我姐姐的养老金资产与代理问题

2012 · 随笔 · 原文约 7654 词
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GMO 季度信函 2012 年 4 月

我姐姐的养老金资产与代理问题(保护你的工作还是保护客户的钱之间的张力)

杰里米·格兰瑟姆

投资业务的核心真相是,投资行为是由职业风险驱动的。在专业投资领域,我们都是代理人,管理着别人的钱。首要指令,正如凯恩斯¹深知的,就是首要且最终的目标是保住自己的工作。他解释说,要做到这一点,你绝不能独自犯错。为了防止这场灾难,专业投资者会无情地关注其他投资者在普遍做什么。绝大多数人要么完全要么部分地“随大流”。这造成了从众效应或动量,从而将价格推至远高于或远低于合理价格的水平。市场定价中存在许多其他低效现象,但这无疑是最大的一个。它解释了波动极大的股票市场与极其稳定的 GDP 增长,以及同样稳定的股市“公允价值”增长之间的差异。这种差异是巨大的——如图表 1 所示,三分之二的时间里,年度 GDP 增长和年度市场公允价值变化都处于其长期趋势正负 1% 的微小范围内。而市场的实际价格——由狂野而多变的个体行为带来——在三分之二的时间里处于正负 19% 的范围内。因此,市场的变动幅度是其公允价值变化幅度的 19 倍。

图表 1 长期企业利润非常稳定,似乎长期风险很小

标普实际价格 vs. 完美前瞻公允价值*:1882 – 2005 年

13.0

20 波动率

12.5

三分之二时间 GDP ± 1%

18 实际价格和公允价值(对数空间)

12.0

三分之二时间公允价值 ± 1% GDP

16

三分之二时间价格 ± 19%

实际 GDP(对数空间)

11.5

11.0

公平

10.5

价值

12

10.0

9.5

标普实际价格

8

9.0

8.5

8.0

4 * 席勒模型

来源:GMO、标准普尔、美联储

截至 2005 年 12 月 31 日

¹ 约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯,《就业、利息和货币通论》,1936 年。

GMO QUARTERLY LETTER April 2012 My Sister’s Pension Assets and Agency Problems (The Tension between Protecting Your Job or Your Clients’ Money) Jeremy Grantham The central truth of the investment business is that investment behavior is driven by career risk. In the professional investment business we are all agents, managing other peoples’ money. The prime directive, as Keynes1 knew so well, is first and last to keep your job. To do this, he explained that you must never, ever be wrong on your own. To prevent this calamity, professional investors pay ruthless attention to what other investors in general are doing. The great majority “go with the flow,” either completely or partially. This creates herding, or momentum, which drives prices far above or far below fair price. There are many other inefficiencies in market pricing, but this is by far the largest. It explains the discrepancy between a remarkably volatile stock market and a remarkably stable GDP growth, together with an equally stable growth in “fair value” for the stock market. This difference is massive – two-thirds of the time annual GDP growth and annual change in the fair value of the market is within plus or minus a tiny 1% of its long-term trend as shown in Exhibit 1. The market’s actual price – brought to us by the workings of wild and wooly individuals – is within plus or minus 19% two-thirds of the time. Thus, the market moves 19 times more than Exhibit 1 Long-Term Corporate Profits Are Very Stable and Seem to Offer Little Long-Term Risk Real S&P price vs. perfect foresight fair value*: 1882 – 2005 13.0 20 Volatility 12.5 2/3 of the Time GDP ± 1% 18 Real Price and Fair Value in Log Space 12.0 2/3 of the Time Fair Value ± 1% GDP 16 2/3 of the Time Prices ± 19% Real GDP in Log Space 11.5 11.0 Fair 10.5 Value 12 10.0 9.5 S&P Real Price 8 9.0 8.5 8.0 4 * Shiller model Source: GMO, Standard & Poor’s, Federal Reserve As of 12/31/05 1 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936.

这一判断正因背后的引擎而成立!行为压倒理性、“有效市场”不攻自破的惊人一幕,20 多年前就由罗伯特·希勒首次发现,却遭到理性预期学派用最扭曲的逻辑反驳——这本身就是一个极高的门槛。希勒为此所用的“公允价值”仰仗的是未卜先知:他从 1917 年、1961 年及之后各起点开始,“预知”了未来所有股息的行进轨迹。由此得出的理论价值始终稳定(即使在“大萧条”中也几乎纹丝不动),但这一数据却被广泛视为无用而遭到忽视。对大多数市场参与者来说,忽视它或许才是正确反应,因为无视波动起伏的市场变化、转而专注于燃烧缓慢的长期现实,在职业层面实在太危险。错过一次大行情——无论其基本面依据多么不充分——都可能招致被解雇的巨大风险。职业风险及由此引发的从众行为很可能永远主导投资。短期永远会被夸大,而公司未来价值延伸至遥远未来这一事实则会被忽略。正如 GMO 的本·英克所写,三分之二的企业价值存在于 20 年之后。然而市场往往交易得像所有价值都落在未来 5 年内,有时甚至是 5 个月。尽管我们市场的波动对一位聪明的火星人来说显得荒谬,但这正是我们的现实,而人人都喜欢搬出据说是凯恩斯(但从未有文字记载)的那句“名言”:“市场保持非理性的时间,可以长过你保持偿付能力的时间。”对我们这些代理人而言,他或许更应该说:“市场保持非理性的时间,可以长过客户保持耐心的时间。”多年来,我们对“标准客户耐心时间”(请允许我造个词)的估计,在正常条件下是 3.0 年。在极端情况下,如果关系以及入场时机不幸地不凑巧,耐心可能比这短一年。例如,5 年好业绩之后出现 2.5 年糟糕表现通常尚可容忍;但从起步期就经历 2.5 年差劲业绩——即便你此前 5 年的好成绩广为人知,却只造福了别人——那绝对不可同日而语!如果入场时机、个人关系都幸运,相对业绩也体面,客户耐心可以超过 3.0 年一年,特殊情况下甚至能长两年。我喜欢说,优秀的客户管理就是为公司多挣一年的耐心。多出这一年对任何投资产品都至关重要;而在资产配置这种错误一目了然的领域,它更是绝对的关键,通常足以决定成败。

is justified by the underlying engines! This incredible demonstration of the behavioral dominating the rational and the “efficient” was first noticed by Robert Shiller over 20 years ago and was countered by some of the most tortured logic that the rational expectations crowd could offer, which is a very high hurdle indeed. Shiller’s “fair value” for this purpose used clairvoyance. He “knew” the future flight path of all future dividends, from each starting position of 1917, 1961, and all the way forward. The resulting theoretical value was always stable (it barely twitched even in the Great Depression), but this data was widely ignored as irrelevant. And ignoring it may be the correct response on the part of most market players, for ignoring the volatile up-and-down market moves and attempting to focus on the slower burning long-term reality is simply too dangerous in career terms. Missing a big move, however unjustified it may be by fundamentals, is to take a very high risk of being fired. Career risk and the resulting herding it creates are likely to always dominate investing. The short term will always be exaggerated, and the fact that a corporation’s future value stretches far into the future will be ignored. As GMO’s Ben Inker has written,2 two-thirds of all corporate value lies out beyond 20 years. Yet the market often trades as if all value lies within the next 5 years, and sometimes 5 months. Ridiculous as our market volatility might seem to an intelligent Martian, it is our reality and everyone loves to trot out the “quote” attributed to Keynes (but never documented): “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent.” For us agents, he might better have said “The market can stay irrational longer than the client can stay patient.” Over the years, our estimate of “standard client patience time,” to coin a phrase, has been 3.0 years in normal conditions. Patience can be up to a year shorter than that in extreme cases where relationships and the timing of their start-ups have proven to be unfortunate. For example, 2.5 years of bad performance after 5 good ones is usually tolerable, but 2.5 bad years from start-up, even though your previous 5 good years are well-known but helped someone else, is absolutely not the same thing! With good luck on starting time, good personal relationships, and decent relative performance, a client’s patience can be a year longer than 3.0 years, or even 2 years longer in exceptional cases. I like to say that good client management is about earning your firm an incremental year of patience. The extra year is very important with any investment product, but in asset allocation, where mistakes are obvious, it is absolutely huge and usually enough.

凯恩斯确实在他《通论》著名的第 12 章里说过:“长期投资者——那种最能促进公众利益的人……实际上,只要投资基金由委员会或董事会管理,他便会招来最多批评。”这位长期投资者,在“一般人的眼里会被视为古怪、非传统、鲁莽……而且如果他在短期内不成功——这很可能发生——他不会得到多少宽恕。”(原文强调)回顾我们早期介入几次极端异常事件时的经历,凯恩斯这番话读来格外精准,痛感“宽恕”有时之稀缺,不亚于斗兽场里遭遇糟糕的一天、满场都是拇指朝下的手势。但与之相对,他关于后果的判断却显得过于严厉了:我们似乎活了下来。

What Keynes definitely did say in the famous chapter 12 of his General Theory is that “the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest … will in practice come in for the most criticism whenever investment funds are managed by committees or boards.” He, the long-term investor, will be perceived as “eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion … and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy.” (Emphasis added.) Reviewing our experiences of being early in several extreme outlying events makes Keynes’s actual quote look painfully accurate in that “mercy” sometimes was as limited as it was at a bad day at the Coliseum, with a sea of thumbs down. But his attribution, in contrast, has proven too severe: we appear to have survived.

显而易见,如果你满足三个条件,就能在押注股市非理性上涨时幸存下来。第一,你必须留出像本杰明·格雷厄姆所说的宽裕的“安全边际”,并且在真正出现极端事件时才下重注。第二,你必须尽量保持适当的分散化。第三,你绝不能使用杠杆。以我个人观点(你可能会补充说,这是事后诸葛亮),尽管我们资产配置团队当时觉得自己的耐心异乎寻常且备受煎熬,但过去我们并非总能足够久地按兵不动,也不是总能足够耐心。价值投资者(就这一点而言,扑克玩家也一样)的典型缺陷就是失去耐心,下注太猛、太急。此外,GMO 的分散化也并非总是最优。与 1998 年相比,我们现在总体上更加谨慎(或者,如果你愿意,也可以说“更有经验”),比如在耐心和分散化这两个方面都如此。而且至少我们资产配置团队从未使用过杠杆。 3 2000 年的美国成长股和科技股泡沫,是有史以来美国市场中最极端的市场事件;我们此前曾在日本那个市盈率高达 65 倍的市场中幸存下来,那可能是任何时间、任何地点所有重要股票市场中最极端的异常事件。这些是对基金经理最严苛的考验,而这两次我们都提前了 2 到 3 年做出判断。虽然留下了一些战斗伤痕,但我们最终靠着极大的帮助幸存了下来,并且最终都大获全胜。假设一下,如果能在该投资的时候抵制过早投资的诱惑…… 2 本·英克,《经济危机中的股票估值》,2009 年 4 月 6 日。

You apparently can survive betting against bull market irrationality if you meet three conditions. First, you must allow a generous Ben Graham-like “margin of safety” and wait for a real outlier before you make a big bet. Second, you must try to stay reasonably diversified. Third, you must never use leverage. In my personal opinion (and with the benefit of hindsight, you might add), although we in asset allocation felt exceptionally and painfully patient at the time, we did not in the past always hold our fire long enough or be patient enough. It is the classic failing of value managers (and poker players for that matter) to get impatient and bet too hard too soon. In addition, GMO was not always optimally diversified. We are generally more cautious (or, if you prefer, “more experienced”) now than in 1998 with respect to, for example, both patience and diversification, and at least we in asset allocation always stayed away from leverage.3 The U.S. growth and technology bubble of 2000 was by far the biggest market outlier event in U.S. market history; we had previously survived the 65 P/E market in Japan, which was perhaps the greatest outlier in all important equity markets anywhere and at any time. These were the most stringent tests for managers, and we were 2 to 3 years early in our calls in both cases. Yet we survived, although not without some battle scars, with the great help that we did, in the end, win these bets and by a lot. Hypothetically, resisting the temptation to invest too 2 Ben Inker, “Valuing Equities in an Economic Crisis,” April 6, 2009.

3 杠杆的解释可以相当宽泛。就我们的资产配置策略而言,它意味着不使用借来的钱。

3 Leverage can be interpreted quite broadly. For our asset allocation strategies, it means no borrowed money.

GMO 2012 年 4 月第二季度信函——我姐姐的养老金资产——1931 年可能是一次更严峻的生存考验,考验的是逆市而行。幸运的是,我们以及所有价值型基金经理当时都不存在,所以没有被那个机会诱惑。(尽管罗伊·纽伯格——他不幸于 2010 年 12 月去世——当时还在世,而且他能像任何投资者一样清晰地讲述那段经历。)

GMO 2 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 soon in 1931 may have been a tougher test of survival in bucking the market. Luckily we, and all value managers, were not around to be tempted by that one. (Although Roy Neuberger – who died in December 2010, unfortunately – was, and he could talk about it as lucidly as any investor ever.)

这完美印证了沃伦·巴菲特的那句格言:投资很简单,但不容易。看出什么是必需的,很简单;但愿意去做、或者能够做到,却不容易。再讲个老故事吧:1998 年和 1999 年,我让大约 1100 位全职的股票专业人士就两个问题投票。他们每个人都同意,如果标普 500 指数从当时 28 到 35 倍的市盈率水平,回到 17 倍市盈率,那将注定引发一场大熊市。更令人惊讶的是,只有 7 个人投票认为它不会跌回去!换句话说,超过 99% 的——来自那些或大或小的投资机构——分析师和投资组合经理都相信,确实会有一场“大熊市”,而与此同时,他们中的代言人——少数几位可敬的例外除外——却还在安抚客户说,不必担心。职业风险和商业风险,在投资的不同层级上分布得很不均匀。比如说,当你挑选保险股时,职业风险非常低,因此你很难丢掉饭碗。通常要等上四五年,情况才会比较清楚地表明你的选股远非出色;而到那时,如果运气好的话,研究总监可能已经换过一两次人了,你的不足也就被历史湮没了。相比之下,选石油股——比如说,而不是保险股——就要显眼得多,因此也危险得多。在一轮气势如虹的牛市中,选择持有现金或采取“保守”策略,其风险恐怕超出了任何上市企业所能承受的疼痛阈值。它根本承受不起——被视为在宏观大方向上“看错”两三年,同时还伴随着随之而来的业务流失。记住,高估的市场可以继续走向极度泡沫化——两年或三年之后——日本和科技泡沫已经证明了这一点。因此,由于在职业和商业风险游戏中,资产类别选择的杀伤力更为致命,所以重大的投资机会更可能出现在资产类别层面,而不是个股或行业层面。但即便你明白这一点,亲爱的专业读者朋友,如果你像我那近 1100 位受访分析师一样看重自己的工作,你可能也对此无能为力。除非——或许是用你自己的资产,或者——比如说,你姐姐的退休金资产。

This exemplifies perfectly Warren Buffett’s adage that investing is simple but not easy. It is simple to see what is necessary, but not easy to be willing or able to do it. To repeat an old story: in 1998 and 1999 I got about 1100 full-time equity professionals to vote on two questions. Each and every one agreed that if the P/E on the S&P were to go back to 17 times earnings from its level then of 28 to 35 times, it would guarantee a major bear market. Much more remarkably, only 7 voted that it would not go back! Thus, more than 99% of the analysts and portfolio managers of the great, and the not so great, investment houses believed that there would indeed be “a major bear market” even as their spokespeople, with a handful of honorable exceptions, reassured clients that there was no need to worry. Career and business risk is not at all evenly spread across all investment levels. Career risk is very modest, for example, when you are picking insurance stocks; it is therefore hard to lose your job. It will usually take 4 or 5 years before it becomes reasonably clear that your selections are far from stellar and by then, with any luck, the research director will have changed once or twice and your deficiencies will have been lost in history. Picking oil, say, versus insurance is much more visible and therefore more dangerous. Picking cash or “conservatism” against a roaring bull market probably lies beyond the pain threshold of any publicly traded enterprise. It simply cannot take the risk of being seen to be “wrong” about the big picture for 2 or 3 years, along with the associated loss of business. Remember, expensive markets can continue on to become obscenely expensive 2 or 3 years later, as Japan and the tech bubble proved. Thus, because asset class selection packs a more deadly punch in the career and business risk game, the great investment opportunities are much more likely to be at the asset class level than at the stock or industry level. But even if you know this, dear professional reader, you will probably not be able to do too much about it if you value your job as did the nearly 1100 analysts in my survey. Except, perhaps, with your own assets or, say, your sister’s pension assets.

我姐姐的养老金资产

这一切引出了我持续时间最长的投资——我一位姐姐的养老金,1968 年我刚在投资行业找到第一份工作时,这笔钱就开始积累,初始金额非常小。一方面因为资产规模不大,另一方面因为我当时胆子更大(或者说思路更僵化),她的养老金资产百分之百投在了我管理的那些股票型共同基金上(一直是价值型,多数是小盘价值型)。不过,组合内的配置比例经常调整,有时调整幅度相当大。比如,进入 1990 年代格林斯潘-伯南克过度刺激的市场之后,她的平均股票仓位明显偏低,而 1998 年以后又大幅倾斜到新兴市场、远离美国(GMO 所有策略在自己操作约束范围内都是如此)。

My Sister’s Pension Assets All of this brings me to my longest-lived investment: the pension of one of my sisters, which started very modestly in 1968, just after I got my first job in the investment business. Partly because the value of the assets was small and partly because I was more aggressive (or unimaginative) then, her pension assets were invested 100% in those equity mutual funds (always value and mostly small cap value) that I was involved with. However, the allocations within the portfolio changed from time to time, sometimes quite significantly. For example, as we entered the GreenspanBernanke over-stimulated market in the 1990s and onwards, she was notably underweight stocks on average, and hugely tilted to emerging markets and away from the U.S. after 1998 (as were all GMO strategies within their respective operational constraints).

后来,随着 GMO 在 1994 年开始推出 10 年预测并积累资产配置领域的实战经验,我姐姐的养老金始终忠实遵循这些预测。但说来有些惭愧,若以风险调整后的收益衡量,她的表现竟略优于我们第一个专注机构资产配置的客户。这主要归因于两点。她拥有的第一个巨大优势是:我只须考虑绝对回报,无需顾忌某些投资者强加的投资约束。我从未感到任何职业风险——在担任了 43 年基本还算称职的基金经理后,她不会轻易解雇我。更何况,她从未询问、我也从未告知她投资变动或短期表现,这已持续数年,毕竟,她是我姐姐。完全没有投资约束、没有被解雇的压力,这赋予我最伟大的投资自由——当数据发出信号时(就像 1998 至 1999 年以及 2007 年最显著时),我能做出规模极大的资产押注。对机构客户而言,这些条件根本无法企及。(在继续往下说之前,我应该告诉你我与姐姐之间一次关于投资沟通的试验。在经历新兴市场股票一次惨痛的亏损后,我觉得应该向她提及此事,并表达我对它最终会好转的信心。她听到亏损后,在我还没来得及说明任何细节之前,就迅速大喊“卖掉!卖掉!”,活脱脱像是 1929 年某部电影里的场景。尽管她恳求,我并未卖出任何仓位;而新兴市场的本性使然,它很快强势反弹,飙升至辉煌的新高。于是,为了平衡之前的坏消息,我告诉她我们获得了闪电般的收益,结果却换来同样迅疾的指责:“卖掉!卖掉!”试验至此结束。)

Later, as GMO started to crank out 10-year forecasts in 1994 and build up a body of experience in asset allocation, my sister’s pension faithfully followed the forecasts, but I’m a little embarrassed to admit that on a risk-adjusted basis she has done a little better than our first dedicated institutional asset allocation client. There are two principal reasons for this. The first very large advantage for her is that I have only had to consider absolute return without the investment constraints some investors impose. I have felt absolutely no career risk. She is not going to fire me easily after 43 years as a mostly effective manager. In any case, she does not ask nor has she been told about investment changes or short-term performance for several years, and she is, after all, my sister. The complete lack of investment constraints and pressure from being fired gives me the greatest of all investment freedoms – the freedom to make very big asset bets when the numbers call for it as they did most notably from 1998 to 1999 and in 2007. For an institutional client, these conditions are impossible to match. (Before moving on I should tell you of my one experiment in investment communication with my sister. After a painful losing experience in emerging market equities, I felt I should mention it along with my confidence that it would eventually work out fine. On hearing of the loss and before I could provide any details, she very quickly cried out, “Sell! Sell!” right out of some 1929 movie. In spite of her pleas, I did no selling and, in the nature of emerging, it came storming back quite rapidly to brilliant new highs. So, to balance the Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 3 GMO old bad news, I told her of our lightning-like gain only to be admonished with the same instantaneous exclamation, “Sell! Sell!” End of experiment.)

在为客户而非自己的亲属管理资产时,我们一直试图采取一系列资产配置策略,确保即便在极端牛市中提前 2.5 年行动(熊市往往快得多),投资组合至少看起来大致正常,客户的痛苦也能勉强忍受。安全边际设得太大,我们等于把太多钱白白扔掉;这很可能是在保自己的饭碗,而不是力求让客户回报最大化。安全边际设得太窄,客户可能会解雇我们,过去有些客户就这么做过。我相信这对我们和客户都没好处——客户往往会在极不合适的时机,由于市场定价极端错误而转向截然不同的投资组合。这当然是投资的核心困境。在我们资产配置经验的头 15 年,解决这一困境的尝试,是把旗舰产品“全球资产配置策略”(原名全球平衡资产配置策略)中全球股票仓位的变动范围限定在最低 50%、最高 75% 之间。我们曾试图设想,普通投资者——无论是个人还是机构——会认为怎样的配置才算得上大致正常,这样当我们在市场操作中不可避免地过早行动时,他们才会坚持住。这个 50% 到 75% 的范围,理论上看起来很保守,但实际并非如此——我们在 1998 年和 1999 年就领教了。当时,市盈率此前在 1929 年触及 20 倍峰值、1964 年达到 19 倍,却在 1999 年初飙升至惊人的 33 倍。在这种环境下不随大流,结果超过大约 40% 的客户无法容忍。基本上,他们认为我们落伍了,因为我们看不到格林斯潘所说的“新高地”——一个黄金时代,他声称互联网和其他技术将永久改变盈利能力,并且“很可能”也会改变估值水平。(市场上许多大型资产配置基金今天都明智地绕过了这次终极压力测试,因为它们在 1998 年和 1999 年根本不存在。)但 60% 的客户留了下来。事后看来,一位哲学家可能会争辩说,如果在这场规模如此之大的考验中——统计上超过三西格玛事件,如果世界呈正态分布,概率大约为千分之一——你没有流失业务,那说明你总体上过于胆小了。这话听起来有道理,但很少有人愿意频繁经历这种“放血”。不过对 GMO 来说,押对了注反而在 2003 年到 2006 年吸引了大批新业务,尽管我们印证了凯恩斯关于“得不到怜悯”的观点,但我们似乎推翻了“理性投资无法在非理性市场中存活”这一普遍论点。顺便说一句,凯恩斯本人无论是亲身经历还是历史记载,都未曾见过像 2000 年美国或 1989 年日本那样非理性的市场。受到这两次经验以及 2007 年下一次泡沫中定价过高之烈度和广度(真正是全球性的)的鼓舞,我们成功推动将全球资产配置策略的股票最低仓位降至 45%,并确保我们持有的股票平均而言更为保守。这一次,我们的时机把握得更好——市场在 2009 年初相当迅速地回落到公允价值,尽管美联储照例鼓励和过度刺激,但市场并未重演 1999 年和 2000 年初那种疯狂高估的诱惑。因此,2008 年我们策略相对于基准取得了健康的超额收益(扣除费用后 +6.9%)。但这仍然让我们相当不满意,因为我们的绝对回报是 -20.8%,而且是在我们极度确信将出现金融危机和市场严重下跌的一年里发生的。例如,到 2008 年 7 月,我甚至对我心爱的新兴市场股票缴械投降,并建议客户“尽可能少承担风险”。我建议忽略基准风险或职业风险,将股票持仓降至最低水平。我写道,我“正式感到害怕”,并承认发现基本面比我预想的要糟糕得多。发出如此可怕的警告,而现实发展甚至可能更糟,可以想象,我们对相对收益强劲但实际损失惨重的结果感到有点不满。还有两件事更是往我伤口上撒盐。首先,我姐姐的养老金资产——输入的信息与我们专业账户完全一样,但没有任何职业风险,也没有任何基准——我认为我为她设定的职责是:机会好时赚钱,机会差时保本——到 2007 年底已经降至 20% 的股票仓位。到 2008 年 7 月,这一配置已进一步降至零股票,而我认为这并非不合理,因为 GMO 在 2007 年 10 月对任何股票子类给出的最高 7 年预测,实际年化收益只有可怜的 1.9%,而这个数字在 2008 年头几个月仅缓慢上升。

In dealing with clients as opposed to sisters, we have tried to adopt a range of asset allocation moves that, even when we are 2.5 years too early in extreme bull markets (bear markets tend to be much quicker), will leave the portfolio looking at least faintly normal and leave the clients’ pain just tolerable. Too big a safety margin and we are leaving too much money on the table; we are probably protecting our job rather than attempting to maximize our clients’ return. Too narrow a safety margin and clients may fire us, as some have done in the past. I believe this is not good for us or our clients, who tend to rebound into much different portfolios, often, given the circumstances of an extremely mispriced market, at a very inauspicious time. It is, of course, a central dilemma of investing. In the first 15 years of our asset allocation experience, our attempt to address this dilemma was to limit the range of our global equity shifts in our flagship Global Asset Allocation Strategy (formerly known as Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy) between a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 75%. We had tried to imagine what the typical investor – both individual and institutional – would consider to be at least faintly normal so that they would hang in when we would inevitably be too early in our market moves. That range – 50% to 75% – had seemed very conservative in theory but not so in practice as we learned in 1998 and 1999. It was then that P/E ratios, which had previously peaked at 20 times in 1929 and 19 times in 1964, moved up to an astonishing 33 times in early 1999. Failing to follow the crowd in this environment turned out to be uncomfortably beyond the tolerance of about 40% of our clients. Basically, they thought that we had been left behind because of our inability to see Greenspan’s new high plateau – a golden era in which he claimed that the internet and other technology would permanently change profitability and “probably” valuation levels as well. (Many of the largest asset allocation funds in the market today had the notable good sense to bypass this ultimate stress test by not existing in 1998 and 1999.) But 60% of our clients stayed. With hindsight, a philosopher might argue that if in a test of that magnitude – statistically over a 3-sigma event, or about a 1 in 1000 chance if it were a normally distributed world – you did not lose business, you were being too timid in general. That sounds reasonable, but few would volunteer to go through that bloodletting too often. For GMO, however, winning the bet attracted a flood of new business from 2003 to 2006 and, despite proving Keynes’s point about receiving “no mercy,” we seemed to have disproved the general thesis that rational investing could not survive an irrational market. Keynes himself, by the way, had not seen such irrational markets as those that occurred in the U.S. in 2000 or in Japan in 1989, either in person or in the history books. Encouraged by those two experiences and by the intensity and breadth of overpricing in the next bubble of 2007, which was truly global in nature, we pushed successfully to have the equity minimum moved down to 45% in our Global Asset Allocation Strategy, and we also made sure that our equities were, on average, more conservative. This time, our timing was better as the market moved down reasonably quickly to fair value in early 2009, resisting the temptation to repeat the crazy overpricing of 1999 and early 2000, despite the usual encouragement and over-stimulation from the Fed. Consequently, 2008 was a year of healthy outperformance against the strategy’s benchmark (+6.9% net of fees). Yet it still left us feeling quite dissatisfied, for our absolute return was -20.8% and it came in a year when we had felt extremely confident of a financial crunch and a severe market decline. By July 2008, for example, I had even thrown in the towel for my beloved emerging market equities and had advised our clients to “take as little risk as possible.” I suggested ignoring benchmark or career risk by reducing equity holdings to rock-bottom. I was, I wrote, “officially scared,” and I confessed to finding fundamentals far worse than I had expected. With such dire warnings and with real life turning out perhaps even worse, one can imagine we were a little unsatisfied with strong relative gains but painful actual losses. And salt was rubbed into my wounds by two other events. First, my sister’s pension assets, driven by exactly the same inputs as our professional accounts but carrying zero career risk and no benchmark at all – I perceived my job description for her was to make money when opportunities were good and protect money when opportunities were poor – was already down to 20% equities by late 2007. By July 2008, this allocation had ducked down to zero equities and not unreasonably so, in my opinion, because GMO’s highest 7-year forecast for any equity subset in October 2007 was a dismal 1.9% a year real and this number rose only slowly in the first few months of 2008.

GMO 四年季度信函——我姐姐的养老金资产——2012 年 4 月 第二个更为重要的因素,加剧了我们对 2008 年那场“相对”胜利的不满:我们这些专业人士拥有一种自创的资产配置策略,堪称“无基准”——我想,这是一种简略说法,意指试图大幅降低基准风险的策略——因为每一种投资策略(或许除了我姐姐的之外)总得在某个地方做些比较。

GMO 4 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 The second and more important factor that increased our dissatisfaction with our 2008 “relative” win was the existence of our own professional version of an asset allocation strategy with “no benchmark,” a shorthand way for saying, I suppose, a strategy attempting to show much reduced benchmark risk, for surely every investment strategy (except perhaps my sister’s) has to make some comparisons somewhere.

1999 年,我们推出了一系列没有官方基准的资产配置策略。其中一项被认定为高风险,一项中等风险,一项低风险。1999 年客户会议上展示的原始材料见附件 2。该材料显示,隐含实际回报(基于我们当时的 10 年预测)在 5% 至 6% 的实际区间,而标普 500 指数的隐含实际回报为 2.2%。然而,当时市场对所有看涨因素的热情如此高涨,以至于直到 2001 年我们才签下第一个客户,即便那时,我们的方法也被认为过于特立独行,以至于被要求将这项策略与 20% 固定配置的保守型多策略产品搭配使用。这种组合策略向机构客户开放,但因容量限制于 2004 年关闭。不过,出于会计目的,其中 80% 的纯多头部分也作为独立投资组合(GMO 无基准配置策略)运营。该策略表现优异,大幅跑赢了我们的旗舰全球资产配置策略(见附件 3)。其超额收益的主要来源,恰恰就是摆脱了基准的束缚。附件 2 使用非传统投资组合实现 5% 至 5.75% 的实际回报 1999 年 GMO 秋季会议数据 7% 5.75% 6% 5.5% 来自资产类别的预期实际回报 新兴 5.0% 非传统股票 5% 19.3% 前沿市场 房地产投资信托基金 15.0% 10.0% 新兴 12.3% 10.0% 15.0% 债务 10.0% 8.1% 4% 美国

In 1999 we offered a suite of asset allocation strategies that had no official benchmarks. One was deemed high risk, one medium risk, and one low risk. The original 1999 exhibit from our client conference is shown as Exhibit 2. It shows the imputed real returns (from our 10-year forecasts at that time) were in the range of 5% to 6% real, compared to the S&P 500 imputed return of 2.2%. Yet, such was the enthusiasm back then for all things bullish that we could sign no one up until 2001, and even then our approach was deemed so unusual that we were asked to match it up with a static 20% allocation to our conservative Multi-Strategy. This combined strategy was offered to institutions and was closed because of capacity concerns in 2004. But the 80% long-only component was, for accounting purposes, also run as a separate portfolio (GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy). It did well, handsomely beating our flagship Global Asset Allocation Strategy (see Exhibit 3). The main reason for this outperformance was precisely its freedom Exhibit 2 Achieving a 5% to 5.75% Real Return Using a Non-Traditional Portfolio 7% From 1999 GMO Fall Conference 5.75% 6% 5.5% Expected Real Return from Asset Class Emerging 5.0% Non-Traditional Equities 5% 19.3% Frontier REITs 15.0% 10.0% Emerging 12.3%% 10.0% 15.0% Debt 10.0% 8.1% 4% U.S.

16.9% 33.6% 债券 27.7% 通胀指数化债券 50.0% 22.1% 3% 政府债 50.0% 2% 1% 传统组合 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 风险(年化波动率) 传统组合 非传统组合 5.0% 5.5% 5.75% (65% 全球股票, 实际 实际 实际 35% 美国债券) 回报 回报 回报 回报 2.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% 风险 10.4% 4.7% 6.8% 8.8% 3 年内回报小于 0% 的概率 36.9% 2.6% 7.0% 11.7% 注:基于 GMO 的 10 年期资产类别回报预测。上述预测在作出时属于前瞻性陈述,基于 GMO 的合理信念,并非对未来表现的保证。前瞻性陈述仅在作出之日有效,GMO 无义务且不承诺更新前瞻性陈述。前瞻性陈述受制于众多假设、风险和不确定性,且这些因素随时间变化。实际结果可能与前瞻性陈述中预期的情况存在重大差异。

16.9% 33.6% Bonds 27.7% Inflation 50.0% 22.1% Protected 3% Gov’t Bonds 50.0% 2% 1% Traditional Portfolio 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Risk (Annualized Volatility) Traditional Portfolio Non-Traditional Portfolios 5.0% 5.5% 5.75% (65% Global Equities, Real Real Real 35% U.S. Bonds) Return Return Return Return 2.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% Risk 10.4% 4.7% 6.8% 8.8% Probability <0% return: over 3 year 36.9% 2.6% 7.0% 11.7% Note: Based on GMO’s 10-year asset class return forecasts. These forecasts above were, at the time they were made, forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and were not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.

来源:GMO 截至 1999 年 9 月 30 日季度信函 – 我姐姐的养老金资产 – 2012 年 4 月 5 日 GMO 在市场定价过高时投资仓位会大幅降低(请记住,我们对股票市场的 7 年预测回报率当时非常低)。我要指出,过去这十年是非常有利的十年:市场波动足够大,比如 2008 年,这给了资产配置策略发挥的空间,但又不至于像科技泡沫时期那样疯狂。相反,如果再来一个平稳的十年,没有几轮极端高估或低估,这种策略就很难有出色表现。在 2000 年的科技泡沫期间,它也会被激进型投资组合远远甩在后面。你还会注意到,GMO 一贯的特点是在投资环境糟糕的时候承担了大部分重任。

Source: GMO As of 9/30/99 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 5 GMO to be much less invested when the market was overpriced (remember, our 7-year-forecasts for equities were very low). I will point out that this last decade was a very favorable one: bumpy enough, as in 2008, to give asset allocation something to play against, but not really crazy, as the tech bubble had been. Alternatively, this strategy could not hope to do very well in a quiet decade, absent several wild over- or under-valuations, should there indeed be such a decade again. It would also have been badly beaten by aggressive portfolios during the tech bubble of 2000. You will also note the usual GMO tendency to do most of its heavy lifting when investment times are bad.

图表 3 全球资产配置策略与无基准配置策略表现

160% 无基准配置策略 +151%

140%

120%

实际收益(经 CPI 调整)

100%

80%

全球资产配置策略 +72%

60%

40%

+30%

20%

0%

全球资产配置基准*

-20%

12 月

01 年 02 年 03 年 04 年 05 年 06 年 07 年 08 年 09 年 10 年 11 年

上图中无基准配置策略的表现显示的是无基准配置组合(以下简称“组合”)的过往业绩,该组合由 Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co. LLC(简称“GMO”)管理的账户和/或共同基金组成。该组合包含 GMO 全权管理、收费的账户,这些账户的投资目标、政策和策略与该组合中其他账户基本相似。2012 年 1 月 1 日之前,该组合中的账户是 GMO 主要通过独立账户客户执行的更广泛实际收益策略**(该策略有自己的 GIPS 组合)的主要组成部分(约占 80%)。预计无基准配置策略与该更广泛实际收益策略的该组成部分不会有显著差异。预计该策略的投资敞口与其作为更广泛实际收益策略组成部分时的配置不会有显著差异,尽管该策略可能会将其资产中更大比例配置给那些以现金类资产为基准的策略。该组合中包含的账户不一定是共同基金;但所有账户都将其资产投资于其他共同基金。构成该组合的所有账户均由资产配置部门管理。尽管构成该组合的共同基金和客户账户具有基本相似的投资目标和策略,但您不应假设共同基金或客户账户将实现与该组合中其他账户相同的业绩。该组合中的客户账户可能会不时发生变化。每个账户的业绩可能因客户特定的限制和/或限制条件以及共同基金之间的不同权重而有所不同。引用的业绩数据代表过往表现,不能预测未来回报。无基准配置策略的净回报是在从组合的扣除管理费前的回报中扣除模型管理和股东服务费后得出的。对于全球资产配置策略,净回报代表该组合中所有账户扣除管理费后的回报的加权平均值。净回报包括交易成本、佣金、外国收入和资本利得的预扣税,并在适用时包括股息和其他收入的再投资。符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩陈述已在此陈述之前的 12 个月内提供,或者随此陈述一并提供,也可在 www.gmo.com 上获取。实际费用在 GMO 的 ADV 表格第二部分中披露,也可在每个策略的合规陈述中找到。以上信息是对 2011 年 4 月已在 GMO 网站上提供的 GIPS 合规陈述的补充。

  • 全球资产配置基准由账户基准的加权平均值组成。许多账户基准由标普 500 指数、MSCI ACWI 除美国指数和巴克莱美国综合指数或类似的市场敞口代理指标组成。对于每个底层账户基准,每个市场指数的权重可能略有不同(通常为 65% 的 MSCI ACWI,35% 的巴克莱美国综合指数)。该指数由 GMO 内部混合,并每月维护一次。

** 对于更广泛的实际收益策略,截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日:净累计回报 = 175.18%。年末净回报如下:2001 年 12 月 31 日:0.16%;2002 年 12 月 31 日:8.80%;2003 年 12 月 31 日:34.20%;2004 年 12 月 31 日:15.29%;2005 年 12 月 31 日:13.54%;2006 年 12 月 31 日:11.01%;2007 年 12 月 31 日:9.99%;2008 年 12 月 31 日:-6.61%;2009 年 12 月 31 日:13.41%;2010 年 12 月 31 日:2.72%;2011 年 12 月 31 日:4.22%。

Exhibit 3 Global Asset Allocation Strategy and Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy Performance 160% Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy +151% 140% 120% Performance (CPI-Adjusted) 100% 80% Global Asset Allocation Strategy +72% 60% 40% +30% 20% 0% Global Asset Allocation Benchmark* -20% Dec- 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy appearing in the chart above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the “Composite”) which consists of accounts and/or mutual funds managed by Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co. LLC (“GMO”). The Composite is comprised of those fee-paying accounts under discretionary management by GMO that have investment objectives, policies and strategies substantially similar to the other accounts included in the Composite. Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy** (which has its own GIPS composite) pursued predominantly by separate account clients of GMO. The Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy is not expected to differ significantly from that component of the broader real return strategy. It is expected that the strategy’s investment exposures will not differ significantly from the allocations the strategy would have had as a component of the broader real return strategy, although the strategy will likely allocate a greater percentage of its assets to the strategies that have cash-like benchmarks. Not all of the accounts included in the Composite may be mutual funds; however, all the accounts have invested their assets in other mutual funds. All of the accounts that make up the Composite have been managed by the Asset Allocation Division. Although the mutual funds and the client accounts comprising the Composite have substantially similar investment objectives and strategies, you should not assume that the mutual funds or the client accounts will achieve the same performance as the other accounts in the Composite. The client accounts in the Composite can change from time to time. The performance of each account may differ based on client specific limitations and/or restrictions and different weightings among the mutual funds. Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Net returns for the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy are presented after the deduction from the composite’s gross-of-fee returns of a model management and shareholder service fee. For the Global Asset Allocation Strategy, net returns represent the weighted average of the net-of-fee returns of all accounts within the composite. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011. * The Global Asset Allocation Benchmark is comprised of a weighted average of account benchmarks. Many of the account benchmarks consist of S&P 500, MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. and Barclays U.S. Aggregate or some like proxy for each market exposure they have. For each underlying account benchmark, the weighting of each market index may vary slightly (generally 65% MSCI ACWI, 35% Barclays U.S. Aggregate). The index is internally blended by GMO and maintained on a monthly basis. ** For the broader real return strategy, as of 2/29/12: Net cumulative return = 175.18%. Net year-end performance is: 12/31/01: 0.16%; 12/31/02: 8.80%; 12/31/03: 34.20%; 12/31/04: 15.29%; 12/31/05: 13.54%; 12/31/06: 11.01%; 12/31/07: 9.99%; 12/31/08: -6.61%; 12/31/09: 13.41%; 12/31/10: 2.72%; 12/31/11: 4.22%.

数据来源:GMO,数据截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日,GMO 第 6 季度通讯《我姐姐的养老金资产》——2012 年 4 月。那么,无基准配置策略(Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy)与我们最初的全球资产配置策略(Global Asset Allocation Strategy)相比如何呢?说到这里,我不得不再次绕个弯,谈谈衡量投资效率的指标,也就是夏普比率。

Source: GMO As of 2/29/12 GMO 6 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 So, how does the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy compare to our original Global Asset Allocation Strategy? This is where I must take yet another detour to talk about measures of investment efficiency, or, Sharpe Ratios.

夏普比率 在我投资生涯的大部分时间里,在投资组合层面管理夏普比率一直是投资组合管理的基础知识,但在实际操作中,它的应用却微乎其微。夏普比率衡量的是投资者过去每获得一单位回报所承受的价格波动单位数。图表 3 显示,我们的全球资产配置策略基准(65% 全球股票 + 35% 美国债券)在过去 10 年实现了每年 2.7% 的净实际回报,波动率为 ±11.6%(一个标准差,也就是三分之二的时间)。因此,其夏普比率被认为低于 0.25——也就是说,每获得 1 单位回报,要承受超过 4 单位的波动。相比之下,全球资产配置策略扣除费用后的回报率为 +5.4%,波动率则低 20%,即每年 ±9.2%。因此,其夏普比率为 0.6,即每单位回报对应的波动不到 2 个单位。这意味着,该策略的效率是基准的两倍以上——每单位波动带来的回报是基准的两倍以上(这种波动常被危险地称为“风险”)。基于这一背景,过去 10 年,无基准配置策略的年回报率是全球资产配置策略的 1.7 倍,而波动率低 10%。这使得其夏普比率达到 1.1,效率几乎是全球资产配置策略的两倍,是该平衡型基准的四倍以上。我还要补充一点:在我看来,客户对所有纯多头投资产品的热情几乎完全取决于“原始”回报。效率提升中因波动降低而带来的那部分收益,据我的经验,基本被忽视了。这显然带来了商业上的危险:当市场在已经高估的基础上大幅反弹(这种事情时不时很容易发生)时,你推出一项策略,其表现可能比现有策略差一倍。理论上,这种痛苦的一个例子是 2008 年市场在意外上涨 30% 之后,在 2009 年崩盘。实际案例是 1999 年,当时市场确实从已经创下纪录的高估水平强劲反弹。即便如此,我认为在全球化平衡投资组合层面,夏普比率是“现代投资组合管理”中少数有用的概念之一。它是一个衡量实际亏损可能性的合理指标——尽管是短期的。相比之下,“信息比率”或“基准风险”则被广泛使用。这些指标衡量的是你每获得一单位超额回报时,偏离基准的程度。换句话说,它衡量的是职业风险:让你老板难堪、丢掉工作的风险。因此,也就不奇怪夏普比率——衡量最终受益人(比如养老金领取者)所承担风险的指标——几乎被忽视了。

Sharpe Ratio Managing Sharpe Ratios at the portfolio level has been Portfolio Management 101 for most of my investment career, but in real life it has been used to a negligible degree. The Sharpe Ratio is a measure of how many units of price volatility an investor has received in the past per unit of return. Exhibit 3 shows that the benchmark for our Global Asset Allocation Strategy, which is 65% global equities and 35% U.S. bonds, delivered a net real return for the last 10 years of 2.7% per year and had a volatility of ±11.6% (at 1 standard deviation or two-thirds of the time). It is therefore considered to have a Sharpe Ratio of under .25 – that is to say, it delivers more than 4 units of volatility for 1 unit of return. The Global Asset Allocation Strategy, in contrast to its benchmark, returned +5.4% net of fees, with a volatility that was 20% less, or ±9.2% a year. It has had, therefore, a Sharpe Ratio of 0.6, or less than 2 units of volatility per unit of return. This means that the strategy has been more than twice as efficient, if you will, as its benchmark, delivering over twice the return per unit of volatility (often referred to, rather dangerously, in my opinion, as “risk”). With this as background, for the last 10 years the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy has delivered 1.7 times the yearly return of Global Asset Allocation Strategy with 10% less volatility. This gives it a Sharpe Ratio of 1.1, or nearly twice the efficiency of the Global Asset Allocation Strategy and over four times that of the balanced benchmark. I will add that I believe that clients’ enthusiasm for all long-only investment products has been geared almost entirely to the “raw” return. That part of the increased efficiency that is due to lower volatility has been, in my experience, more or less ignored. This obviously makes it commercially dangerous to offer a strategy that can be caught out twice as badly as an existing strategy on those occasions when the market rallies a lot from an already overpriced level, which it can quite easily do from time to time. A theoretical example of such pain would have been a 2008 that was up another very unexpected 30% before collapsing, say, in 2009. A real example was 1999, when the market really did rally strongly from an already record overpriced level. That said, I believe the concept of the Sharpe Ratio is one of the few aspects of “modern portfolio management” that is useful at the level of a global balanced portfolio. It is a reasonable, although short-term, measure of the chance of real loss of money. “Information Ratio” or “benchmark risk” is, in contrast, very widely used. These measure how much you deviate from the benchmark per unit of extra return. In other words, it measures career risk: the risk of embarrassing your boss and losing your job. It is no wonder, perhaps, that the Sharpe Ratio – the risk to the ultimate beneficiary, the pensioner, say – is more or less ignored.

简而言之,我很高兴地告诉大家,我们现在可以提供一项几乎不带职业风险的投资策略。它就是“无基准配置策略”,目前可以独立使用,不再依赖过去 10 年它所从属的实际回报策略。我们愿意进行资产类别押注,这让该策略在过去这个尤其危险的 10 年里表现非常出色,因为它押中了那些大赌注。为了充分披露,说得直白些,显然也存在它押不中的风险,那样的话,表现当然就会糟糕得多。要做出这样的大赌注,至关重要的是必须对金融狂热或悲观情绪极端化后总会回归正常这一极强的历史趋势抱有真正的信心。幸运的是,我们确实具备这种信心。

In a nutshell, I am pleased to say that we can now offer an investment strategy that reflects little career risk. It is the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy, and it is now available on a stand-alone basis, independent of the real return strategy of which it has been a part for the past 10 years. Our willingness to make asset class bets has enabled this strategy in this past particularly dangerous decade to do very well because it won its big bets. To state the obvious in the interests of very full disclosure, there was clearly some risk that it would not have won its big bets, in which case, of course, performance would have been considerably worse. To make such big bets, it is vitally important to have real confidence in the very strong historical tendency for extremes in financial enthusiasm or pessimism to move back to normal. Which confidence, thankfully, we have.

讲到这里,任何一个认真听讲的读者都会冒出一个好问题:为什么我们觉得这个策略能扛过客户那套标准的耐心考验?嗯,答案很精确:它可能扛不住。我们试图通过把策略打上“无基准”的标签来提高胜算。它的初衷是先保住资本、再赚大钱。但凯恩斯知道,我也知道——在 1999 年那样的疯狂行情里,很容易就能想象客户那边有个人扫一眼业绩排名,看到那些多头竞争对手的 +47%、+31%、+24%,然后看到 GMO 的 +12%。激战正酣时,他对长期业绩和岗位职责的记忆渐渐模糊,一声质问“那个 +12% 的家伙是谁雇来的?为什么还在组合里?”很可能就会被听到。我们或许有些天真地希望,自己在过往考验中挺过来并最终获胜的记录还能被记住。谁知道呢?但就算时不时被开掉,大概也值了。毕竟,伟大的机会之所以存在,正是因为职业风险和商业风险确实、确实很重要,而它们之所以重要,又因为伴随着痛苦。所以到头来,想要创造我们能达到的最佳长期业绩的冲动,以及那种觉得这才是我们耐心、预测能力、甚至途中甘愿丢客户的最好、最高用途的感觉,占了上风,给了我们推出“无基准配置策略”作为独立策略的信心。我相信,这是我第一次专门、详尽地介绍 GMO 的某个单一策略,也很可能是最后一次。我的借口是,在所有让我牵肠挂肚的投资议题中,这一个——职业风险——在我看来最重要。该策略的存在至少会带来两件事。第一,它会实质性地取代我本人为我姐姐养老金资产所做的管理。(不过我会保留偶尔利用期货额外做空 10% 的能力,纯粹是为了向她炫耀她完全没有职业风险。)第二,凭借它敢于偶尔对看起来严重高估的市场下重注的意愿,它能在我们的时机失误时,让客户有绝佳的机会热情地解雇我们。要记住——那些客户当然不会记住——尽管我们承担着巨大的职业风险或商业风险(而且坦率讲,也把这种风险转嫁给了客户……啊,这就是问题所在),但额外的风险,我相信,是职业风险,是基准风险,而不是真正的风险。我相信这个策略,就像 GMO 大约 90% 的多头策略相对于各自基准所承受的那样,承担的实际风险要小得多。这体现在它(以及它们)的高夏普比率上。它的“风险”是在牛市中表现严重落后。真正的风险,是我同事詹姆斯·蒙蒂埃喜欢说的永久性资本损失的风险。铁律是在熊市中不要表现落后。不过,虽然这可能是一条铁律,但我们都知道,在这个行业里没有什么有用的保证。

At this point, a good question from any reader who has been paying close attention is: why do we think this strategy can survive the client’s standard patience test? Well, an accurate answer is that it may not. We have tried to improve the odds by branding the strategy as benchmark-free. It is intended to protect capital first and yet still make good money. But Keynes knew, as I know, that in a 1999-type frenzy it would be all too easy to imagine someone at the client end looking down the performance list and seeing the +47%, +31%, and +24% of bullish competitors and then GMO’s +12%. In the heat of the battle, his memory of longer-term performance and job descriptions fades, and the response, “Who hired that +12% guy and why is he in the portfolio?” could easily be heard. We, perhaps fondly, hope that our surviving and eventually winning previous tests might be remembered. And, who knows? But even if frequently fired on occasion, it is probably worth it. After all, the great opportunities only exist because career Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 7 GMO and business risk really, really matter and they only matter because of the pain that accompanies them. So, in the end, the urge to have the best long-term record that we can have and the feeling that this is the highest and best use of our patience, forecasting ability, and, yes, willingness to lose business along the way, has won out, giving us the conviction to offer Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy as a stand-alone strategy. This is, I believe, the first time I have written specifically and in some detail about a single GMO strategy and it is likely to be the last. My excuse is that of all of the investment issues close to my heart, this one – career risk – is in my opinion the most important. The existence of the strategy will do at least two things. First, it will substantially replace my own efforts to manage my sister’s pension assets. (Although I will retain the ability to go, on rare occasions, the extra 10% short, using futures, if only to rub it in that she has absolutely no career risk.) Second, it can, by virtue of its willingness to make occasional very big bets against markets that appear very overpriced, give clients great opportunities to fire us enthusiastically from time to time when our timing is off. Bear in mind – as such clients will not – that although we are taking enormous career or business risk (and, admittedly, passing it on to clients … ah, there’s the rub), the extra risk, I believe, is career risk, or benchmark risk, not real risk. I believe that this strategy, like roughly 90% of GMO’s long-only strategies relative to their benchmarks, takes considerably less real risk. This is reflected in its (and their) high Sharpe Ratio. Its “risk” has been that of bad underperformance in bull markets. Real risk is the risk of a permanent loss of capital as my colleague James Montier likes to call it. The cardinal rule is to not underperform in bear markets. And though it may be a cardinal rule, there are, as we all know, no useful guarantees in our business.

投资展望 从现在开始,我的信每季度会聚焦一个特定话题——这是过去几年来越来越明显的做法。有时候我也会谈宽泛的投资展望,但有时候对近期那些“面包和黄油”的核心问题只做粗略点评,这对部分读者来说不太令人满意。为了弥补这一点,本·英克——我们资产配置团队的负责人兼投资组合总经理——将接手这个角色。所以我只管聊我感兴趣的内容,而他则会尽力确保我们覆盖大部分(如果不是全部)重要的投资议题。有些人拿到好差事,有些人可没有!本的观点以单独板块附在本信之后。

Investment Outlook From now on, my letter will focus on a particular issue every quarter as it has increasingly over the last few years. Sometimes I have also covered a broad investment outlook, but sometimes I have given only cursory comments on nearer-term bread and butter issues, which can be unsatisfactory for some readers. To remedy this, Ben Inker, the leader of our asset allocation group and general portfolio manager, will take up this role. So I will comment on whatever I like, and he will attempt to make sure we cover most, if not all, of the important investment issues. Some people get the good jobs and some people don’t! Ben’s comments follow as a separate section of this letter.

附注虚假表象

发言人很容易将团队的功劳归为己有,而这种情况在我身上也时常发生。GMO 的资产配置流程从来都是一项团队协作;实际上,在我们大部分历史中,GMO 各单个策略超越基准的能力,对我们的资产配置策略成功的贡献,远超过我们进行的资产调配。

PSFalse Pretenses It is easy for a spokesperson to receive credit for the work of a team, and this has often been the case for me. GMO’s asset allocation process has always been a team effort; indeed, for much of our history, the ability of the individual GMO strategies to beat their benchmarks contributed more to the success of our asset allocation strategies than did our movement of the assets.

在资产配置方面,我们始终依赖本·英克的投资组合管理能力,尤其是头寸规模把控和风险控制,他担任我们团队的负责人已有十多年。(我对工作的态度一贯是尽早且频繁地授权。)在资产配置的创意生成环节,我们一直努力打造一个民主化、以创意为导向的团队。随着我们的野心不断膨胀,我们对脑力和专业能力的需求也与日俱增:过去五年间,我们的资产配置头脑风暴团队从 4 人扩充到了 25 人。我们希望几乎对每一个通过转移资产来赚钱或省钱的机遇都了如指掌。

In the allocation piece itself we have always depended on the portfolio management skills, particularly sizing and risk control, of Ben Inker and he has been commander in chief of our group for more than 10 years. (My attitude toward work has always been to delegate early and often.) In the idea generation part of asset allocation, we have always tried to be a democratic, idea-driven group and as our aspirations grew, so did our need for brain cells and expertise: our asset allocation brainstorming team has grown from 4 to 25 members over the last 5 years. We want to be well-informed on almost every opportunity to make or save money by moving assets.

上述业绩数据代表过往表现,不能预测未来回报。收益数据均已扣除管理费及适用的业绩报酬费。净收益包含交易成本、佣金、境外收入及资本利得的预扣税,并已按情况计入股息及其他收入的再投资。过去 12 个月内,一份符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩展示曾置于本材料之前,或随附于本材料,亦可访问 www.gmo.com 查阅。实际费用在 GMO 的 ADV 表格第二部分中披露,亦可在各策略的合规展示材料中获取。全球平衡资产配置策略的业绩信息是上述 GIPS 合规展示的补充材料,该合规展示已于 2011 年 4 月在 GMO 网站上发布。

Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are presented after the deduction of management fees and incentive fees if applicable. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compli-ant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The performance information for the Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011.

免责声明:本文所表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2012 年 4 月 18 日的观点,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文并非购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被理解为此类行为。文中提及特定证券和发行人仅为说明目的,无意也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending April 18, 2012, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2012 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2012 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

GMO 8 季度信函——我姐姐的养老金资产——2012 年 4 月 GMO 评论 2012 年 4 月 强行喂食 本·因克

多年来,我们 GMO 公司确实没少抨击美联储。我们的指责大多集中在:过度宽松的货币政策,加上拒绝承认资产泡沫的危险甚至其存在,会引发经济问题。现在,我们又要向美联储发难了,但这次是冲着个人来的。我们对美联储政策的主要抱怨,不是今天这种超级宽松货币政策给全球经济带来的风险(这些风险相当大¹),而是美联储的政策让我们很难搞清楚,自己为客户做的事是否正确。

GMO 8 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 GMO COMMENTARY April 2012 Force Fed Ben Inker Over the years, we at GMO have certainly done our share of Fed bashing. Most of our complaints have centered on the way in which overly accommodative monetary policy and a refusal to see the dangers of, or even the existence of, asset bubbles can lead to economic problems. We’re about to pile on the Fed again, but this time it’s personal. Our major complaint about Fed policy is not about the risks today’s ultra-loose monetary policy imposes on the global economy (which are considerable1), but rather the fact that Fed policy makes it tricky for us to know whether we are doing the right thing on behalf of our clients.

关于 2000 年和 2007 年的资产泡沫,我们可以这么说:虽然它们可能对经济和投资者财富造成了严重破坏,但至少对我们来说,清楚知道该怎样处理自己的投资组合是件简单的事。只要避开那些估值过高的资产(2007 年几乎所有有风险的资产都属于这类),我们就知道自己在做正确的事。当然,即使投资这件事很简单,也不一定容易。在这两次事件中,尤其是 2000 年,我们一直持有的保守型投资组合在泡沫破裂前表现不佳,这一过程中也让我们的客户相当不安。

One thing that we can say about the 2000 and 2007 asset bubbles is that, while they may have done significant damage to the economy and investors’ wealth, it was at least simple for us to know what to do with our portfolios. If we avoided the overvalued assets (which in 2007 was pretty much everything risky) we knew we were doing the right thing. Of course, even when investing is simple, it isn’t necessarily easy. In both episodes, but particularly 2000, the conservative portfolios we were running underperformed until the bubbles burst, causing plenty of consternation for our clients in the process.

如今,美联储制造了这样一种局面:那些我们向来视为低风险资产的类别——政府债券和现金——反而成了极不具吸引力的资产。与互联网泡沫和房地产泡沫不同,这一次并非美联储政策无心插柳的副作用,而是其核心政策目标。美联储多次表示,低利率和量化宽松的核心目标之一,就是通过推高风险资产价格来制造财富效应。通过将利率维持在极低水平并将政府债券收回流通,美联储正试图诱使投资者购入风险资产。我们当下纠结的问题是:该不该上钩?那么,这与 2007 年有何不同?我们手头有一些极不具吸引力的资产,而另一些相比之下则显得好得多。麻烦在于,如果当下那些不具吸引力的资产是现金和债券,那么转向相对有吸引力的资产就意味着提高组合风险;而在 2007 年,远离高风险资产则是降低组合风险。2007 年,我们可以持有这样一个组合:无论资产是花 7 年回归公允价值,还是明天就回归,我们都能跑赢。这令人安心,因为尽管我们在预测中使用 7 年回归周期,但我们深知均值回归的时机极不确定。而今天,如果资产将立即均值回归,你希望持有的组合,与你认为需要 7 年才能回归公允价值时所持有的组合,会截然不同。

Today, the Fed has engineered a situation in which the really unattractive asset classes are the ones we have always thought of as low risk: government bonds and cash. And unlike the internet and housing bubbles, this time it isn’t a quasi-inadvertent side effect of Fed policies, but a basic aim of them. The Fed has repeatedly said that a central part of the goal of low rates and quantitative easing is the creation of a wealth effect by pushing up the price of risky assets. By keeping rates very low and taking government bonds out of circulation, the Fed is trying to entice investors into buying risky assets. The question we are grappling with today is whether we should take the bait. So what makes this different from 2007? We’ve got some very unattractive assets and some others that look a good deal better by comparison. The trouble is that if those unattractive assets are cash and bonds today, moving to the relatively attractive assets involves increasing portfolio risk, whereas in 2007, moving away from risky assets lowered portfolio risk. In 2007, we could hold a portfolio that, whether assets took 7 years to revert to fair value or reverted tomorrow, we would still outperform. This was reassuring, because even though we use a 7-year reversion period in our forecasts, we know that the timing of mean reversion is highly uncertain. Today, the portfolio you would want to hold if assets were going to mean revert immediately is quite different from the one you would hold if you believed it would take 7 years to get back to fair value.

也许思考这个问题最简单的方法,就是观察纯多头绝对收益投资组合的有效边界——过去这些年里,我们曾多次审视过这个边界(见图表 1)。

Perhaps the easiest way to think about the problem is to look at the efficient frontier for long-only absolute return portfolios, which we have reviewed on a number of occasions over the years (see Exhibit 1).

从其本质来看,有效边界在风险维度上总是向右上方倾斜的。它在时间维度上的主要变化体现在斜率和高度两个层面。作为投资者,我们都希望这条边界在图表上处于高位——当各类资产普遍定价能带来强劲回报时,这种情况就会出现。当这条线足够陡峭时,意味着你承担额外风险能获得丰厚的回报。如今的这条边界(以黑色线条表示)位置相当低,但斜率颇为陡峭。具体而言,美联储推行的零短期利率与量化宽松政策,一旦金融体系恢复正常运转后他们未能及时快速撤出宽松措施,就将埋下通胀问题的隐患。与此同时,极低的杠杆成本正在助长投机行为、引发资本错配,并在美国及全球范围内催生资产价格泡沫。

By their nature, efficient frontiers are upward sloping with regard to risk. The major ways in which they change over time is the slope of the line and the level of the line. As investors, we all want the frontier to be high on the chart, which will occur when asset classes are generally priced to give strong returns. When the line is steep, it means you are getting paid a lot for taking on additional risk. Today’s line (in black) is very low, but reasonably steep. That 1 Specifically, the Fed’s policy of zero short rates and quantitative easing creates the potential for an inflation problem if they cannot remove the accommodation fast enough when the financial system is back to functioning normally. In the meantime, the extremely low cost of leverage encourages speculation, the misallocation of capital, and encourages the formation of asset price bubbles in the U.S. and around the world.

表 1 含绝对回报的投资组合随时间的变化

高风险组合(更多新兴市场与国际资产)

14%

12.8%

13%

2009 年 2 月前沿

12%

11%

含阿尔法的预期实际回报

10%

低风险组合(更多固定收益资产)

9%

8.1%

8%

7.0%

6.7%

7%

2012 年 2 月前沿

6%

5%

4.4%

2007 年 6 月前沿

4%

4.8%

4.3%

3.2%

4.3%

3%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

15%

风险(年化波动率)

注:基于 GMO 的 7 年期资产类别回报预测。这些预测是前瞻性陈述,基于 GMO 的合理判断,并非对未来表现的保证。前瞻性陈述仅针对作出之日的情况,GMO 无义务且不承诺更新前瞻性陈述。前瞻性陈述受众多假设、风险和不确定性的影响,这些因素随时间而变化。实际结果可能与前瞻性陈述中的预期存在重大差异。

Exhibit 1 Absolute Return Portfolios Over Time Higher Risk Portfolios (more Emerging and International) 14% 12.8% 13% 2/2009 Frontier 12% 11% Expected Real Return with Alpha 10% Lower Risk Portfolios (more Fixed Income) 9% 8.1% 8% 7.0% 6.7% 7% 2/2012 Frontier 6% 5% 4.4% 6/2007 Frontier 4% 4.8% 4.3% 3.2% 4.3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% Risk (Annualized Volatility) Note: Based on GMO’s 7-year asset class return forecasts. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.

来源:GMO。截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日,这意味着你承担风险反而能获得报酬,但原因并非高风险资产带来高回报,而是低风险资产的回报极低。

Source: GMO As of 2/29/12 means you are getting paid to take risk, but the reason is not very high returns to risky assets but very low returns to low risk assets.

传统定量分析往往假定那条线的水平高低无关紧要。你或许希望那条线更高一些,但你对此无能为力。你能做的只是决定自己在边界上往前推多远,这取决于你的风险承受能力和那条线的斜率。所以,如果我们相信自己对各大类资产的七年期预测、加上对波动率的合理预测、并且不考虑其他因素,那我们就应该在边界上向外推进——而这正是伯南克希望我们去做的事。

Traditional quantitative analysis tends to assume that the level of the line is irrelevant. You might wish that the line was higher, but you can’t do anything about that. All you can do is decide how far out on the frontier you want to be, which is a function of your risk tolerance and the slope of the line. So, if we believe in our 7-year asset class forecasts, some reasonable forecast of volatility, and nothing else, we should be pushing out on the frontier, which is what Bernanke wants us to do.

实际上,我们为客户管理的投资组合并未特别远离风险前沿。我们承担的风险水平属于“正常”范围,甚至略低于正常水平。为什么?你可以将其归因于本能抵触——不愿听从央行行长的指令,但当资产配置团队辩论组合中该承担多大的风险时,伯南克的名字通常不会被提起。我们不愿在风险谱系上走得太远,真正的原因来自我们对组合风险驱动因素的理解。我们坚信,资产的风险随其估值上升而上升。公允价值上的股票,风险低于交易价格高于公允价值 30% 的股票,因为昂贵的股票给你带来价格回落至公允价值时的损失风险。这种风险——借用我的同事詹姆斯·蒙蒂尔的术语叫“估值风险”——会导致损失,且不应指望这些损失能在短期内逆转。廉价资产的价格当然可能下跌,但当它下跌时,你应该预期要么从那个位置获得高复利回报,稳步收回本金;要么在导致价格下跌的条件消散时,出现相当迅速的反弹,快速收回本金。因此损失是暂时的,尽管发生时可能让人感觉不快。而当昂贵的资产回落到公允价值时,后续回报只能假设为正常水平,这意味着相对于预期而言的财富损失是永久的。如今,股票相对于我们对长期公允价值的估算而言是昂贵的。麻烦在于,债券和现金也一样。如果一切都能保证在 7 年内均值回归,我们会持有偏重股票的配置,因为股票与债券或现金之间的价差比正常水平更宽。但我们不知道会不会正好需要 7 年。由于现金和(大多数)债券的期限相对于其贴现率变化而言比股票短,快速回归给它们带来的损失会小于股票。持有一个我们得祈祷均值回归慢慢来的组合,很难让人感到兴奋,因此,我们的股票仓位比 7 年预测所暗示的要轻。这使得在对照 65% 股票/35% 债券的基准进行管理的组合中,股票仓位约为 63% 到 64%;而在绝对收益导向的组合中,股票仓位在 48% 到 58% 之间,视其进取程度和机会集而定。在政府债券方面,考虑到目前极低的收益率,我们比较偏爱的只有澳大利亚和澳大利亚政府债券,因为只有这些国家提供了体面的实际收益率与长期可持续的政府支出政策的组合。但即便是对这些债券,我们的胃口也不大,这使我们持有了大量现金和“其他”资产。如果我们的 7 年预测完全按计划实现,那么不更大幅度地加仓股票,我们会错过一些收益。不过,我们的头寸确实让我们处于一种无需担心资产类别比预期更快回归公允价值的状态,这确实有助于我们晚上睡得踏实。

In reality, the portfolios we are running for our clients are not particularly far out on the frontier. We are running at “normal” levels of risk or slightly lower than that. Why? You could chalk it up to a knee-jerk reluctance to do what a central banker is telling us, but when the asset allocation team is debating the appropriate level of risk to take in our portfolios, Bernanke’s name does not generally come up. The reason for our reticence to move out on the risk spectrum really comes from our idea of what drives portfolio risk. We believe strongly that the risk of an asset rises with its valuation. Stocks at fair value are less risky than stocks trading 30% above fair value because the expensive stocks give you the risk of loss associated with falling back to fair value. That risk – “valuation risk” to use my colleague James Montier’s terminology – leads to losses that should not be expected to reverse themselves anytime soon. A cheap asset can certainly go down in price, but when it does, you should expect either high compound returns from there, which make your money back steadily, or a reasonably sharp recovery when the conditions that drove prices down dissipate, which will make your money back quickly. The loss is therefore temporary, although it may GMO 2 Commentary – Force Fed – April 2012 seem unpleasant while it is occurring. When an expensive asset falls back to fair value, subsequent returns should only be assumed to be normal, which means that the loss of wealth versus expectations is permanent. Today, stocks are expensive relative to our estimate of long-term fair value. The trouble is, so are bonds and cash. If everything was guaranteed to revert to the mean over 7 years, we would hold equity-heavy portfolios, because the gap between stocks and either bonds or cash is wider than normal. But we don’t know that it will take 7 years. Because cash and (most) bonds have a shorter duration with regard to changes in their discount rate than stocks do, fast reversion would lead to smaller losses for them than for equities. Holding a portfolio where we are crossing our fingers that mean reversion will be slow is difficult to be excited about and, as a result, we are lighter on equities than the 7-year forecasts would otherwise suggest. That leaves us around 63% to 64% in equities for a portfolio managed against a 65% equities/35% bonds benchmark and 48% to 58% in equities for absolute return oriented portfolios, depending on their aggressiveness and opportunity set. On the government bond side, given the incredibly low yields around, the only bonds we have much fondness for are Australian and New Zealand government bonds, because only those countries give a combination of a decent real yield and government spending policies that are sustainable in the long run. But our appetite for even these bonds is not great, leaving us with significant holdings of cash and “other.” If our 7-year forecasts play out exactly to plan, we are leaving some money on the table by not moving more heavily into stocks. However, our positioning does leave us in a place where we need not fear the circumstance whereby asset classes revert to fair value faster than expected, and that does help us sleep better at night.

英克先生是资产配置部门的负责人。

Mr. Inker is the head of asset allocation.

免责声明:本文所表达的观点仅代表本·英克尔(Ben Inker)截至 2012 年 4 月 18 日的看法,并可能根据市场及其他条件随时发生变化。本文并非对任何证券的买入或卖出要约或招揽,也不应被理解为如此。

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of Ben Inker as of April 18, 2012 and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such.

版权所有 © 2012 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2012 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

评述 – 强加灌输 – 2012 年 4 月 3 GMO

Commentary – Force Fed – April 2012 3 GMO