奥巴马与铁氟龙人,及其他短篇故事。第一部分。

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GMO 季度信函 2009 年 1 月 奥巴马与“特氟龙人”,以及其他短篇故事。第一部分。

GMO QUARTERLY LETTER January 2009 Obama and the Teflon Men, and Other Short Stories. Part 1.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆:说到经济和金融市场,似乎如果你长久而用力地盯着战争的迷雾,偶尔在顺风吹拂时,你能隐约瞥见可能正在发生什么。对我来说,眼下无疑就是这样的时刻。我们所有人都很清楚,这是意义重大的日子,政府的行动可能产生成败攸关的影响,但我对政府和领导层的信心处于低点。(尽管我必须承认,最近几周我在金融之外的所有领域信心大增。即使在金融领域,信心也略有上升。)为奥巴马总统提供的经济建议五花八门,就连近乎共识的大规模刺激方案也缺乏历史确定性或严谨的智力支撑。每个人似乎都在猜测策略和结果,心里清楚最佳策略本应是避免陷入当前的困境。如果在资产泡沫早期就采取行动,当前的灾难本可轻易避免。而相比之下,摆脱困境将极其艰难。但是,我们已深陷困境,就经济痛苦而言,2009 年很可能是大多数美国人、英国人及其他国家居民一生中最糟糕的一年。所以,祝各位好运!

在这样的时刻,如果能有一份《季度信函》对某件事……任何事都显得确信无疑,那会很有帮助。因此,我为公开在边缘问题上蜻蜓点水而道歉。不过,我并不为向你们推荐我很久以来在《纽约时报》上读到的最好文章而道歉:刘易斯和艾因霍恩的文章¹ 精彩地总结了我们现在所处的位置以及我们如何走到这一步,并为未来提供了一些有用的建议。我只想谈几个边缘话题,这些话题在近几个季度中随着更重要的主题占据主导而累积起来。其中一半的小话题会在这封信中讨论,另一半将在几周后发布。

¹ 迈克尔·刘易斯和戴维·艾因霍恩,《我们所知的金融世界的终结》,《纽约时报》,2009 年 1 月 4 日。该文章可在 www.nytimes.com 在线查阅。

1. 前情提要:贪婪 + 无能 + 相信市场有效 = 灾难。几乎所有人的贪婪和鲁莽的过度自信,使我们忽视风险到了美国历史上可能空前广泛和深刻的程度。更引人注目的是我们领导层缺乏洞察力和基本能力,这导致他们忽视了这一发展,或者更糟,还加以鼓励。新颖的金融工具无疑助长并放大了这些弱点,但它们并非我们这锅有毒杂烩中最关键的成分。这个头衔应归于经济学界,因为他们用数十年时间构建了对理性预期的信仰:即合理、受经济驱动的行为总能保证近似有效的市场。在对数学秩序和优雅模型的追求中,经济学界淡化了不良行为、职业风险管理以及纯粹的非理性爆发这些令人不适的巨大作用。主流经济理论家们如此珍视秩序和理性,以至于他们自己真的信了,而这种错误的信念变得越来越危险。正因如此,格林斯潘和伯南克才无法确认泡沫——即严重的非理性爆发——是否存在。正因如此,研究过 1929 年泡沫的伯南克仍无法将其视为非理性的证据,仍然(像米尔顿·弗里德曼那样)将大萧条视为极其糟糕、本可轻易避免的政策措施的单纯后果。近期更关键的是,正因如此,伯南克才认为美国楼市那个危险且百年一遇的泡沫并不存在。正因如此,海曼·明斯基尽管对金融危机“近乎不可避免”有深刻洞察,却在经济学界被边缘化。正因如此,在学术界提出股票市场无效的观点,更不用说存在严重功能失调,被视为异端。正因如此,伯顿·马尔基尔才能将 1987 年股灾合理化,认为它是对大约 12 个触发因素的有效反应。然而,这些触发因素有一个微不足道的弱点:当时经验丰富的投资组合经理几乎从未听说过其中大多数。永远不要低估一种主导性学术思想扼杀竞争性思想的力量,也永远不要低估学者们面对证据改变观点的意愿之低。他们有几十年的研究和学术地位需要捍卫。

在这样的时刻,动物精神需要培养。奥巴马的当选会有所帮助,至少暂时如此;强调刺激方案的力量会有所帮助(无论这种力量是否真实存在),来自有影响力人物的慈父般的乐观建议也不会错。

Jeremy Grantham With economies and financial markets, it seems that if you 1. The Story So Far: Greed + Incompetence + stare hard enough and long enough at the fog of battle, A Belief in Market Efficiency = Disaster you occasionally get a glimpse of what may be going on Greed and reckless overconfidence on the part of almost when a favorable wind blows. This, for me, is decidedly everyone caused us to ignore risk to a degree that is not one of those occasions. It is obvious to all of us that probably unparalleled in breadth and depth in American these are momentous days in which government actions history. Even more remarkable was the lack of insight may well have make-or-break impact, but my confidence and basic competence of our leadership, which led them in government and leadership is at a low ebb. (Although to ignore this development, or worse, to encourage it. I must admit my confidence has increased enormously Ingenious new financial instruments certainly facilitated in recent weeks in all areas outside of finance. Even in and exaggerated these weaknesses, but they were not the finance it has increased a little.) Economic advice for most potent ingredient in our toxic stew. That honor goes President Obama covers the waterfront, and even the near- to the economic establishment for building over many consensus case for great stimulus is lacking in historical decades a belief in rational expectations: reasonable, certainties or intellectual rigor. Everyone seems to be economically-induced behavior that would always guessing at strategies and outcomes, knowing clearly that guarantee approximately efficient markets. In their desire the best strategy would have been to have avoided getting for mathematical order and elegant models, the economic into this pickle. The current disaster would have been easy establishment played down the inconveniently large role to avoid by making a move against asset bubbles early in of bad behavior, career risk management, and flat-out their lifecycle. It will, in contrast, be devilishly hard to bursts of irrationality. The dominant economic theorists so get out of. But, we are deep in the pickle jar, and it seems valued orderliness and rationality that they actually grew likely that, in terms of economic pain, 2009 will be the to believe it, and this false conviction became increasingly worst year in the lives of the majority of Americans, Brits, dangerous. It was why Greenspan and Bernanke were not and others. So break a leg, everyone! sure that bubbles – outbursts of serious irrationality – could It would be helpful at a time like this to have a Quarterly even exist. It was why Bernanke, who had studied the Letter that sounded convinced of something … anything. bubble of 1929, could still not see it as proof of irrationality So I apologize for overtly tickling around the edges. and could still view the Depression (à la Milton Friedman) I do not apologize, though, for pointing you to the best as a mere consequence of incredibly bad, easily avoidable thing I have read in The New York Times in a very long policy measures. Of more recent importance, it was why time: the article by Lewis and Einhorn1 does a great job Bernanke could dismiss a dangerous 100-year bubble in of summarizing where we are and how we got here, as U.S. housing as being nonexistent. It was why Hyman well as offering some helpful advice for the future. My Minsky was marginalized as an economist despite his contribution is to address a few peripheral topics that have brilliant insight of the “near inevitability” of periodic accumulated over recent quarters as more important topics financial crises. It was why the suggestion in academic have dominated. Half of the mini topics are covered in this circles of stock market inefficiencies, let alone major Letter, and the other half will be posted in a few weeks. dysfunctionality, was considered a heresy. It was why Burton Malkiel could rationalize the 1987 crash as being an efficient response to 12 or so triggers. These triggers, 1 Michael Lewis and David Einhorn, “The End of the Financial World as We however, had a trivial weakness: seasoned portfolio Know It,” The New York Times, January 4, 2009. This article is available online at www.nytimes.com. managers at the time had never even heard of most of them. Never underestimate the power of a dominant At times like this, animal spirits need nurturing. Obama’s academic idea to choke off competing ideas, and never election will help, at least for a while; talking up the power underestimate the unwillingness of academics to change of stimulus will help (whether or not the power is really their views in the face of evidence. They have decades there), and avuncular, optimistic advice from influential of their research and their academic standing to defend. figures will not go amiss.

极其不靠谱的有效市场理论被我们的许多金融领袖全盘信奉,并且几乎被所有人部分信奉。这一理论使我们的经济与政府机构心安理得地坐视不管,即便在资产泡沫、管控松弛、恶性激励以及极其复杂的金融产品这几种致命因素结合,导致我们陷入当前困境时也是如此。“在一个理性、有效的世界里,这一切肯定不会发生,”他们似乎这样想着。

The incredibly inaccurate efficient market theory was But let us look for a minute at the extent of the loss in believed in totality by many of our financial leaders, and perceived wealth that is the main shock to our economic believed in part by almost all. It left our economic and system. If in real terms we assume write-downs of 50% governmental establishment sitting by confidently, even in U.S. equities, 35% in U.S. housing, and 35% to 40% as a lethally dangerous combination of asset bubbles, lax in commercial real estate, we will have had a total loss controls, pernicious incentives, and wickedly complicated of about $20 trillion of perceived wealth from a peak instruments led to our current plight. “Surely none of this total of about $50 trillion. This relates to a GDP of about could happen in a rational, efficient world,” they seemed $13 trillion, the annual value of all U.S. produced goods to be thinking.

而这一切中最糟糕的一面,是服务业。这些资产减记不仅意味着我们感觉自己惊人地贫穷了——它们还戏剧性地提高了我们的真实债务比率。审慎的债务发行基于两个因素:收入和抵押品。就像一个传统的老式抵押贷款发行人一样,我们希望我们发行的债务不超过保守资产价值的 80%,而且越低越好。我们还希望借款人的收入足以支付利息并留有安全边际,并且最理想的是,能够足以慢慢偿还本金。资产价格泡沫破裂时,随之而来的是人们感受到的财富的严重损失,以及无法偿还的债务(stranded debt),而信念体系的这一点导致了人们长期低估资产泡沫破裂的极度危险。好了,能再一次把这些话一吐为快真是太好了!

2. 幻灭:感知财富的损失与无法偿还的债务

在市场上涨期间,我曾写过关于纸面财富的谬误。

And the absolutely worst aspect of this and services. These write-downs not only mean that belief set was that it led to a chronic underestimation of we perceive ourselves as shockingly poorer, they also the dangers of asset bubbles breaking – the very severe dramatically increase our real debt ratios. Prudent debt loss of perceived wealth and the stranded debt that comes issuance is based on two factors: income and collateral. with a savage write-down of assets. Well, it’s nice to get Like a good old-fashioned mortgage issuer, we want the that off my chest once again! debt we issue to be no more than 80% of the conservative asset value, and lower would be better. We also want 2. Lost Illusions: The Loss of Perceived Wealth and the income of the borrower to be sufficient to pay the Stranded Debt interest with a safety margin and, ideally, to be enough to During the market’s rise, I wrote about the fallacy of paper amortize the principal slowly.

按此标准,国民财富——尤其是房产领域的财富——曾高达 50 万亿美元的私人资产基础(借用这个说法)的三倍,而支撑这些财富的私人债务(包括企业债务和个人债务)约为 25 万亿美元。鉴于我们中几乎一半人没有房贷或房贷很少,50% 的债务比例似乎高得危险。但如今资产价值已回落至 30 万亿美元,而债务仍维持在 25 万亿美元左右——加上我们迄今减记的那可怜巴巴的 1 万亿美元,数字也差不多。如果我们希望像过去那样保持 50% 的资产债务覆盖率,那价格就得降到原价的三倍。可它们显然还是那些房子。我们怎么能自欺欺人,以为自己突然发家致富、不用为养老金攒钱了,明明我们住的还是 1974 年买的那几栋房子?建立在如此虚假前提上的“财富”时不时让我们栽跟头,这毫不奇怪。但好消息是,当我们重新回到早先的价格水平时,它们还是那些房子。

On this basis, the National wealth, particularly as it applied to houses. At three times Private Asset Base (to coin a phrase) of $50 trillion the price, they were obviously still the very same houses. supported about $25 trillion of private debt, corporate How could we kid ourselves that we were suddenly rich and individual. Given that almost half of us have small and didn’t need to save for our pensions when we were or no mortgages, this 50% ratio seems dangerously high. sitting in the very same buildings we bought in 1974? But now the asset values have fallen back to $30 trillion, With “wealth” built on such false premises, it is not whereas the debt remains at $25 trillion, give or take the surprising that we come to grief from time to time. But miserly $1 trillion we have written down so far. If we the good news is that, as we move back down to earlier would like the same asset coverage of 50% that we had a prices, they are still the same houses.

我们其实在一年前并没有真正损失,当时我们能支撑的总财富不过 15 万亿美元左右,那只是财富的幻觉。幻觉通常不会带来债务。剩下的 10 万亿美元债务本来会产生非常持久的影响,但当潮水退去时,它们显然搁浅了!更糟糕的是,信贷确实会在短期乃至中期产生非常强大的效应。这个特殊的幻觉,如今让贷款人开始遵循新保守主义标准,它们理所当然地认为:50% 的贷款价值比太高了,40% 甚至更低才更合适。这种幻觉曾笼罩股票、房地产、艺术品以及几乎所有其他资产,堪称壮观,它直接过度刺激了消费,并间接过度刺激了进口。在这个过程中,银行家们现在下雨了,就想收回他们借给我们的伞。

We have not lost year ago, we could support only $15 trillion or so of total wealth, but just the illusion of wealth. Illusions tend not debt. The remaining $10 trillion of debt would have been to have very long-lasting effects, but they obviously can stranded as the tide went out! What is worse is that credit and do have very powerful short- and even intermediate- standards have of course tightened, so newly conservative term effects. This particular illusion, which applied to lenders now assume the obvious: that 50% was too high, stocks, real estate, art, and almost everything else, was and that 40% loan to collateral value or even less would grand indeed, and it directly over-stimulated consumption be more appropriate. As always, now that it’s raining, and indirectly over-stimulated imports. In the process, bankers want back the umbrellas they lent us.

在 40% 的债务水平下,它抑制了我们自身 30 万亿美元经济体的储蓄和投资,理想债务水平应该是 12 万亿左右,来自本地产生的收入。(尽管其中有很大一部分几乎正好是当前实际水平的一半!这是通过外国投资进入美国来填补缺口,而显然我们最近几个月读到的大规模减记——1 万亿到 2 万亿美元——并不会将我们的体系拉回到健康平衡状态。)如今,财富幻觉已经消失,对动物精神造成了巨大的负面影响。我的英雄凯恩斯强调过动物精神在经济学中变化的重要性,并解释了这种精神的变化如何能摧毁最精心计算的投资决策。

At 40% of it suppressed both savings and investments of our own $30 trillion, ideal debt levels would be $12 trillion or so, locally generated income. (Although there was plenty of almost exactly half of where they actually are today! It is foreign investment into the U.S. to fill the gap, which has obvious that the scale of write-downs that we have been its own long-term complications.) reading about in recent months of $1 trillion to $2 trillion will not move our system anywhere near back to a healthy Now the illusion of wealth has been lost, with formidably balance. To be successful, we really need to halve the negative effects on animal spirits. My hero, Keynes, level of private debt as a fraction of the underlying asset emphasized the importance of shifts in animal spirits in values. This implies that by hook or by crook, somewhere economics, and explained how shifts in such spirits could between $10 trillion and $15 trillion of debt will have to ruin the most carefully calculated investment decisions. disappear.

鉴于我们目前的处境,要恢复当前私人债务水平与我们已缩水但更为现实的资产价值之间的平衡,只有三种方式:我们可以咬紧牙关,大幅减记债务(到目前为止,当局似乎对此不感兴趣);我们可以像日本那样,随着我们增加储蓄、修复消费者资产负债表,让漫长的时光慢慢消磨债务水平;或者,我们可以将债务大肆通胀,从而降低其实际价值。

Given where we are today, there are only three GMO 2 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 ways to restore a balance between current private debt as the stock markets then were less developed and housing levels and our reduced, but much more realistic, asset was decidedly pre-McMansion. This time in the U.S., values: we can bite the bullet and drastically write down however, we must write down perceived wealth or capital debt (which, so far, seems unappealing to the authorities); by almost precisely one and a half times GDP, worse than we can, like Japan did, let the very long passage of time the Depression but happily much less than Japan. wear down debt levels as we save more and restore our consumer balance sheets; or we can inflate the heck out In this context, do not kid yourself that the Japanese did a of our debt and reduce its real value.

(考虑到他们糟糕的自救表现,甚至连日本也应该提一下,因为他们有时会对所付出的代价表示沮丧。还有第四种可能的方式:以某种方式再次推高整体资产价格至远超公允价值——比如在 2000 年科技泡沫之后,格林斯潘找到了第二个现成的资产类别——房地产——来施展他的魔咒。但这一次,没有新的重大资产类别可供使用,而且,尽管智人也许不是学得很快的物种,但似乎也不会急着在同一个炉子上烫两次手。我认为,这主要反映出他们最初未能意识到自己陷入的坑有多深。也得承认,他们的计划虽然在概念上可能是正确的,但执行效率并不高。修那些“没用的桥”(比喻无实际效益的公共工程),长期来看,远不如专注于节能以及石油和煤炭替代技术来得有刺激作用或更具生产力。)

(In the interest of terrible job in extricating themselves. Even the Japanese completeness I should mention that there can sometimes often express dismay at the costs they have paid due to be a fourth possible way: to somehow re-inflate aggregate their heroic level of public spending. I believe that this asset prices way above fair value again. After the tech primarily reflects their original failure to realize how bubble of 2000 Greenspan found a second major asset deep their hole was. It can also be admitted that their class ready and waiting – real estate – on which to work program, while probably right in concept, was not highly his wicked ways. This time there is no new major asset efficient. Bridges to nowhere have not been as stimulating class available and, although Homo sapiens may not be or productive long term as a focus on energy conservation very quick learners, we do not appear eager to burn our and oil and coal replacement technologies would have fingers twice on the very same stove.

作为一个社会,我们曾经常说日本人应该咬紧牙关,像美国在处理储贷危机时那样迅速承受打击,而不是拖延痛苦。他们显然需要 15 到 20 年的时间来忘却上一次的创伤。然而,当全球如此多的金融和经济问题产生回响,且动物精神极度受挫时,那些评论现在看来是多么肤浅和自鸣得意。面对我们自己的信贷危机——股市或房地产价格被抬升到远超公允价值的水平——我们发现并没有简单的解药:那颗"子弹"原来是一枚手榴弹,根本不容易塞进嘴里。如果再指望未来几年能轻易通过推高股票或房地产价格来摆脱困境,那几乎是一种渺茫的希望(如果确实还有可能的话)。大约以 4 比 1 的杠杆率,日本企业部门在 1989 年危机爆发时,其杠杆水平远超美国有史以来的任何时期。以上列出的三种现实可能性中,每一种都将极其痛苦,每一种都充满不确定性。

As a society, we been. It was often said that the Japanese should have bitten apparently need 15 to 20 years to forget our last burn. With the bullet as the U.S. did in its S&L crisis, taking a quick so many financial and economic problems reverberating hit rather than dragging out the pain. How superficial around the world and with animal spirits so crushed, re- and self-congratulatory those comments seem now. Faced inflating equity or real estate prices way above fair value with our own credit crisis, we discover there is no easy again in the next few years seems a forlorn hope if indeed cure – the bullet turns out to be a grenade, which doesn’t it is possible at all.) fit as easily into the mouth. At about 4 to 1, the Japanese Each of the three realistic possibilities listed above would corporate sector went into the 1989 crunch with much be extremely painful, each is loaded with uncertainties, higher leverage than the U.S. had ever seen.

请记住,即便其中最快的情况也需要数年才能显现。同样别忘了,他们当时的股市市盈率高达 65 倍,是我们市场近期高点的三倍以上,而他们的地价则是我们的好几倍。1989 年,东京每平方英尺土地的价格大约是曼哈顿的 10 倍!因此,他们虽然承受了更高的资产减记,却同时面对着远高于企业正常水平的杠杆率。如果他们当时以市价快速重估资产,整个日本株式会社(Japan Inc.)都将资不抵债。既然我们知道日本市场中大约四分之一的公司——比如索尼和丰田——还能保持偿债能力,那么就可以推断,按照我们使用的标准来衡量,剩下的四分之三的公司已处于惊人的资不抵债状态。

Remember and even the quickest of them would take several years. too that their stock market, at 65 times earnings, was over Our path this time is likely to involve a hybrid approach: three times our market’s recent highs and their land was at we will certainly take some painful debt liquidations; this several multiples of ours. In 1989, Tokyo’s land per square crisis will almost certainly take far longer than normal foot was around ten times the value of Manhattan’s! So to play out; and probably, before a new equilibrium is they had higher write-offs conflicting with much higher reached, we will see inflation rates that are well above corporate leverage. If they had rapidly marked their normal. assets to market, the entire corporate Japan Inc. would have been under water. And since we know that around a It would be convenient if we could reach safety without quarter of Japan’s market – their Sonys and Toyotas – was having our global economy come to a complete standstill solvent, we can deduce that the remaining three-quarters for a few years; without a wave of very high inflation and, was shockingly under water, using the types of rules we ideally, without a dollar crisis or a trade war.

不幸的是,所有这些问题,用量化分析师的话说,都是“重大可能性”。快乐前行固然有其好处,但在当下这个危险时期,我们至少应该对我们所面临问题的数量级有所准备。随着岁月流逝,少数日本公司倒下了,但绝大多数公司艰难地挣扎着回到了清偿能力。不知怎么的,日本在未引发严重萧条的情况下,吸收了人类历史上最大规模的一次去杠杆化。我只能希望我们也能做到这么好!

All of them, unfortunately, are what a quant would call “non-trivial are attempting to apply to ourselves now. As the years possibilities.” Traveling happily certainly has its virtues, passed, a few Japanese companies failed, but the great but in these dangerous times it is probably better to be mass in the middle painfully clawed their way back to braced at least for the right order of magnitude problem solvency. Somehow or other, Japan absorbed the greatest that we face. deleveraging in human history without incurring a severe depression. I can only hope we do as well!

现在回顾 1989 年至今的日本危机是合适的,因为它与大萧条一样,很可能是当今信贷问题最相关的两个案例之一。尽管日本企业当时的信贷状况比我们现在的企业糟糕得多,但消费者的处境却正好相反。日本个人在 1989 年事件中遭遇的“财富”减记规模比我们更大。他们不得不减记的感知财富金额,竟然高达惊人的国内生产总值(GDP)的三倍!即使在 1929 年,美国需要减记的金额也只是当时一年 GDP 的四分之三。所以,我们的任务是扶持普通民众,正如日本(虽然花了 15 年时间)为其企业所做的那样,想方设法恢复他们的资产负债表质量。

This is a good time to look at the Japanese crisis of 1989 to present since, along with the Great Depression, it is Although Japanese corporations were in much worse probably one of the two most relevant examples for today’s credit shape than ours are now, the reverse is true for problems. The Japanese had an even bigger problem in consumers. Japanese individuals went into the 1989 event write-downs of “wealth” than we have now. They had with a very high savings rate and very high accumulated to write down perceived wealth by an amount equal to a savings. In contrast, our households go into our crunch stunning three times GDP! Even in 1929, we had to write borrowed to the hilt (or beyond) and painfully under-off amounts equal to only three quarters of a year’s GDP, saved. So our job is to nurture our average people in the Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 3 GMO street and somehow restore the quality of their balance One can only admire Bob Rubin’s ability to retain sheets, just as Japan (admittedly taking 15 uncomfortable influence and have his protégés in powerful positions. years) did for its corporations.

鲁宾最后一次公开露面时,正在力劝花旗银行加大杠杆、继续参与游戏。不对,让我想想——他其实是去拜访汉克·保尔森,这位当年在高盛资历比他浅的旧部。他向这位老友求援,并成功争取到史无前例的纾困方案。他是金融体制中的一员,这个体制未能及早对那些不断下滑的财务标准发出强烈担忧——事实上,他本人还助长了这样一种环境:谨慎成了职业风险,CEO 们觉得必须继续起舞。

为了以乐观的基调结束这一章节(也算尽到我的公民责任),值得记住的是,真正的财富不在于债务,而在于受过教育的人、法律、职业道德,以及固定资产的质量与数量、企业组织的效率。我们和日本一样,并不打算摧毁这些资产中的任何一项。我们也和日本一样,只是被虚假资产绊了一跤,如今必须面对长期的去杠杆化与受挫的动物精神。

Rubin is the guy who was last seen exhorting Citibank to take more leverage and keep swinging. No, come to think To finish this section on an optimistic note (my civic of it, he was last seen paying a visit to Hank Paulson, duty), it is worth remembering that real wealth lies not his relatively recent underling at Goldman Sachs. He in debt but in educated people, laws, and work ethic, as pleaded with his old chum, with brilliant success, for an well as in the quality and quantity of fixed assets and the unprecedented bailout. He was part of the establishment effectiveness of corporate organization. We, like Japan, that failed to express early, loud concerns over slipping are not proposing to destroy any of these assets. We, like financial standards, and in fact helped to create an Japan, have just tripped on make-believe assets and we environment where prudence was a career risk and CEOs now have to deal with chronic deleveraging and bruised felt obliged to keep dancing. animal spirits.

当我们应对完这场危机后,所有资产仍将静待其主。萨默斯先生已证明他确实有些锋芒。我们的资产将再次得到充分利用。回顾一下是很有益的——他经常为《金融时报》撰稿,至少在大萧条之后,美国 GDP 回到了原有的趋势线上,仿佛大萧条从未发生过。这样我们就能了解他在金融事务上的公开立场。这么说吧:他绝不可能出现在任何一份那些对潜在金融灾难发出明确警告的人员名单上。而这样的名单有几十份。萨默斯绝不是吹哨人。他没有痛斥日益下滑的金融标准。

同时请记住,尽管你的投资组合下跌了 40%,但就像你依然拥有同一栋房子一样,你仍然控制着相同数量的股票,因而也拥有相同比例的公司所有权。

When we have dealt with this crisis, all of our assets will still be sitting around waiting to be His man Summers has proven he has some bite. Because fully used once again. It is helpful to consider that after he has written often for the Financial Times we at least the Depression, the U.S. GDP got back on its original know his public stance on matters financial. Well, let’s trendline as if the Depression had never occurred. put it this way: he runs no risk of being on any of the many lists of people who gave clear warnings of potential Also remember that although your portfolio is down financial disaster. And dozens did. Summers was 40%, just as you own the same house, you still control emphatically not a whistleblower. He did not rail against the same number of shares and hence the same fraction of falling financial standards.

他所做的——与格林斯潘和鲁宾结成的长期财富同盟——是挫败了布鲁克斯莉·伯恩在 1998 年底发起的一场英勇尝试,当时担任芝加哥商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)负责人的她试图监管场外衍生品。他们拦住了她,大概秉承格林斯潘那句“监管越少越好”的精神。

奥巴马任命加里·根斯勒执掌 CFTC。根斯勒名声不错,但他进入财政部是由……你猜对了……罗伯特·鲁宾招募的。你之前只是高估了自己的财富,以为你拥有的公司眨眼间就翻了一倍。对于个股而言,这种情况很少发生;从大盘层面看,则从未发生过。好消息是,当市场价格腰斩时,你手里的美元变得更有力量了。用于消费时,一美元永远是一美元。而用于投资时,一美元在严重高估的市场中是疲软的,在廉价市场中却是强大的。

What he did, with his allies long-term wealth that you had before. You simply over- Greenspan and Rubin, was beat back a heroic attempt in estimated your wealth before, believing that the companies late 1998 by Brooksley Born, then boss of the CFTC in you owned had quickly become twice as valuable. With Chicago, to supervise OTC derivatives. They held her an individual stock, this is rarely the case; on a broad off, presumably in the Greenspanian spirit of “the less market level, it is never the case. The good news is that regulation, the better.” with the market at half price, you now have much more powerful dollars. For consumption purposes, a dollar Obama appointed Gary Gensler to lead the CFTC. Gensler is always a dollar. Investment dollars, in contrast, are has a good reputation, but was hired into Treasury by … weak dollars in badly over-priced markets but powerful you’ve guessed it … Robert Rubin. dollars in cheap markets.

如今,投资资金的力量远比过去强大得多。(事实上,为了鼓励商业发展,我们将在 1 月特惠活动中推出投资管理服务:今年管理同等数量的全球股票,费用比去年降低 40%!快来抢购,数量有限!)

3. 奥巴马与“不粘锅先生”们

我天生是个逆向投资者和爱挑刺的人,因此觉得——说到蒂姆·盖特纳!美联储公开市场委员会(FOMC)的会议纪要已经公布,至少我们知道了格林斯潘和伯南克的会议上他加进了什么。在格林斯潘主政的年代,其他成员偶尔会有几句告诫——来自一群相当软弱的成员,非常非常少——而我们从记录中知道这些话受到了怎样的对待。格林斯潘一个典型的精准回应是:“那么,看来这是个喝咖啡休息的好时机了,”或者类似的话。

Today, investment dollars are a And as for Tim Geithner! The FOMC minutes are available, whole lot more powerful than they used to be. (In fact, to so at least we know what he added to Greenspan’s and encourage business, we will make a special January sale Bernanke’s meetings. Over the Greenspan years, there on our own investment management services: we will were a few cautionary words from other members – a manage the same number of global equity shares as last very, very few from a rather spineless group – and year for 40% less! Hurry, hurry, limited supply!) we know from the records how they were greeted. A typically precise response from Greenspan was: “So, this 3. Obama and the Teflon Men seems like a good time to break for coffee,” or words to I am naturally a contrarian and a nitpicker, so I found that effect.

我们可以研究一下盖特纳反对我在克林顿时代加入共和党的理由,以及美联储沿着那条通往毁灭的鲜花小径走过的漫漫长路,但我们在布什时代真正研究了粉红色分子。不过,在奥巴马时代纵情欢呼之后就不会太久了,因为他什么都不质疑!他当选后,我甚至还没等到他的就职典礼就开始挑毛病了!作为一名环保主义者,我很高兴他身边聚集了顶尖的人才。我个人认为,希拉里·克林顿被任命领导国务院是一个令人兴奋的选择。但在关键的金融领域,他似乎带回了鲁宾式的老套人物、“唯唯诺诺之辈”,或者两者兼具,这些人中没有一个似乎在金融史上最明显的泡沫形成时有所察觉。玛丽·夏皮罗被任命领导证券交易委员会(SEC),受到了金融业的热烈欢迎,正是因为她在职业生涯中(包括在 SEC 和商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)任职期间)一直大力支持该行业的财务福祉,这非但没有抑制反而助长了我们金融体系中那些不良倾向。

GMO 4 季度信函,第一部分——2009 年 1 月

And we can study Geithner’s objections to the myself becoming a Republican in the Clinton era and a Fed’s long journey down the primrose path, but our study real pinko in the Bush era. But after exulting in Obama’s period will not be a long one, for he questioned nothing! election, I couldn't even reach his inauguration before He was, if anything, a cheerleader, and wrote in support finding fault! As an environmentalist, I am delighted that of the new era of “Great Moderation.” He, however, was he has surrounded himself with the very top talent. I, for not picked by Rubin. No, he was picked by Summers, who one, find Hillary Clinton an exciting choice to head the was picked by Rubin. These guys are very, very loyal! State Department. But in the critical financial arena, he appears to have brought in Rubinesque retreads, “yes Mary Schapiro, appointed to head the SEC, has been men,” or both, none of whom appeared to have seen the greeted with great enthusiasm by the financial industry most obvious developing bubbles in the history of finance. precisely because she has been a great supporter of the GMO 4 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 industry’s financial well-being during her career, which rather than discouraged the bad tendencies in our financial has included positions at the SEC and the CFTC.

她是体制。我们对那些大型金融企业的领导人在引入令人讨厌的麻烦的新法规方面表现出的三流水平感到震惊,尤其是他们缺乏道德骨气,未能限制那种堪称不惜代价的敛财狂欢。布鲁克斯莉·伯恩在哪里,我们正需要她的时候?(为了节省篇幅,这段反对夏皮罗的讨论就从简。帮忙补充一下:1 月 15 日《华尔街日报》——哪家报纸不好偏是它——曾有一篇详细批评,说她是个软骨头。布什要是还在位,一定会自豪地聘用她!)身为股东,我们也知道自己几乎没有做任何事来踩刹车;身为个人客户和房主,我们也助长了贪欲的胜利。在一个容易上当的年代,我们甘愿做轻信的傻瓜。

She is system. We have been amazed at the third-rate job done seen as one who poses no threat by way of introducing by the leaders of our great financial firms, above all by nasty, inconvenient new regulations. Where is Brooksley their lack of moral fiber in restricting what could best be Born when we need her? (In the interest of space, this described as an orgy of moneymaking at any price. As anti-Schapiro section is brief. To help out, on January 15, stockholders, we also know we did little to put on the there was a detailed criticism of her for being a softy in brakes; as individual clients and home buyers, we also The Wall Street Journal, of all newspapers. Bush would did our bit to make it easy for greed to win out. We were have been proud to hire her!) willing gulls in an age of gullibility.

麦道夫倒是替历史学家做了一件好事,他把我们的情况揭示得如此清楚:这简直是一场错失的良机。奥巴马受命之时,本可以推行一项包含严肃底层分析的使命,可我们却在忙着赚那 1.5% 的管理费——即便起疑的时候,大家也是集体不愿惹事。而更严重的是,我们的监管机构乐于按兵不动,不愿迈出任何实质步伐。本来我们可以沿着那条通往可信金融体系的漫漫长路,快速走好几步。现在正是时候。许多读者会反驳说,这些人个个聪明——甚至非常聪明。没错,他们都是。可我们的金融之船正在缓慢下沉,这绝不仅仅是因为金融诚信的败坏。情况比金融诚信的堕落更糟。

Madoff has done historians a good turn by making it so clear that we were What a missed opportunity this all is. Obama was given looking to make our 1.5% fees rather than looking to do a mandate that could have included some serious bottom hard analysis, and that collectively, even when we were kicking. We could have quickly taken quite a few steps suspicious, we were trying not to rock the boat. And, most down the long road leading to a credible financial system significantly, our regulators were happy to leave no stone deserving of respect. The time to do that was now. Many turned! readers will object that these are all bright – even very bright – people. And so they are. But our financial ship But it was worse than merely a decay of financial is not doing a passable imitation of sinking because of a integrity.

2008 年以无能让本已缺乏智慧的结局达到顶点。真正缺失的是骨气,这将被铭记为现代史上最无能的八年——未能公开抵制当权者贪得无厌的狂欢,即便与古代相比也堪称典范。更重要的是,或许是更长时间跨度里缺失的远见。正如保罗·克鲁格曼所言,我们撕毁了社会契约;当时不乏才智,只是智慧太少。因此,如果奥巴马任命的官员中有人曾对不断膨胀的庞氏骗局吹响哨子——正是这个杠杆化的金融体系让我们深陷困境(这也是为什么麦道夫丑闻成为我们危机的完美收官)——那将令人备受鼓舞。但更长远来看,或许更为关键的是视野的缺失。通过有利于富人的税制改革,我们助长了本已存在的全球经济力量,这些力量早已倾向于将财富集中到富人手中。那是一个冷酷无情、缺乏同情心且贪婪成性的时代,个人崇拜凌驾于整个社会之上,而这场以高风险和松懈标准为特征的闹剧,正是这一切的写照。

2008 capped in incompetence what I am sure lack of intelligence. What was lacking was the backbone will be remembered as the most incompetent eight years to publicly resist the establishment's greedy joyride of of government in modern times, and a contender even if risk-taking and sloppy standards. Even more important, we include ancient times. Over an even longer period, as perhaps, was the breadth of vision that was missing. There Paul Krugman would say, we tore up the social contract; was plenty of intelligence, just not too much wisdom. So it through tax changes favoring the rich, we aided and abetted would be very encouraging if there were someone included the strong global economic forces that already tended to in Obama's appointments who had actually blown the concentrate wealth in the hands of the already rich. It was whistle on the spiraling Ponzi scheme that our leveraged an uncharitable, unsympathetic, and avaricious era in which financial system had become (which is why the Madoff the cult of the individual trumped overall society, and the fiasco is such a fitting capstone to our troubles).

如果真的把对财富和奢侈生活的追求放在首位,而像沃尔克这样有真正坚韧品格、能够追求更有价值、更持久事业的人却被边缘化,那才真是最不得人心的事。哦,等一下,难道我们社会在过去 20 年里变得更富有了,但根本没有丝毫研究显示我们变得更幸福了,反而有很多证据表明恰恰相反吗?在这个过程中,我们向毁掉地球迈进了一大步,还不得不眼睁睁看着许多富有的公司花钱搞昂贵的公关项目,试图掩盖科学事实。而我这种爱唱反调的人,是不是只是个游戏里的角色,好让人接受这个局面?可惜,我暗自担心,沃尔克可能不过是总统竞选的装饰品。我敢打赌,到目前为止,他并没有被日夜纠缠着寻求建议。

If only drive for wealth and the luxuries of life took precedence there were someone with real toughness who could do over more worthwhile and longer-lasting values. Most unpopular things. Someone, say, like Volcker. Oh, wait a of our society got richer in the last 20 years, but there is minute. Didn't he get a job? Or was that only a game to get not a hint of research that suggests we got happier, and obstreperous characters like me on board with the program? plenty that suggests the reverse. In the process, we took Unfortunately, I have a sneaking misgiving that Volcker some giant steps toward ruining the planet and had to live was indeed window dressing for the Presidential campaign. with the sight of many wealthy firms funding expensive PR Dollars to donuts he has not been pestered around the clock programs that attempted to obscure the science and suggest for advice so far.

我跟你说一条。别以为煤炭是清洁能源,一切就天下太平。简单说吧,我们搞砸了——了解他的人都知道,如果问题波及面很广,他会在一年之内辞职。去年的局势发展到他们不再当回事的地步。既然他是唯一一个被证明具备正确资质的人——偏好高标准的财务诚信,且有推行不受欢迎但必要的行动的骨气——如果这一年结束时你还没认清现实,那说明你根本没留心。如果彻底失去他,那才真是可惜。

5. 与两位英雄的小争论

And I'll tell you one thing. You don't have that coal is clean and all is well. In short, we messed up to know him well to know that he'll resign within a year if on a very broad front, and last year was when it became they don't get serious. Since he is the only person on the impossible not to see it. If you ended the year without team proven to have the right credentials – a preference for becoming disillusioned, you were not paying attention. high standards of financial integrity and the backbone to push through unpopular but necessary actions – it would 5. Small Arguments with Two Heroes be a real shame to lose him entirely. First, Warren Buffett. At about 950 on the S&P on October 16, he announced that he was a personal buyer of U.S.

4. 幻灭股

用一个词来最贴切地概括我们对这过去真正悲惨一年的所有感受,那就是“幻灭”。我相信,我们所有人都一再被高层官员缺乏能力和误入歧途的理念所震惊,他们多年来一直在鼓励这种做法。1974 年,当他这么说的时候,我们在 Batterymarch 投资组合中的每一只股票都产生了近 10% 的收益率!投资组合的市盈率低于 7.5 倍。即使事后看来,如果你用我们目前的方法来评估 1974 年的市场,GMO 2009 年 1 月季度信函第一部分第 5 页显示,它也比今天 950 点的市场便宜得多,而我们计算出 950 点几乎正是合理价值。嗯,过去几年我们做出的判断,其正确程度可能与我们以往任何时候都差不多。“规避所有风险。”“不要因持有现金而过于自负。”“让别人去勇敢吧。”“预计至少有一家大型银行会倒闭(2007 年 7 月)。”“许多金融公司将接近技术性破产(2008 年 1 月)。”预计 50% 的对冲基金将消失,并且,在滞后一段时间后,预计私人股本领域将出现重大危机,其中 1974 年至 2006 年以及 2007 年的投资价值将趋近于零。更根本的是,我们呼吁经济,特别是中国和英国的经济,将出现持续的、低于预期的增长,并且,我们尤其预计全球利润率将会下降。这些观点或许最能体现在我们的信念中,即冒险行为是泡沫的核心,并且风险溢价几乎必然会显著上升。当然,房价会下跌并引发相当大的麻烦。如果我们既能准确把握大局,又能完美实施,我们将会度过一段天堂般的时光——至少是天堂中为机构管理者预留的那一部分:相对的完美。事实上,我们在实施方面做得有好有坏:有些非常好,有些很糟糕,还有一些好坏参半,但总体而言,我们度过了不错的一年。

重新介绍我们 7 年预测中的第一个:再次看好!

他最近的声明让市场看起来比无聊的合理价值令人兴奋得多。那么,可能性有哪些?他是在履行公民义务吗?当然,动物精神是任何复苏的关键组成部分,因此,来自权威来源的鼓励冒险的言论是完全合理的。他是否相信 1974 年的那种廉价程度永远不会重现,或者在这种特殊情况下极不可能重现?如果这是论点,我们会不同意;我们怀疑,更便宜的价格不仅可能,而且很可能,尽管不可否认远非确定。他是否有一个战术性的市场择时模型,使得他在面对这些平庸的价值时仍能产生明显的兴奋感?鉴于他的风格,这极不可能。或者,是我们的数字错了吗?想都别想!无论如何,这真是一个有趣的难题。

其次,纳西姆·塔勒布和黑天鹅逻辑,我以前曾公开赞赏过。塔勒布以一种只有他才能做到的方式,完全否定任何近乎确定的事情。他暗示,我们刚刚遭受了一个极端事件对标准风险模型的冲击,而标准风险模型只假设事件会以大致正态的方式发生。他认为,建模假设事件会以近似正态分布的方式发生。

4. Disillusionment stocks because they were cheap and their prices reflected The single word that probably best summarizes all widespread fear. This is not typical for him, but he certainly of our feelings toward this last, truly miserable year is did it in 1974. When he said it back then, every stock in “disillusionment.” We have all been, I believe, serially our portfolio at Batterymarch yielded almost 10%! The shocked by the lack of competence and misguided portfolio P/E was below 7.5x. Even with hindsight, if you philosophy of our top officials, who for years encouraged value the market in 1974 using our current methodology, Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 5 GMO it was very much cheaper than it is today at 950, which is Recent Recommendations and Performance what we calculate as almost precisely fair value. Well, we got it about as right over the past few years as we’re ever going to. “Avoid all risk.” “Don’t be too proud His recent announcement made the market seem so much to own cash.” “Let the other guys be brave.” “Expect at more exciting than boring old fair value. So what are the least one major bank to fail (July 2007).” “Many financial possibilities? Was he performing a civic duty? Certainly, companies will approach technical insolvency (January animal spirits are a critical component of any recovery, 2008).” Expect 50% of hedge funds to disappear and, so encouragement to take risk from an authoritative after a lag, expect a major crisis in private equity where source makes perfect sense. Does he believe that 1974-2006 and 2007 investments should approach zero in type cheapness can never return, or is very unlikely value. More fundamentally, we called for persistent, in this particular case? If that were the argument, we below-estimate growth in economies, especially in China would disagree; we suspect that cheaper prices are not and the U.K. and, most particularly, we expected falling just possible but probable, although admittedly far from profit margins globally. These views were perhaps best certain. Has he perhaps a tactical market timing model captured in our belief that risk-taking was at the heart of that produces his obvious excitement, despite these the bubble, and that risk premiums were nearly certain to ordinary values? Most unlikely, given his style. Or are our rise significantly. And, of course, house prices would fall numbers wrong? Perish the thought! In any case, it is all and cause considerable trouble. If we had implemented an interesting conundrum. as well as we got the big picture right, we would have Second, Nassim Taleb and the Black Swan logic, had a year from heaven – at least from that part of heaven which I have previously admired in public. Taleb is reserved for institutional managers: relative heaven. In completely dismissive – in a way only he can be – of any fact, we did a mixed job in implementation: some very near certainties. He implies that we have just suffered good, some bad, and some in-between but, all in all, we from an outlier event crashing up against standard risk had a good year. modeling that only assumes that events will occur in an Re-introducing the Very First of Our 7-year approximately normal way. He argues that modeling the Forecasts: Bullish Again!

95% 或 99% 的常规风险价值(VaR)区间完全忽略了关键所在:真正的博弈发生在最后的 多年来,我们一直使用 10 年期的资产类别回报预测。2001 年 12 月 31 日,我们首次做出 7 年期预测。从 10 年改为 7 年,是因为研究证明这是金融序列均值回归的平均时长。数据见表 1。

你可能发现了,尽管被称为“永久空头”,但我们高估了全球股市的回报,只有新兴市场基本准确。政府债务——考虑到我们的危机,并不意外——也略微跑赢我们的预期。

当前建议

缓慢而谨慎地将现金储备投入全球股市,偏好高质量的美国蓝筹股和新兴市场股票。估算的 7 年回报率略高于正常水平,远高于过去 15 年的平均值。但要为今年或明年再次跌至新低做好准备,因为这是最有可能的历史模式——市场在重大泡沫后往往会在下跌过程中过度修正。标普 500 指数跌至 600 点甚至更低,比我们曾经触及的 750 点更符合典型的低点特征。

95% or 99% normal range in Value at Risk (VaR) misses the whole point: that the real game is played out in the final For many years, we used a 10-year forecast for asset 1%. It's hard to disagree with this criticism of VaR, but is class returns. In January 2002, we made our first 7-year it relevant in this case? Was the recent breaking of our forecast, dated December 31, 2001. We moved from 10 to credit and asset bubbles a totally unpredictable outlier? 7 years because research proved that it was closer to the average time for financial series to mean revert. The data We believe that we live in a world where bubbles routinely is shown in Table 1. form and where there are – in complete contrast to Nassim Taleb’s belief – some near certainties. One is that bubbles As you can see, despite being called “perma bears,” we will break. Bernanke should not have said, “U.S. house overestimated the returns for global equities, except for prices have never declined,” thus implying that they never emerging, where we were more or less spot on. Government would. He should have said, “Never before has a three- debt – not surprisingly, given our crisis – also moderately sigma, 1 in 100, U.S. housing bubble occurred, and be outperformed our estimate. advised that all such analogous bubbles in other asset classes and in housing in other countries have always Current Recommendations burst.” (Robert Shiller for the Fed! He would have said Slowly and carefully invest your cash reserves into almost exactly that.) The bursting of the U.S. and U.K. global equities, preferring high quality U.S. blue chips housing bubbles, the profit margins, and the risk premium and emerging market equities. Imputed 7-year returns are in global asset prices were all “near certainties.” This was moderately above normal and much above the average of a White Swan, a particularly White Swan. Taleb’s work the last 15 years. But be prepared for a decline to new lows will no doubt be correct when we have a genuine Black this year or next, for that would be the most likely historical Swan, but this was most definitely not it. (Okay, Nassim. pattern, as markets love to overcorrect on the downside after I can hear you thinking: this guy Grantham is a complete major bubbles. 600 or below on the S&P 500 would be a loser who has obviously missed my entire point.) more typical low than the 750 we reached for one day.

GMO 6 季度信函,第一部分 – 2009 年 1 月

表 1 长期无畏预测

7 年前的 7 年预测:

在由同样巨大的全球财富账面减记引发的大规模去杠杆冲击之下,一如既往的看多预测

2001 年 12 月 31 日的预测

vs. 2008 年 12 月 31 日的实际情况

GMO 7 年预测

2001 年 12 月预测

实际值

预测(\% 实际年回报率)

7 年实际回报率*

排名

资产类别

排名

1

新兴市场股票

1

9.4

9.9

2

美国 REITs

7

9.1

3.1

3

新兴国家债务

3

6.8

6.4

4

国际小盘股

4

5.2

4.9

5

美国 TIPS

5

3.5

3.9

6

雷曼综合指数

6

2.9

3.8

我们预计,整个发达国家的 GDP 增长率将继续延续我们在 2008 年 4 月概述的过去 12 年的放缓趋势。由于近期的冲击与人口增长放缓叠加,很快大家就会普遍认识到,即使我们从当前的负增长时期复苏过来,G7 国家 2% 的实体增长也是一个现实的目标。当然,新兴国家是另一回事。它们可能会更快复苏,并将继续以发达国家增速的两倍(或更高)增长。(参见 2008 年 4 月《新兴市场泡沫》。)

GMO 6 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 Table 1 Fearless Forecasts for the Long Term The 7-Year Forecast from 7 Years Ago: Under the shock of massive deleveraging caused by Bullish as Ever the equally massive write-down of perceived global Forecasts from December 31, 2001 wealth, we expect the growth rate of GDP for the whole vs. actual as of December 31, 2008 developed world to continue the slowing trend of the last GMO 7-Yr 12 years as we outlined in April 2008. Since this recent Forecast Dec-01 Actual shock overlaps with slowing population growth, it will Estimated (% Real 7-Yr Actual soon be widely recognized that 2% real growth would be Asset Class Rank Return/Yr) Return* Rank Emerging Mkt Equities 1 9.4 9.9 1 a realistic target for the G7, even after we recover from the U.S. REITs 2 9.1 3.1 7 current negative growth period. Emerging countries are, of Emerging Cntry Debt 3 6.8 6.4 3 course, a different story. They will probably recover more Int'l Small Cap 4 5.2 4.9 4 quickly, and will continue to grow at double (or better) the U.S. TIPS 5 3.5 3.9 5 growth rate of developed countries. (See “The Emerging Lehman Aggregate 6 2.9 3.8 6 Emerging Bubble,” April 2008.)

外国债券 7 2.6 7.4 2

关于一月效应和总统周期的脚注 9 2.2 1.0 8

美国短期国债 10 2.1 0.2 9

标普 500 指数 11 -1.0 -3.9 11

2008 年 1 月,我曾指出市场开年创下了有史以来最差的五日表现,这个信号“既引人注目又偏空”,因为 1 月下跌的年份出现全年下跌的概率大幅上升。结果,这成了一个有用的小道消息:“史上最差五日预示史上最差年!快来读读吧!”

这些预测的准确性并不保证当前或未来的预测在 7 年期资产类别排名、实际回报绝对水平或较短周期内的结果也能同样准确。资产类别预测排名的准确性通常每段时期都不同。

*实际指数回报率为 2001 年 12 月 31 日到 2008 年 12 月 31 日期间。来源:GMO

Foreign Bonds 7 2.6 7.4 2 U.S. Small Cap 8 2.2 -0.5 10 Footnote on the January Rule and EAFE 9 2.2 1.0 8 the Presidential Cycle U.S. T-Bills 10 2.1 0.2 9 S&P 500 11 -1.0 -3.9 11 In January 2008, I pointed out that the market had started The accuracy of these forecasts does not guarantee that current or future the year with the worst five days ever recorded, and that predictions will be accurate either with respect to the ranking of those asset the signal was “both impressive and bearish” in that down classes over a 7-year period, the absolute levels of real return, or results over shorter periods. The accuracy of forecasted rankings in the asset class forecasts Januaries materially increase the probability of a down generally varies from period to period. year. Well, that turned out to be a useful tidbit: “Worst-* Actual real index returns are for 12/31/01 to 12/31/08 period. Source: GMO ever five days predict worst-ever year! Read all about it!”

今年五天期回报微涨(全靠最后两个交易小时撑住),但六天期回报下跌了不少。嗯,就这样吧。

This year the five-day return was up a bit (saved by the In fixed income, risk finally seems to be attractively last two hours), but the six-day return was down quite a priced, in that most risk spreads seem attractively wide. bit. Ho hum.

不过,长期国债利率似乎实在太低了。

Long government bond rates, though, seem much too low.

它们反映了对经济疲软的短期恐惧,以及对低短期利率的需求。正如之前所写,总统周期已经被格林斯潘彻底毁了。他在前两年(本应是收紧政策的时间)过度刺激经济,不仅是在 1997 年和 1998 年,在上一轮周期的 2005 年和 2006 年也是如此。两次都导致通常具有刺激作用的第三年出现了额外的投机性飙升——1999 年是纳斯达克,2007 年则是房价和丑陋的金融工具。在关键的选举年(本应是稳定的年份),两次飙升都引发了崩溃。在新周期的第一年,我们应该稍微收紧信贷、压缩预算,这样才好在 2011 年为了下一次大选再度刺激。真是笑话!2009 年将成为有史以来最大的刺激年份,更不用说这本来是一个正常应该收紧的年份了。所以眼下:总统周期——安息吧!

至于大宗商品,谁知道呢?有几个月它们看起来是一个高置信度的做空标的,但现在价格跌了一半甚至更多,变成了一个低置信度的赌注。

在外汇方面,我们知道的更少。容易找到不喜欢的外币,却很难找到喜欢的。在我们看来,没有高置信度的押注。

从长期来看,研究应该聚焦于那些能够抵御通胀问题和美元潜在走弱的投资组合。这是政府大规模救助和国债泛滥全球金融体系之后,我们可能不得不面对的两个严峻问题。

They reflect the short-term fears of economic weakness The Presidential Cycle, as written about previously, has and the need for low short-term rates. We would be short been completely ruined by Greenspan. He over-stimulated long government bonds in appropriate accounts. during the first two years, which are meant to be the time for tightening up, not only in 1997 and 1998, but As for commodities, who knows? There were a few also during this past cycle in 2005 and 2006. Both times months where they looked like a high-confidence short, this caused an extra-speculative surge in the typically but now they are half-price or less, and are much lower-stimulative Year 3s, in 1999 in the NASDAQ, and in 2007 confidence bets. in housing prices and ugly financial instruments. Both In currencies, we know even less. It is easy to find surges set off collapses during the critical election years, currencies to dislike, and hard to find ones to like. There which are meant to be stable. In the coming Year 1 of are no high-confidence bets, in our opinion. the new cycle, we should be squeezing credit a little and tightening budgets so that we can re-stimulate in 2011 for For the long term, research should be directed into the next election. What a joke! 2009 will be the greatest portfolios that would resist both inflationary problems stimulus year ever, let alone in a normally restrictive and potential dollar weakness. These are the two serious year. So for the time being: Presidential Cycle – Rest In problems that we may have to face as a consequence of Peace! flooding the global financial system with government bailouts and government debt.

免责声明:本文所表达的观点仅为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2009 年 1 月 21 日的观点,并可能随市场及其他条件的变化随时调整。本文不构成对任何证券的买入或卖出要约或招揽,也不应被视作此类要约或招揽。文中提及特定证券及发行人仅作说明之用,不构成也不应被解读为买入或卖出该类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 21, 2009, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2009 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2009 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

2009 年 1 月季度信函,第 1 部分 7 GMO GMO 季度信函 2009 年 2 月 奥巴马与特氟龙人,以及其他短故事。第 2 部分。

Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – January 2009 7 GMO GMO QUARTERLY LETTER February 2009 Obama and the Teflon Men, and Other Short Stories. Part 2.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆:1. 过度贴现的价值陷阱年与大幅复苏年已经可靠地多次出现,延续了几个周期。自远古以来,最成功的价值投资者一直都是最勇敢的。价值投资最大的优势始终在于:当你买入的廉价股票价格下跌时,它会变得更便宜、更具吸引力。这与动量股完全相反——动量股在下跌时会失去动量评级,因此变得不再有吸引力。但在价值股上摊低成本,需要极大的胆量和相当的能力,去说服焦虑的客户相信这一策略的稳健性。至少 60 年来,那些处理好这些问题、买入跌幅最大的股票的价值投资者,最终既取得了最强的业绩,也获得了最大的商业成功。(当然,分析能力也有帮助,但我们假设这些能力在勇敢和焦虑的投资者之间是平均分布的。)过去的大市场下跌为勇敢的价值管理者创造了最佳机遇:1972-74 年以及 2000-02 年高达 50% 的跌幅。1972 年和 2000 年的价值投资者,还能以至少自 1945 年以来相对于整体市场最大的折扣,买入价值股。此外,在这些价值股中摊低成本,那些跌幅最大的股票最终会为一个本已强劲的回报增添可观的收益。在这个群体中,分析能力最强的那批价值管理者,成为了少数几位超级成功的投资者。

在轻度经济衰退中,即便是受创的价值股也能完全恢复。在重大衰退中,极少数股票会失败,但数量远不足以抵消巨大的折扣。只有在真正严重的经济衰退中,才会有足够多的伤亡发生,让人们认清一个事实:市净率(P/B)和市盈率(P/E)是风险因素。常规性地买入并摊低成本,多少有点像在压路机前捡的不是镍币——那会低估可观回报——而是像在压路机前捡 1000 美元钞票。因为长期来看(至少对没被压死的人来说),额外的职业风险溢价,即使把罕见的严重基本面危机包括在内,这一策略可能仍然值得。但投资者应该意识到,基本面部分的风险溢价是通过这些痛苦事件来证明其合理性的,这绝不是免费午餐。

Jeremy Grantham 1. The Year of the Value Trap of over-discounting and handsome recovery has taken Since time immemorial, the most successful value place dependably for several cycles in a row. It begins investors have been the bravest. The greatest advantage to look like the natural, even inevitable, nature of things of value investing has always been that when your cheap rather than merely the most usual outcome. The growth stock goes down in price, it gets even cheaper and more in the number of quantitative investors exaggerated this attractive. This is the complete opposite of momentum tendency because quants model the last 10 or 20 years (or stocks, which lose their momentum rating as they decline even 40) without really requiring a full understanding of and hence become unattractive. But averaging down the very long-term pattern and why it behaves the way in value stocks can take lots of nerve and considerable that it does. And none of us modeled data that included ability in convincing anxious clients of the soundness of the last great value trap: the Great Crash of 1929. the strategy. For at least 60 years, those value investors In mild economic setbacks, even the wounded value who managed these problems and bought more of the stocks recover fully. In substantial setbacks, a very small stocks that had tumbled the most emerged with both the number fail, but not nearly enough to offset the large strongest performance and the most business success. (Of discounts. Only in the really severe economic setbacks course, analytical skills also help, but let’s assume that do enough casualties occur to bring home a truth: price-these skills were distributed evenly between brave and to-book (P/B) and price-to-earnings (P/E) are risk factors. nervous investors.) Major market declines in the past set Buying them and averaging down routinely has an element up the best opportunities for brave value managers: the of picking up not nickels in front of the steamroller – that 50% declines of 1972-74 and 2000-02. Value investors would belittle the substantial returns – but, say, $1000 in 1972 and 2000 were also able to buy value stocks at bills in front of the steamroller. Because of the extra their biggest discounts to the general market at least since discounts for career risk in the long run (at least for those 1945. In addition, averaging down in those value stocks who are not dead), the strategy will probably still pay off that fell the most eventually added substantially to an even if the rare, severe fundamental crises are included. already strong return. Those value managers with the But investors should be aware that the fundamental part best analytical skills within this group became the few of the risk premium is justified by the pain of these outlier handfuls of super-successful investors. events and is absolutely not a free lunch.

局外人或许会视此为重返勇气的表现,但这同时也是重返风险。价格与账面价值比最低的股票,正是那些被市场判定为拥有最差资产的公司。而市场先生并不总是一个彻头彻尾的白痴。因为这些公司通常显而易见地不具吸引力,并且被客户如此看待,它们对持有它们的基金经理而言,代表着一种职业风险或商业风险。这种职业风险通常体现在一个额外折扣上,该折扣会为承担职业风险者带来额外回报。这份“职业风险”回报,是在买入质量较低、具有更多根本风险的公司所享有的折扣之上的额外收益。当这种模式被打破时,问题就出现了。

过去两年价值投资的问题尤其严重,因为价值股在 2002 年至 2007 年期间表现远超大盘。它们连续五年获胜,因此到 2007 年中期,价值/成长股之间的估值差,对美股的投资者而言,其不利程度已近乎极限(见图表 1)。(我们承认,当这些数据首次被呈示时,某些价值投资者并不同意。我们当时感到困惑,现在依然困惑,他们是如何得出更为乐观的结论的。)

为了衡量这一时期价值陷阱究竟有多糟糕,请参阅 2007 年秋季版《杰出投资者文摘》。这份出版物聚焦于十几位顶尖价值型投资者,内容可读性强、趣味盎然且充满洞见。然而,那个特定期号却令人心碎,因为其中一位接一位的卓越投资者都提出了这样的观点——尽管已经下跌 30% 到 50%——但 AIG、雷曼兄弟、美联银行……(“非常感谢您如此有用的建议!”)

Outsiders could view this as a return to bravery, but it The value problems of the last two years were particularly was also a return to risk. The cheapest price-to-book bad because of the outperformance that value stocks had stocks are those deemed by the market to have the between 2002 and 2007. They won for five years in a row, least desirable assets. And Mr. Market is not always so that by mid 2007 the value/growth spread was about a complete ass. Because these companies are so often as unfavorable as possible for value stocks in the U.S. obviously undesirable and are seen as such by clients, (see Exhibit 1). (We recognize that some value investors they represent a career or business risk to the manager disagreed with this data when it was first presented. We who owns them. This career risk is usually reflected in an were, and still are, puzzled by how they arrived at their extra discount that will deliver an extra return for bearing more positive conclusion.) the career risk. This “career risk” return is in addition to the discount for buying lower quality companies with To put a measure on how awful the value trap was more fundamental risk. Problems arise when this pattern during this time, please see the Fall 2007 edition of Exhibit 1 Price to Book – Cheapest Quartile vs. Expensive Quartile 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 PB/PB 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Dec-65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 Source: GMO As of 1/31/09 the Outstanding Investor Digest. This publication answer clearly. On the one hand, value stocks are now at concentrates on a dozen or so of the top value investors least much cheaper on a relative basis than they were a and is readable, interesting, and chock-full of insight. year ago. On the other hand, they can get a lot cheaper, However, that particular issue is a heartbreaker as one and they face the worst economy since 1938. I would give after another of these superior investors put forward the them at best a 50/50 bet this year. (“Thank you very much case that – down 30% to 50% – AIG, Lehman, Wachovia, for such useful advice!”)

房利美等公司被荒谬地低估,它们所代表的长期经济特许权价值,是紧张的市场未能看到的。在 GMO 的核心技能集和近乎确定性的丧失之间,我觉得价值股的定价中带有对大萧条的集体记忆——当时许多廉价公司破产,而昂贵的可口可乐公司却幸存得最好。记住,你无法从破产中回归。利用专有研究数据,我们考察了一个固定时间段:1929 年 10 月至 1932 年 6 月。在不进行再平衡的情况下,数据显示了“价值”股的巨大跌幅,其中高市盈率股票的下跌幅度远低于低市盈率股票。

正如我们之前指出的,有一件事是千真万确的:从风险的基本衡量指标来看——盈利水平、盈利波动性以及债务水平——市净率和市盈率低的股票“质量”要低得多,并应在一个非常严重的经济挫折(比如我们正在经历的这次)中受到重创。事实也确实如此,许多最优秀的投资者在 2008 年遭遇了有史以来最惨淡的一年,他们无比庆幸这一年终于过去。2009 年价值股是否会迎来反弹,是一个重要的问题,也是我们无法回答的。对于 GMO 而言,这已变成一个低置信度的赌注,尽管我个人仍持有其中一半,主要是出于对未来房地产市场疲软的考量。日元也是如此。它本质上很便宜,作为流行且有风险套利交易的反面,它是押注超低风险溢价退潮的一种简单而有力的方式。它的表现超出了所有人的预期。但现在,在经历了一轮辉煌的上涨之后,这已是一个低置信度的赌注,我怯怯地保留了最初头寸的四分之一,因为我仍然认为在反风险浪潮中还会有几只鞋子落地。但可能也不会太多了。

最后一点很自然地引出了我的主要遗憾之一:近年来,市场宠坏了我们,它以近乎确定性的投资机会呈现在我们面前,我们认为这些机会的概率超过 0.9。我们的主要技能是研究所有金融序列中重大的上行异常点或泡沫,试图理解并识别其模式。仅此而已。这并非一项深奥的练习。事实上,我的偶像凯恩斯对此颇为不屑。你可能熟悉他 1923 年的名言:“但长期是对当前事务的一个误导性指南。长期来看,我们都死了。”你可能不知道的是这句话的后续:“经济学家为自己设定了一个太容易、太无用的任务,如果在狂风暴雨的季节里,他们只能告诉我们,风暴过去很久之后大海又会恢复平静。”想来,他对于相反的观点也会同样轻蔑:在长期的平静之后,你最好准备好迟早再经历一场风暴。我认为这是一个罕见的例子,凯恩斯在这两种情况下都错了。具有讽刺意味的是,对于一位 13 年后写出关于职业赌博的《圣经》(其《通论》第 12 章)的人来说,他在 1923 年的错误是由于低估了继续跳舞的职业和商业压力。在现实生活中,市场先生通常表现得仿佛平静会永远持续下去,尽管他大概知道这不可能。在那一刻来临之前,这是如此美味地有利可图。即使音乐停止,你仍可能被视为“审慎之人”——你以传统方式失败了,而大有人在。事实证明,在长期平静之后高声警告即将来临的风暴是一项非常不受欢迎的事业。即使在所有人都最终看跌时看涨——即预测风暴后的平静——也无法免于职业风险。

Fannie Mae, etc., were ridiculously underpriced, and represented enormous long-term franchise value that the 2. GMO’s Central Skill Set and Loss of Near nervous market was missing. Certainties It has long been my view that the pricing of value stocks That last point leads neatly into one of my principal has a folk memory of the Great Depression when many regrets: in recent years we have been spoiled by the market cheap companies went bust and the expensive Coca- in that we were presented with investment opportunities Colas survived the best. Remember, you cannot regress that seemed to us to be near certainties, which we define from bankruptcy. Using proprietary research data, we as probabilities over 0.9. Our principal skill has been examined one fixed time slot: October 1929 to June 1932. to study major upside outliers or bubbles in all financial With no rebalancing, the data showed a massive “value” series, trying to understand and recognize their patterns. wipeout in which high P/E stocks declined far less than That’s it. Not a profound exercise. In fact, my hero low P/E stocks. Keynes was quite disrespectful of this exercise. You are probably familiar with his famous quote from 1923, “But As we have pointed out before, one thing is certainly true: this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In on fundamental measures of risk – level of profitability, the long run we are all dead.” What you may be unaware volatility of profitability, and debt levels – stocks with low of is how it continues: “Economists set themselves too P/B and P/E ratios have much lower “quality” and should easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they be expected to be hurt badly in a very serious economic can only tell us that when the storm is long past the setback such as the one we are now experiencing. And ocean is flat again.” Presumably, he would have been so it was that many of the very best investors had their equally contemptuous of the reverse: the prediction that very worst year in 2008, and were exceedingly happy to after a long calm, you had better be prepared for another see the back of it. Whether 2009 will see a snapback for storm sooner or later. I believe it is a rare example of value is an important question, and not one that we can Keynes simply being wrong in both cases. Ironically, for GMO 2 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 someone who 13 years later wrote the Bible on career bets, this one has also become a low-confidence bet, risk (Chapter 12 of his General Theory), his error in 1923 although one I personally still hold half of, principally was because he underestimated the career and business out of consideration for future housing weakness. And pressure to keep dancing. In real life, Mr. Market usually the same goes for the yen. It was fundamentally cheap acts as if the calm will go on forever, even though he and, as the reverse of the popular and risky carry trade, it presumably knows it cannot. It’s so deliciously profitable was a simple and powerful way of playing the movement until it isn’t. And even when the music stops, you can still against an ultra-low risk premium. It worked better than be considered a “prudent man” – you will have failed, one could have hoped. But now, after a magnificent with lots of company, in the traditional way. It turns out move, it is a low-confidence bet where I timidly cling to that shouting warnings about impending storms after a one-quarter of my original position, since I still believe long calm is a very unpopular pursuit. Even being bullish there are a few more shoes left to drop in the anti-risk when everyone else is finally bearish – i.e., predicting a move. But there may not be many more. calm after the storm – is not free of career risk.

押注全球经济疲弱……嗯,亲爱的凯恩斯,这正是我们在 GMO 做的事情。我们是一群不受待见——尤其在中国和英国——的专家,专门在风平浪静之后警告暴风雨终将到来,但同样也会在暴风雨之后提醒风平浪静。过去 10 年里,我们从全球创纪录数量的极端风暴和异常值所提供的机会中获益。2007 年 9 月,我曾一口气警告三个泡沫同时存在¹。它们全是世界纪录,而且几乎“可以确定”会破裂:美国房价高得离谱、全球利润率异常之高、风险溢价创历史最低!那时,我们已经指出了英国房价的离奇泡沫,不久之后就挖到了金矿:警告全球所有资产都存在泡沫。真像猪滚泥浆一样快活!

这些关于经济政策的赌注也是如此。我以前完全确信“他们”——我们那些高贵的领袖们——完全抓不住重点。现在我不那么确定了。是的,我不赞同奥巴马金融班底里那些“换汤不换药”的老面孔,但这些人很聪明(至少非常聪明),他们现在知道事态已经极端。他们或许能应对挑战。他们的潜在无能绝非“可以确定”的事。谢天谢地!所以,总而言之,“确定性”的美妙世界已经结束,这对那些靠预测吃饭的人来说真是可惜。

The bets that global economic weakness was Well, dear Keynes, that is what we do at GMO. We are underappreciated – especially in China and the U.K. – specialists in warning of eventual storms after calms, were also near certainties, but, here again, perceptions and of calms after storms. In the last 10 years we have have changed so fast that these are ordinary, decent benefited from the opportunities offered by a world- bets now. This goes for economic policy as well. I was record number of extreme storms and outliers, and in completely confident that “they,” our noble leaders, were September 2007 I was able to warn of three bubbles in completely missing the point before. Now I’m not so sure. one sitting.1 All of them were world records, and all were Yes, I disapprove of the swallow-the-whistle retreads in “near certainties” to break: extremely high U.S. house Obama’s financial lineup, but these are brilliant (or, at prices, extraordinarily high global profit margins, and the very least, very bright) people who know now that the lowest risk premiums ever recorded! By then, we things are extreme. They may rise to the occasion. Their had already addressed the extraordinary bubble in U.K. potential ineptitude is by no means a near certainty. house prices, and soon afterwards we hit the mother lode: Thank heaven! So, all in all, the wonderful world of a warning of a bubble in all asset prices everywhere. Talk “near certainties” has come to an end, and a pity it is for about pigs in mud! those in the prediction business.

遗憾的是,从某些方面看,这些异常值和高确定性事件正在终结。全球利润率仍极有可能大幅下滑,但这一判断是否已充分反映在股价中,已不再是确定无疑的事。目前只能说,它很可能尚未被充分反映,因此股价还会跌至新低。也许概率是 2 比 1,这虽是非常好的赌注,却远非近乎确定的 9 比 1 的罕见赔率。

Now, regrettably in some ways, the outliers and near 3. On Exiting a World of Bubbles and Entering a certainties are ending. It is still nearly certain that World of Busts global profit margins will decline a lot further. But it Economic wipeouts and severe market over-corrections, is no longer certain that this belief is not reflected fully should they arrive, are second best for us. It is true that they in stock prices. It is merely likely that it is not, and that are outliers, but busts are not so dependable as bubbles. stock prices will therefore decline to new lows. Perhaps In contrast to Greenspan’s reluctance and vacillation in the odds are 2 to 1, which is a very good bet, but far from recognizing bubbles and Bernanke’s dismissal of their the rare 9 to 1 odds of a near certainty.

类似地,美国的泡沫当然也存在。房价极有可能下跌最后 5%,它们总会、总会破裂,而在极端泡沫之后,它们的下跌会跌破趋势线,这是美联储——或者说整个经济——所面临的最危险情况,跌幅可能再扩大 10%。但话说回来,这最多是一个 2 比 1 的稳健赌注。是的,押注英国房价会继续下跌是轻松之举,但一直难以实际执行。在经济困境中,你必须降低回归常态的概率,从“通常”降为“几乎总是”。在极少数情况下,你可以赌其长期低迷。其主要影响现在将是给一个已经如此虚弱的系统施加更多痛苦,使其极有可能持续低迷。

Similarly, U.S. existence, bubbles do, of course, exist. More to the house prices are very likely to decline their last 5% to point, they always, always break, and their breaking trendline and, since it was an extreme bubble, to overrun is the most dangerous situation the Fed – or the whole by, say, another 10%. But, again, this is at best a 2 to 1 economy, for that matter – ever faces. Similarly, strong bet. Yes, a bet that U.K. house prices will continue to economies and heroic profit margins always weaken. In decline is a lay-up, but it has always been hard to play. crunches, you must lower the odds of regression back to Its main effect now will be to impose a lot more pain on normal to “nearly always.” On rare occasions, you can a system already so weakened that it makes it very likely stay down for the duration.

如果你像津巴布韦那样,真的想把国家带回石器时代,你或许能做到。(谢天谢地,美国有任期限制。)阿根廷,1945 年还是全球第四富裕的国家,在抵抗回归常态的趋势方面竭尽全力,至今仍在苦苦挣扎。如果你身处泡沫之中,那么竞争——以这样或那样的形式——就注定会蚕食掉那些非同寻常的机会。在困难时期,人们会犯错。他们为什么不肯承认呢?

If, like Zimbabwe, you really that more bailouts or the nationalization of U.K. financial want to take your country back to the Stone Age, you can companies will continue. Weakness in the pound was my probably do it. (Thank goodness for term limits in the favorite near certainty in the U.K., but that was at over $2 U.S.) Argentina, the fourth richest country in 1945, has to the pound. It is now at under $1.50 and, like the other taken its very best shot at resisting the tendency to revert 1 Danger: Steep Drop Ahead, Fortune, September 17, 2007. back upward to normal, and is still trying hard. If you Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 3 GMO are in a bubble, then competition in one form or another for everyone. In difficult times, people make mistakes. is guaranteed to chip away at exceptional opportunities, Why don’t they say so?

作为典型(虽令人痛苦)的例子,我们的信心可能突然崩溃,或者两者兼有。在关键时刻,我追随保罗·布雷默(他还是我的同班同学!)来到养老金会议的讲台——他刚从伊拉克那灾难性的一系列错误判断中归来。相比之下,没有人会可靠地前来救你或帮你恢复。你只能靠自己,并且可能继续犯错,而这次我们美国人很可能也会这样。所有决定都是在困境中最明智的选择,他辩称道,语气中暗示任何持异议的人都该被关起来。这正是过去八年政府整体氛围的特征。

我们在 GMO 还有另一个问题:几乎所有的工作都集中在研究泡沫或上行风险上。

As a typical, if painful, example, or confidence will suddenly break, or both. In a crunch, I followed Paul Bremer (a classmate, no less!) to the in contrast, no one will reliably come to your rescue or podium at a pension conference. He had just returned help you recover. You’re on your own, and can continue from his catastrophic series of miscalculations in Iraq. to make mistakes, which we in the U.S. may very well do All decisions had been the best that a difficult situation this time. had permitted, he argued, with a tone that implied that anyone suggesting otherwise should be locked up. This We at GMO have another problem: almost all of our was indeed the tone that characterized the whole last eight work has been aimed at the study of bubbles or upside years of government.

日本人是否是唯一会用荣誉准则来研究极端事件的人群?直到八分钟前,对现实中的失败案例所做研究,相比之下还显得很学术。但现在,或者说当你负责的人犯了严重错误时,你无疑应该承认——至少偶尔也得认。在极端错误的情况下——我们刚刚经历了前所未有的数量——甚至可能有人会主动提出辞职。别指望了。作为补充说明:就在今早(真人真事),我拆开了默里·罗斯巴德的一本新书《1819 年恐慌》。当我在我们那张又大又乱的早餐桌旁写下这些文字时,我能看到旁边放着的艾米蒂·斯莱斯的《被遗忘的人》,那本书写的是大萧条时期劳动者的困境和 FDR 那些反复无常的刺激实验——这本书刚出版不久(感谢莫琳·多德在《纽约时报》上的推荐)。

Are the Japanese the only people outlier events. Until eight minutes ago, the study of a real left with a code of honor? When you make mistakes, bust seemed, in comparison, academic. Now, however, or even when the people you are responsible for make we have thrown ourselves into studying the reverse. This serious mistakes, you should surely admit it, at least very morning – true story – I unpacked The Panic of 1819, once in a while. In cases of extreme error, of which we a new book by Murray Rothbard. As I write this at our have just had an unprecedented number, someone might large and untidy breakfast table, I can see the recently read even offer to resign. Not a prayer. As a postscript, hot The Forgotten Man by Amity Shlaes. It is a book about the plight of working men and FDR’s erratic experiments off the press (courtesy of Maureen Dowd in The New with stimulus programs in the Great Depression.

据《纽约时报》报道,GMO 公司出人意料地承认了错误,我们目前正全力加压,研究前副总统迪克·切尼在 CBS 电台的发言:“我认为我们做出了正确的决定。我觉得我们清楚自己在做什么。”多德还报道,拉姆斯菲尔德曾说:“我问心无愧。”说这话的人肯定没有良心!在拒不认错、推卸责任方面,布什政府离任时倒真是轰轰烈烈。

要让这一部分可信,我也得坦白交代。我们正在研究经济和市场低谷的规律,寻找预测线索(运气好的话,下个季度的信里会讲)。但这只是研究了 12 年泡沫之后才开始的相对较新的努力。唉,罢了。当然,所有这些分析都假设我们确实正走向极度低估的极端。情况也可能更糟:我们可能陷入一个无人区,股票价格围绕公允价值波动,一切确定性都消失不见。

At York Times) comes a shocking admission of guilt from GMO, we are now in full-court press mode, studying former Vice President Dick Cheney on CBS Radio: “I the patterns of economic and market lows and looking think we made good decisions. I think we knew what we for predictive clues (with luck, see next quarter’s Letter). were doing.” Dowd also reports that Rumsfeld said, “My But this is a relatively new effort after spending 12 years conscience is clear.” Surely anyone saying that doesn’t studying bubbles. Ah, well. Of course, this is all written have one! In terms of admitting no errors and denying assuming that we are indeed heading to extremes of all responsibilities, the Bush administration is certainly undervaluation. It could be much worse: we could get going out with a bang. stuck in a no man’s land where stocks are around fair If this section is to be credible, I must do some confessing. price and all certainties disappear.

Please not.

Please not.

见鬼!好吧,事情是这样的:在关于“承担责任与道德准则”的第四条自上而下的洞见中,我并非总能通过执行充分捕捉其全部益处。我们的资产配置小组——我自己也是其中一员——同样存在这个问题。事后看来,我们公司在一个或两个策略上承担了过多的流动性风险,并在其他策略上倾斜了过多的风险。即使是我们判断正确的那些洞见,本可以更坚决地去执行。我对所有这些不足感到遗憾,并相信我们可以做得更好。我和 GMO 承诺,下次我们会努力提供更有效的帮助。

我认为,如果所有专业投资者都承认自己犯过一些错误,那将是一种宣泄。天知道,这已经成了一门失传的艺术。近年来,我们逐渐变成了一种显然从不犯错的文化,或者至少从不承认错误。那些把公司拖垮甚至送进坟墓的首席执行官们,几乎没有一个人明确而有力地承担责任。雷曼兄弟和贝尔斯登的高管们似乎是受害者,而不是无能之辈。数千亿美元的股东资金灰飞烟灭,却没有得到明确道歉。那些差点毁掉我们所有人的政府机构也同样没有承认任何错误。格林斯潘只是为别人的缺点道歉——他未能预见到银行家会在短期内如此贪婪且缺乏严谨和分析。真的!最近又有人声称,没有人——无论是美联储还是财政部——有法律权力拯救雷曼。但这些借口只有在事后看来这是一个灾难性的决定时才会被提出来。过去两年非常艰难。

这也是金融业道德标准的最低点。与其长篇大论,不如让我单独指出一个问题:那些经理人收取的费用,包括那些之前声誉卓著的大型欧洲银行,它们把客户的钱转给了伯纳德·麦道夫。它们的法律文件无疑是无懈可击的,并明确表示它们对任何事情都不承担责任,包括彻头彻尾的欺诈。当然,我们必须问,既然它们实际上并没有管理一分钱,那 1.5% 的费用加上业绩激励是为了什么。但这不是重点。从高道德标准来看,它们应该返还所有因如此敷衍了事的工作而收取的钱。即使有最微弱的道德标准,它们至少应该退还其费用。例如,某些欧洲私人银行向客户收取高额费用,将资金投资于费尔菲尔德格林威治集团,而后者又收取高额费用,将资金投资于麦道夫,而麦道夫才是实际“干活”的人!至少麦道夫还有礼貌地免除了自己的费用。只收回本金就够了。你可以称之为“庞氏基金中的基金中的基金”。即使管道末端确实有一笔真实投资,这也同样是不道德的。

这同样是我基于今天使用的方法,追溯到 1974 年 12 月开始的 1 年期预测的最低点,当时预测的回报率为 14%(顺便说一句,这个预测并没有实现,因为市场一直保持便宜)。对于 1982 年 8 月,预测结果将高得惊人——实际回报超过 20%!所以,千万不要认为这就是市场能跌到的极限。现在,我承认格林斯潘和 9/11 减税措施导致了 2002 年至 2007 年“历史上最大的傻瓜反弹”。因此,我们不能排除另一个异常阶段,即极端刺激政策导致市场再次反弹到高估水平,持续几年,从而再次推迟了做出优秀长期投资的机会。但我认为这不太可能。

Rats! Well here goes: I was not always effective in capturing, through implementation, the full benefits of 4. On Accepting Blame and Ethics in General top-down insights. The same could be said for our asset I think it would be cathartic if all professional investors allocation group, to which I belong. With the benefit of confessed to making a few mistakes. Lord knows, it hindsight, we as a firm took too much liquidity risk in has become a lost art. By degrees over recent years, one or two strategies, and tilted toward too much risk in we have become a culture that apparently never makes others. Even those insights we got right, we could have mistakes, or certainly never admits to them. Almost played harder. I regret all of these shortcomings, and none of the CEOs who brought companies to their knees believe that we can do better. I and GMO promise that – or graves – accepted blame clearly and emphatically. we will strive to be more effective help next time. Honchos at Lehman and Bear Stearns were victims, it seems, rather than incompetents. Hundreds of billions This has also been the very lowest point for ethical of stockholders’ money was obliterated without clear standards within the financial industry. Rather than go apologies. Government agencies that nearly ruined us on at length, allow me to single out one issue: the fees all have also admitted no mistakes. Greenspan only charged by managers, including large and previously apologized for other peoples’ shortcomings – he failed to reputable European banks, who shoveled off clients’ realize how bankers would be so greedy in the short term money to Bernard Madoff. Their legal documents are no and bereft of rigor and analysis. Really! More recently it doubt impeccable and make it clear they cannot be held is claimed that no one – neither the Fed nor the Treasury liable for anything, including outright fraud. Of course, – had the legal authority to save Lehman. But such we must then ask what the 1.5% fee plus performance excuses were given only after it appeared to have been a incentives were for, since they were not actually managing disastrous decision. The last two years were very difficult a dollar of the money. But that is not the point. Reflecting GMO 4 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 high ethical standards, they should return all of the money 1-year forecast done on the same basis we use today that for doing so shoddy a job. With even the merest hint of started in December 1974 would have predicted a 14% ethical standards, they should at least return their fees. return (which, by the way, it did not deliver since the Certain European private banks, for example, charged market stayed so cheap). For August 1982, the forecast a substantial fee for investing their clients’ money with would have been shockingly high – over 20% real! So Fairfield Greenwich Group, who, in turn, charged a lot do not think for a second that this is as low as markets to invest with Madoff, who actually did the “work!” At can get. Now, I admit that Greenspan and 9/11 tax cuts least Madoff had the decency to waive his fee. Settling caused the “greatest sucker rally in history” from 2002-for the principal was enough. You could call this a fund 07. We therefore cannot rule out another aberrant phase of funds of funds of Ponzi. Even if there had been a real in which extreme stimulus causes the market to rally once investment at the end of the pipeline, this would have again to an overpriced level for a few more years, thus been iniquitous. postponing the opportunity to make excellent long-term investments yet again. But I think it’s unlikely.

5. 7 年预测与 GMO 的当前策略 GMO 试图在资产配置中小心翼翼地穿越雷区,并尽量减少遗憾,正如我们上个季度所述——在错过优质投资机会的遗憾与押注太多太快、眼看着我们战术性 2 比 1 的新低猜测成真的遗憾之间挣扎。10 月份,我们的全球平衡资产配置策略中,全球股票占比为 39.8%,远低于我们 45% 的目标。而截至 12 月 31 日,我们的 7 年预测与一年前已大相径庭。图 2 展示了 2007 年 12 月 31 日我们对各类资产做出的多么惨淡的预测。如今,所有股票都处于中等程度——可以说,无聊程度——的便宜。对 标普 500 指数的预测已跃升至实际年化 +6% 到 +7%,其他全球股票略高。为了让你有个概念——(图 2:GMO 7 年资产类别回报预测*,截至 2007 年 12 月 31 日;纵轴:7 年实际年化回报;横轴:美国大盘股、美国小盘股、国际大盘股、国际小盘股、新兴市场股票、美国高收益债券、美国投资级债券、美国债券(政府)、国际债券(政府)、新兴市场债券、通胀挂钩债券、美国国债(30 天至 2 年)、木料 2;历史长期美国股票回报 6.5%;各项数值:美国大盘股 0.6%、美国小盘股 0.2%、国际大盘股 0.9%、国际小盘股 0.0%、新兴市场股票 2.7%、美国高收益债券 1.2%、美国投资级债券 1.4%、美国债券(政府)-0.8%、国际债券(政府)-1.1%、新兴市场债券 5.0%、通胀挂钩债券 1.9%、美国国债(30 天至 2 年)0.6%、木料 2:-1.6%)

5. 7-Year Forecast and GMO’s Current Strategy GMO has attempted to tiptoe through the land mines in Our 7-year forecast as of December 31 is a very far cry asset allocation and to minimize regrets as described last from that of a year ago. Exhibit 2 shows what a dismal quarter, caught between the potential regret of missing forecast we had for everything on December 31, 2007. decent investment opportunities, and the potential regret Today all equities are moderately – one might say, of investing too much too soon and then watching our boringly – cheap. The forecast for the S&P has been tactical 2 to 1 guess of a new low come true. In October, jumping around +6% to +7% real, with other global our Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy was equities slightly higher. To put that in perspective, a at 39.8% in global equities, well below our 45% target Exhibit 2 GMO 7-Year Asset Class Return Forecasts* as of December 31, 2007 7% Stocks Bonds Other 6% 6.5 % Long-term Historical U.S. Equity Return 5.0% 5% Annual Real Return Over 7 Years 4% 3% 2.7% 1.9% 2% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0% -1% -0.8% -1.1% -2% -1.6% -3% U.S. U.S. U.S. High Int'l. Int'l. Equities U.S. Bonds Int'l. Bonds Bonds Bonds U.S. Managed equities equities Quality equities equities (emerging) (gov't.) (gov't.) (emerging) (inflation treasury Timber 2 2 (large cap) (small cap) (large cap) (small cap) indexed) (30 days to 2 yrs.)

预估 7 年年化回报率范围 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±6.0 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±10.5 ±4.0 ±4.0 ±8.5 ±1.5 ±1.5 ±5.5 *该图表代表几类资产类别的实际回报预测¹。这些预测是基于 GMO 合理信念的前瞻性陈述,并非未来业绩的保证。实际结果可能与上述预测存在重大差异。¹ ²长期通胀假设:每年 2.5%。国际股票的回报预测不含日本。来源:GMO 季度信函,第二部分 - 2009 年 2 月 5 GMO 最低值(本身已从前一年年底的 50% 下调,我们每年增加了超过 4% 并征得客户同意后降低了实际值)。我们现在处于 55% 对 65% 的绝对波动率,而非基准波动率。常态和 75% 的最高股票仓位。如果市场在我们向美国核心基金注入质量的时间点上的定价,保持在适度低于公允价值的位置,我们当前打算“像蜗牛一样爬行”向中性的 65% 仓位移动,并计划在夏末之前完成。如果价格跑在了公允价值前面,我们将冻结仓位并保持低配。如果价格暴跌至新低,我们将按照预先制定的计划更快地投资,例如在标普 500 指数达到 600 点时,再投资几个百分点的股票仓位,等等。这一计划最大限度地减少了我们潜在的遗憾,并让我们在当前这个奇怪的世界里感到尽可能少的痛苦。6. GMO 与大赌注在资产配置方面,我们在全球股票上持有允许的最低百分比仓位(50%),并且在这个 50% 的最低仓位内,我们对美国股票持有最低敞口。此外,在这个最低美国股票仓位内,我们持有对成长型股票和大盘股的最低敞口。而且,正如我们最近一直自夸的那样,我们的一些长期预测准确得离奇。然而,在短期内——痛苦地持续了两年半——我们在一个高双位数回报的世界里实现了低双位数回报,并且创纪录地损失了我们资产管理业务客户账户中速度最快的那 60%!

Estimated Range of 7-Year Annualized Returns ±6.5 ±7.0 ±6.0 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±10.5 ±4.0 ±4.0 ±8.5 ±1.5 ±1.5 ±5.5 *The chart represents real return forecasts1 for several asset classes. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Actual results may differ materially from the forecasts above. 1 2 Long-term inflation assumption: 2.5% per year. Return forecasts for international equities are ex-Japan. Source: GMO Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 5 GMO minimum (itself lowered from 50% in the previous year end, we had added over 4% a year and lowered the real with clients’ consent). We are now at 55% against a 65% absolute volatility as opposed to the benchmark volatility. norm and a 75% maximum equity position. If the market Our timing of injecting quality into U.S. Core was better stays moderately below fair value, our current intention than the timing of the Japan bet as we won last year by 11 is to move “creeping like snail” toward a neutral 65% percentage points on a divided basis. (This is the number by late summer. If prices pull ahead of fair value, we that determines your compound advantage: for example, will freeze and stay underweight. If prices plummet a 10-point gain in a year when the market doubles is worth to new lows, we will invest more rapidly according to only 5% compounded, and a 10-point gain in a market a prepared schedule, e.g., at 600 on the S&P, invest in that halves is worth 20%. I wish there were a convenient, another several percentage points of equities, etc. This accepted terminology for this.) The bet on quality was plan minimizes our potential regrets and leaves us feeling perhaps U.S. Core’s once-in-a-lifetime override. as little discomfort as possible, given the strange world in Perhaps the biggest and most painful bets in GMO’s which we now live. career, though, were against the 2000 Growth Bubble. In asset allocation, we had the allowed minimum percentage 6. GMO and Big Bets (50%) in global equities, and within that 50% minimum, Dick Mayo and I bet on small caps and hard-core value we had a minimum exposure to U.S. equity. Further, in the Nifty Fifty blue chip market of 1972. Being young within that minimum U.S. position, we had the minimum and rash, and having a senior partner – Dean LeBaron – exposure to growth stocks and large caps. And, as we’ve who admired flash, we put 100% of our money into small been bragging recently, some of our long-term forecasts cap value before either small or value existed as sub were bizarrely accurate. Yet in the short term – two-and-a-categories. We were measured against the S&P, which half painful years – we delivered low double-digit returns made for a bumpy, but eventually very successful, ride. in a high double-digit world, and lost the quickest 60% of our book of asset allocation business on record!

我们带着这套哲学去了 GMO,并对其进行了优化,其中一个优化是加入更多的节制——但也不过火。例如,在 1987 年,EAFE(欧洲、澳洲及远东指数)账户中(我们是该领域最早参与方之一),我们对日本的配置一度降至零(荣耀转瞬即逝啊)。在 2006 年初的波士顿证券分析师协会论坛上,有人问我我们快速增长(资产规模)的秘诀是什么——我回答说那是当晚最简单的问题,并补充道:“我们只是比其他人更愿意丢掉业务。”我的意思是,我们极其执着于这样一种理念:在那些我们拥有极高确信度的相对罕见时刻,我们会下非常大的赌注。这体现在过去 10 年,我们一直在新兴市场大幅超配,同时在美国股市最低配,这反映了我们 10 年前对新兴市场 +10.9% 实际收益率和美国 -1.1% 实际收益率的预测,而新兴市场的配置权重竟一度飙升至 65%!

We took that philosophy with us to GMO and refined it, with one refinement being to add a little more moderation, In early 2006, I was asked at a Boston Security Analysts but not too much. In 1987, for example, in EAFE accounts Society forum what the secret was to our rapid growth (where we were one of the earliest players) we went to zero of assets then (sic transit gloria). I replied that it was in Japan against a Japan weight in the EAFE benchmark the easiest question of the evening, and added, “We are that rose to 65%! More recently, for the last 10 years we simply willing to lose more business than the other guys.” had a handsome overweight in emerging equities and a By this I meant that we are extremely attached to the minimum weight in U.S. equities, reflecting our 10-year- idea that we make very big bets on those relatively rare ago forecasts of +10.9% real for emerging and -1.1% real occasions when we have very high confidence.

我相信标普指数的情况也是如此。(这 12.0% 的十年差异,再加上职业和业务风险——害怕失去客户的恐惧——会以复利方式放大,最终结果是标普指数每 1 美元对应新兴市场 3.10 美元。这让你大概能理解那个预测里的激进程度。而十年后,到了 2008 年 10 月 1 日,美国股票每 1 美元就对应新兴市场 3.20 美元。当啷!)但我们近期最大的押注其实放在美国优质股票上——押注的是那些拥有强大经济特许权的伟大公司。这种职业和业务风险将主导我们的业务,而且很难规避,但大赌注永远都会存在,也始终是职业威胁。而这正是我们锁定的战场:尽可能下“近乎确定”的大注,熬过时机问题,并祈祷客户有耐心。

I believe for the S&P. (This 12.0% difference for 10 years would that career and business risk – the fear of losing clients – have compounded so that every $1.00 in the S&P would be dominate our business, and it is so hard to sidestep that the matched by $3.10 in emerging. This gives you some idea of big bets will always be available and will always be career the degree of aggressiveness in the forecast. And 10 years threatening. And that is the turf we have staked out: make later, on October 1, 2008, there was $3.20 in emerging for the “near certain” bets as large as we can, sweat out the every $1.00 in U.S. equities. Ta da!) But our biggest bet timing problems, and pray for patient clients. recently has been on quality stocks in the U.S. – a bet on the great franchise companies.

我们的美国高质量策略 7. “买入并持有的乐趣”占据了美国股权资金的 90% 以上。我和杰里米·西格尔有过多次辩论,而他始终是看涨的一方。1999 年底,他对互联网股票和部分科技股感到担忧,但认为标普 500 指数能够勉强维持正常水平的回报。为了向他致敬,我一直把我们的两张图表命名为“非常、非常长期的股票”。在第一张图表中(我们之前用过),它显示买入并持有带来的乐趣。全球平衡资产配置策略中,50% 的质量策略资金注入了我们历史悠久的美国核心策略。这是美国量化模型在 29 年历史中第一次被重要的人为干预覆盖!我们曾把低配日本股票称为一生一次的干预——当然,它提前了三年,导致我们在 EAFE 市场大幅上涨时每年损失 10% 的收益。

Our U.S. Quality Strategy 7. On the Joys of Buy and Hold became more than 90% of our U.S. equity money in our Jeremy Siegel and I have had several debates, and he Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy. And 50% of has always been the bull. In late 1999, he was nervous the quality stream was injected into our venerable U.S. about Internet stocks and a few tech stocks, but felt that Core Strategy. This was the first important override of our the S&P would muddle through with an about-normal U.S. quant model in its 29-year history! We used to call return. In his honor, I have always named two of our the Japanese underweight a once-in-a-lifetime override. exhibits “Stocks for the very, very long-term.” In the first It was done – of course – three years too soon, and cost us exhibit, which we’ve used before, we show that buying 10% a year against a dramatically rising EAFE market.

在 1929 年巅峰和 1965 年巅峰买入,随后日本崩盘,都能让我们获得近 20% 的年化收益。但这两次巅峰同样让投资者经历了长达 19 年的等待,才能在真实收益上拿回本金,且期间正收益为零——在短短 80 年、且这个国家并未遭遇全球最惨烈灾祸的情况下,竟出现了两个 19 年零回报的周期!第二个案例显示,日本从 1982 年至今经历了 26 年的循环,收益为零;而从 1989 年至今的 19 年里,投资者损失了 78% 的本金!GMO 季度信函第 6 期第二部分——2009 年 2 月,这种局面完全可以很简单地避免。让我举一个与大家切身相关的资产配置威力例子:GMO 在广泛的股票基金和新兴市场债务(具有股票特性)中拥有扎实的执行优势。我们所有股票基金等权平均后的超额收益(alpha)约为每年 2.0%,扣除了所有费用,市值加权后的数值则更高。

It at both the peak of 1929 and the peak of 1965 would then gained us almost 20% a year as Japan crashed. At the have sentenced investors to identical 19-year periods of GMO 6 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 waiting to get their investment back in real terms, with record and can be done quite simply. Let me give you an precisely zero positive return. Two 19-year periods in example of the power of asset allocation that is very close only the last 80 years, in a country that was spared the to home: GMO has a solid implementation edge in our worst of global misfortunes! The second exhibit shows broad range of equity funds and in emerging debt, which a 26-year round trip in Japan from 1982 until today that has equity-like features. Our average equal-weighted made no gain, and a 19-year period in Japan from 1989 alpha for all equity funds is around 2.0% per year, after all until today that cost the investors 78% of their money! costs, and cap-weighted is somewhat higher.

够可以的。耐心是美德,但这简直离谱!在全市场一众基金中,这是最优秀的业绩记录之一。然而,尽管我们有相当不错的执行优势,在我们运行了 16 年的全球均衡资产配置策略中,超过 80% 的超基准总回报来自资产组合的变动,而非我们的执行。顺便提一句,该策略相较基准每年总超额回报约 +2.9%,波动率降低 22%,效率比率——即回报相较于波动率,或称夏普比率——是基准的 3.5 倍,达到 0.49。长期持有股票头寸对长寿的电脑来说没问题,但对急躁的人类——我们天性容易陷入过度自信和极度恐惧的浪潮——这些头寸根本就是危险且不合适的。买入并持有固定组合、每年再平衡的做法,我觉得对害怕做变动的人还行。但即便如此,我们最好指望这些人不会在像最近这样的所有风险资产齐跌时恐慌抛售股票。

This is one Now patience is a virtue, but this is ridiculous! Heavy of the best records for a broad range of funds. Yet, despite buy-and-hold equity positions are fine for long-lived our very decent implementation edge, in our 16-year-old computers, but for impatient humans – given as we are to Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy, over 80% waves of overconfidence and abject fear – they are simply of the total outperformance of the benchmark and over dangerous and unsuitable. 60% of the reduction in volatility has come from moving The buying and holding of a fixed portfolio mix with the mix of assets, rather than from our implementation. annual rebalancing is okay, I suppose, for individuals (For the record, the total is about +2.9% a year over who are intimidated by making changes. And even for the benchmark, with a 22% reduction in volatility for these individuals we had better hope that they don’t panic an efficiency rating – return compared to volatility, or and abandon stocks completely when all risky assets fall Sharpe Ratio – that is 3.5 times the benchmark, or .49 together as they did recently.

但对于拥有专业建议获取渠道且投资期限较长的机构而言,固定配置显然标准过低。如果过去 15 年教会了我们什么,那难道不是资产类别可能被严重错误定价,比如 2000 年标普指数 35 倍虚高市盈率那样的情况吗?为什么你会忽视这些规避麻烦的机会?在股票之间进行套利的空间既大且相对高效,挑选一只股票相对于另一只的风险也相当有限。相比之下,当你在不同资产类别之间进行选择时,一旦犯错会令人痛心地一目了然。因此,在资产配置上保持相当静态无疑是明智之举,因为可供下嘴的肉更多。反直觉的是,资产类别的定价效率比股票更低。

But for institutions with compared to .14). Asset allocation is simply much easier access to professional advice and with long investment than adding alpha to a fund, since there is more to sink horizons, surely a fixed mix is aiming too low. If the last your teeth into. Counter-intuitively, asset classes are 15 years has taught us anything, hasn’t it taught us that more inefficiently priced than stocks. There is a large and asset classes can be incredibly mispriced, along the lines relatively efficient arbitrage between stocks, and the career of the 35 times inflated earnings for the S&P in 2000? risk of picking one stock versus another is quite modest. Why would you ignore these opportunities to sidestep In contrast, when picking one asset class against another, trouble? It is surely sensible to be fairly static when it is painfully clear when mistakes have been made.

这种定价是正常的,甚至只能算一半正常,但当巨大的职业风险使得大规模错误定价几乎必然发生时,我们难道不应该合理行动吗?由于投资者不愿从极度高估的资产转向其他资产类别,资金难以跨边界流动,因而产生了巨大的低效。难道没有更具吸引力的选择吗?市场在较长周期内具有强烈的均值回归特性,明智的做法是避开货运列车般势不可挡的趋势,而不是试图通过正面迎击来证明自己的耐心。在极端情况下进行资产配置,而在其他时间保持不动,既能获得更高回报,也能降低风险。

This pricing is normal or even halfway normal, but when very immense career risk makes it likely that there will always large mispricings occur, should we not reasonably move be great inefficiencies, for investors are reluctant to move away from extremely overpriced assets toward more money across asset boundaries. Consequently, there is attractive ones? Markets are very mean-reverting over great advantage to be had in getting out of the way of longer horizons, and sophisticated clients always proclaim the freight train, rather than attempting to prove your their patience. Asset allocation based on serious action at discipline by facing it down. The advantage is in both the extremes and inactivity the rest of the time has a good higher return and lower risk.

免责声明:所表达的观点为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2009 年 2 月 11 日的观点,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件变化而调整。本文并非任何证券的买入或卖出要约或招揽,也不应被视作此类要约或招揽。文中提及的具体证券和发行人仅用于说明目的,无意也不应被解释为买入或卖出此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending February 11, 2009, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

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2009 年 2 月季度信函,第 2 部分 – GMO 7

Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – February 2009 7 GMO