •
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大多数宏观预测,结果要么是(一)毫无用处的市场共识预期,要么是(二)极少靠谱的非共识预测。我认识的投资者里,靠宏观预测做决策还能成功的,一只手就数得过来。其余人都是自下而上,一笔一笔地投。他们觉得捡到便宜货就买,觉得贵了就卖——大多根本不看宏观面。承认自己不知道宏观未来会怎样,可能很难说出口,无论对自己还是对别人;但在不确定性极大的领域,不可知论恐怕比自欺欺人更明智。
Most macro forecasts are likely to turn out to be either (a) unhelpful consensus expectations or (b) non-consensus forecasts that are rarely right. I can count on one hand the investors I know who successfully base their decisions on macro forecasts. The rest invest from the bottom up, one investment at a time. They buy when they think they’ve found bargains and sell things they consider overpriced – mostly without reference to the macro outlook. It may be hard to admit – to yourself or to others – that you don’t know what the macro future holds, but in areas entailing great uncertainty, agnosticism is probably wiser than self-delusion.
可别光听我一面之词,看看这些权威观点怎么说?
一想到自己可能有所不知,确实让人害怕,但更吓人的是,这世上大体上是由那些自认为了解一切的人在掌舵。——阿莫斯·特沃斯基
让你陷入麻烦的,不是你不知道的事,而是你确信不疑却大错特错的事。——马克·吐温
But why take my word for it? How about these authoritative views? It’s frightening to think that you might not know something, but more frightening to think that, by and large, the world is run by people who have faith that they know exactly what’s going on. – Amos Tversky It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so. – Mark Twain
2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
版权所有
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这就引出了预测者的业绩记录这个话题,或者更确切地说,是他们根本没有业绩记录。早在 1970 年代,一位前辈告诉我:“经济学家就是一个从不按市价结算的资产组合经理。”这个描述至今看来依然十分贴切。你听过哪个经济学家或宏观策略师说“我认为很快会有经济衰退(而且我的衰退预测里有百分之多少在一年内应验了)”吗?谁会把自己钱交给一个不公布业绩记录的投资经理呢?那又为什么要追随那些不披露业绩记录的宏观预测者呢?
最后,我想指出,同样的批评也适用于大多数投资者。你很少听到他们说“我对宏观未来一无所知”,或者拒绝发表看法。投资成功最重要的要求之一就是自我评估。你的优势和劣势是什么?如果你基于宏观观点做投资,这些观点多久帮上过一次忙?这是你该继续做下去,还是该收手的事情?
把关于预测缺陷的看法一吐为快之后,我打算把这份备忘录的剩余部分用来思考未来。为什么?把这份备忘录开头引用的巴菲特那句话倒过来看——宏观未来也许无法预知,但它确实重要。回想 2000 年之前的那些年,我看到的市场大体上是围绕个股和单个公司的事件在反应。然而,自从 2000 年科技泡沫破裂以来,市场似乎主要在想经济、美联储和财政部,以及世界大事。2008 年全球金融危机之后更是如此。这就是为什么我要用一份备忘录来写一个我基本不认同的课题。
下面我会试着列出那些重要的宏观议题,讨论它们的前景,最后给出一些应对建议。这让我想起我的一个信念:我们每个人对未来都有自己的看法,但正如我们在橡树资本常说的:“有看法是一回事,但认定自己是对的并重注押上去,完全是另一回事。”那正是橡树资本不会做的事。
通货膨胀
在写这篇文章的时候,宏观因素无疑占据主导地位,核心议题就是通胀。过去 16 个月里,美联储、财政部和国会用金钱的消防水管来支持、补贴和刺激工人、企业、州和地方政府、整体经济以及金融市场。这导致了(a)对强劲经济复苏前景的信心,(b)资产价格飞涨,以及(c)对通胀上升的担忧。
上述政策措施按传统预期会带来以下后果:
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That brings me to the subject of forecasters’ track records, or rather the lack thereof. Back in the 1970s, an elder told me, “an economist is a portfolio manager who never marks to market,” and that description still seems highly appropriate. Have you ever heard an economist or macro strategist say, “I think there’ll be a recession soon (and xx% of my recession predictions have turned out to be right within a year)”? Would anyone invest with an investment manager who didn’t publish a track record? Why follow macro forecasters who don’t disclose theirs? Finally, I want to point out that the same comments apply to most investors. You rarely hear them say they have no idea what the macro future holds or beg off from expressing opinions. One of the most important requirements for success in investing is self-assessment. What are your strengths and weaknesses? If you invest on the basis of your macro views, how often have they helped? Is it something you should keep doing or discontinue? Having gotten everything off my chest concerning the shortcomings of forecasts, I’m going to devote the rest of this memo to thinking about the future. Why? To invert the Buffett quote that began this memo, the macro future may not be knowable, but it certainly is important. When I think back to the years leading up to 2000, I picture a market that largely responded to events surrounding individual companies and stocks. Since the Tech Bubble burst in 2000, however, the market has appeared to think mostly about the economy, the Federal Reserve and Treasury, and world events. That’s been even more true since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. That’s why I’m devoting a memo to a subject I largely disavow. I’ll try below to enumerate the macro issues that matter, discuss the outlook for them, and end with some advice regarding what to do about them. That reminds me to put forth my conviction that we all have views about the future, but as we say at Oaktree, “It’s one thing to have an opinion, but something very different to assume it’s right and bet heavily on it.” That’s what Oaktree doesn’t do. Inflation As of this writing, macro considerations are certainly in the ascendency, centering on the subject of inflation. Over the last 16 months, the Fed, Treasury and Congress have used a firehose of money to support, subsidize and stimulate workers, businesses, state and local governments, the overall economy and the financial markets. This has resulted in (a) confidence in the prospects for a strong economic recovery, (b) skyrocketing asset prices, and (c) fear of rising inflation. The policy measures described above traditionally would be expected to produce the following: • • • • • •
经济表现强于原本应有的水平;
企业利润提高;
劳动力市场收紧,进而工资上涨;
更多的资金追逐有限的商品供给;
商品价格上涨速度加快(即通胀上升);
最终,
为对抗通胀而收紧货币政策,导致利率上升。
a stronger economy than would otherwise have been the case; higher corporate profits; tighter labor markets and thus higher wages; more money chasing a limited supply of goods; an increase in the rate at which the prices of goods rise (i.e., higher inflation); and, eventually, a tightening of monetary policy to fight inflation, resulting in higher interest rates.
2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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尽管经济体的运行充满变数与不确定性,但正统经济学认为上述过程几乎是最可靠的了。不过,我想花点时间强调一下思考通胀时所涉及的不确定性。
While the functioning of economies is highly variable and uncertain, economic orthodoxy considers the above process about as reliable as they come. However, I want to take a minute to highlight the uncertainty entailed in thinking about inflation. •
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在我早年投资生涯中,一个醒目的时代特征,是 20 世纪 70 年代初到 1982 年间,美国高达 5%-15% 的年通胀率。当时,悲观博士和沮丧博士——即所罗门兄弟的首席经济学家亨利·考夫曼和第一波士顿的阿尔·沃伊尼洛厄,我分不清谁是谁——经常在令人沮丧的演讲中承认,他们既不确定通胀的成因,也不知如何压低它。没人能遏制通胀,直到美联储主席保罗·沃尔克以大幅加息解决问题,由此引发了 1980-82 年间一次严重的双谷衰退。
再看近些年的情形:多年来,美国、欧洲和日本的央行官员都把目标定在健康的 2% 通胀率,可没有一家能实现。尽管经济增长持续不断、财政赤字相当可观、量化宽松推动货币供应快速扩张,还有低利率——所有这些按理都该带来通胀。
最后,在过去大约 60 年里,经济学家一直信奉所谓的菲利普斯曲线。该曲线认为失业率和通胀之间存在反向关系:失业率越低,劳动力市场越紧俏,工人在谈判中就越有话语权,工资涨幅就越大,消费品价格上升也就越猛。但过去十年间,美国失业率一路走低,最终触及 50 年来的低点,通胀却依然没有实质性上升。于是,如今已经没什么人再提菲利普斯曲线了。
Among the defining elements that marked my early years in investing was the 5-15% annual inflation that prevailed in the U.S. from the early 1970s through 1982. Dr. Doom and Dr. Gloom (chief economists Henry Kaufman of Salomon Brothers and Al Wojnilower of First Boston – I forget which was which) regularly admitted in their depressing speeches that they weren’t sure what was causing the inflation or how to bring it down. No one was able to make progress combatting inflation until Fed Chair Paul Volcker solved the problem by raising interest rates dramatically, bringing on a significant double-dip recession in 1980-82. What about the more recent experience? For years, central bankers in the U.S., Europe and Japan have targeted a healthy 2% rate of inflation, but none of them have been able to produce it. This despite continuous economic growth, significant budget deficits, rapid expansion of the money supply through quantitative easing, and low interest rates – all of which are supposed to be inflationary. Finally, for roughly the last 60 years, economists have trusted the so-called Phillips Curve, which posits an inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation: the lower the unemployment rate, the tighter the labor market, the more negotiating power workers have, the more wages rise, and the greater the increase in the prices of consumer goods. But the U.S. unemployment rate fell throughout the last decade – ultimately hitting a 50-year low – and still there was no material increase in inflation. Thus, few people talk about the Phillips Curve anymore.
美国官方公布的低通胀率,部分原因可能是近几十年来消费者价格指数计算方式的改变,但实话实说,我们对通胀知之甚少,包括其成因和治理方法。我将其形容为“神秘”,因此我认为,对通胀预测的信任度,应当比在其他领域的预测还要低。这当前让投资者处境艰难,因为通胀及其对利率的影响,正是最大的变数所在。
今日通胀展望
关于当前通胀前景的文章已连篇累牍,我就不再赘述,只做简要总结。背景如下:
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The low reported U.S. inflation rates may be partially attributable to changes in recent decades in the way the Consumer Price Index is calculated, but the truth is that we know very little about inflation, including its causes and cures. I describe it as “mysterious,” so I believe we should put even less stock in predictions surrounding inflation than in other areas. That makes life tough for investors at the moment, because inflation and its impact on interest rates constitute the most important wildcards. Inflation Outlook Today There’s been a great deal written about the current prospects for inflation, and rather than rehash it fully, I’ll deliver a brief summary. Here’s the background: • •
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去年,为应对新冠疫情引发的经济停摆、支持经济及其参与者,美联储、财政部和国会采取了严厉措施,以防止一场可能堪比大萧条时期的全球衰退。
他们以向个人发放补助金、向企业和政府提供贷款与赠款、增强失业保险和大规模购买债券等形式,向经济注入了数万亿美元的流动性。事实上,我认为 2020 年正是“万亿”一词进入日常用语的一年。
得益于增强的福利,许多人在 2020 年赚的钱比 2019 年还多。2020 年高于趋势的收入恰逢低于趋势的支出,因为我们无法度假,也无法在晚餐、音乐会、婚礼等方面花钱。据估计,这些因素叠加,为消费者资产负债表增加了约 2 万亿美元。
To support the economy and its participants during last year’s Covid-19-related shutdown, the Fed, Treasury and Congress took drastic action to prevent a global slowdown that could have rivalled the Great Depression. They injected trillions of dollars of liquidity into the economy in the form of benefit payments to individuals, loans and grants to businesses and governments, enhanced unemployment insurance and large-scale bond buying. In fact, I think of 2020 as the year the word “trillions” came into everyday use. Many people made more money in 2020 than they did in 2019, thanks to the enhanced benefits. 2020’s above-trend incomes coincided with below-trend spending, as we couldn’t take vacations or spend money on dinners, concerts, weddings, etc. The combination of these developments is estimated to have added roughly $2 trillion to consumer balance sheets.
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2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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美联储与财政部的行动向金融市场注入了海量资金,推动价格强劲上涨,资本市场重新开放。财富效应——来自股市合计高达数十万亿美元的涨幅,外加房价飙升——效果显著;这一效应远超收入增加和支出减少对消费者资产负债表的正面影响。
The Fed/Treasury actions flooded the financial markets with money, driving strong price increases and the reopening of the capital markets. The wealth effect – from stock market gains totaling in the double-digit trillions of dollars, plus soaring home prices – was significant; this dwarfed the positive impact on consumer balance sheets of higher incomes and lower spending.
以下迹象表明我们可能正迈向一个高通胀的显著时期:
The following signs suggest we may be headed for a significant period of higher inflation: • •
上文所述的一切,按常理本应导致通胀加速。对未来几年通胀上行的担忧,已成为热议话题。起初,这些忧虑仅基于经济理论,但到了 2021 年,已获实证支持:
All the things described immediately above would normally be expected to result in accelerating inflation. Concern about rising inflation in the next few years has been a topic of elevated discussion. Initially these anxieties were based simply on economic theory, but in 2021 they’ve been supported by empirical evidence: o o o o
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二手车价格因进口零部件短缺而大幅上涨。
房价飞涨。
铜、木材和半导体等原材料及零部件价格不断攀升。
智能手机供应紧张。
Used car prices rose dramatically because of shortages of imported parts. Home prices skyrocketed. Materials and component prices escalated: e.g., copper, lumber and semiconductors. Smartphones were in short supply.
部分行业的劳动力短缺进一步加剧了物价上涨的威胁。4 月份消费者价格指数同比上涨 4.2%,5 月份上涨 5.0%,6 月份上涨 5.4%,创下 2008 年 9 月以来的最高读数。不仅投入品价格走高(“成本推动”型通胀)和更多货币追逐商品(“需求拉动”型通胀)可能导致需求超过供给,从而推升通胀,而且过度印钞可能削弱对美元的需求,压低美元价值,推高美国进口商品的美元价格。这方面尤其令人担忧的是,华盛顿近期动辄支出数万亿美元,却未明确“买单”来源。这与现代货币理论影响力的上升不谋而合,该理论的核心观点是赤字和债务无关紧要。可如果这些想法站不住脚呢?
Shortages of labor in certain sectors have added to the threat of rising prices. The year-over-year increase in the Consumer Price Index was 4.2% in April, 5.0% in May and 5.4% in June. These are the highest readings since September 2008. Not only might higher prices for inputs (“cost-push” inflation) and more dollars chasing goods (“demand-pull” inflation) result in an excess of demand over supply and thus rising inflation, but excessive money printing might reduce the demand for U.S. dollars, cutting the currency’s value and causing the dollar prices of imports to the U.S. to rise. Particularly troubling in this regard is the recent tendency of those in Washington to spend trillions of dollars without identifying solid “pay-fors.” This has coincided with the rising influence of Modern Monetary Theory, which essentially says deficits and debt don’t matter. What if these ideas are ill-founded?
另一方面,以下是一些支持更高通胀可能被证明是“暂时的”(时下热词)的理由。
On the other hand, here are the arguments for why higher inflation might prove “transitory” (the word du jour). •
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成品和制造投入品的许多短缺,以及由此引发的价格上涨,可以看作是经济重启,尤其是全球供应链重启的自然结果。指望全球经济的所有部分立即恢复高效运转并不现实,而一个零部件的缺失就可能导致严重混乱,使成品制造变得困难。由于这些因素源于重启过程,它们可能只是暂时的。
应当牢记,原材料或成品价格并非仅由当前经济形势以直接、机械的方式决定,这意味着在既有条件下,价格不一定“正确”,正如股票价格也并非总是正确一样。相反,商品价格受到经济参与者心理的影响,很容易过度上涨或下跌(就像股票市场一样)。正如约翰·莫尔丁在《美联储的愚行》(2021 年 7 月 23 日)中所写:“累积成通胀的物价上涨,是生产者与消费者对未来预期的结果。”因此,价格不仅是当下供需的产物,也反映了人们对未来价格的看法。
Many of the shortages affecting finished goods and manufacturing inputs – and the resultant price increases – can be seen as a natural consequence of restarting the economy and, especially, the global supply chain. It’s unrealistic to expect all parts of the global economy to immediately resume efficient functioning, and a lack of a single part can cause significant disruption, making it hard to manufacture finished goods. Since these factors result from the restart, they may prove ephemeral. It should be borne in mind that the prices of raw materials or finished goods aren’t solely determined by current economic developments in a direct, mechanical way, meaning prices aren’t necessarily “right” given prevailing conditions, any more than stock prices are always right. Rather, prices of goods are influenced by economic participants’ psyches and can easily overshoot or undershoot (just as in the stock market). As John Mauldin wrote in Federal Reserve Folly (July 23, 2021), “The rising prices that add up to inflation are the result of producer and consumer expectations for the future.” Thus prices aren’t just the result of supply and demand today, but also an indication of what people think prices
2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
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未来仍将如此。我们在木材价格中可见一斑,自 2020 年 4 月低点——当时无人认为新屋会有需求——至 2021 年 5 月高点——当时无人认为房屋供应能满足需求——之间,木材价格飙升约 540%。如今,仅在过去两个月内,木材价格已下跌逾 60%,我们也不再频繁听到其对通胀的贡献。
显然,2021 年上半年所见的大量通胀,可归因于新冠救济金刺激下的消费者支出增长,以及由此引发的储蓄和财富激增。这应当是暂时的:一笔额外资金无法永远推动高支出。
9 月份增强版失业救济金的结束,应促使更多工人进入就业市场,减轻劳动力短缺对工资的影响,进而缓解商品价格压力。
2021 年或 2022 年之后,经济增长无疑将放缓,届时 2020 年被压抑的消费者需求的影响将大幅消退。
有希望的是,随着经济持续扩张,近期的刺激措施、赤字支出和货币印发规模将在未来几年内回落(或至少其增速放缓),这意味着这些因素相对于经济规模将有所下降。
技术、自动化和全球化可能继续产生显著的通货紧缩效应。
will be in the future. We see this in the price of lumber, which rose by roughly 540% between the low in April 2020 – when no one thought there would ever be demand for new homes – and the high in May 2021 – when no one thought the supply of homes could ever meet the demand. Now the price of lumber is down by more than 60% in just the last two months, and we no longer hear much about its contribution to inflation. Clearly, a lot of the inflation seen in the first half of 2021 can be attributed to increased consumer spending financed by Covid-19 relief and the resultant bulge in savings and wealth. This should prove temporary: a given pool of extra dollars can’t produce elevated spending forever. The ending of enhanced unemployment benefits in September should bring more workers into the job market, reducing the impact of labor shortages on wages and thus the prices of goods. The growth of the economy will undoubtedly slow after 2021 or 2022, by which time the impact of 2020’s pent-up consumer demand will ebb significantly. There’s hope that the recent levels of stimulus, deficit spending and money printing will recede in the next few years (or at least their rate of growth will slow) as the economy continues to expand, meaning these factors will decline relative to the size of the economy. Technology, automation and globalization are likely to continue to have significant deflationary effects.
关于当前通胀究竟是长期性的还是暂时性的,争论仍在激烈进行。答案至关重要,因为更高的通胀无疑会推高利率,进而压低资产价值。但在我看来,这个答案无法预知。(这就是结论:问题重要,却不可知。)争论双方都有聪明人,但我坚信,没有人能“知道”最终结果会是什么。
美联储知道什么?
美联储的职责之一是控制通胀(此外还有其他任务)。然而,美联储领导人坦言,他们对自身预期并没有十足把握。以下为美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔在 2021 年 6 月 16 日新闻发布会上的发言(强调部分为原文所加):
所以我无法给你一个精确数字或确切时间,但我要说的是,我们确实预计通胀会回落。如果你看看我在联邦公开市场委员会同事们对 2022 年和 2023 年的预测,你会发现人们确实预计通胀会朝着我们的目标显著回落。我认为 2023 年通胀预测的完整区间在 2% 到 2.3% 之间,这与我们的目标一致。
几乎在同一时间,圣路易斯联邦储备银行行长詹姆斯·布拉德也谈到了当前存在的不确定性:
布拉德先生……表示,美国经济“处在一个波动很大的环境中,所以眼下完全不清楚这些情况是否会像任何人说的那样发展。”(《华尔街日报》,2021 年 6 月 18 日,强调部分为原文所加)
The debate rages on regarding whether today’s inflation will prove permanent or transitory. There’s a great deal riding on the answer since higher inflation would doubtless lead to higher interest rates and thus lower asset values. But in my view, it’s impossible to know the answer. (There you have it: important, but not knowable.) There are intelligent people on both sides of the argument, but I’m convinced there’s no such thing as “knowing” what the outcome will be. What Does the Fed Know? The Fed is responsible for keeping inflation under control (among its other jobs). However, Fed leaders admit that they’re not highly confident regarding their expectations. Here’s what Fed Chair Jerome Powell said in a June 16, 2021 press conference (emphasis added): So I can’t give you an exact number or an exact time, but I would say that we do expect inflation to move down. If you look at the forecast for 2022 and 2023 among my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee, you’ll see that people do expect inflation to move down meaningfully toward our goal. And I think that the full range of inflation projections for 2023 falls between 2% and 2.3%, which is consistent with our goals. At roughly the same time, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank President James Bullard also spoke about the uncertainty that’s present: Mr. Bullard . . . said the U.S. economy “is in an environment where we’ve got a lot of volatility, so it’s not at all clear that any of this will pan out the way anybody’s talking about.” (The Wall Street Journal, June 18, emphasis added)
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这正是我们需要的那种坦诚之言。但由以上可见,我们不能就此断言我们“找到了通胀问题的答案”……甚至不能说存在“一个答案”。
市场知道什么?
2016 年伊始,股市大幅下挫,在我看来这毫无理性可言。因此,我写了一篇备忘录,说市场需要去看精神科医生(《躺在沙发上》,2016 年 1 月 14 日)。第二天,当我上电视讨论那篇备忘录时,有人追问我股市下跌是否预示着某种可怕的事情。“不,”我说:市场对我们集体未知的未来并不“知道”更多。这促使我在五天后又写了一篇备忘录,标题与本节相同:《市场知道什么?》(2016 年 1 月 19 日)。今天,它又在告诉我们什么?
近几个月来,通胀快速攀升的迹象无处不在,媒体也把股市的偶发下跌与通胀担忧挂钩。例如,标普 500 指数在截至 6 月 18 日的 10 个交易日里出现温和下跌。以下是《华尔街日报》次日的报道:
美国股市周五回落,交易员警惕地注视美联储,寻觅货币政策走向的线索。
道琼斯工业平均指数创下自 10 月 30 日当周以来的最差周表现。蓝筹股指数周五下跌 1.6%,即 533.37 点,收于 33290.08 点。本周累计下跌 3.45%。
标普 500 指数周五下跌 1.3%,即 55.41 点,收于 4166.45 点,本周累计下跌 1.9%,打破了连续三周上涨的势头。纳斯达克综合指数下跌 0.9%,即 130.97 点,至 14030.38 点,大型科技股同步走低。本周累计下跌 0.3%。
政策制定者周三已暗示,预计将在 2023 年底前加息,比之前的预期更早。周五,圣路易斯联储行长詹姆斯·布拉德在 CNBC 上表示,他预计首次加息会更早到来,就在 2022 年底,市场情绪再度转弱……
ThinkMarkets 分析师法瓦德·拉扎克扎达表示,股市下跌并不令人意外。美国股市屡创新高,自去年以来一直跑赢经济复苏的步伐。如今,交易者正一边关注美联储慢慢开始调整货币政策立场,一边对“再通胀交易”重新定价。“这迟早要来,”他说。“这种抛售迟早会发生,因为市场跑到了自己前面。”
被华尔街称为“恐慌指标”的芝加哥期权交易所波动率指数(VIX)攀升至数周高点。
This is the kind of candid speech we need. But it’s clear from the above that we can’t conclude “we have the answer” on the subject of inflation . . . or even that there is “an answer.” What Does the Market Know? The stock market started off 2016 with a big decline, which seemed to me to be irrational. As a result, I wrote a memo saying the market needed a trip to a psychiatrist (On the Couch, January 14, 2016). The next day, when I went on TV to discuss that memo, I was pressed on whether the stock market’s decline foreshadowed something dire. “No,” I said: the market doesn’t “know” much about the future that we don’t collectively know. That inspired me to write another memo five days later with the same title as this section: What Does the Market Know? (January 19, 2016). What is it telling us today? In recent months, signs of rapidly rising inflation have been everywhere, and the media have tied the occasional stock market dips to inflation fears. For example, the S&P 500 Index experienced a moderate decline for the 10 trading days ending on June 18. Here’s what The Wall Street Journal had to say the next day: U.S. stocks retreated Friday, as traders warily eyed the Federal Reserve for hints of where monetary policy is headed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average had its worst week since the week ended Oct. 30. The index of blue-chip stocks on Friday fell 1.6%, or 533.37 points, to 33290.08. For the week, it lost 3.45%. The S&P 500 declined 1.3%, or 55.41 points, to 4166.45 on Friday, losing 1.9% on the week. That broke a three-week streak of gains. The Nasdaq Composite lost 0.9%, or 130.97 points, to 14030.38, as large technology stocks also fell. For the week, it was down 0.3%. Policy makers had signaled Wednesday that they expect to raise interest rates by late 2023, sooner than they had previously anticipated. Sentiment waned again on Friday after Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis leader James Bullard said on CNBC that he expects the first rate increase even sooner, in late 2022. . . . It isn’t surprising that equities are falling, said ThinkMarkets analyst Fawad Razaqzada. U.S. stocks have hit a series of record highs and have been outpacing the economic recovery since last year. Now traders are repricing that “reflation trade” as they watch the Federal Reserve slowly start to alter its stance on monetary policy. “It was coming,” he said. “This kind of selloff was coming because the market got ahead of itself.” The Cboe Volatility Index, known as Wall Street’s “fear gauge,” climbed to its highest level in weeks.
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“市场对 2022 年转为加息会更加恐慌,因为那将意味着他们也不得不缩减购债规模。”三菱日联银行(MUFG Bank)欧洲地区全球市场研究主管德里克·哈尔彭尼如是说。(《华尔街日报》,6 月 19 日)
一如既往,媒体评论员们随时准备以合乎逻辑的方式解释市场为何如此表现(我总想知道他们是从哪里找到这些解释的)。他们也乐于告诉我们这对未来意味着什么,而且 invariably 是通过外推的方式。
不管怎样,2021 年迄今的主题一直是通胀上升。通胀以及对利率走高的连带担忧,被用来解释股市中发生的诸多现象。数据显示通胀迅速攀升,股市投资者转为悲观。
到目前为止,一切顺利。你或许会说,股市正在有效反映当前形势和未来展望。但债市却不这么看:
在债券市场,10 年期美国国债收益率周五跌至 1.449%,低于周四的 1.509%。10 年期收益率已连续五周下跌……
美国城市居民消费价格 5 月份年化涨幅超过 7%,4 月份超过 9%。如果这种势头在今年剩余时间持续下去,这将是美国自 20 世纪 80 年代以来经历的最高通胀率。但一些投资者和美联储表示,不必恐慌,债市并不担心。收益率上周虽在美联储主席杰伊·鲍威尔周三讲话后有所上升,但仍保持在历史低位。如果市场不担心,或许我们也不该担心……(艾莉森·施拉格,曼哈顿研究所高级研究员,彭博观点,6 月 18 日)
股市担心通胀和利率走高,但债市——其价格走势主要受利率前景主导——却给出了更高的价格和更低的收益率,似乎对通胀毫不在意。
这让我想到黄金,历来人们购买黄金是为对冲通胀。尽管通胀信号不断显现,黄金市场似乎与债市看法一致,认为通胀前景温和。
黄金期货下跌 0.3%,延续周四的跌势,周四金价遭遇 10 个多月来最大单日跌幅。本周金价累计下跌 5.8%,创截至 2020 年 3 月 13 日当周以来最差单周表现。(《华尔街日报》,6 月 19 日)
金价于 2020 年 8 月 6 日创下每盎司 2067 美元的历史新高,很可能是受美联储向经济和市场大规模注资推动。而到了 2021 年 6 月 18 日,当对通胀的担忧似乎升温时,金价触及 1773 美元,较 10 个月前的高点下跌 14%。(金价数据来自 Goldhub)
因此,6 月份我们看到股市数次走弱,据称是出于对通胀的担忧,而债市价格上升(收益率下降),似乎是基于债券买家的信念,即经济疲软将使通胀受到抑制。我们还看到黄金——经典的对冲通胀工具——价格也被下调,正如股市
“The markets will be more spooked by 2022 turning to a rate hike, because that will mean they have to taper as well,” said Derek Halpenny, head of research for global markets in the European region at MUFG Bank. (The Wall Street Journal, June 19) As usual, media commentators stand ready to explain in a logical fashion why the markets did what they did (I always wonder where they look to get the explanation). They’re also glad to tell us what that means for the future, invariably through extrapolation. Regardless, the theme thus far in 2021 has been rising inflation. That and the associated fear of higher interest rates have been used to explain much of what’s been going on in the stock market. The data reflected rapidly rising inflation, and stock market investors turned negative. So far, so good. You might say the stock market was efficiently reflecting developments and the outlook. But the bond market didn’t see it the same way: In bond markets, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note fell to 1.449% Friday, down from 1.509% Thursday. The 10-year yield has fallen for five straight weeks . . . Consumer prices paid by city dwellers in the U.S. rose more than 7% [in May] and more than 9% in April on an annualized basis. If this keeps up the rest of the year, it will be the highest inflation rate the U.S. has experienced since the 1980s. But fear not, say some investors and the Federal Reserve, the bond market isn’t worried. Yields fell over the last week and remain low by historical levels, even after rising on the back of [Fed Chair] Jay Powell’s speech Wednesday. And if markets aren’t worried, maybe we shouldn’t be either. . . . (Allison Schrager, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Bloomberg Opinion, June 18) The stock market was afraid of higher inflation and interest rates, but the bond market – where price movements are governed predominantly by the outlook for rates – gave us higher prices and lower rates, seemingly unconcerned about inflation. That brings me to gold, which historically has been bought for protection against inflation. Despite all the inflationary signs, the market for gold seems to agree with the bond market that the outlook for inflation is benign. Gold futures fell 0.3%, adding to their losses from Thursday, when they suffered their largest drop in over 10 months. For the week, gold fell 5.8%, its worst one-week performance since the week ended March 13, 2020. (The Wall Street Journal, June 19) The price of gold hit an all-time high of $2,067 per ounce on August 6, 2020, likely driven by the Fed’s enormous injection of money into the economy and markets. And then, on June 18, 2021, when concern about inflation seemed to be rising, it hit $1,773, down 14% from the high reached 10 months earlier. (Gold prices from Goldhub) So in June we had bouts of stock market weakness, reportedly on inflation fears, and rising bond prices (declining yields), seemingly based on bond buyers’ conviction that economic weakness will keep inflation subdued. And we saw gold, the classic anti-inflation tool, marked down just as stock
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市场投资者当时被描述为对通胀感到担忧。市场不仅不知道接下来会发生什么,而且其行为往往在长期来看毫无意义或意义甚微。
我在 2016 年的备忘录《市场知道什么?》结尾曾写道,关于何时买卖证券,“市场提供不了任何有价值的参考”。我认为,对于未来宏观事件,市场同样一无所知。或许,市场思维过程的最好诠释,莫过于这幅经典漫画——堪称史上最伟大之一——我曾将其收录于《沙发上》一文中。
market investors were described as being concerned about inflation. Not only do the markets not know what’s coming, but they often behave in ways that make little or no long-term sense. I concluded my 2016 memo What Does the Market Know? by saying that, on the subject of when to buy and sell securities, “the market has nothing useful to contribute.” I think we can say the same about what it knows about future macro events. Perhaps the market’s thought process is best understood through this old cartoon – one of the greatest of all time – which I included in On the Couch.
市场就像一个极其灵敏的仪表,吸收各种事件,然后给出反应,无论看涨还是看跌。虽然市场通常是个出色的“观察者”,对当下动态异常敏锐,但有时它似乎会戴上一副正面或负面的透镜来看待事件(并且在这两者之间摇摆),如上文所示。此外,它们也很少是出色的“预言家”——就预知未来会发生什么而言。
由于市场对短期变动的反应往往趋于过度,它会对这些变动的重要性发出大量真假信号。但市场可能过度强调当下动态、看得不够远,这并不意味着市场就该被完全无视。尤其是当证券价格的表现与我们基于自身观点所预期的不同时,我们应该想想,市场是不是察觉到了什么,从而对我们先前的理解构成挑战。(市场有能力洞见非凡吗?看看标普 500 指数自 3 月 23 日低点以来到年底上涨 68% 的表现。)
Markets function like highly sensitive instruments, absorbing events and publishing their reaction, be it bullish or bearish. While markets are usually good “observers,” hyper-attuned to current developments, they sometimes seem to view events through either a positive or a negative lens (and to oscillate between the two), as shown above. Further, they’re rarely good “predictors,” in the sense of knowing what comes next. Because their reaction to short-run developments tends toward excess, the markets provide a lot of false positives and negatives regarding their significance. But the fact that markets can overemphasize current developments and fail to look far enough into the future doesn’t mean they should be ignored entirely. In particular, when security prices perform differently than what we would expect based on our views, we should consider whether the market has discerned something that throws our prior understanding into question. (Are the markets capable of exceptional insight? Check out the S&P 500’s 68% gain from its low on March 23 through the end
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2020 年,“没人”在年初时认为这一结果合理。市场对美联储/财政部行动潜在影响的识别能力,显然比大多数评论员要强得多。)
预测者知道什么?
虽然这涉及的是股市回报而非通货膨胀,但我必须分享一些谢尔登·斯通提供的数据,他是我合作时间最长的伙伴(我们刚一起工作满 38 年)。去年 12 月,他分享了一篇《纽约时报》上杰夫·索默的文章,标题是《对 2020 年一头雾水,华尔街预测者又在为 2021 年重蹈覆辙》(2020 年 12 月 18 日)。文章提到:
2019 年 12 月,华尔街的预测中值认为标普 500 指数在 2020 年将上涨 2.7%。由于该指数的实际回报为 18.4%,这一预测低了 16 个百分点。但在 2020 年 4 月,疫情全面爆发后(以及美联储、财政部和国会宣布并启动初步行动之后),共识预测回报被下调至负 11%——比最终结果低了近 30 个百分点。
显然,没人能指望预测到疫情。同样,也没人能预测到政策应对的完全成功,或随之而来的市场反弹的时机和幅度。但索默分享了贝斯普克投资集团联合创始人保罗·希基提供的更长期数据,这些数据更有意义。我将主要借用索默的话来传达事实:
of 2020, which “no one” thought made sense when it began. The markets certainly did a much better job of recognizing the potential impact of the Fed/Treasury actions than did most commentators.) What Do the Forecasters Know? Although it’s on the subject of stock market returns rather than inflation, I can’t fail to share some data regarding forecasts supplied by Sheldon Stone, my longest-running partner (we just passed 38 years working together). Last December, he shared a New York Times article by Jeff Sommer entitled “Clueless About 2020, Wall Street Forecasters Are at It Again for 2021” (December 18, 2020). According to the article: In December 2019, the median forecast on Wall Street held that the S&P 500 would rise 2.7% in 2020. Since the actual return on the index was 18.4%, that forecast was too low by 16 percentage points. But in April 2020, after the pandemic had taken hold (and after the initial actions on the part of the Fed, Treasury and Congress had been announced and initiated), the consensus forecast return was revised downward to negative 11% – almost 30 percentage points below the eventual outcome. Obviously, nobody could have been expected to have predicted the pandemic. Ditto for the full success of the policy response or the timing and extent of the consequent market bounce. But Sommer shared longer-term data from Paul Hickey, co-founder of Bespoke Investment Group, which is more meaningful. I’ll mostly use Sommer’s words to convey the facts: •
2000 年以来,分析师预测中位数预计标普 500 指数年均回报率为 9.5%,而实际平均涨幅为 6.0%。你或许会说:“不算太糟,只偏差了 3.5 个百分点。”或者你可能会说:“糟糕透了——预测者高估了平均涨幅达 58%(9.5/6.0 - 1)。”
Since 2000, the median analyst forecast has called for an average yearly return on the S&P 500 of 9.5%, whereas the actual average gain was 6.0%. You might say, “not bad, only off by 3.5 percentage points.” Or you might say, “terrible – the forecasters overestimated the average gain by 58% (9.5/6.0 - 1).”
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自 2000 年以来,每年 12 月,市场预测的中位数从未预期下一年股市会下跌……(黑体为原文所加)。然而,在这些年份中,股市有六年是亏钱的。
“Each December since 2000, the median forecast never called for a stock market decline over the course of the following calendar year . . .” (emphasis added). And yet the stock market lost money in six of those years.
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以 2018 年为例,市场下跌了 6.9%,而预测者曾预言其将上涨 7.5%,两者相差 14.4 个百分点。在 2002 年,预测增幅为 12.5%,实际却下挫 23.3%,差距近 36 个百分点。
“In 2018, for example, the market fell 6.9 percent, though the forecasters said it would rise 7.5 percent, a spread of 14.4 percentage points. In 2002, the forecast called for an increase of 12.5 percent, but stocks fell 23.3 percent, a spread of almost 36 percentage points.”
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把这类误差加总起来看,2000 年到 2020 年间,华尔街预测的中位值平均每年偏离实际目标 12.9 个百分点——这一误差是股市同期实际年均表现(6.0%)的两倍多。年复一年,这些预测的准确度堪比一位总预报晴好天气的天气预报员,而那座城市约有 30% 的时间在下雨或下雪。真是好预测!(* 第一点里提到的平均误差 3.5 个百分点与这里的 12.9 为何不同?我猜想后者是误差“绝对值”的平均。以绝对值来算,第一年高估 3%,第二年低估 2%,误差绝对值加起来是 5%,而不是相抵后只剩 1%。)
“All told, when gaps like that are taken into account, the median Wall Street forecast from 2000 through 2020 missed its target by an average 12.9* percentage points — which was more than double the [6.0%] actual average annual performance of the stock market. Year after year, these forecasts are about as accurate as those of a weatherman who always calls for balmy sunshine in a city where it rains or snows about 30 percent of the time. Some forecasts!” (* What accounts for the difference between the average error of 3.5 percentage points cited in the first bullet point and this 12.9? I assume the latter to be the average of the “absolute value” of the error. When you think in terms of absolute value, being too high by 3% in year one and then too low by 2% in year two means the absolute values of the errors add up to 5%, rather than netting out to only 1%.)
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归根结底,成百上千的人靠专业市场预测谋生,尽管预测的中位数毫无价值:平均而言总是错的,好坏年份皆然,而在准确预测本可带来最大收益之时,却往往离目标十万八千里。
美联储的角色
当前围绕宏观前景的大量争论,焦点落在美联储及其政策和行为上。2020 年 3 月,美联储将关键联邦基金利率降至 0-0.25%,启动贷款和赠款计划,并大量购买债券,由此触发我们正在享受的复苏。这套组合拳非常成功,经济与金融市场双双强劲复苏。然而,同样的举措也助长了通胀持续走高的威胁。
美联储有两大主要职责:一是确保经济充分增长以创造就业,实现充分就业;二是将通胀控制在合理范围内。从某种程度上说,这两项任务存在冲突。经济增长过猛,有经济过热和通胀之虞;通胀升高,则促使投资者要求更高的利率,以弥补购买力的损失。而利率上升,又可能拖累经济放缓。
去年夏天,在美联储和财政部的行动推动下,经济前景转为乐观,随后疫苗的成功又进一步增添了动力。于是我们看到经济增长强劲——第一季度实际 GDP 年化增长率达 6.4%——市场对 2021 年剩余时间乃至 2022 年的预期依然高企。然而,美联储仍将利率维持在接近零的水平,并每月购买 1200 亿美元债券。为何要刺激一个表现如此出色的经济,并冒通胀的风险呢?
事实上,美联储对通胀似乎并不太担忧。起初它说认为不会出现通胀(近期数据已推翻这一判断);然后又说即便有通胀,也是暂时的;美联储接着表示,如果通胀看来并非暂时性,他们也有工具与之抗衡。
通过维持高度宽松的货币政策,美联储表明它更担心经济疲软而非通胀。一位知情观察人士告诉我,如果经济增长在政府向经济倾注了大量刺激措施后仍回落到 2% 或更低这一近年常态,美联储觉得我们面临严重停滞的风险。别忘了两点:一是自世纪之交以来,GDP 增长一直缓慢,围绕“长期停滞”的讨论不绝于耳;二是 2009 年至 2019 年的经济复苏虽为史上最长,却也是二战以来最缓慢的一次。
美联储主席鲍威尔最近的证词,显示出他在复苏进行数月之际如何权衡这些考量:
美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔周三承诺以“强有力支持”完成美国经济从新冠疫情中的复苏……
在向美国众议院金融服务委员会作证时,鲍威尔表示,他确信近期的物价上涨与该国后疫
The bottom line is that hundreds or perhaps thousands of people make their living as professional market forecasters, despite the fact that the median forecast is of no value: wrong on average, positive in good years and bad, and way off target when an accurate forecast would have been most profitable. The Role of the Fed A great deal of the current debate over the macro outlook surrounds the Fed and its policies and behavior. In March 2020, the Fed triggered the recovery we’re enjoying by cutting the key federal funds rate to 0-0.25%, initiating loan and grant programs, and buying vast amounts of bonds. This combination was very successful, producing powerful recoveries in the economy and the financial markets. However, the same actions helped create the threat of persistently higher inflation. The Fed has two primary assignments: (a) making sure the economy grows enough to create jobs, leading to full employment, and (b) keeping inflation under control. To some extent, these tasks are in conflict. Stronger economic growth risks overheating and inflation. Higher inflation leads investors to demand higher interest rates to more than compensate for the loss of purchasing power. Higher interest rates threaten to slow the economy. The economic outlook turned positive last summer in response to the Fed/Treasury actions and then was further bolstered by the success of vaccines. Thus, we’re seeing strong economic growth – real GDP rose at an annualized rate of 6.4% in the first quarter – and expectations remain high for the rest of 2021 and perhaps 2022. Yet, the Fed continues to hold interest rates near zero and buy $120 billion of bonds per month. Why stimulate an economy that’s doing so well, and run the risk of inflation? In fact, the Fed seems to be relatively unworried about inflation. At first it said it didn’t think there would be inflation (recent data has disproved that). Then it said if there is inflation, it will be transitory. And the Fed went on to say if inflation appears to be other than transitory, they have the tools with which to fight it. By maintaining its high level of accommodativeness, the Fed is showing that it’s more worried about economic sluggishness than about inflation. One informed observer told me that if growth falls back to the recent norm of 2% or less despite all the stimulus that’s been thrown at the economy, the Fed feels we risk serious stagnation. And let’s remember that (a) ever since the turn of the century there has been slow GDP growth and serious discussion of “secular stagnation” and (b) while the economic recovery from 2009 through 2019 was the longest in history, it was also the slowest since World War II. Fed Chair Powell’s recent testimony shows how he prioritizes the considerations, several months into the recovery: Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell on Wednesday pledged “powerful support” to complete the U.S. economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic . . . In testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, Powell said he is confident recent price hikes are associated with the country's post-
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疫情重开带来的通胀终将消退,美联储应专注于让尽可能多的人重返工作岗位。
鲍威尔表示,任何通过先放缓美联储每月 1200 亿美元债券购买来减少经济支持的措施“还有一段距离”,目前仍有 750 万个岗位未恢复到疫情前水平。(路透社,7 月 14 日)
但即便经济疲软是更大的风险——谁又能不同意美联储的判断并坚持认为不然呢——通胀风险依然真实存在,其后果也同样如此。我相信,美联储在刺激措施上可能过度,而非不足,对我们所有人都要好得多。我也认为,尽管存在负面后果的可能性,美联储所做的一切都是正确的。尽管如此,我们仍必须考虑这些后果。
pandemic reopening and will fade, and that the Fed should stay focused on getting as many people back to work as possible. Any move to reduce support for the economy, by first slowing the U.S. central bank’s $120 billion in monthly bond purchases, is “still a ways off,” Powell said, with 7.5 million jobs still missing from before the pandemic. (Reuters, July 14) But even if economic sluggishness is the greater risk – and who’s to disagree with the Fed and insist it’s not – the risk of inflation is still real, as would be the consequences. I’m sure we’re all much better off with the Fed possibly overshooting on stimulus, rather than undershooting. And I believe the Fed was right to do all it did despite the possibility of negative ramifications. Still, we must consider those ramifications. • • • • • • • •
更高的通胀可能导致利率上升,因为投资者要求获得正的实际收益;反之,若为遏制通胀而采取紧缩货币政策并推高利率,同样会促使利率上行。利率上升可能对经济产生负面影响。更高的利率迫使投资者要求更高回报,从而压低金融资产价格,并可能引发市场崩盘(参见 1972-1982 年)。高通胀对低收入美国人的冲击最为严重,因为他们将收入的绝大部分用于必需品开支,同时也会威胁数百万退休人员及其他固定收入者的生活方式。利率上升还会增加国家债务的偿还成本,进一步扩大年度赤字(进而推高国债规模)。更大的赤字可能让贷方(及外国买家)对美国国债要求更高的利率,形成负反馈循环。如果我们继续印钞以支付利息并填补赤字,最终美元的价值及其作为世界储备货币的地位可能受到质疑。正如我们过去所经历的,物价快速上涨可能导致通胀预期植根于美国民众心理,使物价攀升自我延续,难以遏制。
Higher inflation could lead to higher interest rates as investors demand positive real yields, but also if tighter monetary policy and higher rates are employed to fight the inflation. Higher interest rates could negatively affect the economy. Higher interest rates make investors demand higher returns, leading to lower prices for financial assets and the possibility of a market collapse (see 1972-82). Higher inflation would hit low-income Americans the hardest, since they spend the lion’s share of their incomes on necessities, and threaten the lifestyle of the millions of retirees and others on fixed incomes. Higher interest rates would raise the cost of servicing the national debt, further swelling the annual deficits (and therefore the national debt). Larger deficits could make lenders (and foreign buyers) demand still-higher interest rates on U.S. debt securities, creating a negative feedback loop. If we continue to print enough money to pay the interest and fund the deficit, eventually the value of the dollar and its use as the world’s reserve currency could be called into question. As we’ve experienced in the past, rapidly rising prices could cause inflationary expectations to become embedded in Americans’ psyches, making the increases self-perpetuating and hard to combat.
此外,我们还应考虑宽松货币政策本身的负面效应:
Further, we should consider the negative aspects of accommodative monetary policy itself: •
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美联储的慷慨可以被视为暗示存在“美联储看跌期权”,或对未来救助的一种保证。其后果可能包括道德风险加剧(即投资者认为可以无后果地冒险),以及市场安全所必需的风险厌恶情绪削弱。
上述状况可能促使企业和投资者加大杠杆使用,从而放大经济放缓带来的潜在损害。
正如我们在过去 16 个月所见,美联储无法在不提升经济价值的情况下刺激经济。而谁从中受益?是拥有经济的人(即股票、公司和房地产的所有者)。因此,刺激措施及其引发的资产升值加剧了财富差距,这一问题正受到越来越多的关注。
如果美联储维持当前的宽松水平——包括将利率保持在接近零的水平——那么在未来经济放缓需要额外刺激时,其可动用的工具将相对有限。例如,降息是去年救市的关键手段之一。
Fed largesse can be viewed as implying the existence of a “Fed put,” or a guarantee of future bailouts. The consequences can include increased moral hazard (the belief that investors can take risk without consequences) and a diminution of the risk aversion that must be present in order for markets to be safe. The above conditions can lead businesses and investors to use more leverage, magnifying the potential damage from a slowdown. As we’ve seen in the last 16 months, the Fed can’t stimulate the economy without increasing the value of the economy. And who receives the benefit? The people who own the economy (i.e., the owners of equities, companies and real estate). Thus, stimulus and the resultant asset appreciation exacerbate the disparity in wealth, which is receiving increased consideration. If the Fed maintains its current level of accommodation – including keeping interest rates near zero – it will have relatively few levers to pull in case a future slowdown calls for incremental stimulus. For example, cutting interest rates was a key part of last year’s rescue
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这套组合拳能否奏效,取决于美联储出手时利率是否仍处于低位——如果当初利率已归零,这套操作便无从谈起。
有人怀疑,美联储能否像去年那样,制造出永久繁荣,让衰退永不降临或最小化。有人寄望低利率能永远托住市场。有人觉得,财政部尽可无限发债,反正美联储乐意当最后的买家。显然,联邦政府里不少人也认为,花钱可以没有上限,不必担心赤字和债务水涨船高带来的恶果。
我没那么聪明,拿不出证明,但在我看来,这些假设美好得不像是真的。它们像永动机,又像一张没有额度上限、也不用还账单的信用卡。我说不清机关在哪里,但我相信一定有机关。或者说得更直白点,让我赌它没机关,我可不干。
1930 年代,约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯提出,国家在经济疲弱时应实行财政赤字,以刺激需求、重振经济、创造就业。赤字开支被冠以“凯恩斯主义”之名,绝非无缘无故。但凯恩斯勋爵也明确说过,赤字固然是启动低迷经济的合理手段,政府却应在繁荣期实现盈余,用来偿还疲弱期欠下的债务。然而到了 21 世纪,财政纪律、预算盈余、债务偿还这些概念,似乎已被扔出窗外。
美国已经连续 20 多年维持巨额且不断扩大的赤字,而且看样子比以往任何时候都更难改变。传统经济学认为这会引发通胀,但如前所述,2010 年代的赤字并未带来实质性通胀。也许它们只是支撑了一个原本可能更虚弱的经济。
不管怎样,我们现在已进入考验期。如前所述,2020 年我们看到数万亿美元福利增加、美联储购债、美联储资产负债表扩张、联邦财政赤字上升、美国国债规模扩大。所有这些相对于经济总量的占比都大幅攀升。后果我们将来会看到。
艾伦·格林斯潘从 1990 年代开始让美联储变得高度激进(由此催生了“格林斯潘看跌期权”,后来演变成“美联储看跌期权”),这一姿态在进入本世纪后已接连挺过三场金融危机。再说一遍,美联储的救援行动至关重要、无可厚非,但在我看来,这不应该是常态。我更希望看到的美联储,不是不断微调,而是大多数时候“放手不管”,只在极端情况下出手刺激或收紧经济。
我想我的读者都信奉自由市场,尤其相信它是资源配置的最佳手段。在自由市场中,亚当·斯密的“看不见的手”会把劳动力和资本等资源引向最能发挥效用的地方。但今天我们的货币领域并不是自由市场,至少从 2008 年全球金融危机以来就不是;美联储在 2009 年 1 月将联邦基金利率降至零,此后一直维持低位。其间有过加息的尝试,但市场以一连串“发脾气”来回应,让后续努力就此止步。
我想说清楚,我并不认为自己比美联储的当家人更懂行。不过总体而言,我希望经济被刺激的次数少一些,至少不要没完没了。
package. This wouldn’t have been possible if rates had been at zero when the Fed first took action. Some people wonder whether the Fed might produce perpetual prosperity, preventing recessions or minimizing them as it did last year. Some hope low interest rates can keep markets aloft forever. Some think the Treasury can issue as much debt as is needed, with the Fed willing to step in as the buyer of last resort. Obviously, a lot of people in the federal government think unlimited sums can be spent without negative consequences from the resulting increased deficits and debt. I’m not smart enough to prove it, but to me these assumptions seem too good to be true. They have the appearance of a perpetual motion machine or a credit card with no credit limit and no requirement to pay off the balance. I can’t tell you exactly what the catch is, but I think there has to be one. Or, perhaps better put, I wouldn’t bet the ranch on there not being a catch. In the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes suggested that nations should run fiscal deficits in times of weakness to stimulate demand, reenergize their economies, and create needed jobs. It’s not for nothing that deficit spending is described as “Keynesian.” But even Lord Keynes asserted that while deficits are a reasonable way to jumpstart a sluggish economy, governments should run surpluses in times of prosperity and use them to repay the debts incurred in times of weakness. However, in the 21st century, concepts like fiscal discipline, budget surpluses and debt repayment seem to have gone out the window. The U.S. has run large and growing deficits for more than 20 years, and that seems less likely than ever to change. Traditional economics asserts that this will be inflationary, but as mentioned earlier, the deficits of the 2010s didn’t bring on substantial inflation. Perhaps they merely helped support an economy that would have been even weaker in their absence. Regardless, we’ve now entered into a time of testing. As I said earlier, in 2020, we saw trillions of dollars of increased benefits, Fed bond-buying, expansion of the Fed balance sheet, federal fiscal deficits, and additions to the U.S. national debt. All of these things increased sharply as a percentage of the total economy. We’ll see the consequences in the future. Alan Greenspan made the Fed highly activist starting in the 1990s (giving rise to the concept of the “Greenspan put” and eventually the “Fed put”), a posture that has persisted through three financial crises already in this young century. Again, the Fed’s rescue actions have been essential and appropriate, but in my view they should not be permanent. I would prefer to see a Fed that isn’t continually fine-tuning, but rather one taking a “hands-off” approach most of the time and acting to stimulate or restrict the economy only at extremes. I imagine my readers believe in the free market and, especially, its power as the best allocator of resources. In a free market, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” moves resources such as labor and capital where they can be most productive. But we don’t have a free market in money today, and we haven’t had one since at least 2008’s Global Financial Crisis; the Fed cut the federal funds rate to zero in January 2009 and has kept it low ever since. There have been attempts to raise interest rates, but the markets greeted them with a series of “tantrums,” discouraging continued efforts. I want to make clear that I don’t think I know better than the people who run the Fed. However, in general, I would like to see the economy stimulated less often, and certainly not continually. We
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或许有人希望未来经济增长速度能快于经济体自身的自然增速,
但我认为,长期增长率不可能靠货币和财政政策永久性抬高,更不可能在毫无负面后果风险的情况下实现。
要实现更健康的资本配置,我希望看到货币领域的自由市场,对我来说,这意味着利率应是“自然形成”的。人为压低的利率会扭曲资本市场,惩罚储蓄者,补贴借款人,推高资产价格,助长更多风险承担和杠杆使用。再说一次,我更希望看到的美联储,是除非万不得已,否则不愿出手干预的那种。
might like to have faster growth in the years ahead than the economy would provide on its own, but I don’t think the long-term rate of growth can be lifted perpetually through monetary and fiscal policy, and certainly not without the risk of negative consequences. To have a healthier allocation of capital, I’d like to see a free market in money, and to me that means interest rates that are “naturally occurring.” Rates held artificially low distort the capital markets, penalizing savers, subsidizing borrowers, lifting asset prices and encouraging increased risk taking and the use of more leverage. Again, I’d prefer to see a Fed that’s reluctant to intervene other than when intervention is essential. *
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在疫情暴发后我写的第一篇备忘录中,我这样写道:
关于新冠病毒,没有人了解得多,因为这是它首次出现。哈佛流行病学家马克·利普西奇在一个播客节目中谈到这个话题时说,存在(a)事实,(b)基于与其他病毒类比而得出的有根据的推断,以及(c)观点或猜测。科学家们正努力做出有根据的推断。到目前为止,我认为关于新冠病毒的数据还不足以让他们把这些推断变成事实。(《无人知晓其二》,2020 年 3 月 3 日)
把“科学家”换成“经济学家”,把“新冠病毒”换成“通货膨胀”,我觉得这段话今天依然贴切。在思考通胀成因时,事实寥寥无几,而且我们这一生中美国只有一次先前的通胀经历可供推断。因此,我认为今天任何人关于未来几年通胀的说法,都属于利普西奇所说的“观点或猜测”,或者用我的话说,“瞎猜”。
我过去曾提到,我常常在备忘录即将收尾时碰到绝佳材料。所以,我想加入一段与利普西奇观点呼应的引文。它来自比尔·米勒,一位业绩卓著的传奇投资者:
没有人能比别人更早看到未来,市场预测的准确性往往和抛硬币差不多。当然,可以拿当前环境与历史数据对比,画出种种类比,但能否成功,关键取决于未来究竟会在多大程度上与过去相似,以及所引用的类比是否真的具有主导性。记录似乎表明,有时会,有时不会,于是我们又回到了抛硬币。(比尔·米勒 2021 年二季度市场信函,2021 年 7 月 9 日)
下面这段话极好地概括了这类情形下决策所面临的挑战:
再高明的技巧也无法改变这样一个事实:你所知道的一切都属于过去,而你做出的所有决定都指向未来。(伊恩·H. 威尔逊,通用电气前高管)
In my first memo of the pandemic, I wrote the following about the coronavirus: No one knows much about it, since this is its first appearance. As Harvard epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch said on a podcast on the subject, there are (a) facts, (b) informed extrapolations from analogies to other viruses and (c) opinion or speculation. The scientists are trying to make informed inferences. Thus far, I don’t think there’s enough data regarding the coronavirus to enable them to turn those inferences into facts. (Nobody Knows II, March 3, 2020) Substitute “economists” for “scientists” and “inflation” for “coronavirus,” and I think this paragraph can serve well today. In thinking about the causes of inflation, there are few facts and only one prior inflationary episode in the U.S. in our lifetimes from which to extrapolate. Thus, I consider anything anyone says today about inflation in the coming years to be Lipsitch’s “opinion or speculation” . . . or, as I’d say, “guesswork.” I’ve written in the past about the way I tend to come across great material just as memos are approaching the finish line. Thus, I want to include a quote that connects with Lipsitch’s view. It’s from Bill Miller, a legendary investor with an outstanding record: No one has privileged access to the future and market forecasts tend to be about as accurate as calling a coin toss. There are, of course, analogies that can be drawn about how the current environment maps onto previous historical data, but success in that depends crucially on how the future will, in fact, resemble the past, and whether the cited analogies turn out to be the governing ones. The record seems to show that sometimes they will and sometimes they won’t and we are back at the coin toss. (Bill Miller 2Q 2021 Market Letter, July 9, 2021) The following quote does a terrific job of summarizing the challenge entailed in decision-making in cases like this: No amount of sophistication is going to allay the fact that all your knowledge is about the past and all your decisions are about the future. (Ian H. Wilson, former GE executive)
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这不意味着未来人们不会对通胀问题发表强烈意见。早在 17 年前,我就写过这样一段话:
“自信”是描述“我知道”学派成员的关键词。而“我不知道”学派,尤其是在面对宏观未来时,关键词则是“谨慎”。后者的信奉者通常认为,你无法预知未来;你也不必预知未来;恰当的目标是在缺乏这种认知的情况下,尽可能做好投资。(《我们与他们》,2004 年 5 月 7 日)
那么,这对今天的投资者行为意味着什么?如果我们无法判断眼下的通胀是暂时的还是会长久存在,投资者是不是就无事可做了?答案就在我 2002 年一份备忘录的标题里:你无法预测,但你可以准备。没人能底气十足地预测我们是否正踏入一个通胀时代,但一旦如此,后果将相当严重。因此,我要简要重提我在回顾 2020 年时关于市场曝险的观点。
在 1 月那份题为《有价值之物》的备忘录中,我描述了自己的基因构成、早年经历,以及在叫停一些不可持续的金融创新和市场过热方面的成功,如何让我变成了一个近乎条件反射式的怀疑论者。去年我们两家住在一起时,我儿子安德鲁提醒了我这一点,他的话让我深有共鸣。
过去的我,很可能会抓着眼下的高估值和冒险行为,警告泡沫将至、调整必来。但换上一副新眼镜之后,我得出结论:虽然这些现象确实存在,但大幅削减市场曝险却没什么道理:
That doesn’t mean people won’t express forceful opinions regarding inflation in the period ahead. As I wrote 17 years ago: “Confident” is the key word for describing members of [the “I know”] school. For the “I don’t know” school, on the other hand, the word – especially when dealing with the macro-future – is “guarded.” Its adherents generally believe you can’t know the future; you don’t have to know the future; and the proper goal is to do the best possible job of investing in the absence of that knowledge. (Us and Them, May 7, 2004) So what does that mean for investor behavior today? If we can’t know whether today’s inflation will prove transitory or be with us for a while, is there nothing for investors to do? The answer lies in the title of a 2002 memo of mine: You Can’t Predict. You Can Prepare. No one can confidently predict whether we’re entering an inflationary era, but the consequences of doing so would be significant. Thus, I’ll briefly rehash the opinion regarding market exposure that I expressed in my review of 2020. In January’s memo Something of Value, I described the way my genetic makeup, early experiences, and success in blowing the whistle on some unsustainable financial innovations and market excesses had turned me into something of a knee-jerk skeptic. My son Andrew called this to my attention while our families lived together last year, and what he said struck a responsive chord. The old me likely would have latched onto today’s high valuations and instances of risky behavior to warn of a bubble and the subsequent correction. But looking through a new lens, I’ve concluded that while those things are there, it makes little sense to significantly reduce market exposure: • • •
基于可能成真也可能落空的通胀预测,
面对种种强有力的反驳论据,
而投资中最重要的一条规则是我们应当着眼长远、长期满仓,
除非有绝对令人信服的相反证据,否则绝不退出市场。
on the basis of inflation predictions that may or may not come true, in the face of some very positive counterarguments, and when the most important rule in investing is that we should commit for the long run, remaining fully invested unless the evidence to the contrary is absolutely compelling.
最后,我想简单谈谈当前市场的估值水平。在 2020 年前的四五年里,我经常被问到我们是否处于高收益债券泡沫中。“不是,”我回答,“我们处于债券泡沫中。”高收益债券相对于其他债券定价合理,但所有债券定价都偏高,因为利率较低。
如今,我们听到有人说一切都在泡沫中。我再次认为,大多数资产的价格彼此之间是合理的。但考虑到利率在决定这些价格中的强大作用,以及利率处于我们见过的最低水平这一事实,许多资产价格处于我们见过的最高水平,这难道不合理吗?例如,标普 500 指数的市盈率在 20 倍出头,“盈利收益率”(市盈率的倒数)在 4% 到 5% 之间。在我看来,这与 10 年期美国国债约 1.25% 的收益率相比显得合理。如果市盈率处于二战后平均的 16 倍,那将意味着盈利收益率为 6.7%,相对于 10 年期国债似乎过高。这告诉我,资产价格相对于利率是合理的。
当然,说资产价格相对于利率是合理的是一回事,但说利率将保持低位,意味着价格将保持高位(或上涨),则完全是另一回事。这又让我们回到通胀问题。不难想象利率会从这里上升,要么是因为美联储提高
Finally, I want to briefly touch on the level of today’s markets. Over the four or five years leading up to 2020, I was often asked whether we were in a high yield bond bubble. “No,” I answered, “we’re in a bond bubble.” High yield bonds were priced fairly relative to other bonds, but all bonds were priced high because interest rates were low. Today, we hear people say everything’s in a bubble. Again, I consider the prices of most assets to be fair relative to each other. But given the powerful role of interest rates in determining those prices, and the fact that interest rates are the lowest we’ve ever seen, isn’t it reasonable that many asset prices are the highest we’ve ever seen? For example, with the p/e ratio of the S&P 500 in the low 20s, the “earnings yield” (the inverse of the p/e ratio) is between 4% and 5%. To me, that seems fair relative to the yield of roughly 1.25% on the 10-year Treasury note. If the p/e ratio were at the postWorld War II average of 16, that would imply an earnings yield of 6.7%, which would appear too high relative to the 10-year. That tells me asset prices are reasonable relative to interest rates. Of course, it’s one thing to say asset prices are fair relative to interest rates, but something very different to say rates will stay low, meaning prices will stay high (or rise). And that leads us back to inflation. It isn’t hard to imagine rates increasing from here, either because the Fed lifts
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让它们防止经济过热,或是因为通胀上升要求加息,以使实际回报保持为正(或两者兼而有之)。尽管加息的可能性(以及随之而来的资产价格下跌)令我们所有人担忧,但我认为不能说当前资产价格相对于利率而言是不理性的。
媒体人士试图让我说出“买入”或“卖出”、“进场”或“离场”,而如今我则从进攻性与防御性的适当配置比例来形成观点。鉴于上述种种交叉趋势,橡树资本在两者之间保持平衡,大体上与我们一贯的立场一致(而非像进入 2020 年时那样采取高度防御姿态)。
尽管如此,针对通胀风险在边际上做一些调整是合理的。对通胀风险感受强烈的投资者,或者更担心期间资产减值(而不太在意若通胀未出现可能错过的收益)的投资者,或许应着重考虑:
•
•
•
them to keep the economy from overheating or because rising inflation requires higher rates in order for real returns to be positive (or both). While the possibility of rising rates (and thus lower asset prices) troubles us all, I don’t think it can be said that today’s asset prices are irrational relative to rates. Whereas folks from the media try to get me to say “buy” or “sell” and “in” or “out,” I formulate my view nowadays in terms of the appropriate mix of aggressiveness versus defensiveness. Given the above crosscurrents, Oaktree is maintaining a balance between the two that’s generally in line with our normal stance (as opposed to the elevated defense we maintained going into 2020). Having said that, it’s reasonable to make some adjustments at the margin in response to the risk of inflation. Investors who feel strongly about the risk, or who worry more about interim markdowns (and less about gains they might forgo if inflation fails to materialize), might wish to emphasize: • • •
浮动利率债务;投资于固定成本占比较高、或具备转嫁成本上涨能力的企业,或能以其他方式将通胀纳入价格的企业(如某些房东);以及利润增长潜力快于物价上涨的情况。
floating-rate debt; investments in businesses with largely fixed costs or the ability to pass on cost increases, or that can otherwise incorporate inflation in prices (like certain landlords); and/or situations where profits have the potential to grow faster than prices rise.
这些都是如今人们为应对通胀环境可能做的准备。我认为,投资者对通胀升高的可能性有所留意是合理的,但不必因为那些可能准确也可能不准的宏观预期,而大幅调整资产配置。
2021 年 7 月 29 日
These are all ways one might prepare today for an inflationary environment. I consider it reasonable for investors to give a nod to the possibility of higher inflation, but not to significantly invert asset allocations in response to macro expectations that may or may not prove accurate. July 29, 2021
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