再次严肃对待(可能还为时过早)
GMO 季度信函 2011 年 5 月 第二部分:是时候认真起来了(而且可能又太早了) 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 核心结论 现在就要减少风险敞口,别等我之前建议的 10 月 1 日了。但一如既往,如果你采纳我的建议,准备好承受“太早”的代价吧!
GMO QUARTERLY LETTER May 2011 Part 2: Time To Be Serious (and probably too early) Once Again Jeremy Grantham The Bottom Line Lighten up on risk-taking now and don't wait for October 1 as previously recommended. But, as always, if you listen to my advice, be prepared to be early!
关于投资中“太早”的问题:如果你是一个价值型基金经理,你会买入便宜的资产。如果你非常“有经验”——这是对屡遭挫折的委婉说法——你会努力把大赌注留到资产非常便宜的时候再出手。但即便如此,除非你运气好得离谱,否则还是会时不时碰到极其便宜、甚至离奇便宜的资产,而等到那种情况发生时,你很可能已经持有它们相当长一段时间了,账面上满是亏损。如果市场仁慈的话,它会在某个领域出现明显的错误定价,然后在你适度建仓之后,又回归正常。那会非常令人愉快,也容易管理。但我的职业生涯,和你们大多数人一样,充斥着异常多的真正极端事件。这当然带来了刺激,但即使对于纪律严明的价值型基金经理来说,也会带来真切的痛苦。以下是其中一些极端事件的快照。1974 年,美国市场市盈率跌至 7 倍,美国价值/成长股估值差达到了看起来像是一个 3 西格玛(700 年一遇)的事件。美国小盘股跌至其历史上最大的折价,然而到 1984 年,美国小盘股却史上首次以溢价交易。到 1989 年,日本股市在达到 65 倍市盈率后见顶,而在此之前该周期中从未超过 25 倍!1994 年,新兴市场债券收益率比美国国债高出 14 个百分点,到 2007 年已降至创纪录的低点,低于 2 个百分点。到 1999 年,标普 500 指数市盈率达到了著名的 35 倍周期峰值收益;2000 年,价值/成长股估值差追平了 1974 年那个令人难以置信的纪录(我当时几乎愿意拿性命打赌它绝不会重现)。同样不可能的是,2000 年,美国小盘股/大盘股估值差也打破了其 1974 年的纪录,而新兴市场股票在我们的 10 年预测中,相对标普 500 指数的收益差距高达 12 个百分点(新兴市场 +10.8% 对比标普 500 指数 -1.1%)。此外,就在标普 500 指数吸引力降至谷底的同时,新发行的 TIPS(美国国债通胀保值债券)的收益率却达到了超过 4.3% 的吸引力峰值,REITs 收益率也达到了 9.5% 的峰值。真是离奇。到 2007 年,整个世界都沉浸在冒险狂欢之中,美国房地产经历了其历史上首次全国性泡沫,同样达到了 3 西格玛、700 年一遇的水平(当然,“本·伯南克”还是没注意到)。也许是资产世界发生了某种变化,导致了过去 35 年里涌现出如此多的极端事件。谁知道呢?但结果对于价值投资者——至少是那些想要真正解决问题、而不只是浅尝辄止的人来说——是市场定价过高,吓得他们离场,然后市场就像那只敲鼓的兔子一样,涨了又涨,没完没了。嗯,那些戏剧性的机会确实抓住了我,我热情地投身于每一个机会,当然,每次都太早了。有些机会从看起来像是 40 年一遇变成了 700 年一遇!
A word on being too early in investing: if you are a value manager, you buy cheap assets. If you are very “experienced,” a euphemism for having suffered many setbacks, you try hard to reserve your big bets for when assets are very cheap. But even then, unless you are incredibly lucky, you will run into extraordinarily cheap, even bizarrely cheap, assets from time to time, and when that happens you will have owned them for quite a while already and will be dripping in red ink. If the market were feeling kind, it would become obviously misvalued in some area and then, after you had taken a moderate position, it would move back to normal. That would be very pleasant and easy to manage. But my career, like most of yours, has been filled with an unusual number of real outliers. That certainly makes for excitement, but it also delivers real pain for even a disciplined value manager. Following is a snapshot of some of those outliers. In 1974, the U.S. market fell to seven times earnings and the U.S. value/growth spread hit what looked like a 3-sigma (700-year) event. U.S. small caps fell to their largest discount in history, yet by 1984 U.S. small caps sold at a premium for the first time ever. By 1989, the Japanese market peaked at 65 times earnings, having never been over 25 times before that cycle! In 1994, emerging market debt yielded 14 points above U.S. Treasuries, and by 2007 had fallen to a record low of below 2 points. By 1999, the S&P was famously at 35 times peak earnings; in 2000, the value/growth spread equaled its incredible record of 1974 (that I, at the time, would have almost bet my life against ever happening again). Equally improbable, in 2000, the U.S. small/large spread beat its 1974 record and emerging market equities had a 12 percentage point gap over the S&P 500 on our 10-year forecast (+10.8 versus -1.1%). Further, as the S&P 500 peaked in unattractiveness, the yield on the new TIPS (U.S. Government Inflation Protected Bonds) peaked in attractiveness at over 4.3% yield and REIT yields peaked at 9.5%. Truly bizarre. By 2007, the whole world was reveling in a risk-taking orgy and U.S. housing had experienced its first-ever nationwide bubble, which also reached a 3-sigma, 1-in-700-year level (still missed, naturally, by “The Ben Bernank”). Perhaps something was changing in the asset world to have caused so many outliers in the last 35 years. Who knows? The result, though, for value players, or at least those who wanted to do more than just tickle the problem, was overpriced markets that frightened them out and then, like the bunny with the drum, just kept going and going. Well, those dramatic opportunities certainly hooked me, and I jumped enthusiastically into every one and was, of course, too early. Some of them went from looking like 1-in-40-year opportunities to 1-in-700!
所以,我在市场判断上有着漫长且不光彩的历史,总是太早,而且两次损害了两家不同公司——Batterymarch 和 GMO——的财务健康。另一方面,在漫长而血腥的最后(比喻意义上的,不是英国式的那种),我们下的那些大赌注全都赢了,只有品质股和现金股还在等待。但正如我喜欢说的,我们常常带着优异的长期业绩和比大多数人更低的绝对波动性冲过终点线,但和我们一起起跑的客户却不一定还在。过去 20 年里,我们的赌注一直是公开记录的一部分,而在此之前(包括我在 Batterymarch 时下的赌注),这些赌注大到没人会错过:1972 年在 Batterymarch 时,赌小盘价值股跑赢“漂亮 50”那种 IBM 类型的股票(并且押上了 100% 的投资组合!);1986 年,早了三年做空日本(例如,基准配置是 60% 的日本股票,而我们持有 0%!);早了两年半做空科技泡沫;以及最近的住房和冒险泡沫,痛苦程度小得多,但又是早了两年。但今天,我真正想强调的是,我目前又面临一个可能早两年做空广泛美国市场的机会。正如读者所知,由于我越来越讨厌以这么大的时间差提前入场,我最近一直在尝试顺应潮流。为这种不当行为辩护一下,请放心,这并非追逐动量,而是因为我越来越认识到美联储的巨大力量——有时是极其危险的力量。这种力量最清晰的体现,莫过于它能够轻易推动资产价格,特别是股票价格,而这一点在总统周期的第三年表现得最为明显。我不会再给你们重复一遍周期那令人惊叹的、一边倒的结果,但我会借此机会介绍我新发现的关于第三年力量的变体:“5 月卖出,然后离开。”这个说法最近出现,我们于是测试了一下。宾果!自 1960 年以来,在第三年的前七个月里,第三年实际月均回报率为 2.5%,经通胀调整后累计总回报达 20%。相比之下,5 月之后的五个月平均月回报率为 0.5%,如同周期的第四年一样。现在,20% 这个数字非常接近整个 48 个月周期 21% 的总回报。这当然意味着,剩下的 41 个月加起来回报率只有可怜的 1%。这给出了一条绝妙的懒人投资法则:“在第三年的 5 月卖出,然后离开 41 个月。”哇哦!不幸的告诫是,这个分析只有 11 个数据点,所以很可能纯属运气。不过,它还是很有趣的,特别是如果你喜欢在海滩上躺 41 个月的话。
So, I have had a long and ignoble history of being early on market calls, and on two occasions damaged the financial well-being of two separate companies – Batterymarch and GMO. On the other hand, at long and bloody last (in the figurative, not the British, sense), the big bets we made have all been won, with quality and cash still pending. But, as I like to say, we often arrive at the winning post with good long-term results and less absolute volatility than most, but not necessarily with the same clients that we started out with. Our bets have been part of the public record for the last 20 years and before that the bets (including those made while I was at Batterymarch) were so big that no one could have missed them: while at Batterymarch in 1972, betting (two years too early) on small cap value against the “nifty-fifty” IBM types (and with 100% of the portfolio!); betting against Japan three years too early in 1986 (as in zero percent Japan against 60% in the benchmark!); betting against the Tech bubble, two and a half years too early, and against the recent Housing and Risk-taking Bubble, much less painfully but, once again, two years too early. But, what I really want to emphasize today is my current opportunity to be two years too early once again by betting against the broad U.S. market. As readers know, driven by my increasing dislike for being early by such substantial margins, I have been experimenting recently with going with the flow. In defense of this improper behavior, rest assured that it was motivated not by chasing momentum, but by my growing recognition of the immense power – sometimes the thoroughly dangerous power – of the Fed. Nowhere is this power more clearly revealed than in the ease with which it can move asset prices, particularly stock prices, and nowhere is this revealed more clearly than in Year 3 of the Presidential Cycle. I will not inflict on you once again the amazingly lopsided results of the Cycle, but will take this opportunity to introduce my new pet variant of Year 3 power: “Sell in May and go away.” This nugget came up recently, so we tested it. Bingo! In the first seven months of the third year since 1960, Year 3 has returned 2.5% per month for a total of 20% real (after inflation adjustment). In contrast, the second five months after May have delivered an average return of 0.5% per month, as does the fourth year of the cycle. Now, 20% is perilously close to the total for the whole 48-month cycle of 21%. This means, of course, that the remaining 41 months collectively return a princely 1%. This offers a brilliant, lazy investor’s rule: “Sell in May of Year 3 and go away for 41 months.” Whoopee! The unfortunate caveat is that there are only 11 entries for this analysis so it may well be pure luck. Still, it’s intriguing, especially if you like sitting on the beach for 41 months.
除了去年 10 月进入第三年之外,我们还有伯南克的 QE2……这仿佛是对一旦出问题就会有救市承诺的永恒承诺的强调,就好像诺亚收到的不是一道彩虹,而是两道!所以,尽管去年 10 月 1 日时市场就已经大幅高估,我发现自己异常地写道,标普 500 指数很可能在明年 10 月 1 日前飙升至 1400 到 1600 点的范围。当然——我赶紧补充一下——我强调了告诫,即更严肃、厌恶风险的长期投资者,不应当在当时标普仅 900 点的市场上玩火。我还补充说,GMO 为客户严格遵循价值投资纪律操作,只是稍有变通。但我个人(无疑是被“太早”综合症逼疯了)为了向美联储的行为致敬,承担了稍微多一些的风险。当然,我完全不认可这种行为。但那是老生常谈了。
In addition to entering Year 3 last October, we also had Bernanke’s QE2 … a kind of underlining of the seemingly eternal promise of a bailout should something go wrong, as if Noah had been sent not just one rainbow, but two! So, even though the market was substantially overpriced by last October 1, I found myself atypically writing that it was likely that the market would race up to the 1400 to 1600 range on the S&P 500 by October 1. Of course – I hasten to add – I emphasized the caveat that more serious, risk-averse, long-term investors would not want to play fast and loose with a market then worth only 900 on the S&P. I also added that GMO played pretty strictly by the value book for our clients, shading only a little here and a little there. But I personally (no doubt driven mad by the too-early syndrome) took a little more risk in honor, as it were, of the Fed’s behavior. Behavior I, of course, completely disapprove of. But that’s an old story.
好吧,信不信由你,第三年在前七个月的表现堪称完美。截至 4 月底,标普 500 指数的总回报率达到 21%。而目前在 1360 点的市场,只需要再涨 3%,就能在剩下的五个月内达到我预测的下限 1400 点。
Well, believe it or not, the third year has behaved perfectly for the first seven months. At the end of April, the S&P had offered up 21% in total return. And the market at 1360 needs just a 3% rise to reach my lower limit of 1400 in the five months remaining.
这一切的发生,仿佛一切都很正常:仿佛经济正在强劲复苏,仿佛住房市场在经历了前所未有的两年平躺后开始重新集结,最重要的是,仿佛特殊的外部冲击并没有试图轮番攻击第三年。然而,所有这些假设至少部分是错误的。事实上,这开始让人觉得像是一场不公平的比赛。前一分钟,第三年效应还在稳步推进,我们这些巴甫洛夫式的投资者忠实地响应着美联储。下一分钟,我们就要应对不是一次,而是两次外部冲击:突尼斯-埃及-利比亚-也门-叙利亚冲击,以及可怕的海啸冲击。一般来说,众所周知,外部冲击在最初几天的过度心理性抛售之后,影响就微乎其微了(偶尔持续几周)。不幸的是,对于我们目前来说,这个规则的一个痛苦的例外是石油冲击。(幸运的是,除了两三次恐慌之外,真正严重的只有两次——1974 年和 1979 年。)石油冲击就像对企业征税,对消费者征税。它迅速将财富转移到往往不受欢迎的政府金库,并造成财富“再循环”的问题。它通常会随着汽油价格上涨而迅速抑制消费者需求;它通常会抑制 GDP 增长,通常稍晚一些;而且它总会动摇商业信心。股市也许预见到了这一点,在察觉到严重的石油危机时,会迅速而剧烈地下跌。
All of this has occurred as if everything is normal: as if the economy is recovering strongly, as if the housing market has started to regroup after an unprecedented two years flat on its back, and, most importantly, as if special and exogenous shocks have not tried to tag-team Year 3. Yet, all of those presumptions are at least partly wrong. In fact, it is beginning to feel like an unfair contest. One minute we have the Year 3 effect chugging along, with us Pavlovian investors responding faithfully to the Fed. The next minute we are dealing with not one, but two, exogenous shocks: the Tunisia-Egypt-Libya-Yemen-Syria shock and the dreadful tsunami shock. In general, exogenous shocks famously have little effect after the first few days (or occasionally weeks) of exaggerated psychological sell-offs. The painful exception to this rule is, unfortunately for us now, an oil shock. (Happily, there have been only two bad ones – in 1974 and 1979 – as well as two or three scares.) An oil shock is like a tax on business and a tax on consumers. It quickly transfers wealth to often undesirable government coffers and poses a “recycling” of wealth problem. It will usually depress consumer demand quite quickly as gasoline prices rise; it will usually depress GDP growth, generally a little later; and it will always unsettle business confidence. The stock market, perhaps anticipating this, has declined rapidly and severely when it has sensed a serious oil crisis.
然而这一次,市场强劲反弹,第三年效应稳稳获胜。但当前局势难道不能清楚地降低我们对地中海阿拉伯世界(此前也从未那么确定)的任何确定性吗?这场危机难道不能迟早明确地蔓延到沙特或其他海湾国家吗?依我之见,这一次,短期效应低估了麻烦的潜力——这真是对第三年信心(及投机)效应的一个真实证明。
Yet this time the market bounced back with the Year 3 effect winning handily. But doesn’t the current situation there clearly reduce any certainties about the Mediterranean Arab world (which have, in any case, never been that high)? Can’t this crisis clearly spread to Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states sooner or later? For once, in my opinion, the short-term effect is underestimating the potential for trouble – a real testimonial to the Year 3 confidence (and speculation) effect.
GMO 第二季度信函,第二部分——该认真了——2011 年 5 月
市场刚从石油冲击中反弹,紧接着就遭遇了日本灾难。请记住,这类灾难在历史上对市场的长期负面影响通常极小。不过,它们确实比所谓的破窗效应影响更大:灾难能够远远超越短期创造就业的替代努力,极大地激励政客、政府和普通公众。9/11 事件后我立即写道,实际 GDP 影响(与人员伤亡相比)微乎其微,而美联储的应对几乎肯定会让经济比原本更强。事后来看,我认为这个判断是正确的。但是——这是一个很大的“但是”——日本的损失空前巨大,其中一些将是长期的。更重要的是,对世界其他地区而言,日本的触角很长,我们正在重新发现世界已经变得多么相互连接、相互关联。日本是某些小型零部件的近乎垄断型供应商,没有这些零部件,整个生产线都可能停摆。而全球工业体系已不再像从前那样有韧性:日本人教会了我们所有人采用精益而严格的“准时制”库存,结果到了交货切断的那一刻,这一策略的隐患之一便暴露无遗。面对这第二次冲击,市场像个挨了一记雷霆重拳的拳击手一样摇了摇脑袋,然后再次回升到高点。但我们至少还要经历一轮较量,因为现在必须面对所谓的“比尔·格罗斯效应”。比尔邀请我们思考 QE2 在 6 月 30 日结束的后果,也许更令人震撼的是,他让我们知道,他自己至少已经紧张到完全清空美国国债的地步,不想等着看谁会成为接替美联储的最新最后买家。仿佛这还不够,资源价格的无情上涨作为主要效应开始拖累经济,而作为次要效应,则加剧了通胀压力——尤其是在发展中国家。这些国家的应对措施是努力给经济降温,尤其是通过加息。发展中国家这些更为紧缩的动作,可能很快就会影响发达国家的商业信心。但即便如此,标普 500 指数也只是略微波动一下,然后又创出复苏新高,这或许得益于(终于!)一些招聘方面的利好消息。美国市场在这些压力下的强劲表现,引出了一个问题:如果它没有不得不消化这些打击,它会不会更高?我猜如果没受干扰,它可能高出 5%,而且没人能证明我错了!因此,我们有四个因素在对抗美联储效应(或者说四个半,如果算上我那个相对轻量的“五月卖出”因素的话——它表明所有正常的第三年超常表现可能已经兑现了)。面对这些逆风,我不像之前那么有把握——我之前相当确信——认为美联储能在今年 10 月 1 日前横扫一切。第三轮量化宽松很可能会让投机游戏继续下去。但没有 QE3,似乎有太多不期而至(甚至不可预期)的特殊因素,在这些估值过高的时期里拖累着风险偏好。我之前曾建议,为了纪念第三年、QE2 和美联储总体,可以承担比价值本身所证明合理的风险略高一些的风险。现在的风险应更多地反映投资世界的现实:股票价格比公允价值高出 40%(标普 500 大约在 920 点),而受美联储操纵的固定收益资产也严重高估。
GMO 2 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – Time To Be Serious – May 2011 Immediately after the market bounced back from the oil shock, it was met by the Japanese disaster. Bear in mind that catastrophes of this type historically have particularly little negative long-term effects on markets. They do, however, have a greater impact than the so-called broken window effect: disasters can galvanize politicians, governments, and the general public far beyond the short-term job-creating replacement effort. Immediately after 9/11, I wrote that the actual GDP effect (as compared to the human cost) would be negligible and that the Fed’s response would almost certainly cause the economy to be stronger than it would otherwise have been. I think, with hindsight, that this was correct. But, and this is a big “but,” the Japanese damage is unprecedentedly high and some of it will be long-lasting. More importantly for the rest of the world, Japan has long tentacles and we are now rediscovering just how interconnected and interrelated the world has become. The Japanese are important, near-monopoly suppliers of certain small parts, without which whole production lines can be brought to a standstill. And the global industrial system does not have the resilience it once had: the Japanese have taught us all to have lean and mean “just-in-time” inventories, just in time for deliveries to be cut off, revealing one of the troubling vulnerabilities of that approach. In reaction to this second shock, the market shook its head like a prizefighter after having taken a thunderous right to the chin, and rallied back once again to its high. But we have at least another round to go as we must now face what might be called “the Bill Gross” effect. Bill invites us to consider the consequences of QE2 ending on June 30 and, perhaps with more impact, lets us know that he at least is nervous enough to completely bail out of U.S. government bonds, not wanting to find out who will replace the Fed as the most recent buyer of last resort. As if even that wasn’t enough, the relentless rise in resource prices is beginning to act as an economic drag as a primary effect and, as a secondary effect, it is causing inflation pressures to increase, particularly in developing countries. This inflationary pressure is being met in those countries by efforts to cool economies down, notably by interest rate increases. These more restrictive moves in developing countries might soon begin to affect business confidence in the developed world. But, even given all of this, the S&P merely wobbles a bit and then moves on to new recovery highs, helped perhaps by (finally!) some better news on hiring. The U.S. market’s strong performance under these pressures leads us to the question as to whether it would have been even higher had it not had to absorb these several blows? I would guess it might be up to 5% higher had it been left alone, and no one will ever prove me wrong! So, we have four factors working against the Fed effect (or 4¼, counting my more lightweight “sell-in-May” factor, which suggests that all of the normal Year 3 exceptional performance may have been delivered already). With these headwinds, I do not feel the same degree of confidence that I did, which was considerable, that the Fed could carry all before it until October 1 of this year. A third round of quantitative easing would very probably keep the speculative game going. But without a QE3, there seem to be too many unexpected (indeed unexpectable) special factors weighing against risk-taking in these overpriced times. I had recommended taking a little more risk than was justified by value alone in honor of Year 3, QE2, and the Fed in general. Risk now should be more reflective of an investment world that has stocks selling at 40% over fair value (about 920 on the S&P 500) and fixed income, manipulated by the Fed, also badly overpriced.
尽管借助美联储的顺风而承担一些“额外”风险在过去六个月里一直有利可图,但我承认自己略感失望:我原本真的以为,在美联储的助力下,市场会乘风而上,到 10 月 1 日时深探到 1400 至 1600 点的区间,届时它将再次成为一个超过 2 个标准差、44 年一遇的事件,或者,按官方的说法,一个泡沫。(至少在 GMO 的官方定义下是如此。)到了那个水平,我本准备当一个真正的英雄,彻底加固舱口,变得极度保守,并准备好硬扛任何进一步的市场上涨(以我的记录来看,这极有可能发生!)。市场或许仍然能在 10 月前涨到,比如说,1500 点,但我对此表示怀疑,尤其是在没有 QE3 的情况下,尽管到 10 月 1 日时再小幅上涨一点的概率可能仍然略高于五成。而且,无论它能否达到 1500 点,环境都已经变得过于危险,不值得审慎的投资者继续久留、指望碰运气。因此,现在不是随波逐流跟美联储浮沉的时候,而是要与它对抗。投资者应当采取一种强硬的估值方法,这在 GMO 意味着在优质蓝筹股和新兴市场股票这一核心基础之上,持有大量现金储备——根据我们的 7 年预测,这两类资产的真实隐含收益率都还算体面,超过 4% 的实际收益率。GMO 的仓位也已经相应削减了几个百分点的股权投资风险。
Although the taking of some “extra” risk by riding the Fed’s coattails has been profitable for six months, I admit to being a bit disappointed: I really felt the market had the Fed’s wind in its sails and would move up deep into the 1400 to 1600 range by October 1, where it would be, once again, over a 2-sigma 1-in-44-year event, or, officially, a bubble. (At least in a world where GMO is the official.) At such a level, I was ready to be a real hero and absolutely batten down the hatches, become extremely conservative, and be prepared to tough out any further market advance (which, with my record, would be highly likely!). The market may still get to, say, 1500 before October, but I doubt it, especially without a QE3, although the chance of going up a little more by October 1 is probably still better than even. And whether it will reach 1500 or not, the environment has simply become too risky to justify prudent investors hanging around, hoping to get lucky. So now is not the time to float along with the Fed, but to fight it. Investors should take a hard-nosed value approach, which at GMO means having substantial cash reserves around a base of high quality blue chips and emerging market equities, both of which have semi-respectable real imputed returns of over 4% real on our 7-year forecast. The GMO position has also taken a few more percentage points of equity risk off the table.
季度信札,第二部分——该认真了——2011 年 5 月 3 GMO 日本
GMO 在其合适的资产配置账户里,也增加了对日本的敞口。我们早在这场麻烦之前就认为日本相对有吸引力。更准确地说,我们当时觉得,如果情况没有太大变化,它至少算得上中规中矩,但它还提供了一些免费期权,押注几项有希望的变化:对股东态度改善、更注重提升盈利能力、尤其是更少随意性的资本过度投资。有一些积极的迹象表明,变化可能正在开始。海啸也带来了典型的短期过度反应。随后的资产减记金额,可能相当于日本 GDP 的 5%(这远远高于通常水平),但即便是如此巨大的成本,对日本股票当前市值的拉低幅度也要小得多,更不用说市场给出的 20% 折价了。关键在于,近期的灾难也许、仅仅是也许,会构成一次心理和经济上的冲击,30 年后回头再看,可能被视作一个向好的转折点。
Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – Time To Be Serious – May 2011 3 GMO Japan GMO also has, in asset allocation accounts where it is appropriate, increased exposure to Japan, which we had thought, pre-troubles, was relatively attractive. More precisely, we had thought it was at least average if nothing much changed, but that it represented some free options on several promising changes: improved attitude to shareholders, more focus on improving profitability, and, in particular, less casual capital overinvestment. There are some favorable signs that a change could be beginning. The tsunami also presented a typical short-term overreaction. The ensuing write-down of assets may equal the equivalent of up to 5% of Japan’s GDP (which would be far more than usual), but even such a large cost would lower the present value of Japanese stocks by substantially less than that, let alone the 20% discount that was offered. Critically, the recent disasters may, just may, act as a psychological and economic shock, which, 30 years from now, may be seen as a turning point for the better.
关于 GMO 预测的更多内情
我手头缺一张图表,所以这就是它了。这张图以一种非常粗糙的方式,展示了从 1994 年起点开始运用 GMO 预测的结果。它假设每个月,你都能凭借钢铁般的神经、无需向任何委员会汇报(简直是天堂!),将全部资金投入 GMO 预测值最高的那个单一资产类别,且不考虑交易成本。然后每当一个新资产类别跃居预测榜首时,你就全额切换——这大约每年发生一次,这个换手率实际上还算可以接受。显然,这种策略只适合动用你每年重新平衡后的总资金的 5% 到 10% 左右。无论如何,按照各自的资产类别基准,这样做能产生 +16.7% 的年化回报率,让资金在这段时期增长 13 倍。用 GMO 基金进行资产配置的简单方法:GMO 最大预测值理论投资组合指数 REITs 链接新兴市场国际优质债券债券新兴小型价值最大预测值投资组合最大预测值 S&P 投资组合 500 8 倍年化回报率 16.7% 8.8% 年化风险 20% 16% 累计总回报夏普比率 0.66 0.344 倍 S&P 500 2 倍 1 倍 1994 年 6 月 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 假设性表现不代表未来业绩的预测。这些结果反映的是投资者按下文所述方式投资可能获得的业绩,并不代表任何投资者实际获得的回报。假设性结果是通过对基于历史数据构建的模型进行回顾性应用计算得出的,并基于模型内含的假设,这些假设或可验证或不可验证。一般性假设包括:GMO 基于其 7 年期资产类别预测,以 100% 权重对上个月预测值最高的资产类别进行加权,并每月再平衡。这些假设的变化可能对呈现的假设性回报产生实质性影响。为建模目的已作出某些假设,但这些假设不太可能实现。对这些假设的合理性不作任何陈述或保证。假设性业绩是在事后视角下开发的,具有固有局限性。具体而言,假设性结果不反映实际交易,也不反映重大经济与市场因素对决策过程的影响。由于交易实际上并未执行,结果可能对某些市场因素(如流动性匮乏)的影响进行了低估或高估,且可能不反映某些经济或市场因素对决策过程的影响。实际业绩可能与假设性业绩存在显著差异。假设性结果已调整以反映股息及其他收入的再投资,且除另有说明外,均为扣除费用前的总回报,不包含假设性交易成本、管理费、业绩报酬或开支(如有)的影响。来源:GMO、标普公司,截至 2011 年 2 月 28 日。GMO 4 季度信函,第二部分——该认真了——2011 年 5 月。实际情况因需考虑交易成本而变得复杂,但回报率大约每年会高出 2 个百分点。尽管该投资组合波动性较大(这不奇怪),但其夏普比率(风险对回报的衡量)远高于标普 500 指数。这不是一个投资建议,我们也从未按此基准运行过任何策略。把它放在这里纯粹是为了好玩(当然,也是为了塞进我唯一的一张图表里)。
Yet More on GMO Forecasts I miss not having an exhibit so this is it. It shows a very crude way of using GMO’s forecasts from their starting point in 1994. It assumes that every month, with nerves of steel and no committee to report to (Heaven indeed!), you put all of your money in the single asset class with GMO’s highest forecast with no transaction costs. You then change 100% every time a new asset comes to the top of the list, which happens to be about once a year, a turnover level that actually seems acceptable. Obviously, such a strategy would not be tolerable for much more than 5 or 10% of one’s money, rebalanced each year. Anyway, doing so generates a knock-out annualized performance of +16.7% (increasing your money 13x over this period) using the respective asset class benchmarks. Returns using GMO funds Asset Allocation the Simple Way: GMO Max Forecast Theoretical Portfolio Index REITs Linked Emerging International Quality Bonds Bonds Emerging Small Value Max Forecast Portfolio Max Forecast S&P Portfolio 500 8x Annualized Return 16.7% 8.8% Annualized Risk 20% 16% Cumulative Total Return Sharpe Ratio 0.66 0.34 4x S&P 500 2x 1x Jun- 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Hypothetical performance is not predicative of future results. The results reflect performance an investor would have obtained had it invested in the MANNER DESCRIBED BELOW and do not represent returns that any investor actually attained. Hypothetical results are calculated by the retroactive application of a model constructed on the basis of historical data and based on assumptions integral to the model, which may or may not be testable. General assumptions include: GMO weighting the previous month’s top asset class based on GMO’s 7-year asset class forecast with a 100% weight and re-balanced each month. Changes in these assumptions may have a material impact on the hypothetical returns presented. Certain assumptions have been made for modeling purposes and are unlikely to be realized. No representations and warranties are made as to the reasonableness of the assumptions. Hypothetical performance is developed with the benefit of hindsight and has inherent limitations. Specifically, hypothetical results do not reflect actual trading or the effect of material economic and market factors on the decision-making process. Since trades have not actually been executed, results may have under- or over-compensated for the impact, if any, of certain market factors, such as lack of liquidity, and may not reflect the impact that certain economic or market factors may have had on the decision-making process. Actual performance may differ significantly from hypothetical performance. Hypothetical results are adjusted to reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other income and, except where otherwise indicated, are presented gross of fees, and do not include the effect of hypothetical transaction costs, management fees, performance fees, or expenses, if any. Source: GMO, Standard and Poor’s As of 2/28/11 GMO 4 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – Time To Be Serious – May 2011 are complicated by the need to account for transaction costs, but they would be approximately 2 percentage points a year higher. Although the portfolio is, not surprisingly, volatile, the Sharpe Ratio (risk over return) is way above that for the S&P. This is not a recommendation and we have never run a strategy on this basis. It is here just for fun (and, of course, to get in my one exhibit).
品质
细心的读者会记得,我曾提到一个奇特现象:通常在大型牛市末期,随着投资者变得不安却又无法让自己停止跳舞,乏味的蓝筹股开始获胜。好吧,自 3 月 31 日以来,标普 500 指数上涨 2%,罗素 2000 指数下跌 1%,而我们的品质策略上涨了 5%!¹ 我知道一燕通常不成夏,但我希望这次能成。
Quality Careful readers will remember that I mentioned the odd characteristic that usually, late in very substantial bull markets, boring blue chips start to win as investors get nervous but can’t bring themselves to stop dancing. Well, since March 31 the S&P is up by 2%, the Russell 2000 is down by 1%, and our Quality Strategy is up by 5%!1 I know that one swallow ordinarily doesn’t make a summer, but I wish this time that it would.
长期建议:维持不变
我极为长期的个人建议保持不变:林业和优质农田、“埋在地里的东西”,以及资源效率类投资。近期已提及入场时机风险方面的注意事项。² 如果大宗商品因天气良好、中国问题或两者兼而有之而在短期内暴跌,我认为这将创造又一个“千载难逢的投资机会”,与近年来我们经历过的几次机会颇为相似。
Longer-term Recommendations: No Change My very long-term personal recommendations remain the same: forestry and good agricultural land, “stuff in the ground,” and resource efficiency plays. The caveats on entry point risk have recently been mentioned.2 Should commodities crash in the near term because of good weather, problems in China, or both, I think it will create another “investment opportunity of a lifetime,” much like the several we have had in recent years.
后记:金融黑幕
作为后记,我想推荐一部电影和一篇杂志文章。电影《监守自盗》(Inside Job)由查尔斯·弗格森执导,今年获得了奥斯卡最佳纪录片奖。影片讲述了金融崩溃的经过,片中你会看到电影史上最精彩的一些坐立不安的嘴脸。我为片中的人物既喝彩又喝倒彩——这是我自从七岁时参加周六上午电影俱乐部以来头一回这样做。依我看,这部片子几乎是精准无误、绝对无价的,只是对马丁·费尔德斯坦有点过于严厉,他看起来像个无辜的旁观者。其他人都是罪有应得。弗格森在奥斯卡获奖感言中基本是在问:“为什么还没人进监狱?”问得好。
Post Script: Financial Skullduggery As a postscript, I would like to recommend one movie and one magazine article. The movie, “Inside Job,” was directed by Charles Ferguson and won this year’s Oscar for best documentary. It covers the financial crash and in it you will see some of the highest-quality squirming in the history of film. I cheered and booed the cast of characters, the first time I’ve done so since my Saturday morning movie club when I was seven. In my opinion, it is nearly spot-on and absolutely priceless, but just a little hard on Martin Feldstein, who seems an innocent bystander. The rest deserve what they get. Ferguson’s Oscar acceptance speech basically asked, “Why has no one gone to jail?” Good question.
马特·泰比,《滚石》杂志那位以“吸血鬼乌贼”报道闻名的记者,写了一篇令人瞠目的文章,揭露美联储在发放救助资金时有多草率。(在我看来,美联储增加透明度似乎也是个绝妙的主意。)文中提到,一些“华尔街太太”从美联储获得了大约 2.2 亿美元的贷款,并用借来的钱投资于由美联储担保的项目——基本是零风险。你可能会问:凭什么?这帮权势人物的厚颜无耻令人叹服,至于他们的道德水准,那就没那么值得称赞了。至少,他们对自己的太太不错,大概对自家的狗也挺好。^3 GMO 并未对这些数据进行详细核查。
Matt Taibbi, the Rolling Stone Magazine journalist of vampire squid fame, has written a jaw-dropping piece on some of the sloppiness of the Fed’s bailout money. (More Fed transparency seems an excellent idea to me too.) It tells, among other things, of some “Wall Street wives” getting loans of some $220 million from the Fed, and using the borrowed money to make investments guaranteed by the Fed – essentially risk free. Why, you may well ask? The chutzpah of these powerful guys is admirable. Their ethics less so. At least they are nice to their wives; probably their dogs, too.3 GMO has not checked the data in any detail.
最后,最近参议院关于金融危机的报告中引用了我的话,这让我极为满意,内容正是关于道德这个话题——卡尔·莱文、汤姆·科伯恩以及他们那帮显然非常勤奋的工作人员(报告长达 650 页)对此主题深有共鸣。这段话引用自我去年夏天恳请银行退出自营交易的言论,我认为自营交易不道德、不必要、存在利益冲突,而且会让机构(包括我们的客户)损失一大笔钱。这段引用(整整一个段落!)就在第 637 页。
Finally, the recent Senate report on the financial crash quoted me, to my extreme satisfaction, on this very topic of ethics – a theme that has resonated with Carl Levin, Tom Coburn, and their obviously hard-working staff (it’s 650 pages long). The quote is taken from my pleadings of last summer for banks to get out of proprietary trading, which I believe is unethical, unnecessary, a conflict of interest, and costs institutions, including our clients, a ton of dough. The quote (one whole paragraph!) is on page 637.
1 数据截至 2011 年 5 月 4 日。
1 Data is as of May 4, 2011.
2 杰里米·格兰瑟姆,《该醒醒了:资源充裕、价格持续下跌的时代已一去不复返》,2011 年第一季度季报致客户信,2011 年 4 月。(参见 www.gmo.com。)3 马特·泰比,《华尔街的真正主妇们》,《滚石》杂志,2011 年 4 月 12 日。
2 Jeremy Grantham, “Time to Wake Up: Days of Abundant Resources and Falling Prices Are Over Forever,” 1Q 2011 Quarterly Letter, April 2011. (Avail-able at www.gmo.com.) 3 Matt Taibbi, “The Real Housewives of Wall Street,” Rolling Stone Magazine, April 12, 2011.
所引用的业绩数据代表过往业绩,不能预测未来表现。回报数据已扣除管理费及业绩报酬(如适用)。净回报包含交易成本、佣金、境外收入和资本利得的预扣税,并已按情况计入股息及其他收入的再投资。一份符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩展示文件已在过去 12 个月内早于本展示提供,或随本展示一并提供,也可在 www.gmo.com 获取。实际费率在 GMO 的 Form ADV 第二部分中披露,也可在各策略的合规展示文件中查阅。以上信息基于策略内一个代表性账户,该账户因限制最少且最能体现策略执行情况而被选用。上述信息是对 GMO 网站 2011 年 4 月提供的 GIPS 合规展示文件的补充。
Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance.. Returns are presented after the deduction of management fees and incentive fees if applicable. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The above information is based on a representative account within the strategy selected because it has the least number of restrictions and best represents the implementation of the strategy. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011.
免责声明:本文所表达的观点系杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2011 年 5 月 11 日期间的观点,并可能基于市场及其他情况随时发生变化。本文并非购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被理解为如是。文中提及特定证券和发行人仅为说明目的,不构成也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending May 11, 2011, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
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Copyright © 2011 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
2011 年 5 月致季度信函,第二部分——该严肃了 5 GMO
Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – Time To Be Serious – May 2011 5 GMO