美国市场的巨大悖论
美国市场的一大悖论!
THE GREAT PARADOX OF THE U.S. MARKET!
杰里米·格兰瑟姆观点 价格近乎完美,然而当今世界却极其不完美且危险 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 | 2024 年 3 月 1: 美国市场 嗯,如果看股价的话,美国确实在自得其乐。席勒市盈率 34 倍(截至 3 月 1 日),处于历史前 1% 的水平。总利润(几乎是占任何指标的比例)也接近历史纪录。请记住,如果利润率与市盈率同时处于历史高位,那真的是双重叠加、双重风险——因为在未来的某个时刻,等待我们的是另一个 1982 年 7 月或 2009 年 3 月,那时市盈率将同时处于历史低位,利润率也严重低迷。
JEREMY GRANTHAM VIEWPOINTS Prices reflect near perfection yet today’s world is particularly imperfect and dangerous Jeremy Grantham | March 2024 1: The U.S. Market Well, the U.S. is really enjoying itself if you go by stock prices. A Shiller P/E of 34 (as of March 1st) is in the top 1% of history. Total profits (as a percent of almost anything) are at near-record levels as well. Remember, if margins and multiples are both at record levels at the same time, it really is double counting and double jeopardy – for waiting somewhere in the future is another July 1982 or March 2009 with simultaneous record low multiples and badly depressed margins.
但对于那些即便在美国股票普遍严重高企时也非得持有不可的人(大多数机构都是如此),市场上仍有一些相对有吸引力的选择——当然,这个“相对”是相对于整个美国市场而言的。
But for those who must own U.S. stocks (most institutions) even when they are generally very overpriced, there is a reasonable choice of relatively attractive investments – relative, that is, to the broad U.S. market.
■ 质量股: 如今虽算不上极度便宜,但美国质量股¹ 在历史上有一个鲜明特征——牛市中略微跑输,熊市中大幅跑赢(尽管在最近这轮上涨中表现异常出色)。此外,它们的长期表现令人瞩目。AAA 级债券每年回报率比低等级债券低约 1%——这一点人尽皆知,且历来如此。而奇怪的反差在于,与之相当、破产风险更低、波动更小、风险明显更小的 AAA 级股票,历史上却比标普 500 指数每年多赚 0.5% 到 1.0%(精确地说,过去 63 年每年多赚 1.0%,且涨幅集中在 2008 年之后)。这究竟是怎么回事?哪怕只是与指数持平,本该都难以想象。这是有史以来市场最大的反常现象,我很高兴地说,我们 GMO 在 45 年前就意识到了这一点,当时法马和弗伦奇还在执迷于高波动小盘股与市净率的回报²。既然在自夸,我还得说一句:GMO 在那个 1% 的基础上,又稳稳地多赚了一笔长期增量——过去 10 年,我们的质量策略每年跑赢标普 500 指数 1.3%³。 ■ 资源股: 不仅原材料是有限的——信不信由你!——而且越来越稀缺,因此价格必然上涨,更关键的在于,在更长的时间跨度(10 年)上,资源股是股市中唯一与大盘呈负相关的板块。它们无疑是最具分散效果的板块(见图表 1)。此外,它们当前还特别便宜,因为最近刚遭受重挫。质量股的核心定义是:股本回报率稳定且偏高,资产负债表无可挑剔。
■ Quality: Although not spectacularly cheap today, U.S. quality stocks1 have a long history of slightly underperforming in bull markets and substantially outperforming in bear markets (although they did unusually well in the recent run-up). In addition, their long-term performance is remarkable. AAA bonds return about 1% a year less than low-grade bonds – everybody gets it, and always has. In bizarre contrast, the equivalent AAA stocks, with their lower bankruptcy risk, lower volatility, and just plain less risk, historically have delivered an extra 0.5% to 1.0% a year over the S&P 500 (to be precise, an extra 1.0% a year for the past 63 years, with the gains concentrated in the period since 2008). What on earth is that? Even holding their own should be inconceivable. It is the greatest aberration of all time in the market, and one I’m happy to say we at GMO realized 45 years ago, when Fama and French were still obsessing about returns to risky small cap and price to book.2 And while I’m bragging, I should say that GMO has added a decent long-term increment to that generic 1%, totaling 1.3% a year above the S&P 500 in our Quality Strategy for the last 10 years.3 ■ Resource equities: Not only are raw materials finite – believe it or not! – getting scarcer, and therefore certain to rise in price, but at longer horizons (10 years) resources are the only sector of the stock market to be negatively correlated with the broad stock market. They are far and away the most diversifying sector (see Exhibit 1). They are also The essence of a quality stock is a high stable return on particularly cheap today having been whacked recently. equity and an impeccable balance sheet.
本·英克最近在 GMO 2023 年第四季度致股东信《质量异常:全球最怪异的市场无效性》(2023 年 12 月)中探讨了这个话题。
Ben Inker recently broached this topic in GMO’s Q4 2023 Quarterly Letter, The Quality Anomaly: The Weirdest Market Inefficiency in the World (December 2023).
截至 2024 年 1 月 31 日,扣除费用后。优质策略并非对标标普 500 指数管理。提及该指数仅供比较之用。
Net of fees, as of January 31, 2024. The Quality Strategy is not managed relative to the S&P 500. References to the index are for comparison purposes only.
美国市场的大悖论!| p2 图 1:各行业与标普 1000 指数其余成分股之间的相关性:1970—2023 年 1.0 0.8 0.6 相关系数 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1 个月 1 年 3 年 5 年 10 年 金融 必需消费品 公用事业 能源/金属 截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日 | 数据来源:MSCI、CRSP、GMO ■ 气候相关投资:随着气候损害日益加剧,以及各国政府采取行动的意愿不断增强,我相信气候投资在未来几十年内,其营收增长将确保高于平均水平,尽管增长的平滑性无法保证。但由于太阳能、风能等投资的全部成本都在前期,运营成本极低,气候投资对折现率异常敏感——这使它们在过去两年半中遭受重创。而市场一如既往地对利率上升趋势反应过度,使得这些投资如今成了真正的廉价品。今天,太阳能股票的估值比整体股市折价超过 50%,一些全球最优秀的清洁能源公司的交易价格甚至隐含了负的实际增长。
The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! | p2 EXHIBIT 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SECTORS AND THE REST OF THE TOP 1,000 U.S. COMPANIES: 1970-2023 1.0 0.8 0.6 Correlation 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1 Month 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year Financials Consumer Staples Utilities Energy/Metals As of 12/31/2023 | Source: MSCI, CRSP, GMO ■ Climate-related investments: With increasing climate damage and the increasing willingness of governments to take action, I believe climate investments will have top-line revenue growth that is guaranteed to be above average for the next many decades, although with no guarantees as to the smoothness of that growth. But, with all the cost of solar, wind, etc. being up front and little of the cost being operational, climate investments are exceptionally discount rate-sensitive, which has hammered them over the past two and a half years. And in its usual way, the market has overreacted to the trend of rising rates, making these investments real bargains today. Today, solar stocks are priced at over a 50% discount to the broad equity market, and some of the best clean energy companies in the world trade at levels that imply negative real growth.
■ 深度价值:这些股票看起来足够便宜,值得投入一些资金,因为其与整个市场的估值差距几乎达到了历史极值。按定义,美国股市中最贵的 20% 股票始终是贵的,但当前它们处于过去 40 年历史区间中最差的 10%(与市值前 1000 名股票相比)。形成鲜明对比的是,最便宜的 20% 股票则处于其历史区间中最好的 7%。
■ Deep value: These stocks look cheap enough to be worth some investment, as the comparison with the total market is about as wide as it ever gets. The most expensive 20% of U.S. stocks are by definition always expensive, but today they are in the worst 10% of their 40-year range (compared to the top 1000 stocks). In great contrast, the cheapest 20% are in the best 7% of their range.
就美国整体市场而言,从未有过一次持续上涨行情是从 34 倍席勒市盈率起步的。唯一从类似水平继续上行的牛市,是 1989 年之前日本最后 18 个月,以及 1998 年和 1999 年美国科技泡沫,而那些结局如何我们都知道。另外,也从未有过一次持续上涨行情是从充分就业水平起步的。
As for the U.S. market in general, there has never been a sustained rally starting from a 34 Shiller P/E. The only bull markets that continued up from levels like this were the last 18 months in Japan until 1989, and the U.S. tech bubble of 1998 and 1999, and we know how those ended. Separately, there has also never been a sustained rally starting from full employment.
简单的法则是:石头里榨不出血。如果你把资产价格翻倍,你就把它未来的回报砍掉了一半。美国大盘股目前的长期前景,看起来几乎与历史上任何时期一样糟糕。(再次强调,1998-2000 年是一个极为罕见的例外,随后迎来了股票市场失去的十五年。而在某些数据中,1929 年则是另一个著名例外,随之而来的是大萧条。)泡沫与人工智能 回顾过去,我们 2021 年的泡沫后来怎样了?新冠疫情刺激泡沫在 2022 年似乎以相当传统的方式破裂——在 2022 年上半年,标普 500 指数的跌幅超过了自 1939 年欧洲进入二战以来的任何上半年。之前在 2021 年,市场显示出泡沫顶峰的所有经典迹象:投资者极度狂喜;IPO 和 SPAC 热潮;以及高波动的投机龙头股早在 2021 年初就开始下跌,即使蓝筹股继续上涨,足以带动整个市场在当年取得可观涨幅——这一特征在此前仅出现在 1929 年、1972 年、2000 年的晚期大泡沫中,而现在是 2021 年。但这种历史上熟悉的模式在 2022 年 12 月被 ChatGPT 的发布以及随之而来的公众对一项新的变革性技术——人工智能(AI)的认知——粗暴地打断了,AI 看起来很可能与互联网一样强大且改变世界,甚至很可能有过之而无不及。
The simple rule is you can’t get blood out of a stone. If you double the price of an asset, you halve its future return. The long-run prospects for the broad U.S. stock market here look as poor as almost any other time in history. (Again, a very rare exception was 1998-2000, which was followed by a lost decade and a half for stocks. And on some data, 1929, which was famously followed by the Great Depression.4) BUBBLES AND AI Looking backwards, what happened to our 2021 bubble? The Covid stimulus bubble appeared to be bursting conventionally enough in 2022 – in the first half of 2022 the S&P declined more than any first half since 1939 when Europe was entering World War II. Previously in 2021, the See the first chart of Hussman’s “Cluster of Woe,” Hussman market displayed all the classic signs of a bubble peaking: extreme investor euphoria; a rush Market Comment, February 4, 2024. to IPO and SPAC; and highly volatile speculative leaders beginning to fall in early 2021, even as The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! | p3 blue chips continued to rise enough to carry the whole market to a handsome gain that year – a feature hitherto unique to the late-stage major bubbles of 1929, 1972, 2000, and now 2021. But this historically familiar pattern was rudely interrupted in December 2022 by the launch of ChatGPT and consequent public awareness of a new transformative technology – AI, which seems likely to be every bit as powerful and world-changing as the internet, and quite possibly much more so.
但每一次这样的技术革命——从互联网回溯到电话、铁路,再到运河——都伴随着早期的巨大炒作和股市泡沫,因为投资者聚焦于该技术的终极可能性,将绝大多数非常长期的潜力立即定价到当前市场价格中。而且,许多这类革命最终往往像那些早期投资者预见的那样具有变革性,有时甚至更具变革性——但那是在经历了一段相当长的失望期,初始泡沫破裂之后。因此,作为科技泡沫最引人注目的例子,亚马逊引领了投机市场,从 1998 年初到 1999 年的峰值上涨了 21 倍,随后在 2000 年至 2002 年间下跌了几乎难以想象的 92%,之后却继承了零售业的半壁江山!
But every technological revolution like this – going back from the internet to telephones, railroads, or canals – has been accompanied by early massive hype and a stock market bubble as investors focus on the ultimate possibilities of the technology, pricing most of the very long-term potential immediately into current market prices. And many such revolutions are in the end often as transformative as those early investors could see and sometimes even more so – but only after a substantial period of disappointment during which the initial bubble bursts. Thus, as the most remarkable example of the tech bubble, Amazon led the speculative market, rising 21 times from the beginning of 1998 to its 1999 peak, only to decline by an almost inconceivable 92% from 2000 to 2002, before inheriting half the retail world!
如今的 AI 泡沫很可能也会重蹈覆辙。但像这样“泡中泡”的现象——即便仅限于少数几只股票——是史无前例的,因此翻阅历史书可能作用有限。不过,尽管我承认这种奇怪的新事物没有清晰的历史类比,但最合理的猜测仍然是:这第二波投资泡沫——也就是 AI 泡沫——至少会暂时破灭,并很可能促使 2022 年 12 月因我们暂停追捧 AI 股而中断的那波原始泡沫,以一种更正常的方式收场。同时,利率上升的后续影响,以及 2020–2021 年和当前(2023 年 11 月至今天)的荒谬投机,最终很可能以一场经济衰退收场。2 美国以外的股票市场和房地产市场如果一切都这么好,那世界其他地区为什么如此低迷?经济实力和盈利能力平平,而且两者都在走弱。英国和日本都陷入了技术性衰退;欧盟,尤其是德国,也显得疲软;而过去几十年在全球增长中承担了大部分重担的中国,眼下几乎是个烂摊子(尽管其股市已变得相当便宜)。全球住宅房地产市场看起来也格外棘手,尽管房价通常需要很长时间才能追上或跟上抵押贷款利率的变化。今天发达国家的任何年轻夫妻,能买到和他们父母当年同龄时买得起的同等新房吗?房价收入比峰值乘以早已过时的抵押贷款利率(美国目前为 6.8%),得出了极为苛刻的可负担性计算结果。至于写字楼,就别提了。在高利率和疫情引发的居家办公这双重问题下,没有人对任何事情有信心,没有人会再建任何新楼,所有人都屏息以待,看着估值开始下调,银行贷款给商业地产正变得越来越危险。而在中国,严重的过度建设同时威胁着住宅和商业地产。
So it is likely to be with the current AI bubble. But a new bubble within a bubble like this, even one limited to a handful of stocks, is totally unprecedented, so looking at history books may have its limits. But even though, I admit, there is no clear historical analogy to this strange new beast, the best guess is still that this second investment bubble – in AI – will at least temporarily deflate and probably facilitate a more normal ending to the original bubble, which we paused in December 2022 to admire the AI stocks. It also seems likely that the after-effects of interest rate rises and the ridiculous speculation of 2020-2021 and now (November 2023 through today) will eventually end in a recession 2: Non-U.S. Equities and Real Estate If things are so good, why on earth is the rest of the world so down at heel, with very average economic strength and average profitability and with both getting weaker? The UK and Japan are both in technical recessions; the EU, especially Germany, also looks weak; and China, which has done a lot of the heavy lifting in global growth for the last few decades, is pretty much a basket case for a while (although getting very cheap in its stock market). Global residential real estate looks particularly tricky also, although it often takes a very long time for prices to catch up or down with mortgage costs. Can any young couple in the developed world today buy a new home comparable to those bought at the same age by their parents? Peak prices as a multiple of family income multiplied by an old-fashioned looking mortgage rate (now 6.8% in the U.S.) makes for a very tough affordability calculation. And as for office space, forget about it. With the double problem of higher rates and Covid-induced work-from-home, no one is confident of anything, no one will build anything new, and all sit holding their breath as appraisals start to come down and bank loans to commercial property look increasingly dicey. And in China, extreme overbuilding threatens both housing and commercial real estate.
再加上几场迟迟无法结束的战争,以及与美国和俄罗斯、中国之间军事对抗升级的可能性越来越大,你就不难理解为什么世界其他地区都保持冷静,并且股价比美国合理得多(要理解美国的乐观情绪要难得多)。更准确地说,我想说,与美国股市的极端高估形成对比,海外股市只是略微高估,回报虽不温不火,但仍是正回报。在这种普遍、适度的偏高估值中,正面的例外情况出现在新兴市场股票和非美国发达市场股票(包括日本)的价值型或低增长板块,它们不仅远低于高增长型股票的价格,而且售价处于从合理到实际上低于正常水平的区间内。详情请参见 GMO 的 7 年期资产类别预测。
Throw in a couple of wars that refuse quick endings and rising possibilities of expanded military confrontations with Russia and China, and you can see why the rest of the world is sober and much more reasonably priced than the U.S. (Understanding U.S. optimism is much more difficult.) To be more precise, I would say that in contrast to extreme overpricing of U.S. equities, those overseas are a little overpriced, offering uninspired but positive returns. The positive exceptions to this general, moderate overpricing are at the value or low-growth end of emerging market equities and non-U.S. developed equities (including Japan), which are not only much cheaper than the high-growth varieties but are selling in a range from fair price to actually cheaper than normal.5 See GMO’s 7-Year Asset Class Forecast for full details.
美国市场的巨大悖论! | p4 GMO 对日本情有独钟,我们乐观地认为,日本能够在自身那种企业资本主义版本下,继续保持近期缓慢但扎实的改善势头。此外,我们非常有信心,日元兑美元迟早会升值 20% 甚至 30%。
The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! | p4 GMO has a particularly soft spot for Japan, where we are optimistic that they can continue their recent slow-but-steady improvements in their version of corporate capitalism. Additionally, we are very confident that the yen will sooner or later gain 20% or even 30% against the dollar.
最后几个月,非美股终于开始有点起色了,而美国则在人工智能泡沫中一路冲向近乎前所未有的高位。日本近期表现尤其强劲。从基本面看,这些市场的上涨空间比美国大得多,而泡沫破裂时的风险却小得多。
Finally, in the last few months, non-U.S. stocks have begun to perk up a little, even as the U.S. – in the midst of its AI bubble – vaults onwards to near unprecedented heights. Japan especially has been a strong recent performer. Fundamentally these have much more room to run than the U.S., with much less risk when the bubble bursts.
3:全球经济潜伏的棘手与威胁性问题
过去 15 年里,我把 90% 的时间花在研究我所称的“未被充分认识的长期问题”上,天哪,对这样一个专业领域来说,这真是一段有趣又忙碌的时光!尤其是眼下,所有这些长期问题——就在几年前,它们似乎还给我们留出 5 到 10 年的喘息空间,才可能咬我们一口——却决定要一拥而至。
3: The Unpleasant and Threatening Issues That Lie in Wait for Global Economies I’ve spent 90% of my time for the last 15 years studying what I call underrecognized long-term problems, and oh my has this been an interesting and busy time for such a specialty! Particularly right now as all these long-term issues, which seemed just a couple of years ago to be offering the hope of 5 or 10 years before they took a bite out of us, have decided to all arrive in a hurry.
不久以前,气候变化带来的损失还像是一场“公说公有理,婆说婆有理”的争论——该信谁呢?如今,只有蠢人和死硬派才会怀疑。去年不仅是人类进化以来最热的一年,而且是升温幅度最大的一年——比以往任何一年都高出整整一个台阶。6 如果把最新数据也算进去,截至今年 1 月 31 日的 12 个月里,全球气温已突破令人恐惧的工业化前水平 1.5°C 大关。7 任何曾经以为 1.0°C 或 1.5°C 听起来不过是个小数字的人,如今都被接二连三、每起损失超 10 亿美元的破坏性气候事件(见图表 2)彻底教育了。去年全球 GDP 因气候灾害减少超过 1%,在 2.9% 的总增长率之下 8,这个减量相当可观,而较贫穷国家承受了不成比例的冲击。9 就在我写作本文的 2 月初,前所未有的“大气河流”正在加利福尼亚州我们儿子一家所在的地方一天之内降下一个月的正常雨量。10 昨天,智利一场史无前例的森林大火造成逾百人死亡。11 前天……等等。如今,所有人突然开始谈论气候变化导致保费上涨,并视其为一项严重的成本压力(而且,越来越多的地区干脆买不到保险)。
Climate damage a short while ago was a ‘he says, she says,’ thing. Who to believe? Now only idiots and ideologues are non-believers. Last year was not just the warmest year since humans evolved. It was the warmest year by the biggest increment ever.6 If you include the most recent data and take the 12 months ended this January 31st, the world has breached the dreaded 1.5°C above pre-industrial level.7 And anyone who thought 1.0°C or 1.5°C seemed like such little numbers has been disabused by the avalanche of damaging climate incidents of over $1 billion each (see Exhibit 2). Globally last year GDP was reduced by over 1%, which at 2.9% total growth8 is a lot, with poorer countries suffering a disproportionate share of that damage.9 Unprecedented ‘atmospheric rivers’ are dropping a month’s normal rain in a day on our son’s family in California as I write this in early February.10 Yesterday well over 100 people died in unprecedented forest fires in Chile.11 The day before…etc. Everyone is suddenly beginning to talk about insurance premiums rising from climate damage as a serious cost pressure. (And in an increasing number of cases, insurance is simply unavailable.)
附件 21980-2023 年 美国十亿美元级(经 CPI 调整)天气与气候灾害
林赛与达尔曼,《气候变化:全球温度》,NOAA Climate.gov,2024 年 1 月 18 日。
EXHIBIT 2UNITED STATES BILLION-DOLLAR (CPI-ADJUSTED) WEATHER AND CLIMATE DISASTERS, 1980-2023 Lindsey and Dahlman, Climate Change: Global 25 Temperature, NOAA Climate.gov, January 18, 2024.
7 20 弗里德曼,《创纪录的 1 月为地球首个 12 个月期气温突破 1.5°C 目标画上句号》,Axios,2024 年 2 月 8 日。
7 20 Freedman, Record January Caps Earth’s First 12-Month Period Above 1.5°C Target, Axios, February 8, 2024.
OECD,《经合组织经济展望 2023》,第 2 期,2023 年 11 月。
OECD, OECD Economic Outlook 2023, no. 2, November 2023.
赛德斯报告——今日之损失与损害:气候变化对全球国内生产总值和资本的非均衡影响,特拉华大学气候变化研究中心,1980 年、1982 年、1984 年、1986 年、1988 年、1990 年、1992 年、1994 年、1996 年、1998 年、2000 年、2002 年、2004 年、2006 年、2008 年、2010 年、2012 年、2014 年、2016 年、2018 年、2020 年、2022 年,2023 年 11 月 28 日。
Siders, Report – Loss and Damage Today: The Uneven Effects of Climate Change on Global GDP and Capital, University of Delaware Climate Change Hub, November 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 28, 2023.
2024 年 2 月加州大气河流事件,维基百科,截至 2024 年 1 月 9 日 | 来源:美国国家环境信息中心(NCEI),访问日期 2024 年 2 月 29 日。
February 2024 California Atmospheric Rivers, Wikipedia, As of 1/9/2024 | Source: NCEI accessed February 29, 2024.
Ore 等人,《森林火灾致 123 人死亡,智利遭遇 2010 年地震以来最严重灾难》,路透社,2024 年 2 月 5 日。
Ore et al., Forest Fires Kill 123 in Chile’s Worst Disaster Since 2010 Earthquake, Reuters, February 5, 2024.
美国市场的巨大悖论!|p5 资源限制在 2000 年之前其实不算什么问题,当时价格在经历 100 年的实际(扣除通胀后)下跌后开始上涨。GMO 的 34 种等权重商品指数在 1900 年以 100 为基准,到 2002 年跌至 30 的低点(顺便说一下,当时不过是一次非常温和的衰退),现在大约在 65 左右,自 2002 年以来曾三次回到最初的 100,最近一次就在 2022 年。它在世纪之交给人的那种无情下降的印象现在已完全消失。最多只能说它在几十年里呈现出横向震荡的走势。我个人认为,它很可能在未来 20 年内创下新高,尤其是考虑到铜、镍、钴以及其他绿色经济所需的金属面临的压力。我们认为,这是一个完全不同的世界,原因是中国自 1990 年以来持续强劲的增长,以及许多商品极低成本储备开始进入终结阶段。当东西是有限的时候,它们确实会被耗尽。现在我们面临这里、那里、处处都是瓶颈,同时还夹杂着可观的供应过剩和价格下跌,这恰恰是商品的运作方式——无论是间歇性下跌还是上涨。但与 20 世纪那个美妙的、价格持续下降的失落世界相比,缓慢上涨且波动剧烈的价格让人感到痛苦。
The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! | p5 Resource limitations were not really a problem until about 2000, when prices started to rise after 100 years of real (after inflation) decline. GMO’s index of 34 equal-weighted commodities, which fell from an indexed 100 in 1900 to a low of 30 in 2002 (which, by the way, was only a very mild recession) is now around 65, having returned to its original 100 three times since 2002, including as recently as 2022. The impression it gave at the turn of the century of being in remorseless decline is no longer evident at all. At best it has been wandering sideways, with volatility, for decades. I personally believe it is likely to go to new highs in the next 20 years, especially given the pressures on copper, nickel, cobalt, and other metals needed to green the economy. This is a very different world brought on, we believe, by the remarkably sustained growth of China since 1990 and the beginning of the end of very cheap reserves for many commodities. When things are finite, they do run out. Now we are faced with bottlenecks here, there, and everywhere, with handsome gluts and price falls thrown in, which is simply how commodities work, whether irregularly falling or rising. But slowly rising, volatile prices are a pain compared to the wonderful lost world of the 20 th century’s declining prices.
我们世界的毒性水平正以惊人的速度上升,其推动力来自塑料和化学品产量类似的增长。塑料那奇妙的不朽特性,同时也正是一种可怕的不朽之势。更糟糕的是,当塑料碎裂成更小的碎片时,它们可能会变得更加危险,因为纳米级别的塑料已经进入我们的血液、大脑,以及天底下每一种动物的体内。(事实上,我们并不知道所有这些纳米颗粒在我们身体里到底有多危险,因为我们还没有进行过测试。但前景可不太妙,不是吗?)塑料垃圾的总重量据估算已经超过所有现存动物的总重量。¹² 这个数字还在以每年惊人的 5 亿吨速度增长,¹³ 而且非常不祥的是,它仍被瞄准为未来无限期的高速增长目标!
Toxicity levels in our world have been rising at incredible rates carried along by similar gains in plastics and chemical production. Plastics with their wonderful feature of indestructibility have this dreadful feature of indestructibility. What is worse is that as plastics break into smaller pieces they have the potential to become much more dangerous, for the nano-level plastics have entered our bloodstreams and our brains and those of every animal under the sun. (The fact is we don’t know just how dangerous all those nanoparticles are in our bodies because we have not done the testing yet. But the prospects don’t feel good, do they?) The weight of plastic waste has been calculated to be more than that of all living animals.12 It is growing at an astonishing half a billion tons every year13 and very ominously is still targeted for rapid growth into the indefinite future!
化学品的情况更为糟糕。其中 14 万种化学物质以数百万吨的规模生产,但没有任何一种经过与其它物质混合后的毒性测试——而这正是它们在环境中的实际存在方式——甚至单独测试的品种都极少。其中至少 1 万种是“永久性化学品”,其化学键无法被自然分解。成千上万种这类化学物质——远不止“永久性”这一类别——属于内分泌干扰物,会扰乱昆虫、两栖动物和哺乳动物的激素系统,破坏其生育能力,而人类尤其不能幸免。这场由人造复杂化学物质构成的猛攻,似乎已让我们的环境变得对生命充满敌意。正如昆虫种群因之崩溃而付出代价,人类的生育能力和整体健康也同样在承受恶果。
Chemicals though are even worse. 350,000 of them14 are produced at a scale of millions of tons and none of them are tested for toxicity in combination with each other – the way they actually occur – and very few are even tested alone. At least 10,000 of these15 are ‘forever chemicals’ whose bonds cannot ever be broken down by nature. Untold thousands of these chemicals, and not just the ‘forever’ variety, are endocrine disruptors that mess with our hormones and interfere with the fertility of insects, amphibians, and mammals – notably including humans. This onslaught of man-made complex chemicals has, it seems, made our environment hostile to life. And just as much as the collapsing insect populations pay the price, so does human fertility and our general health.
将不断加剧的毒性问题和生育能力问题,加入到女性推迟或避免生育的漫长理由清单中(所有这些理由都非常合理),那么可以肯定的是,在可预见的未来,我们的新生儿数量和劳动力数量将持续出现两位数的下降。我们的劳动力人口老龄化已经持续了几十年,并且这一趋势还将继续。老龄化劳动力队伍的生产效率较低,而按照目前的制度设计,退休人员不仅完全没有生产力,反而成为社会的负担。
Add growing toxicity and fertility problems to the long list of reasons for women to postpone or avoid childbirth (all of them very reasonable) and we are guaranteed to have a continued 12 decline in both our baby cohorts and in our workforce for the foreseeable future. Our Resnick and Zarracina, All Life on Earth, in One Staggering populations have been ageing for a couple of decades and this will continue. Older workforces Chart, Vox, August 15, 2018; Ritchie, FAQs on Plastics, Our are less productive, and retirees, as currently configured, are not only totally unproductive but World in Data, September 2, 2018.
13 资源密集型。日本已进入人口下降期 30 年,其 18 岁年龄组人数(Ritchie 等,《塑料污染,我们的数据世界》,2024 年 2 月 29 日查阅)已比峰值下降一半以上。不过,我的半开玩笑式严肃投资规则第 7 条是:永远不要拿日本做外推!他们的社会非常、非常不同,他们的社会契约——为了共同利益放弃个人利益的意愿(Wang 等,《走向对化学污染的全球理解:国家与地区化学物质清单的首次全面分析》,《环境科学与技术》,2020 年 1 月 22 日)——要强大得多。例如,很容易想象,如果美国 18 岁年龄组也下降这么多,那确实会引发一场非常严重的危机。
13 resource intensive. Japan is 30 years into population decline and their cohort of 18-year-olds Ritchie et al., Plastic Pollution, Our World in Data, accessed is already down over half from the peak.16 However, my joke-serious investing rule #7 is never, February 29, 2024. ever extrapolate from Japan! Their society is very, very different and their social contract – Wang et al., Toward a Global Understanding of Chemical willingness to forego individual interests for the common good – is much, much stronger. It Pollution: A First Comprehensive Analysis of National and is easy, for example, to imagine that if 18-year-olds in the U.S. were down this much, it would Regional Chemical Inventories, Environmental Science & cause a very major crisis indeed. Technology, January 22, 2020.
15 这几种长期力量的负面影响如今已经降临,并且已经在抑制增长。婴儿和劳动力数量的进一步下降,以及人口结构的进一步老龄化,是确定无疑的。同样确定的还有,由于毒性上升以及温室气体数量增加,环境受到的损害也在加剧。与这些确定性相比,不确定性反而有更多空间。
15 The negative impacts of these several long-term forces are upon us now and are already Sneed, Forever Chemicals Are Widespread in U.S. Drinking Water, Scientific American, January 22, 2021. holding growth back. Further declines in babies and workforces and further ageing of the 16 population profile are certain. As is increasing damage to the environment from rising toxicity Japan’s 18-Year-Olds at Record-Low 1.06 Million on Falling and rising counts of greenhouse gases. In comparison to these certainties there is more room Births, The Japan Times, December 31, 2023.
美国市场的巨大悖论!| p6 杰里米·格兰瑟姆关于资源限制的论点值得一听,但数据不会撒谎:我们正开始耗尽这些资源。而当这些长期火苗开始燃烧时,我们在做什么?我们在敷衍。我们为了维护既得利益而混淆视听,1977 年格兰瑟姆创立 GMO 就是为了对抗这一点。我们选择忽视,因为正视现实令人不快。我对此深表同情,因为思考这些问题确实非常令人不适。
The Great Paradox of the U.S. Market! | p6 Jeremy Grantham for argument about resources limitations, but the data doesn’t lie: we are beginning to run Mr. Grantham co- out. And while these longer-term fires begin to burn, what do we do? We fiddle. And obfuscate founded GMO in 1977 to protect vested interests. And ignore, because not to do so is unpleasant. I’m sympathetic and is a member of because a lot of this is very uncomfortable to think about!
从这一切来看,投资的关键问题在于:我们能否潜入这些定价更合理的市场,在我之前描述的日益集结的长期负面因素大军(再加上我们这两场战争不可预测的结局,以及由此导致的国际关系和贸易前景严重恶化)狠狠咬住我们的后路、并有将经济放缓或温和衰退变成某种更严重更持久局面的风险之前,带着利润抽身而出?
GMO’s Asset Allocation team, serving as the From all of this, the key question for investing is: can we sneak into these more reasonably firm’s long-term investment strategist. He is priced markets and take our profits before the gathering army of formerly long-term negatives the Chairman of the GMO Board of Directors, that I described earlier, combined with the unpredictable outcomes of our two wars, and the a partner of the firm, and has also served on resulting much deteriorated prospects for international relationships and trade, bite us hard on the investment boards of several non-profit the bottom and risk turning a slowdown or a mild recession into something substantially more organizations. Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. serious and long-lived?
格兰瑟姆自 1969 年起联合创办了 Batterymarch Financial Management,并在 1971 年推荐了商业指数化投资,这算是他诸多“首创”主张之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌石油公司的经济学家岗位,拥有英国谢菲尔德大学的本科学位和哈佛大学的 MBA 学历。让我对美国市场感到担忧的悖论在于:我们起步时的希勒市盈率和企业利润率均接近历史高点,几乎预示着尽善尽美——然而现实中我们不仅要面对一个动荡不安、地缘政治冲突不断的世界,对民主、平等和资本主义的担忧日益加剧,还要应对一份前所未有的、开始产生实际影响的长期负面清单。表面上的市场狂热与这些潜在问题之间的鲜明反差,显得极端、不合逻辑,而且危险。
Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he The paradox that worries me here for the U.S. market is that we start from a Shiller P/E and recommended commercial indexing in 1971, corporate profit margins that are near record levels and therefore predicting near perfection; one of several claims to being first. He began yet we face in reality not just a very risky disturbed geopolitical world, with growing concerns his investment career as an economist with about democracy, equality, and capitalism, but also an unprecedented list of long-term Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his negatives beginning to bite. The stark contrast between apparent embedded enthusiasm and undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an MBA from Harvard these likely problems seems extreme, illogical, and dangerous.
商学院。他是美国艺术与科学学院院士,持有大英帝国司令勋章(CBE),并获卡内基慈善奖章。对消化力强的读者,我们将推出一系列六篇论文,详细审视这些长期负面影响。第一篇(引言)将于下周发布,第六篇希望年底前完成。建议每篇配一杯烈威士忌。敬请期待。(欲知抢先内容,可收听《大简化》第 99 期长播客,或上 YouTube 观看。)
Business School. He is a member of the P.S. For those with a strong stomach, we are going to produce a series of six papers examining Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE in some detail these longer-term negatives mentioned here. Paper one, the introduction, from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie will be out next week and paper six, I hope by year end. A stiff whiskey is recommended for Medal for Philanthropy. each of these. Stay tuned. (A sneak preview can be had in a mammoth podcast at The Great Simplification, Episode 99 or on YouTube.)
免责声明 本文中表达的观点为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2024 年 3 月期间的观点,可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的买卖要约或招揽,也不应被视为此类文件。年化收益率截至报告日期。
Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending March 2024 and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security Annualized Returns as of and should not be construed as such.
2023.12.31(净值,美元) 起始日 1 年 3 年 5 年 10 年 起始至今 文中提及的特定证券和发行方仅用于说明目的,不构成也不应被理解为买入或卖出此类证券的建议。GMO 品质策略 2004.2.29 29.14% 11.11% 16.41% 13.21% 9.81% 标普 500 指数 26.29% 10.01% 15.69% 12.03% 9.60%
12/31/2023 (Net, USD) Inception 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year ITD References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not GMO Quality Strategy 2/29/2004 29.14% 11.11% 16.41% 13.21% 9.81% intended to be, and should not be interpreted S&P 500 Index 26.29% 10.01% 15.69% 12.03% 9.60% as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
业绩数据所代表的都是过往表现,不能用于预测 Copyright © 2024 by GMO LLC. 未来业绩。
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