修复破碎的金融体系

2009 · 演讲 · 原文约 5284 词
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修复破碎的金融体系

约翰·C·博格发言

先锋集团创始人兼前首席执行官

斯特拉德利、罗南、史蒂文斯与杨律师事务所

宾夕法尼亚州费城

2009 年 2 月 12 日

今天能有如此出色的出席人数,我倍感欣慰——这无疑表明我们大费城地区商界和法律界的许多领导者都对这场在我们会面时仍在持续的金融危机深感忧虑。我也感谢斯特拉德利·罗南律师事务所给我这个机会向各位阐述我的观点,并赠与诸位我的最新著作——第七本——几个月前刚刚出版。

Fixing a Broken Financial System Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder and Former Chief Executive, The Vanguard Group Before A Stradley, Ronan, Stevens & Young Assembly Philadelphia, PA February 12, 2009 I’m so pleased with this wonderful turnout—surely an indication that many leaders in our Greater Philadelphia business and legal community are deeply concerned by the financial crisis that continues to unfold as we meet. And I thank Stradley Ronan for giving me the opportunity to present my views to you, as well as their presenting each of you with my newest book—number seven—published just a few months ago.

说来也巧,在诸多方面,《够了》这本书提前预见了——有人说甚至预言了——我们的市场和经济的危机。但与此同时,该书也传达了一个信息:过去几十年里,我们社会在品格和价值观上出现的衰落。如果斯崔德利律所的前资深合伙人、已故的安德鲁·B·扬律师仍在世,面对如今这些乱象,他一定会感到无比震惊。在温斯洛管理公司任法律顾问的 25 年里,我深受安迪的指导,而在这位伟人漫长人生的最后 25 年里,我又从他的洞见和智慧中获益良多。所以,我冒昧将这篇致词献给他,以作纪念。(斯崔德利、罗南、史蒂文斯与扬律所的同仁们:请永远铭记你们那份优秀的传承。)

As it happens, in many respects, ENOUGH, anticipated—some say, predicted—the crisis in our markets and our economy. But the book also sends a message about the decline in our society’s character and values that we have witnessed over the past few decades. No one would have been more appalled by what has gone wrong than Stradley’s former senior partner, the late Andrew B. Young, Esq. I benefited greatly from Andy’s mentorship as Wellington Management Company’s counsel during the 25 years we worked together, as well as from the insight and wisdom of this great man for the remaining 25 years of his long life. So I take the liberty of dedicating these remarks to his memory. (Stradley, Ronan, Stevens & Young people here: never forget your fine heritage.

____________________ 注:本演讲中所表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

____________________ Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.

知足之道。

The Story of ENOUGH.

我先就“够”这个字多说几句。我写这本新书,很大程度上是因为我深切关注那些正在流失的传统价值——不仅在我们的金融体系中,在商界、社区,甚至在我们自己的生活中也是如此。“够”的故事,始于库尔特·冯内古特的一首近似诗歌的作品,标题是《乔·海勒》,是我 2005 年 4 月在《纽约客》上偶然读到的。这首诗致敬了《第二十二条军规》已故的作者——那是二战后划时代的小说之一,也是最成功的小说之一。我可以用几句话概括这首短诗:在谢尔特岛一位亿万富翁举办的聚会上,库尔特·冯内古特告诉海勒,他们那位对冲基金经理的主人,一天之内赚到的钱,比海勒从自己风靡一时的小说《第二十二条军规》整个历史中赚的还多。海勒答道:“是啊,但有一点他一辈子也不会拥有……够了。”

Let me begin with a few comments about ENOUGH. I wrote my new book largely because I care deeply about the traditional values that are eroding not only in our financial system, but also in our businesses, in our communities, and even in our own lives. The story of ENOUGH. begins with a sort-of-poem by Kurt Vonnegut. It was entitled “Joe Heller,” and I chanced upon it in The New Yorker in April 2005. The poem was a tribute to the late author of Catch 22—one of the seminal books of the post-World-War-II era, and one of its most successful. I can summarize the short poem in just a few words: At a party given by a billionaire on Shelter Island, Kurt Vonnegut tells Heller that their host, a hedge fund manager, had made more money in a single day than Heller had earned from his wildly popular novel Catch 22 over its whole history. Heller responds, “Yes, but I have something he will never have . . . enough.”

够了。我震惊于这个词既含义深邃、又简洁优雅,而且它出现得既及时又无比精准。对于我们社会的关键群体——其中包括许多最富有、最有权势的人——似乎从来不知道什么叫“够了”。

Enough. I was stunned by both the profound eloquence and the simple elegance of that word. And it couldn’t have been more accurate or more timely. For a critical element of our society, including many of the wealthiest and most powerful among us, there seems to be no limit on what enough entails.

想想看。我们生活在既美好又令人悲伤的时代——美好在于,民主资本主义的福祉从未像今天这样在全球范围内如此广泛地传播;悲伤在于,同一套民主资本主义的放纵也极少像现在这样暴露无遗。这些放纵最触目惊心的体现,就是我们高杠杆、过度投机的银行与投资银行业持续深陷危机,这场金融危机反过来又成为我们当前经济危机——自大萧条以来最严重的一次——的主要诱因。

Think about it. We live in wonderful and sad times—wonderful in that the blessings of democratic capitalism have never been more broadly distributed around the globe, sad in that the excesses of that same democratic capitalism have rarely been more on display. We see the excesses most starkly in the continuing crisis in our overleveraged, overly-speculative banking and investment banking industries, creating a financial crisis that has been, in turn, the principal cause of the economic crisis we are facing, the worst since the Great Depression.

尽管经济和市场陷入崩溃,我们却亲眼目睹了我国上市公司首席执行官们——包括那些失败的 CEO,甚至往往在他们被扫地出门之际——领取着令人发指(除此之外没有别的词可以形容)的薪酬;考虑到这些机构迫切需要资本才能勉强生存,这些薪酬实际上是由联邦政府——或者更准确地说,是由纳税人,或者更令人痛心地说,是由我们——来支付的。

Despite the economic and market meltdown, however, we witness the obscene (there is no other word for it) compensation paid to the chief executive officers of our nation’s publicly held corporations—including failed CEOs, often even as they are being pushed out the door— compensation that, given the capital these institutions urgently require merely to survive, is being paid by the federal government—or, more accurately, the taxpayers, or, even more poignantly, us.

普通大众却要为华尔街的可耻行为买单……这听起来不太公平,对吧?确实不公平!

Main Street bailing out Wall Street for its disgraceful conduct . . . it doesn’t seem fair, does it? Well, it isn’t!

但是,席卷我们金融体系和企业界的猖獗贪婪,其根源远比金钱更深刻。不明白“够了”是什么,正在侵蚀我们社会的传统价值观:自私自利和贪婪取代了社群利益,专业精神沦为了做生意,金钱凌驾于服务社群之上,服务自我优先于服务他人。这种对“足够”的迷失,在我们的宏观生活中把我们引入歧途——我们常常向那些转瞬即逝、最终毫无意义的东西顶礼膜拜;却未能珍视那些无法衡量、实则永恒的东西。若不加以遏制,我们的失败最终会导致国民品格和价值观的沦丧。所以,从更广泛的意义上说,对于美国已经出问题的地方,我们每个人都负有部分责任。关于我们社会对财富的崇拜以及伦理道德日益堕落的信息,我认为,正是约瑟夫·海勒在说出那个掷地有声的单词时捕捉到的……够了。

But the rampant greed that has overwhelmed our financial system and corporate world runs deeper than money. Not knowing what enough is subverts our society’s traditional values, as self-interest and greed replace community interest, professions behave as businesses, money vs. service to the community, and service to self takes priority over service to others. This confusion about what is enough leads us astray in our larger lives, as we too often bow down at the altar of the transitory and finally meaningless; and we fail to cherish what is beyond calculation, indeed eternal. Unchecked, our failures ultimately result in the diminution of our national character and values. So in a broader sense, we all bear some of the responsibility for what has gone wrong in America. That message about our society’s worship of wealth and the growing corruption of our ethics, I think, is what Joseph Heller captured when he spoke that powerful single word . . . enough.

在乔治城大学的演讲 冯内古特的那首诗让我深受触动,以至于两年后,我在乔治城大学商学院的毕业典礼演讲中,借它来传达一个信息。那是 2007 年 5 月,距离席卷股市、金融体系、房地产持有量和整个经济的巨大泡沫开始破裂,只剩短短几个月。我在那次演讲中以“够了”为主题,开篇引用了冯内古特的诗。

A Speech at Georgetown I was so inspired by Vonnegut’s poem that, in my commencement address at Georgetown University’s business school two years later, I used it to send a message. It was May of 2007, only a few short months before the great bubble that had enveloped our stock market, our financial system, our real estate holdings, and our economy would begin to burst. There I used “Enough” as my theme, and began it with Vonnegut’s poem.

下面是我当时对那些新出炉的 MBA 们说的话:“如果你要进入金融领域,就要睁大眼睛走进去,要认识到,任何从客户身上榨取价值的行当,在比眼下更艰难的时刻,都可能会搬起石头砸自己的脚。华尔街有句俗话说得没错——‘金钱没有良心’,但别让这句老话让你忽略了自己的良心,也别让它改变你的行为和品格。”

Here’s what I then said to those newly-minted MBAs: “If you enter the financial field, do so with your eyes wide open, recognizing that any endeavor that extracts value from its clients may, in times more troubled than these, find that it has been hoist by its own petard. It is said on Wall Street, correctly, that ‘money has no conscience,’ but don’t allow that truism to let you ignore your own conscience, nor to alter your own conduct and character.”

事实证明,我在那次演讲中提出的警告——即必须认识到“任何从客户身上榨取价值(实际上是从社会窃取价值)的行当,在比当时更动荡的时代,都可能发现自己是搬起石头砸了脚”——不仅听起来惊人地准确,而且时机出乎意料地及时。因为金融业确实即将被自己的炸药炸得粉身碎骨。

As it turned out, the warning I set forth in that speech—the need to recognize “that any endeavor that extracts value from its clients (and indeed subtracts value from our society) may, in times more troubled than these, find that it has been hoist by its own petard”—proved not only eerily prophetic, but surprisingly timely. For the financial sector was indeed about to be blown up by its own dynamite.

信念之举

我们金融体系的失败,体现在它对自身投资基本原则的背叛,也是对信念的背叛。矛盾的是,仅仅十年前,我就在 1999 年出版的《共同基金常识:聪明投资者的新准则》一书的开篇第一句中写道:“投资是一种信念之举。”

An Act of Faith The failure of our financial system is reflected in its betrayal of the fundamental principles under which we invest, a betrayal of our faith. Paradoxically, just a decade ago, I wrote in the very first sentence of my 1999 book, Common Sense on Mutual Funds: New Imperatives for the Intelligent Investor, that, “investing is an act of faith.”

接着,我用三方面内容来充实这句简短直白的陈述句:1)相信我们的企业经理人“能为我们的投资带来高回报率”;2)相信“美国经济及其金融市场的成功将持续下去”;3)相信我们的专业投资经理“会成为我们委托给他们的资产的警惕管家”。

I then amplified that short, simple declarative sentence in three areas: 1) faith that our corporate managers “will generate high rates of return on our investments”; 2) faith that the “success of the U.S. economy and the nation’s financial markets will continue”; and 3) faith that our professional money managers “will be vigilant stewards of the assets we entrust to them.”

如今我们知道,我们的信任,在太多时候遭到了背叛。太多的企业管理者——最近的是银行和投资银行行业,更早的则是安然、世通等公司——为了自身财务利益而非股东/所有者的利益行事,辜负了我们的信任。我们的经济正深陷自大萧条以来最严重的衰退。股市已暴跌至 1996 年以来的最低点,几乎抹去了近十几年的涨幅。(暂且不提其中一些涨幅反映的,嗯,非理性繁荣,代表着,嗯,注定消失的“虚幻收益”。)而我们的专业基金经理们,非但没有扮演长期投资者的角色——作为我们资产警惕的守护者,作为共同基金投资者和养老金受益人的审慎受托人,他们本应忠于职守——反而在很大程度上变成了短期投机者,行事如同股票交易员,将自身利益置于客户利益之上。

As we now know, our faith, far too often, has been betrayed. Too many of our corporate managers—most recently those in the banking and investment banking industries, but earlier at Enron, WorldCom and the like—have forfeited our trust by operating in their own financial interests and not in the interests of their shareholders/owners. Our economy is in the midst of the deepest recession since the Great Depression. Our stock markets have plunged to levels not seen since 1996, forfeiting nearly a dozen years of gains. (Leave aside that some of those gains reflected, well, irrational exuberance, and represented, well, “phantom returns” destined to vanish.) And our professional money managers, rather than acting as long term investors— serving as vigilant stewards of our assets and acting as prudent trustees for the mutual fund investors and the pension fund beneficiaries they were duty bound to serve—have instead largely become short-term speculators, behaving as stock traders and placing their own interests ahead of the interests of their clients.

危机的父亲们。对于这场灾难,要分担责任的人可不少。常言道“胜利有一千个父亲,但失败是个孤儿”——然而,在我们这场毁灭性的金融危机中,投资者遭受的失败,打个比方来说,似乎有一千个父亲。美联储在 2000-2002 年股市崩盘后,将利率维持在过低水平过久,且未能对抵押贷款银行家施加约束。我们的银行和投行,设计并销售了价值数万亿美元的极其复杂且高风险的抵押贷款支持债券,以及数十万亿美元的衍生品(主要是信用违约沼泽)。它们还被迫持有大量这些有毒衍生品,资产负债表杠杆率极高——有时高达 33 倍甚至更多。算算便知:资产价值仅缩水 3%,就会抹去股东 100% 的净资产。

Fathers of the Crisis There is plenty of responsibility to spread around for what went wrong. So while it is often said that “victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan,” the defeat suffered by investors in our devastating financial crisis seems to have, figuratively speaking, a thousand fathers. The Federal Reserve, keeping interest rates too low for too long after the 2000-2002 stock market crash, and failing to impose discipline on mortgage bankers. Our banks and investment banks, which designed and sold trillions of dollars worth of incredibly complex and risky mortgage-backed bonds and tens of trillions of dollars of derivatives (largely credit default swamps). They were also left holding the bag with many of these toxic derivatives, held in highly leveraged balance sheets—sometimes by as much as 33 to one or more. Just do the math; a mere three percent decline in asset value wipes out 100 percent of shareholder equity.

这些机构还给我们带来了“证券化”——将贷款出售给未经检验的金融工具,从而切断了放贷人与借款人之间的传统纽带。随着这一变化,银行放出贷款后再把贷款卖给这些新型债券基金,银行要求借款人具备信用可靠性的动力几乎消失殆尽。银行业早已彻底脱离了以“借款人财务诚信与品格”为核心的社区贷款模式——那种我们在《美好人生》里看到的传统。(还记得吉米·斯图尔特演的乔治·贝利,以及莱昂纳尔·巴里摩尔饰演的脾气暴躁的波特先生吗?)

These institutions also brought us “securitization,” selling off loans to untested financial instruments and severing the traditional link between lender and borrower. With that change, the incentive to demand credit-worthiness on the part of those who borrow almost vanished as banks lent the money and then sold the loans to these new bond funds. In banking we’ve come a long, long way from community lending built on the financial probity and the character of the borrower, the kind of thing we saw in “It’s a Wonderful Life.” (Remember Jimmy Stewart as George Bailey and Lionel Barrymore’s crusty Mr. Potter?)

我们的市场监管者也难辞其咎:美国证券交易委员会(SEC)几乎对资本市场上正在发生的一切无动于衷,未能意识到事态的严重性。美国商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)则放任衍生品的交易和定价在完全不透明的情况下进行——既不要求充分披露、让阳光照进市场,也毫不关心对手方在押注失利时是否有能力履行其财务义务。

Our market regulators, too, have a lot to answer for: The Securities & Exchange Commission was almost apathetic in its failure to recognize what was happening in the capital markets. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission allowed the trading and valuation of derivatives to proceed opaquely, without transparency, without demanding the sunlight of full disclosure, and without concern for the ability of the counterparties to meet their financial obligations if their bets went sour.

也别忘了国会,它在几乎漫不经心间就把衍生品市场的监管责任甩给了商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)。国会纵容——甚至鼓励——我们那些由政府资助(现在实质上由政府拥有)的企业——房利美和房地美——去冒险,允许它们将业务扩张到远超资本金所能支撑的规模,并推动它们降低贷款标准。国会还废除了 1933 年的《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》,这部法案原本将传统银行业务与投资银行业务隔离开来,这种隔离在超过 60 年的时间里一直很好地服务于我们的国家利益。

And let’s not forget Congress, which passed responsibility for regulation of the derivatives market to the CFTC almost as an afterthought. Congress allowed—indeed encouraged—risk-taking by our government-sponsored (now essentially government-owned) enterprises—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—allowing them to expand far beyond the capacity of their capital, and pushing them to lower their lending standards. Congress also gutted the GlassSteagall Act of 1933, which had separated traditional banking and investment banking, a separation that for more than 60 years well-served our national interest.

我们的专业证券分析师也难辞其咎,尤其是他们几乎普遍未能意识到,新一代银行家和投资银行家所承担的巨额信贷风险——这些人对自己所在机构的盈利增长,远比对其资产负债表的稳健性更感兴趣。我们的信用评级机构同样难逃其责:它们以收取巨额费用为回报,将证券化贷款评为 AAA 级——这些慷慨的费用恰恰来自那些要求获得该评级的发行人,而正是这一评级令那些最终被证明大多是垃圾债券的证券得以在市场上出售。(没错,这就叫“利益冲突”。)

Our professional security analysts also have much to answer for, especially in their almost universal failure to recognize the huge credit risks assumed by the new breed of bankers and investment bankers who were far more interested in earnings growth for their institutions than in the sanctity of their balance sheets. So do our credit rating agencies, for bestowing AAA ratings on securitized loans in return for enormous fees—handsomely paid in return by the very issuers who demanded those ratings, which allowed what proved to be largely junk bonds to be sold in the marketplace. (Yes, it’s called “conflict of interest.”)

是的,可以指责的对象很多,但归根结底,问题出在全体美国公民身上——我们对“更多”永不知足的追求,以及日益膨胀的自私放纵,而非对体制健康的关心。

Yes, there’s plenty of blame to go around, finally rooted in the American citizenry at large with our insatiable demand for “more” and our growing appetite for self-indulgence rather than the well-being of our system.

我们该如何修复这个支离破碎的体系?

How Can We Fix Our Broken System?

我们眼下确实是一团糟。这局面要怎么收场?首先要认清:这是我们自己搞出来的烂摊子。在经济层面,我们需要相当长的时间来消化房贷和消费信贷累积的巨大债务负担,也需要相当长的时间让银行体系修复满目疮痍的资产负债表。当那些捉襟见肘的美国家庭开始多储蓄、少消费时,这道修复题只会更难。我们正经历经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯所说的“节俭悖论”——储蓄对个人而言是好事、是必需,但在我们这个靠消费驱动的经济里,同样的储蓄反而会起反作用,让市场苦苦等待的商业活动回升遥遥无期。

So we have a real mess on our hands. How does it ever get resolved? The first thing to recognize is that it’s our mess. In the economy, it will take considerable time to unwind the huge debt overload we have taken on in our mortgages, and our consumer debt, and considerable time for our banking system to re-liquefy its tattered balance sheets. The task will hardly be made easier when our hard-pressed families save more and spend less. We are living through “the paradox of thrift,” economist John Maynard Keynes’s formulation that described savings as good and necessary for the individual, even as those same savings are counterproductive for our consumer-driven economy, crying for the long awaited upsurge in business activity.

需要多久?我猜——虽然我既没有高深洞见也谈不上经济专长——衰退放缓、企业活动回升,可能还要一年半到两年。这场经济危机积重难返,要从中脱困同样需要很长时间。但最终,随着我们体制的改革,美国社会与经济的韧性必将重现。

How much time will it take? I’d guess—although I have neither great insight nor economic expertise—that it might take a year and a half to two years before the recession slows and business activity turns upward. It took a long time to create this economic crisis, and it will take a long time to fight our way out of it. But ultimately, given reforms in our system, the resilience of our American society and our American economy will reassert itself.

我需要指出的是,尽管目前由总统和国会选用来刺激经济的工具充满不确定性且未经检验,但它们能帮助我们度过这场危机。然而,我们最需要的是恢复信心所必需的清晰性和一贯性。正在走向总统办公桌的那份 7890 亿美元刺激方案远非完美,但它大体上做了正确的事——提高失业救济金、为年收入低于 20 万美元的人群减税、改善基础设施、帮助房贷持有人。尽管这份法案肯定不完美,但要说联邦政府应该无视这场可怕的经济危机,那根本说不过去。

I should point out that while the tools we use to stimulate the economy are now being chosen by our president and our congress, these remedies are uncertain and untested. They can help us through the crisis, but what we need most of all are the clarity and consistency necessary to restore confidence. The $789 billion stimulus package that is now on the track to the President’s desk is a long way from perfect, but it is largely doing the right things—increased unemployment benefits, tax cuts for those earning less than $200,000 per year, infrastructure improvements, help to mortgage holders. Imperfect as the bill surely will be, it’s impossible to argue that the federal government should ignore this ghastly economic crisis.

除了刺激计划之外,当然,我们还在处理另一套旨在拯救银行体系的金融方案——又是 1 万亿美元(公共和私人资金),而且数字还在增加,再加上 10 亿美元的联邦贷款担保。(我们似乎对近 3 万亿美元的联邦承诺变得麻木了!)财政部长盖特纳近期的提案似乎无人理会,股市——以它那不可避免的投机性愚蠢——立刻给了他不及格的评价。但没有什么灵丹妙药。尽管如此,财政部计划的核心是正确的:我们需要同时动用私人资本和公共资本,以便让我们的银行——一家接一家——清理它们的资产负债表,恢复正常的放贷业务。部长还承诺进行“压力测试”,旨在评估银行的财务状况,同样是一家一家来。(人们可能会认为,这本该是银行管理层和银行监管者长期以来的做法。但事实并非如此。)而且,那些通不过测试的银行——可能数量不少——将不得不被清算,其存款在现有联邦法律下基本得到保障。

In addition to the stimulus package, of course, we’re dealing with a separate financial package designed to rescue our banking system—another $1 trillion (public and private) and counting, and $1 billion of Federal loan backing. (We seem immune to shock over the nearly $3 trillion of Federal commitment out there!) Treasury secretary Geithner’s recent proposals seemed to fall on deaf ears, and the stock market—in its inevitably speculative unwisdom—immediately gave him a failing grade. But there is no miracle cure. Nonetheless, the essence of the Treasury plan is correct: we need to engage private capital as well as public capital in order to enable our banks—one by one—to clean up their balance sheets and resume normal lending practices. The secretary also promised “stress tests” designed to assess their financial health, again, bank by bank. (One might have thought this had been a long-standing practice of bank managers and bank regulators alike. But that was not the case.) And surely banks that don’t pass the test—and there may be quite a few—will have to be liquidated, with their deposits largely guaranteed under existing federal law.

如果联邦政府支付了银行的账单,自然也有权决定奏什么曲调。这是所有权赋予的权利,也引出了一个现实问题——我们的体系已部分国有化。我个人认为,政府对其提供资本的机构,远未谈成足够苛刻的条件。事实上,我怀疑,如果换作迪拜这样的地方,向花旗集团注入 550 亿美元资本,它索取的权益会远高于一笔低收益优先股和认股权证——后者赋予政府的潜在持股比例还不到 1%。(为记录在案:花旗集团目前的市值约为 190 亿美元,而 2006 年时曾高达 2740 亿美元。花旗还背负着约 5000 亿美元的短期和长期债务,简单计算一下就能知道,这些债务在某种程度上也同样位列“濒危物种”名单。)

If the federal government pays the bank piper, of course, it has the right to call the tune. That’s the right of ownership, and it brings up the issue of nationalization our—let’s face it— already partially-nationalized system. My own view is that the government has not driven nearly a hard enough bargain with the institutions for which it has provided capital. Indeed, I suspect that, say, Dubai, would have demanded a lot more equity for a $55 billion capital infusion into Citigroup than a low-yielding preferred stock and warrants that might entitle it to own less than 1 percent of the company. (For the record, the current market value of Citigroup is about $19 billion, down from $274 billion as recently as 2006. Citi also has some $500 billion of short- and long-term debt, which simple mathematics tells us must also be, to one degree or another, on the endangered species list.)

核心问题

然而,很少有人关注那些助长这场危机的更广泛的系统性因素。资本主义的两大根本性变化显然起了关键作用。问题的核心,恰恰指向了我们对大型上市公司的所有权这一根本议题。

The Heart of the Matter But little attention has been given to the broader systemic issues that have contributed to this crisis. Two overarching changes in capitalism have clearly played a major role. The heart of the matter goes to the very issue of the ownership of our giant publicly-held corporations.

只有企业管理者专注于为所有者创造长期价值,美国企业界才能成为国家增长与繁荣的首要引擎,以及创新与实验的主要源泉。如果管理者不受约束地坐在驾驶座上,以牺牲所有者利益为代价中饱私囊,资本主义就无法繁荣昌盛。

Only if its managers are focused on creating long-term value for its owners can corporate America be the prime engine of the nation’s growth and prosperity and a major source of innovation and experimentation. To the extent that mangers sit unchecked in the driver’s seat, feathering their own nests at the expense of their owners, capitalism cannot flourish.

在过去的半个世纪里,资本主义的本质经历了一场病态的突变。我们已经从一个所有权社会——92% 的股票由个人投资者持有,他们照管自己的利益,只有 8% 由金融机构持有——转变成了一个代理社会:如今我们的机构持有 75% 的股票,个人仅持有 25%。

During the past half-century, the very nature of capitalism has undergone a pathological mutation. We have moved from an ownership society in which 92 percent of stocks were held by individual investors looking after their own interests and only 8 percent by financial institutions, to an agency society in which our institutions now hold 75 percent of stocks and individuals hold but 25 percent.

这些机构代理人不仅背弃了对其负有受托责任的主体的利益,也抛弃了传统的投资原则。正是这些代理人推动着市场参与的核心特征从长期投资——即持有能带来资本回报的企业,通过留存收益再投资创造价值并向股东分配股息——转向短期投机,本质上是买卖股票、押注未来价格。玩这种游戏的不仅是对冲基金,还包括大多数共同基金和许多大型养老计划。

These institutional agents have not only betrayed the interests of the principals to whom they owe a duty of trusteeship, but have also abandoned their traditional investment principles. For it is these agents who have been the driving force in changing the central characteristic of market participation from long-term investment—owning businesses that earn a return on their capital, creating value by reinvesting their earnings and distributing dividends to their owners—to short-term speculation, essentially trading stocks and betting on their future prices. It is not only hedge funds that are playing this game, but most mutual funds and many giant pension plans.

今天我们正在见证一场前所未有的投机狂欢。1929 年美股最高年换手率为 140%,而在我从事这一行的头几十年里,这一数字降至约 25%。去年换手率达到了约 350%,投机者之间相互交易,每个人都想占对手的便宜——显而易见——这创造的经济价值为零。正是因为投机的兴起,才会出现这样的现象:往年正常年份里,市场从未出现过单日涨跌幅达到或超过 3% 的情况,但自 2008 年 1 月 1 日以来,这样的交易日已经出现了 50 次。

Today, we are witnessing an orgy of speculation the likes of which have never been seen before. Turnover in the U.S. stock market is at the previous high in 1929 was 140 percent; it fell to about 25 percent during my first few decades in this business. Last year, turnover was about 350 percent, speculators trading with other speculators, each with the idea of taking advantage of those on the other side of the trade, creating—to state the obvious—zero in economic value. It is the rise of speculation that explains why in a typical year the market never moved by daily increments of 3 percent or more (up or down) but have experienced 50 such days since 1/1/08.

投机掌握了方向盘。但华尔街的营销人员和企业家们却狂热拥抱这套新体系——复杂产品、量化模型、创新口号与无约束风险——因为这为他们带来了数十亿美元的利润。于是,华尔街内部人士很容易就沉溺于这套体系为自己创造的财富,而忽视它对客户财富的摧毁。我们的股票经纪公司、资金管理公司以及其他内部人士的收入,从 1990 年估计的 600 亿美元飙升至 2007 年的约 6000 亿美元。

Speculation is in the Driver’s Seat But Wall Street marketers and entrepreneurs loved this new system of speculation in complex products, quantification, innovation, and unconstrained risk, for it made them billions in profits. So it was easy for Wall Street insiders to wallow in the wealth it generated for themselves, and ignore its destruction of their clients’ wealth. Revenues of our stock brokerage firms, money managers, and the other insiders soared from an estimated $60 billion in 1990 to some $600 billion in 2007.

所以,尽管投资者之间的相互买卖——这本身就很愚蠢——按定义是一个零和游戏,但一旦扣除华尔街赌场荷官的费用,就变成了一个负和游戏。(想想拉斯维加斯,想想大西洋城赛马场。哎,想想伦德尔州长的彩票。)因此,对于作为一个整体的投资者群体来说——他们不可避免地处于投资食物链的底层,在扣除荷官费用后获得剩余的市场回报——交易是一个负和游戏,亏损额正好等于这些费用。2007 年的 6000 亿美元,加上此前多年的数千亿美元,显然对投资者在牛市中获得的收益构成了一个极其沉重的打击,并在随后的熊市中给了他们一记响亮的耳光。投资者曾经对华尔街抱有的任何信心,如今已基本消失殆尽,这本该如此。我们中的投机者,以及那些忘记了投资与投机区别的人——这两类人不可避免地都表现出极大的贪婪——必须为金融泡沫及其后的崩盘承担部分责任。

So while trading back and forth with one another—foolish as it is—is by definition a zero-sum game, once the costs of our Wall Street croupiers are deducted it is a loser’s game. (Think Las Vegas, think the Atlantic City Race Track. Heck, think Governor Rendell’s lottery.) So for investors as a group—who inevitably feed at the bottom of the food chain of investing receiving whatever market returns remain after the croupiers costs—trading is a loser’s game, by the amount of these costs. That $600 billion in 2007 plus many hundreds of billions in earlier years, obviously represent a truly staggering hit to the gains investors earned in the bull market, and a financial slap in their face in the bear market that followed. Any confidence in Wall Street that our investors once may have had has largely vanished, just as it should have. The speculators among us, and those of us who have forgotten the distinction between investment and speculation—two groups that inevitably display a large amount of greed—must share a portion of the responsibility for the financial bubble and the ensuing crash.

当一个“拥有股票”的行业变成了“租用股票”的行业,对公司治理的担忧便首当其冲成为牺牲品——这是资本主义体系运转失常的预兆。然而,理想的股东是长期持有者,甚至可能是永久持有者,其目标与公司高度一致。伦敦《经济学人》杂志说得很好:“如今一切都取决于金融机构能否加大力度推动改革,让董事会更像监管者,而不是首席执行官手中提线木偶的集合……金融机构还必须争取恢复作为股东的权利,并利用自身影响力选举董事,而这些董事必须只代表股东作为所有者的集体利益。首席执行官仍然经营公司;但就像其他任何员工一样,他们也得有个老板。”

When an own-a-stock industry becomes a rent-a-stock industry, concern about corporate governance is the first casualty—a harbinger that our capitalistic system is not working properly. Yet the ideal owner is a long-term stockholder, perhaps even a permanent owner, whose goals are closely aligned with those of the corporation, The Economist of London expressed it well: “Everything now depends on financial institutions pressing even harder for reforms to make boards of directors behave more like overseers, and less like the chief executive’s collection of puppets . . . Financial institutions must also fight to restore their rights as shareholders and use their clout to elect directors, who would be obliged to represent only their collective interest as owners. Chief executives will still run their firms; but, like any other employee, they would also have a boss.”

美国投资界的巨型机构必须带头实现这些目标。我们的资金管理者不仅持有全部股票的 75%,而且他们拥有足够的人手来仔细审阅公司的财务报表和代理委托书;拥有专业能力来评估 CEO 的业绩、薪酬和特权;而且,一旦所有代理投票(无论是养老基金还是共同基金)的全面披露成为强制性要求,他们就有动力按照受益人完全有权期待的方式去投票。他们在这些领域的失职,也对我们金融体系出现的问题负有重要责任。(比如说,有谁在分析我们银行那些有毒的资产负债表?)

The giant institutions of investment America must take the lead in accomplishing these goals. Our money managers not only hold 75 percent of all shares, but they have the staff to pore over corporate financial statements and proxies; the professional expertise to evaluate CEO performance, pay, and perquisites; and, once full disclosure of all proxy votes (by pension funds as well as mutual funds) becomes mandatory, the incentive to vote in the manner that their beneficiaries have every right to expect. Their dereliction of duty in these areas also bears an important responsibility for what went wrong in our financial sector. (Who, for example, was analyzing those toxic balance sheets of our banks?)

当他们回归——他们必然回归——对长期投资的传统关注时,这些机构所有者必须争取对其所拥有公司的控制杠杆,这种介入既符合其主导性所有权地位,也体现了他们愿意承担企业公民的权利与责任。如果这些机构不能很快回归审慎投资的传统标准,我们就必须制定联邦层面的受托责任法规,让资本所有者的利益优先——为存在缺陷的代理社会确立新的所有权导向。这是我们新兴金融体系监管改革的主要任务之一。

When they return—as they must—to their traditional focus on long-term investing, these institutional owners must fight for the access to the levers of control over the corporations they own that are both appropriate for their dominant ownership position and a reflection of their willingness to accept both the rights and responsibilities of corporate citizenship. And if these institutions do not soon return to traditional standards of prudent investment, we’ll have to institute a Federal stature of fiduciary duty, under which the interests of those whose capital is at stake comes first—a new ownership focus for our flawed agency-society. And this is one of the major reforms in the regulation we need in our emerging financial system.

将资本主义归还给所有者需要时间,这一点毋庸置疑。但新的现实——日益清晰——是,良好的公司治理绝非只是可供辩论的理想。它是必须付诸实践的关键要素。我强调,所有者的角色仅仅是确保董事和管理层的利益在实质上与股东利益保持一致。当利益冲突出现时,应由股东做出决策。符合国家公共利益和投资者利益的是,由投资美国所代表的所有者意识到,开明的公司治理不仅是企业所有权的权利。它更是对国家的责任。

The task of returning capitalism to its owners will take time, true enough. But the new reality—increasingly visible with each passing day—is that proper corporate governance is not merely an ideal to be debated. It is a vital necessity to be practiced. The role of the owners, I underscore, is to do no more than ensure that the interests of directors and management are aligned with those of the shareholders in a substantive way. When there is a conflict of interest, it is the shareholders who should make the decision. It is in the national public interest and in the interest of investors that the owners—represented largely by investment America—come to realize that enlightened corporate governance is not merely a right of business ownership. It is a responsibility to the nation.

在这个我们似乎喜欢用“故事”来解释复杂问题的时代,以下三位人物分别代表了三个简短轶事,他们的名字你们都很熟悉——(1)艾伦·格林斯潘、(2)伯纳德·马多夫、(3)巴拉克·奥巴马,一个看似不可能的三位一体——以及他们各自在(1)这场金融危机如何开始、(2)我们如何欺骗自己、(3)我们必须做些什么来度过如今困扰我们的这些极为棘手的经济困境中所扮演的角色。我将通过叙述来进行分析。

In these days when we seem to like “stories” to explain complex issues, each of these men exemplify, respectively three short anecdotes centered on individuals whose names will be familiar to you—(1) Alan Greenspan, (2) Bernard Madoff, and (3) Barack Obama, an unlikely triumvirate if ever there were one—and their respective roles in: (1) how this financial crisis began, (2) how we fooled ourselves, and (3) what we must do to work out way through the incredibly intractable economic woes that now plague us. I’ll do this analysis by relating.

艾伦·格林斯潘与泡沫 首先是前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘。他比任何其他人都更处于金融泡沫及其必然破裂的发展核心。他在收紧信贷的时机早已到来之时,成功说服他的美联储同僚继续提供宽松信贷,并忽视由自由放任的抵押贷款业务所制造的危险,在这种业务中,借款人与贷款人之间的必要联系已经被切断。事实证明,他的理论分析和影响市场的能力,建立在一个错误的假设之上。

Alan Greenspan and the Bubble First, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. More than any other individual, he was central to the development of the financial bubble and the burst that inevitably followed. He successfully urged his fellow Fed governors to continue to make easy credit available when the time to tighten credit had long since arrived, and to ignore the perils created by a free-wheeling mortgage banking business in which the necessary link between borrowers and lenders had been severed. His intellectual analysis and his market-moving power, it turns out, were based on a false premise.

值得肯定的是,去年十月在国会作证时,格林斯潘承认了自己的错误。他承认这场危机是由“一场百年一遇的信贷海啸”引发的,而这场海啸源于“整个知识大厦”的坍塌。他说:“那些指望贷款机构的自利行为能保护股东权益的人——尤其是我自己——都处于震惊的难以置信之中。”他说,自利未能实现自我调节,这是“我所认为的定义世界运行方式的关键功能结构中的一个缺陷”。

To his credit, in his testimony before Congress last October, Greenspan admitted his mistake. He acknowledged that the crisis had been prompted by “a once-in-a-century credit tsunami,” which had arisen from the collapse of a “whole intellectual edifice.” “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity—myself especially—are in a state of shocked disbelief,” he said. This failure of self-interest to provide self-regulation was, he said, “a flaw in the model that I perceived as the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works.”

这个短语值得深思:“定义世界运行方式的关键功能结构”。正如《纽约客》作家约翰·兰彻斯特所言:“在一个如此宏大的东西里发现缺陷,可真够呛。”兰彻斯特接着描述了另一种理解这一缺陷的方式:“掌权者自以为比实际懂得更多。银行家们显然数学懂得太多,历史懂得太少——或许两者都不够。”对此我要补充:确实如此!

It’s worth dwelling on that phrase: “the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works.” As the New Yorker writer John Lanchester observed: “That’s a hell of a big thing to find a flaw in.” Here’s another way of describing that flaw, Lanchester continues: “the people in power thought they knew more than they did. The bankers evidently knew too much math and not enough history—or maybe they didn’t know enough of either.” To which I would add, enough indeed!

伯纳德·马多夫与自欺欺人 接下来,让我们转向第二个问题,即我们在金融市场上如何欺骗自己,投资者——无论是个人还是机构——似乎都失去了所有判断力。短期投机——比美国历史上任何时期都更甚——成了这场大戏的主角,而长期投资连配角都算不上。我们中太多人过于贪婪,太愿意相信有些基金经理能够大幅击败市场产生的回报;我们几乎像孩子一样急切地支付高昂成本来获取这些回报(结果证明根本不存在);并且或多或少没有意识到那个为华尔街机器上油的强大营销体系。所有这些有害力量都汇聚在伯纳德·马多夫操纵的庞氏骗局中。

Bernard Madoff and How We Fool Ourselves Next, let’s turn to issue number two, how we fooled ourselves in the financial markets, where investors—individual and institutional alike—seemed to lose all perspective. Short-term speculation—more than at any time in the entire history of our nation—was the star of this show, and long-term investment barely played even a supporting role. Too many of us were too greedy, too willing to believe that there were managers who could roundly beat the returns generated in our markets; almost childlike in our eagerness to pay the substantial costs to capture these returns (which proved non-existent); and more or less unaware of the powerful marketing system that greases the machinery of Wall Street. All of these baneful forces converged in the enormous Ponzi scheme directed by Bernard Madoff.

与格林斯潘不同,马多夫对本轮危机的贡献只是边缘性的,但他无疑是其典型代表。正如我国最大、最著名的金融机构创造的众多复杂创新一样,马多夫的庞氏骗局确实被自身的炸药炸毁了。然而,尽管投资者似乎对马多夫基金的崩溃感到惊讶,并为其规模感到震惊,但我们本不该如此。

Unlike Greenspan, Madoff was only a marginal contributor to the present crisis, but he surely is its exemplar. Like so many of the complex innovations created by our nation’s largest and most prominent financial institutions, Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was indeed blown up by its own dynamite. While investors seemed surprised by the collapse of the Madoff fund and astounded by its magnitude, however, we should not have been.

事实上,他声称的投资回报是荒谬的。在我漫长的职业生涯中,我见过一些实现了高回报的基金经理,也见过其他成功实现了持续回报的基金经理——无论出于技巧还是运气。但任何经验丰富的投资者都知道,兼具高回报和持续回报的组合纯粹是自相矛盾的。然而,马多夫吸引了许多自认为属于“聪明钱”群体、或试图加入该群体的富裕投资者。这些投资者往往将财富托付给那些知道赚大钱“秘诀”的经理,这个秘诀能让那些已经足够、但还想要更多的人致富。然而,可悲的是,战胜市场的秘诀就是没有秘诀。

In fact, the investment returns he claimed were preposterous. In my long career, I’ve seen some money managers who have earned high returns, and others who have succeeded in earning consistent returns—in each case, whether by skill or luck. But any seasoned investor knows that a pairing of returns that are both high and consistent is truly oxymoronic. Yet Madoff attracted wealthy investors who thought of themselves as part of the “smart money” crowd, or sought to join that crowd. Too often these investors entrusted their fortunes to managers who knew “the secret” of making lots of money, a secret that would enrich those who had, well, enough, but wanted still more. Alas, however, the secret of beating the markets is that there is no secret.

随着他在个人投资者中因拥有“聪明钱秘诀”而声名鹊起,那些本该更懂行的机构经理也加入了“高且持续回报”的行列。马多夫的骗局得到了营销者的推波助澜,他们将马多夫推荐给自己重要的客户——那些被马多夫骗局所迷惑、同时又因此大发横财的 FOF 基金(fund of hedge funds)经理。例如,仅一家公司就在短短四年内,通过简单地将客户资金投资于马多夫的基金,获得了 5 亿美元的费用。这些经理显然无视“信任,但要核实”这一历史悠久的准则,未能通过尽职调查的考验。他们付出如此少的努力却获得如此巨额的报酬,生动地诠释了厄普顿·辛克莱的一个永恒警告,我在此转述:“如果一个人因为不理解某事而能获得一笔小财富,那么他很难理解这件事,这真是令人惊讶。”

As his reputation for having the “smart money secret” was burnished by individual investors, institutional managers who should have known better also joined the “high-and-consistent-returns” throng. Madoff’s scheme was fostered by marketers who recommended him to their own substantial clients—hedge-fund-of-hedge-funds managers who were taken in by Madoff’s scam, even as they were grossly enriched by it. In just four years, for example, a single firm received $500 million of fees, simply by investing their clients’ money in Madoff’s fund. Apparently ignorant of the time-honored rule “trust, but verify,” these managers flunked the due-diligence test. Paid such huge revenues for so little effort, they are a vivid example of one of Upton Sinclair’s timeless warnings, which I paraphrase here: “It’s amazing how difficult it is for a man to understand something if he’s paid a small fortune not to understand it.”

奥巴马总统、领导力与信心 我的第三个也是最后一个主题是“我们该往何处去?”我们正面临我成年以来最严重的经济危机(我出生在大萧条前夕,所以我不记得那次危机!),一场规模大得超乎想象、复杂程度超过我们大多数人(或许所有人!)智力能力的金融烂摊子。更糟糕的是,我们正在考虑的解决方案没有先例——因此成功与否尚不确定。解决危机和改革体制需要耐心和牺牲——这两种特质目前似乎远非我们国民性格的界定要素。

President Obama, Leadership, and Confidence My third and final subject is “where do we go from here?” We are facing the worst economic crisis of my adult lifetime (I was born just before the Great Depression, so I don’t remember it!), a financial mess that is enormous beyond imagination, and complex beyond the intellectual capacity of most (perhaps all!) of us. What’s more, the solutions that we are considering are without precedent—and therefore uncertain of success. Resolving the crisis and reforming the system will take patience and sacrifice—two traits that at the moment seem far from being the defining elements of our national character.

这就是巴拉克·奥巴马登场的地方。因为尽管解决问题和改革既不容易也不迅速,但两者都需要强有力的领导。没有强有力的领导,我们就迷失了方向。我并非以党派人士的身份,而是以一名公民的身份表达我的信念:奥巴马总统能够——并且将会——给我们提供我们迫切需要的领导力。显然,他理解这一挑战。请回忆他在就职演说中的这些话:“我们正处于危机之中,这一点现在已广为人知……我们的经济严重受损,这是部分人的贪婪和不负责任的结果,也是我们集体未能做出艰难抉择、未能为国家迎接新时代做好准备的结果……摆在我们面前的问题(不是)市场是善还是恶。它创造财富和扩大自由的力量无与伦比,但这场危机提醒我们,如果没有警惕的目光,市场可能会失控——而且如果一个国家只惠及富裕者,它就无法长久繁荣。我们经济的成功,向来不仅取决于我们国内生产总值的规模,还取决于我们繁荣的广度;取决于我们向每一颗渴望的心提供机会的能力……这是通往我们共同福祉的最可靠途径。”

Here is where Barak Obama comes in. For while resolution and reform will come neither easily nor quickly, both require strong leadership. And without strong leadership, we are lost. I speak not as a partisan but as a citizen when I express my belief that President Obama can—and will—give us the kind of leadership we urgently require. Clearly, he understands the challenge. Recall with me these words from his Inaugural Address: “That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood . . . Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age . . . The question before us (is not) whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control—and that a nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on our ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart . . . the surest route to our common good.”

“我们成功所依赖的那些价值观——勤奋与诚实、勇气与公平、包容与好奇、忠诚与爱国——这些是古老的。这些是真实的。因此,所需要的就是回归这些真理。现在要求我们的是一个新时代的责任——每个美国人都要认识到,我们对自己、对国家、对世界负有责任,这些责任我们并非勉强接受,而是欣然承担,坚定地知道,没有什么比全身心投入一项艰巨任务更能让精神满足、更能定义我们的品格。这就是公民身份的代价和承诺。”

“Those values upon which our success depends—hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism—these things are old. These things are true. What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility—a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character, than giving our all to a difficult task. This is the price and the promise of citizenship.”

聆听总统就职演说时,他出众的口才给我留下了深刻印象。当我在第二天报纸上读到发言稿时,其铿锵韵律中回荡的力量、清晰与现实主义更令我震撼。虽然他没有使用“美国,我们受够了”这句话(他在接受党内提名时用了这句——当然,这让我很高兴),但我惊讶地发现,他的言辞和价值观与我数月前为《够了》一书所写的内容何其相似。在我提出“对美国来说够了吗?”的那一节中,请看看我们新总统的理想是否回响着我自己的理念:“虽然美国似乎拥有足够多的物质财富,但我们的传统价值观正在侵蚀,很快我们将所剩无几。所以请永远记住,长期来看,构成任何国家核心的既不是物质,也不是权力或金钱,而是价值观——正是那些应用于我们社会的价值观,我在此为我们每个人所描述的:坚韧、韧性、道德标准和美德——这些造就了伟大国家。简而言之,问题不在于美国是否有足够的金钱、足够的生产性财富来维持和增强其全球存在与实力,而在于我们是否有足够的品格、价值观和美德来做到这一点。”

As I listened to the president’s Inaugural Address, I was impressed with his obvious gift of oratory. And when I read the text in the next day’s newspaper, I was even more struck by the power, the clarity, and the realism that resounded throughout his cadences. While he didn’t use the phrase “America, we have had enough” (as he did—of course, to my delight—in his speech accepting his party’s nomination), I was struck by how his words and values paralleled what I had written months earlier for my own ENOUGH.. In the section in which I ask, “Enough for America?,” see if you don’t find the echoes of my own ideals in the ideals of our new president: “While we seem to have quite enough things in the United States, our traditional values seem to be eroding, and soon we’ll not have nearly enough of them. So let’s never forget that over the long term it is not things, nor power, nor money that form the heart of any nation. Rather, it is values, the very values, applied to our society that I have described here for us as individuals: the persistence, resilience, moral standards, and virtue that have made this nation great. The question, in short, is not whether the United States has enough money—enough productive wealth—to maintain and enhance its global presence and power, but whether we have enough character, values, and virtue to do so.”

而这正是《够了》的全部意义所在……在这个忙碌的早晨,在这个不满的漫长冬日里,我确实给你们施加了足够多的言语。这确实是“考验人类灵魂的时代”,但请记住这些永恒的智慧之语:“这一切终将过去。”所以今天的危机也会过去,因为时间、我们体系的韧性,以及我们在管理美国资本主义方式上的重要变革,将治愈我们受伤的经济。对我来说,这来得越早越好!

And that’s really what ENOUGH. is all about . . . and that’s surely enough words to inflict on you on this busy morning, during this long winter of our discontent. These are truly “the times that try men’s souls,” but please remember the eternal wisdom of these words: “This too shall pass away.” And so today’s crisis shall pass away, as time and the resilience of our system—and important changes in the way we manage American capitalism—heal our wounded economy. It can’t pass away too soon for me!