等待最后一舞——后期大泡沫中资产配置的风险

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杰里米·格兰瑟姆:《观点之末舞》——大型泡沫后期的资产配置风险

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2021 年 1 月 5 日

自 2009 年开启的漫长牛市终于成熟,演变为一场彻头彻尾的史诗级泡沫。其特征包括极端高估、爆炸式价格上涨、疯狂发行证券以及歇斯底里般的投机行为。我认为,这一事件将被载入金融史册,与南海泡沫、1929 年大崩盘和 2000 年互联网泡沫并列。大钱正是在这些大型泡沫中赚到和亏掉的——投资者也正是在这里真正证明了自己的胆识。因为,要让投资组合在泡沫破裂时避开最剧烈的痛苦,这很可能就是最困难的部分。行业中每一项职业激励机制,以及人类个体心理的每一种缺陷,都会合力引诱你投入其中。但这个泡沫终将适时破裂,无论美联储多么努力地支撑它,都将对经济和投资组合造成破坏性后果。毫无疑问——对当今大多数投资者来说,这很可能就是你投资生涯中最重要的事件。作为一个研究市场多年的老人和史学家,我不得不说,这在智识上既令人兴奋又令人恐惧。能再一次亲身经历这样的市场,是一种特权。

“你永远无法改变的一个现实是:价格更高的资产必然带来比价格更低的资产更低的回报。你不能鱼与熊掌兼得。你可以现在享受,也可以在遥远的未来稳稳获得,但二者不可兼得——我们为让这个市场涨得更高付出的代价,就是从顶部算起未来十年更低的回报。”

大多数时候(大约四分之三的时间),各大资产类别的定价彼此之间是相对合理的。正确的应对方式是,对那些经测量显得更便宜的资产做出适度押注,并希望测量结果正确。凭借还算过得去的资产评估能力,基于估值的资产配置者有望在这些阶段完好无损地存活下来,并取得小幅的超额表现。“小幅”是因为机会本身很小。如果你想说得不客气些,可以认为资产配置在这个阶段不太可能有多重要。当然,如果基金经理还能在执行层面(即有效选择国家、行业、产业、个股,以及主要资产类别)增加价值,那在这些时期也会有所帮助。然而,资产配置真正的问题,出现在剩余的那些时候——当资产价格大幅偏离公允价值时。这在熊市中还不算太糟,因为重要的熊市往往短暂而猛烈。客户的第一反应通常是震惊到按兵不动,在此期间,经理人有时间重新调整投资组合和论点,以保住业务。真正的问题在于持续数年的重大牛市。缓慢燃烧的长期牛市可以在远超公允价值的价格上停留很多年,甚至远高两倍、三倍、四倍的状态也能持续两三年。这类事件很容易超过大多数客户的耐心极限。而当价格上涨非常迅速时(通常发生在牛市末期),不耐烦之后便是焦虑和嫉妒。正如我喜欢说的:没有什么比看着邻居发财更让人恼火的了。

客户如何区分极端市场行为与一个迷失方向的经理人?证明才能的通常证据是过去的成功,但市场的长周期少之又少。两次事件赢两次、三次事件赢三次,远不如更大样本量那么有说服力。更糟糕的是,早先的重大市场崩溃早已远去:2008 年、2000 年,或者日本 1989 年,几乎都已写进历史书。大多数参与者已经换了人。当然,那些最终在很久以前获胜的人所感受到的满足感,也无法缓解你此刻亲身经历的痛苦。换句话说,如果凯恩斯真的说过“市场可以保持非理性的时间,比你能保持偿付能力的时间更长”,那他可就说得太对了。

Jeremy Grantham WAITING FOR THE VIEWPOINTS LAST DANCE The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble EXECUTIVE SUMMARY January 5, 2021 The long, long bull market since 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. Featuring “The one reality that you can never change is that a higher-priced asset will produce a lower return extreme overvaluation, explosive than a lower-priced asset. You can’t have your cake and eat it. You can enjoy it now, or you can enjoy it price increases, frenzied issuance, steadily in the distant future, but not both – and the price we pay for having this market go higher and and hysterically speculative investor higher is a lower 10-year return from the peak.”1 behavior, I believe this event will be recorded as one of the great bubbles Most of the time, perhaps three-quarters of the time, major asset classes are reasonably of financial history, right along with the priced relative to one another. The correct response is to make modest bets on those South Sea bubble, 1929, and 2000. assets that measure as being cheaper and hope that the measurements are correct. These great bubbles are where With reasonable skill at evaluating assets the valuation-based allocator can expect fortunes are made and lost – and to survive these phases intact with some small outperformance. “Small” because the where investors truly prove their opportunities themselves are small. If you wanted to be unfriendly you could say that mettle. For positioning a portfolio to asset allocation in this phase is unlikely to be very important. It would certainly help avoid the worst pain of a major bubble in these periods if the manager could also add value in the implementation, from the breaking is likely the most difficult part. effective selection of countries, sectors, industries, and individual securities as well as Every career incentive in the industry major asset classes. and every fault of individual human The real trouble with asset allocation, though, is in the remaining times when asset psychology will work toward sucking prices move far away from fair value. This is not so bad in bear markets because investors in. important bear markets tend to be short and brutal. The initial response of clients But this bubble will burst in due time, no is usually to be shocked into inaction during which phase the manager has time to matter how hard the Fed tries to support reposition both portfolio and arguments to retain the business. The real problem is in it, with consequent damaging effects on major bull markets that last for years. Long, slow-burning bull markets can spend many the economy and on portfolios. Make no years above fair value and even two, three, or four years far above. These events can mistake – for the majority of investors easily outlast the patience of most clients. And when price rises are very rapid, typically today, this could very well be the most toward the end of a bull market, impatience is followed by anxiety and envy. As I like to important event of your investing say, there is nothing more supremely irritating than watching your neighbors get rich. lives. Speaking as an old student and historian of markets, it is intellectually How are clients to tell the difference between extreme market behavior and a manager exciting and terrifying at the same time. who has lost his way? The usual evidence of talent is past success, but the long cycles It is a privilege to ride through a market of the market are few and far between. Winning two out of two events or three like this one more time. out of three is not as convincing as a larger sample size would be. Even worse the earlier major market breaks are already long gone: 2008, 2000, or 1989 in Japan are practically in the history books. Most of the players will have changed. Certainly, the satisfaction felt by others who eventually won long ago is no solace for current pain experienced by you personally. A simpler way of saying this may be that if Keynes really had said, “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent,” he would have been right.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆,CNBC,2020 年 11 月 12 日。

Jeremy Grantham, CNBC, November 12, 2020.

等待终场舞会:后泡沫阶段资产配置的陷阱 | p2 我早已从投资组合管理岗位退休,但很乐意在这里分享我的看法:美国市场极有可能正处于一场重大泡沫事件中,这类事件通常每隔几十年出现一次,上一次发生在 20 世纪 90 年代末。尽管万事没有绝对,这次泡沫大概率将以糟糕的结局收场。我还要告诉你我对看空市场成功的定义:那就是迟早会有一个时刻,投资者庆幸自己之前离开了市场。也就是说,他因离场而省下了钱,同时在完整周期中降低了风险或波动性。这个成功定义绝对不包括精准的时机把握。(预测泡沫何时破裂与估值无关。历史上所有泡沫市场都极度高估,这次也不例外。高估是泡沫破裂的必要条件,但不是充分条件。)要精确指出顶部所在的周、月或季度,几乎是不可能的。

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p2 I am long retired from the job of portfolio management but I am happy to give my “ opinion here: it is highly probable that we are in a major bubble event in the U.S. market, of the type we typically have every several decades and last had in the late ...sooner or later there 1990s. It will very probably end badly, although nothing is certain. I will also tell you my definition of success for a bear market call. It is simply that sooner or later there will come a time when will come a time when an investor is pleased to have been out of the market. That is to an investor is pleased say, he will have saved money by being out, and also have reduced risk or volatility on to have been out of the the round trip. This definition of success absolutely does not include precise timing. market. (Predicting when a bubble breaks is not about valuation. All prior bubble markets have been extremely overvalued, as is this one. Overvaluation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for their bursting.) Calling the week, month, or quarter of the top is all but impossible.

我在 2008 年相当接近地喊中了一次牛市顶点,又在 2009 年初精准把握住了一个熊市底部——当时我写了《在恐惧中重新投资》一文。即使放在长达 50 年的职业生涯里,这幸运程度也远远超出我能指望的。更典型的情况是,我在日本泡沫中提前了整整三年。GMO 在 1987 年就彻底退出了日本市场,当时日本在 EAFE 指数中占比超过 40%,市盈率高达 40 倍以上,而此前历史最高纪录是 25 倍。当时退出看起来是审慎之举,但接下来三年我们痛苦地跑输大市,因为日本市场的市盈率一路冲到了 65 倍,在指数中的占比也超过了 60%!不过,我们在顶部之后也整整三年没有碰日本市场,最终在这趟来回旅程中赚到了不错的钱。

I came fairly close to calling one bull market peak in 2008 and nailed a bear market low in early 2009 when I wrote “Reinvesting When Terrified.” That’s far more luck than I could hope for even over a 50-year career. Far more typically, I was three years too early in the Japan bubble. We at GMO got entirely out of Japan in 1987, when it was over 40% of the EAFE benchmark and selling at over 40x earnings, against a previous all-time high of 25x. It seemed prudent to exit at the time, but for three years we underperformed painfully as the Japanese market went to 65x earnings on its way to becoming over 60% of the benchmark! But we also stayed completely out for three years after the top and ultimately made good money on the round trip.

同样,在 1997 年末,当标普 500 指数突破 1929 年时 21 倍市盈率的前期高点后,我们迅速减持了自主决定的美国股票仓位,随后眼睁睁看着市场在盈利增长中一路涨到 35 倍市盈率,过程令人心惊胆战。我们的资产配置业务规模缩减了一半,但在随后的市场下跌中,我们不仅收复了损失,还远远弥补了当初的亏损。

Similarly, in late 1997, as the S&P 500 passed its previous 1929 peak of 21x earnings, we rapidly sold down our discretionary U.S. equity positions then watched in horror as the market went to 35x on rising earnings. We lost half our Asset Allocation book of business but in the ensuing decline we much more than made up our losses.

相信我,我知道这些都是老掉牙的故事。但它们是直接相关的。因为当前的市场事件确实还是那个老故事。今年夏天,我说过我们很可能已经处于泡沫后期,只不过新冠疫情崩盘的特殊性带来了一些不确定性。历史上大泡沫后期唯一最可靠的特征,就是投资者行为变得极度疯狂,尤其是散户行为。在这轮史上最长的牛市的前 10 年里,我们并没有看到如此狂热的投机。但现在有了。而且规模创纪录。我的同事本·英克(Ben Inker)和约翰·皮斯(John Pease)在最新一期 GMO 季度信中写到了其中一些狂热案例,包括赫兹、柯达、尼古拉,尤其是特斯拉。作为一名 Model 3 车主,我个人最喜欢的一个特斯拉趣闻是:其市值现已超过 6000 亿美元,相当于每辆年销量对应 125 万美元,而通用汽车每辆车只对应 9000 美元。1929 年有什么能与之匹敌?这些趣闻中的任何一个或许都可以被视为孤立案例(相信我:它们不是),但整体宏观指标看上去更糟糕。

Believe me, I know these are old stories. But they are directly relevant. For this current market event is indeed the same old story. This summer, I said it was likely that we were in the later stages of a bubble, with some doubt created by the unique features of the COVID crash. The single most dependable feature of the late stages of the great bubbles of history has been really crazy investor behavior, especially on the part of individuals. For the first 10 years of this bull market, which is the longest in history, we lacked such wild speculation. But now we have it. In record amounts. My colleagues Ben Inker and John Pease have written about some of these examples of mania in the most recent GMO Quarterly Letter, including Hertz, Kodak, Nikola, and, especially, Tesla. As a Model 3 owner, my personal favorite Tesla tidbit is that its market cap, now over $600 billion, amounts to over $1.25 million per car sold each year versus $9,000 per car for GM. What has 1929 got to equal that? Any of these tidbits could perhaps be dismissed as isolated cases (trust me: they are not), but big-picture metrics look even worse.

“巴菲特指标”——股市总市值与 GDP 的比值——突破了 2000 年创下的历史最高纪录。2020 年,共有 480 宗首次公开发行(其中包括惊人的 248 宗 SPAC,即特殊目的收购公司,一种为合并私有公司而设立的壳公司,使其能比正常 IPO 流程更快上市),超过了 2000 年的 406 宗。有 150 家非微型公司(即市值超过 2.5 亿美元的公司)一年内股价上涨超过两倍,这一数量是过去二十年中任何一年的三倍以上。散户小规模买入(少于 10 份合约)美股看涨期权的成交量相比 2019 年增长了 8 倍,而 2019 年本身已远高于长期平均水平。或许最令人不安的是:诺贝尔奖得主、长期看空者罗伯特·席勒——他曾正确而勇敢地指出 2000 年和 2007 年的泡沫,也是我极少数敬重的经济学家之一——这次却在观望。他近期指出,他传奇性的 CAPE 资产定价指标(表明股票估值几乎与 2000 年泡沫顶峰时一样高)在与债券比较时,显示出的高估程度没那么惊人。然而,从历史比较来看,债券比股票还要贵得多。哦,天哪!

The "Buffett indicator," total stock market capitalization to GDP, broke through its all-time-high 2000 record. In 2020, there were 480 IPOs (including an incredible 248 SPACs2 ) – more new listings than the 406 IPOs in 2000. There are 150 non-micro-cap companies (that is, with market capitalization of over $250 million) that have more than tripled in the year, which is over 3 times as many as any year in the previous 2 decade. The volume of small retail purchases, of less than 10 contracts, of call options A SPAC is a Special Purpose Acquisition Company, a shell on U.S. equities has increased 8-fold compared to 2019, and 2019 was already well that is created for the specific purpose of merging with above long-run average. Perhaps most troubling of all: Nobel laureate and long-time some private company to take that company public more quickly than could have been the case with a normal initial bear Robert Shiller – who correctly and bravely called the 2000 and 2007 bubbles and public offering (IPO) process. who is one of the very few economists I respect – is hedging his bets this time, recently Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p3 making the point that his legendary CAPE asset-pricing indicator (which suggests stocks are nearly as overpriced as at the 2000 bubble peak) shows less impressive overvaluation when compared to bonds. Bonds, however, are even more spectacularly expensive by historical comparison than stocks. Oh my!

所以,我一点也不意外,自入夏以来,市场加速上涨,投机泡沫愈演愈烈。这正是你在泡沫后期应该预料到的情形:一段加速、近乎垂直的上涨阶段,持续时间无法预知——但通常很短。即便时间不长,这一泡沫末尾的阶段也令人震惊地痛苦,对看空者来说充满了职业风险。

So, I am not at all surprised that since the summer the market has advanced at an accelerating rate and with increasing speculative excesses. It is precisely what you should expect from a late-stage bubble: an accelerating, nearly vertical stage of unknowable length – but typically short. Even if it is short, this stage at the end of a bubble is shockingly painful and full of career risk for bears.

我正在加倍下注,因为随着价格以加速的节奏越来越偏离趋势,投机热情也日益高涨,作为市场历史学者的我当然更加确信,这确实是泡沫的后期阶段。一个正在变得堪称惊天动地的泡沫。

I am doubling down, because as prices move further away from trend, at accelerating speed and with growing speculative fervor, of course my confidence as a market historian increases that this is indeed the late stage of a bubble. A bubble that is beginning to look like a real humdinger.

“目前市场的市盈率处于历史区间的顶部区域,而经济却处于历史最差的底部区域。本轮牛市最奇怪的特征之一,就是它与此前的每一次大泡沫都截然不同。以往的泡沫,都伴随着宽松的货币政策,以及当时——无论对错——被视作近乎完美的经济状况,人们还把这种完美状态无限外推到未来。当然,任何泡沫中经济处于顶尖水平的那百分之几,都不会持续太久;但如果它真能持续,那么市场按账面价值的超高倍数交易倒也顺理成章。但今天受伤的经济完全不同:只是部分复苏,可能面临二次探底,很可能正在放缓,而且毫无疑问面临着极高度的不确定性。然而,市场却比去年秋天经济看起来不错、失业率处于历史低位时高得多。目前市场的市盈率处于历史区间的顶部区域,而经济却处于历史最差的底部区域。这完全史无前例,甚至可能比 SPAC (特殊目的收购公司)更能衡量投机烈度。

“ Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the The strangest feature of this bull market is how unlike every previous great bubble it is in one respect. Previous bubbles have combined accommodative monetary conditions with economic conditions that are perceived at the time, rightly or wrongly, as near perfect, which perfection is extrapolated into the indefinite future. The state of top few percent of the economic excellence of any previous bubble of course did not last long, but if it could have lasted, then the market would justifiably have sold at a huge multiple of book. historical range and the But today’s wounded economy is totally different: only partly recovered, possibly economy is in the facing a double-dip, probably facing a slowdown, and certainly facing a very high worst few percent. degree of uncertainty. Yet the market is much higher today than it was last fall when the economy looked fine and unemployment was at a historic low. Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the top few percent of the historical range and the economy is in the worst few percent. This is completely without precedent and may even be a better measure of speculative intensity than any SPAC.

这一次,投资者比以往任何泡沫都更依赖宽松的货币条件和无限期外推的零实际利率。理论上,这与假设经济永远处于峰值状态效果类似:它可以用来证明所有资产的收益率都应“大幅降低”,从而对应更高的资产价格。但完美的经济条件或完美的金融条件都不可能永远持续——问题就在这里。

This time, more than in any previous bubble, investors are relying on accommodative monetary conditions and zero real rates extrapolated indefinitely. This has in theory a similar effect to assuming peak economic performance forever: it can be used to justify “ much lower yields on all assets and therefore correspondingly higher asset prices. But neither perfect economic conditions nor perfect financial conditions can last forever, and there’s the rub.

所有泡沫都以几乎所有人都接受“当前这个泡沫不会结束”而告终……因为。因为 1929 年,经济已经切入“一个永久性的高位平台”;因为 2000 年格林斯潘的美联储预测生产率将持久改善,并宣誓效忠(或者说提供道德风险)于股市;因为 2006 年伯南克相信“美国房价仅仅反映了强劲的美国经济”,同时他延续了道德风险:赢了归自己,输了有我们兜底。耶伦,以及现在的鲍威尔,都沿袭了这一做法。鲍威尔的三位前任都声称,他们助长膨胀的资产价格会反过来通过财富效应惠及经济——这个效应我们都承认确实存在。但三位前任都避免为随之而来的、不可避免的市场崩盘邀功:2000 年的股市崩盘和 2008 年的房地产崩盘,每场都伴随我们最不需要时到来的反财富效应,放大了本已确定的经济疲软。这场游戏,无疑是终极的与魔鬼交易。

All bubbles end with near All bubbles end with near universal acceptance that the current one will not end universal acceptance yet…because. Because in 1929 the economy had clicked into “a permanently high that the current one will plateau”; because Greenspan’s Fed in 2000 was predicting an enduring improvement not end yet… in productivity and was pledging its loyalty (or moral hazard) to the stock market; because Bernanke believed in 2006 that “U.S. house prices merely reflect a strong U.S. economy” as he perpetuated the moral hazard: if you win you’re on your own, but if you lose you can count on our support. Yellen, and now Powell, maintained this approach. All three of Powell’s predecessors claimed that the asset prices they helped inflate in turn aided the economy through the wealth effect. Which effect we all admit is real. But all three avoided claiming credit for the ensuing market breaks that inevitably followed: the equity bust of 2000 and the housing bust of 2008, each replete with the accompanying anti-wealth effect that came when we least needed it, exaggerating the already guaranteed weakness in the economy. This game surely is the ultimate deal with the devil.

等待最后一舞:晚期大泡沫中的资产配置风险 | p4 现在又一次,人们认为当前的高价会持续下去……因为利率将永远保持在零附近——这是道德风险的终极表述,也是我们业已熟悉并依赖的非对称市场风险。2020 年底的口头禅是:人为的低利率可以阻止资产价格下跌。永永远远!但当然,这在 2000 年是谬论,现在也是谬论。最终,道德风险并未阻止科技泡沫的崩盘,纳斯达克指数下跌了 82%。没错,82%!同样,2008 年它也没能阻止美国房价一路跌回趋势线甚至以下——这进而首先造成了住房感知价值令人震惊的超过 8 万亿美元损失;其次,带来了随后的经济疲软;第三,引发了风险溢价全面上升和全球资产价格全面下跌(见图表 1)。所有的承诺最终一文不值,只有一个例外:美联储尽其所能收拾残局,帮助市场重整旗鼓,为下一轮的涨价和随后的下跌做准备。于是我们又回到了这里,等待最后一舞,并最终等待音乐停止。

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p4 Now once again the high prices this time will hold because…interest rates will be kept around nil forever, in the ultimate statement of moral hazard – the asymmetrical market risk we have come to know and depend on. The mantra of late 2020 was that engineered low rates can prevent a decline in asset prices. Forever! But of course, it was a fallacy in 2000 and it is a fallacy now. In the end, moral hazard did not stop the Tech bubble decline, with the NASDAQ falling 82%. Yes, 82%! Nor, in 2008, did it stop U.S. housing prices declining all the way back to trend and below – which in turn guaranteed first, a shocking loss of over eight trillion dollars of perceived value in housing; second, an ensuing weakness in the economy; and third, a broad rise in risk premia and a broad decline in global asset prices (see Exhibit 1). All the promises were in the end worth nothing, except for one; the Fed did what it could to pick up the pieces and help the markets get into stride for the next round of enhanced prices and ensuing decline. And here we are again, waiting for the last dance and, eventually, for the music to stop.

图表 1泡沫——美好时光的短暂辉煌

住房泡沫科技泡沫
2.002.00
指数水平 1.00指数水平 1.00
1997 2000 2003 2006 20091995 1997 1999 2001
住房泡沫截至 2011 年 11 月 30 日,科技泡沫截至 2003 年 2 月 28 日
来源:标普 500 指数(科技泡沫);全美房地产经纪人协会、美国人口普查局(住房泡沫)

投资中没有任何东西会完全重复。投资泡沫尤其如此。每一次非理性繁荣的形式都不同;我们只是在寻找可以说是精神上的相似性。即便现在,我知道这个市场还能再狂飙几个星期甚至几个月——感觉我们可能处在 1999 年 7 月到 2000 年 2 月之间的任何时点。也就是说,它随时可能崩盘,因为所有条件都已满足,但它也可能再咆哮几个月。我对这个泡沫能存活多久的最佳猜测是晚春或初夏,与新冠疫苗的广泛接种同时发生。在那时,世界经济面临的最紧迫问题将得到解决。市场参与者会松一口气,环顾四周,然后立刻意识到经济状况仍然糟糕,随着新冠危机结束刺激措施将很快缩减,而且估值荒谬。“买传闻,卖事实。”但请记住,为泡沫破裂择时,在历史上鲜有成功。

EXHIBIT 1BUBBLES – GREAT WHILE THEY LAST Housing Bubble Tech Bubble 2.00 2.00 Index Level 1.00 1.00 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001 Housing bubble as of 11/30/2011, Tech bubble as of 2/28/2003 Source: S&P 500 (Tech bubble); National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau (Housing bubble) Nothing in investing perfectly repeats. Certainly not investment bubbles. Each form of irrational exuberance is different; we are just looking for what you might call spiritual similarities. Even now, I know that this market can soar upwards for a few more weeks or even months – it feels like we could be anywhere between July 1999 and February 2000. Which is to say it is entitled to break any day, having checked all the boxes, but could keep roaring upwards for a few months longer. My best guess as to the longest this bubble might survive is the late spring or early summer, coinciding with the broad rollout of the COVID vaccine. At that moment, the most pressing issue facing the world economy will have been solved. Market participants will breathe a sigh of relief, look around, and immediately realize that the economy is still in poor shape, stimulus will shortly be cut back with the end of the COVID crisis, and valuations are absurd. “Buy the rumor, sell the news.” But remember that timing the bursting of bubbles has a long history of disappointment.

即使事后看来,也很难指出是那根针扎破了泡沫。造成这种不清晰的主要原因在于,大牛市并非在遭遇重大意外负面事件时破裂。那些事件,比如 1987 年的投资组合保险灾难,往往带来急剧下跌和快速反弹。从更大格局看,它们是独特的技术性事件,不属于大泡沫潮起潮落的一部分。大牛市通常在市场条件非常有利,但只是比昨天稍微不那么有利的时候开始转向。这就是为什么它们总是被错过。

等待最后一舞:晚期大泡沫中的资产配置风险 | p5

Even with hindsight, it is seldom easy to point to the pin that burst the bubble. The main reason for this lack of clarity is that the great bull markets did not break when they were presented with a major unexpected negative. Those events, like the portfolio insurance fiasco of 1987, tend to give sharp down legs and quick recoveries. They are in the larger scheme of things unique and technical and are not part of the ebb and Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p5 flow of the great bubbles. The great bull markets typically turn down when the market conditions are very favorable, just subtly less favorable than they were yesterday. And that is why they are always missed.

无论如何,市场目前正在验证一个主要泡沫的所有感性特征。最令人印象深刻的是多头的强度和热情、股票和市场的报道广度,以及最重要的——对空头日益增长的敌意。1929 年,做空者面临人身攻击的风险,并且注定要遭受人格诋毁。对我们来说,1999 年是唯一一次客户的反应好像我们蓄意恶意地剥夺他们收益的日子。相比之下,2008 年根本不算什么。但在过去几个月里,这种敌对语气迅速升级。然而,对空头来说讽刺的是,这恰恰是我们想听到的。这是最终崩盘的经典前兆;伴随着股票上涨,并非因为基本面,而仅仅是因为它们在上涨。

Either way, the market is now checking off all the touchy-feely characteristics of a major bubble. The most impressive features are the intensity and enthusiasm of bulls, the breadth of coverage of stocks and the market, and, above all, the rising hostility toward bears. In 1929, to be a bear was to risk physical attack and guarantee character assassination. For us, 1999 was the only experience we have had of clients reacting as if we were deliberately and maliciously depriving them of gains. In comparison, 2008 was nothing. But in the last few months the hostile tone has been rapidly ratcheting up. The irony for bears though is that it’s exactly what we want to hear. It’s a classic precursor of the ultimate break; together with stocks rising, not for their fundamentals, but simply because they are rising.

另一个可衡量的晚期牛市特征,从南海泡沫到 1999 年的科技泡沫,一直是最后阶段的加速。在近期的案例中,最后 21 个月到顶点的涨幅超过 60%,速度是正常牛市上升速度的两倍多。这一次,美国主要指数在短短 9 个月内,标普 500 指数从上涨 69% 到罗素 2000 指数上涨 100%。还不错!而且可能仍有更多上涨空间。但它已经通过了这个晚期泡沫的必要检验。

Another more measurable feature of a late-stage bull, from the South Sea bubble to the Tech bubble of 1999, has been an acceleration3 of the final leg, which in recent cases has been over 60% in the last 21 months to the peak, a rate well over twice the normal rate of bull market ascents. This time, the U.S. indices have advanced from +69% for the S&P 500 to +100% for the Russell 2000 in just 9 months. Not bad! And there may still be more climbing to come. But it has already met this necessary test of a late-stage bubble.

作为市场历史学家,能够再次经历一次重大的股市泡沫是一种特权。1989 年的日本、2000 年的科技泡沫、2008 年的房地产和次贷危机,以及现在的泡沫——这是我一生中意义最重大、最扣人心弦的四次投资事件。在大多数更正常的市场中,你只是上班、干活。平平无奇。然后,在很长一段时间里,市场会螺旋远离公允价值与现实。财富迅速被创造和毁灭,投资顾问有了一个难得的机会来真正证明自己的存在价值。但是,和往常一样,没有免费的午餐。这些发挥作用的机会都伴随着职业风险。

It is a privilege as a market historian to experience a major stock bubble once again. Japan in 1989, the 2000 Tech bubble, the 2008 housing and mortgage crisis, and now the current bubble – these are the four most significant and gripping investment events of my life. Most of the time in more normal markets you show up for work and do your job. Ho hum. And then, once in a long while, the market spirals away from fair value and reality. Fortunes are made and lost in a hurry and investment advisors have a rare chance to really justify their existence. But, as usual, there is no free lunch. These opportunities to be useful come loaded with career risk.

所以,我们又来到了这里。我预计我的泡沫判断会再次符合我适度的成功定义:在未来的某个日期,无论何时,从 2020 年仲夏开始规避风险对你来说都是值得的。但是,很少专业或个人投资者能够真正规避。时间不确定性和客户迅速加剧的懊悔感相结合,意味着与泡沫抗争的职业和业务风险对于大型商业机构来说太大了。即使市盈率像日本那样达到 65 倍,他们也永远无法全力支持看空建议。这些巨型机构中,在泡沫中唯一接近提供全面看空建议的是 1999 年的瑞银(UBS),其立场与我们在 GMO 的立场几乎完全相同。也就是说,介于勇敢和鲁莽之间。不过对我们来说幸运的是,他们改变了策略,在 2000 年 2 月市场见顶前,转换为瑞银布林森(UBS Brinson)及其子公司菲利普斯 & 德鲁(Phillips & Drew)的满仓成长股推荐。这搬走了那只本来会凭借顽固逆行拿走大部分回报的 800 磅大猩猩。所以,不要指望高盛和摩根士丹利会变得看空:这永远不会发生。对他们来说,这是一个极其非商业的赌注。也许对任何人来说都是。对客户来说有利可图且降低风险,是的,但对顾问来说在商业上不切实际。他们最好的政策清晰而简单:永远极度看多。这对生意有好处,在智力上也不费劲。它对大多数投资者有吸引力,因为他们更喜欢乐观而非现实的评估——从新冠疫情中我们就生动地看到了这一点。当一切结束时,作为一个持续的多头,你将拥有压倒性的同伴。这就是为什么在泡沫中你一直得到看多建议,并且永远会如此。

So, here we are again. I expect once again for my bubble call to meet my modest definition of success: at some future date, whenever that may be, it will have paid for you to have ducked from midsummer of 2020. But few professional or individual investors will have been able to have ducked. The combination of timing uncertainty and rapidly accelerating regret on the part of clients means that the career and business risk of fighting the bubble is too great for large commercial enterprises. They can never put their full weight behind bearish advice even if the P/E goes to 65x as it did in Japan. The nearest any of these giant institutions have ever come to offering fully bearish advice in a bubble was UBS in 1999, whose position was nearly identical to ours at GMO. That is to say, somewhere between brave and foolhardy. Luckily for us though, they changed their tack and converted to a fully invested growth stock recommendation at UBS Brinson and its subsidiary, Phillips & Drew, in February 2000, just before the market peak. This took out the 800-pound gorilla that would otherwise have taken most of the rewards for stubborn contrariness. So, don't wait for the Goldmans and Morgan Stanleys to become bearish: it can never happen. For them it is a horribly non-commercial bet. Perhaps it is for anyone. Profitable and risk-reducing for the clients, yes, but commercially impractical for advisors. Their best policy is clear and simple: always be extremely bullish. It is good for business and intellectually undemanding. It is appealing to most investors who much prefer optimism to realistic appraisal, as witnessed so vividly with COVID. And when it My paper of January 2018, “Bracing Yourself for a Possible Near-term Melt-up,” has substantially more data all ends, you will as a persistent bull have overwhelming company. This is why you have and exhibits on this topic. always had bullish advice in a bubble and always will.

等待最后的舞蹈:在一个晚期重大泡沫中进行资产配置的危险 | 第 6 页 杰里米·格兰瑟姆

然而,对于任何愿意承担这种职业风险的经理人——或者更可能是个人投资者——来说,要求你完美地把握时机,就有些强人所难了。如果判别泡沫的门槛设得太高,以至于你必须精确地预测高点,那你根本就不会去尝试。而这恰恰会让你每个周期都和绝大多数投资者与经理人一样,跟着一起跌下悬崖。

怎么办?

如同 1929 年、2000 年以及 1972 年“漂亮 50”(一个次级泡沫,与冠军公司为伍)这些泡沫顶峰时常见的情况一样,当今市场在资产类别、行业和公司之间存在着极端的价值差异。处于最廉价一端的资产包括全球范围内的传统价值型股票(相对于成长型股票而言)。价值型股票在截至 2019 年 12 月的十年间表现是史上最差的,随后 2020 年又是史上最糟糕的一年,成长型与价值型股票之间的业绩差距在单一年份里平均达到了 20 到 30 个百分点!同样,新兴市场股票目前正处于过去 50 年相对于美股的三次(大致处于同等水平)相对低点之一。毫不意外,我们认为你应该把相对重注押在这两个概念的重叠区域——价值股与新兴市场——同时,在你的职业和业务风险所允许的范围内,最大程度地回避美国成长型股票。祝你好运!

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p6 Jeremy Grantham However, for any manager willing to take on that career risk – or more likely for the Mr. Grantham co- individual investor – requiring that you get the timing right is overreach. If the hurdle for founded GMO in 1977 calling a bubble is set too high, so that you must call the top precisely, you will never try. and is a member of And that condemns you to ride over the cliff every cycle, along with the great majority of GMO’s Asset Allocation investors and managers. team, serving as the firm’s chief investment strategist. He is a What to Do? member of the GMO Board of Directors As often happens at bubbly peaks like 1929, 2000, and the Nifty Fifty of 1972 (a and has also served on the investment second-tier bubble in the company of champions), today’s market features extreme boards of several non-profit organizations. disparities in value by asset class, sector, and company. Those at the very cheap end Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham include traditional value stocks all over the world, relative to growth stocks. Value was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial stocks have had their worst-ever relative decade ending December 2019, followed by Management in 1969 where he recommended the worst-ever year in 2020, with spreads between Growth and Value performance commercial indexing in 1971, one of several averaging between 20 and 30 percentage points for the single year! Similarly, claims to being first. He began his investment Emerging Market equities are at 1 of their 3, more or less co-equal, relative lows career as an economist with Royal Dutch against the U.S. of the last 50 years. Not surprisingly, we believe it is in the overlap of Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate these two ideas, Value and Emerging, that your relative bets should go, along with the degree from the University of Sheffield greatest avoidance of U.S. Growth stocks that your career and business risk will allow. (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business Good luck!

他是艺术与科学学院的成员,拥有英国颁发的 CBE(大英帝国司令勋章),并获得卡内基慈善奖章。

School. He is a member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for Philanthropy.

免责声明 本文表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2021 年 1 月 5 日的观点,且随时可能根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被理解为上述行为。

Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 5, 2021, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such.

提及特定证券及发行方仅为示例之用,不构成、也不应被解读为买入或卖出此类证券的建议。

References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

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