只有母亲才会爱上的投资

2020 · white_paper · 原文约 4225 词
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只有母亲才会爱的投资:白皮书——战术逻辑摘要 卢卡斯·怀特 与 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 | 2020 年 4 月 30 日 ■ 在经历了大宗商品及其生产商的艰难十年之后,我们看到资源类公司相对于整体股票市场,在某些指标上正以创纪录的低估值水平交易。引言 2016 年,我们撰写了《只有母亲才会爱的投资:自然资源股票的理由》。

AN INVESTMENT ONLY A MOTHER COULD LOVE: WHITE PAPER THE TACTICAL CASE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Lucas White and Jeremy Grantham | April 30, 2020 ■ After a rough decade for commodities and commodity producers, we see resource companies trading at record low valuation levels relative to the broad Introduction In 2016, we wrote “An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Case for Natural equity market on some measures.

资源股票,”一份强调投资自然资源板块战略优势的论文,对战术性优势仅略作点评。1 即便大宗商品价格持平,公共资源股票仍有望实现强劲回报,无论是通过估值回归还是高股息收益。在战术层面,我们撰写该论文时,资源股票的估值相对于整体股市正徘徊在历史低位附近。正如处理不受欢迎的资产类别时常见的情况那样,资源股票从便宜走向更便宜,如今在某些指标上已达到有史以来的最低水平。我们是在油价跌破每桶 20 美元、且近月西德克萨斯中质原油期货首次跌入负值后撰写此文,这反映出供应过剩带来的储油挑战。在这份报告中,我们将重点转向投资资源板块的战术性理由。特别是,资本周期通过低价时减少供应来支撑大宗商品价格。在这些估值水平下,对资源板块感兴趣的投资者无需看好大宗商品价格,但也有理由保持乐观。

Resource Equities,” a paper underscoring the strategic virtues of investing in the ■ Even if commodity prices were to natural resources sector with only glancing comments on the tactical merits.1 We stay flat, public resource equities continue to believe that the strategic case for making a significant investment in would be well positioned to generate resource equities is as compelling an investment case as you’re likely to come across. strong returns, either through a From a tactical perspective, resource equity valuations were hovering around historic reversion in valuation or through the lows relative to the broad equity market when we wrote that paper. As is often the case high dividend yields on offer. when dealing with out-of-favor asset classes, resource equities have gone from cheap ■ At these valuation levels, investors to cheaper and now register at the cheapest levels ever recorded on some measures. interested in the resources sector don’t We write this in the aftermath of oil prices falling below $20 per barrel and the front need to be bullish about commodity month West Texas Intermediate oil future actually going negative for the first time ever, prices, but there are reasons to be reflecting storage challenges given the level of oversupply. In this paper, we shift our optimistic. In particular, the capital focus to the tactical case for investing in the resources sector. cycle supports commodity prices by reducing supply when prices are low.

先回顾一下过去。我们简要看看过去几十年的情况。大多数机构投资者永远不会超配资源板块。随着商品价格在 1980 年代和 1990 年代持续下跌,商品生产商削减投资,导致商品市场因被视为高风险而准备不足,但中国引领的商品需求热潮从 21 世纪初真正开始后,供给短缺的结果是,商品价格在 2000 年代急剧飙升,最终涨幅超过两倍。如果你现在不超配资源板块,那你什么时候才要超配呢?

The Past First, let’s very briefly look back at what has happened over the last few decades ■ Most institutional investors will never in the resources sector. As commodity prices fell throughout the 1980s and 1990s, go overweight the resources sector commodity producers cut back on investment, leaving commodity markets unprepared due to the perceived riskiness, but to meet the China-led boom in commodity demand that started in earnest in the early if you’re not going to go overweight 2000s. As a result of supply shortages, commodity prices rocketed upwards over the resources now, when will you? course of the 2000s, eventually more than tripling.

2000 年代的大宗商品高价有两个显著后果。第一,高价格帮助大宗商品生产商在市场下跌时获得了强劲的回报。

High commodity prices in the 2000s had two notable consequences. First, the high prices helped the commodity producers generate strong returns in a down market.

尽管资源类股票在短期内与股市同涨同跌,但拉长时间看,它们与大宗商品的关联度更高:MSCI 全球上游商品企业指数(一个上游资源公司指数)在十年内实现了年化近 9% 的实际回报,而同期标普 500 指数每年下跌超过 3%。其次,大宗商品价格的异常飙升引发了资本支出的惊人增长,生产商纷纷想从高价中获利。卢卡斯·怀特和杰里米·格兰瑟姆,《一个只有母亲才会爱的投资:自然资源股的理由》,2016 年 9 月。可在 www.gmo.com 查阅。随着这些投资在 2010 年代逐步见效,新增的大宗商品供应涌入市场,大宗商品价格因此回落至正常水平,实际价格下跌约 18%¹。其中,规模最大的大宗商品——石油,跌幅约为这个数字的两倍。²

¹此处大宗商品以彭博即期商品指数(一个广泛的大宗商品价格指数)为代表。

²此处大宗商品以彭博即期商品指数(一个广泛的大宗商品价格指数)为代表。

While resource companies move with equities in the short term, they move more with commodities over the longer term; the MSCI ACWI Commodity Producers Index, an index of upstream commodity companies, delivered almost 9% per annum in real terms in a decade in which the S&P 500 lost more than 3% per annum. Second, the extraordinary run in commodity prices spurred a tremendous increase in capital Lucas White and Jeremy Grantham, “An Investment Only a expenditure as producers rushed to profit from high prices. Mother Could Love: The Case for Natural Resource Equities,” September 2016. Available at www.gmo.com. As the increased investment came to fruition in the 2010s and new commodity supply 2 flooded the market, commodities came back down to Earth, dropping approximately Commodities are represented here by the Bloomberg Spot 18% in real terms.2 Oil, the biggest commodity of them all, fell around twice as much, Commodity Index, a broad index of commodity prices.

3 下跌 35%。几乎与前十年的回报完全镜像,标普 500 指数年化实际回报超过 11%,而 ACWI 大宗商品生产商指数每年大约下跌 1%,两者之间的差距与前一个十年大致相同。我们忍不住要强调,这种分散化投资对你的整体投资组合非常有利,并且本身也构成了将大量资金配置到资源板块的充分理由。

3 down 35%. In almost a mirror image of returns from the decade before, the S&P 500 We can’t resist underscoring that this diversification is delivered over 11% per annum real while the ACWI Commodity Producers Index wonderful for your overall portfolio and justification, in and lost around 1% per annum, approximately the same spread as the previous decade, of itself, for a substantial allocation to the resources sector.

资源类股票为投资者提供的回报具有股权特征,但其表现方式与大盘显著不同。当然,赢家与输家之间此消彼长。2019 年底时,我们认为资源板块经历艰难十年后,已处于有力反弹的有利位置。

Resource equities give investors equity-like returns in a very though obviously the winner and loser swapped positions.3 As 2019 came to a close, we different way than the broad equity market. believed the resources sector was very well positioned to rebound after a tough decade.

只有亲妈才爱的投资:战术层面的逻辑 | p2 接着,我们目睹了新冠病毒在 2020 年第一季度席卷全球,并致使全球经济大片区域停摆。对这个行业而言,雪上加霜的是,在史无前例的石油需求冲击中,沙特阿拉伯和俄罗斯未能“就石油减产达成一致,反而加大了产量!油价随之暴跌近 70%。4 一个极其艰难的季度结束时,标普 500 指数下跌约 20%,而 ACWI 大宗商品生产商指数的跌幅几乎是它的两倍。……绝望的深渊中萌生出估值的机遇,然而,绝望的深渊中萌生出机遇,资源板块的估值已触及历史水平。随着 2010 年代大宗商品价格下跌,负面情绪推动资源公司股价下跌得更快。这是典型的双重计价。大宗商品价格下跌对基本面产生负面影响,而与商品暴跌相关的恐惧则导致投资者对更低的基本面给予折扣倍数(见图表 1)。

An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p2 Then, we watched as Coronavirus swept the globe and shut down large swaths of the global economy in the first quarter of 2020. To make matters worse for the sector, in the midst of an unparalleled oil demand shock, Saudi Arabia and Russia were unable to “ agree to oil production cuts and instead ramped up production! Oil prices plummeted almost 70% in response.4 A very difficult quarter ended with the S&P 500 down around 20% and the ACWI Commodity Producers Index down almost twice as much. ...from the depths of despair sprout Valuations opportunities, and However, from the depths of despair sprout opportunities, and valuations in the resources sector have hit historic levels. As commodity prices fell over the course of valuations in the the 2010s, negative sentiment helped push resource company share prices down even resources sector have faster. This is classic double counting. Falling commodity prices have a negative impact hit historic levels. on fundamentals, and the fear associated with tumbling commodities leads investors to assign a discounted multiple to the lower fundamentals (see Exhibit 1).

附件 1资本周期

大宗商品价格走低 → 新供应上线 → 估值承压 → 当价格处于极端水平时,均值回归的可能性远大于不回归。

EXHIBIT 1THE CAPITAL CYCLE Low Commodity Prices New Supply Depressed Comes Online Valuations Commodity prices are more likely than not to mean revert when they’re at extremes.

供给过剩令估值脱轨 / 资本开支削减 大宗商品价格高企

来源:GMO

估值收缩在多大程度上解释了资源板块的糟糕表现?能源和金属公司在 2010 年初交易价格较标普 500 指数折价约 28%,与其历史平均水平相差不远(见图表 2)。然而,到该十年末期,这一折价已跃升至 66%,而在受新冠疫情冲击的 2020 年第一季度之后,折价幅度更达到了近 80%。

Elevated Supply Taken Valuations Offline/Capex Cuts High Commodity Prices Source: GMO How much of a factor has valuation contraction been in explaining the poor performance in the resources sector? Energy and Metals companies entered 2010 trading at about a 28% discount to the S&P 500, not far from where they trade on average (see Exhibit 2). By the end of the decade, however, that discount had jumped to 66%, and after the rough Coronavirus-impacted first quarter in 2020, the discount stood at almost 80%.

关于石油前景的讨论,请参见附录 A。

See Appendix A for a discussion of the prospects for oil.

一个只有母亲才可能爱的投资:战术层面的理由 | p3 图表 2:估值处于历史低位 能源与金属公司对标普 500 指数的相对估值 1.4 相对标普 500 指数估值 1.2 1.0 平均值 0.8 0.6 0.4 “0.2 0.0 在投资界, 1926 1935 1944 1953 1962 1971 1980 1989 1998 2007 2016 截至 2020 年 3 月 31 日 | 来源:标普、MSCI、穆迪、GMO 我们一直引领着 估值指标是市盈率(基于标准化历史盈利)、市净率和股息收益率的组合。 气候变化作为投资考量因素的重要性,并且长期坚信投资者必须认真考虑化石燃料的前景。在大约过去 100 年的时间里,我们从未见过资源类公司相对于整体市场出现如此之低的估值水平。此外,我们也不记得有哪个资产类别在这样大的折价下交易,而投资者能够相当肯定该资产类别在 10 年后仍会大致以当前形式存在——气候变化的问题先放一边(我们随后就会讨论)。5 尽管个别大宗商品或公司的前景会随时间变化,但全球经济的运转仍将像以往一样,继续需要资源行业的支撑。

An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p3 EXHIBIT 2: VALUATIONS ARE AT HISTORIC LOWS Valuation of Energy and Metals Companies Relative to the S&P 500 1.4 Valuation Relative to S&P 500 1.2 1.0 Average 0.8 0.6 0.4 “ 0.2 0.0 Within the investment 1926 1935 1944 1953 1962 1971 1980 1989 1998 2007 2016 community, we have As of 3/31/20 | Source: S&P, MSCI, Moodys, GMO led the charge on the Valuation metric is a combination of P/E (Normalized Historical Earnings), Price to Book Value, and Dividend Yield. importance of climate change as an investment Over the last 100 years or so, we have never seen resource companies trading at consideration and anything close to these levels relative to the broad market. Furthermore, we can’t recall have long believed that an asset class trading at such a large discount when investors can be fairly certain investors must carefully that the asset class will exist more or less in its current form 10 years hence, climate concerns notwithstanding (we will address them forthwith).5 While the prospects for consider the prospects for individual commodities or companies will change over time, the global economy will fossil fuels. continue to need the resources sector to function, as it always has.

气候变化、搁浅资产风险及 ESG 对估值的影响 在投资界,我们率先倡导将气候变化作为一项重要的投资考量因素,并且长期以来一直认为投资者必须审慎考虑化石燃料的前景。搁浅资产风险是指,由于与气候变化相关的碳定价/监管或技术颠覆(例如,电动汽车取代内燃机汽车,从而压低石油需求),化石燃料公司可能无法开采其全部储量。更广泛地说,许多注重 ESG 的投资者对大宗商品生产商心存疑虑。完全剥离化石燃料投资的做法在行业内已积聚起相当大的势头,大量庞大资产池要么已经完成剥离,要么正在剥离过程中。一些机构投资者则更进一步,完全回避包括金属和化肥开采在内的采掘业。

THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, STRANDED ASSET RISK, AND ESG ON VALUATIONS Within the investment community, we have led the charge on the importance of climate change as an investment consideration and have long believed that investors must carefully consider the prospects for fossil fuels. Stranded asset risk is the risk that fossil fuel companies will be unable to produce all of their reserves due to climate change-related carbon pricing/regulation or technological disruption (e.g., electric vehicles displace internal combustion engine vehicles and drive down demand for oil). More generally, many ESG-oriented investors have qualms about commodity producers. Divesting from fossil fuels completely has gathered considerable momentum across the industry, and many huge pools of assets have either already divested or are in the process of doing so. Some institutional investors have taken it a step further and eschew extractive industries, including metal and fertilizer mining, altogether.

然而,离开采掘业,全球经济就无法运转。

However, the global economy couldn’t function without extractive industries.

此外,世界要从化石燃料转向清洁能源,离不开清洁能源所依赖的材料(例如铜、锂、镍、钒等)。

Furthermore, the world can’t transition from fossil fuels to clean energy without the materials that clean energy relies upon (e.g., copper, lithium, nickel, vanadium, etc.).

新兴市场股票在 1990 年代末亚洲金融危机期间,相对于标普 500 指数也出现过类似的折价。当时,受影响经济体的未来确实面临严峻质疑。然而,ESG 关切似乎影响了资源类公司的定价,这或许是能源和金属公司相对市场而言交易在历史低位的最可能解释。对于关注回报、对资源板块感兴趣的投资者而言,这种在一定程度上由非投资因素驱动的需求缺失,创造了一个独特的机会,并且很可能带来更高的预期回报。从许多受影响国家在 1999 年开始显现复苏迹象,一直到 2007 年底,MSCI 新兴市场指数每年跑赢标普 500 指数超过 15%。

Emerging Market equities traded at a similar discount to the S&P 500 in the late 1990s during the Asian Crisis. During Regardless, ESG concerns have seemingly impacted the pricing of resource companies that time, there were real questions about the futures of and are perhaps the most likely explanation for why Energy and Metals companies are the impacted economies. From when many of the affected trading at all-time lows relative to the market. For return-oriented investors interested countries started to show signs of recovery in 1999 through the end of 2007, the MSCI EM Index outperformed the S&P in the resources sector, this lack of demand, driven to some extent by non-investment 500 by over 15% per annum. considerations, creates a unique opportunity and likely leads to higher expected returns.

只有母亲才会喜欢的投资:战术层面的逻辑 | p4 关于搁浅资产风险,我们在分析中当然会考虑这一可能性。自 2011 年推出资源策略以来,由于担心搁浅资产,我们已将煤炭、油砂、重油以及大部分水力压裂项目排除在可投资范围之外。然而,绝大多数传统石油和天然气生产商的储量远不足 15 年,无论世界以多快的速度向清洁能源转型,在可预见的未来我们仍需要石油和天然气。如果石油和天然气公司拥有 30 或 40 年的储量,情况会有所不同,但这并非投资者面对的现实。此外,考虑到资源板块普遍提供高个位数甚至两位数的股息收益率,投资者并不需要这些公司存续 30 或 40 年,就能在预期中获得极佳的投资回报。

An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p4 With regards to stranded asset risk, we certainly consider the possibility of stranded assets in our analysis. Since the launch of our Resources Strategy in 2011, we have excluded coal, oil sands, heavy oil, and most fracking from our investable universe due to concerns about stranded assets. However, the vast majority of traditional oil and gas producers have significantly less than 15 years of reserves, and no matter how quickly the world transitions to clean energy, we will need oil and natural gas for the foreseeable future. It would be different if oil and gas companies had 30 or 40 years of reserves, but that’s not the reality that investors are confronted with. Furthermore, given the availability of high single-digit or even double-digit dividend yields in the resources sector, investors don’t need these companies to exist for 30 or 40 years to make them excellent investments in expectation.

需要明确的是,气候变化、搁浅资产和 ESG 风险在评估资源行业的投资时,应当被纳入决策考量。然而,如果投资者对这些风险反应过度或采取非经济的方式来应对,那么机会就会大量涌现。

To be clear, climate change, stranded asset, and ESG risks should be incorporated in decision making when assessing investments in the resources sector. However, to “ the extent that investors overreact or take non-economic approaches to these risks, opportunities will abound.

长期来看,我们认为这可能被证明是一个绝佳的入场时机。未来会走向何方?短期之内,谁知道呢?但长期而言,我们相信对投资者而言,这或许是一个极佳的入场点。有理由对大宗商品价格持乐观态度。首先且最重要的是,资本周期推动着大宗商品价格。当大宗商品价格相对较低时——正如过去及目前持续的情况——资本支出被削减,供应被停产,这或多或少保证了未来的供应短缺。通过这种方式,低价大宗商品正在治愈低价大宗商品本身。

In the long run, we The Future believe this could prove Where do we go from here? In the short run, who knows? In the long run, we believe to be an excellent entry this could prove to be an excellent entry point for investors. There are reasons to point for investors. be optimistic about commodity prices.6 First and foremost, the capital cycle drives commodity prices. When commodity prices are relatively low, as has been and continues to be the case, capex is slashed and supply is taken offline, more or less guaranteeing future supply shortages. In this way, low commodity prices cure low commodity prices.

有证据显示,资本周期一直在发挥作用,甚至早于上一季度的疫情和油价崩盘就已如此。尽管产量水平比十年前高出许多,能源与金属公司在过去十年间将资本支出削减了约 40%(见图表 3)。缺乏大量的维护性和扩张性资本支出,大宗商品生产商的产量注定会下降。在供应端收缩的情况下,即便其他条件不变,不仅大宗商品价格会上升,市场情绪也会变得远为乐观,从而倾向于推高估值(再次参见图表 1)。这种双重计算——它有助于解释资源板块的凌厉走势——变成了一种正向力量。

There’s evidence that the capital cycle had been playing out, even before the pandemic and oil crash last quarter. Despite production levels much higher than a decade earlier, Energy and Metals companies cut capex by around 40% over the course of the last decade (see Exhibit 3). Without vast amounts of maintenance and expansion capex, commodity producers inevitably see production decline. With the reduction on the supply side, not only do commodity prices rise, all else equal, but sentiment becomes much more positive and tends to push valuations up (once again, see Exhibit 1). The double counting, which helps to explain the big runs in the resources sector, becomes a positive.

附录 3资本纪律的迹象

能源与金属公司——过去十年的变化

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

-20%

-40%

我们将主要聚焦资本周期的含义,但关于资源稀缺(另一个支撑大宗商品价格上涨的因素)的最新情况,请参见附录 B。

截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日 | 数据来源:MSCI、WorldScope、标普、GMO

亲妈都不爱的投资:战术性理由 | 第 5 页

然而,一个人无需看好大宗商品价格,也能看好资源板块的回报。从 1926 年到上一个十年之初,大宗商品实际价格略有下跌,但能源与金属公司的表现每年仍跑赢标普 500 指数超过 3 个百分点(见附录 4)。资源……一个人无需看好大宗商品价格,也能看好资源板块的回报。在此期间,资源公司的估值通常比市场低约 20%,远不及当前这么大的折价。

附录 4:即使大宗商品价格不上涨,资源公司也能获胜

能源与金属公司 vs. 标普 500 指数

3.1%

年化回报率(实际值,对数刻度)

1,000%

500%

0%

-0.1%

年化回报率(实际值)

-50%

大宗商品

1925 1932 1939 1946 1953 1960 1967 1974 1981 1988 1995 2002 2009

截至 2009 年 12 月 31 日 | 数据来源:标普、MSCI、CRSP、GFD、GMO

大宗商品以 GMO 大宗商品指数(包含 34 种大宗商品的指数)为代表。

EXHIBIT 3SIGNS OF CAPITAL DISCIPLINE Energy and Metals Companies - Change over the Course of the Last Decade 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% -40% We’re primarily going to focus on the implications of -60% the capital cycle, but see Appendix B for an update on Capital Expenditure Dividends resource scarcity, another factor that supports rising commodity prices. As of 12/31/19 | Source: MSCI, WorldScope, S&P, GMO An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p5 Yet, one does not need to be bullish about commodity prices to be bullish about returns for the resources sector. From 1926 through the beginning of the last decade, “ commodity prices were down slightly in real terms, yet Energy and Metals companies outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 3% per annum (see Exhibit 4). Resource ... one does not need to be companies typically traded at around a 20% discount throughout this period, nowhere near the current discount. bullish about commodity prices to be bullish about returns for the resources EXHIBIT 4: RESOURCE COMPANIES CAN WIN WITHOUT RISING sector. COMMODITY PRICES Energy and Metals Companies vs. S&P 500 3.1% 1,000% per annum Returns (Real Terms, 500% Logarithmic Scale) 0% -0.1% per annum -50% Commodities 1925 1932 1939 1946 1953 1960 1967 1974 1981 1988 1995 2002 2009 As of 12/31/09 | Source: S&P, MSCI, CRSP, GFD, GMO Commodities represented by the GMO Commodity Index, an index of 34 commodities.

鉴于当前折价幅度之大,资源类公司似乎处于特别有利的位置,有望产生强劲回报。随着大宗商品价格在过去十年间下跌,能源和金属公司的股息中位数派发额增长了 70%(见图表 3)。股息派发额的增加与估值的收缩相结合,使得资源板块即便不计入股份回购,也产生了强劲的股息收益率。MSCI 全国家世界指数大宗商品生产商指数的股息收益率目前为 7.1%,而标普 500 指数仅为 1.9%(见图表 5)。尽管由于经济形势不断变化,股息在短期内将面临脆弱性,但事实仍然是,除非该板块出现显著的重估,否则大宗商品生产商的收益水平很可能会是标普 500 指数的两到三倍。

Given the size of the current discount, resource companies appear to be particularly well positioned to generate strong returns. As commodity prices fell last decade, median dividend payouts by Energy and Metals companies increased by 70% (see Exhibit 3).7 Increased dividend payouts and contracting valuations have combined to produce strong dividend yields in the resources sector, even without taking share repurchases into account. The dividend yield of the MSCI ACWI Commodity Producers Index stands at 7.1% compared to the S&P 500 at 1.9% (see Exhibit 5). While dividends will be vulnerable in the short term due to the evolving economic situation, the fact remains that the commodity producers are likely to deliver yields two to three times higher than the S&P 500, barring a significant re-rating of the sector.

**展品 5股息收益率极具吸引力** 股息收益率 8% 6% 4% 2% 从历史上看,缺乏资本纪律一直是自然资源生产商受到的主要批评,但据传闻,这些公司似乎已更加注重将资本返还给股东,而这些数据似乎也印证了这一点。截至 2020 年 3 月 31 日 | 数据来源:MSCI、WorldScope、标普、GMO 《只有母亲才会爱的投资:战术性论据》| 第 6 页 如果大宗商品价格大幅上涨,资源行业的投资者很可能会取得巨大成功,而看涨的理由包括资本周期的运作以及资源稀缺的内在动力。然而,正如前文所述,大宗商品价格上涨并非资源行业表现出色的先决条件,且当前估值已颇具吸引力。投资者不应抱持估值将在短期内回归正常水平的预期而投资资源行业。当然,如果估值果真回归正常,投资者很可能会获得非常强劲的回报。然而,即使估值从此保持平稳,由于资源行业提供了高得多的收益率,其仍处于有利地位能够实现强劲表现。

EXHIBIT 5DIVIDEND YIELDS ARE VERY ATTRACTIVE Dividend Yield 8% 6% 4% 2% Historically, lack of capital discipline has been a major criticism leveled at the commodity producers, but 0% anecdotally, companies appear to have become more MSCI ACWI Commodity Producers Index S&P 500 focused on returning capital to shareholders, and this data would seem to back that up. As of 3/31/20 | Source: MSCI, WorldScope, S&P, GMO An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p6 Investors in the resources sector are likely to be very successful if commodity prices rise substantively, and reasons for bullishness on that score include the functioning of the capital cycle and the underlying dynamics of resource scarcity. Yet, as discussed, commodity price rise is not a prerequisite for strong performance in the resources sector, and current valuations are compelling. Investors should not invest in the resources sector with the expectation that valuations will revert to more normal levels in the short term. If they do, of course, investors will likely experience very strong returns. However, even if valuations were to remain flat from here, the resources sector is well positioned to deliver strong performance due to the much higher yields on offer.

通胀 “通胀的可能性为投资资源板块提供了另一个战术性动机。近年来,投资界似乎几乎不再把通胀当作首要投资关切。《经济学人》最近对此恰如其分地指出:‘富裕世界里的通胀就像童话里的怪兽。老一辈人用那怪兽的恶行故事来吓唬年轻人,但没几个严肃的人真指望见到怪兽,有些人甚至怀疑它是否存在过。’然而,通胀依然是长期投资者面临的两三个最大风险之一,而摆脱当前经济危机的努力很可能引发一轮通胀,至少在经济真正开始复苏时会如此。在资源板块投资的可能性,又为此提供了另一个战术性动机。”

INFLATION “ The possibility of inflation provides another tactical motivation for investing in the resources sector. In recent years, the investment community seems to have all but brushed off inflation as a primary investment concern. The Economist recently put it The possibility of nicely: “Inflation in the rich world resembles a fairy-tale beast. Older members of society inflation provides frighten younger ones with stories of the creature’s foul deeds, but few serious people another tactical expect to see one and some doubt it ever existed.” Yet, inflation remains one of the two or three biggest risks to long-term investors and digging out of the current economic motivation for investing crisis could well lead to a bout of inflation, at least when recovery starts in earnest. in the resources sector.

我们将见证创纪录的财政刺激规模——世界各国政府试图重启经济,而激进的货币刺激也已拉开序幕,大规模印钞和零利率政策遍地开花。财政刺激往往包含资源密集型的基础设施项目,在中国尤其如此,这些项目对大宗商品市场有着相当直接的影响。更普遍地说,刺激措施催生的需求可能会撞上商品和服务供给不足的墙——全球供应链已经断裂,数千万人丢了饭碗。虽然在金融危机之后,货币刺激并未引发严重的通胀,但若以为大规模印钞没有通胀风险,那就太愚蠢了。

We’re going to see record amounts of fiscal stimulus as governments attempt to restart the global economy, and aggressive monetary stimulus has begun with widespread money printing and zero percent interest rates. Fiscal stimulus often includes resource-intensive infrastructure projects, particularly in China, which have a fairly direct impact on commodity markets. More generally, stimulus-driven demand may run up against a limited supply of goods and services, as global supply chains have been disrupted and tens of millions of people have lost their jobs. And while monetary stimulus didn’t lead to significant inflation in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, it would be foolish to assume that widespread money printing isn’t without inflationary risk.

通胀 notoriously 难以预测,但随着我们试图从又一次“百年一遇”的危机中脱身,这一风险可能正在抬升。从历史上看,资源板块在通胀时期表现非常出色,其原因要么是商品价格上涨首先推动了通胀,要么是货币贬值导致了商品价格上涨。¹ 在我们识别出的过去 100 年的高通胀期内,能源和金属公司不仅跟上了通胀的步伐,其购买力实际还以每年约 6% 的速度增长,而同期标普 500 指数的购买力则每年损失约 1.5%。虽然我们无法确定通胀未来的走向,但我们认为,如果通胀卷土重来,资源类股票在增长购买力方面,不输于任何其他选择。

Inflation is notoriously difficult to predict, but the risk may be elevated as we try to extract ourselves from yet another once-in-a-lifetime crisis. Historically, the resources sector has performed very well during inflationary periods, either because commodity price appreciation was driving the inflation in the first place, or because currency devaluation led to commodity price appreciation.8 During the high inflation periods we’ve identified over the last 100 years, not only have Energy and Metals companies kept up with inflation, they’ve actually grown purchasing power by around 6% per annum compared to a loss of purchasing power of about 1.5% per annum for the S&P 500. While we can’t be sure about the future trajectory of inflation, we believe resource equities are as good a bet as any for growing purchasing power if and when inflation rears its head.

结论 在经历了长达十年的大宗商品价格下跌和估值收缩之后,资源板块相对于整体股市的便宜程度,已是我们前所未见的。在这样的估值水平下,你对大宗商品价格并不需要抱有多么宏大的预期。然而,展望未来,我们仍有理由对大宗商品价格——进而对该板块的市场情绪——持乐观态度。短期内,大宗商品价格可以随意波动,但从长期来看,需求增长往往相当稳定,而边际生产成本则限制了价格能低到或高到哪里。

Conclusions After a decade of falling commodity prices and contracting valuations, the resources sector measures cheaper than we’ve ever seen relative to the broad equity market. At these valuation levels, one doesn’t need heroic expectations for commodity prices. Yet, there are reasons to be optimistic about commodity prices, and hence sentiment in the sector, going forward. In the short term, commodity prices can go all over the place, but in the longer term, demand growth tends to be fairly stable, and the marginal cost of production limits how low or high prices can be.

多年来,我们在与数百家机构投资者讨论资源类资产时注意到一个现象:商品本身可以被视为一种货币。令人印象深刻的是,投资者几乎总是处于配置目标上限或低于该水平。我们怀疑,无论资源板块变得多么具有吸引力,绝大多数投资者永远不会超配资源类资产,因为它被认为风险太大。这倒也没什么不对——毕竟我们都要顾及自己的职业生涯。但是,如果你有一个资产类别,投资者永远不会超配它,那么几乎必然的结果就是出现错误定价的资产。资源类公司近年来处境艰难,但在目前这样的估值水平下,即便采用非常保守的假设,投资者也拥有巨大的安全边际。尽管短期前景不确定,但我们相信,这很可能最终会成为长期投资者的绝佳入场点。如果现在都不超配资源品,那还要等到什么时候呢?

8 As we’ve talked about resources with hundreds of institutional investors over the years, Commodities can be thought of as currencies themselves. it’s struck us that investors are virtually always at their allocation target or below it. We An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p7 “ suspect the vast majority of investors will never go overweight resources no matter how attractive the sector gets, because it’s perceived to be too risky. That’s all well and good – we all have careers to manage. However, if you have an asset class that investors will ...if you have an asset never go overweight, you almost definitionally end up with mispriced assets. class that investors will Resource companies have had a rough go of it in recent years, but at these valuations, never go overweight, you investors have a large margin of safety even with very conservative assumptions. almost definitionally While the short-term prospects are uncertain, we believe this will likely end up being end up with mispriced an excellent entry point for long-term investors. If you’re not going to go overweight resources now, will you ever? assets.”

附录 A 石油的未来

APPENDIX A What’s to Come for Oil?

2020 年第一季度,原油价格从每桶 60 美元跌至 20 美元。通常,当大宗商品价格出现剧烈波动时,原因要么是需求冲击,要么是供给冲击。而这一次,我们两者兼具:新冠疫情导致全球经济停摆,造成需求急剧萎缩;同时沙特阿拉伯与俄罗斯未能达成协议,展开不加节制的原油开采。由于原油在大宗商品市场中的重要地位,其价格下跌对资源板块的市场情绪产生了巨大影响,并且进一步恶化了整个板块的投资氛围。

In the first quarter of 2020, oil fell from $60 per barrel to $20. Typically, when there’s a sharp move in the pricing of a commodity, it’s due to a demand shock or a supply shock. In this case, we had both: dramatic demand destruction due to the Coronavirus-led global economic shutdown and unrestrained oil pumping as Saudi Arabia and Russia couldn’t come to an agreement. Given its prominence in commodity markets, oil has a huge impact on sentiment in the resources sector, and its fall has helped sour sentiment in the sector more broadly.

但油价会走向何方?这个老问题!短期内,答案并不令人满意。我们本来要写:随着储油空间告急,短期油价很容易跌到每桶 10 美元以下——事实上,在现货市场上,石油已经在以这个价位成交。然后,就在我们写这段话时,西德克萨斯中质原油(WTI)近月期货价格在史上首次跌入负值,最终触及负 40 美元!鉴于需求史无前例地遭重创,储油设施迅速填满,短期油价可能长期维持在极低水平。不过,从中长期看,油价或多或少必须从现在的位置大幅上涨。

But where do oil prices go from here? The age-old question! In the short run, the answer isn’t very satisfying. We were going to write that oil could easily fall below $10 per barrel in the short term as we run out of storage and, in fact, was already changing hands in the physical market at such levels. Then, as we were writing, the front month West Texas Intermediate oil future dropped into negative territory for the first time in history, eventually reaching negative $40! Given unprecedented demand destruction and rapidly filling storage, oil prices could stay at very low levels in the short term. In the medium to long term though, oil prices more or less have to go up significantly from here.

虽然我们预计电动车销量会随时间快速上升,但世界在未来很多年里仍需要石油来满足交通、石化等领域的需求,而石油市场上能在油价 20-30 美元区间赚钱的玩家屈指可数。那些能做到这一点的少数玩家(如沙特阿拉伯和俄罗斯)在这些价格下也无法平衡自身预算。油价可以在低位维持一段时间,但可持续的油价很可能比当前水平高出至少 100-200%。

While we expect fast growth in electric vehicle sales over time, the world will need oil for transportation, petrochemicals, etc., for many years into the future, and very few players in the oil market can make money at $20-30 oil. The few players who can (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Russia) can’t balance their budgets at these prices. Oil can stay low for a while, but sustainable oil prices are likely to be at least 100-200% higher than current levels.

附录 B 资源稀缺性更新

杰里米在 2008 年至 2011 年间对资源稀缺性的研究,启发了我们在资源板块的工作。⁹ 经历了十年的大宗商品价格下跌后,让我们重新审视稀缺性问题。其理论要旨是:自然资源长期供需动态将倾向于在未来几十年推动价格总体上涨。需求将不可阻挡地增长,主要驱动力来自新兴市场的工业化、城市化和经济发展。¹⁰ 在供给端,我们几十年来已经消耗掉了那些成本低廉、易于开采、易于加工的优质资源,如今被迫转向品位更低、开采难度更大、成本更高的资产。新资源储量的发现,除少数例外,近几十年来已基本枯竭。

这一理论是否已在现实中得到验证?嗯,需求确实保持了稳步增长。过去十年,石油消费年均增长约 1.5%。铜和铁矿石的需求年均增速均在 3.5% 至 4% 之间。全球在积极推动从煤炭的转型,但即便如此,过去十年全球煤炭消费仍以年均约 1.3% 的速度增长。在供给端,页岩油气至少在短期内改变了石油和天然气的游戏规则,但金属矿石品位持续下降,新资源资产的发现也寥寥无几。廉价资源的供给是有限的。

稀缺性对大宗商品价格的影响很难衡量,但证据最终会体现在价格本身。即便在当前由新冠病毒导致的低谷中,铁矿石的实际价格仍比 20 年前高出 100% 以上。铜价上涨超过 60%,钯金则上涨超过 200%。显然,每种大宗商品的稀缺性将以不同的速度和方式发挥作用,但即使经历了上个季度的需求破坏,大宗商品的实际价格仍比进入新千年时高出 60% 以上。¹⁰

稀缺性从消费开始的那一刻起就在发挥作用,但在由短期供需驱动的大宗商品市场中,人们往往难以看清全局。稀缺性在过去 20 年里一直潜伏在资源板块的所有波动之下,并将继续对未来的大宗商品价格构成上行压力。

¹ 参见杰里米·格兰瑟姆 2008 年 7 月和 2011 年 4 月的 GMO 季度信函。

¹⁰ 一个只有母亲才会爱的投资:战术性案例 | 第 8 页 卢卡斯·怀特。怀特先生是资源与气候变化策略的投资组合经理。他是 GMO 聚焦股票团队的成员,也是公司的合伙人。此前在 GMO,他曾在全球股票团队从事投资组合管理工作,负责质量策略、战术机会和美国增长策略。在 2006 年加入 GMO 之前,他曾在 Standish Mellon Asset Management 和 MFS 工作。怀特先生拥有杜克大学经济学和心理学学士学位。他是 CFA 持证人。

杰里米·格兰瑟姆于 1977 年联合创立了 GMO,是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任公司的首席投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会成员,并曾在多家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。在 GMO 创立之前,格兰瑟姆先生于 1969 年联合创立了 Batterymarch Financial Management,并于 1971 年推荐了商业指数化,这被认为是多项“首创”之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌石油公司,担任经济学家。格兰瑟姆先生拥有英国谢菲尔德大学的学士学位和哈佛商学院的 MBA 学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,拥有英国颁发的 CBE 荣誉,并获得卡内基慈善奖章。

APPENDIX B Resource Scarcity Update Jeremy’s research into resource scarcity from 2008 to 2011 inspired our work in the resources sector.9 Given a decade of falling commodity prices, let’s revisit scarcity. The thesis is that the long-term supply/demand dynamics for natural resources will favor generally rising prices in the decades to come. Demand will inexorably grow due largely to the industrialization, urbanization, and economic development of the emerging 9 markets. On the supply side, we’ve chewed through the cheap, easy to access, easy See Jeremy Grantham’s GMO Quarterly Letters from July 2008 and April 2011. to process resources for decades now and are being forced into lower quality, more An Investment Only a Mother Could Love: The Tactical Case | p8 Lucas White expensive assets. Discoveries of new pockets of resources, with some exceptions, have Mr. White is the portfolio more or less dried up in recent decades. manager for the Resources and Climate Has this thesis been playing out? Well, demand has continued its steady growth. Oil Change Strategies. He consumption grew by around 1.5% per annum over the last decade. Copper and iron ore is a member of GMO’s demand both grew by between 3.5% and 4% per annum. The world has actively moved Focused Equity team and a partner of the firm. to transition from coal, but even coal consumption has grown globally over the last Previously at GMO, he was engaged in portfolio management for the Global Equity team, decade at around 1.3% per annum. On the supply side, shale has changed the game for including responsibilities for the Quality, Tactical oil and natural gas, at least in the short term, but metal ore grades continue to fall and Opportunities, and U.S. Growth Strategies. Prior new asset discoveries are few and far between. Supply of cheap resources is finite. to joining GMO in 2006, he worked at Standish Mellon Asset Management and MFS. Mr. White Scarcity’s impact on commodity prices is difficult to measure, but evidence will earned his B.A. in Economics and Psychology ultimately lie in the prices themselves. Even in the current Coronavirus-driven trough, from Duke University. He is a CFA charterholder. iron ore prices are over 100% higher than they were 20 years ago in real terms. Copper is up over 60%, palladium up more than 200% on the same basis. Obviously, scarcity Jeremy Grantham will play out at a different pace and in a different way for each commodity, but even after Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a the demand destruction last quarter, commodity prices are still over 60% higher in real member of GMO’s Asset terms than they were entering the millennium.10 Allocation team, serving as the firm’s chief investment Resource scarcity started playing out the moment consumption began, but in commodity strategist. He is a member of the GMO Board of markets driven by short-term supply and demand, it can be difficult to see the bigger Directors and has also served on the investment picture. Scarcity has been playing out underneath all the volatility of the resources sector boards of several non-profit organizations. Prior over the last 20 years and will continue to put upward pressure on commodity prices to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham was co-founder going forward. of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. He is a member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for Philanthropy.

免责声明 文中所表达的观点仅代表卢卡斯·怀特(Lucas White)和杰里米·格兰瑟姆(Jeremy Grantham)截至 2020 年 4 月 30 日的看法,并随时可能根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被理解为此类文件。文中提及的具体证券和发行人仅用于说明目的,无意也不应被解读为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Lucas White and Jeremy Grantham through the period ending April 30, 2020, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

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商品方面,这里再次使用彭博现货商品指数(Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index)作为代表。

Once again, commodities are represented here by the Bloomberg Spot Commodity Index.