彼得·林奇1994年10月8日对国家新闻俱乐部讲座实录(含时间码)

1994 · 演讲 · 原文约 4856 词
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引言由门罗·卡明撰写

Intro by Monroe Karmin

[8:30] 林奇先生是波士顿人,1965 年毕业于波士顿学院,并在宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院获得 MBA 学位。他曾在军中担任中尉,1969 年加入富达。目前他是富达的副董事长,在莫里斯-克努森公司和 W. R. 格雷斯公司担任董事,并积极参与慈善事业。请大家欢迎彼得·林奇先生。

[8:30] A native of Boston, Mr. Lynch is a 1965 graduate of Boston College and received his MBA from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business Education. He served as a lieutenant in the Army before coming to Fidelity in 1969. He currently serves as vice-chairman of Fidelity, sits on the boards of Morris-Knudsen and W. R. Grace and is heavily involved in charity work. Would you please welcome Mr. Peter Lynch.

[9:10] 非常感谢,我很高兴来到这里,我爱这座城市(华盛顿特区),能和吉姆·约翰逊一起站在这里让我很激动,他为房利美做出了巨大贡献,那是我这辈子最成功的一只股票,至今仍是我最大的持仓。会后如果有人想聊怎么赚钱,我会告诉他们怎么买更多房利美,现在我还要把房地美也加进清单。还有众议员埃德·马基,他毕业于波士顿学院和波士顿学院法学院,在国会为全美国人民做出了出色贡献,尤其为马萨诸塞州选区的居民做了很多好事。但最让我感到荣幸的是我的妻子卡罗琳就在我身边,我的爱人,也是我伟大的选股高手,她找到了乐格斯和一堆其他好股票。今天我要做的是——我不知道该拿这柄木槌怎么办,我从没用过这种东西。

[9:10] Thank you very much it’s a pleasure to be here, I love this town {Washington, DC} and it’s a thrill to be here with Jim Johnson who did so much for Fannie Mae and that was the greatest single stock of my life. It’s still my largest position and anybody who wants to talk after about how to make money; I’ll tell them how to buy more Fanne Mae and now I’ve added Freddie Mac to the list too. And Congressman Ed Markey, who went to Boston College and Boston College Law School and has done a great job in Congress for everybody in this country, but especially the people in his districts in Massachusetts. But the great honor is my wife Caroline right here, my sweetheart, and my great stock picker who found Leggs and a bunch of other good stocks. What I am going to try to do today (I don’t know what I’m supposed to do with this gavel, I never had one of these things before)

[10:] 今天我想聊聊那些我多年来一直在用的方法——从我做业余投资者的时候,到管理麦哲伦基金的时候,直到今天仍然在用。我觉得这些方法很有道理,对投资者来说也很有道理。坦率地说,我认为美国有一桩悲剧:媒体——纸媒、广播、电视——一直在说服小投资者,让他们觉得自己根本没机会。那些大型机构,带着他们所有的电脑、所有的学位、所有的钱,好像占尽了优势。但事实根本不是这样。

[10:] I am going to try to say some words on the things I’ve used over the years when I was an amateur, when I ran Magellan and I still use today. I think they make sense. I think they make a lot of sense for investors and I frankly think that it’s a tragedy in America that the small investor has been convinced by the media: the print media, the radio, the television media that they don’t have a chance. The big institutions with all their computers and all their degrees and all their money have all the edges and it just isn’t true at all.

[10:37] 而当他们深信不疑的时候,这种现象发生的时候,人们就会照做。一旦他们相信了,就会买一周的股票,买期权,这周买智利基金,下周买阿根廷基金。他们得到的回报,就与这种投资方式相匹配。这非常令人困扰。我认为公众完全可以在股市中靠自己做得非常好。我认为如今机构主导市场,对小投资者反而是个利好,因为机构会把股票推到异常低的价位,也会推到异常高的价位。对于那些能够保持冷静、有自己的判断并且对某个行业有所了解的人来说,这是利好,不是利空。所以,这就是我想谈的内容。

[10:37] And when they are convinced, when this happens, when this occurs, people act accordingly. When they believe it, they buy stocks for a week, they buy options, they buy the Chile fund this week and next week it’s the Argentina fund. And they get results proportional to that kind of investing. And that’s very bothersome, I think the public can do extremely well in the stock market on their own. I think the fact that institutions dominate the market today is a positive for small investors because institutions push stocks to unusual lows, they push them to unusual highs. For someone that can sit back and have their own opinion and know something about an industry this is a positive; it’s not a negative. So that’s what I want to talk about

[11:20] 对我来说,股市里最重要的一件事,对任何人都一样,就是知道自己买的是什么。我特别惊讶,那么多人持有股票,却说不清自己为什么持有。他们连一分钟都说不清楚。实际上,如果你真把他们逼急了,他们会说:“我买这个,是因为这玩意儿在涨。”就这一个理由。他们持有股票的唯一理由就是这个。如果你没法解释——我是认真的,如果你没法在两分钟内给一个十岁小孩讲清楚你为什么买这只股票,那你就不该买它。我觉得,持有股票的人里,大概有 80% 都是这种情况。

[11:20] And the single most important thing to me in the stock market, for anyone, is to know what you own. I’m amazed at how many people own stocks, they would not be able to tell you why they own it. They couldn’t say in a minute or less why they own it. Actually, if you really press them down, they’d say, “The reason I own this is the sucker is going up.” And that’s the only reason. That’s the only reason they own it. And if you can’t explain – I’m serious, if you can’t explain to a ten year-old in two minutes or less why you own a stock, you shouldn’t own it. And that’s true I think of about 80% of people that own stocks.

[11:50] 这就是人们喜欢持有的那种股票。这是人们热爱拥有的那种公司:它相对简单,只生产一种非常窄、容易理解的产品。他们制造一种 1 兆位的 SRAM CMOS 双极 RISC 浮点数据 I/O 阵列处理器,配有优化编译器、16 路双端口内存、一个双扩散金属氧化物半导体单芯片逻辑芯片,带等离子矩阵真空荧光显示屏。它有 16 位双内存,运行 UNIX 操作系统,四个 Whetstone 兆级浮点运算的多晶硅发射极,高带宽(这一点非常重要)6 G 赫兹的双层金属化通信协议,异步向后兼容,外设总线架构,四路交织内存,令牌环交换背板,而且能在 15 纳秒内完成运算。听着,如果你想买这种破烂玩意儿,你永远赚不到钱。永远。总会有人带着更多 Whetstone 浮点或更少 Whetstone 浮点、更大兆级浮点或更小兆级浮点冒出来。你根本搞不清发生了什么。而人们却一直在买这种垃圾。

[11:50] And this is the kind of stock people like to own. This is the kind of company people adore owning: it’s a relatively simple company, they make a very narrow, easy to understand product. They make a one-megabit SRAM CMOS bipolar RISC floating point data I/O array processor with an optimizing compiler, a 16 dual-port memory, a double-diffused metal oxide semiconductor monolithic logic chip with a plasma matrix vacuum fluorescent display. It has a 16-bit dual memory. That has a UNIX operating system, four Whetstone megaflop polysilicon emitter, a high bandwidth (that’s very important) 6 gigahertz double metalization communication protocol, an asynchronous backward compatibility, peripheral bus architecture, four-way interleaved memory, a token ring interchange backplane, and it does it in 15 nanoseconds of capability. Now, if you want a piece of crap like that, you will never make money. Never. Somebody will come along with more Whetstones or less Whetstones or bigger megaflop or a smaller megaflop. You won’t have the foggiest idea what’s happened. And people buy this junk all the time.

[13:00] 我在唐恩都乐赚到了钱。我能看懂它。经济衰退的时候,我不需要担心会出什么事。我过去那儿,人们还是照样去,我不需要担心韩国低价进口品的竞争。我是说,我就是没有——你知道,我能看懂它。你们笑,我在唐恩都乐赚了 10 倍到 15 倍的钱。那种股票是能让我看懂的。如果你看不懂,那就不灵光。这是唯一最重要的原则。人们对自己的钱格外谨慎,这一点让我很不安。

[13:00] I made money in Dunkin’ Donuts. I can understand it. When there was recessions I didn’t have to worry about what was happening. I could go there, and people were still there, I didn’t have to worry about low-priced Korean imports. I mean, I just didn’t have – you know, I could understand it. And you laugh, I made 10 or 15 times my money in Dunkin’ Donuts. Those are the kind of stocks I could understand. If you don’t understand it, it doesn’t work. This is the single biggest principle. And it bothers me that people are very careful with their money.

[13:31] 大众买冰箱时会去看《消费者报告》,买微波炉也会这样做。他们会问别人哪种雷达测距仪最好,或者买什么车好。他们会做研究。买公寓也一样。去怀俄明州旅行时,他们会翻美孚旅行指南;去加州也一样。去欧洲时,他们会带米其林旅行指南。

[13:31] The public, when they buy a refrigerator they go to Consumer Reports. They buy a microwave oven, they do that. They ask people what’s the best kind of radar range or what kind of car to buy. They do research. On apartments. When they go on a trip to Wyoming, they get a Mobil travel guide or California. When they go to Europe, they get the Michelin travel guide.

[13:50] 人们在公交车上听了个股票的小道消息,太阳还没落山就把半辈子积蓄投了进去。然后他们还纳闷为什么会在股市里亏钱。等钱亏完了,就把责任推给机构投资者和程序化交易。这纯属扯淡。他们自己根本没做任何研究。买的是一堆垃圾。他们连资产负债表都不看一眼——亏钱是活该。这正是我们被推向的处境,而且这是个自我实现的预言。普通投资者投资水平一塌糊涂,却说自己根本没机会。那都是因为他们的行为方式决定的。我在努力说服人们:投资是有方法可循的。股票上涨是有原因的。

[13:50] People hear a tip on a bus on some stock, and they’ll put half their life savings in it before sunset. And they wonder why they lose money in the stock market. And when they lose money, they blame it on the institutions and program trading. That is garbage. They didn’t do any research. They bought a piece of junk. They didn’t look at the balance sheet and that’s what you get for it. And that’s what we’re being driven to and it’s self-fulfilling. The public does terrible investing and they say they don’t have a chance. It’s because that’s the way they’re acting. I’m trying to convince people there is a method. There are reasons for stocks that go up.

[14:25] 可口可乐。这数字非常神奇,很容易记住。可口可乐如今的每股收益是 32 年前的 30 倍,股价也涨了 30 倍。而伯利恒钢铁公司现在的利润还不如 30 年前,股价也只有 30 年前的一半。股票不是彩票,每只股票背后都对应着一家公司。公司经营得好,股票自然就好。道理没那么复杂。

[14:25] Coca-Cola. This is very magic. It’s a very magic number, easy to remember. Coca-Cola is earning 30 times per share what they did 32 years ago. The stock has gone up thirtyfold. Bethlehem Steel is earning less than they did 30 years ago; the stock is half its price of 30 years ago. Stocks are not lottery tickets. There’s a company behind every stock. If a company does well, the stock does well. It’s not that complicated.

[14:53] 人们总是太容易头脑发热。首先,他们试图预测股市。这完全是浪费时间。没有人能预测股市。他们还试图预测利率。(我的意思是这……)如果有人能连续三次准确预测利率,他们早就成为亿万富翁了。考虑到地球上没有那么多亿万富翁,这非常……你知道,我有一套逻辑,我有一套三段论,我在波士顿学院时研究过这些。不可能有那么多能预测利率的人,因为那样就会有无数亿万富翁了。

[14:53] People get too carried away. And first of all, they try to predict the stock market. That is a total waste of time. No one can predict the stock market. They try to predict interest rates. (I mean this is…) If anybody can predict interest rates right three times in a row, they’d be a billionaire. Considering there’s not that many billionaires on the planet, it’s very … you know I had logic, I had a syllogism, I studied these when I was at Boston College. There can’t be that many people who can predict interest rates because there’d be lots of billionaires

[15:21] 没人能预测经济。在座不少人都经历过 1981 年和 1982 年,那时候最优惠利率高达 20%,通货膨胀是两位数,失业率也是两位数。我不记得 1981 年有谁提前告诉过我这些。我读过、研究过所有这些资料,但不记得有谁说过我们会经历大萧条以来最严重的衰退。所以,我想告诉你们的是:知道股市会怎样走当然有用。如果一年后道琼斯指数是 X,或者知道我们将经历全面衰退,或者知道利率会到 12%,那当然再好不过了。这些信息确实有用。但你永远不可能事先知道。你就是学不会。所以我一直说,如果你一年花 14 分钟思考经济学,那其中 12 分钟都是浪费——我确实这么认为。

[15:21] And no one can predict the economy. I know a lot of people in this room were around in 1981 and 1982 when we had a 20% prime rate with double-digit inflation, double-digit unemployment. I don’t remember anybody telling me in 1981 about it. I didn’t read, I study all this stuff, I don’t remember anybody telling me we’d have the worst recession since the Depression. So, what I’m trying to tell you, it would be useful to know what the stock market will do. It would be terrific to know the Dow Jones average a year from now would be X, that we’re going have a full-scale recession, or to know interest rates will be 12%. That’s useful stuff. You never know it, though. You just don’t get to learn it. So, I’ve always said if you spend 14 minutes a year on economics, you’ve wasted 12 minutes and I really believe that.

[16:05] 现在,我得说句公道话。我讲的是广义的经济学,预测明年经济会下滑还是回暖,或者 M1、M2、3B 这些乱七八糟的 M 系术语。对我来说,经济学就是你聊废钢价格的时候。当我持有汽车股时,我想知道二手车价格的变化。二手车价格涨了,这是个好信号。当我持有酒店股时,我想知道酒店入住率。当我持有化工股时,我想知道乙烯价格在发生什么。这些都是事实。如果铝库存连续五个月下降,那是相关的。我能处理这种信息。还有住房负担能力。当我持有房利美或地产股时,我想知道这个。这些才是事实。有经济事实和经济预测之分,而经济预测纯粹是浪费时间。

[16:05] Now, I have to be fair. I’m talking about economics in the broad scale, predicting the downturn for next year, or the upturn, or M1 and M2, 3B, all of these Ms. {economic terms} Economics to me are when you talk about scrap prices. When I own auto stocks, I want to know what’s happening to used car prices. When used car prices rise, it’s a good indicator. When I own hotel stocks, I want to know hotel occupancies. When I own chemical stocks, I want to know what’s happening to the price of ethylene. These are facts. If aluminum inventories go down five straight months, that’s relevant. I can deal with that. Home affordability. I want to know about when I own Fannie Mae, or I own a housing stock. These are the facts. There are economic facts and there are economic predictions, and economic predictions are a total waste.

[16:52] 利率——艾伦·格林斯潘是个非常诚实的人。他会告诉你,他预测不了利率。他能跟你讲未来六个月的短期利率会怎么走,但要是让他猜三年后的长期利率,他就会说,“我完全没概念。”连美联储主席都做不到的事,你一个投资者,凭什么能预测利率呢?

[16:52] Interest rates – Alan Greenspan is a very honest guy. He would tell you he can’t predict interest rates. He can tell you what short rates are going to do in the next six months. Try and stick him on what the long-term rate will be three years from now. He’ll say, “I don’t have any idea.” So how are you, the investor, supposed to predict interest rates if the head of the Federal Reserve can’t do it?

[17:10] 所以我认为……你应该研究历史,历史是你学习的重要素材。从历史中学到的是:市场会下跌,而且会大跌。数学很简单。本世纪(指 20 世纪)有 93 年。(这很好算)市场有 50 次跌幅达到或超过 10%。所以 93 年里 50 次下跌,大约每两年一次市场跌 10%。我们管这叫“回调”,这其实就是快速亏很多钱的委婉说法。我们叫它回调。所以 93 年里 50 次下跌,大约每两年一次市场跌 10%。这 50 次下跌中,有 15 次跌幅达到或超过 25%。这被称为“熊市”。93 年里有 15 次下跌(至少 25%),所以每六年,市场就会出现一次 25% 的下跌。这就是你需要知道的全部。你需要知道市场有时会下跌。如果你没准备好,就不该持有股票。

[17:10] So I think that’s … that you should study history and history is the important thing you learn from. What you learn from history is that the market goes down, it goes down a lot. The math is simple. There’s been 93 years this century. (This is easy to do) The market has had 50 declines of 10% or more. So 50 declines in 93 years, about once every two years the market falls 10%. We call that a correction, that means, that’s a euphemism for losing a lot of money rapidly. We call it a correction So 50 declines in 93 years, about once every two years the market falls 10%. Of those 50 declines, 15 have been 25% or more. That’s known as a “bear market.” We’ve had 15 declines {of at least 25%} in 93 years, so every six years, the market has a 25% decline. That’s all you need to know. You need to know the market is going to go down sometimes. If you’re not ready for that, you shouldn’t own stocks.

[18:09] 而当它发生(市场下跌)时,其实是好事。如果你喜欢一只 14 美元的股票,它跌到 6 美元,那太棒了。你了解这家公司。你看它的资产负债表。它们经营得很好。你希望它涨到 22 美元;从 14 美元到 22 美元很出色,从 6 美元到 22 美元则非同凡响。所以你要利用这些下跌。下跌总会发生,没人知道它们何时发生。事后会有人告诉你他们预测到了,但他们之前已经预测过 53 次了。所以,如果你了解你拥有什么,你就能利用市场的波动。所以我认为这是一个关键要素。

[18:09] And it’s good when it happens {a market decline}. If you like a stock at $14 and it goes to $6, that’s great. You understand the company. You look at the balance sheet. They’re doing fine. You are hoping to get to $22 with it; $14 to $22 is terrific, $6 to $22 is exceptional, so you take advantage of these declines. They’re {declines} are going to happen, and no one knows when they’re going to happen. People will tell you after the fact that they predicted it, but they predicted it 53 times. So, you can take advantage of the volatility of the market if you understand what you own. So, I think that’s a key element.

[18:40] 另一个关键要素是,你有大把时间。人们买股票时急得难以置信。我给你举个知名公司的例子。沃尔玛在 1970 年 10 月上市;1970 年它上市了。它已经有了辉煌的业绩和 15 年的表现;资产负债表非常健康。你完全可以等上十年,说自己是个保守的投资者,不确定沃尔玛能否成功。你想观察。你看到他们在小镇上经营。你担心它们只经营着七八个州。你想等它们扩展到更多州。你继续等待。你可以在沃尔玛上市十年后买入它,赚到 35 倍的回报。如果你在它上市时买入,你会赚到 500 倍,但你可以在沃尔玛上市十年后买入,仍然赚到超过 30 倍的回报。

[18:40] Another key element is that you have plenty of time. People are in an unbelievable rush to buy a stock. I’ll give you an example of a well-known company. Walmart went public in October of 1970; 1970 it went public. It already had a great record and had 15 years’ of performance; great balance sheet. You could have waited ten years, saying you’re a conservative investor and you’re not sure this Walmart can make it. You want to check. You see them operate in small towns. You’re afraid, they only operate in seven or eight states. You want to wait until they go to more states. You keep waiting. You could have bought Walmart 10 years after it went public and made 35 times your money. If you bought it when they went public, you would have made 500 times your money, but you could have waited 10 years after Walmart went public and made over 30 times your money.

[19:30] 你也可以在微软上市三年后买入,赚到 10 倍的回报。如果你对软件有所了解(我对软件一无所知),你会说:“这帮家伙搞定了。我不在乎谁会赢,康柏、IBM。我不知道谁会赢,日本电脑。我知道微软的 MS-DOS 是对的。”你就能买入微软。

[19:30] You could have waited three years after Microsoft went public and made 10 times your money.. If you knew something about software (I know nothing about software) you would have said, “These guys have it. I don’t care who’s going to win, Compaq, IBM. I don’t know who’s going to win, Japanese computers. I know Microsoft MS-DOS is the right thing.” You could’ve bought Microsoft.

[19:50] 再说一次,我在重复我自己,股票不是彩票。每只股票背后都有一家公司,你可以持续观察。你有大把时间。人们买股票时急得喘不过气来。你不需要这么做。

[19:50] Again, I’m repeating myself, stocks are not a lottery ticket. There’s a company behind every stock, and you can just watch it. You have plenty of time. People are in an amazing rush to purchase a security. They’re out of breath when they call up. You don’t need to do this.

[20:07] 你还需要一个优势才能赚钱。人们有不可思议的优势,却把它们扔掉了。我快速举个例子,史克公司。这家公司有泰胃美(Tagamet)这个药。你不需要在泰胃美进行临床试验时买入史克。你不需要在《新英格兰医学杂志》或英国版《柳叶刀》讨论泰胃美时买入史克。你可以在泰胃美刚推出,或推出一年后买入史克。假设你的配偶、你的母亲、你的父亲是护士、药剂师或医生,在开这些处方。泰胃美在治疗溃疡方面效果惊人,而且对公司来说它是一款很棒的药,因为如果你停止服用,溃疡会复发。你看,如果你花一美元吃了药,溃疡就好了,那会是个烂产品;但对公司来说这是个好产品。你可以在该产品上市两年后买入,赚到 5 到 6 倍的钱。我的意思是,所有药剂师、所有护士、所有人,数百万人都看到了这个产品,而他们却在买石油公司或钻井公司。这种事经常发生。然后三四年后,葛兰素,一家更大的公司,一家英国大公司,推出了善胃得(Zantac),在当时是更好、更优的产品。你会看到它抢占市场份额,表现很好。你可以买入葛兰素,赚到三倍的钱。所以,你一生中只需要几只股票。它们就在你所在的行业里。

[20:07] You need an edge to make money, too. People have incredible edges and they throw them away. I’ll give you a quick example of Smith Kline. This is a stock that had Tagamet. Now, you didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was doing clinical trials. You didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was talked about in the New England Journal of Medicine or the British version, Lancet. You could have bought Smith Kline when Tagamet first came out or a year after it came out. Let’s say your spouse, your mother, your father; you’re a nurse, a druggist, or a physician writing all these prescriptions. Tagamet was doing an amazing job of curing ulcers and it was a wonderful pill for the company because if you had stopped taking it, the ulcer came back. See,it would’ve been a crummy product if you took it for a buck and it went away but it was a great product for the company. But you could have bought it two years after the product was on the market and made 5 or 6 times your money. I mean all the druggists, all the nurses, all the people, millions of people saw this product and they’re out buying oil companies or drilling companies. It happens. Then three year later or four years later Glaxo, an even bigger company, it’s a huge company, a British company, brought out Zantac which was, at that time, a better, an improved product. You could have seen that take market share and do well. You could have bought Glaxo and tripled your money. So, you only need a few stocks in your lifetime. They’re in your industry.

[21:30] 我认为人们,如果你在汽车行业工作;假设你过去十年是汽车经销商,你会看到克莱斯勒推出了小货车。如果你是别克、丰田或本田的经销商,你会看到克莱斯勒的经销店里挤满了人。你可以在小货车推出后一年,在克莱斯勒身上赚到 10 倍的钱。福特推出了金牛座/Sable,这是过去 20 年中最非凡的汽车系列。福特凭借金牛座/Sable 涨了七倍。所以,如果你是汽车经销商,每十年你只需要买几只股票。当你的生命结束时,从 1 万美元或 5000 美元起步,你不需要很多能赚五倍的股票就能赚到大钱。所以,在你自己的行业里,你会看到很多股票,这正是让我感到困扰的地方。有很多好股票在等着你,而人们却不听、不看。他们有不可思议的优势。

[21:30] I think people, if you’d worked in the auto industry; let’s say you’re an auto dealer the last 10 years, you would have seen Chrysler come up with the minivan. If you were a Buick dealer, a Toyota dealer, a Honda dealer, you would have seen the Chrysler dealership packed with people. You could have made 10 times your money on Chrysler a year after the minivan came out. Ford introduces the Taurus/Sable, the most exceptional line of cars in the last 20 years. Ford went up sevenfold on the Taurus/Sable. So, if you’re a car dealer, you only need to buy a few stocks every decade. When your lifetime is over, you don’t need a lot of five-baggers to make a lot of money starting with $10,000 or $5,000. So, in your own industry you’re going to see a lot of stocks, and that’s what bothers me. There are good stocks out there looking for you and people aren’t listening and they’re just not watching. They have incredible edges.

[22:20] 人们拥有比我大得多的优势。他们在铝业工作。他们看到铝行业库存连续六个月下降。他们看到需求改善。在今天的美洲,你知道,要获得一个环保署许可证来开个保龄球馆都很难,更不用说建一座铝冶炼厂了。所以,你知道当铝变得紧俏时,你根本不可能建起七座铝冶炼厂。所以,当你看到这种情况来临时,你可以说:“等等,我可以赚点钱。”当一个行业从糟糕变得平庸时,股票会涨。从平庸变得良好时,股票会涨。从良好变得极好时,股票会涨。在你自己的行业里有很多赚钱的方式。你可以是该行业的供应商。你可以是客户。这种情况在造纸行业发生。在钢铁行业发生。它不会每周都发生,但如果你身处某个领域,你会看到它好转。你会在出版行业看到一些东西。这些事情接踵而至,人们竟然会放弃这些机会,真是令人费解。

[22:20] People have big edges over me. They work in the aluminum industry. They see the aluminum industry inventory coming down six straight months. They see demand improving. In America today, you know it’s hard to get an EPA permit for a bowling alley, never mind an aluminum smelter. So, you know when aluminum gets tight; you just can’t build seven aluminum smelters. So, when you see this coming, you can say, “Wait a second. I can make some money.” When an industry goes from terrible to mediocre, the stock goes north. When it goes from mediocre to good, the stock goes north. When it goes from good to terrific, the stock goes north. There’s lots of ways to make money in your own industry. You can be a supplier in the industry. You can be a customer. This thing happens in the paper industry. It happens in the steel industry. It doesn’t happen every week, but if you’re in some field, you’ll see it turn. You’ll see something in the publishing industry. These things come along, and it’s just mind boggling that people throw it away.

[23:17] (其中一件事……)我想抛出几条我觉得有用的规则。很多时候,人们基于“股票已经跌了这么多;还能跌到哪去”这种想法买入。我记得宝丽来从 130 美元跌到 100 美元时,人们说:“这是一家伟大的公司,业绩辉煌。如果它跌到 100 美元以下,你知道,就把所有股票都买下来。”你知道,它确实跌到了 100 美元以下,很多人基于此买入,说:“看,它从 135 美元跌到 100 美元。现在 95 美元了。多好的买入机会!”一年之内,它跌到了 18 美元。这是一家没有负债的公司。它只是被严重高估了,所以跌了下来。

[23:17] (One of the things…) A couple of rules I want to throw out a couple of rules that I find useful. A lot of times, people buy on the basis the stock has gone down this much; how much further can it go down. I remember when Polaroid went from $130 to $100 and people said, “Here’s this great company, great record. If it ever gets below $100, you know just buy every share.” You know, it did get below $100 and a lot of people bought on that basis saying, “Look, it’s gone from $135 to $100. It’s now at $95. What a buy!” Within a year, it was $18. This is a company with no debt. It was just so overpriced, it went down.

[23:55] 我在富达的第一年或第二年也做过同样的事。凯撒工业从每股 26 美元跌到 16 美元。我说:“16 美元还能跌到哪去?”所以,我想我们在美国证券交易所买入了可能是最大的一批凯撒工业股票,价格是 14 美元。我说:“它从 26 美元跌到 16 美元。还能跌到哪去?”嗯,在 10 美元时,我打电话给我妈说:“妈,你一定得看看这个凯撒工业。还能跌到哪去?它从 26 美元跌到 10 美元了。”它跌到了 6 美元。跌到 5 美元。跌到 4 美元,然后跌到 3 美元。我很幸运这事发生得很快,否则我可能还在当球童或在 Stop and Shop 超市工作,但这事很快。时间很紧凑。

[23:55] I did the same thing in my first or second year in Fidelity. Kaiser Industries had gone from $26 a share to $16. I said, “How much lower can it go at $16?” So, I think we bought one of the biggest blocks ever probably on the American stock exchange of Kaiser Industries at $14. I said, “It’s gone from $26 to $16. How much lower can it go?” Well, at $10, I called my mother and said, “Mom, you got to look at this Kaiser Industries. How much lower can it go? It’s gone from $26 to $10.” It went to $6. It went to $5. It went to $4, and it went to $3. I am fortunate this happened rapidly, or I would probably still be caddying or working at the Stop and Shop but it happened fast. It was compressed.

在 3 美元时,我意识到这里有问题,因为凯撒工业持有 40% 的凯撒钢铁。持有 40% 的凯撒铝业。持有 32% 的凯撒水泥。它还拥有凯撒广播、凯撒砂石、凯撒工程。它拥有吉普。它拥有一家又一家的公司,而且它没有负债。

And at $3, I figured out there’s something wrong here because Kaiser Industries owns 40% of Kaiser Steel. They own 40% of Kaiser Aluminum. They own 32% of Kaiser Cement. They own Kaiser Broadcasting, Kaiser Sand and Gravel, and Kaiser Engineers. They own Jeep. They own business after business, and they had no debt.

[24:50] 我早早就学到了这一点。这可能对你们中的一些人是突破性的。如果你没有任何负债,要破产是非常困难的。这有点 tricky,有些人可以接近破产,但那可真是项成就。但它们没有负债,整个公司,在 3 美元时,总市值约为 7500 万美元。那时候,这相当于买一架波音 747 的钱。我说,这家公司卖 7500 万美元一定有问题。我在 16 美元时有点过早,但我说一切都会好的,最终这会有好结果。

[24:50] And I learned this early. This might be a breakthrough for some of you people. It’s very hard to go bankrupt if you don’t have any debt. It’s tricky, some people can approach that; it’s a real achievement. But they had no debt and the whole company, at $3, was selling at {a total market capitalization} about $75 million. At that point, it was equal to buying one Boeing 747. I said there’s something wrong with this company selling for $75 million. I was a little premature at $16, but I said everything’s fine, and eventually this will work out.

它们所做的,是把所有股份都分给了股东。他们分发了凯撒水泥的股份。分发了凯撒铝业的股份。分发了凯撒钢铁的流通股。他们卖掉了所有其他业务,而你最终得到了大约每股 50 美元。

And what they did is they gave away all their shares to their shareholders. They passed out shares of Kaiser Cement. They passed out shares of Kaiser Aluminum. They passed out the public shares in Kaiser Steel. They sold all the other businesses, and you got about $50 a share.

[25:30] 但是,如果你不了解这家公司;你只是因为它从 26 美元跌到 16 美元,又跌到 10 美元才买进,那它跌到 9 美元时你会怎么做?跌到 8 美元呢?跌到 7 美元呢?这就是人们的问题:他们卖股票,是因为当初不知道自己为什么买进;股票跌了,他们又不知道该怎么做。是抛硬币吗?还是出去绕一圈?你怎么办?精神科医生到现在也没帮上忙。我从来没见过哪个“心理治疗基金”去 SEC 注册过,作为共同基金上市。他们似乎也没起到什么作用。我试过祈祷,也没用。所以,如果你不了解这家公司,股票下跌时你就会遇到这个问题。

[25:30] But if you didn’t understand the company; if you were just buying on the fact the stock had gone from $26 to $16 and then again to $10, what would you do when it went to $9? What would you do when it went to $8? What would you do when it went to $7? This is the problem people have: is they sell stocks because they didn’t know why they bought it, then it goes down and they don’t know what to do now. Do you flip a coin? Do you walk around the block? What do you do? Psychiatrists haven’t worked so far. The psychological psychiatry fund I’ve never seen file with the SEC to make it through as a mutual fund. They haven’t seemed to help. I’ve tried prayer; that hasn’t worked. So, if you don’t understand the company, you have this problem when they go down.

[26:13] 最终,它们总会涨回来的。——这一条也不管用。人们觉得 RCA 被通用电气收购时,股价差不多回到了 1929 年的高点。双面针织品可没涨回来,还记得那些好东西吗?软盘、西联汇款,名单还长着呢。人们总说:“它会回来的。”

[26:13] Eventually, they always come back. This one doesn’t work either. People think RCA just about got back to its 1929 high when General Electric took it over. Double knits never came back; remember those beauties? Floppy disks, Western Union, the list goes on and on. People saying: “Iit’ll come back.”

好吧,它不一定非得回来。

Well, it doesn’t have to come back.

[26:40] 还有一句你常听到的话:“才 3 美元,能亏多少?”我总接到电话,人家说:“我想买这只股票,3 美元,能亏多少?”好吧,你大概需要拿张纸算算:如果你拿 2 万美元买一只 50 美元的股票,或者你邻居拿 2 万美元买一只 50 美元的股票,而你拿 2 万美元买一只 3 美元的股票,它跌到零,你亏的钱一模一样——全亏光。如果有人说,“才 3 美元,能亏多少?”——你押上 100 万美元,你就会亏掉 100 万美元。

[26:40] Here’s another one you hear all the time: “It’s $3, how much can I lose?” I’ve had people call me up all the time saying, “I’m thinking of buying this stock at $3. How much can I lose?” Well, again you may need a piece of paper for this, but if you put $20,000 into a stock at $50 or your neighbor put $20,000 into a stock at $50 and you put $20,000 in at $3 and it goes to zero, you lose exactly the same amount of money, everything. If people say, “It’s $3. How much can I lose?” If you put $1 million on it, you can lose $1 million.

[27:15] 这倒可能是个理由,让你去研究一下股票。股票从 100 美元跌到 3 美元,并不意味着你该买它。实际上,那些真正在股票上赚钱的空头,他们不会做空沃尔玛,不会做空家得宝,不会做空那些伟大的公司,比如强生。他们做空的是那些从 80 美元跌到 7 美元的股票。他们想 16 美元或 22 美元时就做空,但他们算准了,到 7 美元时这家公司要归零。只是它还没吹响终场号角。它就要归零了,而他们在 7 美元、6 美元、5 美元、4 美元、3 美元、2 美元、1.25 美元卖空。你要知道,卖空需要有人买。总得有人买这该死的东西!你会纳闷谁在买。买家就是那些说“才 3 美元,还能跌多少?”的人。

[27:15] This may be a reason to research a stock. The fact a stock is $3 down from $100 doesn’t mean you should buy it. And in fact, short sellers, people who really make money in stocks, they don’t short Walmart. They don’t short Home Depot. They don’t short the great companies, Johnson & Johnson. They short stocks down from $80 to $7. They’d like to short it at $16 or $22, but they figured out at $7, this company is going to zero. They just haven’t blown taps on this thing yet. It’s going to zero, and they’re selling short at $7. They’re selling short at $6, at $5, at $4, at $3, at $2, at $1.25. And you know to sell something short, you need a buyer. Somebody has to buy the damn thing! You wonder who’s buying this thing. The buyers are people saying, “It’s $3. How much lower can it go?”

{时间快到了,所以跳过一个部分}

{Getting close on time, so an area was skipped}

[28:11] 重要的是,你不能对一只股票太上心。你必须明白,股票背后是一家公司。你不能把它当成孙子辈来对待。你得跟股票打交道时说:“我了解这家公司。”如果它情况恶化,基本面滑坡,你就得跟它说拜拜。有一条规则你要记住:股票不知道你拥有它。这是一个突破性的认识。你必须理解它,并且说:他们经营得好,只要他们持续经营得好,我就持有。我最好的股票,是我持有到第五、第六、第七年时,而不是第五、第六、第七天。所以,你必须理解这一点,并坚持下去。

[28:11] The important thing is you can’t get too attached to a stock. You have to understand there’s a company behind it. You can’t treat this like your grandchildren. You have to deal with the stock and say, “I understand the company.” If it deteriorates, if the fundamentals slip, you have to say goodbye to it. One rule you want to remember: the stock does not know you own it. This is a breakthrough. You have to understand it and say, they’re doing well and as long as they’re doing well {I’ll keep my position}. My best stocks have been the stocks I owned in my fifth, sixth, and seventh years I own then, not my fifth, sixth, or seventh day. So, you have to understand that and stay with it.

[28:48] 接下来我谈谈那些“长线冷门股”。避开长线冷门股。我这辈子买过大约 30 只长线冷门股,没有一只回本的。最糟糕的那种叫“耳语股”。如果亚瑟·莱维特(1993 年至 2001 年任 SEC 主席)在场,他会对这些故事感同身受。那时候,有人打电话给你说:“嗨,彼得,卡罗琳怎么样?孩子们好吗?我想跟你聊聊国际布利维特公司。盈利……(压低声音)盈利会很难预测。规模会很小。每股 3 美元,每股 1 美元……”他们不停地小声嘀咕这些事。我说:“你在说什么?我听不懂。”这时候,要么他们周围挤满了人,全都会冲出去买这只股票,因为太激动人心了;要么他们以为 SEC 在监听。他们想争取个短一点的刑期,蹲六个月营房而不是两年。但耳语股不管用。

[28:48] I’ll switch through to my long shots. Avoid long shots. I bought about 30 long shots in my life. I’ve never broken even on one. The ones that are really bad are called “whisper stocks.” If Arthur Levitt {Chairman of the SEC from 1993 to 2001} were here, he’d appreciate these stories. These are the times that somebody calls you up and says, “Hi, Peter. How’s Carolyn? How are the kids? I’d like to talk to you about International Blivit. Earnings { Lynch whispering} Earnings will be unpredictable. They’ll be small. It’s $3 a share, a $1 a share” and they keep whispering all these things. And I say: “What are you talking about? I don’t understand.” Now, either they’re so surrounded by people that are going to run out and buy this stock because it’s so exciting, or they think the SEC is listening in. They’ll get a shorter term, they’ll get six months in the camp rather than two years in the camp. But whisper stocks don’t work.

[29:45] 现在,我想总结一下:永远有东西让你担心。如果你持有股票,就总是有东西让你担心,你躲不掉。1950 年代发生了什么?人们担心我们走出大萧条的唯一原因是第二次世界大战。50 年代初又来了次衰退,我们就说:我们要立马回到大萧条了。1950 年代人们担心大萧条,还担心核战争。那时候,那些小弹头的威力,连弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩、或查尔斯顿都炸不烂。

[29:45] Now, I want to conclude by saying there’s always something to worry about. If you own stocks there’s always something to worry about. You can’t get away from it. What happens in the 1950s, people were worried about the only reason we got out of the Depression was World War II. We got another recession in the early 1950s and we said we’re going to go right back into a depression. People were worried about a depression in the 1950s, and they were worried about nuclear war. Back then, the little warheads they had then, they couldn’t blow up a McLean, West Virginia, or McLean, Virginia or Charlestown.

[30:19] 现在,所有那些国名以“-斯坦”结尾的国家,有九个从俄罗斯独立出来的“-斯坦”国家,每个都有足够多的弹头把世界炸个遍,却没人担心这件事。我小时候,人们建防辐射掩体,我们还有民防演习。还记得高中时的这些吗?躲在桌子底下。我那时候就觉得,这实在不是什么好办法。他们吹哨子,有人戴上帽子,我们就全钻到桌子底下去了。但 1950 年代人们不肯买股票。除了 1980 年代,1950 年代是 20 世纪股市最好的十年。1950 年代人们不肯买股票,因为他们担心核战争,又担心大萧条。

[30:19] Now, all of these countries that end in “-stan”; there’s nine of these “-stan” countries that have come out of Russia. They all have enough warheads to blow the world up and no one worries about it. When I was a kid, people were building fallout shelters and we used to have civil defense drills. Remember this from high school? You get under your desk. I never thought, even then, that was a particularly good thing to do. They’d blow a whistle, somebody would put on a hat, and we’d all get under our desks. But in the 1950s people wouldn’t buy stocks. Except for the 1980s, the 1950s was the best decade this century of the stock market. People wouldn’t buy stocks in the 1950s because they were worried about nuclear war and they were worried about depression.

[30:54] 还记得石油从 4 美元涨到 40 美元,说要涨到 100 美元,然后我们就要迎来大萧条了吗?大概三年后,同样的专家,现在拿更高的薪水,石油跌到 10 美元,他们说油价要朝 4 美元去,我们又要大萧条了。

[30:54] Remember when oil went from $4 to $40 and it was going to go to $100 and we were going to have a depression? Well, about three years later, the same experts, now higher paid, oil is now at $10 and they said it was headed for $4 and we’re going to have a depression.

[31:10] 然后是日本人。还记得日本人要买下全世界,我们就要迎来大萧条了吗?还记得这说法吗?大约两年后,我们又都在担心日本崩溃了。这是我听过最荒谬的事。这是一个储蓄率 20%、劳动力惊人、生产力惊人的国家,人们却说我们要大萧条,因为日本要崩溃了。你知道吗,在他们的祈祷清单上,他们降低了特蕾莎修女和残疾儿童的优先级,晚上为日本祈祷。真是难以置信。

[31:10] And then the Japanese, remember how the Japanese were going to own the world, and we were going to have a depression? Remember that one? And then about two years later, we were all worried about Japan collapsing. This is the most absurd thing I’ve ever heard. This is a country with a 20% savings rate, incredible work force, incredible productivity, and people were saying we’re going to have a depression because Japan is going to collapse. You know, in their prayer list, they’ve lowered Mother Teresa and crippled children and they’re praying for Japan at night. You know, it’s unbelievable.

[31:33] 还有 LDC(欠发达国家)债务,还记得 LDC 债务吗?还记得那个吗?所有那些国家,大通银行把它的全部净资产都借给了巴西、智利、秘鲁和所有其他那些国家。它们不会还的,然后我们就要迎来大萧条了。结论总是“我们要迎来大萧条”,或者“大萧条,我们要迎来大萧条”。我一直不太明白“大萧条”前面那个“大”字。大萧条,或者“大事件”要来了。

[31:33] The LDC {Lesser Developed Countries] debt. Remember the LDC debt? Remember that one? All these countries, Chase had lent their net worth to Brazil, Chile, Peru and all these other countries. They were not going to pay it back and we were going to have a depression. It always ends in we’re going to have a depression, or the Great Depression, we’re going to have the Great Depression. I never could quite understand that adjective in front of Depression. The Great Depression or the Big One is coming.

[31:54] 但现在所有这些国家,我明白了它们叫什么——那时候,它们叫“欠发达国家”。我们以前叫它们“不发达国家”。这些说法都错了。政治上不正确。你得叫它们“新兴国家”。你不能用“欠发达”或“不发达”。实际上,前几天我听到一个政治上正确的说法,形容一个人超重:横向挑战者。

[31:54] But all these countries now, I understand what these are called – then, they were called “less developed” countries. We used to call them “underdeveloped” countries. Those are all wrong terms. Those are not politically correct. You have to call these “emerging” countries. You can’t use “less developed” or “underdeveloped”. In fact, the other day I heard the politically correct term for somebody that’s overweight: laterally challenged.

[32:17] 所以,永远有东西让你担心。在股市中,你身体里最关键器官是胃,不是大脑。如果你能把 8 加 8 算出差不多 16,那就是你需要的全部数学水平。你不需要知道曲线下的面积。还记得二次方程、积分微积分和曲线下的面积吗?谁在乎那该死的曲线下面是什么?但你得学这些。在股市里,你不需要这些。所以,你只需要知道,股市永远会可怕,永远有让人担心的事。你只需把这一切都忘掉,全部抛开,去拥有好公司,或者做困境反转股。研究它们,你就会做得很好。就这么简单。我准备好回答问题了。

[32:17] So, there is always something to worry about and the key organ in your body in the stock market is your stomach. It’s not the brain. If you can add 8 and 8 and get reasonably close to 16, that’s the only level of math you need to know. You don’t know to need the area under the curve. Remember that quadratic equation and integral calculus and the area under the curve? Whoever cared what was under the damn curve? But you had to study this. You don’t need this in the stock market. So, all you have to know is that it’s always going to be scary, there’s always going to be something to worry about. You just have to forget all about that.. Cut it all out and own good companies or own turnarounds. Study them and you’ll do well and that’s all there is and I’m ready for questions.