文字、思想、理想与书籍的力量

2000 · 演讲 · 原文约 5055 词
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词语、思想、理想与书籍的力量

《共同基金常识》演讲词

约翰·C·博格尔

先锋投资集团创始人

于费城自由图书馆

宾夕法尼亚州费城

2000 年 3 月 9 日

作为一名普通的商人兼作者,能站在这群听众面前,是莫大的荣幸——他们刚刚(或即将)有机会聆听弗兰克·麦考特、斯科特·图罗、乔伊斯·卡罗尔·欧茨和 P.D. 詹姆斯等杰出且堪称创意非凡的作者演讲。与这些获奖小说家不同,我的写作领域是枯燥的金融市场。

The Power of Words, Ideas, Ideals, and Books “Common Sense on Mutual Funds” Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder, The Vanguard Group of Investment Companies at the The Free Library of Philadelphia Philadelphia, PA March 9, 2000 It’s an extraordinary honor for this mere businessman-author to find himself before an audience that has had (or will shortly have) the opportunity to listen to such distinguished and truly creative authors as Frank McCourt, Scott Turow, Joyce Carol Oates, and P.D. James. Unlike any of these award-winning writers of fiction, I ply my writing trade in the mundane fields of the financial markets.

尽管我的任务要轻松得多——只需要写出以解释说明为主的散文——写作对我来说并不容易。虽然可以说我已经从事这项工作整整半个世纪了,但我仍然会提前准备写作提纲,寻找恰当的轶事和有趣的例证,努力用过去的数据来证明观点,并在机会出现时,加上一点恰到好处的修辞点缀。但真正的工作才刚开始——或许对所有作者都是如此——当我坐在桌前,面前放着一本横线笔记本,页面空白得令人恐惧,把笔尖触到纸上时。我的笔反复来回,一行又一行,直到第一章完成;再如此继续,一章又一章,开头、中间和结尾,终于全部写完。

Despite my far lesser task of producing prose that is largely expository and explanatory, writing comes not easily to me. While I’ve been at it, arguably, for a full half century, I still prepare a written outline, seek out appropriate anecdotes and interesting illustrations, endeavor to prove my points with statistical evidence from the past, and, when the opportunity arises, add a modest rhetorical flourish. But the real work begins—perhaps this is so for all authors—when I sit down at a table with a lined pad before me, frighteningly blank, and touch pen to paper. Back and forth goes my pen, line after line, until the first chapter is complete, and on and on, chapter after chapter, the beginning, the middle, and the end, finally complete.

遗憾的是,我的初稿几乎从不顺眼,因为我的写作天赋有限。我的弥补方式是编辑……再编辑……再编辑——起初毫不留情,接着考虑连贯性,最后打磨风格,常常多达八遍。截稿日过后,稿件送交印刷厂,第一版校样返回,又得再行编辑。第二版校样也受到同样对待,尽管改动较轻。你心知肚明,出版商对这种做法毫无好感,但最好还是趁书付梓让世人过目之前,尽可能把它改好。几乎所有的——即便不是全部——人类努力,写作都是一件苦差事。至少在我身上是如此。

Alas, my first drafts are rarely pretty, for my gift for writing is limited. I compensate by editing . . . and editing . . . and editing—at first mercilessly, then for continuity, finally for style, and often as many as eight times. And after the deadline arrives and the copy goes to the printer, the first proofs return, only to be edited again. The second proofs get the same treatment, albeit lighter. Publishers, you rightly suspect, do not care at all for this practice, but best to make the book as good as you can before it is published for the world to see. Even as nearly all—if not all—human endeavors, writing is hard work. Or at least that is so in my case.

我可以相当准确地说出我开始认真关注写作的起点——1945 年秋天。那是我在布莱尔学院读大三的时候,我遇到了第一位真正严苛的英语大师,他的名字,信不信由你,叫亨利·亚当斯。他是一位令人振奋的老师。到了大四,接替他的是马文·加菲尔德·梅森,那是一个更令人难忘的人物。梅森先生似乎隐约察觉到我体内潜藏着一点写作的天赋,因为他批改我每周的作文时,热情得像个魔鬼,红笔在我每一个短语上飞舞——至少我今天回忆起来是这样。他反复向我灌输的,正是麦考利评价约翰逊博士的那句话: “他精神的力量克服了他所有障碍。”

I can fairly date the beginning of my major concern with writing to the autumn of 1945, when, in my junior year at Blair Academy, I studied under my first truly challenging master of English by the name of, believe it or not, Henry Adams. He was an inspiring teacher, who in my senior year was succeeded by Marvin Garfield Mason, an even more memorable character. Mr. Mason seemed somehow to sense a grain of writing potential within me, for he marked my weekly themes with the enthusiasm of the devil himself, his red pencil flying across my every phrase, or so I recall it today. What he drummed into me, most of all, was what Macaulay wrote about Dr. Johnson: “The force of his mind overcame his every impediment.”

感谢那两位大师的悉心指导,我已为应对普林斯顿大学的挑战做好了充分准备。在那里就读的头两年,我勉强成为了一名合格的——充其量也就是这样了!——主题作文、论文和考试文章的写手。但真正让我当时的写作生涯达到巅峰的,是我撰写毕业论文的经历。而事实证明,那也成为我在共同基金行业漫长职业生涯的开端。因为我决心写一个前人从未涉足过的论文题目——这下可把亚当·斯密、卡尔·马克思和约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯都抛在脑后了!——在 1949 年 12 月,我偶然在《财富》杂志上读到一篇长篇报道,这篇报道改变了我的人生。文章将共同基金行业描述为“规模虽小,却争议不断”。尽管我之前从未听说过“共同基金”这个术语,但我当场决定,这个行业就该成为我论文的主题。我将论文题目定为《投资公司的经济角色》。就这样,就在 50 年前的 12 月,我在这条漫长道路上的旅程开始了。

Thanks to those two masters under whose tutelage I served, I was well prepared for the challenge of Princeton University. And during my first two years there, I became a passable—no more than that!— writer of themes and papers and examinations. But it was the writing of my senior thesis that became the magnum opus of my writing career up to that time. And, as it turned out, the genesis of my long career in the mutual fund industry. For, determined to write my thesis on a subject which no previous thesis had ever tackled—there went Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes!—in December 1949 I stumbled across an extensive article in Fortune magazine that would change my life. The article described the mutual fund industry as “tiny but contentious.” While I had never before even heard the term “mutual fund,” I decided on the spot that this industry should be the topic of my thesis. I entitled it, “The Economic Role of the Investment Company,” and so, just 50 years ago last December, my long journey in this industry began.

图书馆的力量……以及文字的力量。我必须补充一点,我是在普林斯顿那幢宏伟的、当时新落成的费尔斯通图书馆(Firestone Library)的阅览室里读到那篇文章的。大学期间,我在那座图书馆里花了一个又一个小时学习,进行经济研究,并在分配给每个大四学生的小小研究间里写下了那篇长达 140 页的论文。时至今日,图书馆依然是让我极为关切的事物。几年前,当 20 卷本的《牛津英语词典》第二版出版时,我极为激动地向布莱尔那座崭新的提姆肯图书馆(Timken Library)捐赠了全套词典。

The Power of Libraries . . . and Words I must add that I came across that article in the reading room of the splendid, then-newly opened Firestone Library at Princeton. In that library, I spent hour after hour studying during my college years, did my economic research, and wrote my 140-page tome in the tiny carrel each senior was given for his work. To this day, libraries are an important concern of mine, and I was thrilled to present Blair’s splendid-new Timken Library with a full set of the 20-volume second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary when it was published a few years ago.

我热爱英语这门语言,几乎每天都会翻阅我的那套《牛津英语词典》第二版,不仅是为了确保用词精准无误,更是为了享受探寻每个词语来源的乐趣。每一个词都有它的出处!的确,在我的著作《共同基金常识》中“论领导力”一章里,我用了好几页篇幅来描述恰当词语的力量,如何“塑造投资者看待我们的方式,以及我们看待自己的方式”。(例如,禁止使用“雇员”而改用“组员”;禁止使用“顾客”而改用“客户”;禁止使用“产品”而改用“共同基金”。)我知道,在座各位今晚都与我一样,对我们这门精彩母语的词汇怀有热情,并恳请你们将这份热情传递下去,以同样的热情支持你们当地的图书馆。

I love the English language, and I look at my own OED II virtually every day, not only to make sure I get my words just right, but to enjoy learning from whence all those words come. Every word comes from somewhere! Indeed, in my chapter “On Leadership” in Common Sense on Mutual Funds, I devote several pages to describing the power of the right words to “shape the way investors look at us, and the way we look at ourselves.” (Employee, for example is banned in favor of crewmember; customer is banned in favor of client; and product is banned in favor of mutual fund.) I know that all of you here this evening share my passion for the words of our splendid mother tongue, and urge you to pass that passion along to others, and to support your local libraries with the same passion.

在 1949 年至 1951 年间,我泡在费尔斯通图书馆里的那些时光,我的论文逐渐成型。尽管一些慷慨的人曾断言,这篇论文似乎不太可能为先锋如今的样貌勾勒出蓝图,但我当时所指出的许多做法,在 50 年后,确实被证明是我们成功的核心所在。“共同基金的首要职能是管理其投资组合。其他一切皆为附属…… 通过降低销售佣金和管理费率,可实现行业未来的最大增长…… 共同基金不能声称自己优于市场平均水平。” 最后,以一句华丽的修辞收尾:基金应“以尽可能最高效、最诚信、最经济的方式运作。” 这些文字是为一家坚实企业描绘的早期蓝图?还是仅仅是不成熟、甚至幼稚的理想主义?我把评判权留给你。但无论当年我心中真正所想的是什么,这篇论文清晰地提出了一个主张:共同基金的股东必须得到公平的对待。自 1974 年我们成立以来,这正是先锋始终如一的核心使命。而且,我可以向你保证,它行之有效!

During those hours in Firestone Library in 1949-1951, my thesis took shape. While it seems problematical, as some have generously alleged, that it laid out the design for what Vanguard would become, many of the practices I specified then would, 50 years later, prove to lie at the very core of our success. “The principal function of mutual funds is the management of their investment portfolios. Everything else is incidental . . . Future industry growth can be maximized by a reduction of sales loads and management fees . . . Mutual funds can make no claim to superiority over the market averages.” And, with a final rhetorical flourish, funds should operate “in the most efficient, honest, and economical way possible.” Were these words an early design for a sound enterprise? Or merely callow, even sophomoric, idealism? I’ll leave it to you to decide. But whatever was truly in my mind all those years ago, the thesis clearly put forth the proposition that mutual fund shareholders must be given a fair shake. Since our outset in 1974, that is what Vanguard has been all about. And, I can assure you, it works!

我下一桩极好的好运来自一位普林斯顿校友——1920 届的沃尔特·L·摩根,他于 1928 年在费城创立了惠灵顿管理公司和惠灵顿基金。他读了我的论文,印象深刻,于是在 1951 年我大学毕业后给了我一份工作。面对这位伟人——他后来成为我的挚友,直到 1998 年以 100 岁高龄辞世——给我的机会,我本该立刻抓住,但我却对进入当时还很小的一行感到了风险,犹豫不决。不过,我的论文结论是这一行业前景光明,这给了我勇气,我终于接受了这份工作。还好我接受了!

My next wonderful piece of good fortune came my way when fellow Princetonian—class of 1920—Walter L. Morgan, who founded Wellington Management Company and Wellington Fund in Philadelphia in 1928, read my thesis. He was impressed enough to offer me a job after my graduation from college in 1951. While I should have leapt at the chance offered to me by this great man—and my good friend until his death at age 100 in 1998—I agonized about the risks of going into what was then a tiny business. But, my courage strengthened by the conclusion in my thesis that the industry’s future would be bright, I finally accepted the offer. And a good thing, too!

截至 1965 年,摩根先生已明确表示将由我接替他的职位。当时公司落后于同行,他让我不惜一切代价解决问题。年轻气盛的我(当时才 36 岁)主导了一场合并,对象是四位“神奇小子”组成的高飞团队,他们在过去六年里取得了非凡的投资业绩。(这种相信过往业绩能预测未来表现的做法,当然与今天我所信奉的一切背道而驰。)我们五个神奇小子一起高飞了几年,然后便重重摔落。1960 年代中期“沸腾年代”的股市投机狂热退潮,1970 年代初期市场暴跌 50%。曾经快乐合伙人们分道扬镳,1974 年 1 月,我被自己视作“我的”公司扫地出门。

By 1965, Mr. Morgan had made it clear that I would be his successor. At that time, the company was lagging its peers, and he told me to do whatever it took to solve our problems. Young and headstrong (I was then but 36 years of age), I put together a merger with a high flying group of four “whiz kids” who had achieved an extraordinary record of investment performance over the preceding six years. (Such an approach—believing that past performance has the power to predict future performance—is, of course, antithetical to everything I believe today.) Together, we five whiz kids whizzed high for a few years, and then we whizzed low. The speculative fever in the stock market during the “Go-Go Era” of the mid-1960s died, and in the early 1970s was followed by a 50% market decline. The once happy partners had a falling out, and in January 1974 I was fired from what I had considered “my” company.

在行业中进出……然后又进来——但若没有 1951 年那场幸运的招聘(让我从此踏入这个行业),也没有 1974 年那场仓促的解雇(让我陡然离开这个行业),就不会有今天的先锋集团。不过,在卸任威灵顿管理公司掌门人一职后,我决定走一条史无前例的路。解雇我的威灵顿管理公司董事会在威灵顿基金本身的董事会中只占少数,我于是向基金董事会提出一项全新方案:让该基金及其当时旗下的十只关联基金,宣布独立于其管理人。这倒并不像 1776 年的《独立宣言》那样,直接让乔治三世国王滚蛋。但基金独立——即有权为自己的股东利益而运作,不受利益冲突和外部控制——正是我提案的核心。

In the Business and Out . . . And In Again But without both the 1951 hiring, which providentially brought me into this industry, and the 1974 firing, which abruptly took me out of it, there would be no Vanguard today. Nonetheless, removed from my position as head of Wellington Management Company, I decided to pursue an unprecedented course of action. The Wellington Management Company directors who fired me comprised a minority of the Board of Wellington Fund itself, and I went to the Fund Board with a novel proposal: Have the Fund, and its then-ten associated funds, declare their independence from their manager. It wasn’t exactly the Declaration of Independence telling King George III to get lost, as it were, in 1776. But fund independence—the right to operate in the interest of their own shareholders, free of conflict and outside domination—was at the heart of my proposal.

很大程度上,得益于威灵顿基金一位关键董事——费城人查尔斯·D·鲁特二世——的决心,基金董事会在经过七个月的激烈辩论后,以最微弱的多数接受了我的提议。或许是因为我们企业界真正的领袖实在太少,这种独立董事展现的担当,在今天的美国已极为罕见。我可以向你保证,在那些年月里就更是凤毛麟角。但它毕竟发生了,这又是一次幸运的意外——新公司的设计方案,一家将归基金自身所有而非外部人士的公司,终于在 1974 年夏天获得了董事会的批准。

Thanks largely to the determination of a key Wellington Fund director, a Philadelphian named Charles D. Root, Jr., the Fund Board, after seven months of heated debate, accepted my proposal by the narrowest of margins. Perhaps because there are so few true leaders in our corporate society, such leadership by an independent director is rare in America today. I can assure you that it was even rarer all those years ago. But happen it did, yet another happy accident, and the design of the new firm—a firm that would be owned, not by outsiders, but by the funds themselves—was finally accepted by the Board during the summer of 1974.

这些事件究竟是机缘巧合、纯属偶然,还是天赐良机,我留给你们自己去判断。但另一件事即将发生。这家新公司需要一个名字。到了 9 月份,时机恰好,一位古版画经销商来到我的办公室,带来了一些拿破仑战争时期的小型版画,描绘的是惠灵顿公爵的军事战役——多年前,摩根先生正是以他的名字命名了自己的第一只共同基金。我买下这些版画后,他又向我推荐了同一时期的英国海战版画。我向来被大海及其永恒的神秘所吸引,于是也买了下来。经销商喜出望外,把那些版画原本所属的书送给了我。他离开后,我翻了翻那本书,就像 25 年前翻阅《财富》杂志一样。我读到了历史上著名的尼罗河战役的故事(最近被《纽约时报》评为千年最伟大的海战)。1798 年,纳尔逊勋爵在那里击沉了拿破仑的舰队,终结了他征服世界的梦想。我停了下来,注意到纳尔逊在他胜利的旗舰“先锋号”甲板上发出的捷报。“先锋”这个名称的海军传统,加上“先锋”一词本身蕴含的领先之意,让我无法抗拒。两周后,1974 年 9 月 24 日,“先锋集团”成立了——从深远意义上说,它是命运之子。

Whether each of these events was fortuitous, or accidental, or Heaven-sent, I’ll leave for you to decide. But another was about to happen. The new firm needed a name. In September, not a moment too soon, a dealer in antique prints had come by my office with some small engravings from the Napoleonic War era, illustrating the military battles of the Duke of Wellington, for whom Mr. Morgan had named his first mutual fund all those years before. When I bought them, he offered me some companion prints of the British naval battles of the same era. Ever enticed by the sea and its timeless mystery, I bought them, too. Delighted, the dealer gave me the book from which they had been removed. After he left, I browsed through it, even as I had browsed through Fortune 25 years earlier. I came to the saga of the historic Battle of the Nile (recently designated by The New York Times as the greatest naval battle of the millennium). There, in 1798, Lord Nelson sank Napoleon’s fleet, ending his dream of world conquest. I paused, and noticed Nelson’s triumphant dispatch “from the deck of HMS Vanguard,” his victorious flagship. The naval tradition of the name “Vanguard,” together with the leading-edge implication of the noun vanguard, was more than I could resist. And two weeks later, on September 24, 1974, “The Vanguard Group, Inc.” was born—in a profound sense, the child of fortune.

理念的力量 但说实话,先锋集团的意义远不止于这一系列不可思议的幸运巧合。因为这家公司,首先是被几个简单理念的力量所驱动的。所以,请允许我接下来带你们认识一下这家刚刚成立的公司其品格与特质。我们的基本理念是:让共同基金自己负责自身的治理和管理——毕竟,这对基金来说,1974 年的独立意义,就如同 1776 年对殖民地一样。通过这一步,我们在基金行业开辟了新天地。我们不仅会以成本价运营基金,而且会以尽可能低的成本运营,在每一笔支出上都精打细算、严格约束,总是问自己:“这笔支出有必要吗?”或者换一种问法:“如果这是我自己的钱,而不是股东的钱,我会花这笔钱吗?”(幸运的是,对我们的投资者来说,我真的很讨厌花自己的钱!)

The Power of Ideas But, truth told, there is more to Vanguard than this incredible series of happy accidents. For the firm is, above all, driven by the power of a few simple ideas. So let me take you now to the character and nature of the company that had just come into existence. Our basic idea was to have the mutual funds themselves responsible for their own governance and administration—after all, that’s what independence was all about for the funds in 1974 even as it was for the colonies in 1776. By taking this step, we broke new ground in the fund industry. Not only would we operate the funds at cost, but we would operate them at the lowest possible cost, disciplined and sparing in every expenditure, always asking ourselves: “Is this expenditure necessary?” Or, to put it another way: “If this were my own money rather than the shareholders’ money, would I spend it?” (Happily for our investors, I really hate to spend my own money!)

在许多企业中,所有这些成本纪律可能只是一项苛求的政策或一种无害的消遣。但在投资中,成本至关重要。毫不夸张地说,在大多数方面,股票市场就是一个赌场。一个投资者-赌徒们互相交换股票的赌场,一个所有投资者作为一个群体,必然分享股票市场的全部收益——不多也不少——的赌场。但这只发生在荷官们收走筹码之前。到那时,投资者在扣除成本前试图战胜市场的徒劳追寻(一场零和博弈),在扣除投资成本后,就变成了一场负和博弈——一场输家的游戏。

In many businesses, all of this cost discipline could be merely a finicky policy or a harmless diversion. But in investing, cost matters. It doesn’t stretch reality to point out that in most respects the stock market is a casino. A casino in which the investor-gamblers swap stocks with one another, a casino in which, inevitably, all investors as a group share the stock market’s returns, no more, no less. But only until the rakes of the croupiers descend. Then, what was a fruitless search by investors to beat the market before costs—a zero-sum game—becomes a negative-sum game after the costs of investing are deducted—a loser’s game.

而如今的共同基金游戏运作方式,成本高昂,且涉及众多荷官,每个人手里都挥舞着一把宽大的耙子。购买(大多数)基金时产生的销售佣金成本。股票基金在上涨市场中持有现金储备的机会成本。基金管理费、运营和营销成本——你看到的那些电视广告。基金经理买卖基金组合中的股票时,被经纪商和投资银行家侵占的交易成本。基金股东被不必要地征收的过高税赋的成本——这个成本巨大,其根源在于基金组合持续不断、往往是无意义的换手——现在每年接近 100%。这只能让人想起帕斯卡的话:“人类的一切邪恶都源于此,人不能安静地坐在房间里。”

And the way the mutual fund game is played today carries heavy costs and entails lots of croupiers, each wielding a wide rake. The cost of sales commissions when (most) funds are purchased. The opportunity cost when stock funds hold cash reserves in rising markets. The cost of fund management fees, operations and marketing—all those television advertisements you see. The transaction costs expropriated by brokers and investment bankers when fund managers buy and sell the stocks in fund portfolios. The cost—and it is huge—of the excessive taxes to which fund shareholders are subjected unnecessarily, the result of the incessant, often mindless, turnover of fund portfolios—now nearly 100% per year. One can only be reminded of Pascal’s words: “All human evil comes from this, man’s inability to sit quietly in a room.”

成本有多重要?非常重要!考虑到销售费用、管理费、运营费以及组合换手率,普通共同基金每年从投资者回报中扣除约 2.5%。假设(这确实是一个武断的假设)基金经理能够匹配每年 12.5% 的股票市场税前回报率,那么股东在扣除成本后将获得 10% 的净回报。结果是:一年内,投资者回报的 20% 被成本吞噬,十年内是 29%,而短短二十五年内,足足有 45% 的回报被消耗殆尽。

How much do costs matter? Hugely! Taking into account sales charges, management fees, operating expenses, and portfolio turnover, the average mutual fund deducts about 2½% per year from investor returns. Assuming—an arbitrary assumption indeed—that the manager is able to match an annual stock market return of, say, 12½% before costs, the shareholder would receive a net return of 10% after costs. Result: 20% of the investor’s return is consumed by costs in one year, 29% in a decade, and fully 45% of the return is consumed in a quarter century.

普通共同基金所产生的成本,已经没收了股票市场所产生的累积回报的近一半。这还是在税前。在一个年回报率为 12.5% 的市场中,不必要的换手所产生的超额税赋很容易达到每年 2%,进一步将那个税后 10% 的回报削减至 8% 的税后回报。现在,荷官们一年内就消耗了投资者回报的 36%。随着复利效应,十年内这个比例跃升至 48%,而二十五年内——我很高兴你们都坐着!——足足有 68%。留给投资者的只有市场回报的 32%,而他们却投入了 100% 的资本,承担了 100% 的风险。是的,成本至关重要。

Nearly one-half of the cumulative return generated by the stock market has been confiscated by the costs incurred by the typical mutual fund. And that’s before taxes. In a market returning 12 ½% annually, excess taxes generated by unnecessary turnover could easily reach 2% per year, further slashing that 10% after-cost return to an 8% after-tax return. Now, the croupiers have consumed 36% of the investor’s return in a year. With compounding, it leaps to 48% in a decade and—I’m glad you’re sitting down!—fully 68% in a quarter century. That leaves but 32% of the market’s return remaining for the investor, who put up 100% of the capital and took 100% of the risk. Yes, costs matter.

指数基金的强大理念 成本至关重要的理念,其力量迅速将先锋集团引向了与我关系最为密切的两项重大共同基金创新——一项广为人知,另一项则几乎无人知晓。广为人知的——现在几乎快成传说了——是我们付诸实践的第一个投资理念,也是我们公司战略发展的第一步:1975 年中期,我们率先创立了第一只指数共同基金。公司成立仅仅几个月后,我就开始为指数基金构建理论基础。事实上,二十五年前,我在普林斯顿大学的本科毕业论文中,至少已经间接关注过指数基金的概念。(还记得吗,“共同基金不能声称自己优于市场平均水平。”)到了 20 世纪 70 年代中期,学术金融期刊上已经发表了几篇文章,概述了指数基金的论据。为了证明我前面提到的赌场理论在实践中是有效的,我手工计算了前三十年普通共同基金的年均回报率,然后将其与标普 500 指数的回报率进行了比较。指数以每年税前 1.5% 的优势胜出——这几乎与那个成本更低的早期时代,共同基金荷官们实际收取的成本完全一致。瞧!实践证实了理论。到 1975 年 12 月 30 日,我们成立了业内第一只指数基金。

The Powerful Idea of the Index Fund The power of the idea that costs are crucial quickly brought Vanguard to the two major mutual fund innovations with which I’ve been most closely identified—one very well known, the other barely known at all. Well-known—indeed it seems almost folklore now—is the very first investment idea we put into practice, the very first step in the development of our corporate strategy: Our pioneering formation of the first index mutual fund in mid-1975. Only months after we began operations, I began to develop the rationale for the index fund. A quarter century earlier, the concept of an index fund had received at least tangential focus in my Princeton senior thesis. (Remember, “mutual funds can make no claim to superiority over the market averages.”) And by the mid-1970s, the academic financial journals had published several articles outlining the case for an index fund. In order to prove that the gambling casino theory that I mentioned earlier worked in practice, I calculated by hand the annual returns generated by the average mutual fund during the previous 30 years, and then compared them with the returns of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. The Index won by an annual pre-tax margin of 1½%— virtually identical to the actual costs assessed by the mutual fund croupiers during that earlier, lower cost era. Viola! Practice confirmed theory. By December 30, 1975, we had incorporated the industry’s first index fund.

为什么是先锋集团,而不是其他基金公司成为了先驱?许多金融公司肯定和我想得一样容易,都理解市场的数学原理——投资成功取决于投资者与管理者(甚至如同赌徒与荷官之间)对回报的分配。但外部基金管理公司在维持自身极高的盈利能力方面,拥有强大的既得利益。只有我们拥有内部管理的结构,以及成为全球成本最低的金融服务提供商的使命。所以,即使在捕捉指数化带来的这一生机遇的同一瞬间,有 100 家共同基金公司都抓住了机会,但 99 家都会祈祷指数化这杯苦酒能赶快从他们手中移开。

Why was it that Vanguard, rather than some other fund firm, was the pioneer? Many financial firms must have recognized, just as easily as I did, the mathematics of the marketplace that define investment success by the apportionment of returns between investors and managers, even as between gamblers and croupiers. But external fund managers had a powerful vested interest in maintaining their own extraordinarily high profitability. We alone had an internally managed structure, and a mission to be the lowest-cost provider of financial services in the world. So even if 100 mutual fund firms had grasped the opportunity of a lifetime that indexing presented at the same instant we did, 99 would have prayed that the cup of indexing pass quickly from their hands.

但是,命运的安排是,随着支持指数化的证据不断增多,一家新成立的公司——就像一部优秀谋杀悬疑片中的嫌疑人——既有机会也有动机去抓住时机,迈出那注定会重塑我们看待投资方式的第一步。我们意识到了自己的机会。接下来,只需要意志力——坚持、耐心和决心,再加一点传教士般的热情。毕竟,执行总是比构思要难得多!但我们以极大的热情去执行,看着接纳度一点点提高,见证了指数化从异端邪说走向信条的过程。

But, as fate would have it, as the evidence in favor of indexing began to mount, one firm had just been formed that—like the suspect in a good murder mystery—had both the opportunity and the motive to seize the day, and take the first step that would one day re-landscape the way we look at investing. We recognized our opportunity. Then, only force of will—persistence, patience, and determination, along with a healthy dollop of missionary zeal—were required. Implementation, after all, has always been far tougher than ideation! But we implemented with zeal, watched acceptance follow, and have seen indexing move from heresy to dogma.

多系列债券基金的强大理念 我们的第二项重大创新无需经历如此翻天覆地的变化——即采用一种全新的、不同的策略来管理债券基金的理念。这个强大的理念在我们成立指数基金后不到一年就诞生了,其基础完全相同:认识到在任何特定的金融市场领域,作为一个整体,管理者群体必然因其荷官角色产生的总成本而亏损。由于我们既有使命也有结构,能以尽可能低的成本为投资者提供服务,我们再次成为了先驱。再一次,机会与动机交汇!

The Powerful Idea of the Multi-Series Bond Fund No comparable sea change was required in our second major innovation—the idea of managing bond funds with a new and different strategy. This powerful idea came less than a year after we formed our index fund, and had precisely the same basis—the knowledge that, in any given sector of the financial market, managers as a group must lose by the amount of the aggregate costs of the croupiers. Since we had both the mission and the structure to provide our services to investors at the lowest possible cost, we were again the pioneer. Again, the intersection of both opportunity and motive!

1976 年 6 月,国会通过了一项法律,使得提供市政债券共同基金成为可能。首批此类基金是传统的主动管理型债券基金,收取高昂的费用。作为一名永远的逆向投资者,我深信没有任何基金经理能够持续准确地预测利率,从而在长期内显著跑赢以高效著称的债券市场。从这一洞察中产生的这个强大而简单的理念,为先锋集团提供了机会,去改变的不仅仅是共同基金中固定收益管理的结构,更是其本质。鉴于我们低廉的运营费用,我们能够提供一种市政债券基金,为我们的投资者带来该领域最高的净收益率,不是靠天才,而是通过将最低成本与不那么激进的债券管理方法相结合,在业绩竞赛中胜出。

In June 1976, Congress had passed a law making it possible to offer municipal bond mutual funds. The first such funds were traditional actively-managed bond funds, charging high costs. Ever the contrarian, I was deeply skeptical that any manager could consistently forecast interest rates with accuracy, and thus significantly outpace the famously efficient bond market over the long run. This powerful, but simple, idea that resulted from this insight presented Vanguard with the opportunity to change, not merely the structure of fixed-income management in mutual funds, but its very nature. Given our low operating expenses, we were in a position to offer a municipal bond fund that could deliver to our investors the highest net yields in the field, winning the performance derby not by genius, but by combining minimal cost with a less active approach to bond management.

但我们如何处理债券期限管理的问题呢?那个众所周知的灵光闪现的时刻来了:一个简单到无法形容的想法。我们没有像当时公认的惯例那样,创建一个单一的“管理型”市政债券基金,而是创建了三个独立的系列:一只长期基金;一只短期基金(本质上是第一只免税货币市场基金);以及——你猜对了!——一只中期基金。每只基金都将持有高等级的免税债券,严格维持其既定的期限范围,聘请专业经理人,并最大限度地减少组合换手率。而股东们则将获得顶级业绩的回报。

But how would we deal with the question of managing bond maturities? The proverbial light-bulb went on: An idea so simple and so obvious as to defy description. We created not a single “managed” municipal bond fund—as was the accepted custom of the day—but three separate series: A long-term fund; a short-term fund (essentially the first tax-exempt money market fund); and—you guessed it!—an intermediate-term fund. Each would own high-grade tax-exempt bonds, rigorously maintain its defined maturity range, employ professional managers, and minimize portfolio turnover. And the shareholders would be rewarded with top performance.

如此朴素的想法,很难让人引以为豪。然而,三层债券基金这个简单的概念,结果证明极为有效。事实上,它在免税债券基金和应税债券基金中都已牢固确立为行业标准。凭借其显而易见、朴素简洁以及对极低成本的依赖,我们在 1976 年首创的三层固定收益策略,与我们在 1975 年首创的指数股票基金有着相同的起源:一个平淡无奇的洞察——正是投资成本,决定了股票和债券市场提供的回报与投资者作为一个整体实际获得的回报之间的差距。结论:胜者为王——低成本基金的股东拿走全部收益。

It is difficult to be very proud of such an elemental idea. Yet the simple notion of the three-tier bond fund proved to be remarkably powerful. Indeed, it is now firmly established as the industry norm, for tax-exempt and taxable bond funds alike. In its obviousness, its elemental simplicity, and its reliance on rock-bottom costs, the three-tier fixed-income strategy we pioneered in 1976 had the same genesis as our 1975 pioneering of the index stock fund: The banal insight that it is the costs of investing that determine the gap between the returns the stock and bond markets provide and the returns investors as a group receive. Conclusion: To the victors—the shareholders of the lowest cost funds—belong the spoils.

正是先锋集团在股票指数化和债券管理方面的投资策略——以及我们因高效执行这些策略而赢得的声誉——推动了公司绝大部分的增长。目前我们管理的资产中,高达 3700 亿美元(占总资产的三分之二)来自遵循这两大强大战略理念的基金。当然,成功绝非一蹴而就。例如,在整整十年之后,我们的第一只指数基金(我们目前有 28 只指数基金,分别追踪不同的股票和债券市场指数)的资产总额还不到 5 亿美元,而今天这一数字已超过 1050 亿美元。凭借我们的传教士般的热忱、对简单投资策略和投资者教育的专注,我认为,我们已开始让共同基金行业成为投资者更值得托付血汗钱的地方。

It is Vanguard’s stock indexing and bond management investment strategies—and the reputation we have earned for their efficient implementation—that have accounted for the lion’s share of our growth. Fully $370 billion of the assets we manage today—two-thirds of our total—is accounted for by funds following those two powerful strategic ideas. Of course, success hardly came overnight. After a full decade, for example, the assets of our first index fund (we now have 28 index funds, keyed to various stock and bond market measures), totaled less than $500 million, compared to more than $105 billion today. With our missionary zeal and our focus on simple investment strategies and investor education, we have, I think, begun to make the mutual fund industry a better place for investors to entrust their hard-earned dollars.

《一本著作的力量:<共同基金常识>》 我们的使命不仅是改变共同基金行业的焦点,更是改变其根本结构。我毫不怀疑,一本将我多年来依赖的言论和思想融为一体的著作,有能力将这种变革以连贯的方式凝聚在一起。这样一本书——一篇全新的、我希望写得更好(也更长!)的高级论文——不仅能阐述和强化我的理念,还能将其传递给全球的明智投资者。于是,我写了关于共同基金投资的第二本书。受托马斯·潘恩《常识》力量的鼓舞,我将其命名为《共同基金常识》。在书中,我旨在做两件事:第一,帮助读者成为更成功的共同基金投资者;第二,为共同基金行业的变革绘制路线图。

The Power of a Book: Common Sense on Mutual Funds Our mission is to change, not only the focus of the mutual fund industry, but its very structure. I had no doubt that a book that put the words and ideas I have relied on would have the power to bring this change all together in a cogent way. Such a book—a new and I hope better-written (and longer!) senior thesis—could not only articulate and reinforce my message, but deliver it to intelligent investors all over the globe. And so I wrote my second book on the subject of mutual fund investing. Emboldened by the power of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, I called it Common Sense on Mutual Funds. In it, I aim to do two things: First, to help readers become more successful mutual fund investors, and second, to chart a course for change in the mutual fund industry.

虽然像一本典型的书那样,它被设计为按顺序阅读,但实际上它由 22 篇独立的文章组成,每篇都可独立阅读。本书的前三部分纯粹涉及投资问题,涵盖:(1)投资策略,包括金融市场的回报本质和资产配置;(2)投资选择,包括指数基金、投资风格以及股票、债券和全球基金;(3)投资表现,包括均值回归在金融市场中的强大作用、税收效率(以及税收低效性),以及时间对回报、风险和成本的影响。

While, just as a typical book, it is designed to be read sequentially it is in fact a series of 22 essays, each of which can be read independently. The first three parts of the book are purely about investment issues, encompassing (1) investment strategy, including the nature of financial market returns and asset allocation; (2) investment choices, including index funds, investment styles, and stock, bond, and global funds; and (3) investment performance, including the powerful role that reversion to the mean plays in the financial markets, tax-efficiency (and tax-inefficiency), and the effect of time on return, risk, and cost.

本书的最后两部分以批判的眼光审视了行业问题,这些问题在导致各类共同基金过往记录令人失望方面发挥了关键作用。第四部分“论基金管理”描述了行业偏离其原始原则的情况,讨论了营销凌驾于管理之上成为我们的护身符,谴责了基金董事未能维护股东利益的行为,并提出我刚才讨论的行业结构变革的积极意义。这个主题对于一个关于基金投资的书来说当然不同寻常,但第五部分“论精神”的主题则更加不同寻常。在这里,我的结论是,互助结构,尽管可能对股东有益,但还不够。无论结构如何,这个行业中的公司都需要一种服务投资者的互助态度,而这种态度在今天几乎完全缺失,引人注目。因此,在第五部分,我冒昧地描述了作为先锋集团的创始人和领导者,我努力向我们的企业灌输的互助价值观和精神。

The final two parts of the book turn a critical eye to industry issues that have played a key role in the disappointing past records of mutual funds of all types. Part four, “On Fund Management” describes the industry’s deviation from its original principles, discusses the ascendancy of marketing over management as our talisman, rails at the failure of fund directors to uphold shareholder interests, and suggests the positive implications of the change in industry structure that I discussed a few moments ago. This subject matter, of course, is unusual stuff for a book on fund investing, but the subject of part five, “On Spirit,” is even more unusual. Here, I conclude that a mutual structure, as helpful to shareholders as it may be, is not enough. Irrespective of their structure, the firms in this industry need a mutual attitude toward serving investors, an attitude conspicuous only by its virtual absence today. So in part five, I take the liberty of describing the mutual values and spirit that, as Vanguard’s founder and leader, I have endeavored to inculcate in our enterprise.

《常识》是贯穿这本书每个主题的核心思想。不仅是你们和我今天理解的常识,更是托马斯·潘恩大约 225 年前在他的小册子中所使用的《常识》,他向殖民地的公民们提出了“尚不够流行以博得普遍青睐……仅提供简单事实和直白论据”的观点,并要求读者“慷慨地拓展他们的视野,超越当下”。在我自己的书中,我向共同基金投资者提出了类似的观点——以及同样简单的事实和直白论据。

Common sense is the theme that suffuses each of the book’s subjects. Not only common sense as you and I understand it today, but Common Sense as Thomas Paine used it in his pamphlets some 225 years ago, presenting sentiments to the citizens of the Colonies “not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure their general favor . . . offering nothing more than simple facts and plain arguments,” and asking the reader to “generously enlarge his views beyond the present day.” In my own book, I present similar sentiments—and equally simple facts and plain arguments—to mutual fund investors.

除了最后一部分,这本书并非关于先锋集团。它主要讲述我关于如何成功投资共同基金的根深蒂固的信念。尽管我的想法在半个世纪对金融市场的观察中有所修正,但更重要的是,它们在经验和时间的熔炉中得到了强化和淬炼。在早期,我直率地将我们的结构描述为共同基金治理领域的“先锋实验”。25 年之后,我想可以公平地说,它不再是一个实验了。从成立之初的 10 亿美元起,我们为投资者托管的资产已增长到超过 5000 亿美元,我们竭尽全力赢得了诚信、公平交易和稳健投资原则的声誉,在这个行业中首屈一指。我们惊人的增长——我从未寻求过的增长——在很大程度上是源于那些构成了我个人哲学基础的简单投资理念和基本人类价值观。我坚信,这些理念和价值观将在先锋集团长久存续,因为它们是正确的思想和正确的价值观,不可动摇、经久不衰,甚至永恒。

Except for the final section, the book is not about Vanguard. It is largely about my deeply held convictions on how to invest successfully in mutual funds. While my ideas have been modified to a degree by my half-century of observing the financial markets, the more important point is that they have been reinforced, annealed in the crucible of experience and time. In the early years, I forthrightly described our structure as “the Vanguard experiment” in mutual fund governance. After 25 years, I guess it’s fair to say it’s an experiment no more. From $1 billion at our founding, the assets we hold in stewardship for investors have grown to more than $500 billion, and we’ve done our best to earn a reputation for integrity, fair-dealing, and sound investment principles that is second to none in this industry. Our staggering growth—which I never sought—has come in important part as a result of the simple investment ideas and basic human values that are the foundation of my personal philosophy. And I have every confidence that they will long endure at Vanguard, for they are the right ideas and right values, unshakable and enduring, even eternal.

经济学与理想主义 回首往事,我相信是理想主义——对更美好世界的梦想;对人类同胞的公平;对简约的关注;对受托责任的强调;相信文字、思想和书籍的力量——驱动了我漫长的人生和激动人心的事业。令人欣慰的是,我们已经证明理想主义与经济学之间的联系是强大的。事实上,先锋集团的结构和指数基金的概念都是开明理想主义即为稳健经济学的经典例证。

Economics and Idealism In retrospect, I believe that idealism—the dream of a better world; fairness to one’s fellow human beings; focus on simplicity; emphasis on stewardship; a belief in the power of words and ideas and books—has driven my long life and exciting career. Happily, we’ve proved that the link between idealism and economics is a powerful one. Indeed, both Vanguard’s structure and the index fund concept are classic examples of the fact that enlightened idealism is sound economics.

即使随意翻阅我那篇古老的论文,我认为也能反映出那种无处不在的理想主义。时至今日,我仍引用其中的语句来定义我观点的起源,无论是驱动金融市场的力量(按照凯恩斯勋爵不朽的表述,即企业和投机),还是那些未能推动基金经理像负责任的企业公民一样行动的力量(即所谓的“基金的沉默”)。但这种理想主义的最高体现,在于我长期以来的观点:共同基金业务的核心原则,不应该是向客户营销金融产品,而是为客户提供投资服务的受托责任。

Even a casual reading of my ancient thesis would, I think, reflect that pervasive idealism. To this day, I use quotations from it to define the genesis of my views, from the forces that move financial markets (both enterprise and speculation, in Lord Keynes’ timeless formulation), to the forces that fail to move fund managers to behave as responsible corporate citizens (“The Silence of the Funds,” as it were). But the highest manifestation of this idealism comes in my long-standing view that the central principle of the mutual fund business should be, not the marketing of financial products to customers, but the stewardship of investment services for clients.

我很高兴地报告,我 55 年来笔耕不辍的编年史——这个故事始于 1945 年布莱尔中学与亚当斯和梅森校长,1949 年延续至普林斯顿费尔斯通图书馆和我的论文,1951 年发展到与沃尔特·摩根和威灵顿公司,然后在 1975 年与查克·鲁特和先锋集团,再到 1999 年出版《共同基金常识》——尚未结束。就在我们今晚相聚之时,另一个故事——更多的文字,实际上是另一本书——正在被书写。几个月前,麦格劳-希尔出版公司找到我,提议其即将出版的系列丛书《金融领域的伟大思想》第一卷,以《博格论投资》为题,收录我多年来发表的众多演讲中的选段,并以——没错!——我的普林斯顿大学本科毕业论文为核心。这或许是一种某种意义上的因果报应:在写就半个世纪之后,这部将成为先锋集团非凡好运形成基础的理想主义与经济学的谦逊先驱之作,终于将得见天日——这是我在今晚讲述的由文字、思想和书籍构成的漫长链条中的又一环。

I’m happy to report that my 55-year chronicle of putting pen to paper—a story that begins at Blair in 1945 with schoolmasters Adams and Mason, continues in 1949 at Princeton’s Firestone Library and my thesis, rolls on to 1951 with Walter Morgan and Wellington, then to 1975 with Chuck Root and Vanguard, and to 1999 with “Common Sense on Mutual Funds”—is not yet over. Even as we meet this evening, another story—more words, indeed another book—is being written. McGraw-Hill Publishing Corporation came to me a few months ago and proposed that Volume One of its forthcoming series, “Great Ideas in Finance,” be entitled Bogle on Investing and consist of selections from the scores of speeches I’ve given over the years, using—yes!—my Princeton senior thesis as the centerpiece. It may be some sort of poetic justice that, a half-century after it was written, this modest, unassuming precursor of the idealism and economics that would lead to Vanguard’s remarkably fortuitous formation will at last see the light of day—yet one more link in the long chain of words, ideas, and books that I’ve recounted this evening.

威廉·佩恩的启示 在这个盛大的场合,就在我们伟大的家乡州——宾夕法尼亚州,似乎理应将其增长的相当一部分功劳归于此地。威廉·佩恩卓越的美利坚联邦一直是良好治理和商业友好的源泉,是优秀劳动力的家园,也是先锋集团忠诚股东基础的历史纽带。更重要的是,我们践行了威廉·佩恩在 1621 年来到他新获封的土地时所珍视的那种简约,并因此受益良多。佩恩自己的话精准地描述了我们在先锋集团的经营之道:方法极大地有助于避免商业中的麻烦:因为它使任务变得简单,防止混乱,节省大量时间;并指导那些有业务依赖的人,该做什么以及该期待什么。

The Inspiration of William Penn On this grand occasion, right here in our great home state, it seems only fair to attribute considerable credit for our growth to being here in Pennsylvania. William Penn’s remarkable American commonwealth has been the source of fine governance and hospitality to business, the home of a splendid labor force, and the historic nexus of Vanguard’s loyal shareholder base. What is more, we have been well-served by practicing the kind of simplicity William Penn cherished when he came to his newly-chartered lands in 1621. Penn’s own words come preciously close to describing how we have conducted Vanguard’s affairs: Method goes far to prevent trouble in business: for it makes the task easy, hinders confusion, saves abundance of time; and instructs those that have business depending, both what to do and what to hope.

因此,正如威廉·佩恩将宾夕法尼亚视为他关于人权和完美自由的“神圣实验”,我将先锋集团作为一场实验——尽管并非神圣——来探索该做什么以及该期待什么。我们的理念和方法将检验一个共同基金企业——一个由股东创立、归属于股东、服务于股东的独特企业——能否在一个竞争激烈、同类相食的行业中取得成功。凭借我们如同贵格会信徒般简约的投资哲学,以及我们商业战略中威廉·佩恩式的固执、坦诚和节俭,我认为,迄今为止,我们已经通过了考验。因为我相信,一个企业的经济运作与其所秉持的理想不可分离,这一信念在实践中取得了辉煌的成效。

And so, even as William Penn looked at Pennsylvania as his “Holy Experiment” for human rights and perfect freedom, I began Vanguard as an experiment—though hardly a holy one—in what to do and what to hope. Our ideas and methods would test whether a mutual fund enterprise—a unique enterprise that is of, by, and for the shareholders—could succeed in a competitive, dog-eat-dog industry. With the Quaker-like simplicity of our investment philosophy and the characteristic stubbornness, candor, and thrift of William Penn in our business strategy, I believe that, so far, we’ve met that test. For that belief that the economic functioning of a business enterprise cannot be separated from the ideals it holds high has worked splendidly in practice.

但总有些事情能让一个成功的企业变得更好——甚至更专注于服务我们的人类同胞——在结束这些讲话之前,我想承认,在我漫长人生的这个阶段,我比以往任何时候都更渴望以威廉·佩恩的这句话来度过余生:我预想此生只能经过这个世界一次。因此,任何我能做的善事,或我能向任何同胞展示的善意,让我现在就去做。让我不要拖延或忽视它,因为我将不再经过这条路。

But there are things that can make even a successful business better—even more focused on service to our fellow human beings—and I want to close these remarks by acknowledging, more than ever at this stage of my long life, my aspiration to live the remainder of my days by these words of William Penn: I expect to pass through this world but once. Any good therefore that I can do, or any kindness I can show to any fellow creature, let me do it now. Let me not defer or neglect it, for I shall not pass this way again.

被这些美妙的文字所安慰和激励,我将继续我的文字、我的思想、我的理想和我的书籍。愿它们的力量比它们的作者更长久!

Comforted and inspired by those wonderful words, I shall press on with my own words, my ideas, my ideals, and my books. May their power long outlive their author!

注:本次演讲中表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。© 2000 年,约翰·C·博格版权所有。

Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management. © Copyright 2000 by John C. Bogle