我确实相信美国市场将会回归

2017 · 随笔 · 原文约 892 词

译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文，也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。

观点 2017 年 6 月 29 日我确实相信美国市场将回归其历史均值——只是速度非常缓慢杰里米·格兰瑟姆在几位记者断章取义和误解之后——他们或许太急于抓一个醒目的标题，又不愿花时间研读我那两篇又长又可能令人乏味的《不是一声巨响，而是一声呜咽》——我不得不做出回应。

Viewpoints June 29, 2017 I Do Indeed Believe the US Market Will Revert Toward Its Old Means – Just Very Slowly Jeremy Grantham After a few misquotes and misunderstandings by journalists, overeager perhaps for a punchy headline and unwilling to invest time in my two long and quite possibly boring pieces on “Not With a Bang But a Whimper,” I need to reply.

他们说过，或暗示过，我认为高估值会永远持续，而且均值回归已经结束。这当然是不准确的，正如我的季度信读者所知。我提出的观点是，尽管利润率与市盈率的均值回归仍有可能，但回归的速度已大幅放缓，变得粘滞。这种放缓是因为几乎所有导致回归的因素本身都不太可能迅速改变。这些因素包括：美联储政策（含道德风险）、较低利率、人口老龄化、增长与生产率放缓，以及企业政治权力与垄断权力的增强。

They have said, or implied, that I believe high prices are here permanently and that I also believe regression to the mean has ended. This is, of course, inaccurate, as readers of my quarterly letters know. I have suggested that although mean reversion in margins and price earnings ratios is still probable, the speed of regression has slowed way down and become sticky. This slowdown is because nearly all of the factors causing it are themselves unlikely to change fast. These include Fed policy including moral hazard, lower interest rates, an aging population, slower growth, and productivity; and increased political and monopoly power for corporations.

由于这种粘滞性，我提出市盈率与利润份额的回归将需要 20 年，而非 7 年（GMO 官方 7 年预测的基础）——1900-1997 年间更为典型的回归周期是 7 年——而且即使到那时，这些指标也只会回归到旧常态的三分之二。

Because of this stickiness, I have suggested that regression of P/Es and profit share will take 20 years as opposed to the 7 years (the basis of GMO’s official 7-year forecast) that is more typical of the period 1900-1997 and that even then those measures will have only regressed back two-thirds of the way to the old normals.

不过，这项工作中让我相当惊讶的是，即便这种降低后的回归速度，对标普 500 指数的隐含回报会造成多大破坏：20 年内实际年化回报率 2.7%，这一数字必将令许多企业和公共养老基金官员心碎。（这也在 GMO 标准 7 年预测方法——假设第 8 至 20 年正常增长——扩展到 20 年时，每年半个百分点以内。）

What was quite surprising to me in this work, though, was how damaging even this reduced regression rate would be to the imputed returns of the S&P 500: 2.7% real per year for 20 years, a rate bound to break the hearts of many corporate and public pension fund officers. (It is also within a half a point a year of GMO’s standard 7-year forecast methodology when that is extended to 20 years, on the assumption of normal growth in years 8 to 20.)

当然，总会有常规的熊市，而在这个周期里，两三年后它很可能因年高（或劳动力短缺）而寿终正寝，进入衰退。衰退和熊市都是正常的，正如它们的复苏一样。我的关键问题是：如果很快出现一场熊市，甚至是一场严重熊市，它会恢复到 23 倍的新常态，还是 15 倍的旧常态？我相信前者。让我提醒各位，这个新的 20 年高价位时代曾经历过非常严峻的压力测试：2000 年科技泡沫 50% 的暴跌，以及 2008-2009 年 50% 的暴跌——这可能是现代金融体系最大的崩溃之一。显然，这两次壮观的事件都不足以将价格趋势震回到此前较低的水平。

Of course there will always be normal bear markets, and in two or three years this cycle is likely to die of old age (or lack of labor) and go into a recession. Both recessions and bear markets are normal, as are their recoveries. My key question is: If we have a bear market soon, even a severe one, will it recover to the new normal of 23x or the old normal of 15x? I believe the former. Let me remind you that that new 20-year era of higher prices was very severely stress-tested by the 50% decline from the 2000 Tech Bubble and the 50% decline in 2008-2009, perhaps the biggest foul-up of the financial system in modern times. Neither spectacular event was enough, apparently, to jolt the price trend back to its former lower level.

此外，当前市场缺乏真正泡沫的多数行为指标。相反，我们应该做好准备，迎接一条漫长而痛苦的回飞路径，回到我们熟悉已久的旧比率。作为一名价值型投资经理，我希望事实并非如此。

Further, the current market lacks most of the behavioral indicators of a true bubble. Rather, we should be braced for a long-drawn-out and painful flight path back toward the old ratios we know so well. As a value manager, I wish it were not so.

附言在美国，一个完全成熟、充满行为狂热的泡沫仍有可能出现。不过，在如今变化了的环境中，我认为需要标普 500 指数达到相当高的水平才行。想到这里可真让人恼火！我建议让泡沫式狂热的证据自己说话，所以当本地午餐店开始吹嘘股票而不是红袜队重播时——就像 1999 年那样，而且 1929 年无疑也会通过收音机播放——我会通知你们。

P.S.A fully-fledged bubble in the US with full behavioral ecstasy can still occur. In today’s changed environment, though, I think it would take a considerably higher level on the S&P 500. Now that’s a seriously irritating thought! I suggest letting the evidence of bubble-type euphoria speak for itself, so when the local lunch places are touting stocks and not Red Sox replays, as they did in 1999 and no doubt would have done by radio in 1929, I’ll let you know.

另外，请记住这是我个人的观点，不是 GMO 的官方观点。它也被描述为“一项思想实验”。遗憾的是，我 1999 年和 2007 年的那些“近乎确定”如今已不复存在。

Also, please remember that this is my personal view, not GMO’s official view. It is also described as “A Thought Experiment.” My “near certainties” of 1999 and 2007 vintages are sadly lacking these days.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆。格兰瑟姆先生于 1977 年联合创立 GMO，现任 GMO 资产配置团队成员，担任公司首席投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会成员，并曾在多家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。在创立 GMO 之前，格兰瑟姆先生于 1969 年联合创立了 Batterymarch 金融管理公司，并于 1971 年率先推荐商业指数化——这算是成为“第一”的几个说法之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌公司的经济学家职位。格兰瑟姆先生获得英国谢菲尔德大学的本科学位和哈佛商学院的 MBA 学位。

Jeremy Grantham. Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a member of GMO’s Asset Allocation team, serving as the firm’s chief investment strategist. He is a member of the GMO Board of Directors and has also served on the investment boards of several non-profit organizations. Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School.

免责声明：预测是基于 GMO 的合理信念作出的前瞻性陈述，并非对未来业绩的保证。前瞻性陈述仅在其作出之日有效，GMO 没有义务也不承诺更新前瞻性陈述。前瞻性陈述受众多假设、风险和不确定性的影响，这些因素会随时间变化。实际结果可能与预期存在重大差异。

Disclaimer: Forecasts are forward‐looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward‐looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward‐looking statements. Forward‐looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated.

所表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2017 年 6 月 29 日的观点，并可能随时根据市场及其他条件变化。这不是对任何证券的购买或销售要约或招揽，也不应如此理解。提及特定证券和发行人仅为说明目的，不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending June 29, 2017, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

2 我确实相信美国市场将回归其历史均值——只是速度非常缓慢 2017 年 6 月 29 日

2 I Do Indeed Believe the US Market Will Revert Toward Its Old Means – Just Very Slowly June 29, 2017