两个市场的故事

2006 · 演讲 · 原文约 3377 词
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一分为二的市场——约翰·C·博格主题演讲,先锋集团创始人兼前首席执行官 ∞ ∞ ∞ 在加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院颁发杰出财务报告贡献奖仪式上 第十七届年度财务报告会议 加利福尼亚州旧金山 2006 年 10 月 27 日 对于今天下午你们授予我的这一杰出财务报告贡献奖,我深感荣幸。当然,我极为惶恐,但也颇感惊讶,因为我并非科班出身的财务专业人士。但我确实关心,并且深切关心财务报告中的诚信问题。

A Tale of Two Markets Keynote Speech by John C. Bogle, Founder and former chief executive The Vanguard Group ∞ ∞ ∞ Upon receiving The Berkeley Award for Distinguished Contributions to Financial Reporting from The Haas School of Business, University of California at th The 17 Annual Conference on Financial Reporting San Francisco, CA October 27, 2006 I am profoundly honored by the prestigious award for Distinguished Contributions to Financial Reporting that you bestow on me this afternoon. Of course I am deeply humbled, but I’m also somewhat stunned, for I am not a trained financial professional. But I do care, and care deeply, about integrity in financial reporting.

在我至今 55 年的投资生涯中的这最后一个十年里,我一直带着关注和忧心研究这个主题,发表过兼具布道与痛斥意味的演讲,还写了一本言辞激烈的书——《资本灵魂之争》(The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism)——要求我们正视过去二十年间,我们的商业领袖、会计师、投资银行家和资金管理人在行为与价值观上的显著沦丧。

In this latest decade of my now 55-year career in investing, I’ve studied this subject with attention and concern, delivered lectures that were a combination of sermon and jeremiad, and written a fiery book—The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism—that demands that we address the remarkable erosion in the conduct and values of our business leaders, our accountants, our investment bankers, and our money managers that has taken place over the past two decades.

资本主义运作方式的这一变化,绝非一个狭隘的地方性问题。容我引用自己书中的话:“如果我们的国家要克服这个充满风险的现代世界中无穷无尽、往往看似难以解决的挑战,我们就需要一个强大而公平的资本形成体系。我们的经济实力、政治自由、军事力量、社会福利,乃至我们自由的宗教价值观,都依赖于它。”作为金融专业人士,你们的工作事关重大。____________________ 注:本演讲所表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

This change in the conduct of capitalism is hardly a parochial issue. For quoting, if I may, from my book, “If our nation is to overcome the infinite, often seemingly intractable, challenges of our risk-fraught modern world, we require a powerful and equitable system of capital formation. Our economic might, our political freedom, our military strength, our social welfare, and even our free religious values depend upon it.” There is a lot at stake in your work as financial professionals. ____________________ Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.

导致那种行为标准与价值观念受到侵蚀的一个主要因素,是我们金融市场本质的变化。这种变化反映了一种对投资本质、以及我们国家会计制度在界定投资时所扮演角色的截然不同的看法。一个市场是内在商业价值的真实市场;另一个市场则是瞬息万变股价的预期市场。正因如此,我今天选择“两个市场的寓言”作为我发言的主题。

One major contributor to the erosion of that conduct and those values has been the change in the nature of our financial markets that reflects radically different views of what investing is all about, and the role of our nation’s accounting system in defining them. One is the real market of intrinsic business value. The other is the expectations market of momentary stock prices. This is why I have chosen “A Tale of Two Markets” as the title of my remarks today.

现实市场与预期市场

在商业的现实市场中,真实公司花真金白银,雇真人,投真金在资本设备上,制造真实产品、提供真实服务。如果它们以真正实力参与竞争,就能赚取真实利润,并从中支付真实股息。但要做到这一点,需要切实的战略、坚定的决心和实打实的资本支出,更不用说需要真正的创新和远见了。

The Real Market and the Expectations Market In the Real Market of business, real companies spend real money and hire real people and invest in real capital equipment, to make real products and provide real services. If they compete with real skill, they earn real profits, out of which they pay real dividends. But to do so demands real strategy, real determination, and real capital expenditures, to say nothing of requiring real innovation and real foresight.

与这个“真实市场”松散关联的是“预期市场”。在这里,市场价格并非由我刚刚描述的商业现实决定,而是由投资者的预期决定。关键的是,这些预期由数字来设定,而这些数字在很大程度上又是我们管理层想要它们成为的产物——太过容易被操纵,且可以通过多种方式定义。我们有备考利润(体现了通过合并两家公司所能创造的神奇利润增长,同时也带有某种掩饰)。我们有经营利润(排除了以往糟糕投资决策、坏账以及已终止的不良经营所引发的所有减记)。我们还有符合公认会计原则(GAAP)的报告利润,而 GAAP 会计本身在逻辑和执行上就存在大量实质性漏洞,使得那些有此倾向的人可以进行各种财务把戏。

Loosely linked to this Real Market is the Expectations Market. Here, market prices are set, not by the realities of business that I have just described, but by the expectations of investors. Crucially, these expectations are set by numbers, numbers that are to an important extent the product of what our managements want them to be, too easily manipulated and defined in multiple ways. We have pro-forma earnings (reflecting the magical earnings growth that can be created by merging two firms, as well as a certain dissembling). We have operating earnings (absent all those write-offs of previous bad investment decisions, bad debts, and bad operations that were discontinued). And we have reported earnings, conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP accounting which itself is riddled with its own substantial gaps in logic and implementation that permit all sorts of financial shenanigans by those who are so inclined.

我第一次看到“真实市场”与“预期市场”之间那种令人信服的区分,是在去年春天,在多伦多大学罗特曼商学院院长罗杰·马丁的文章里。他做出的这个区分让我印象特别深刻,因为长期以来,我也一直用不同的词语在关注这同一个二元对立。我最近一次提起这个区分,是在 2002 年普林斯顿大学经济政策研究中心的一次演讲中,那场演讲的核心思想,后来又在耶鲁大学出版社去年出版的《资本主义灵魂之争》一书中占据了重要位置。

I first encountered the compelling formulation of the distinction between the Real Market and the Expectations Market only last spring, in the writings of Roger Martin, dean of the Rotman School of Business at the University of Toronto. I was particularly impressed by the distinction he drew, for I’ve been focused on the very same dichotomy with different words, for a long time. I most recently raised the distinction in a speech I gave at Princeton University’s Center for Economic Policy Studies in 2002, the core ideas of which in turn found their way to a prominent role in Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, published last year by Yale University Press.

那场演讲的主旨——“别指望它。数字迷信的危险”——大意是:“在我们的社会、经济学和金融领域,我们过于信赖数字。但数字并非现实。往好里说,它们只是现实的一抹苍白投影;往坏里讲,它们是对我们试图衡量之真相的严重扭曲……(因此)我们崇拜硬数字,把股价那一刻的精确性当作投资现实的护身符,却忽视了公司内在价值永恒而模糊的存在。”

The thesis of that speech—“Don’t Count On It. The Perils of Numeracy”—was that, “in our society, in economics, and in finance, we place too much trust in numbers. But numbers are not reality. At best, they’re a pale reflection of reality. At worst, they’re a gross distortion of the truths we seek to measure . . . (As a result), we worship hard numbers and accept the momentary precision of stock prices as the talisman of investment reality rather than the eternal vagueness of intrinsic corporate value.”

企业与投机 这些见解,实际上又源于另一个主题——那是在半个世纪前,我在普林斯顿大学完成的本科毕业论文,写于 1951 年。在那篇论文中,我引用了伟大的英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在其《通论》第 13 章中的精彩论述,他在那里经典地区分了企业(“预测资产在其整个存续期内的预期收益”)与投机(“预测市场的心理走向”)。

Enterprise vs. Speculation These ideas, in turn, were in fact the product of yet another thesis—a real one, written a half-century earlier—my senior thesis at Princeton University, completed in 1951. There, I cited the words of the great British economist John Maynard Keynes, in his wonderful Chapter 13 of The General Theory, where he drew the classic distinction between enterprise (“forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life”) and speculation (forecasting the psychology of the markets”).

凯恩斯深切担忧短期投机行为对股价的影响在不断扩大,这给社会带来的后果。他写道:“[股票的]传统估值——由大量无知个体的群体心理所确立——极易因那些对未来收益影响甚微的因素引发的观点突然波动而剧烈变化,因为缺乏坚定的信念根基来维持稳定……从而产生非理性的乐观与悲观情绪浪潮。”

Keynes was deeply concerned about the societal implications of the growing role of short-term speculation on stock prices. “A conventional valuation [of stocks] which is established [by] the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals,” he wrote, “is liable to change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which do not really matter much to the prospective yield, since there will be no strong roots of conviction to hold it steady. . . resulting in unreasoning waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment.”

接着,凯恩斯先知般地预言,这一趋势还会加剧,因为就连那些“判断力和知识远超普通个人投资者的专家型专业人士——人们本以为他们会纠正这些反复无常的波动——所关心的,也不是对一项投资在其整个存续期内可能产生的回报做出更优的长期预测,而是在大众之前,提前一小段时间预判传统估值方法的短期变化。”凯恩斯警告说,最终股市会变成“一场比试智力的竞赛,比的不是一项投资在长期内可能产生的回报,而是对未来几个月里传统估值依据的预判。”

Then, prophetically, Lord Keynes predicted that this trend would intensify as even “expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the average private investor, who, one might have supposed, would correct these vagaries . . . would be concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield on an investment over its entire life, but with forecasting changes in the conventional valuation a short time ahead of the general public.” As a result, Keynes warned, the stock market would become “a battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation a few months hence rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years.”

在我的论文中,我引用了上面那番话,然后竟斗胆提出了不同意见。我当时的预测——事实证明,这个预测相当准确——是:共同基金行业将变得远比现在庞大,而基金经理们将“为市场提供一种对证券的需求,这种需求是稳定、成熟、明智且具有分析性的(原文着重强调),其基础本质上取决于公司本身的(内在)表现(即凯恩斯所说的企业),而不是公众对股票价值的评估,即其价格。”

In my thesis, I cited those very words, and then had the temerity to disagree. Portfolio managers, in what I predicted—accurately, as it turned out—would become a far larger mutual fund industry, would “supply the market with a demand for securities that is steady, sophisticated, enlightened, and analytic [italics added], a demand that is based essentially on the [intrinsic] performance of a corporation [Keynes’ enterprise] rather than the public appraisal of the value of a share, that is, its price.”

遗憾的是,我曾预测专业机构投资者会带来稳定、成熟、理性且富有分析性的需求,但这根本没有发生。事实恰恰相反!当时股票型基金的换手率大致稳定在每年 15% 左右,这意味着投资组合中股票的平均持有期为 6 年——但后来竟直线飙升。近年来,基金换手率平均超过 100%,平均持有期不到一年。所以,在我论文中写下那些话整整半个世纪之后,我不得不勉强承认一个显而易见的事实:洞察世事的凯恩斯是对的,而我这个漠然又理想主义的博格尔是错的。记分牌上,凯恩斯 1 分,博格尔 0 分。

Alas, the steady sophisticated, enlightened, and analytic demand I had predicted from our expert professional investors simply didn’t happen. Quite the contrary! Portfolio turnover of equity mutual funds, then running steadily about 15 percent, year after year—a 6-year average holding period for the average stock in the portfolios—actually soared skyward. In recent years, fund turnover has averaged above 100 percent—an average holding period of less than one year. So, a half-century after I wrote those words in my thesis, I must reluctantly acknowledge the obvious: the worldly-wise Keynes was right, and that the callously idealistic Bogle was wrong. Call the score, Keynes 1, Bogle 0.

“资本主义的活儿很可能干不好” 在最近这段时期,我们为凯恩斯精准预言的那个转变付出了高昂代价。当专业机构投资者把注意力从长期投资的智慧转向短期投机的愚蠢时,“国家的资本开发[变成了]赌场活动的副产品。”正如他警告的那样,“当企业沦为投机旋涡上的一个泡沫时,资本主义的活儿很可能干不好。”

“The Job of Capitalism is Likely to be Ill-Done” During the recent era, we have paid a high price for the shift that Keynes so accurately predicted. As professional institutional investors moved their focus from the wisdom of long-term investment to the folly of short-term speculation, “the capital development of the country [became] a by-product of the activities of a casino.” Just as he warned, “when enterprise becomes a mere bubble on a whirlpool of speculation, the job of capitalism is likely to be ill-done.”

近些年来,它的工作确实做得糟糕透顶。情绪压倒理性——这一现象反映在众多机构投资者身上那种赌场心态里——已酿成了严酷的后果。由价格主导的预期市场,一次又一次压倒了由企业基本面构成的真实市场。然而,当感知(即股票此刻精确却短暂的价格)与现实(即公司难以衡量却持久的内在价值)严重背离时,这一鸿沟最终只能以现实一方获胜来弥合。

In the recent era, its job has indeed been ill-done. The triumph of emotions over economics that has been reflected in the casino mentality of so many institutional investors has had harsh consequences. The expectations market of prices has trumped the real market of business at every turn. Yet when perception—the precise but momentary price of the stock— vastly departs from reality—the hard-to-measure but enduring intrinsic value of the corporation— the gap can be reconciled only in favor of reality.

事实是,一家公司相对容易就能推高其股票的短期价格,以满足预期市场的需求。但在真实的商业市场中,长期致力于构建内在价值,却是一项艰难且要求极高的任务,只有卓越的公司才能做到。

The fact is that it’s relatively easy for a firm to raise the short-term price of its stock and meet the demands of the expectations market. But the job of building intrinsic value in the real business market over the long term is a tough, demanding task, accomplished only by the exceptional corporation.

美国企业界与投资界究竟出了什么问题?

What Went Wrong in Corporate America and Investment America?

简而言之——这也是我这本书的核心论点——在美国公司身上出问题的事,在美国投资界的推波助澜下,是资本主义的一种病态变异:从传统的所有者资本主义——投资收益主要归于那些投入资本并承担风险的人——蜕变为一种新的、有害的管理者资本主义,资本投资的收益中过度的一部分流向了公司管理层和金融中介机构。

Simply put—and this is the main thesis of my book—what went wrong in Corporate America, aided and abetted by Investment America, was a pathological mutation in capitalism— from traditional owners’ capitalism, where the rewards of investing went primarily to those who put up the capital and took the risks—to a new and virulent managers’ capitalism, where an excessive share of the rewards of capital investment went to corporate managers and financial intermediaries.

怎么会发生这种事?主要有两个原因。第一,“所有权社会”——我们企业的股票几乎全部由直接股东持有——逐渐转变为一个新的“代理社会”,金融中介机构掌控了绝大多数股票。(自 1950 年以来,机构持股比例从美国股市的 8% 升至 68%;个人持股比例从 92% 降至 32%。)但这些代理人并没有像所有者那样行事。他们没有维护委托人的利益,这些委托人主要是持仓共同基金和享受养老金计划的 1 亿个家庭。

How could this have happened? There were two principal reasons. First, the “ownership society”—in which the shares of our corporations were held almost entirely by direct stockholders—was gradually transformed into a new “agency society,” with financial intermediaries controlling the overwhelming majority of shares. (Since 1950, institutional ownership has risen from 8 percent of U.S. stocks to 68 percent; individual ownership has dropped from 92 to 32 percent.) But those agents didn’t behave as owners. They failed to honor the interest of their principals, largely those 100 million families who are the owners of our mutual funds and the beneficiaries of our pension plans.

第二个原因是,机构投资策略的主导焦点从企业市场的长期投资转向了预期市场的短期投机。过去几十年里,我们进入了预期投资时代,企业盈利的增长——尤其是盈利指引及其达成情况——成了投资者口中的关键词。企业经理人和股东——如今不再是真正的所有者,而是租客——逐渐接受了这样的观念:无论报告的盈利是什么,它们就是“真实的”。实际上,就像一只企业界的矮胖蛋(Humpty Dumpty)对机构投资者爱丽丝(Alice)说的:“当我报告盈利时,它就是我想要它表示的意思,不多也不少……问题是谁是主人——仅此而已。”爱丽丝则回答:“是,是,先生。”

The second reason is that the predominant focus of institutional investment strategy turned from long-term investment in the business market to short-term speculation in the expectations market. During the past few decades, we entered the age of expectations investing, where growth in corporate earnings—especially earnings guidance and its achievement—became the watchword of investors. Corporate managers and corporate stockholders—now no longer true owners, but renters—came to accept that whatever earnings were reported were, well, “true.” In effect, as a corporate Humpty Dumpty might have told institutional investor Alice in Wonderland: “When I report my earnings it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less . . . the question is who is to be the master—that’s all.” And Alice said, “aye, aye, Sir.”

管理层成了数字的主人,而我们的注册会计师们——太多次了——也跟着随波逐流。在我所说的企业管理者、董事、会计师、投资银行家以及股票的机构持有者和租用者之间的“愉快共谋”中,各种稀奇古怪的财务工程层出不穷。报告的数字满足了预期市场的需求,但往往与商业市场的现实毫无关系。宽松的会计准则使得凭空捏造出所谓利润成为可能,即使是在公认会计准则(GAAP)标准下也不例外。例如:漫不经心地将对收入的大额费用归类为“不重要”;夸大养老金计划的假设未来回报率,即使对未来回报的理性预期已经恶化;将向购买者贷出公司资金所产生的销售额计入收入;并购调整中涉及巨额应收账款冲销,随后却将其收回;冲销状况完好的厂房和设备,从而消除未来的折旧费用;将股票期权补偿成本从企业费用中剔除(幸好,这种做法现在已被禁止);以及,没忘了提,GAAP 与税务会计之间的时间差。

Management became the master of the numbers, and our public accountants, too often, went along. In what I’ve called “the happy conspiracy” between corporate managers, directors, accountants, investment bankers, and institutional owners and renters of stocks, all kinds of bizarre financial engineering took place. The reported numbers met the demands of the expectations market, but often had little to do with the realities of the business market. Loose accounting standards made it possible to create, out of thin air, what passes for earnings, even under GAAP standards. For example:  Cavalierly classifying large charges against revenues as “immaterial.”  Hyping the assumed future returns of pension plans, even as rational expectations for future returns deteriorated.  Counting as revenues sales made by lending corporate monies to the purchasers.  Merger adjustments involving huge write-offs of accounts receivable, only to collect them later on; and write-offs of perfectly good plant and equipment, eliminating future depreciation charges.  Excluding the cost of stock option compensation from corporate expenses. (This practice has now, happily, been prohibited.)  And, lest I forget, timing differences between GAAP and tax accounting.

我甚至还没提到特殊目的实体(special-purpose entities)里的债务隐瞒问题——安然公司(Enron)是其中最臭名昭著的滥用者。

And I haven’t even touched on the concealment of debt in special-purpose entities, abused most notably by Enron.

根据公认会计准则(GAAP),这些做法都是,嗯,合法的。可以肯定地说,这种创意金融工程的症结不在于什么是不合法的,而在于什么是合法的。(确实,就连期权回溯——企业高管渎职的最新例证——只要会计处理得当——也是合法的。)于是,管理顾问的陈词滥调——“能量化的,就能管理”——成了首席执行官的口头禅。

Under GAAP, these practices are all, well, legal. Surely it can be said that the problem in such creative financial engineering isn’t what’s illegal. It’s what’s legal. (Indeed, even the back-dating of options—the most recent example of the malfeasance of corporate managers—when accounted for properly—is legal.) And so the management consultant’s bromide—“If you can measure it, you can manage it”—became the mantra of the chief executive.

现实不及预期。但是,通过操纵盈利来炒作预期市场,这种把戏只能持续到真实商业市场兑现承诺为止——而它当然没能做到。1980 年至 2004 年间,上市公司预期的年化增长率为平均 11.5%,但实际盈利增长仅为 6%——大约只有目标的一半,甚至略低于我们每年 6.2% 的 GDP 增长率。(在座各位不难明白:长期来看,企业盈利增长与经济增速密切相关。)在大泡沫期间,预期市场——也就是幻觉——高高凌驾于商业市场——也就是现实——之上。然后,股市泡沫最终不可避免地破灭了。

Reality Falls Short But hyping the expectations market by managing earnings can only continue to the extent that the real business market delivers the goods, and of course it couldn’t. During 1980-2004, public corporations had projected their growth at an annualized rate averaging 11 ½ percent. But they actually delivered earning growth of 6 percent—only about half of their goal, and even slightly less than our GDP growth of 6.2 percent per year. (It will hardly surprise this audience to learn that over the long term, corporate earnings growth is closely linked to the growth of the economy.) During the great bubble, the expectations market—illusion—soared above the business market—reality. And then, inevitably, the stock market bubble finally burst.

现在请思考这一点:如果每位股东在整个上涨与下跌周期中都持有相同的股票,那么这种最终无法调和的差异——根本就不会造成任何影响。股价先大幅超越内在价值,然后遵循重力法则回落,那又怎样?但问题在于,它确实产生了影响。为什么?因为一场大规模的财富转移发生了——从各种各样的股票卖方(主要是行使股票期权的公司内部人士,以及将企业上市的企业家)手中,转移到了形形色色的股票买方手中(主要是毫无戒心、往往还很贪婪的公众,以及颇具讽刺意味的、那些为了避免期权导致盈利稀释而回购股票的企业自身)。

But now think about this: if each stockholder held the same stocks throughout the boom and the bust, that difference—finally irreconcilable—simply wouldn’t have mattered. Prices would have soared past intrinsic value and then, observing the laws of gravity, returned. So what? But it did matter. Why? Because an enormous transfer of wealth took place from a variety of stock sellers—largely corporate insiders exercising their stock options and entrepreneurs taking their enterprises public—to a variety of largely different stock buyers—the unsuspecting (and often, greedy public and, ironically, or corporations themselves, buying back stock in order to avoid earnings dilutions from those options.

然而,这并非零和博弈。对于那些金融中介机构——那些将疯涨股票兜售给客户的投行和经纪商,以及将各类“新经济”基金推销给公众的共同基金经理——他们反而将其变成了输家的游戏。我估算,仅在 1998 年至 2002 年期间,这些赌场庄家式的成本就已超过 1 万亿美元(!)。

But this was no zero-sum game. For the financial intermediaries—investment bankers and brokers who sold all those high flying stocks to their clients, and mutual fund managers who sold all those “new economy” funds to the public—turned it into a loser’s game. I calculate these croupier costs at more that $1 trillion (!) during 1998-2002 alone.

当我们面对两个截然不同的市场时,几乎必然会产生重大冲突。多伦多的罗杰·马丁用职业橄榄球做类比来构建他的批判观点。在橄榄球领域,预期市场体现在赌注中对阵双方球队的分差赔率上。比赛结束时,现实当然是实际的分差。他指出,职业橄榄球“不允许现实市场的任何参与者涉足预期市场。”也就是说,明星四分卫以及所有参与这些橄榄球大戏的演员,都不得对任何比赛下注,即便是他们未出场的比赛也不例外。当然,几乎没人会认为这样的禁令不是一项明智的政策。

When we have two vastly different markets, it is almost inevitable that major conflicts arise. Toronto’s Roger Martin sets up his critique using pro football as an analogy. There, the expectations market is reflected in the betting on the point spread between the scores of rival teams. When the game ends, the reality, of course, is the actual spread. In pro football, he notes, “No participant in the real market is permitted to participate in the expectations market.” That is, the star quarterbacks, as well as all the other actors in those football dramas are not allowed to bet on any games, even those in which they do not play. Surely few would argue that such a prohibition is not a sensible policy.

接着他投下重磅炸弹。“但还有一场更宏大的游戏:在真实市场中博弈的玩家不仅被允许、还被大力鼓励,去参与对应的预期市场——那当然就是一家公司的股票市场。虽然首席执行官的任务是打造真实业务,但他却花大量时间在预期市场里玩:设定预期、操控体现预期是否达标的数字,并据此拿到巨额股票薪酬——理论依据是,这类薪酬能使高管的利益与股东利益保持一致。”

And then he drops the bomb. “But there is an even bigger game in which players in the real market are not only allowed, but strongly encouraged to play in the related expectations market: It is of course the stock market for a company’s shares. While the task of the CEO is to build the real business, he spends a lot of his time playing in the expectations market, setting expectations, controlling the numbers that will reflect whether or not they are met, and getting paid staggering amounts of stock-based compensation on the theory that such compensation aligns the interest of executives with the interest of shareholders.”

胡说八道!股权激励根本起不了那种作用。它只会鼓励高管——以及他们的首席财务官(常常在外部审计师和董事的默许下)——操纵市场预期,为自己牟利。即便职业橄榄球都禁止这种做法,高管薪酬也不该允许。这种操纵有时会体现在:被夸大的过往收益,在未来增长放缓。(通用电气,在近年泡沫时期被广泛视为管理收益的高手之一,1996 年至 2000 年间报告的每股收益年增长率为 15%。此后,增长率萎缩到了 4%。)还有些时候,我们会看到公司重述财报。而在近年,这种情况屡见不鲜。2005 年,美国上市公司共发布了 1195 次财报重述,较 1995 年的 116 次足足翻了 10 倍。

Baloney! Stock-based compensation does nothing of the sort. It encourages executives—and their chief financial officers, too often with the tacit approval of their public accountants and their directors—to manipulate the expectations market to their own benefit. Even as it is banned in pro football, it shouldn’t be allowed in executive compensation. Sometimes this manipulation is reflected in a future slowing of overstated past earnings. (General Electric, widely regarded as one of the champions of managed earnings during the recent bubble era, reported growth in earnings per share in 1996-2000 of 15 percent per year. Since then, the growth rate has dwindled to 4 percent.) At other times, we get earnings restatements. And, in the recent era, lots of them. In 2005, there were 1195 restatements by U.S. public companies, a mere 10-fold increase over the 116 restatements in 1995.

当价格偏离价值时……但长期来看,财报上报告的盈利数字并不会改变投资的本质。伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下拥有上市公司的传奇投资人沃伦·巴菲特,时常向股东们反复强调一个观点:他更希望伯克希尔的股票交易价格与内在价值大致持平——既不要显著高于,也不要显著低于这一水平。他解释道:“内在价值,就是企业在其剩余存续期内所能提取的现金的折现值……当股价暂时跑赢或跑输企业实际表现时,只有数量有限的股东——无论是卖方还是买方——能以交易对手的代价获得超额收益。(但)长期而言,伯克希尔股东的总收益必然与企业的经营收益相匹配。”

When Prices Depart from Values But in the long-run, the numbers that are reported as earnings don’t change the realities of investing. Berkshire Hathaway’s legendary investor Warren Buffett, whose firm is publicly held, regularly hammers home to his shareholders the message that he prefers Berkshire stock to trade at or around its intrinsic value—neither materially higher nor lower. He explains that “intrinsic value is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of the business during its remaining life . . . When the stock temporarily over-performs or under-performs the business, a limited number of shareholders—either sellers or buyers—receive out-sized benefits at the expense of those they trade with. [But] over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must of necessity match the business gains of the company.”

如果所有投资者都是长期投资者,那么财务诚信以及所有那些盈余管理问题就不会那么令我们担忧。但正如巴菲特先生所说,股票价格大幅短期偏离内在价值,会给少数股东——无论是买方还是卖方——带来超额收益,而这些收益是以与他们交易的另一方股东为代价的。当这些收益不成比例地落入企业内部人士手中,且那些业务利益恰恰依赖这些异常现象的投资银行家和基金经理默许纵容时,我们就面临一个社会性问题——这需要、甚至要求我们予以关注。

If all investors were long term investors, financial probity and all that earnings management would be of less concern to us. But substantial short-term departures of stock prices from intrinsic values generate out-size benefits to a limited number of shareholders—either buyers or sellers—at the expense of those with whom they trade, just as Mr. Buffett says. When those benefits are disproportionately bestowed on corporate insiders with the tacit consent of investment bankers and fund managers whose business interests are served by these aberrations, we have a societal problem that requires—indeed demands—our attention.

您的奖项特别表彰了提供对投资者做投资决策有用的财务信息的重要性。但报告公司最高管理层有强烈的动机去美化自己的业绩,而投资者则希望获得可靠、有用的财务报表——这两者之间存在严重的利益冲突。

Your award specifically recognizes the importance of providing financial information that is useful to investors in making investment decisions. But a serious conflict exists between the powerful motivation of top management of reporting corporations to produce favorable reports on their accomplishments and the interest of investors in receiving reliable and useful financial statements.

在《商业伦理杂志》近期一篇见解独到的文章中,伯克利荣休教授乔治·斯托布斯认为——在我看来颇具说服力——我们的审计师理应对财务报表的使用者(即所有者及其他相关方)而非被审计企业的管理层负责,而他们未能履行这一职责。他还批评会计学者和会计准则制定机构的成员存在同样的效忠偏差。然而,美国最高法院已在判例中裁定(1984 年“美国诉亚瑟·杨案”),审计师的“最终效忠对象是公司股东,以及投资公众”。

In his perceptive recent article in the Journal of Business Ethics, Berkeley Professor Emeritus George Staubus argues—persuasively, in my view—that our auditors owe their allegiance to the owners and other users of the financial statements rather than the managements of the enterprises that they audit, and that they have failed in carrying out that mandate. He also faults academic accountants and members of accounting standards-setting bodies for the same flawed allegiance. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled (in U.S. vs. Arthur Young, 1984) that the auditor’s “ultimate allegiance is to a corporation’s stockholders, as well as the investing public.”

我们必须努力建立这样一个制度:审计师代表的不是公司管理层,而是公司所有者。19 世纪时,制度确实是这么运作的——英国的银行和保险公司把资本送往大洋彼岸,为美国的资本投资(铁路和运河)提供融资,同时派出自己的会计师来审计账簿。可以想见,他们的标准为美国的审计工作奠定了基础。被誉为"美国第一位审计师"的詹姆斯·安扬(James Anyon)就是沿着这条路走的。1912 年,他对行业同仁建议:"要依据事实、真相和原则来思考与行动,只把数字当作表达这些内容的工具。"诚哉斯言!

We must work toward a system in which auditors represent, not corporate managers, but corporate owners. This is how the system actually worked back in the 19th century, when the British banks and insurers who sent their capital across the sea to finance American capital investment—our railroads and our canals—sent their own accountants to audit the books. Presumably, their standards set the stage for American auditing. James Anyon, known as America’s first auditor, followed in their footsteps. In 1912, he advised his professional colleagues, “Think and act upon facts, truths, and principles, and regard figures only as things to express them.” Amen!

当然,指导审计师效忠于公司的所有者,也只解决了当今有缺陷的美国资本主义版本问题的一部分。因为在我们这个代理社会中,持股人与其委托人之间隔着一层充满冲突的代理关系,股票的长线所有者太少,而短线租客太多,实现这一目标绝非胆怯者所能胜任。但我今天的发言时间所剩无几,或许你们的耐心也已耗尽。那这个问题,我们明天再解决吧。

But of course directing the allegiance of the auditors to the owners of our firms is only part of the solution to today’s flawed version of American capitalism. For in our agency society, where the holders of our stocks are a conflict-ridden step removed from their principals, and where there are too few long-term owners of stocks and too many short-term renters of stocks, accomplishing that goal is not a task for the faint-hearted. But time runs out on my remarks today, and perhaps your tolerance. We’ll have to solve that problem, well, tomorrow.

为了社会福祉,我们需要回归到这样一个体系:让真正拥有企业的真实市场在投资策略中重新扮演主角,而类似赌场的预期市场则退居配角——尽管我们仍要努力提供财务报告,尽可能让这些预期变得坚实、可靠、贴近现实。正如所罗门·达尔文教授在上午会议开场时提出的主题那样,要做到这一点,我们每个人都必须集中自身诚信与品格的个人人力资源,去解决这个有缺陷的资本主义时代中出现的那些顽固而棘手的难题。

For the good of our society, we need to return to a system in which the real market of owning businesses returns to play the starring role in investment strategy, and the casino-like expectations market is consigned to a supporting role, even as we strive to provide financial reporting that makes those expectations as hard and firm and realistic as we possibly can. To do so, returning to the theme set out by Professor Solomon Darwin as he opened this morning’s session, each one of us must focus our own personal human resources of integrity and character on resolving the stubborn and difficult issues that have arisen in this flawed era of capitalism.