2023 年股东大会 · 下午场
华盛顿应明确为美国所有银行存款提供担保
Washington should explicitly guarantee all U.S. bank deposits
沃伦·巴菲特好,请各位就座。外面的销售火爆极了,你们正是我喜欢的那类观众。(笑声)我不断收到报告说我们在打破各种纪录。我们先从第 26 号提问开始,这个问题交给 2 号台。
WARREN BUFFETTOK, so take your seats please. Sales are terrific out there, so you're my kind of crowd. (LAUGH) I've been getting reports we're breaking all kinds of records. And we're going to start off with question number 26, which goes to station two.
现场股东巴菲特先生、芒格先生,你们好。我是来自马来西亚的詹姆斯。鉴于美国银行近期面临的挑战,两位对银行业的前景怎么看?你们如何评估这个领域的风险与机遇?
AUDIENCE MEMBERHi Warren and Charlie. My name is James from Malaysia. Given the recent challenges faced by the U.S. banks, what is your outlook on the banking industry? How do you assess the risk and the opportunity in this section?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,料到会有人问银行的问题,我决定我们该用银行术语来开场(笑声)来描述——还有查理。(笑声和掌声)银行业的情况与过去一直以来的情况非常相似,恐惧总是具有传染性。历史上,这种恐惧有时是合理的,有时则不然。我父亲在 1931 年因为银行挤兑丢了工作,当时一家州立银行发生了挤兑。阿拉莫国民银行的负责人说:“我们是国民银行,国民银行从未发生过挤兑。”当然,他们两家面临的其实是同样的问题。所以,过去如果你看到人们在银行排队,正确的反应就是加入队伍。他们总会离开队伍的。故事是这样的:高盛的西德尼·温伯格,在 1907 年左右的一次银行挤兑期间,他在高盛当跑腿员,问老板能不能请一周假。老板说:“当然可以,反正也没什么事。”于是他就排队去了,可能是克尼克博克信托公司或其他地方。等他排到队伍前面时,他把自己的位置卖给了别人。他在那家银行根本没有账户,但那位置就是一项资产。(笑声)这些年来,银行体系发生了巨大变化。在我看来,我们建立联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)时做了一件极其明智的事。第一次世界大战后,一年内曾有多达 2000 家银行倒闭。我的意思是,银行挤兑曾是常态。如果你让人们对银行里的钱是否安全感到担忧,并都想取出来,那经济就无法正常运转。所以,FDIC 非常合乎逻辑。这些年来它有所变化,但到了 2023 年的今天,我们实际上看到 FDIC 对所有人按 100% 的比例赔付或确保所有活期存款可用。然而,人们仍然非常担心——周期性地、地域性地,以各种疯狂的方式。这就不应该发生。所以,信息传达一直很糟糕。政客们传达得很糟糕,他们有时乐见其糟。机构传达得很糟糕,我会说媒体也传达得很糟糕。我的意思是,你不该让这么多人误解这样一个事实:尽管可能有债务上限,但它会被修改。尽管 FDIC 有 25 万美元的限额,但 FDIC、美国政府以及美国公众没有兴趣让银行倒闭,让人们真正损失存款。我们在硅谷银行的那个周末看到了一个示范项目,公众仍然感到困惑。所以,一项自 1934 年生效的法律,虽然在某些方面有所缓和,但人们对像银行体系这样重要的事情仍然不了解,这真是令人遗憾。我不认为美国公众有那么蠢,我只是——顺便说一句,我在东京提过那个赌注,至今没人想接我 100 万美元的赌约,赌的是公众在银行的活期存款是否会遭受损失,无论金额大小。这就是我们生活的世界。这意味着一点火星可能引发一场大火,也可能被吹灭。谁知道会发生什么。我们没有任何担忧——伯克希尔把资金以现金和国库券的形式持有,因为我们在季度末持有 1280 亿美元或之类的规模。我们想确保,如果银行系统暂时以某种方式停摆,我们能够存在。它不应该停摆,我认为它不会,但我认为它有可能。而且我认为银行监管中的激励机制一团糟,太多人乐见其糟,这完全疯了。我的意思是,房利美和房地美在美国抵押贷款业务中占比约 40%。这个规模巨大。它们受到监管,就这两家公司,由某个机构监管。我不记得那机构叫什么了。但该机构有 150 人负责判断房地美和房利美是否在正确行事。好吧,我一个人就能干这活。你知道,查理也能干。而且我不确定他们甚至需要一个助手。但激励机制完全错了。房地美和房利美在 2008 年 8 月还运行良好,或者说在 2008 年 7 月和 8 月看起来运行良好,但在 9 月初被纳入政府监管。随之而来的一系列事件简直难以置信。所以,存在二阶、三阶和四阶效应,它们的影响、顺序等都有些不可预测。但情况会变。如果人们还认为存款是粘性的,他们只是活在一个不同的时代。你知道,按个按钮,你无需排队等上几天,看着出纳员慢慢地用金币数钱(笑声)以期队伍消失。几秒钟内就会发生挤兑。所以,问题没有得到妥善解决,这本身就是一个问题。谁知道这会导致什么后果。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, anticipating a few questions on banks, I decided we should start using bank language here to (LAUGHTER) describe — And Charlie. (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE) The situation in banking is very similar to what it's always been in banking, that fear is contagious, always. And historically sometimes the fear was justified, and sometimes it wasn't. My dad lost his job in 1931 because of a bank run, and they had a bank run on state banks. And the head of the Alamo National Bank said, "Well, we're a national bank, and they didn't never a run on the national banks." And, of course, they both faced the same problem. So, it used to be that if you saw people lining up at a bank, the proper response was to get into the line. And they'd always leave it. And the story is that Sidney Weinberg of Goldman Sachs, during one of the bank runs back in 1907 or thereabouts, had a job as a runner at Goldman Sachs, and asked his boss if he could take the week off. And the boss said, "Sure, not much is going on anyway." So, he got in line, whether it was the Knickerbocker Trust or wherever. And as he got toward the front of the line, he sold his place in line to somebody. He didn't have an account at the bank, but that was an asset. (LAUGHTER) And the banking system has changed so much over the years. And we did something enormously sensible, in my view, when we set up the FDIC. As many as 2,000 banks had failed in one year back after World War I. I mean, bank runs were just part of the picture. And if you have people that are worried about whether their money is safe in the bank and are all trying to withdraw, you can't run an economy very well. So, the FDIC was very logical. It's got changed over the years some, but here we are in, you know, 2023. And we actually see the FDIC pay off at a hundred cents on the dollar to everybody or make it available on all demand deposits. And yet you still have people very worried about their — periodically, geographically, all kinds of crazy ways. And that just shouldn't happen. So, the messaging has been very poor. It's been poor by the politicians, who sometimes have an interest in having it poor. It's been poor by the agencies, and I would say it's been poor by the press. I mean, you shouldn't have so many people that misunderstand the fact that although there may be a debt ceiling, it's going to get changed. Although there's a $250,000 limit on FDIC, the FDIC and the U.S. government and the American public have no interest in having a bank fail and have deposits actually lost by people. We had a demonstration project the weekend of Silicon Valley Bank, and the public is still confused. So, it really, it's something to have a law that became effective in 1934, although mollified it in some ways, not understood about something as important as the banking system. I don't think the American public is that dumb, and I just, well, I made that offer over in Tokyo, incidentally, that I haven't heard from anybody that wants to take up my $1 million bet on whether the public will lose money if they have a demand deposit at a bank, no matter what the size. So that's the world we live in. It means that a lighted match can turn into a conflagration, or it can be blown out. And who knows what will happen. And we don't have any worry — we keep our money in cash and Treasury bills at Berkshire, because we keep $128 billion or whatever it was at the end of the quarter. And we want to be there if the banking system temporarily even gets stalled in some way. It shouldn't, I don't think it will, but I think it could. And I think that the incentives in bank regulation are so messed up, and so many people have an interest in having them messed up, that it's totally crazy. I mean, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were doing 40% or so of the mortgage business in the United States. That is huge. They were regulated, just those two companies were regulated by some group. I forget what they called it. But they had 150 people that were in charge of just figuring out whether Freddie and Fannie were doing the right thing. Well, I could've done it. You know, Charlie could've done it. You know, and I'm not sure they needed an assistant even to do it. But the incentives were all wrong. And Freddie and Fannie, which were doing fine in August, or apparently doing fine in July and August of 2008, were put into conservatorship, you know, early in September. And the things that followed from that were just incredible. So, there are second order and third order and fourth order effects that are somewhat unpredictable, as to what they will be and the sequence and all that. But things change. And if people think that deposits are sticky anymore, they're just living in a different era. You know, press a button, you don't have to get in a line and wait for days and have the teller counting out the money slowly in gold so (LAUGH) that you hope the line goes away. You're going to have a run in a few seconds. So, the way it hasn't been addressed properly is a problem. And who knows where it leads.
巴菲特:倒闭银行的 CEO 应受惩罚
Buffett: CEOs of failed banks should be punished
沃伦·巴菲特但你得让做错事的人受到惩罚。以第一共和银行为例,你去看它的 10-K 年报,就会发现它们提供非政府担保的巨额固定利率抵押贷款,有时在转为浮动利率之前固定期限长达十年。这是个疯狂的安排。如果对银行有利,客户会找上门来说:“我按 1.5% 再融资,然后再降到 1%”,反过来如果对银行不利,他们就得锁定十年。你不该给这种选择权。可第一共和银行就是这么干的,而且是明摆着的。全世界对此熟视无睹,直到事情爆雷。这些银行里有内部人士出售了部分股票。谁知道他们是事先有个按部就班的计划,还是某种无伤大雅的安排,或是开始预感到了什么。但你确实知道董事们没法从书上读到什么,但他们确实有能力追究 CEO 的责任。CEO 把银行带进困境,CEO 和董事都应该跟着遭殃。未来的股东不应该受罚。他们什么都没做。现在这样不会给任何人带来任何教训,只会告诉你:如果你经营一家银行并且搞砸了,你照样是富人,俱乐部不会开除你,慈善机构也不会停止邀请你出席他们的筹款会。世界照常运转。对于掌握着经济大权的人来说,这可不是一个好教训。所以,我认为还有工作要做,但这并不是一个难题。只是我们把答案搞砸了,也把沟通搞砸了。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTBut you will have to have a punishment for the people that do the wrong thing. And if you take First Republic, for example, you could look at their 10-K and see that they were offering non-government guaranteed mortgages to, in jumbo amounts, at fixed rates, sometimes for ten years before they changed to floating. And that's a crazy proposition. If it's to the advantage of a bank, they've got the guy coming in and says, "I'll refinance at 1.5% and then 1%," and if it's to the advantage the other way, they keep it out ten years. You don't give options like that. But that what First Republic was doing, and it was in plain sight. And the world ignored it till it blew up. And some of the stock in some of these banks that were held by insiders was sold. And who knows whether they had a plan, or some plan that was innocent, or whether they started sensing what was coming. But you do know that the directors are not going to be able to read some book or anything like that. But they do have the ability to hold the CEO accountable. The CEO gets the bank in trouble, both the CEO and the director should suffer. The stockholders of the future shouldn't suffer. They didn't do anything. It doesn't teach anybody any lessons or anything, it teaches the lesson that if you run a bank and you screw it up, you're still a rich guy and the clubs don't drop you and the charity groups don't quit asking you to their benefits. And the world goes on. And that is not a good lesson to teach people who are holding the behavior of the economy in their hands. So, I think there's some work to be done, but it's not a difficult problem. It's just we've screwed up the answer and we've screwed up the communication of it. Charlie?
查理·芒格哎,我太老派了,我多少有些怀念银行不做投资银行业务的那个时代。这品位在现代世界让我显得特别落伍。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I'm so old fashioned that I kind of liked it that when banks didn't do investment banking. That makes me very outmoded in the modern world.
沃伦·巴菲特而国家一度曾认为这违背公众利益,后来银行又想重操旧业。
WARREN BUFFETTAnd the country decided it was contrary to public interest for a while, and then the banks wanted to get back into it.
查理·芒格可不是吗。
CHARLIE MUNGERDid they ever.
沃伦·巴菲特对。不,我是说——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. No, I mean —
查理·芒格而且我不认为坐拥一帮全都想发财的银行家会带来什么好事。我倒是(掌声)认为,银行家应该更像工程师。他该更执着于规避麻烦,而不是一门心思发财。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd I don't think having a bunch of bankers, all of whom are trying to get rich, leads to good things. But I (APPLAUSE) think a banker should be more like an engineer. He's more, like, into avoiding trouble than he is getting rich.
沃伦·巴菲特没错,安分守己也能干得不错。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, and they could do fine.
查理·芒格安分守己确实能干得不错啊。我认为,当我们搞出一家每个人加入时都盘算着发财的银行时,那我们就犯了大错。这跟价值观相悖。
CHARLIE MUNGERThey can do fine that way. And I think that we're making a big mistake when we get a bank where everybody who joins it plans to get rich. It's a contradiction in values.
沃伦·巴菲特我们过去得出的就是这个结论,我也记不清《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》是哪年通过的什么的,但后来他们又想杀回去。在座有多少人知道——也许我记错了,我最近没查——美联储实际上曾被赋予设定保证金要求的职责。他们多次调整保证金要求,因为大家都知道,如果有太多人借了太多钱,会给银行体系带来危险,如此种种。结果呢?银行想出了上千种花样,让客户可以用 100% 的保证金来借钱,你知道吧?我是说,通过衍生品各种手段,它们把所有来自 1929 年大崩盘的教训全都扭曲了——
WARREN BUFFETTAnd we came to that conclusion, I don't know when Glass-Steagall was passed or anything, but then they want to get back in. How many of you know, and maybe I'm wrong on this, I haven't looked lately, but the Federal Reserve actually was given the responsibility for setting margin requirements. And they change margin requirements a lot of time because it was known that people that borrow a lot of money cause a danger to the banking system if you get too many in the picture and all of that sort of thing. And what's happened? The banks figured out a thousand different ways to get so you could borrow on 100% margin, you know? I mean, through derivatives and everything, they just totally distorted all the lessons that were learned in the '29 crash and —
查理·芒格想想看,把银行业带进衍生品交易,哪个头脑正常的人会允许这种事?
CHARLIE MUNGERImagine taking banking into derivatives trading. Who in his right mind would have allowed that?
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。嗯,这行钱更多嘛。而且——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, there's more money in it. And —
查理·芒格嗯,他们正是为此而来的。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, that's why they're in on it.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。而且——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And —
查理·芒格但这对于我们其他人来说,不见得是什么了不起的社会成果。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd but it isn't necessarily a great social outcome for the rest of us.
沃伦·巴菲特这就是当年参议院各委员会在 1931 年和 1932 年作出的决定。然后到了 1990 年代末,尤其——我是说,一些非常正直的人,但你知道,鲍勃·鲁尔曼(Bob Ruhlman)和一些人,他们说这是现代世界。而这就是现代世界交到我们手上的结果。银行业可以有各种新发明,但它需要坚守旧的价值观。而且——
WARREN BUFFETTThat's what those Senate committees decided back in 1931 and '32. And then in the late 1990s, particularly, I mean, very decent people, but, you know, Bob Ruhlman and some of the people, you know, they said this was the modern world. And here's what the modern world has turned out to hand us. And banking can have all kinds of new inventions, but it needs to have old values. And —
查理·芒格嗯,如果我们要——
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, if we do —
沃伦·巴菲特——我们不知道会发生什么。要知道,当前局面可能衍生出很多种后果。储户不会亏钱。股东和债券持有人、控股公司等等,他们应该亏钱。那些靠商业房地产借了钱、现在贷款无法展期的人,他们应该出局。这很糟糕。这就是按 100% 保证金借款的一部分,人们在商业房地产上一直这么干。你必须施加惩罚,打击那些制造问题的人。如果他们承担了不该承担的风险,而你想改变人们未来的行为,这些风险就必须落在他们头上。(掌声)
WARREN BUFFETT—we don't know what's going to happen. You know, because there are a lot of things that could happen out of the present situation. Depositors will not lose money. Stockholders and debt holders, the holding company and all that, they should lose money. And people borrowed out on commercial real estate and now it isn't, the loans aren't getting extended, they should leave. It's too bad. That's part of borrowing on 100% margin, which is what people have been doing with commercial real estate. You've got to have the penalties, hit the people that cause the problems. And if they took risks that they shouldn't have, it needs to fall on them if you're going to change how people are going to behave in the future. (APPLAUSE)
除美国银行外,伯克希尔对银行股持谨慎态度
Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks
沃伦·巴菲特好,贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, Becky?
贝基·奎克这个问题来自德克萨斯州休斯顿的戴维斯·汉斯。他写道:“在硅谷银行事件之后,您如何看待大型银行与地区银行的商业模式对比?而这种认为所有银行存款都享有隐性担保的看法,对大银行和那些地区银行又有什么影响?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Davis Hans in Houston, Texas. He writes, "What do you think about the business models of the big banks as compared to the regional banks in the wake of the events at Silicon Valley Bank? And how does the perceived implicit guarantee of all deposits at all banks affect big banks and those regional banks?"
沃伦·巴菲特好的。这个我可以这么说。如果你遵循稳健的银行业务方法——意味着不做别人做的那些事——银行完全可以是一笔相当不错的投资。事实上,查理和我,嗯,最初是我在 1969 年,在伯克希尔旗下买了一家银行。我们投了 1900 万美元在那家银行里。我记得我们在保险公司投了 1700 万美元。如果 1970 年《银行控股公司法》没有通过,我们最后可能手里会是一堆银行,而不是一堆保险公司。我们当时还在看更多银行,哈里·基夫(Harry Keefe)带着我们在芝加哥四处考察。还有其他业务可以做。然后,哗的一下,他们通过了 1970 年《银行控股公司法》,我们必须在十年内剥离那家银行——我们也确实这么做了——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, I can say this. If you follow sound banking methods, which means not doing some things that other people do, a bank can be a perfectly decent investment. And in fact, Charlie and I, well, me originally in 1969, we bought a bank at Berkshire. And we had $19 million invested in that bank. And we had $17 million I think invested in our insurance companies. And if the Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 hadn't been passed, we might've ended up owning a lot of banks instead of a lot of insurance companies. We were looking at more banks, and Harry Keefe was taking us around Chicago. And there were other things we could do. And then, bingo, they passed the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, and we had to divest ourselves of that bank in ten years, which we did —
查理·芒格顺便说一句,它没有过一笔坏账。
CHARLIE MUNGERBy the way, it never had a bad debt.
沃伦·巴菲特哦,这个——
WARREN BUFFETTOh, it —
查理·芒格它没有过一笔不必要的开支。它什么都不做,就只是在没有风险的情况下赚钱。它从未给政府带来过任何存款保险风险。
CHARLIE MUNGERIt never had an unnecessary cost. It made nothing but money with no risk. It never presented any deposit insurance risk to the government.
沃伦·巴菲特零风险。
WARREN BUFFETTZero.
查理·芒格它曾是这个社区里一家令人称道、稳健且富有建设性的机构。任何一个走进去、有信用的人,都能贷到钱。
CHARLIE MUNGERIt was a lovely, sound, constructive institution in this community. And any person who went in and deserved credit could get credit.
沃伦·巴菲特没错,我们本来还要买更多银行。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, and we were going to buy more banks.
查理·芒格于是我们被迫退出了。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd we were forced out of it.
沃伦·巴菲特我们本来打算买更多银行。要是真买了更多银行,我们可能就不会把保险业务做这么大。但你知道,法律变了,我们只好剥离银行业务,保险做得还行。可银行业当年对我们来说吸引力更大——市场更大,可收购的目标也更多。那时候你可以经营一家完全稳健的银行,没有可转让大额存单这些东西。后来冒出来的所有发明创造,你现在照样可以用它们经营银行,还能赚大钱,非常可观的钱。我们会找到更多银行的。但我们被禁止那样做了。过去这几年,我们卖掉了银行和银行股——先是疫情爆发时卖了一批,最近六个月又卖了一些。现在大银行、地区银行,或者说任何银行的股东会走向何方,我们根本不知道。我自己的个人存款,很可能已经超过联邦存款保险公司的上限,我放在一家本地银行。我个人完全不担心。但要说持有银行股,未来走向得看事态发展。现在有政客掺和进来,还有一大帮根本不懂这个系统运作的人。我得说,不同人士与美国公众之间的沟通不够理想。所以,美国公众对银行业的困惑程度大概跟过去差不多。这就会带来后果。没人知道后果是什么,因为每发生一起事件,就会重新形成一种不同的态势。我是说,在物理学里,你知道π是 3.14,后面还有无穷多位,不管发生什么都不变。但你根本不知道存款黏性现在变成什么样了。2008 年改变了一次,这次又变了一次。这改变了一切。所以,在这样一种情况下,我们对持有银行股权非常谨慎。我们确实还保留着一家银行的持股,是一笔交易,是我们当年主动找美国银行谈成的。我喜欢美国银行,喜欢它的管理层。那笔交易是我提议的,所以我继续持有。但问我能不能预测接下来会发生什么?答案是:不能。因为过去几个月我看到的很多事情,对我而言其实并不算太意外,但都再次印证了我原来的看法——美国公众并不了解我们的银行体系,而国会里一些人可能对它也不比我了解火箭为什么能上天多多少。我是说,有太多东西是我不知道的。但如果你在国会,你就得对每件事都表态。而且有时候,你真的理解这件事,反而不把真实想法全说出来,反而对你有利。事情就是这样。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWe were going to buy more banks. And if we bought more banks, we probably wouldn't have expanded the insurance business. But, you know, the law changed and so we divested, and we've done OK in insurance. But banking was more attractive to us. It was bigger and there were more targets to buy. And you could run a perfectly sound bank then, and no negotiable certificates of deposit. All these things, all the inventions that came later, and you could still run them today and you could earn good money. Very good money. And we would've found more banks. But we're precluded from doing that. And we've sold banks, bank stocks in the last, well, we sold them first when the pandemic broke out, and then we sold some more in the last six months. And we don't know where the shareholders of the big banks, necessarily, or the regional banks or any bank, are heading now. I've got my own personal money, and I'm probably above the FDIC limit, and I've got it with a local bank. And I think, I don't worry about it in the least. But in terms of owning banks, events will determine their future. And you've got politicians involved. You've got a whole lot of people who don't really understand how the system works. And I would say you've had something less than a perfect communication between various people and the American public. So, the American public is probably as confused about banking as ever. And that has consequences. And nobody knows what the consequences are because every event starts recreating a different dynamic. I mean, in physics you know that pie is going to be 3.14, you know, infinite number of numbers after that, but no matter what happens. But you don't know what has happened to the stickiness of deposits at all. It got changed by 2008. It's gotten changed by this. And that changes everything. And so, we're very cautious in a situation like that about ownership of banks. And we do remain with one bank holding, a deal, but we originated that deal with the Bank of America. And I like Bank of America. I like the management. And I proposed the deal with them, so I stick with it. But do I know how to project out what's going to happen from here? The answer is I don't, because I've seen so many things in the last few months which really weren't that unexpected to me to see. But which reconfirmed my beliefs that the American public doesn't understand our banking system, and some people in Congress perhaps don't understand it any more than I don't understand why the spaceships go up. I mean, there's all kinds of things I don't know about. But if you're in Congress, you have to take a position on everything. And sometimes it's to your advantage if you really understand it not to say exactly what you feel. And here we are. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,我这一生银行业发生了很多变化。我很欢迎早年美国银行向那些有资格的移民提供贷款的做法。而且我认为,信用卡最初以银行原始卡的形式出现时,是对文明的一大贡献。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, a lot has happened in banking in my lifetime. I welcomed all that early banking of the deserving immigrants by the early Bank of America. And I think all the credit cards when they came in as original bank cards were a great contribution to civilization.
查理·芒格而且,事情越像赌博,越像投资银行那一套,作为公民,我就越不喜欢。我一直,向来对那种人人都想发财、又互相嫉妒的氛围深恶痛绝。我觉得那种环境极其有毒。说到这个,我想到一个故事,这又是真事。我不点名字,也不是皮特·杰弗里斯,因为皮特可能适合这个名头,但真不是他。我们的英雄,吉恩·阿贝格,迟早得退休。所以,我们找了个未来接班人。这多少有点我刚才说的那个问题——你有个完美的生意,现在要引进一个人。我们其实找来一个人,这人跟查理上过同一所中央高中,虽说——
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd but the gamier it gets and the more it looks like investment banking, the less I like it, as a citizen. I don't want, I am always, I am deeply distrustful of situations in which everybody wants to get rich and envies everybody else. I regard that atmosphere as utterly toxic. And to people who like one story, which this is, again, a true story, and I'm not naming the name, and it wasn't Pete Jefferies, because he might fit this name, but it wasn't Pete. But our hero, Gene Abegg, was going to have to retire at some point. And so, we hired a future replacement. This is kind of a little bit of the problem I talked before, about having the perfect business, and now we're going to bring in somebody. We actually bring in somebody who went to Central High with Charlie, although —
查理·芒格我的同班。
CHARLIE MUNGERMy class.
沃伦·巴菲特对。(笑)而且查理不知道我正在挑这个人选。他当时并没——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (LAUGH) And Charlie didn't know I was picking out this guy. He wasn't —
查理·芒格他要来问我,我们根本不会雇他。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERIf he'd have asked me, we wouldn't have hired him. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,如果我问你,那我大概根本不会雇任何人,但这是另一个问题了。不过这家伙来了,人还不错,体面,你知道,看起来像个银行家,方方面面都像。当然,他第一件想做的事——我们有这家很棒的银行,可银行在罗克福德的办公大楼是全市最破烂的。我们不需要什么气派的大楼,我们只需要一个出色的银行家。可这家伙自然想建一栋新大楼。虽然我们是利润最高的银行,但看上去并不像利润最高的(笑声)。所以,我告诉他,他可以要任何他想要的楼,条件只有一个——高度不能超过离我们最近的竞争对手,必须比对方矮。他立刻就彻底没了兴趣。(笑声)他想当镇上最高大楼顶层的主人,我告诉他,你水平方向怎么折腾都行,但垂直方向不行。这件事让我看清了这家伙人生的动机。不过——最后他也没当上那家银行的负责人。总之,我对银行的了解就这些,也许还多了点。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, if I asked you, I probably wouldn't have hired anybody, but that's another question. But this guy comes over, and perfectly decent guy, but presentable, you know, looks like a banker and everything. And, of course, the first thing he wants to do, we've got this wonderful bank, but we've got the crummiest looking building in Rockford. And we don't need a great building, we just need a great banker. And naturally this guy wants to build a new building. And because we were the most profitable bank, but we didn't look like we were the most profitable (LAUGH) bank. So, I told him he could have any building he wanted, as long as it was not higher than, it had to be shorter than our nearest competitor. And he lost interest totally. (LAUGH) He wanted to be on the top floor of the biggest building in town, and I told him he could horizontally do anything he wanted but he couldn't do it vertically. And it taught me a lot about the guy's motivations in life. But — and he didn't end up running the bank anyway. Anyway, that's all I know about banking and probably more.
持续印钞简直是“发疯”
It is 'madness to keep printing money'
沃伦·巴菲特三号站?
WARREN BUFFETTStation three?
现场股东巴菲特先生、芒格先生,你们好。
AUDIENCE MEMBERMr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, hi.
沃伦·巴菲特你好。
WARREN BUFFETTHi.
现场股东我叫达芙妮,今年 13 岁,这是我第六次参加伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会。(掌声)过去几年我有幸向两位提过问。今天我带来的问题是这样的:如您所知,美国国债目前估计高达 31 万亿美元,约占美国 GDP 的 125%。与此同时,过去几年里美联储一直在传递信号,打算通过印数万亿美元来将债务货币化,即便他们坚称正在对抗通胀。而世界上其他主要经济体,比如中国、沙特阿拉伯和巴西,已经预见到这一点,开始逐步远离美元。我的问题是,未来我们是否很可能面临美元不再是全球储备货币的时刻?伯克希尔对此有何准备?作为美国公民,我们又能做些什么来保护自己,以应对这种似乎已初见端倪的去美元化趋势?
<<<END P 13>>>
AUDIENCE MEMBERMy name is Daphne. I'm 13 years old, and this is my sixth annual Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder's Meeting. (APPLAUSE) And I've had the privilege to ask you both questions in years past. My question for you today is the following. As you know, the U.S. national debt is currently at an estimated $31 trillion, making up about 125% of the U.S. GDP. In the meantime, over the past few years, the Federal Reserve has telegraphed that they intend to monetize the debt by printing trillions of dollars, even as they insist that they're fighting inflation. Already other major economies in the world, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil are moving away from the dollar in anticipation of this. My question is are we likely to face a time in the future when the U.S. dollar is no longer the global reserve currency? How is Berkshire prepared for this possibility? And what can we do as American citizens to attempt to shelter ourselves from what's beginning to look like the beginnings of de-dollarization?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,(掌声)我该请你上来回答几个问题。我的意思是,(笑声)也许吧。这很有意思,我的意思是,我们是储备货币。我看不出还有其他任何货币能成为储备货币。而且我认为没有人比杰伊·鲍威尔更了解这种情况。但他无法控制财政政策,而且他时不时会给出一些暗示。毫无疑问,当疫情爆发时,我的意思是,那是一种半战争状态。但没人知道,在纸质货币失控之前,你能走多远。如果,特别是如果你是世界的储备货币,没人知道答案。你也不想去试图找出它真正成为问题的那一点,因为那之后一切就都完了。我认为我们应该非常小心。我的意思是,你知道,我们都学过凯恩斯主义,并在二战期间将其运用于国家利益,我们竭尽全力防止战争期间的通胀。然后战争在 1945 年 8 月结束,我认为是在 1946 年 1 月,我现在完全不是在给你精确的数字,但 1946 年 1 月,我认为通胀率大约在 1% 左右。到那年年底,我认为它达到了 15% 左右。再次说明,我是凭久远的记忆说的。但美国很容易做得太过火,但如果我们做得太过火,一旦把魔鬼放出瓶子,就很难看到如何恢复。人们会失去对货币的信心。他们的行为方式会与他们认为把钱存银行、有养老金计划或任何其他形式,能获得大致相同购买力时完全不同。那会改变一切。然后各种事情都可能发生。我无法预测,其他人也无法预测。但我确实知道那不会好。我们会看到,我这么做,你知道,我投票给过两党。这不限于任何一党的政客或任何类似情况。但人们会采取立场,有些人明白自己在做什么,有些人则不明白。你知道,如果把我放到某个医学委员会里,我也不知道自己在做什么。你知道,你不能精通所有事情,这没什么不对。我们不可能都是艾萨克·牛顿。但你不能到处假装自己懂,或者根据这个做决策。我们在控制通胀预期方面不如以前那么好了,通胀预期会自我实现,而且我们在那方面不如以前。而伯克希尔比大多数投资更能为那样的时期做好准备。而且,我的意思是,我在年报里说过,但我们没有完全准备好,因为没法完全准备好。你不知道会采取什么行动方案。现在这是一个非常政治化的决定。某种程度上这是一个部落式的决定。你希望有领导力真正做些什么,认识到问题。美国是一个不可思议的社会,很富裕,你知道吗?我们拥有一切有利条件。但那并不意味着我们可以无限地印钞当债务。看看结果如何将会很有趣。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, (APPLAUSE) I should ask you to come up here and answer some questions. I mean, (LAUGHTER) maybe. It's very interesting, I mean, we are the reserve currency. I see no option for any other currency to be the reserve currency. And I think that nobody understands the situation better than Jay Powell. And but he's not in control of fiscal policy, and every now and then he drops a few hints. And there was no question that when the pandemic broke out, I mean, it was a semi-war-like situation. But nobody knows how far you can go with a paper currency before it gets out of control. If, and particularly if you're the world's reserve currency, nobody knows the answer to that. And you don't want to try and pick out the point at where it does become a problem, because then it's all over. And I think we should be very careful. I mean, you know, we all learned Keynesianism and we applied it in World War II to the advantage of the country, and we did everything we could to prevent inflation during the war. And then the war ended in August of '45 and I think in January of '46, and I'm not giving you exact figures at all now, but in January of '46 I think the rate of inflation was at, you know, something like 1% or thereabouts. And by the end of the year, I think it was at, like, 15%. And again, I'm doing this from long memories. But it's easy for America to do it a lot, but if we do too much it's very hard to see how you recover once you let the genie out of the bottle. And people lose faith in the currency. And they behave in an entirely different manner than they do when they feel that if they put some money in the bank or have a pension plan, or whatever it may be, that they're going to get to have something with roughly equal purchasing power. And it just changes the (UNINTEL). And all kinds of things can happen then. And I can't predict them and nobody else can predict them. But I do know they aren't good. And we will see, and I do this as, you know, I've voted for both parties. And it's not limited to politicians of either party or anything of the sort. But people take positions, some of them understand what they're doing, some of them don't understand what they're doing. And, you know, if they put me on some medical board, I don't understand what I'm doing. You know, there's nothing wrong with the fact that you can't master everything. We can't all be Isaac Newton. But you can't go around pretending you do or making decisions on it. And we are not as well off in relation to curbing inflation expectations, which become self-fulfilling, then we are not as well off as we were earlier. And Berkshire is better prepared than most investments for that kind of a period. And, I mean, I said this in the annual report, but we aren't perfectly prepared, because there's no way to perfectly prepare. You don't know what course of action will occur. And it's a very political decision now. It's a tribal decision to some degree. And you hope for leadership that actually will do something, recognizes the problem. And America's an incredible society, rich, you know? We've got everything going for us. But that doesn't mean we can just print money indefinitely as debt. And it'll be interesting to see how it turns out. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,在某个时点,印钱买选票会适得其反。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, at some point printing money to buy votes will be counterproductive.
沃伦·巴菲特对。
WARREN BUFFETTYup.
查理·芒格而且我们不知道(掌声)确切发生在哪里。如果某件事危险且无益,你最好离它远一点。现在,如果你有一个像日本那样异常强大的文化,他们在那里做过一些奇怪的事情。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd we don't know (APPLAUSE) exactly where that comes. And if something is going to be dangerous and unproductive, you ought to keep it a fair distance away. Now, if you have a culture that is exceptionally strong, like Japan, they have done some strange things there.
沃伦·巴菲特但他们不可能是储备货币。
WARREN BUFFETTBut they couldn't have been a reserve currency.
查理·芒格不,当然不是。但是,日本回购了大部分国债和很多普通股和债券。差不多日本央行(日本银行)持有了日本国内的一切,而国家仍在运转。日本经历了 30 年的经济停滞,但并没有走向地狱。我确实很钦佩日本。不过,我认为我们不应该试图模仿它。我觉得我们在应对方面没有日本做得好——
CHARLIE MUNGERNo, of course not. And, but Japan bought back most of the national debt and most of the, a lot of the common stocks and debt. Just the federal reserve owns practically everything in Japan, and the country's working. It's had 30 years of economic stasis, but it's not going to hell. I really admire Japan. And, but I don't think we should try and imitate it. I don't think we're as good as Japan at taking —
沃伦·巴菲特他们有一种凝聚力的文化,而我们没有,查理。我们——
WARREN BUFFETTThey have a cohesive culture, and we don't, Charlie. We —
查理·芒格对,确实如此。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, that's exactly right.
沃伦·巴菲特对。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
查理·芒格在日本,每个人都应该忍辱负重,而在美国,我们只会抱怨。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERIn Japan, everybody's supposed to suck it up and cope, and in America we complain. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特所以,我希望明年您能带个更难的问题来。(笑声)不过——谢谢您。我预测,如果今天能再出生一次,我仍然会选择美国。我是说,我们做了很多蠢事还能混过去,但不可能无限地混下去。有人在关心这事。而且,你知道,你得甘愿承受极度的不得人心。我是说,保罗·沃尔克,其他美联储主席不会做他做过的事。那实在太难受了。内布拉斯加以前有个政客,要是你问他像“你对堕胎怎么看?”这种特别棘手的问题,他会直视你的眼睛说:“我对此立场稳妥。”然后他就跳到下一个话题。嗯,人们在通胀问题上基本就是这么干的。他们用这样那样的方式说“我对此立场稳妥”,然后就不去考虑自己行为的后果,尤其是严重后果。要是你们有 435 个人,只当 435 分之一,而不是那个负责的人,那多轻松啊。总之,我还是那个看法——比起两个超级大国的问题、毁灭地球的问题,在没有替代品的情况下毁掉世界储备货币,忘掉一切玩具——我是说,想什么代币或者(笑)那种疯狂完全是笑话。但持续印钱也是疯狂,没错。我们知道怎么干,二战时我们确实就搞过印钱经济,那是必需的。然后我们经历了严重的通胀,物价水平——我是说,有一万种方法衡量——大概涨到了当时的十倍左右。嗯,那已经接近你不想再持有美元、想持有别的东西的边沿了。你想持有房地产,你想持有企业的股权。有很多好东西,你最好的防御是你自己的赚钱能力。如果你是镇上最好的医生、最好的律师、最好的老师,哪怕只是第十好的,你都能过得不错。你知道,这个经济是富有生产力的。靠你的才华,你会成功。但靠囤积美元你不会成功,你成功只因为你对社区的价值——这个社区整体很富裕——是稳定的。所以最好的投资永远是投资你自己。这就是我能给你的答案。
WARREN BUFFETTSo, I hope you come next year with a tougher question. (LAUGHTER) But — and thank you. And I predict, I would love to be being born again today in the United States. I mean, we can do a lot of dumb things and get away with it. We can't do an unlimited number. There are people who care about that. And, you know, you have to be willing to be extraordinarily unpopular. I mean, Paul Volcker, there are other Federal Reserve chairpeople that would not have done what he did. It's just, it's too uncomfortable. And there used to be a politician in Nebraska, and if you asked him some really tough question like, you know, how do you stand on abortion, he would look you right in the eye and he'd say, "I'm all right on that one." And then he'd move next. Well, that's what people have done basically on inflation. And they, one way or another, they say, "I'm all right on that," and then they don't really think about what the consequences of their actions could be, particularly. And it's so much fun to, if there's 435 of you, to just be one of 435 instead of being the person actually responsible. Anyway, I am still, next to the question of two superpowers and when you get in to really destroying a planet, destroying the reserve currency of the world when there's really no substitute, and forget about all the toys, you know, I mean, it's a joke to think of any tokens or (LAUGH) that sort of madness. But it's also madness to just keep printing money, yeah. And we know how to do it, and we actually came from a money-printing economy in World War II, which was required. And we suffered significant inflation, the price level — I mean, there's a million ways to judge it — but it's maybe ten times what it was then or something like that. Well, that's getting close to the edge of where you don't want to hold dollars anymore, you want to hold something else. You want to hold real estate; you want to hold interest in a business. There's a lot of good, and your best defense is your own earning power. If you're the best doctor in town, if you're the best lawyer in town, if you're the best teacher in town, or even if you're the tenth best, you're going to make a good living. You know, the economy is productive. And you will succeed with your talents. But you won't succeed by hoarding dollars, you'll just succeed by the fact that your value to the community, which is a rich community overall, is sustained. And so the best investment is always in yourself. That's the answer I would give you.
查理·芒格嗯,我们处于这样一种情况:我们学会了大量印钱,而我们一大部分年轻人直接进入了财富管理行业。(笑声)这是——
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, we have a situation where we've learned to print money in gobs, and a big chunk of our young people go right into wealth management. (LAUGHTER) This is —
沃伦·巴菲特就像我们一样。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTLike we did. (LAUGH)
查理·芒格对,就像我们一样,就像我们一样。是的,我们是坏榜样。我想说,我进入这个行业时,没想到财富管理会变得这么大。我想为所发生的一切道歉。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, like we did, like we did. Yes, we're bad examples. And I want to say that I didn't realize wealth management was going to get so big when I went into it. And I want to apologize for what's happened. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,好吧。不管怎样,你做得很好。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, well. Anyway, you did well. (LAUGH)
巴菲特原本更愿早些买更多 Pilot 股份,但对方不卖
Buffet would have preferred to buy more of Pilot earlier, but it wasn't for sale
沃伦·巴菲特贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTBecky?
贝基·奎克这个问题来自俄亥俄州帕尔马的加里·甘比诺,他说他从 2004 年起就是伯克希尔的股东。他说:“今年为购买 Pilot 41.4% 股权所支付的金额,将整个公司估值约为 190 亿美元。这大约是 BP 收购 Travel Centers of America 出价的六倍,但 Pilot 的市场份额仅为 Travel Centers of America 的三倍。是否是一个巨大的错误,将最终定价基于 2022 年的收益,而当时的燃油利润率异常高?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Gary Gambino in Parma, Ohio, who says he's been a Berkshire shareholder since 2004. He says, "The amount paid this year for the 41.4% stake in Pilot values the entire company at around $19 billion. That's about six times what BP is paying for Travel Centers of America, but Pilot's market share is just three times Travel Centers of America's. "Was it a big mistake to base the final price in 2022 earnings, which has unusually high fuel margins?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这个问题问得非常好。答案是,我们安排分三个阶段购买,第三阶段由那 20% 股份的持有者选择是否出售。第一阶段我们买到的价格相当合算。第二阶段,柴油业务那一年表现非常好,所以卖方卖了个好价钱。总的来说,以我们付出的价格拥有那 80% 的股份,我们感觉很好,但如果我们一开始就买下那 80%,结果会更好。最后那 20% 卖方有选择权,这种结构安排向来不够明智。我们跟其他公司也有过这种安排,嗯,比如内布拉斯加家具城,我们在 1983 年 8 月 30 日买下了它 80% 的股份,差不多 40 年前了,结果非常理想。但当你给对方选择权时,他们就占了某种优势。我们现在拥有 80% 的一家我们非常喜欢的生意,把它跟 Travel America 比其实不太恰当,因为 Travel America 不仅规模小得多,而且他们所有的地产都是租的。我们在州际公路沿线有几百个地块,已经规划好了商业用途,有的可能有 15 英亩,那是独一无二的。州际公路不可能往右移两英里什么的,你知道,绝无可能。所以,我们的位置很好,至于 BP 是不是做了一笔好交易,那不好说。我读过招股说明书,我理解。我是说,这对 BP 来说是个很大的产出来源。但我喜欢 Pilot 现有的管理层。我非常喜欢那位即将上任的新 CEO。我得跟你说说亚当·赖特,他接任这个职位。他来自奥马哈。他不是因为来自奥马哈才被选中的。他来自奥马哈。他毕业于北高中,一所公立学校,我妻子就是从那里毕业的。我有孙辈也从那里毕业。他上了内布拉斯加大学,差点打破了校史橄榄球冲球纪录,这个纪录永远不会被打破了,因为他们已经放弃了橄榄球项目,但我记得他冲了大概(笑声)3600 码。上学期间他同时干着三份工作。20 年前他在 MidAmerica 实习,他母亲工作供他上学。我是说,这简直就是,霍雷肖·阿尔杰故事的平方。我们让他来管理 Pilot。哈斯拉姆家族给我们留下了一个很好的生意,“大吉姆”,现在他(听不清)有很棒的人。现在就是这样。我非常高兴我们拥有 Pilot,我只希望我第一次做交易时就买下 100%(笑),但当初人家不是那么卖的——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, that's a very good question. And the answer is that we arranged to buy it in three stages, with the third stage being at the option of the owner of 20%. The first stage we bought at what turned out to be a very attractive price. The second stage turned out to be a very good year for the diesel business, which means that the seller got a very good price. And I would say that overall, we feel very good about the fact that we own the 80% at the price that we do, but we would've been better if we just bought the 80% to start with. And the last 20% the seller has the option, and that's always an unintelligent way of structuring something. We've had that arrangement with other, well, we had it with the Furniture Mart, we bought 80% of the [Nebraska] Furniture Mart on August 30th, 1983, almost 40 years ago, and it's worked out perfectly. But when you give the other person the option, they've got some advantage. We have 80% now of a business we like very much, and the comparison to Travel America is really spurious, because Travel America is not only much smaller, but they rent all their properties. And we have hundreds and hundreds of locations on the interstate that are zoned for what we, commercial, maybe 15 acres or, there's nothing like it. And they're not going to move the interstate two miles to the right or something, you know, or anything of the sort. So, we've got a position that, you know, BP may or may not have made a fine deal. I've read the prospectus and I can understand. I mean, it's a big source of output for BP. But I like the management we have had at Pilot. I like very much the fellow who's coming in that's the new CEO. I just have to tell you a little bit about Adam Wright, who's taking that job on. He came from Omaha. He wasn't selected because he came from Omaha. He came from Omaha. He came from North High, a public school that my wife graduated from. I've got grandchildren that graduated from there. He went to the University of Nebraska and almost set the rushing record in football, which will never be beaten because they've given up football, but I think he rushed for maybe (LAUGHTER) 3,600 yards. He held three jobs while he went through there. He interned at MidAmerica 20 years ago, his mother worked to put him through school. I mean, it's just, it's Horatio Alger-squared. And we have him to manage Pilot. And the Haslams have given us a wonderful business, "Big Jim," and now he (UNINTEL) great people. And here we are. And I'm very glad we own Pilot, I just wish we bought 100% (LAUGH) of it when I first made the deal, but that was not the deal that was offered to us —
查理·芒格沃伦,当初它不卖。
CHARLIE MUNGERWarren, it wasn't for sale.
沃伦·巴菲特对,不卖。嗯。家具城最后的 20% 我们买下 80% 时也不卖,所以我们就买了 80%。结果很好。我们做过各种各样的交易,方式各不相同。最好的方式就是直接给人开支票,拿到股票。我们买 TTI 时就是这么做的,但你不可能总是做成同样的交易。如果我们足够喜欢这个生意,足够喜欢这些人,我们会采取不同的定制方式,但我们的偏好是开支票拥有全部,并且让管理层留任。查理,有什么补充吗?
WARREN BUFFETTIt wasn't for sale. Yeah. And the last 20% of the Furniture Mart wasn't for sale when we bought it, so we bought 80% of it. And that's worked out well. And we've done various deals various ways. The best way to do it is just write people the check and get the stock. But we did that with TTI, but you can't always make the same deal. If we like the business well enough and the people well enough, we will tailor it differently, but our preference is to write a check and own the whole place and keep the management in place. Charlie, anything to add on?
查理·芒格没有。
CHARLIE MUNGERNo.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯。看着像亚当·赖特这样的人一步步成长起来,确实很棒。我是说,基本上,我不知道他母亲挣多少钱,但他上了北高中,离这儿大概四五英里。公立学校毕业。然后一步步往上走。在太平洋燃气与电力公司干了一段时间,我们在 Pilot 把他带回了家。Pilot 嘛,去年柴油价格差别很大。Pilot 去年销售额接近 800 亿美元,但今年价格更正常,规模大概就一半左右,也许再多一点。但他,我不知道亚当多大,大概 40 多岁。他是从格雷格·阿贝尔参与过的组织里成长起来的。现在他掌管着一家非常大的企业。伯克希尔能做到这点很好。我不知道,也许别人上过更有名的商学院,那又怎么样呢?我们已经见识过亚当的能力了。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. It's really wonderful to watch something like Adam Wright work out. I mean, basically, you know, I don't know what his mother was earning, but he went to North High, which is probably four or five miles from here. Public school graduate. And worked his way up. Went through a short period at Pacific Gas and Electric, and we brought him home there on Pilot. And Pilot, well, Pilot, the prices on diesel were way different last year. Pilot was close to $80 billion of sales last year, but more normal prices this, it's significant, you know, it's half that or thereabouts, maybe a little more. But he is, I don't know how old Adam would be, but he's in his 40s. And he came up through the organization that Greg Abel was involved with. And now here he is, running a very major business. It's good at Berkshire to be able to do that. And I don't, you know, somebody else may have gone to more prestigious business schools, and I think so what? You know, we've seen what Adam can do.
“你应该写下自己的讣告,然后努力活成那个样子”
'You should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it'
沃伦·巴菲特好,四号座位?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, station four?
现场股东下午好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我叫 J.C.,15 岁,来自俄亥俄州。这是我第四次亲临伯克希尔股东大会。我非常热衷于从您的演讲、访谈和文章中学习。感谢您一直分享智慧。巴菲特先生,在您今年的致股东信里,您说伯克希尔的旅程包括“持续储蓄、复利的力量、美国的顺风以及避免重大错误”。您过去曾谦逊地承认自己犯过很多错误。但这是我第一次特别注意到“重大错误”这个说法。请问您能就投资和生活中应该避免哪些重大错误给我们一些建议吗?我也想听听芒格先生的看法。非常感谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBERGood afternoon Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is J.C. I am 15 years old and I'm from Ohio. This is my fourth in-person Berkshire meeting. I have a lot of passion learning from your speeches, interviews, and articles. Thank you for sharing your wisdom all the time. Mr. Buffett, in your annual shareholder letter this year, you said that Berkshire's journey consisted of "continuous savings, the power of commanding, the American tailwind, and avoidance of major mistakes". You have humbly admitted in the past that you have made many mistakes. But this is the first time that major mistakes stood out to me. Could you please advise us on what major mistakes we should avoid in both investing and in life? I would also like to have Mr. Munger's thoughts too, please. Thank you very much.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,主要的,(掌声)查理说过你可能犯的最大错误,你知道,你如果身在美国那已经很幸运了。如果你环顾世界,有些地方你没多少选择。但你应该写下自己的讣告,然后努力活成那个样子。你知道,这是你随着时间推移会越来越明白的事。商业上的错误,你只需要确保自己别犯那种会让你出局或者差点出局的错误。你永远不应该因为投资而彻夜难眠,我是说,假设你还有钱可投的话。你应该花的比你挣的少一点。如果你花的比挣的多一点,那你就会背上债务,很可能一辈子都还不清。买房子按揭贷款算是个例外。但是信用卡债务嘛,我们可是信用卡业务的大玩家,而且会继续做下去,但为什么要让自己陷入被动呢?如果你实际上在支付 12% 或 14% 或任何比例的信用卡利息,那等于你在说,“我挣的钱能超过 12% 或 14%”。如果你能做到,那就来伯克希尔·哈撒韦吧。所以,查理就在我旁边,我不想这么说,但这真是本·富兰克林式的道理。我是说,(笑)没那么复杂。但是,嗯,我给你几个建议。你知道,汤姆·墨菲,我第一次见他时,他跟我说了两件事。他说,“你永远可以明天再叫人去死。”这在当时就是绝妙的建议。想想看,当你坐在电脑前,30 秒内就能发句话叫人去死或别的什么,从而彻底搞砸你的人生,这建议有多棒。而且你没法删除。你知道,你没有保留选择权。他还说,“赞美我的名字,批评我的类别。”还有什么比这更有道理的呢?我是说,谁会喜欢一个老是批评你的人呢?讨论话题时,你不需要诋毁任何人来表达你的观点。另一个笼统的建议是,我从来没见过一个本质善良的人死的时候没有朋友。我见过很多有钱人死的时候没有朋友,包括他们的家人。但我从来没见过谁,你知道,我见过一些人,包括汤姆·墨菲老先生,也许还有他儿子,他今天在这儿(笑),但肯定是他父亲,我观察了他 50 年,我从未见他做过任何不友善的事。我也没见他做过多少蠢事。我是说,他不是毫无辨别力,他只是觉得没必要那么做。哇,这给人生带来的差别真大。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, the main, (APPLAUSE) Charlie said the major mistake you could make, you know, you're lucky if you're in the United States. If you go around the world you don't have a lot of choices in some places. But you should write your obituary and then try and figure out how to live up to it. And, you know, that's something you get wiser on as you go along. The business mistakes, you just want to make sure you don't make any mistakes that take you out of the game or come close to taking you out of your game. You should never have a night when you're worried about investing, I mean, assuming you have any money to invest at all. And you should just spend a little bit less than you earn. And you can spend a little bit more than you earn, and then you've got debt, and the chances are you'll never get out of debt. I'll make an exception in terms of a mortgage on your house. But credit card debt, and we're in the credit card business big time, and we'll stay in the credit card business, but why get behind the game? And if you're effectively paying 12% or 14% or whatever percent you're paying on a credit card, you know, you're saying, "I'm going to earn more than 12% or 14% of my money." And if you can do that, come to Berkshire Hathaway. So, it's, I hate to say this when Charlie's around me, but it's straight out of Ben Franklin. I mean, (LAUGH) and it's not that complicated. But you, well, I'll give you a couple lessons. You know, Tom Murphy, the first time I met him, said two things to me. He said, "You can always tell someone to go to hell tomorrow." Well, that was great advice then. And think of what great advice it is when you can sit down at a computer and screw your life up forever by telling somebody to go to hell, or something else, in 30 seconds. And you can't erase it. And, you know, haven't lost the option. And he said, you know, "Praise my name, criticize my category." Well, what makes more sense than that? I mean, who do you like that criticizes you all the time? And you don't need to vilify anybody to make your point on subjects of discussion. And then the other general piece of advice, I've never known anybody that was basically kind that died without friends. And I've known plenty of people with money that have died without friends, including their family. But I've never known anybody, and you know, I've seen a few people, including Tom Murphy Sr. and maybe Jr., who's here, (LAUGH) but certainly his dad, I never saw him, I watched him for 50 years, I never saw him do an unkind act. I didn't see him do very many stupid acts either. I mean, it wasn't that he was non-discriminating, he just decided that there was no reason to do it. And wow, what a difference that makes in life. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,很简单,花的比挣的少,明智地投资,远离有毒的人和有毒的活动,终生保持学习,等等等等,大量地延迟满足,因为你喜欢这样的生活。如果你都做到了,你几乎肯定会成功。如果你没做到,那你需要很多运气。你不想需要很多运气。你想参与一个即使没有异常运气也很可能获胜的游戏。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, it's so simple to spend less than you earn, and invest shrewdly, and avoid toxic people and toxic activities, and try and keep learning all your life, et cetera, et cetera, and do a lot of deferred gratification because you prefer life that way. And if you do all those things, you are almost certain to succeed. And if you don't, you're going to need a lot of luck. And you don't want to need a lot of luck. You want to go into a game where you're very likely to win without having any unusual luck.
沃伦·巴菲特我再补充一点,你需要知道别人是怎么操纵别人的,而且你要抵御自己这样做的诱惑。
WARREN BUFFETTI'd add one more thought too, you need to know how people can manipulate other people, and you need to resist the temptation to do it yourself.
查理·芒格哦对,那些试图欺骗你、对你说谎、或者不履行承诺的有毒之人。人生的一大教训就是——让他们滚出你的生活。
CHARLIE MUNGEROh yes, the toxic people who are trying to fool you or lie to you or aren't reliable in meeting their commitments. A great lesson of life is get them the hell out of your life.
沃伦·巴菲特对。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
查理·芒格而且要快。(掌声)要快。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd do it fast. (APPLAUSE) Do it fast.
沃伦·巴菲特我想补充,查理完全同意我的看法——如果可能的话,也要做得有策略一点。(笑)但一定要让他们滚出你的生活。
WARREN BUFFETTAnd I would add, Charlie would totally agree with me, do it tactfully, if possible, too. (LAUGH) But do get them out of your life.
查理·芒格对。嗯,我不介意稍微讲点策略。(笑声)甚至付出一点经济代价。但关键是要让他们滚出你的生活。
CHARLIE MUNGERYes. Yeah, I don't mind a little tact. (LAUGHTER) Or even a little financial cost. But the question is getting them the hell out of your life.
家庭成员消极时是“棘手的问题”
'Tough problem' when family members are negative
沃伦·巴菲特好,贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, Becky?
贝基·奎克好的,这个问题来自罗杰·李·谭。他说:“我叫罗杰,来自香港,是伯克希尔的长期股东,也是巴菲特先生和芒格先生智慧与原则的仰慕与追随者。您二位都曾说过,人生中最难的问题永远是人的问题。而您学到的能过上幸福成功人生的关键一课,就是远离消极的人。我的问题是,如果那些消极的人是您的家人(笑声),是您不能简单远离的人,那该怎么办?”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this comes from Roger Lee Tan. He says, "My name is Roger from Hong Kong, a long-term shareholder of Berkshire, admirer and follower of Mr. Buffett's and Munger's wisdom and principle. Both of you have said before that the most difficult problems in life are always people problems. "And one of the key lessons you have learned to be able to live a happy life and a successful life is to stay away from negative people. My question is what to do if those negative people are your families, the people (LAUGHTER) whom you can't simply stay away from?"
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。那就尽量减少接触。但你不能——不,我的意思是,这确实没办法。查理前几天给了一个我觉得堪称分寸拿捏大师的回答,他说:“你总是应该和品行良好的人打交道。”他说:“当然,对家人你得有些例外。”但(笑声)这是真的。而且,你知道,我真的不知道,如果你有一个酗酒、欺凌成性——大概是父亲吧,或者说家长,一般意义上的,那会是什么样子。我的意思是,你怎么处理?很有意思的是,麦克阿瑟家族,就是那位非常著名的约翰·麦克阿瑟,创立麦克阿瑟基金会的人,他有五个孩子。其中四个后来都以这样那样的方式成了超级明星,而他们有一个疯狂、四处漂泊、酗酒的父亲。但他们都决定,该做的事就是赶紧离开那个家。所以,那个麦克阿瑟基金会的创始人做了这件事,五个兄弟姐妹中的三个也都这么做了。所以,你知道,我很幸运,查理也很幸运。我的意思是,我们的父亲看到了我们俩身上的很多缺点,但是,他们仍然会支持我们。如果你有一个不会支持你的父亲,那是一个非常棘手的问题。我想,如果我遇到那种情况,我或多或少是能挺过来的,但我觉得我的人生会大不相同。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. You minimize it. But you can't, no, I mean, there's no question about it. And Charlie gave an answer I thought was master of tact the other day when he says, "You always ought to interact with people who behave well." He says, "Of course, you have to make some exceptions for your family." But (LAUGH) it's true. And, you know, you really, I don't know what it's like to have, you know, a drunken, you know, bully-ish, probably father, but parent, just generally. I mean, you know, how do you handle it? It's very interesting that the MacArthur family, the very famous John MacArthur, the man who set up the MacArthur Foundation, he had five kids. And four of them turned out to be superstars of one sort or another, and then they had this crazy, itinerant, drunken father. But they all decided that the thing to do was to get the hell out of the house. And so, he had this, the father of the — of the MacArthur Foundation that did that along with three of the siblings out of five. So, you know, I was lucky, I mean, and Charlie was lucky that, you know, if you have, I mean, our fathers saw plenty of shortcomings in both of us, but, you know, they would still be there for us. And if you have one that won't be there for you, you know, it's a very tough problem. And I think one way or another I probably would have gotten through with that, if I had that situation, but I think my life would've been a lot different. Charlie?
查理·芒格我没什么要补充的。
CHARLIE MUNGERI have nothing to add.
为什么 Garanimals 只在沃尔玛销售?
Why are Garanimals only sold at Walmart?
沃伦·巴菲特好的,五号区?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, station five?
现场股东嗨,沃伦和查理,下午好。我叫 Sudakaredi Anapredi,来自阿肯色州本顿维尔——沃尔玛的故乡。我从 2019 年开始是股东,我女儿们从 2020 年开始也是股东。我的问题是,这是我第一次来参加股东大会。沃尔玛和伯克希尔·哈撒韦通过 BNSF 铁路、麦克莱恩公司,以及 Fruit of the Loom 和 Garanimals 等消费品,有着非常良好的关系。我的问题是,Garanimals 只在沃尔玛独家销售,而 Fruit of the Loom 则在许多其他零售商处销售。伯克希尔·哈撒韦是如何决定哪些商品只在某些零售商那里独家销售,而哪些又在许多零售商那里销售的呢?
AUDIENCE MEMBERHey Warren and Charlie, good afternoon. My name is Sudakaredi Anapredi. I am from Bentonville, Arkansas, home of Walmart. I'm a shareholder since 2019, and my daughters are shareholders since 2020. My question is, this is my first time coming to shareholders, and my question is Walmart and Berkshire Hathaway has a very great relationship with BNSF, McLane, and consumer goods like Fruit of the Looms and Garanimals, and et cetera. My question is Garanimals is exclusively sold at Walmart, and Fruit of the Loom is sold at many other retailers. How does Berkshire Hathaway decide some items are sold at some retailers exclusively, versus others are sold at many retailers?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这是个好问题。不过显然,如果你有一个产品,你肯定希望控制分销渠道。要是消费者点名要你的产品,你的毛利率很可能更高。我是说,他们刚发了一篇关于贝尔纳·阿尔诺的文章,他创立了 LVMH,你知道,蒂芙尼有个蓝色盒子。那蓝色盒子本身就代表某种意义。可口可乐的瓶子也有意义。我想是在 1920 年代,有一项研究,让人蒙上眼睛摸瓶子,很高比例的人能认出那是可口可乐。当人们不仅能认出产品,还能认出包装容器时,你的毛利率就会很好。但如果你只是另一种可乐——这样的牌子有过几百种——即便你有沃尔玛这样的分销渠道,沃尔玛有自己的山姆可乐,那也完全不一样。我是说,我就在这,对吧?1886 年左右,亚特兰大的约翰·彭伯顿创造了它,之后他们花了非常可观的资金做广告。而另一方面,好时几乎没花一分钱做广告。所以,我和查理都观察过非常多的产品、非常多的零售方式。我们确实认为自己对此了解不少,但同时也很清楚自己有多少不懂的地方。这并不意味着我们想亲自去做零售,而是说我们在一定程度上学会了该避开什么。我们也学会了什么时候某个东西确实有真东西。Garanimals 就有点真东西。只不过,你知道,沃尔玛为我们做了很好的分销工作。对沃尔玛来说这是个好产品,对我们也是。至于 Fruit of the Loom,他们能卖很多种类的内衣,也能做出很大的销量,但面对一大堆竞争对手的产品,我们赚不了那么多钱,我认为相对于投入资本或其它任何指标而言,利润也不那么高。如果孩子想要 Garanimals 的睡衣之类的东西——这种产品不至于让人愿意开车 20 英里专门去买,或类似那样。但如果你人在沃尔玛,给孩子挑睡衣什么的,孩子想要某个特定品牌,价格合理、耐穿,那你就会很高兴通过有沃尔玛这种分销能力的渠道去卖它。沃尔玛也很高兴有这种产品。总的来说,拥有喜诗糖果显然比拥有一家无名糖果公司要好。你知道,特别是当人们一年只买几次当礼物时。我是说,他们知道,如果送给女朋友、送给住院的人、在圣诞节或去赴宴时送礼物,当他们把一盒糖果递过去时,他们不会同时说:“给你,这糖我买得超划算。”那会瞬间毁掉气氛,对吧?他们希望看到的是对方收到礼物时脸上的笑容,而这个满足感,喜诗的盒子就能带来。所以说,要懂得顾客。喜诗的盒装巧克力,第一,市场远没有软饮料那么大。第二,这种产品不太能全球流通。好时巧克力就没能全球流通。我是说,看看巧克力棒,英国流行的与美国流行的并不一样,各种情况都有。可口可乐能全球流通。世界上大约有 200 个国家,其中大概 180 个国家它是主导产品。这怎么做到的?嗯,如果你从 1886 年就开始做,(笑)然后一路走到现在,那当然有帮助。所以我们学到了很多。我们还有很多要学。但我们确实学到了一点:像 Garanimals 这样的东西我们懂。它刚出现时没人听说过,结果我们以很低的价格买下了它。那是 20 年前了,至今还是没人知道它或者知道我们拥有它,这没关系。但人们知道 Garanimals 是什么,而且它很有生命力,年复一年地持续经营。而有些东西就像宠物石。我们在不断学习。查理?(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, that's a good question. But obviously you'd love to control, if you have a product, you'd love to control the distribution. And you're probably going to get better gross of margins if they ask for you by name. I mean, they just had an article about Bernard Arnault, who built LVMH, and you know, he's got a blue box at Tiffany. And the blue box itself means something. And Coca-Cola, the bottle meant something. In the 1920s, I think, there was a study that kind of (UNINTEL) bottle and blindfolded, and a very high percentage of the population could recognize it was Coca-Cola. When they can recognize not only the product, but the container, you know, you're going to have good gross margins. And if you're just another cola, and there have been hundreds of them, and even if you have distribution through something like Walmart, who has Sam's Cola, it just doesn't, it's not the same. I mean, here I am, you know? And 1886 or so, John Pemberton in Atlanta created it, and they spent a very significant amount of money advertising. And on the other hand, Hershey's didn't spend any money on advertising. So, we have observed, Charlie and I both, have observed so many products, so many methods of retail. And we really think we know quite a bit about them, and we also know how much we don't know about it at the same time. And it doesn't mean that we want to go into retailing ourselves, but it does mean we've learned, to some extent, what to avoid. And we've learned when somebody really has something. And Garanimals has something. It's just that there's only been, you know, Walmart does a great job of distribution for us. And it's a good product for Walmart, it's a good product for us. And on Fruit of the Loom, they can sell lots of types of underwear, and they can do a big volume, but we're not going to make as much money, as well as I believe the capital employed or anything, with a product that has a whole bunch of competitors. And if the kid wants a Garanimals, well, pajamas or something, it's not the sort of product that causes people to drive 20 miles out of their way to buy it, or anything of the sort. But if you're in the Walmart and you're picking out pajamas or something for the kid, and he or she wants a particular product, and it's reasonably priced and everything, and wears well and everything, you know, we're happy to have it distributed through somebody with the distribution power of Walmart. And they're very happy to have the product. On balance it's obviously better if you own See's Candy than if you own the no-name candy company. You know, particularly when people buy it as gifts a couple times a year. I mean, they know that if they give their girlfriend, if they give somebody in the hospital, if they give a gift at Christmas or going to a dinner, they know if they hand the box of candy to somebody they don't say at the same time, "Here, I got a wonderful deal on this candy." I mean, that just kills the moment, right? What they really want to see is a smile on the other person's face that they're receiving it, and they get it. So, knowing what customers, and See's boxed chocolates, A, are not remotely the market that soft drinks are. And the product does not travel particularly. Hershey's chocolate didn't travel. I mean, if you look at candy bars, what's popular in the U.K. isn't that popular in the U.S. and all kinds of things. Coca-Cola travels. There's 200 countries, roughly, and probably 180 of them it's the dominant product. And how do you do it? Well, it helps if you started in 1886 (LAUGH) and go from that point forward. So, we've learned a lot. We got lots to learn. But we did learn that something like Garanimals we understood. When it came around nobody had ever heard of it and we bought it for a very low price, as it turned out. And 20 years ago, and still nobody knows it, or that we own it, and that's fine. But they know what Garanimals are, and it has legs. It just keeps going year after year. And some things are like pet rocks. And we're learning all the time. Charlie? (LAUGHTER)
查理·芒格我没什么要补充的。
CHARLIE MUNGERI have nothing to add.
沃伦·巴菲特好的。你可能从没买过 Garanimals。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. You probably have never bought any Garanimals.
查理·芒格没有,我从没买过。(笑声)我甚至不穿。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERNo. I never have. (LAUGH) I don't even wear them. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特你也穿不下。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTYou wouldn't fit. (LAUGH)
派拉蒙全球在流媒体领域面临激烈竞争
Paramount Global faces tough competition in streaming
沃伦·巴菲特好的,贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, Becky?
贝基·奎克这个问题来自纽约市的巴里·拉弗。“根据最新公布的数据,伯克希尔持有约 9400 万股派拉蒙全球的股票。这家资产富余的公司在最近几个季度的财报中表现令人失望,就在本周还将股息大幅削减了 80%。您如何看待流媒体战争的演变?您对自己的投资论点还有信心吗?您的投资论点是基于该公司成为收购目标,还是基于其基本面?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Barry Laffer in New York City. "Berkshire owns about 94 million shares of Paramount Global as of the last published data. This asset-rich company has disappointed on recent quarterly earnings reports, and just this week slashed its dividend by 80%. "How do you see the streaming wars evolving? And do you still have conviction in your investment thesis? Is your investment thesis based on the company being an acquisition target, or based on its fundamentals?"
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。那你愿意无偿替我管钱吗?(笑声)你知道,我们不做给人提供股票建议的生意。那些对股票一窍不通的人倒能靠这赚大钱,但我们认为这不是我们该白送的东西。不过我要说一句,任何公司取消分红或者大幅削减股息,都不是什么好消息。流媒体行业看起来极其有意思,因为人们喜欢用他们的 iPhone 看,在面前的屏幕上或手机上找点娱乐消遣。但做这一行的公司太多了。你需要更少的公司,或者需要更高的价格。嗯,你需要更高的价格,否则这生意就转不动。而且你靠一部剧集播出期间把人拉进来订阅,并不能锁定他们。我是说,你知道,你能留他们一小段时间,但大概也就是一个月。我们等着看结果吧。我 21 岁或 22 岁的时候开过一个加油站,离这儿就三四英里、四五英里远。我们只有一个竞争对手。他决定了我们的利润,因为我们每天都盯着他的价格看。如果我们降价,他会跟着降,我们也没法提价。他的汽油销量是我们的两倍,所以他赢了。有些行业天生就有基本的商业难题,而另一些行业没有。迪士尼在 30 年代和 40 年代靠动画片独树一帜——你知道,它提供的东西独一无二。他们在首轮放映时就把成本全部摊销,然后每隔七年把《白雪公主》这些片子拿出来重映一次,这生意很划算。但现在世界不一样了。观众的注意力不会大幅增加,他们能花的时间也不会大幅增加。而你们有一大堆公司不肯退出。谁知道在这种局面下定价会怎样。但任何告诉你他清楚未来定价会怎样的人,都是在自欺欺人。查理?顺便说一句,查理在好莱坞有过很多经验。我是说,在我认识他之前,他就——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And how would you like to manage my money for nothing? (LAUGH) They, you know, we are not in the business of giving stock advice to people. And people who don't know anything about stocks can make a lot of money doing that, and we don't think it's something we should give away. But I will say this, it's not good news when any company passes its dividend or cuts its dividend dramatically. And the streaming business is extremely interesting to watch, because there's, people love to use their iPhones, watching, being entertained on a screen in front of them, or a phone, or whatever it may be. But there's a lot of companies doing it. And you need fewer companies, or you need higher prices. And, well, you need higher prices, or it doesn't work. And you don't lock in people when you get them to join up for the streaming period when your serial runs. I mean, you know, you keep them on for a while, but you get them for, like, a month. And we'll see what happens. I mean, I had a gasoline station when I was 21 or 22, and it's about three or four, four or five miles from here. And we had one competitor. And he determined our profit, because we looked at his price every day. And if we cut the price he'd match it, and we couldn't raise the price. And he did twice the gallonage, so he won. And there's just basic business problems that you see with certain industries that you don't see with the other. Disney was unique in its animated — what it offered, you know — in the '30s and '40s. And they wrote the stuff off at the first showing, and then they rejuvenated Snow White and all these other people every seven years, and that was fine. But this is a different world. And the eyeballs aren't going to increase dramatically in the time they can spend is not going to increase dramatically. And you've got a bunch of companies that don't want to quit. And who knows what pricing does under that. But anybody who tells you that they know what pricing will do in the future is kidding themselves. Charlie? Charlie's had a lot of experience, incidentally, with Hollywood. I mean, he used to, before I even met him —
查理·芒格我认为电影行业是个相当难做的生意。
CHARLIE MUNGERI think the movie business is one tough business.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
查理·芒格这是我的看法。
CHARLIE MUNGERThat's my view.
沃伦·巴菲特人才会赚到钱,经纪公司也会赚到钱。如果你有一家电影院,你看,现在影院的营收只有疫情前的 70%。大热片的票房确实极为可观。但你没法减少供应。人们一天只有那么多小时,也只有两只眼睛。他们面临的选择比以往任何时候都多,还有更便宜的东西能提供类似的体验。有些人喜欢去影院的那种体验,特别是去看大热片的时候。但这又不像你可以把人口或眼球数量翻个倍。参与其中的人很多。人才永远能拿到报酬。当你用这样那样的方式整合这些人才,需要收取更高的票价,而业内又有许多实力雄厚的公司不愿退出,这便构成了一道有趣的方程式。
WARREN BUFFETTThe talent will make the money; the agents will make the money. And if you've got a theater, you know, the theaters are now doing 70% of the business that they did before the pandemic. And big hits, you know, have enormous grosses. But you can't reduce the supply. People have only got so many hours in the day. They've only got two eyeballs. And they've got more choice than ever before, and they've got stuff that's cheaper that offers them the same experience. And some of them like the experience, you know, particularly with the big hits of going. But it isn't like you can double the number of people or double the eyeballs or anything like that. And you've got a lot of people. The talent will always get paid. And when you essentially are packaging that talent one way or another, and you need to get higher prices, and you've got a lot of strong companies who don't want to quit, that's an interesting equation.
查理·芒格如果你觉得电影难做,不妨试试投资纽约的传统舞台剧。在那个行当里,让投资人把钱拿回来,会被视为背信弃义。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd if you think the movies are tough, try to invest in a New York show on a conventional stage. There they think it's a breach of faith in that business to let the person who put up the money to ever get any money back. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。是啊,嗯,查理确实亲眼见过不少,当年——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Yeah, well, Charlie saw a lot of that actually when —
查理·芒格是啊。我不喜欢那样的生意。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. I don't like those businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特跟大家说说《埃及艳后》那部戏的结果,查理。(笑声)这种事,不对,这行人人都经不住诱惑。他们都喜欢参投一部戏的感觉,你懂的,还能获得某种心理收益。但——
WARREN BUFFETTTell them what happened on "Cleopatra, Charlie." (LAUGHTER) It, no, it's a business that everybody's tempted. They love the idea of going in it, you know, and they get a certain amount of psychic income. But —
查理·芒格我连赛马都没养过。
CHARLIE MUNGERI never owned any racehorses, either.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我岳父和我以前常在 AK-SAR-BEN 赛马场讨论去认领一匹马,但一直没真去办。我们俩一起去马场倒是玩得很开心。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, my father-in-law and I used to talk about claiming a horse at AK-SAR-BEN, but we never quite got around to it. And we had a lot of fun going to the track together. (LAUGH)
“我们在风能和太阳能上的记录,没有哪家公用事业公司能超越”
'Our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility'
沃伦·巴菲特好,第六区?
WARREN BUFFETTOK, section six?
现场股东下午好。我叫汉娜·海斯,是来自爱荷华州的一名高中生。您今天早些时候提到,向可再生能源转型有足够的人力和资金支持。那么,既然对可再生能源的充足投入、储能技术的开发很快就能满足爱荷华州的能源需求,并且通过《通胀削减法案》的资金还能获得政府体系的支持,为什么伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司没有切实投资未来,加快那些燃煤电厂的退役计划呢?这些电厂运营成本很高,目前是爱荷华州最大的碳排放源,而且会一直运行到 2049 年才最终退役。按照 IPCC 的说法,拖到那时再减排就太晚了。
AUDIENCE MEMBERGood afternoon. My name is Hannah Hayes and I'm a high schooler from Iowa. You said earlier today that transitioning to renewable energy has the people and capital to support it. So, with enough investment in renewables, the development of energy storage technology to soon meet Iowa's energy needs, and support from the government system through Inflation Reduction Act funding, why hasn't Berkshire Hathaway Energy truly invested in the future by accelerating retirement plans for the coal plants, which have high operating costs and are currently Iowa's biggest carbon polluter, and will continue to be until they're finally retired in 2049, which is too late to be curbing emissions, according to the IPCC?
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。这很有意思。在爱荷华州,我们实际生产的风能已经超过了我们客户使用的总电量。但这不一定能 24 小时生产。所以,存在一些问题。顺便说一句,在爱荷华州,绝大多数县在我们去建风机时都欢迎我们。有些则不想要。你知道,总有些“别在我后院”的地方。其他地方则喜欢从一小块土地获得的收益。人们也喜欢支付的税。但我要说,如果全美有一个州在开发方面特别突出,那就是爱荷华州。但爱荷华州还有一个有趣的地方,我们有一家主要竞争对手。还有一大堆小合作社和各类公司卖电。但我们有一个主要对手。我们的价格明显更低。事实上,我们现在也在奥马哈公共电力区域运营。三四英里外,我们在爱荷华州卖电。我们卖得还更便宜,尽管公共电力起源于内布拉斯加州,而且已经——我觉得还在继续——乔治·诺里斯在 1930 年代就推行了。你知道,内布拉斯加州在某种程度上比爱荷华州更抵制风电。但就像我说的,我们的竞争对手——替代能源——并没有像我们那样积极追求这个。但我要说,我们在风能和太阳能方面的记录,美国任何公用事业公司都没超过。当然,这也得益于大多数公用事业公司把 70% 或 80% 的利润作为股息发放。而我们 20 年来没拿过普通股股息。我们不知道再投资了多少个亿。这就是为什么利润从 2 亿美元增长到 40 亿美元,但我们的资本回报率并不比刚起步时高。我们只是随着发展往业务里投了更多资本,不断再投入资本。所以,我希望格雷格在这儿能告诉你更多细节。但我要说,我们确实敢把伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司的记录和任何美国公用事业公司比。查理,你一直看着呢。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. It's very interesting. In Iowa, we have actually produced more wind energy than is the total amount of energy used by our customers. But it's not producible 24 hours a day necessarily. So, there's problems. And incidentally, in Iowa, a significant majority of counties welcome us when we come around and want to put in wind. And some don't want it. I mean, you know, there's a not-in-my-backyard someplace. There's other places where they love the money they get from a small plot of ground. And people like the taxes that are paid. But I would say that if there's one state in the Union that stands out in the development, it's Iowa. But what's also interesting in Iowa is that we have one other major company. There's always loads of little co-ops and all kinds of things that sell electricity. But we have one major competitor. And our prices are significantly lower. And, as a matter of fact, we are now in the Omaha Public Power District. And three miles or four miles away, we're selling the electricity in Iowa. And we are selling it cheaper, even though public power was invented in Nebraska, and has been — I think it's going on — George Norris did it back in the 1930s. And, you know, Nebraska's resisted, to some extent wind power, more than Iowa. But like I said, our competitor — alternate source — hasn't really pursued it the way we have. But I would say that our record in wind and solar has not been topped by any utility in the United States. And, of course, it's been aided by the fact that most utilities pay out 70% or 80% of earnings and dividends. And we haven't taken a common dividend, you know, for 20 years. We reinvested I don't know how many billion. That's the reason why the earnings have gone from $200,000,000 to $4 billion, but we're not earning a higher rate of return on capital than we were when we started. We just put way more capital into the business as we went along, kept reinvesting the capital. So, I wish Greg were here to tell you more details about it. But I would say that we'd really put up Berkshire Hathaway Energy's record against any utility in the United States. Charlie, you've watched it.
查理·芒格嗯,我一直看着。我个人完全无法确定全球变暖最终会有多糟。我认为,没人确切知道海平面是会上升两英寸还是 20 英尺。因此,在一个大量情况尚不明朗的领域里,存在许多虚假的说法。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I have. And I'm not personally at all sure how bad the global warming is going to be. I don't think anybody knows for sure whether the seas are going to rise two inches or 20 feet. And so, I think there's a lot of false claims here in a world where much is not known.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。(掌声)怀俄明州的风很多。我们正在建设向西延伸的输电线路。但早在二战时期,他们就要求我们这么做了。当时华盛顿有一位能拍板的“沙皇”式人物,可以说,“把事办了就行”,就像他们让亨利·凯泽去造舰时说的那样。你简直没法想象,要是当年就那么干了,我们现在能比眼下领先多少。但我们有钱,我们有技术。今年我们公用事业公司的折旧金额大约是 40 亿美元,在此基础上我们还会额外再投入约 30 亿美元。所以,我们可能总共要花 70 亿美元。在公用事业行业内,很少公司能按这么高的比例在折旧额之外追加投资。我们倒是希望能投得更多,可到处都有人不想让输电线穿过他们的地方,不想让铁塔立在那里,管它是什么。这就是民主体制下会遇到的难题。而且,正如我刚才提到的,即使在爱荷华州内部,也有许多县——我认为是大多数、绝大多数县会欢迎风电。但也有一些县不喜欢。我们显然只会和那些愿意合作的县合作。我们没有权力跑到别人地盘上,对人家指手画脚。另外,每个州都有公共事业委员会,从根本上监管着我们能赚多少钱、能做什么事,这个行业就是这么发展过来的。这本身并不坏,除非你碰到那些事实上——你知道——构成了全国性体系,而不仅是州内体系的事务。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (APPLAUSE) There is a lot of wind in Wyoming. And we are building transmission lines that extend out through the West. But it was World War II when they told us to do it. And we had a czar in Washington that could say, you know, "Just get it done," like they said to said Henry Kaiser on building ships. You know, you can't believe how ahead we would be down from where we are. But we've got the money. We've got the know-how. This year our depreciation in our utility company is on the order of $4 billion. And we spend maybe $3 billion additional to that. So, maybe we spend $7 billion. And there are very few companies in the utility industry that are spending, you know, that percentage of their depreciated money. But we'd love to be spending more, but there are people all over that don't want the pipeline to go through there. They don't want the tower, whatever it may be. And that is the problem of a democracy. And even, as I mentioned, within Iowa, you've got a great many counties that — majority, great majority of the counties I think would welcome the wind power. And you've got some counties that don't like it. And we're obviously going to work with the ones that want to work with us. We do not have the ability to go in and tell anybody what do on that. And there's a public utility commission in every state that basically governs what we earn on it, what we do, and that's the way the industry's developed. And that's not bad, unless you get into the things that in effect, you know, extend — they're part of a country-wide system, rather than state-wide system.
查理·芒格我还认为,即使我们不担心全球变暖,转向可再生能源以保护我们的碳氢化合物也是明智的——
CHARLIE MUNGERI think also that even if we weren't worried about global warming, it would make sense to —
沃伦·巴菲特当然。
WARREN BUFFETTSure.
查理·芒格——。碳氢化合物能做一些其他东西做不了的事。而且它们的储量是有限的。为什么不谨慎地保护它们呢?
CHARLIE MUNGER— shift to renewables to conserve our hydrocarbons. There're certain things hydrocarbons can do that nothing else can do. And there's only so much of them there. Why not be cautious in conserving them?
沃伦·巴菲特而且成本也大大降低了。我是说,风力。你看我们现在做的,那些风塔的效率高得多——但有很多人谈论那些做不到的事。还有——
WARREN BUFFETTAnd the cost, they've gotten so much more efficient, too. I mean, the wind. I mean, if you look at what we're doing now, those towers are way more efficient than — But there's a lot of people that are talking about things that can't be done. And then there's —
查理·芒格这个领域里有很多胡扯。如果你喜欢胡扯,那这个领域正适合你。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERThere's a lot of nonsense in this field. If you like nonsense, this is the field for you. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特但我们就在这个领域里,所以。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTBut we're in the field, so. (LAUGHTER)
查理·芒格我知道。我知道。
CHARLIE MUNGERI know. I know.
“我们不会提出收购西方石油控制权的要约”
'We will not be making any offer for control of Occidental'
沃伦·巴菲特好的,贝基。
WARREN BUFFETTOk, Becky.
贝基·奎克这个问题来自 Monroe Richardson(音)。《华尔街日报》3 月报道称,石油生产商产量下降,可能已在二叠纪盆地达到峰值。考虑到西方石油和雪佛龙在二叠纪盆地都持有大头寸,您能否解释一下,伯克希尔为何大量持有这两家公司,基于那里的石油未来前景?
BECKY QUICKThis is a question from Monroe Richardson (PH). The Wall Street Journal reported in March that oil producers are producing less oil and may have reached their peak in the Permian Basin. Given the major positions of both Occidental Petroleum and Chevron in the Permian, which you please explain the rationale for Berkshire's significant holdings of both those companies, considering that future outlook for oil there?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,毫无疑问——石油确实很有意思,查理比我懂石油多得多,你什么时候在贝克斯菲尔德或什么地方买的那份矿权?那是在我认识你之前,对吧?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, there's no question — it's really interesting about oil, and Charlie knows way more about oil than I do, when did you buy that royalty in Bakersfield, or wherever it is? But that was before I met you, right?
查理·芒格是的——不,不是之前——是——是的,是之前。就在之前。你说得对。那该死的矿权到现在还每年付给我 7 万美元。
CHARLIE MUNGERYes — no, it wasn't before — it was — yes, it was. It was just before. You're right. And that goddamn royalty is still paying me $70,000 a year.
沃伦·巴菲特你买矿权花了多少钱?
WARREN BUFFETTWhat'd you pay for the royalty?
查理·芒格1000 美元。
CHARLIE MUNGERA thousand dollars.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯。嗯。那跟二叠纪正好相反。我父亲在 1964 年去世前买了 1000 美元或 1500 美元的矿权。他把它们留给了我母亲。我母亲把它们留给了她的两个女儿。我姐姐去世了。我妹妹今天也在这里。她每个月都收到这些支票。而且她知道所有这些不同的油田,以及它们的产量。这就是美国大约一半石油产量或者其他比例的现状。另一半是页岩油。你知道,如果你去过电影院,看过石油题材的电影,你从没见过那些在加州泵出查理矿权的设备。你会看到那些喷油井。好吧,在二叠纪,你第一天就会意识到这一点,第一天当你开井时,可能每天 1.2 万桶,或者 1.5 万桶。而且这很危险。西方石油有一次开井,我认为一天大约达到 1.9 万桶之类的。一年、一年半以后,它就变成了几乎什么都没有。这实际上是完全不同的生意。在美国,这挺有意思。我们每天大概用 1100 多万桶——嗯,我们每天生产 1100 多万桶油当量。但如果页岩油停产了,我是说,它会很快降到 600 万桶。那就想想每天从全球产量中拿掉 500 万桶是什么概念。而且我们还在动用战略石油储备。战略石油储备是最顶级的油田。你不用钻井。我们已经有油了。它本应是战略性的,但被卷入了政治。所以,当你谈论石油生意时,你基本上是在谈论不同类型的生意。我们喜欢西方石油在二叠纪的位置。我们不会喜欢那个位置——嗯,它有一天跌到了负值。它跌到了每桶负 30 美元。那当然很疯狂。但如果石油卖到 X 美元,你知道,你会做得非常好。如果卖到 X 的一半,你的成本一样,产量不变。那就不那么好了,但也会很快拉低美国的石油产量。所以我们不知道油价会怎样。但我们确实非常喜欢西方石油拥有的位置。这就是我们几年前资助他们的原因,当时那看起来像个可怕的错误。然后石油市场彻底崩盘了。接着情况又变了。我们买了大量普通股。过去几个月,他们赎回了我们的优先股,我们当然不喜欢这样。但如果他们不赎回,我们会感到失望。从他们的立场看,这是明智的。所以我们收回了——在 100 亿美元优先股里,我们大概拿回了 4 亿或 5 亿美元,按面值的 110% 赎回。但 Vicki Hollub,她是一位杰出的西方石油管理者。她的第一份工作是在城市服务公司(Cities Service)。那是我 1942 年买的第一只股票。她知道地表下面发生了什么。我懂它的数学。但如果我在油田里,我完全不知道该做什么。我是说,我可以在自家后院挖两英尺深。那就是我对地下世界的了解。我无法想象查理从 50 多年前、大概 60 年前就开始每月收到支票的那块油田,或者我妹妹在不同油田收到的那些,那里的油一直泵啊泵啊泵。在美国,我们很幸运能绝对地生产出我们从页岩中获得的这种石油。但它不是一个长期来源,不像你通过看石油电影或其他什么可能会想的那样。查理,你有什么要补充的吗?
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Yeah. Now that's the opposite of the Permian. My dad bought $1,000 or $1,500 worth of royalties before he died in 1964. He left them to my mother. My mother left them to her two daughters. And my older sister died. And my younger sister is here today. And she gets these checks every month. And she knows about all these different fields, and what they're producing. And that's the reality of half of the oil production, or something around that, in the United States. And then the other half is shale. And, you know, if you've gone to the movies, and ever watched oil, you've never watched the things that are pumping Charlie's royalties in California. You'll see these gushers of oil. Well, in the Permian, this should sink in on you, in the first day, the first day when you bring in a well, you know, it may be 12,000 barrels, or maybe 15,000 barrels. And it's dangerous. Occidental had one come in at I think at 19,000 barrels or something like that in one day. And in a year, year and a half, it becomes partly nothing. It's a different business in effect. In the United States, it's interesting. We use maybe 11 and a fraction — well, we produce 11 and a fraction million barrels of oil equivalent a day. But if shale stopped, I mean, it would drop to six million very fast. Well, just imagine taking five million barrels a day out of production in the world. And then we're also taking down our strategic petroleum reserve. Strategic petroleum reserve is the ultimate oilfield. You don't have to drill. It's just we've got them. And it was supposed to be strategic, but it gets involved in politics. And so, there's all — when you talk about the oil business, you're talking about different kinds of businesses, basically. And we like Occidental's position in the Permian. And we wouldn't like that position — well, it got to minus one day. It got to minus $30 a barrel. That was crazy, of course. But if oil sells at X, you know, you do very well. And if it sells at half of X, you know, your costs are the same, and it doesn't change the production. And it doesn't work as well, but it also brings down the oil production of the United States very fast. So, we don't know what oil prices will be. But we do very much like the Occidental position they have. And that's why we financed them a few years ago, when it looked like it was a terrible mistake. Then the oil market just totally collapsed. And then it changed around. And we bought a lot of the common stock. In the last few months, they've reduced our preferred, which we don't like, obviously. But we'd be disappointed in them if they didn't reduce it. It's intelligent from their standpoint. So, we've taken — of the $10 billion preferred, we've gotten maybe $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 of it, retired at 110% of par. But, Vicki Hollub, she's an extraordinary manager of Occidental. Her first job was with Cities Service. That was the first stock I bought in 1942. She knows what happens beneath the surface. I know the math of it. But I wouldn't have the faintest idea what to do if I was in an oil field. I mean, I can dig two feet down in my backyard. And that's my understanding of subsoil in the world. I can't picture the field that Charlie has been collecting that monthly check from, from 50-plus years, 60 years roughly, or my sister, getting at various fields, where they just keep pumping, and pumping, and pumping. And we, in the United States, we're lucky to have the absolutely to produce the kind of oil we've got from shale. But it is not a long-term source, like you might think, by watching movies about oil, or something of the sort. Charlie, do you have anything to add?
查理·芒格是的。那些页岩井衰减得确实很快。如果你喜欢油井快速枯竭,我们这儿就有。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It really dies fast, those shale wells. If you like quick death in your oil wells, we have them for you.
沃伦·巴菲特但西方石油做了很多正确的事。
WARREN BUFFETTBut Occidental, they're doing a lot of good things.
查理·芒格是的。他们钻了很多新井。而且这么做是盈利的,但这是另一种类型的石油。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. They drill a lot of new wells. And they're doing it at a profit, but it's a different kind of oil than this.
沃伦·巴菲特就是不一样。嗯。嗯。美国几乎一半的石油产量都是这样。而且有时候——
WARREN BUFFETTIt's just different. Yeah. Yeah. And that's true of almost half the oil produced in the United States. And there's times —
查理·芒格那地下有很多石油,没人知道怎么开采。他们已经琢磨了大约 50 年。他们研究现有页岩开采也搞了约 50 年,才终于搞明白。而且,最后能成功开采时,过程还异常复杂——只有一种沙子能管用。
CHARLIE MUNGERThere's a lot of oil down there that nobody knows how to produce. And they've been working at it for, like, 50 years. But they worked at the existing shale production for about 50 years before they figured it out. And it was weirdly complicated when they finally were able to do it. There's only one type of sand that works.
沃伦·巴菲特你能想象一根水平管道,大概一英里半长之类的吗?它跟你想象的大不相同。
WARREN BUFFETTCan you imagine a horizontal pipe, you know, maybe a mile and a half or something? It's just so different than what you think about.
查理·芒格它横向延伸三英里,向下两英里。你都已经在地下两三英里深处了,到底怎么才能再横向钻探两三英里?他们掌握了大量极其复杂的技术,才得以从这些油井中采出哪怕一点点石油。
CHARLIE MUNGERIt goes laterally for three miles, two miles down. How in the hell do you drill two or three miles laterally, when you're already two or three miles under the Earth? They have mastered a lot of very tricky technology to be able to get any oil out of these wells at all.
沃伦·巴菲特我们喜欢西方石油的仓位。我们也喜欢让 Vicki 来管理它。他们一直——
WARREN BUFFETTAnd we love the position with Occidental. And we love having Vicki run it. And they've been —
查理·芒格而且下面还有更多的石油,如果有人能想出另一个魔法把戏的话。我们只需要另一个魔法把戏。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd there's a lot more oil down there, if anybody can figure out another magic trick. That's all we need is another magic trick.
沃伦·巴菲特但西方石油还有一些别的东西。
WARREN BUFFETTBut Occidental has some other things too.
查理·芒格是的。是的。但是——
CHARLIE MUNGERYes. Yes. But —
沃伦·巴菲特但石油价格对于短寿命石油的经济性仍然极其重要。我是说,这一点毫无疑问。
WARREN BUFFETTBut the price of oil still is incredibly important in terms of the economics of short-lived oil. I mean, no question about that.
查理·芒格嗯,如果它——
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, if it's —
沃伦·巴菲特我们顺便——你知道——有传言说我们要买控制权。我们不会买控制权的。(笑)我们不想管理——我们有合适的管理层在运营。我们不能——我们不知道该怎么处理它。而且(听不清)不知道该怎么处理一个油田。
WARREN BUFFETTAnd we will incidentally — you know — There's speculation about us buying control. We're not going to buy control. (Laughs) We don't want to run — We've got the right management running it. We can't — we wouldn't know what to do with it. And (UNINTELLIGLE) wouldn't know what to do with an oil field.
查理·芒格承认你买煤就像出去找癌症一样。你现在甚至不能借钱来扩建煤矿。这变得非常过时。
CHARLIE MUNGERAdmitting you're buying coal would be like going out and seeking to acquire cancer or something. You can't even borrow to expand a coal mine now. It got very unfashionable.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。而且我们认为,坦率地说,有些说法很荒谬。两边都是。在两个极端。我是说,你面对的是物理学。你面对的是——在能源这种极其重要的事情上立场政治化,只会被煽动家、筹款人、咨询机构以及所有人利用。我们会做出理性的决定。我们并不觉得生产石油是非美国的。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And we think, frankly, some of the things said are ridiculous. And on both sides. In both extremes. I mean, you're dealing with physics. You're dealing with — the politicization of positions on something that's enormously important in terms of energy just lends itself to demagogues, and fundraisers, and advisory organizations, and everybody in sight. And we will make rational decisions. And we do not think it's un-American to be producing oil.
查理·芒格就前景而言,美国没有一个油盆能与二叠纪相比。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd there is no oil basin in the United States that compares to the Permian, in terms of promise.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。我们很幸运。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. We were lucky.
查理·芒格嗯,我不——
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I don't —
沃伦·巴菲特我们之前不知道它在那里,直到——
WARREN BUFFETTWe didn't know it was there until –
查理·芒格是的。
CHARLIE MUNGERYes.
沃伦·巴菲特——没多少年前的事。
WARREN BUFFETT— not that many years ago.
查理·芒格它基本上被采完了。他们一直知道那里有页岩油,但认为它永远无法开采。
CHARLIE MUNGERIt had sort of been used up. And then they always knew the shale oil was there. But they thought it was going to stay unrecoverable forever.
沃伦·巴菲特我买的第二或第三只股票是德州太平洋土地信托(Texas Pacific Land Trust)。他们在那里拥有 300 万英亩土地,每年收入大约 1 万美元左右。他们坐拥如此巨量的石油。基本上,那家公司现在实际上是雪佛龙的一部分,中间经历了德士古(Texaco)和各种变化。现在还有一家德州太平洋土地信托,但很多地产是费属——矿产权归雪佛龙所有,这有一些优势。但这是个有趣的话题,我这么说吧。我们不会提出收购西方石油控制权的要约,但我们喜欢我们持有的股票。未来我们可能会买更多,也可能不会。但我们肯定有认股权证,作为原始交易的一部分,以大约每股 59 美元的价格获得大量股票。那些认股权证持续很长时间。我很高兴我们持有它们。
WARREN BUFFETTThe second or third stock I bought was Texas Pacific Land Trust. And they owned 3,000,000 acres down there. And they were raising revenues of $10,000 a year or something like that. And they were sitting on this incredible amount of oil. And basically, that company is now actually part of Chevron. And it went through Texaco and did all kinds of things. And there's still a Texas Pacific Land Trust. But a lot of that property is fee owned by — the minerals are owned by Chevron, which is some advantage. But it's an interesting subject, I'll put it that way. And we will not be making any offer for control of Occidental. But we love the shares we have. And we may or may not own more in the future. But we certainly have warrants, which we got as part of the original deal, on a very sustainable amount of stock, at around $59 a share. And those warrants last a long time. I'm glad we have them.
埃隆·马斯克是个“极其极其聪明的人”,他“喜欢承担不可能完成的工作”
Elon Musk is a 'brilliant, brilliant guy' who 'likes taking on the impossible job'
沃伦·巴菲特好的。七号站台。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Station seven.
现场股东我叫马克斯·乔亚,来自加拿大多伦多。我想问查理一个问题,跟您过去说过的一句话有关。您曾提到,您宁愿雇一个 IQ 130 却觉得自己只有 120 的人,也不愿雇一个 IQ 150 却觉得自己有 170 的人。我知道您这是在说埃隆·马斯克。(笑声)考虑到他最近那些项目都成功了,比如特斯拉、SpaceX 和星链,我很好奇,您现在是否仍然认为埃隆·马斯克高估了自己?非常感谢。(掌声)
AUDINCE MEMBERMy name is Max Joa (PH). I'm from Toronto, Canada. I have a question for Charlie regarding a statement you made in the past. You once mentioned that you'd prefer to hire someone with an IQ of 130 who believes it's 120, over someone with the IQ of 150 who thinks it's 170. I understand that you are referring to Elon Musk. (LAUGHTER) Given the recent success of his ventures, such as Tesla, SpaceX, and Starlink, I'm curious to know if you still hold the view that Elon Musk overestimates himself. Thank you so much. (APPLAUSE)
查理·芒格嗯,是的。我认为埃隆·马斯克确实高估了自己。但他非常有天赋。所以,他高估的是一个本来就不需要高估也足够有天赋的人。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, yes. I think Elon Musk overestimates himself. But he has a — he is very talented. So, he's overestimating somebody who doesn't need to overestimate to be very talented.
沃伦·巴菲特有个比尔·马赫的节目,大概一周前,也可能是两周前播的。他采访了埃隆。埃隆跟比尔·马赫一对一较量,表现得特别棒。值得一看。埃隆这个人——他是个极其极其聪明的人。我会说,你知道,他可能能超过 170。但他——你知道,他梦想的事情——他的梦想是有根基的。
WARREN BUFFETTThere's a Bill Maher program, about a week old, maybe two weeks old. But he interviews Elon. And Elon does a terrific job toe-to-toe with Bill Maher. It's worth watching. And Elon is — he's a brilliant, brilliant guy. And I would say that, you know, he might score over 170. But he — you know, it's — he dreams about things. And his dreams have got a foundation.
查理·芒格如果他不是去追求那些极不合理的极端目标,他这辈子也不可能取得现在的成就。他喜欢接下不可能的任务,然后把它做成。我和沃伦不一样。我们俩找的是自己能看明白的容易活。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERHe would not have achieved what he has in life if he hadn't tried for unreasonably extreme objectives. He likes taking on the impossible job and doing it. We're different, Warren and I. Warren and I are looking for the easy job that we can identify. (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。要是靠玩井字棋就能搞定,我们就去玩井字棋,你知道吧?(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. If we can do it playing tic-tac-toe, we'll do it, you know? (LAUGHS)
查理·芒格我们做事的方式完全不同。
CHARLIE MUNGERWe have a totally different way of going about it.
沃伦·巴菲特但在很多事情上,我们不想跟埃隆竞争。
WARREN BUFFETTBut we don't want to compete with Elon in a lot of things.
查理·芒格我们可不想栽那么多跟头。
CHARLIE MUNGERWe don't want that much failure.
沃伦·巴菲特对。(笑声)对。而且那种活法会把你的生活整个占满,这根本不适合我们。但将来会有——嗯,埃隆已经办成了不少大事。这需要——说“狂热”也不太对。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (LAUGHTER) Yeah. And it takes over your life in a way that it just doesn't fit us. But there are going to be — well, there have been important things done by Elon already. And it requires — fanaticism isn't the word.
查理·芒格嗯,就是这个词。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It is the word.
沃伦·巴菲特好吧。(笑声)好吧,不完全是这个词。但那种全身心投入、非要把不可能做成不可的劲头,隔三差五,他还真能做成。不过对我和查理来说,那简直是折磨。我喜欢我现在的生活方式,我可不想待在他的——但他也绝不会想跟我换位子。去看看比尔·马赫那期采访吧。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. (LAUGHTER) Well, it isn't quite the word. But it's a dedication to solving the impossible. And every now and then, he'll do it. But it would be torturous to me or Charlie. And I like the way I'm living. And I wouldn't enjoy being in his — but he wouldn't enjoy being in my shoes, either. Watch the Bill Maher interview.
我们想留着伯克希尔的现金买企业
We want to save Berkshire's cash to buy businesses
沃伦·巴菲特好,贝基。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Becky.
贝基·奎克这个问题来自福斯特·泰勒(音)。“在 2010 年伯克希尔股东大会上,您说您会问伯克希尔 CEO 的那个问题是,随着伯克希尔现金越堆越多,如何向股东分派现金。那么,我就来问这个问题:对我们手头超过 1000 亿美元的现金,您仍然对它的未来前景有信心吗?还是我们离现金分派越来越近了?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Foster Taylor (PH). "At the 2010 Berkshire annual meeting, you said the one question that you would ask of the Berkshire CEO would be about the distribution of cash to shareholders, as the Berkshire cash pile grows larger and larger. "So, let me ask that question. Do you still feel confident of the future prospects for our over $100 billion in cash on hand, or are we getting closer to cash distributions?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,有一点,如果伯克希尔的股价低于我们认为它应有的价值,那本身就是一种相当大规模的现金分派方式。但我们确实想做的,是收购优秀的企业。如果我们能买一家 500 亿、750 亿或 1000 亿美元的公司,我们可以做到。我们能办到,而且我们的信用是可靠的。但对上市公司来说这很困难,因为实际上,你向一家公司出价,你发出收购要约,他们的股东几个月之后才投票。你相当于白白送出一个期权。如果我们有实力履约,而对手有办法——
WARREN BUFFETTWell, the one thing, if Berkshire shares are selling for less than we think they're worth, that could be a pretty big way to distribute cash. But what we would really like to do is buy great businesses. If we could buy a company for $50 billion, or $75 billion, $100 billion, we could do it. And we could do it. And our word's good. It's difficult with a public company, because in effect, if you bid on a company, you make the bid, and their shareholders vote months later. And you're giving out an option. If we're good for it, and the other guy has a way to —
查理·芒格加价压你一头。
CHARLIE MUNGERTop you.
沃伦·巴菲特——加价压你一头,或者各种花招,他们就能脱身。然后你拿到的分手费是 2% 或 1%,这可不是一个合理的价码。另一方面,特拉华州法院还会裁定他们该不该这样做。世界就是如此。我是说,这就是法律。所以,收购私人公司会容易得多。体量大的私人公司并不多。但反过来,在合适的条件下,也没有别人能像我们这样做成交易。也许会出现这样一种局面:一批相当不错的公司,资本结构极不合理,钱正好在最不该到期的时候到期。到那时他们就会打电话来,就像当年的蒂芙尼、哈雷戴维森,你能想到的都有。我是说,2008 年有一大堆公司。这种事还会再发生,不管到时候接到电话的是不是我们,不管当时世界是什么样子。但有一点我们很清楚:在那种时候,你能拨通的电话,数量极其极其有限。而且会有一些不错的公司,它们未必想把公司卖掉,只是可能需要 50 亿、100 亿或 200 亿美元,看你说的是哪家公司。这种情况有可能发生。我们自己的股东也可能把股票卖得太便宜。我们绝不会做任何事诱使他们低价卖出。我们会如实告诉他们公司业务的情况。但如果市场环境导致我们能用低价买回 500 亿美元的自家股票,我们会买的。所以,我们等着看世界给我们什么吧。我们已经不像以前有那么多机会了,但现有的机会也够了。我们持有的东西本身就在赚钱。手里攥着 1300 亿美元的短期国债,收益率 5% 以上,还有类债券的等价收益,这又不会要我们的命。人人都说,“哎,以后收益率要降。”我压根不知道以后收益率会怎样。要知道,在 1981 还是 1982 年,最优惠利率是 21.5%。当时人们担心它会失控,彻底崩盘。[美联储主席保罗]沃尔克阻止了那一切发生。可要是沃尔克不在那个位子上,鬼知道会是什么结果。所以,我们经营伯克希尔的方式,就是保证我们干得还行。说不定比还行还要好那么一点。查理?
WARREN BUFFETT—top you, or all kinds of things, they can get out of it. And then you get paid 2% for that, or 1% that, that is not an appropriate price. And on the other hand, Delaware will decide whether they should do it or not. And that's the way the world is. I mean, that's the law. So, it'd be easier to do with a private company. And there aren't very many that are big. On the other hand, there's nobody else that can quite make a deal like we can, under the right circumstances. And there could be a situation where a number of very decent companies have got a very uncomfortable borrowing structure, and money comes due to them at the exact wrong time. And that's when they pick up a phone, as did Tiffany, and Harley-Davidson, and you name it. I mean, a whole bunch of companies in 2008. That sort of thing will happen again, whether it results in us getting the calls, or what the world is exactly at that time. But the one thing we know is that the number of phone calls that you can make at a time like that is very, very limited. And there can be good companies, they don't want to sell the company necessarily, but they just may need $5 billion, or $10 billion, or $20 billion, depending on what company you're talking about. And that can happen. And our own shareholders can be selling the stock too cheap. And we'll never do anything to make them sell it cheap. And we'll tell them the truth about what the business is. But if market circumstances result in us being able to buy in $50 billion of our own stock, we'll buy it. So, we'll see what the world holds. But we don't have the opportunities we used to have. But we've got enough. And we're making money with the things we have. It isn't killing us to hold $130 billion of bills at 5% plus bond equivalent yields. And everybody says, "Well, yields are going to go down in the future." I don't have the faintest idea what yields are going to do in the future. And, you know, the prime rate was 21.5% in 1981 or '2. And people were worried that it was going to go totally out and spin out of control. And [Federal Reserve Chairman Paul] Volcker kept it from happening. But if Volcker hadn't been in there, who the hell knows what would've happened. So, we're running Berkshire so that we'll do OK. And maybe we'll do a little bit better than OK. Charlie?
查理·芒格行。有可能。挺好。
CHARLIE MUNGEROK. Maybe. Fine.
芒格:“人生太短”,不值当去做野心勃勃的律师
Munger: 'Life is too short' to be an ambitious lawyer
沃伦·巴菲特好,八号台。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Station eight.
现场股东您好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我叫卡洛斯·桑切斯(音),很荣幸从墨西哥瓜达拉哈拉来到这里。芒格先生,作为一名同行律师,我想请教一个公司法方面的问题。鉴于您的经历和成就,如果您要给一位像拉尔夫·托托雷拉那样、在成为伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司律师之前的职业初期的人一些指引,您会建议他掌握哪些关键原则或经验教训,帮助他在这个行业里脱颖而出?
AUDIENCE MEMBERHello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Carlos Sanchez (PH). And I am honored to be here from Guadalajara, Mexico. Mr. Munger, as a fellow lawyer, I have a question regarding corporate law. Considering your experience and success, if you were to offer guidance to someone like Ralph Tortorella when he was at the beginning of his career, and before becoming Berkshire Hathaway Company's lawyer, what key principles or lessons would you suggest to help him excel in his profession?
查理·芒格嗯,我不确定我是不是全听清楚了。不过,对于怎么当一名成功的律师,我想我没有太多建议。我有个女婿,他形容大律所里的现代律师生活,是这么说的:“就像一场吃派大赛,赢了的奖励是可以继续吃派。”(笑声)我建议你绕开那种律所。人生太短,不能除了吃派什么正事都不干。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I'm not sure I quite caught all of that. But I don't think I have a lot of advice about how to succeed as a lawyer. I have a son-in-law who describes modern law practice in a big firm. He says, "It's like a pie-eating contest where if you win you get to eat more pie." (LAUGHTER) And I advise you to avoid that kind of a law firm. Life is too short to just do nothing but eat pie.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊,查理大概从 1964 年往后就不执业了,好像是吧。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Charlie has not practiced law since what 1964 maybe, whatever it was.
查理·芒格1962 年。
CHARLIE MUNGER1962.
沃伦·巴菲特62 年。查理给过我四五条建议,并非来自他的法律背景,而是因为他深谙这个体制。你知道,尽管他有时候会嘲笑老师,但他当年在哈佛法学院确实成绩非常优秀。他给过我四五个解决办法,全世界没有第二个人能给我,不管是律所还是其他什么人。我向他描述问题之后,几乎在瞬间他就给出了答案,别人谁都想不到的答案。去年我跟你们讲过其中一个。这次股东大会我就不重复了。但如果事情真的很重要,我们拥有全世界最好的律师,那就是查理。有好几次,我都利用了这一点。查理不想当律师。他不想把自己的时间,也许一小时 20 美元左右,卖给那些他认为在做错误决策的人。而他比那些人懂得更多。那在他看来,绝不是一种好的生活方式。我觉得他很可能是对的。我想,如果不得不一直干那行,他真的会变得很痛苦。那一点儿都不好玩。就像我给某人提供投资建议——或者从某人那里接受建议一样。我就是不想干那事。查理想通了这一点。所以我们决定为自己工作。结果很成功。从此幸福快乐。
WARREN BUFFETT'62. And Charlie has given me four or five pieces of advice that don't really come from his legal background, but because he knows the system so well, and, you know, really did do quite well at Harvard Law School, despite his taunting of teachers in a few things. He has given me four of five solutions on things that nobody else in the world would've given me, law firm or otherwise. And it's been within a nanosecond of when I described the problem to him. And he just gave me the answer that nobody else would've come up with. And I told you one of them last year. So, I won't repeat it at this meeting. But we've got the best lawyer in the world in Charlie, if it's something that really matters. And there've been times when I've taken advantage of that. And Charlie didn't want to be a lawyer. He didn't want to sell his time, maybe at 20 bucks an hour or something, to people he thought were making the wrong the decisions. And he knew more about it than they did. And that just did not strike him as a good way to go through life. And I think he's probably right on that. I think he'd have really gotten to be miserable if he had to keep doing that. It's just no fun. It'd be like me giving investment advice to somebody that — or taking it from somebody. I just wouldn't want to do it. And Charlie figured that out. And so, we decided to work for ourselves. And this worked. Been happy, happily ever after.
查理·芒格我们没什么可抱怨的。
CHARLIE MUNGERWe have no complaints.
沃伦·巴菲特对,一点也没有。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. None.
新规 15% 最低公司税“完全不影响我”
New minimum 15% corporate tax 'doesn't bother me in the least'
沃伦·巴菲特好的,轮到贝基了。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. We're at Becky.
贝基·奎克这个问题来自瑞安·哈丁,是关于新的 15% 公司最低税率的。根据他的理解,这项税是按三年滚动期来执行的,并且基于报告利润。第一,在现行财务报告准则下,报告利润中包含了未实现损益,这是否会影响公司最低税率计算?如果一项重大持股的市场价格上涨只是暂时的,哪怕是极端上涨,会不会把一些名义递延税转化为实际现金税?第二,它会不会削弱某些可再生能源税收优惠及其他激励措施的效果?
BECKY QUICKThis question come from Ryan Harding (PH). And it's about the new 15% corporate minimum tax rate. As he sees it, its implementation is currently understood, he thinks as he understands it, to apply over rolling three-year periods, and to be based on reported earnings. First, does the inclusion of unrealized gains and losses in reported earnings under the current financial reporting standards contribute to the calculation for corporate minimum tax rate purposes? And could it potentially convert some of those notional deferred taxes into cash taxes, even if a rise in the market price of a major holding is only temporary, but rather extreme? And then second, could it reduce the effect of some of the renewable energy tax incentives, and others?
沃伦·巴菲特第二部分的问题,我想答案很可能是否定的。但我不想把话说死,因为他问的这些正是我问马克·汉伯格的问题——马克是整合商业理解、税法理解、证监会规则以及其它一切方面最聪明的人,你在美国企业界很难找到第二个。这些问题——特别是关于融资融券证券的那个问题——我觉得还没有答案。而且我认为新税法里还有不少条款尚未生效。不过我要这么说:我们自己早就表明了我们认为经营收入该怎么处理。我们不是因为这个税法才设计出来的,我们几年前就这么做了。所以,我们认为你不会把资本利得、未实现资本利得算进去。但无论结果怎样,我们手里的筹码都够多。15% 的税率一点不让我发愁。一旦规则明确,我们总能找到办法支付那 15% 的税。要知道,我当初通过合伙公司收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦控制权时,联邦所得税税率是 52%。我是说,税率已经大幅下降了。比如山宝地图公司(Sanborn MAT)当时利用税法允许的机制规避了那笔税,那反映的是递延税款。但那可是巨额税款啊,52%。所以,我们会适应这部税法。而且我们认为美国企业的税负并不重。那些说我们会在全球竞争中落败之类的言论,我觉得真是废话。但我们有一部新法律,实施细则还没写出来。等我们搞清楚游戏规则之后,我们绝对能找到办法每年缴纳 15% 的税——实际上我们本来大体上就在缴这么多。而且我说过,如果美国有一千家公司和伯克希尔缴的税一样多,那美国其他任何人、任何个人、任何公司,都不用再缴一分钱所得税、社保税、赠与税、遗产税或任何其它税。一千家像伯克希尔·哈撒韦这样的公司,就能产生现行税法下全美国所有人贡献的税收。我对这点一点都不觉得难受。而且我很乐意把它降到五百分之一或者类似的比例。但我想以这个税率来做到——我们能做到。我很高兴这样做。我认为能生活在美国是我们的特权。但我们也得控制支出。这是国会不太喜欢做的事。我父亲当年在国会时他们就不喜欢做。但随着时间推移,他们越来越顽固了。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTI think the answer on the second part, probably, is no. But I don't want to say it is for sure, because he's asking the same questions I ask of Marc Hamburg, who's the smartest guy on combining understanding a business, understanding the tax code, understanding SEC rules, and everything else, that you'll find in corporate America. And these questions — the particular question on marginable securities — I don't think has been answered yet. And I think that there are a number of things about the new tax act that were not enacted yet. But I would say this. We have said ourselves what we think the proper approach to operating income. We didn't design that because this tax law came along, we did some years back. So, we would think that you wouldn't include capital gains, unrealized capital gains in. But we've got enough, I think no matter how things turn out. The 15% tax doesn't bother me in the least. And we can figure ways, once we know the rules, where we will pay the 15% tax. And, you know, we were paying 52% tax as federal income taxes when I bought control in the partnership of Berkshire Hathaway. I mean, the tax rate has come down dramatically. And the deferred tax that was embodied, for example, at Sanborn MAT, when it was involved in a system that was allowed under the tax law to avoid that tax. But that was a huge tax, 52%. So, we will live with this tax code. And we do not think corporations are overtaxed in the United States. And, you know, I think that the conversation about how we'd lose out to the world, and all that sort of thing is really nonsense. But we've got a new law that the regulations haven't been written on. And when we know what the game is, we will absolutely figure out a way to pay 15% every year, which generally, we've been paying anyway. And as I pointed out, if there were a thousand corporations in the United States that paid what Berkshire has been paying, nobody else in the United States, no individual, no corporation, would ever pay any income tax, social security tax, gift tax, estate tax, anything else. A thousand like Berkshire Hathaway would produce the revenue that's being derived under the present tax code from everybody in the United States. And I don't feel badly about that. And I love to get it to one five-hundreth, or something of the sort. But I'd like to do it — we can do it at this rate. I'm happy to do it. I think we are privileged to live in the United States. But we also have to control spending. And that's something that Congress doesn't quite like to do. And they didn't like to do it when my dad went to Congress. But they've dug in more, as the years have gone by. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,这个话题我们之前已经谈过了。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, we covered this subject earlier.
沃伦·巴菲特好吧。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTOK. (LAUGHTER)
我们处在“完美的游戏”里
We are in 'the perfect sort of game'
沃伦·巴菲特九号站。我没搞错吧?是的。
WARREN BUFFETTStation nine. Am I right on this? Yeah.
现场股东我叫阿夫隆·格罗斯(音译)。我来自加利福尼亚州洛杉矶。我是股东。这是我第四年来参加“资本主义的伍德斯托克”了。(笑声)
AUDIENCE MEMBERMy name is Avlon Gross (PH). And I am from Los Angeles, California. I am a shareholder. And it's my fourth year coming to the "Woodstock of Capitalism." (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特很高兴你来。
WARREN BUFFETTWe're glad you came.
现场股东非常感谢沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格所做的一切。你们之间有什么从未讲过的、最好笑的故事?还有,你们生意中最难的部分是什么?(掌声)
AUDIENCE MEMBERThank you so much for everything Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. What is the funniest story that you have never told about each other? And also, what is the hardest part of your business? (APPLAUSE)
沃伦·巴菲特我来回答第二个问题。第二个问题——我们的生意不难。我们热爱我们的生意。每天早上我起床时,心情都很好。我不知道那天会发生什么。也许什么都不会发生。但也许会发生点事。就算没别的,我还能滚动点国库券之类的。但我跟你能想到的最棒的一群人一起工作。我是说,我们彼此喜欢。没人盯着别人的职位或者诸如此类的事。工作条件理想极了。而且离我家大概五分钟路程。所以我这辈子没花过时间通勤。我想象不出还有什么比这更好的了。查理肚子里有很多你没听过的趣事。我们看看他会讲哪个。
WARREN BUFFETTI'll answer the second. The second part of your question is that we don't have a hard business. We love our business. Every morning, when I get up, I feel good. I don't know what's going to happen that day. Maybe nothing will happen. But maybe something will happen. And if nothing else, I'll roll some T-bills or something. But I work with the greatest group of people you can imagine. I mean, we like each other. And nobody is after anybody else's job, or anything of the sort. It's ideal working conditions. And it's five minutes from my home, or thereabouts. So, I haven't spent my life commuting. I just can't imagine having anything better. And Charlie's got a lot of funny stories you haven't heard. But we'll see which one he comes up with.
查理·芒格嗯,我觉得沃伦和我天生就够荒唐了,不需要太多有趣的段子。我们各自做的事都很古怪,足够互相逗乐了。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I think Warren and I are naturally so ridiculous that we don't need very many funny stories. We each do things that are peculiar enough so that we can keep one another amused.
沃伦·巴菲特跟他们说说,我们买霍希尔德-科恩(Hochschild Kohn)的时候,你跟律师是怎么说的。
WARREN BUFFETTTell them what you told the lawyer when we were buying Hochschild Kohn.
查理·芒格我不记得了。你来讲吧。
CHARLIE MUNGERI don't remember. You tell them.
沃伦·巴菲特你难道不记得了?(笑声)那是 1966 年,我们在巴尔的摩,正准备买一家百货公司。我们需要一名律师。我们需要一名就在附近、让他干什么他就干什么的律师。查理找来了威尔默-卡特勒(Wilmer Cutler)律师事务所的一名很不错的律师,我记得是。我不知道查理还记不记得当时他给那名律师的指示。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, you remember? (LAUGHTER) It was 1966, and we were down in Baltimore, buying a department store. And we needed a lawyer. And we needed a lawyer who was nearby and would do exactly as told. And Charlie came up with a very good lawyer from Wilmer Cutler's, I believe. And I don't know whether Charlie remembers the instructions he gave the lawyer or not.
查理·芒格不,我不记得了。
CHARLIE MUNGERNo. I don't.
沃伦·巴菲特好吧,查理对那名律师——我们之前从没见过他——说:“对待沃伦要像对待——”我当时 36 岁,也可能是 35 岁。他说:“对待沃伦要像对待任何一位 90 岁的客户一样。”(笑声)那家伙立刻就明白了查理的意思。我们很快就做成了那笔交易。然后我们去了银行,我记得是第一国民银行——其实是马里兰国民银行。当时那儿有个叫卡米·斯莱克(Cammy Slack)的人,对吧,查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, Charlie told the lawyer, who we never met before. And he said, "Treat Warren like" — I was 36 at the time or 35. He said, "Treat Warren like any other 90-year-old client." (LAUGHTER) This guy knew exactly what he meant. And we made the deal in a hurry. And then we went to the bank, First National Bank, I believe it was — or Maryland National Bank, actually. And there was a fellow named Cammy Slack there, wasn't there, Charlie?
查理·芒格对。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah.
沃伦·巴菲特我们以一笔 1200 万美元的收购,想借 600 万美元。卡米一脸困惑地看着我们,说:“你们想为这个小小的老霍希尔德-科恩借 600 万美元?”查理和我大致说了句:“嗯,马里兰国民是我们打的第一通电话。如果他们不想做,我们还有另一家银行可找。”反正,他们还是把钱借给了我们。但当他提到“小小的老霍希尔德-科恩”时,我们立刻开始琢磨:“没准儿这不是我们这辈子见过的最好的交易。”从那一刻起,我们就一直在想法子怎么把它卖掉。桑迪·戈特斯曼(Sandy Gottesman)当时也跟我们在一块儿。那些某种意义上没成功的交易,跟那些做成的交易一样,都让我们觉得乐趣无穷。我的意思是,如果你知道打高尔夫会一杆进洞,球飞出去,直接掉进 300 码或者 400 码外的洞,没人会打高尔夫的。游戏的一部分乐趣在于,你会把球打进树林,有时能把球救出来,有时不能。所以说,我们处在一个相当完美的游戏里。我们俩都很享受。我们在一起乐子很多。我们不必做任何自己内心不认可的事。我的意思是,我们不受制于任何团体。所以,我们可以打造自己的命运,从某种意义上说,也可以打造我们经营公司所遵循的原则。那是人生中莫大的奢侈。我们不想当世界上任何其他一家公司的总裁、CEO,或别的什么职位。那样我们就得去迁就某些我们确实不想迁就的事。这样说还算准确吧,查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWe wanted to borrow $6,000,000 bucks against a $12,000,000 purchase. And Cammy looked at us with bewilderment. And he says, "You want you borrow $6,000,000 for this little old Hochschild-Kohn?" And Charlie and I said something to the effect, "Well, the Maryland National was our first call. And if they didn't want to do it, we had another bank we'd go to." And, anyway, they lent us the money. But when he said little old Hochschild-Kohn, we immediately started thinking, "Maybe this isn't the best deal we've ever seen in our lives." And from that point on, we were trying to figure out how to sell it. Sandy Gottesman was involved with us then too. And we had as much fun out of deals that didn't work in a certain sense as the ones that did work. I mean, if you knew you were going to play golf and you were going to hit a hole in one on every hole, you just hit the ball, and it went in the hole that was 300 yards away, or 400 yards away, nobody would play golf. I mean, part of the fun of the game is the fact that you hit them to the woods. And sometimes you get them out, and sometimes you don't. So, we are in the perfect sort of game. And we both enjoy it. And we have a lot of fun together. And we don't have to do anything we don't really believe in doing. I mean, we are not dictated to by any group. And so, we get to forge our own destiny. And in a sense, forge the principle by which we can run the company. And that's a huge luxury in life. And we don't want to be president of any other company in the world, or CEO, or anything else. We'd have to conform to certain things that we really don't want to conform to. Is that a fair description, Charlie?
查理·芒格对,很准确。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, it is.
沃伦·巴菲特对。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
动视暴雪的套利押注看上去不太乐观
Arbitrage bet on Activision isn't looking good
沃伦·巴菲特好的,贝基。
WARREN BUFFETTOK, Becky.
贝基·奎克这个问题来自马里兰大学商学院教授大卫·卡斯(David Kass)。他说:“在去年的股东大会上,沃伦提到伯克希尔在动视暴雪(Activision Blizzard)持有大量仓位,作为并购套利操作。由于英国监管机构阻止了微软的收购,伯克希尔是否已经减持或卖出了这部分仓位?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from David Kass, who is a professor at the business school at University of Maryland. He says, "At last year's annual meeting, Warren mentioned that Berkshire had taken a large stake in Activision Blizzard as a merger arbitrage play. Since the U.K. regulator has blocked its acquisition by Microsoft, has Berkshire reduced or sold its stake?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,关于我们怎么处理股票,除了按法律要求披露——比如 13F 表格,或者我们提交的其他文件——我们不提供信息。有些东西你们可以仔细看我们今早提交的 10-Q 报告,其实也能推敲出来。但你们得看得非常仔细才行。不过,我可以这么说:我认为微软在配合监管机构方面表现得极为——怎么形容呢——积极主动。我的意思是,他们想做这笔交易。而且在我看来,他们对反对意见已经做出了远超一半的让步。但这并不意味着,如果某个国家——在这个案子里是英国——执意要阻止它,这交易就能成。按照当今世界的运作方式,英国比美国更有条件阻止这项交易。而这也不是靠多给钱能解决的问题。所以,我不知道最终结果会如何。但如果交易没完成,我不认为那是微软或动视暴雪的错。但,该发生的事情也不一定会发生。我们 18 个月前跟道明尼能源(Dominion Energy)做交易时,就碰到过这种情况。他们让我们买下了我们想买的大部分资产。然后政府实际上说:“你们不能买某项资产。”我觉得那块资产由我们来做,会比任何人的表现都好,而且涉及的几个州不反对,客户也不反对。但你总不能跟美国政府对着干吧?你会尽量去找那些不会碰钉子的事情做。我觉得在那个案子里,美国政府犯了个错误;在这个案子里,我觉得英国政府也犯了个错误。但就像查理会说的,这就是大城市里的日子。而我们会怎么做,取决于很多因素。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I think in terms of what we do with stocks, we don't give information except when required to, which is in the 13F, or whatever we file. And there's certain things you can actually figure out by looking at our 10-Q, which we filed this morning. But you have to look pretty hard. But I would say this. I think Microsoft has been remarkably, what's the word, willing to cooperate with governing bodies. I mean, they want to do the deal. And they've met the opposition, it seems to me, more than halfway. But that doesn't mean that it gets done if a given country, in this case the U.K., wants to block it. They're in a better position to block it than the United States, by just the way the world works. And that doesn't get solved by offering more money. So, I don't know how it turns out. But if it doesn't go through, I don't think it's through any shortcoming by either Microsoft or Activision. But not everything that should happen does happen. And, well, we ran into it when we made the deal with Dominion Energy 18 months ago. And they let us buy a good bit of what we wanted to buy. And then the government in effect said, "You can't buy something else," which I think we would've done a better job with than anybody else did, and which the states involved did not object to it, which the customers didn't object to it. But you don't take on the United States government, you know? And you try and figure out things that you won't have a problem with. And I think in that case, the U.S. government made a mistake. I think the British government's making a mistake in this case. But that's life in the big city, as Charlie would say. And what we do will depend on a lot of things. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,我觉得——嗯,我们确实——是啊——你这事儿搪塞得可真漂亮。(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I think — well, we do — yeah — you kissed that one off beautifully. (LAUGHTER)
如果你无法为自己工作,为伯克希尔工作也几乎一样好
If you can't work for yourself, working for Berkshire is almost as good
沃伦·巴菲特好了。十号站。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Station 10. (Laughter)
现场股东嗨,沃伦。嗨,查理。我叫安德森·富勒(音),来自加拿大新斯科舍省的埃文波特。在提问之前,我想先感谢你们所做的一切,让我们得以洞察你们作为投资者的思维方式。对我来说,伯克希尔最引人注目的收获,就是你们对激励机制的恰当对齐所给予的重视和成功运用。在我看来,拥有并领导一家企业有两个核心好处。第一,随着公司成长,你通过持股直接受益;第二,你拥有自主权。给员工的激励相对容易理解,比如提供福利、公平薪酬和打造强大的文化。但我一直很难理解最高层面的激励。即使你们说伯克希尔给予旗下经理人很大的灵活性,那也肯定比不上他们独立经营时的自由度。此外,你可能会觉得,对事业的热情和出售意愿是成反比的。那么,伯克希尔到底是如何弥合这个差距,激励子公司的所有者把这些好处让给伯克希尔的?谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBERHi, Warren. Hi, Charlie. My name's Anderson Fuller (PH). And I'm from Avonport, Nova Scotia in Canada. And before I ask my question, I just want to thank you for all you've done to give us insight into your minds as investors. So, for me, the most compelling takeaway from Berkshire is your guys' emphasis on and successful use of properly aligned incentives. In my view, owning and leading a business has two central benefits. First, you directly benefit as the company grows, through your equity in it, and second, you have autonomy. Incentives for employees are a bit easier to understand, such as offering benefits, fair pay, and creating a strong culture. But I've always struggled to understand them at the highest level. Even though you say Berkshire gives its managers significant flexibility, it must be less than what they had when they were independent. Additionally, you would think passion and a willingness to sell would be inversely correlated. So, how exactly does Berkshire bridge this gap and incentivize owners of its subsidiaries to give up these benefits to Berkshire? Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们希望找到的,是那些热爱自己生意、但不喜欢作为上市公司附带的许多东西的经理人。我的意思是,如果他们得花大量时间听别人指手画脚,告诉他们该干这干那,他们又不敢得罪那些人,或者他们得跟着行业协会走,不管叫什么名字,因为你不想显得像搭便车的人。大多数工作中,人们都得做出各种妥协。查理和我解决了这个问题。我一生中有过五个老板。五个我都喜欢。其中两位对我的人生影响巨大,让我过得更好。但五个我都喜欢。有几个,你们知道的,有些人听说过彭尼百货、库珀·史密斯,我那时一小时挣 75 美分,我喜欢在彭尼工作。嗯,其实我不喜欢在彭尼工作。但我喜欢为库珀·史密斯工作。当时一小时 75 美分。但我得按他们吩咐的去做,先是卖男装衬衫,然后是男装,再是童装,如此类推。我也喜欢为报社工作。在内布拉斯加大学的时候,我有一位非常棒的上司。我还为本杰明·格雷厄姆工作过。一切都很顺利。但没有什么比为你自己工作更好了。如果你不能拥有一家大公司,那么在伯克希尔·哈撒韦管理一家公司,就是最接近那种感觉的了。你不用花时间讨好那些分析师——在许多情况下你可能都瞧不起他们。你不用花时间和银行打交道去融资,特别在糟糕的时期。有各种各样的——你获得了很多自由,我觉得这对我会很有意义。当然,如果你整个公司都是你自己的,那可能更好。但也许你的兄弟姐妹想退出。也许——有上百万种理由让你无法实现这一点,除非你把公司卖给伯克希尔。如果是一家家族企业,大家想各走各路,那可能比一家上市公司更容易办成这件事。但上市公司也有这种可能。所以,这就是为什么我认为,如果我拥有一家上市公司,市值高达几百亿美元,而伯克希尔·哈撒韦想收购它,股东也愿意投票通过,我会考虑自己会如何看待生活——首先,我可不打算 65 岁就退休。我想继续工作。卖给伯克希尔是有理由的,查理和我,在特定情况下,如果我们站在另一边,我们会接受这笔交易。但这并不适合所有人。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, what we really hope to find is managers who love their business, but don't like a lot of what comes with it as a public company. I mean, if they have to spend a lot of time listening to people tell them what to do about this or that, and they can't afford to irritate them, or they have to go along with their trade association, or whatever they may call it, because you don't want to look like a free rider. There's all kinds of things, compromises that people have to make in most jobs. And Charlie and I solved that problem. I had five bosses in my life. And I liked all five of them. And two of them were just huge factors in making my life better. But I liked all five of them. A couple of them were, you know, some people hear JCPenney, Cooper Smith, you know, I worked for 75 cents an hour and I loved working at Penny's. Well, I didn't love working at Penney's. But I loved working for Cooper Smith. And, you know, it was 75 cents an hour. But I had to do what they told me to do, which was to sell men's shirts first, and then men's clothing, and then children's clothing, and so on. And I loved working for the newspaper. And I had a great manager when I was at the University of Nebraska. I got to work for Ben Graham. I mean, everything worked out. But there's nothing like working for yourself. And if you can't own a big company, working at Berkshire Hathaway, from running a company is the closest thing you will get. You don't have to spend time courting analysts who you'll probably have contempt for in many cases. You don't have to spend time with banks, you know, getting money, and particularly in terrible times. There's all kinds of — you get a lot in the way of freedom that I would think would be meaningful to me. And it might be better if you own the whole place yourself. But maybe you've got siblings that want out. Maybe — there's a million reasons why you may not be able to achieve that unless you sell to Berkshire. And that's easier, probably, if you have a family business, where people want to go in different directions, than it is with a public company. But there's still possibilities there. So, that's why I think if I owned a public company, and it was worth a great many billions of dollars, and Berkshire Hathaway wanted to buy it, and the shareholders were willing to vote it, I would consider the way I would feel about life, for one thing, I wouldn't want to retire at 65. I'd want to keep working. And there are reasons to sell to Berkshire, which Charlie and I, in certain positions, if we were on the other side, would take the deal. But it isn't for everybody. Charlie?
查理·芒格我觉得我们的吸引力相当不错。我们一直很幸运。我不知道。在我看来,大多数最终会走上我们这条路的人,他们几乎已经知道该怎么做了。
CHARLIE MUNGERI think we have a pretty good one. We've been very lucky. And I don't know. It seems to me that most of the people who are going to end up the way we did, they almost already know how to do it.
沃伦·巴菲特但回过头来看,我们可能做过的最重要的一笔收购,是国民赔偿公司。不是因为它具体做了什么,而是因为它带来的连锁反应。杰克·林沃特控制着这家公司。我认识他,也喜欢他。他也认识我。每年一次,当内布拉斯加州保险局或其他什么机构的人来检查时,他就会生气。他说他们总是在 AK-SAR-BEN 赛马场开放的时候来。我的意思是,他有各种理论来解释为什么被监管是个麻烦事。我跟查理·海德说:“下次杰克再有那种情绪,想卖公司的时候,只是因为他厌倦了跟那些人周旋,一定要找到他。”于是,有一天查理打电话给我。他说:“杰克发情了。”我说:“带他过来。”我们就做成了交易。这就是杰克卖掉公司的原因。他做完交易后很高兴。我也很高兴。所以,有一个人掌控着一家企业,但一旦那些麻烦变成了我的问题,而不是他的,那些人似乎就没那么烦他了。你永远说不准闪电什么时候会劈下来。这笔交易最初并没有给我们带来什么了不起的回报。但看看它后来引向了什么,对吧?所以,你永远——如果你事先知道怎么打完 18 洞,那打球就没什么意思了。你连第一个发球台都懒得上去。我的意思是,正是那种不确定性、玩游戏的乐趣、对手,各种各样的事情,才让一场游戏变得有趣。我觉得查理和我正在参与世界上最有趣的游戏。
WARREN BUFFETTBut the most important purchase, in retrospect, that we may have made was National Indemnity. Now because specifically what it did, but what it led to. And Jack Ringwalt controlled the company. And I knew him and liked him. And he knew me. And once a year, he'd get irritated when the Nebraska Department of Insurance, or somebody would come around. And he said they always came around when the AK-SAR-BEN racetrack was open. I mean, he had all these theories about why it was a pain in the neck to be regulated. And I told Charlie Heider, "Next time Jack is in that mood, where he's ready to sell, just because he's tired of fooling around with all these guys, be sure and find him." And so, Charlie called me one day. And he says, "Jack is in heat." And I said, "Bring him over." And we made a deal. But that's why Jack sold. And he was happy after he made the deal. And I was happy after we made the deal. So, there's a man that controlled a business, but just decided these people didn't seem to bother him as much once they were my problem and not his. And you just can't tell when lightening will strike. And that didn't do magnificent things for us initially. But just look at what it led to, you know? So, you never — you know, if you knew how you were going to shoot all 18 holes, it wouldn't be any fun playing. You wouldn't get out on the first tee. I mean, it's the uncertainty, the fun of playing the game, the opponents, all kinds of things that make a game interesting. And I think Charlie and I are in the most interesting game in the world.
喜诗糖果是“不走远的奇妙品牌”
See's Candies is a 'wonderful brand that doesn't travel'
沃伦·巴菲特好的。贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Becky?
贝基·奎克这个问题来自西澳大利亚珀斯的西蒙·威瑟斯(音)。“我们已经很久没听到喜诗糖果和利捷公务航空的消息了。您能给我们介绍一下喜诗的最新业绩吗?以及你们预计它在美国的店铺扩张空间什么时候会用完?另外,您能概述一下利捷自收购以来的表现吗?它是否达到了你们当初收购时所看到的潜力?”
BECKY QUICKHere's a question from Simon Withers (PH), in Perth, in Western Australia. "It's been a long time since we've heard about See's Candy and NetJets. Could you please give us an update on See's performance, and when you project it will run out of places to open stores in the United States? "And could you also give us an overview of how NetJets has performed since its acquisition, and whether it's achieved the potential you saw at the time of that acquisition?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,对喜诗来说,问题不在于开店。我们发现,这个奇妙的品牌走不远。你知道的。那种神秘感、实际的产品、人们对某些东西的感受,就像我们以前说过的,它有时会局限在特定的市场。胡椒博士在达拉斯-沃斯堡卖得极好,人均消费量可能是底特律或波士顿的十倍。你会说:“一个存在了一个世纪的产品,怎么会这样?”人们会旅行。有全国性的广告。我也不确定。但通过观察不同的品牌,我一直在学习。查理和我,我们在加利福尼亚的经济效益太好了,以至于我们在很多情况下反复尝试同样的实验。实验成本不高。我们试遍了世界上所有能让一个品牌走出去的方法。而且我们总是觉得头一个星期是对的。然后我们就发现,那种魔力——我们基本上能打败任何其他糖果店。但随着世界的变化,现在几乎没有什么糖果店了。所以,喜诗现在 101 年了。它有魔力。但在相邻的西部地区,这种魔力是有限的,几乎是地心引力式的。然后到了东部。顺便说一句,在东部,人们更喜欢黑巧克力而不是牛奶巧克力。在西部,人们更喜欢牛奶巧克力。在东部,你可以卖小包装的、黑巧的——在西部——我的意思是,消费者会做各种疯狂的事。但你要持续观察,因为你确实能学到一点东西。对查理和我来说,尝试新事物的诱惑一直都在,因为一旦成功,经济效益会非常好,所以我们试过各种办法。当然,每个新来的经理都想尝试。因为他们学了理论,觉得应该有效。但就是行不通。而这正是让这一切变得非常有趣的地方。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, with See's it hasn't been a question of opening stores. We found out that we have this wonderful brand that doesn't travel. You know? The mystique, the actual product, the feelings people have about some things, as we said before, I mean, it sometimes it's limited to given markets. Dr. Pepper sells at a huge rate in Dallas-Fort Worth, and maybe at 10 times the percentage per capita, maybe that it has in Detroit, or Boston. And you say, "Well, how can that be with a product that's been around for a century?" And people travel. You have national advertising. And I'm not sure. But I keep learning more, as I watch different brands. And Charlie and I, our economics were so good in California, that we tried in many cases the same experiment over and over again. It doesn't cost much to experiment. And we've tried everything in the world to cause a brand to travel. And we always think we were right for the first week. And then we find out that the magic — we can beat any other candy store, pretty much. But there aren't any candy stores anymore to speak of, as the world has changed. So, See's is 101 years now. It has magic. And it has limited magic in sort of the adjacent West. It's gravitational, almost. And then you get to the East. And incidentally, in the East, people prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate. In the West, people prefer milk chocolate to dark. In the East, you can sell miniatures, and dark — in the West — I mean, there's all kinds of crazy things in the world that consumers do. But you want to keep observing it, because you do learn a little. And with Charlie and I, the temptation to keep trying things, because the economics were so good if we succeeded, so we tried various things. And, of course, every manager wants to try that comes along. Because they've learned that it should work. But it doesn't work. So, but that's what makes it very interesting.
利捷公务航空是“一家了不起的公司”
NetJets is a 'marvelous' company
沃伦·巴菲特说到 NetJets,我们确实学会了如何区分——并且是理直气壮地区分——一项服务,它的使用者必须非常富有。但如果你已经很富有了,你实际上是在花你继承人的钱。我的意思是,这就像我当年对我姑妈爱丽丝说的话。她当了一辈子教师,后来变得有几百万几百万的资产。她来看我,她一辈子没结过婚。她说:“我买得起这件皮大衣吗?”那是 1968 年还是 1969 年的事。我说:“爱丽丝,不是你买,是你的侄女和侄子们买,因为你的钱最后是留给他们的。”“作为你侄女和侄子的代言人,我想说,我们希望你买。”现在也是一样。你的继承人希望你坐着那架飞机飞来飞去吗?还是希望你把更多钱留给你的基金会或你的孩子?解决这个问题的方法,就是让你的孩子自己体验几个小时。那样他们的态度就会改变了。所以,NetJets 是独一无二的。它做到了法拉利在汽车领域以另一种方式做到的事。法拉利一年卖 11,000 辆车。我是说,也许 12,000 辆。但它们闻名全世界。我们在波士顿或什么地方有个雪佛兰经销店,我们卖的车数量差不多。但我们不是法拉利。NetJets 有 600 架——算上欧洲的话,大概 650 架——但今年我们要买 100 架飞机。我们一架都不会卖,因为我们有积压订单。我们坐 NetJets 飞到了东京。一路顺利。在那里待了两天,又飞回来。整个过程毫不费力。现在你可能会说:“你看你,老了就开始堕落了。”但钱最终会捐给慈善事业。这笔钱大概会有 1000 亿甚至更多。我觉得慈善机构也希望我给自己花点小钱。只要这笔钱花得比那些慈善机构花的最后几美元更值就行,而那些机构在找有意义的事做时本身就有一堆问题。所以,NetJets 没有任何竞争对手。我们前几天看了一下 Wheels Up。它几年前上市,发行价 10 美元。前几天跌到了 48 美分。他们有 12,600 个客户,这些客户预付了超过 10 亿美元购买了预付卡,以后可以兑换一定时数的飞行服务。但我不认为——我觉得有很大一部分人以后会非常失望。当他们有钱享受 NetJets 的服务时,他们知道自己能坐上和我以及我的家人——从我们收购公司之前就一直在坐——完全一样的飞机,由同样的飞行员驾驶。所以,这个决策并非受任何商业目的左右。几年前,我根本没听说过 NetJets。是 Frank Rooney 跟我提的。我立刻就买了股票。然后我们收购了这家公司。那么,我的孩子有时也得坐商业航班。不过他们也有机会用我们的飞机。但我从来没坐过别的。我为什么要坐呢?我是说,它就是黄金标准。没人能比得上我们的机队。如果你有 600 架飞机,你在美国能到达的地方就比其他人多得多。我觉得我们是第二大机队(听不清),仅次于商业航空公司。而且我们的机队还在增长,就像我说的,每年增加 100 架。所以,这是一家非常出色的公司。Adam Johnson 干得很漂亮。你简直不敢相信他在这项业务上做了什么。很长一段时间里,这个模式都很艰难。但他把它带到了现在这个位置。我们永远会拥有一家很棒的公司。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTAnd NetJets, we have really learned how to distinguish, and justifiably distinguish a service to people that you have to be very well to do to use it. But if you're very well to do, in effect, you're spending your heir's money. I mean, it's what I told my Aunt Alice after she went from teaching to be worth millions and millions of dollars. And she came to see me. She'd never been married. And she said, "Can I afford to buy this fur coat?" in 1968 or '69. And I said, "Alice, you aren't buying it. Your nieces and nephews are buying it, because that's who you're leaving your money to." "Speaking on behalf of your nieces and nephews I would say we want you to buy it." And it's the same way. Do your heirs want you to fly around in that jet? Or do they want you to leave a little more money to your foundation or your kids? And the way to solve that one is to offer your kids a few hours themselves. Then their attitude can change. So, it's in a class by itself. It's done what Ferrari has done in a different sort of way in cars. Ferrari sells 11,000 cars a year. I mean, maybe 12,000. And they're known throughout the world. And we'll have a Chevy dealership in Boston or something. We'll sell as many cars. But we're not Ferrari. And NetJets has 600 — well, counting Europe, I mean, it's maybe 650, but we're going to buy 100 planes this year. And we won't sell any, because we've got a backlog. And we took a NetJet flight over to Tokyo. And we arrived in good shape. And we spent a couple days there. And we flew back. And there's just nothing to it. Now, you can say, "Well, you're getting sort of decadent and all that in your old age." But the money will go to philanthropy. And the money will probably be a hundred billion or more. And I figured the philanthropies want me to spend a few bucks on myself. All it has to do is be better than the last dollars that are spent by various philanthropies, which have plenty of problems finding things to do that make lots of sense. So, NetJets, there isn't any competitor. We had looked the other day at Wheels Up. Stock came out at $10 a couple years ago. It was selling at 48 cents the other day. And they've got 12,600 people that have given a billion dollars, a little over a billion dollars on prepaid cards where they've given them money, and they get a certain number of hours later on. And they don't — I think there's a good chance that some people are going to be very disappointed later on. When they have money to do the NetJets, they know they'll get on the same planes, with the same pilots as I and my family have flown on since before we bought the company. So, the decision wasn't shaped by some commercial objective. A couple years before, I'd never heard of NetJets. And Frank Rooney mentioned it to me. And I bought share immediately. And we bought the company. And, well, my kids have to fly commercial sometimes. But sometimes they get to use ours, too. But I've never flown anything else. And why would I? I mean, it's the gold standard. And nobody will match our fleet. I mean, if you got 600 planes, you've got them a lot more places in the United States than anybody else will have theirs. I think we're the second largest fleet (UNINTEL) commercial airliners. And our fleet's growing, like I said, at the rate of a hundred planes a year. So, it's a marvelous company. And Adam Johnson has performed. You just can't believe what he's done with the business. It was a tough model for a long time. But he's brought it where it is. And we should have a wonderful company forever. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,NetJets 确实非常了不起。你甚至可以说,它现在的价值不亚于任何一家航空公司。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, NetJets has been remarkable. You can argue that it's worth as much as any airline now.
沃伦·巴菲特它太不一样了。而且查理——我们费了好大劲才说服查理买 NetJets 的会员。然后我们想到让他买会员的办法就是在机舱里放一个经济舱座位。(笑声)这招真把他拿下了。我觉得他是唯一一个我们靠这个理由卖出去会员的人。
WARREN BUFFETTIt's so different. And Charlie — we had a hard time selling Charlie a NetJets membership. And then we figured the way to get him to buy a membership was to put a coach seat in the fuselage. (LAUGHTER) And that really knocked him off. I think he's the only one we sold on the basis of that.
查理·芒格我以前每年都从洛杉矶坐经济舱来参加伯克希尔股东大会。舱里坐满了富有的股东。当我走进经济舱时,他们会鼓掌。我真的很喜欢那种感觉。(笑声)(掌声)
CHARLIE MUNGERI used to come to the Berkshire annual meetings on coach from Los Angeles. And it was full of rich stockholders. And they would clap when I came into the coach section. I really liked that. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE)
沃伦·巴菲特但我得告诉你,我们算是把他半带坏了。他觉得自己好像得解释一下,但他自己还是坐 NetJets 飞,所以……不坐才傻呢。你知道,你的继承人在给你买单。我是说,要是有谁因为花在 NetJets 上的钱导致遗产变成负数的,请告诉我。反正我还没见过这种案例。巴菲特家族也不会出这种事。是你的最终底层受益人——你的继承人——在为你支付会员费。不过,当你像查理和我这辈子大部分时间那样生活过,要习惯花那么多钱还是有点难的。
WARREN BUFFETTBut I've got to tell you, we semi-corrupted him. He feels he kind of has to explain it, but he still flies in NetJet himself, so. And it'd be crazy not to. You know, your heirs are paying for it. I mean, find me anybody whose estate came in at less than zero because of what they spend on NetJets, threw them into that position, let me know. But I've never seen a case yet. And it won't be the case for the Buffett family. And it's the residual bottom beneficiary that's paying for your membership. And it's a little hard to get used to paying that much money though, when you've lived like Charlie and I have most of our lives.
汽车行业令人着迷却难以预测
Auto industry is fascinating but hard to predict
沃伦·巴菲特好。我们进入第 11 区。
WARREN BUFFETTOK. We will go to section 11.
现场股东你好。我叫 Humphrey Liu,来自弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔。
AUDIENCE MEMBERHello. My name is Humphrey Liu, I'm from Charlottesville, Virginia.
沃伦·巴菲特啊!
WARREN BUFFETTAh!
现场股东首先,我想和您、芒格先生和巴菲特先生,以及伯克希尔的全体同仁,每年举办这场盛大的活动,表示我的感谢。纵观全球趋势,零排放汽车似乎终于快要迎来大规模普及的临界点了。您在这个领域看到机会了吗?无论是具体的汽车制造商,还是相关技术?
AUDIENCE MEMBERFirst, I wanted to add my thanks to you and Mr. Munger and Mr. Buffett, and all of Berkshire, for throwing this grand event each year. Looking at the global trends, it increasingly does seem that zero-emission vehicles may have finally reached the cusp of mass adoption. Do you see any opportunities in this space, either in specific vehicle manufacturers or in related technologies?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我想说,查理和我早就觉得汽车行业实在是太难搞了。你知道,福特汽车公司,我是说,亨利·福特,靠着 T 型车,简直像是拥有了全世界。他把价格大幅降下来,又把工资大幅提上去。要是他性格或者某些观点稍有不同,他可能就当上美国总统了。我是说,最近有本好书讲了这个故事——里面也提到了一点内布拉斯加州的事——但讲的是亨利·福特和托马斯·爱迪生联手的经过,大概就一两年的事。如果你对汽车感兴趣,应该读读那本书。但亨利·福特做到了那些,你知道,20 年后他们就在亏钱了。而另外那个家伙,兜里揣着枪,好像是 Harry Bennett,你知道,当时在管着福特汽车公司。公司都快成废品了,后来那群“神童”才进来。亨利·福特二世,大家叫他“汉克二世”,把 Tex Thornton、我的朋友 RJ Miller 和其他几个人带进来了。我前几天刚看了通用汽车 1932 年的年报,实际上。那是我读过最好的年报之一。它非常诚实,你知道,准确地评估了它们当时的处境:当时有 19,000 家经销商,而人口,像我之前说的,大约 1.2 亿左右。现在,有 3.3 亿人,美国所有品牌加起来大概只有 18,000 家经销商什么的。这是一个你拥有众多全球竞争者的行业,它们不会消失。而且在任何一个特定时期,看起来似乎都会有赢家,但这并不能给你一个永久的位置。不过,就像我提到的,法拉利处于一个特殊的位置。但它们一年只卖 11,000 或 12,000 辆车。去年美国大概卖了 1400 多万辆。这不是一个让我们觉得有吸引力去进入的行业。我们喜欢我们的经销业务,但我觉得我没法告诉你五年或十年后汽车行业会是什么样。我确实认为你是对的,你知道,你会看到汽车本身的变化。但不会有人因为改变了汽车就能主宰市场。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I would say that Charlie and I, we long have felt that the auto industry is just too tough. You know, the Ford Motor Company, I mean, Henry Ford, looked like he owned the world with the Model T. And he brought down the price dramatically, he took up wages dramatically. He might have been, with a different personality, or some different views, elected President of the United States. I mean, there's a good book that came out on that recently that told about the story — it tells a little about Nebraska in terms of it, but Henry Ford and Thomas Edison joining up, maybe a year or two it was. If you're interested in autos, you ought to read that book. But Henry Ford did that, you know, and 20 years later they were losing money. And the other guy, with a gun in his pocket, I think Harry Bennett, you know, was running the Ford Motor Company. It was on its way to the junk heap when the whiz kids came in. And Henry Ford II, "Hank the Deuce," as they called him, brought in Tex Thornton, and my friend RJ Miller, and a few people. I was reading the other day, actually, the 1932 Annual Report of General Motors. And it's one of the best annual reports I've read. It's a totally honest, you know, assessment of exactly where they were: They had 19,000 dealers then, and the population, as I mentioned earlier, was about 120 million or so. And now, with 330 million people, all brands in the United States have, like, 18,000 dealers or something. It's just a business where you've got a lot of worldwide competitors, they're not going to go away. And it looks like there are winners in any given time, but it doesn't get you a permanent place. Although, as I mentioned, I would say Ferrari is in a special place. But they only sell 11,000 or 12,000 cars a year. In the U.S. last year, I think there were 14 million-something. And it's not a business where we find it fascinating to be in. We like our dealership operation, but I don't think I can tell you what the auto industry will look like five or ten years from now. I do think that you're right that, you know, you will see a change in the vehicles. But you won't see anybody that owns the market because they changed the vehicle. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,电动汽车正在大规模到来,这是一个非常有意思的发展。当下,它正带来巨额的资本成本和巨大的风险。而我不喜欢巨额的资本成本和巨大的风险。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, the electric vehicle is coming big time, and that's a very interesting development. At the moment, it's imposing huge capital costs and huge risks. And I don't like huge capital costs and huge risks.
沃伦·巴菲特而且我们在美国还在补贴它,我们实际上正在做——试图加入一种亲工会性质的——我是说,它受政治因素的影响也大到你难以想象。但它会和我们相伴,我们不会停止开车,而且——美国公众对它们一往情深。但我认为我知道苹果五年或十年后会在哪里,而我不知道汽车公司五年或十年后会在哪里。我可能错了。但查理和我以极大的兴趣关注着汽车行业。查理的公司在太平洋海岸证券交易所是通用汽车的特种经纪商,那曾经是个特许经营权,对吧,查理?
WARREN BUFFETTAnd we're subsidizing it in the United States, and we're actually doing it — tried putting in a pro-labor-type — I mean, it is subject to politics like you can't believe, too. But it's going to be with us, we're not going to quit driving cars, and — the American public has love affair with them. But I think I know where Apple's going to be in five or ten years, and I don't know where the car companies are going to be in five or ten years. And I may be wrong. But Charlie and I follow the auto business with intense interest. Charlie's firm was the specialist at General Motors on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, and that was a franchise, wasn't it, Charlie?
查理·芒格是啊。我们拼命工作,也只能赚点小钱。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. By working very hard, we could make a minor amount of money.
沃伦·巴菲特对。对。不过当时可不是“小钱”。得了吧——(笑)但——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Yeah. Wasn't "minor" at the time, though. Come on — (LAUGH) but —
查理·芒格是,是,就是小钱——
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, it was. It was —
沃伦·巴菲特是吗?
WARREN BUFFETTWas it?
查理·芒格——在当时也算不上大钱。
CHARLIE MUNGER— pretty minor at the time even.
沃伦·巴菲特是吗?好吧,那确实算不上大钱。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah? Well, it was pretty minor.
巴菲特不担心美联储的资产负债表
Buffett isn't worried about the Federal Reserve's balance sheet
沃伦·巴菲特好。贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Becky?
贝基·奎克这个问题来自爱荷华州锡达拉皮兹的林赛·彼得·舒马赫。“美联储当前的资产负债表规模是否让您担忧?尤其是量化宽松的结果——美联储凭空扩张了其资产负债表。就净效果而言,实质上是一种单式记账,仅凭一系列账目凭空创造了有价值的东西。同时想听听芒格先生对此的看法。”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Lindsay Peter Schumacher in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. "Does the current size of the Federal Reserve balance sheet concern you? In particular, the result of quantitative easing — the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet out of nothing. The net effect in essence is a form of single-entry accounting creating something of value out of nothing other than a series of book entries. And wondering what Mr. Munger thinks about this as well."
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我不认为美联储是问题所在,而且我认为他们解决不了财政问题。我并不担心美联储。我觉得它在履行设立时所赋予的职能。美联储有两个目标,至于把通胀目标从 0 改为每年 2%,我大概不会投赞成票。你知道,如果你告诉人们你正努力让货币每年贬值 2%,这会引出很多引申后果。虽然这对不少人来说感觉不错。很多人想要一点通胀,但除了那些债台高筑的人,没人想要高通胀。我并不担心美联储的资产负债表。我倒是喜欢研究它,数字很大——我一向喜欢大数字。但有趣的是:对我来说,最有趣的数据之一是流通中的货币。我是说,它已经——早在 2007 年和 2008 年,人们就说,“现金是垃圾”,“所有这些现金都会消失。”好吧,如果你看看美联储的资产负债表,流通中的货币这一项已经从 8000 亿增加到了 2.2 万亿,其中绝大多数是 100 美元面额的钞票。我估算下来,美国人均——包括婴儿在内,每人大概有 50 张 100 美元钞票,我非常想知道这些钱都在哪里。我是说,没人会在南美、非洲或其他什么地方囤积欧元吧。而现在对现金的需求——你知道,其中一些可能涉及毒贩子不那么显眼的活动之类。但任何认为“现金是垃圾”的人都该看看美联储的资产负债表。实际上,你可以去看看 5 美元、2 美元和 1 美元钞票的数量,而大幅增长的则是 100 美元钞票。我是说,100 美元钞票流通扩张的方式简直令人震惊。当然,我不知道它们都在哪里,我也不认为美联储能确切知道,但他们大概能比我猜得准得多。但我知道这已经是事实了,你可以每周观察,你会看到流通中的货币大概会增长那么一点点。而且,相信我,“现金”不是垃圾。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I don't think the Federal Reserve is the problem, and I think they can't solve the fiscal problem. I do not worry about the Federal Reserve. I think it's fulfilling the functions for which it was established. They have two objectives, and I would not have been one probably that would have changed the inflation objective: to 2% a year from 0. You know, I think that if you tell people that you're shooting to depreciate your currency at 2% a year, that has a lot of implications. Although it feels good to a (LAUGH) lot of people. A lot of people want a little inflation, but nobody wants a lot of inflation except somebody's that got a lot of debts. And I do not worry about the Federal Reserve balance sheet. I enjoy looking at it, and the numbers are big — I always like big numbers. But it's interesting: One of the most interesting figures, to me, is currency in circulation. I mean, it has gone — they were saying, "Cash is trash," back in 2007 and '08, "and all that cash is going to disappear." Well, if you look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet, it's gone from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion, and most of that's in hundred-dollar bills, overwhelmingly. And I figured out I think there's about 50 $100 bills per person — babies, everybody, in the United States, and I would really like to know where all of that is. I mean, nobody's hoarding eurodollars, you know, in South America, or Africa, or wherever. And the demand for currency now — you know, some of it may be subtle drug dealers' activities and of that. But anybody who thinks "cash is trash" ought to look at the Federal Reserve balance sheet. And, actually, you can look at how many $5 bills and $2 bills, and ones and all that, and the action has been in $100 bills. I mean, it is just astounding the way that hundred-dollar bills have spread. And, of course, I don't know where they are, and I don't think the Fed can know exactly, but they'd probably make a lot better guess than I could. But I do it's happened, and you can watch it every week, and you'll watch currency in circulation probably grow a little bit. And, believe me, "cash" is not trash. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,我不知道这一切会走向何方。情况已经非常极端了。我认为你可以相当极端地去应对它:比如大萧条之类的,前提是你之后能回归一段有所克制的时期。但如果你只是——但如果你打算不停地印钱、不停地花,那我认为最终会带来严重的麻烦。你在拉丁美洲就能看到这种情况。拉丁美洲总是让货币失控,当然,它在经济成就上也因此大大落后于美国。所以,我认为如果我们彻底抛弃过去的老路,进入一个只想靠印钱、好让这一年更容易混过去的新世界,我们最终会付出代价。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I don't know where we're headed with all of this. It's been very extreme. I think you could be pretty extreme in fighting it: depressions and so forth, if you reverted afterwards to a period of some discipline. But if you just — But if you're going to just keep printing money and spending it, I think eventually it causes bad trouble. And you can see it Latin America. Latin America let its currency get out of control all the time, and, of course, it lagged the United States in economic achievement greatly. So, I think we pay a price if we ever give up our old ways entirely and go into a new world where we just try and print money, just make it easier to get through the year.
沃伦·巴菲特我们在二战时就付过代价,我是说,每个人:学生和其他所有人,包括我自己。我们买了最初称作“战争债券”、“国防债券”、“储蓄债券”之类的东西。但从 1942 年到 1944 或 1945 年,你付 18.75 美元,到期拿回 25 美元,每个孩子都攒储蓄邮票之类的。但到头来一看,你知道,国债占到了 GDP 的 120%,而不是 30% 或 40%。随后我们又经历了很多通胀,非常多。所以,那些确实买了债券、支持了战争的人,有一部分购买力就这样被拿走了。嗯,这本身并没什么错。但当国家习惯了这么做,我认为就很难找到社会的那个临界点了。但我觉得你不会想接近那个点。
WARREN BUFFETTWe paid a price in World War II, I mean, everybody: school kids and everybody else, myself included. And we bought what were originally called "War Bonds," and "Defense Bonds," and "Savings Bonds," and all that. But from 1942 to 1944 or '45, you paid out $18.75 and you got $25.00 back, and every kid saved savings stamps and all that. But when you got all through, you know, you had 120% of GDP in the national debt instead of 30% or 40%. And we had a lot of inflation subsequently, a lot. So, the people that really bought those bonds and supported the war had a portion of their purchasing power taken away from them. Well, there wasn't anything wrong with that, particularly. But when the country gets in the habit of doing that, I think it's tough to figure out where the breaking point is with society. But I don't think you want to come anywhere close to it.
查理·芒格是啊,但让大量人口失业也很棘手。这就是矛盾所在。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, but it's also tough to have a mass of people unemployed. That's the tension.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。嗯,这就是为什么美联储在就业和通胀方面有两个目标。但他们不是制造赤字的那一方。到目前为止,这个体系运转得还不错,尽管,就像我说的,它已经——
WARREN BUFFETTYep. Well, that's why the Fed has two objectives, in terms of employment and inflation. But they are not the ones that could create the deficits. And so far, the system has worked pretty well, although, like I say, it's been —
查理·芒格到目前为止,那个刚从高楼上跳下去的人——
CHARLIE MUNGERSo, far, the man who just jumped off a tall building —
沃伦·巴菲特是啊,没错。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, right.
查理·芒格——在落地之前也都还好好的。
CHARLIE MUNGER— is all right until he hits the ground.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。(笑声)嗯,但我们或许可以在三楼或六楼的时候停住。我们不知道现在到了几楼,但知道还没落地。但你知道,从政治上看,投票拨款非常、非常、非常诱人,而投票加税可就没那么愉快了。参议院财政委员会主席拉塞尔·朗,现在有栋以他命名的大楼,他说过,“你知道,别征你的税,别征我的税,去征躲在树后那个家伙的税。”(笑声)基本上这就是普遍态度——我是说,这就是政治上很管用的现实。到目前为止,这个国家在许多理论上可能造成大问题的事情上,都应对得很好。但这并不能保证我们未来依然如此,作为储备货币让我们能做很多事,但如果我们搞砸了,也会引发很多后果。查理?
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (LAUGHTER) Well, but there could be ways we can stop now at the third floor, or the sixth floor. We don't know what floor it is, but we know it hasn't hit the ground. But, you know, politically it's very, very, very tempting to vote appropriations, and it's not fun to vote taxes. And Russell Long, head of the Senate Finance Committee, they've got a building named after him now, he said, "You know, don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that guy behind the tree." And (LAUGH) basically that is the attitude — I mean, it's the reality of what is useful in politics. And so far, this country's managed to work very well with lot of things that could theoretically cause a lot of problems. But it doesn't guarantee us the future on it and being the reserve currency lets us do a lot of things, but it also creates a lot of consequences if we screw it up. Charlie?
查理·芒格嗯,我们是在把这个话题往死里说,但它确实是个问题。我希望我们能有个解决办法。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, we're beating a subject to death, but it is a problem. I wish we had a solution.
[章节] 我们需要照顾被资本主义取代的人
We need to take care of people displaced by capitalism
沃伦·巴菲特好。接下来我们转到一号站,看看——
WARREN BUFFETTOK. With that we'll go to station one and see if we —
现场股东您好,巴菲特先生、芒格先生。我叫康纳,是诺丁汉大学的经济学学生。今天我想问的是:疫情期间我们看到了供应链短缺,特别是来自亚洲的。因此,一些公司基于政治意图,选择把生产迁走。公司应该做这样的决定吗?政府又是否应该支持它们?
AUDIENCE MEMBERHello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name's Connor, I'm an economics student at the University of Nottingham. My question for you today is during the pandemic we witnessed supply chain shortages, especially from Asia. As a result, companies have chosen, with political intentions, to move production away. Should companies make these decisions? And should the government support them?
沃伦·巴菲特查理?
WARREN BUFFETTCharlie?
查理·芒格嗯,问得好。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, that's a good question.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。
WARREN BUFFETTYep.
查理·芒格显然,这是合乎逻辑的——如果你做生意,在墨西哥能以便宜得多的成本生产,那你自然会去墨西哥开厂,拿到更便宜的零部件。很多汽车制造商就是这么做的。但另一方面,没人想把整个国家掏空,让所有制造业岗位都流到别处去,我们自己过得像一群农民:就像,你知道,1820 年左右的英国殖民地那样。这些想法之间当然存在巨大的张力。我们在海外的生产占比没那么多,对吧,沃伦?
CHARLIE MUNGERObviously, it's logical — if you're in business and you can make the thing in Mexico way cheaper, it's natural to open a factory in Mexico and get your parts cheaper. And a lot of the auto manufacturers have done exactly that. On the other hand, nobody wants to hollow out the whole country, so all the manufacturing jobs are elsewhere and we're all living like a bunch of farmers: You know, like English colonies in 1820 or something. And these ideas are, of course, in big tension. We don't have that much foreign production, right, Warren?
沃伦·巴菲特对。嗯,但我们失去了——其实,伯克希尔·哈撒韦最初作为一家纺织制造商,败就败在南方相对于北方变得更有成本优势。当然,后来——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, but we've lost — well, originally Berkshire Hathaway, as a textile manufacturer, lost because the South became feasible versus the North. And, of course, then eventually —
查理·芒格南方也贵了——
CHARLIE MUNGERThe South got expensive —
沃伦·巴菲特南方——
WARREN BUFFETTSouth got —
查理·芒格——然后搬到了中国。
CHARLIE MUNGER— and moved to China.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。社会从中受益,但总有一些人会在这类情形中受到重创。一个富裕的社会,应该以某种方式照顾好那些在我们的鞋厂、纺织公司工作过的人。我是说,1964 年我们接手纺织厂时,一半工人只会说葡萄牙语。而且,你知道,他们拿的工资一点也不高。但后来生产可以转移到南方去,我们就注定要倒闭了。这绝不是工人的错,不论从哪个层面、以何种形式看,都不是。也不是我们的错:我们一直在努力竞争。
WARREN BUFFETTSure. And society benefits and some people get killed in that sort of a situation. And a rich society should take care, one way or another, of people that worked in our shoe factories, people who worked in our textile companies. I mean, if you worked in our textile operation, in 1964 when we took it over, half our workers only spoke Portuguese. And, you know, they weren't getting great wages at all. But now you could do it in the South, and we were doomed to go out of business. And it wasn't the fault of the worker in any way, shape, or form. It wasn't our fault: We kept trying to compete.
查理·芒格嗯,那边田纳西河流域管理局有廉价电力。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, TVA had cheap power down there.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。
WARREN BUFFETTSure.
查理·芒格税收的钱确实能办成电力这种事。
CHARLIE MUNGERAnd tax dollars really can yield power.
沃伦·巴菲特还有空调改变了一切,因为那些鬼地方热得让人根本待不下去。所以,原因很多。但后来生产在很多方面转移到了海外,总体来看,国家确实因此变得更好。不过,它也让许多人失去生计,这些人在生活中确实很难再找到其他出路。你不能对一个 55 或 60 岁、只会说葡萄牙语的人谈什么“再培训”,真对他们说,他们将在马萨诸塞州新贝德福德迎来“大好前程”。你知道,这种事不能说得轻飘飘的。我们有能力照顾这些人。我们也有运作还算不错的制度,但这里总有一种张力——你知道,那那些什么都不做的人又该怎么办,诸如此类。所以,这些都不是容易解决的问题。但我想说的是,总的来说,我们希望整个世界都繁荣,我们不希望美国成为一个极度繁荣,而世界其他地方——
WARREN BUFFETTAnd air conditioning changed everything because the heat in those damn places was impossible. And so, a lot of things. But then it moves offshore in many ways, and net the country is better off because of it. But it displaces a lot of people who really can't do something else in life. You can't talk about "retraining" somebody that's 55 or 60, and speaks only Portuguese, and really tell them they're going to have "a great future" in New Bedford, Mass. You know, and so you don't want to be glib about it. And we can afford to take care of those people. And we've got some systems that work reasonably well, but there's a tension between — you know, what about the person that doesn't do anything and all that kind of stuff. So, these are not easy problems to solve. But I would say that, by and large, we want the whole world to prosper, we do not want the United States to be a country of extraordinary prosperity, and have the rest of the world —
查理·芒格——在挨饿。
CHARLIE MUNGER— starving.
沃伦·巴菲特不,这行不通。尤其是在一个核武器世界里更行不通。所以——你作为一个有人性的人可以有自己的感受,但这件事可以做得更好。而且我们有资源去做。我的意思是,这个国家的产出,一方面可以用更少的人来完成,同时做更专业化的事情。当然,现实也确实如此。在我的一生中,美国的工作周时长已经大幅缩短。但人们仍然觉得自己很忙。人类的宿命就是会说,“我怎么才能把所有这些事都做完?”但我母亲当年不会开车送三个孩子去任何地方,如果你想去哪儿,运气好、年龄够大,你才能有辆自行车。而这个世界总是把一切提升都看成某种基线,让人或多或少感到不满足。凭借我们的繁荣,我们能做许多 1930 年做不了的事,包括照顾那些因别人能干他们的工作、生活因此改善而失业的人。我们必须确保拥有最好的体系来照顾那些因此失业的人。但在我们现有的政治体系下,一路走来会犯很多错误。但我们必须朝着这个方向继续前进。我要说——
WARREN BUFFETTNo. It isn't going to work. And it particularly isn't going to work in a nuclear world. So — and you can have your own feelings about it as a humane person, but it can be done better. And we've got the resources to do it. I mean, the output of this country, one, can be done with a lot fewer people, and doing more specialized things. And, of course, it has been. The workweek in the United States, you know, in my lifetime, has dropped dramatically. And people still feel busy. And it will be the human lot to say, you know, "How can I get all these things done?" But my mother didn't drive three kids anyplace, I mean, if you wanted to go anyplace, if you were lucky and you got old enough, you had a bicycle. And the world just keeps looking at everything moving up as becoming sort of a base that leaves them somewhat dissatisfied. And with our prosperity, we can do a lot of things we couldn't do in 1930, including taking care of people that got displaced by the fact that somebody else can do that work and improve their lot in life. And we've got to make sure that we have the best system that takes care of the people who get displaced by that. But doing that in the political system we have and everything, we'll make a lot of mistakes along the way. But we've got to keep moving in that direction. And I'd say —
查理·芒格这件事相当有趣的地方在于,亚当·斯密是对的:自由市场资本主义会自动让财产掌握在私人手中。自由贸易和所有这一切会自动带来人均 GDP 的增长,帮助每个人,包括最底层的人:对每个人都有很大帮助。但在这个过程本身,自由市场资本主义也伴随着大量痛苦:比如说,新贝德福德一家纺织公司里的葡萄牙工人。从来没有人想出如何彻底消除所有痛苦。我们确实有政府安全网来减轻一些痛苦,而且随着时间的推移,我们让这些安全网变得稍微大一些。但除此之外,如果你试图消除所有痛苦,你也会消除所有收益。我们不会再有增长的人均 GDP。你会有一个像俄罗斯那样的经济,它被形容为:“他们假装付我们工资,我们假装工作。”(笑声)
CHARLIE MUNGERThe really interesting thing about it is that Adam Smith was right: that free market capitalism automatically leaves a property in private hands. And free trade and all that automatically creates GDP per capita that grows and helps everybody, including the people at the bottom: helps everybody a lot. But inherent in the process, there's a lot of pain in that free market capitalism: for instance, for the Portuguese workers in a textile company in New Bedford. And nobody's ever figured out how to take all the pain out of it. We do have government safety nets that take some of the pain out, and we make those safety nets a little bigger as time goes by. But, apart from that, if you try and take all the pain out, you'll also take all the gains out of it. We won't have a growing GDP per capita. You'll have an economy like Russia's, which has been characterized as saying: "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work." (LAUGHTER)
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。其他体系没有运行得更好,但它也产生了越来越多的财富差距。那些只靠管理资产、没有实际创造任何额外价值的人却发了大财。我的意思是,政府的职责是保留资本主义最好的方面,同时不让只会说葡萄牙语的人在这个过程中受苦。从长远来看,这两者是无法兼容的。我们在社会保障之类的事情上磕磕绊绊地取得进展。我们比我出生时好多了。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. The other systems haven't worked better, but it also produces more and more disparities in wealth. And people that do nothing but get assets under management without actually performing anything extra make fortunes. And, I mean, it's a job of government to keep the best aspects of capitalism, while not causing people that only speak Portuguese to suffer in the process. I mean, the two aren't compatible politically over time. And we stumble along making progress on things like Social Security and all that. And we are a lot better off than we are when I was born.
查理·芒格总的来说,美国在资本主义增长和不断扩大的社会安全网之间的这种紧张关系上做得非常好。回顾过去,我们可以为自己的国家感到相当自豪。
CHARLIE MUNGERNet, the United States has done a very good job of this tension between capitalistic growth and a growing social safety net. We can be pretty proud of our country, looking backward.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。这也许就是为什么我们以占世界 0.5% 的人口,在几个世纪内创造出了世界 25% 的 GDP。我的意思是,这是一个奇迹。这不是因为我们更聪明,但我们必须承认,这个体系一定有某些东西运行得相当好,尽管它引发了内战和各种各样的事情,你知道?女人,你知道,即使是在第 19 条修正案通过之后,也得不到任何机会。但这是一个不断进步的过程。我认为事实上确实有进步,但人类的本性就是总能看到问题,如果你——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. That may be why we have 25% of the world's GDP starting with a half-a-percent of the population and did it in a few centuries. I mean, it's a miracle. And it wasn't because we're smarter, but we've got to say there must be something to the system that's worked pretty well even though it's produced a civil war and all kinds of things, you know? And women, you know, not getting a shot at anything, you know, even after they passed the 19th Amendment. But it's a work in progress. I think actually there's been progress, but it's mankind's nature to see the things wrong with it if you —
查理·芒格更糟的是:人类的本质是把进步视为理所当然。不是需要去赢得或争取的东西,而是应该自动从窗户里飘进来的东西。这种态度是毒药。对任何人都没好处。
CHARLIE MUNGERIt's even worse: It's man's nature to take the progress as a right. Not something to be earned or strive for, but something that should automatically just flow in over the transom. And that attitude is poison. It doesn't do anybody any good.
谈到会计,“我们会始终做合法的事,我们会始终说出我们认为对的事”
When it comes to accounting, 'We'll consistently do what is legal, and we'll consistently say what we think is right'
沃伦·巴菲特好的。现在问我们一个简单的问题吧,贝基。(笑声)(掌声)
WARREN BUFFETTOK. Now ask us an easy question, Becky. (LAUGH) (APPLAUSE)
贝基·奎克这个问题来自道格·德希尔(音)。“自从会计规则改变,要求伯克希尔将股权投资公允价值变动计入损益表以来,巴菲特先生一再告诉股东忽略这些变化,因为它们不能反映这些投资将产生的长期回报。最近,巴菲特先生认为,银行使用的持有至到期会计法,以避免反映银行投资组合公允价值变动对损益表和股东权益账户的影响,这种做法损害了其各利益相关方。巴菲特先生能否详细说明,为什么他对银行和伯克希尔的市值会计法看法不同?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from Doug DeShiel (PH). "Since the accounting rules changed requiring Berkshire to report the change in fair value of its equity investments through the income statement, Mr. Buffett has repeatedly told shareholders to ignore those changes as they're not reflective of the long-term returns that those investments will produce. "Recently, Mr. Buffett has argued that hold-to-maturity accounting used by the banks to avoid reflecting the changes in fair value of bank investment portfolios in the income statement and the shareholder equity account do a disservice to its various stakeholders. Can Mr. Buffett elaborate on why he views mark-to-market accounting differently for banks in comparison to Berkshire?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我认为,在这两种情况下,都应该在资产负债表上做,而不是在损益表上。审计师面临的一个非常棘手的问题是,显然损益表会流入资产负债表。但资产负债表告诉你存款能否支付,它告诉你很多事情。我们在资产负债表上显示了这些。我们相信在资产负债表上显示市值。我们只是不相信应该把它计入损益账户。而在这一点上,我们本来可以把它放在“其他综合收益”里,就像过去很长一段时间那样。所以,我在某种程度上——在很大程度上——同情审计组。但他们必须决定,他们是希望资产负债表代表价值——但如果我们买下喜诗糖果,它实际价值远高于账面,那么这方面它又是保守的;还是希望有一个对人们来说毫无意义的损益账户。因为它每五秒钟就变一次,你知道?我的意思是——嗯,今天市场休市,但你知道,我想苹果上周五涨了七八个点左右。我的意思是,那是 70 亿美元:一个疯狂的损益账户。它只是反映了我们在那个时点的状况。当然,如果你是银行,你的钱实际上投在那些东西上——主要是抵押贷款,对银行来说是糟糕的持有工具,但对消费者来说是极好的购买工具;而且现在整个社会以一种与过去完全不同的方式内置了这一点,你必须注意他们拥有的资产价值和明天早上可能被要求偿还的金额之间是否失衡。(笑声)如果我们所有的钱,明天早上都可能被人要求偿还,那我们的行为方式就得和伯克希尔完全不同。所以,我确实认为,正确的做法是我们推荐的方式。那正是直到几年前一直采用的方法。我建议股东们这样看待它,但显然我们得遵守 SEC 和州当局等所有机构要求我们的规则。但我仍然会向股东们解释,我会对我姐姐解释的关于伯克希尔最重要的是什么。我认为每个管理层实际上都有这个义务,但其实他们却走向了另一个方向,给股东们提供一堆完全胡说八道的数字。你无法想象有些东西—— EBITDA,我以为已经够糟糕了。但他们还在继续。你知道,息税折摊前一切:EBE。(笑声)但这不会改变我对姐姐说的话,她就在观众席里,我希望如此。我应该对所有股东说:“我们会始终做合法的事,我们会始终说出我们认为对的事。”查理?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I believe, in both cases, in doing it on the balance sheet and not in the income statement. And it's a very tough problem the auditors face is that obviously the income statement feeds into the balance sheet. But the balance sheet tells you whether deposits can be paid, it tells you a lot of things. And we show it on our balance sheet. We believe in showing market values on our balance sheet. We just don't believe in running it through the income account. And in getting there we would put in "other comprehensive income," like it was for a long time. So, I sympathize, to some extent — a far extent, with the audit group. But they have to really decide whether they want the balance sheet to represent values — except it doesn't reflect them on the upside if we buy a See's Candy and it's worth way more money, so it's conservative in that sense; or whether they want to have an income account that becomes meaningless to people. Because it really changes every five seconds, you know? I mean — well, the market's closed today, but, you know, I guess Apple was up, what, seven or eight points or something on Friday. I mean, that's $7 billion: I mean, that's a crazy income account. It is a reflection of where we stand at that point. And, of course, if you're a bank, where you're putting out money really at things — mortgages, I mean, primarily, that are terrible instruments for a bank to own, but a great instrument for a consumer to buy; and built-in to the whole society now in a way that is entirely different than in the past, you've got to pay attention to whether they've gotten out of whack in terms of the value of what they own and what can be demanded of them tomorrow morning. (LAUGH) And if we had all of our money that could be demanded from us tomorrow morning, we'd have to behave a lot differently than Berkshire does. So, I really think the way to do it is the way we recommend doing. Which is exactly what was being done until a few years ago. I recommend the shareholders look at it that way, but we're going to follow the rules, obviously that the SEC, you know, the state authorities and everybody require of us. But I'll still explain to the shareholders exactly what I would explain to my sister about what really counts at Berkshire. And I think every management actually has an obligation to that, and instead of it, they go in the other direction and give them a lot of figures that are total nonsense. You can't imagine some of the — you know, EBITDA, I thought, was about as bad as you could get. But they've kept going. You know, earnings before everything: EBE. (LAUGHTER) But that doesn't change what I would tell my sister, who's here in the audience, I hope. And I should tell this to all the shareholders: "We'll consistently do what is legal, and we'll consistently say what we think is right." Charlie?
查理·芒格是的。(掌声)
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. (APPLAUSE)
沃伦·巴菲特我们希望主人理解他们拥有什么。你懂吗?这不意味着他们必须理解细节。但这就是为什么我们有持股 50 或 60 年的股东。这不意味着他们读了 10-Q 报告之类的。但他们觉得我们就像邻居一样在告诉他们实话。
WARREN BUFFETTWe want owners who understand what they own. You know? That doesn't mean they have to understand the detail of it. But that's why we have people that have been around 50 or 60 years. That doesn't mean that they read the 10-Qs or anything like that. But they feel we're telling it to them like, you know, they lived next door to us.
查理·芒格是啊,我不知道那些会计师做出这个改变时在想什么。我觉得这简直是疯了,绝对疯了。我看不出任何一个理解企业如何运营、以及应该如何由所有者管理者来运营的人,会做出那样的会计变更。那些会计师这么做,只是一时头脑发热。
CHARLIE MUNGERYeah, I don't know what the accountants were thinking when they made that change. It strikes me as bonkers, absolutely bonkers. I don't see how anybody who understands how businesses really operated, and should be operated by owning managers, would have made that accounting change. The accountants did it just because they had a wild moment.
沃伦·巴菲特25 年前,我向审计行业建议,审计委员会应该向审计师问四个问题,如果这些问题被问出来,股东们会对公司了解更多。但问这些问题对审计师不利,因为如果他们回答了,可能会增加他们的责任。而客户也不想他们回答,因为管理层不想。
WARREN BUFFETTTwenty-five years ago, I suggested to the audit profession that the audit committee ask auditors four questions, and the shareholders would know a lot more about the company if those questions were asked. But it wasn't good for the auditors to be asked those questions because it might increase their liability if they answered them. And the client didn't want them to answer them because the management didn't want them to.
查理·芒格不,他们想要一个系统,只要遵守某些规则,他们就安全了。这可以理解。但我认为去年,这个要求将可交易证券的季度公允价值变动计入损益账户的规则,他们这么做并不是为了自我保护,免于——
CHARLIE MUNGERNo, they want a system where, if they follow certain rules, they're safe. And that's understandable. But I don't think the past year, this rule requiring changes in marketable securities to go through the income account quarterly, they didn't do that to protect themselves from —
沃伦·巴菲特没有。
WARREN BUFFETTNo.
查理·芒格——责任。他们纯粹是出于某种自己不可理喻的理由才这么做的。
CHARLIE MUNGER— liability. They just did that for some crazy reason of their own.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
查理·芒格你想想看,一帮人在一个庞大复杂的体系里领着高薪、步步高升,就像我们军队里的许多军官一样——天知道你要是把他们单独关进一个小房间里,让他们去发明新的会计准则,他们会搞出什么东西来。
CHARLIE MUNGERYou get a bunch of people who will all be drawing a lot of pay out of a big, complicated system, and rising in it like so many of our officers in the Army, God knows what they'll do if you put them in a little room by themselves and tell them to invent new accounting standards.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这话是查理说的,我们的审计师朋友可要记住——他其实并不——(笑声)但我百分之百同意他。(笑)他 99 岁了,说什么都比我更容易被放过。(笑声)好了,二号机位——但他刚才说的内容极其重要。我是说,你得对实际到底发生了什么有一些自己的洞察。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, to our auditor, remember that's Charlie talking, and he doesn't really — (LAUGHTER) But I agree with him, (LAUGH) 100%. He's 99, he can get away with more than I can get away with. (LAUGHTER) OK. Station two — But what he said is enormously important. I mean, you've got to have some insights into what the hell really goes on.
查理·芒格哪怕你是个(听不清)会计师。
CHARLIE MUNGEREven if you're (inaudible) accountant.
沃伦·巴菲特是啊。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
芒格:对孙辈不照着我的想法来这件事,我看得很开
Munger: I'm 'philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do'
沃伦·巴菲特好,二号机位。
WARREN BUFFETTOK, Station two.
现场股东亲爱的沃伦,亲爱的查理。我叫维多利亚·温思罗普(Victoria Winthrop),今年 22 岁,在慕尼黑的数字技术与管理中心(CDTM)读书。你们的孙辈年龄跟我差不多,所以我想问:你们如何把智慧传给孙辈和继承人?你们怎么引导他们走上投资这条路?你们觉得以家庭为单位做投资有价值,还是各自去投资更有价值?谢谢。
AUDIENCE MEMBERDear Warren, dear Charlie. My name is Victoria Winthrop, I am 22 years old, and I study in Munich at the CDTM, the Center of Digital Technology and Management. As your grandchildren are more in my age group, let me ask you: How do you transfer your wisdom to your grandchildren and heirs? How do you lead them to investing? Do you see value in investing as a family, or individually? Thank you.
沃伦·巴菲特这个问题我让查理先回答。他更——
WARREN BUFFETTI'm going to let Charlie do the answer now. He's got more —
查理·芒格嗯,我孙辈更多。(笑)不过,对孙辈不照着我的想法来这件事,我看得很开。在我看来,这差不多就是人生的常态。我按自己的方式过日子,他们要是愿意,可以把我当作一个范本来观察。要是不愿意,也可以试试其他路子。他们试其他路子的时候我不太乐意。(笑声)有些男朋友、女朋友我明明看不上,还得装出喜欢的样子,(笑声)但我跟所有人一样,硬扛着而已。(笑声)通常,我就是咬住舌头,一声不吭。这就是我的处理方式。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I have more grandchildren. But (LAUGH) I am quite philosophical about my grandchildren not thinking exactly the way I do. It seems to me that's almost the natural course of life. And I just live my life my own way, and they can observe it as an example if they want to. And if they don't, they can try some other way. I don't like it when they try some other way. (LAUGHTER) And I have to pretend that I like some of the boyfriends and girlfriends I don't like, (LAUGHTER) but I just struggle through like everybody else. (LAUGHTER) And usually, I just bite my tongue and keep silent. That's my way of handling it.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我想说,就我个人来说,我的三个孩子在过去 30 年里变得聪明了很多,我自己也变聪明了。(笑)而且——
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I would say that I think, in my case, my three children have grown a lot smarter in the last 30 years, and I think I've grown smarter. (LAUGH) And —
查理·芒格嗯,我知道,但你当年需要一堆的帮助。
CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I know, but you needed a lot of help.
沃伦·巴菲特那绝对没错——(笑声)不是,我完全承认。这就是我为什么有那么大的进步空间。我是说,我值得改进的地方还多得很。不过——
WARREN BUFFETTThat is for sure — (LAUGHTER) no, I would totally acknowledge that. That's why I have the room to grow. I mean, I have plenty of room for improvement. But —
查理·芒格我们当时要改进的地方都很多。我在美国钢铁公司干过一年,是在他们洛杉矶的制造部门,那是个很大的业务。那摊子事完全死路一条,三年后就退回到了荒地状态,整个厂区被夷为平地。我当时完全没预见到这个结果。要知道,在我那个年纪就能那么无知,真是一种罪过。而且我的教授们总体上比我还无知。我年轻的时候,根本没人用科学的方法去观察过生意的底层经济规律。
CHARLIE MUNGERWe all had a lot to grow. I worked a year for US Steel, which was in their fabrication department in Los Angeles, a big operation. The thing was utterly doomed, and three years later it went back to greenfields. The whole thing was razed to the ground. I did not see it coming. Now, to be that ignorant as I was at that age, it was a sin. And my professors by and large were even more ignorant than I was. Nobody had observed the basic economics of business in a scientific way at all when I was young.
沃伦·巴菲特好吧,既然到了坦白时间,我得告诉各位:现在是 3 点半。所以(笑),我们不想再继续下去了——再聊半个小时谁知道我们会说出些什么。总之(笑声),非常感谢大家前来。4 点半我们在这里召开股东会议。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, if we're getting into confession time, I have to tell you: It's 3:30. So, (LAUGH) we don't want to keep going on: Who knows what we'll be saying in another half-hour. So, (LAUGHTER) I thank you all very much for coming. At 4:30 we will have the shareholders meeting here.