致合伙人信(1964-07-08)
巴菲特合伙有限公司
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 基威特广场
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈 31
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
1964 年 7 月 8 日 上半年业绩
全家 6 月 23 日就要动身去加利福尼亚,所以这封信我提前了几天,6 月 18 日就写了。不过,对于习惯拿我们的信件对表的朋友,我还是尽量维持一贯的时间节奏,先留几处空白,等比尔拿到 6 月 30 日的最终数字后补上。1964 年上半年,道琼斯工业平均指数(以下简称“道指”)从 762.95 点涨到 831.50 点。这期间若一直持有道指,还能拿到大约 14.40 点的股息,上半年道指的总回报便是 +10.0%。写这封信的 6 月 18 日,我们的成绩看来和道指相差无几。我倒宁愿告诉你们:道指不赚不赔,我们领先 5%;或者更妙一点,道指跌了 10%,我们打个平手。我一向说,在上涨的市场里跑赢道指,比在横盘或下跌的市场里更难。下面把历年成绩汇总一下,列出道指的表现、合伙基金在向普通合伙人分配前的表现,以及有限合伙人的实际收益:
年份
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964 上半年
July 8, 1964 First Half Performance The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available. During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “DOW”) advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones. To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners' results: Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1st half 1964
道指整体回报率(1) -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 10.9%
Overall Results From Dow (1) -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 10.9%
合伙企业业绩(2) 10.4% 40.9% 25.9% 22.8% 45.9% 13.9% 38.7% 12.0%
Partnership Results (2) 10.4% 40.9% 25.9% 22.8% 45.9% 13.9% 38.7% 12.0%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
有限合伙人业绩(3) 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 10.5%
Limited Partners’ Results (3) 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 10.5%
116.1% 10.8% 521.0% 27.6% 354.4% 22.2%
116.1% 10.8% 521.0% 27.6% 354.4% 22.2%
累计业绩 年复利回报率
Cumulative results Annual compounded rate
(表格脚注见下页。)
(See next page for footnotes to table.)
前表附注:
Footnotes to preceding table:
(1)基于道指每年的价值变动,加上当年持有道指本可获得的股息。该表涵盖合伙基金全部完整运营年份。(2)1957 至 1961 年为全年运营的各前身有限合伙企业的合并业绩,已扣除所有费用,但未向合伙人分配收益、也未向普通合伙人划拨。(3)1957 至 1961 年的数字,按前一列合伙基金业绩计算,并计入向普通合伙人的划拨——
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. (2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner. (3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for
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即按照现行合伙协议、在有限合伙人月度提款之前的划拨。上半年的买入相当令人满意。这尤其让我欣慰,因为我认为买入这一环占了这门生意的 90%。我们的普通类持仓里,如今有三家公司,B.P.L. 是其最大的单一股东。这些股票的买入价远低于它们在私人所有者眼中的价值,而且仍在继续买。其中一只我们已经买了大约 18 个月,另外两只也买了将近一年。倘若接下来至少一年、甚至两年乃至更久,我们仍旧只是周复一周地耐心买入这些证券,我丝毫不会意外。对于上面这三种情形,我们确实乐见的局面是:公司在盈利改善、资产增值等方面稳步向前,而我们不断买入时,股价却几乎按兵不动。这对短期业绩帮助不大,在上涨的市场里尤其如此,却是长期利润一个踏实而合乎逻辑的来源。这样的操作最终通常带来两种结果:要么外部因素推动市价上涨,要么我们以便宜的价格取得一家企业的控股权。两条路我都乐意走。不过要看清楚一点:我们普通类持仓中的大多数,仍是那些我们认定被大幅低估、却根本没有半点可能取得控股地位的证券。我们指望市场在合理的时间内证明我们的判断,但在这些证券上,并没有上一段说的那两条弦同时为我们发力。
allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners. Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more. What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn't do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me. It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.
投资公司
Investment Companies
我们经常拿自己的成绩,同两家最大的开放式投资公司(共同基金)以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司作比较。这些公司的典型做法,是把 95%–100% 的资金投在普通股上。这四家——马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三大陆公司和雷曼公司——合计管理着 40 多亿美元,很可能代表了整个 280 亿美元投资公司行业的常态。它们的成绩见下表。依我看,这样的表现大体也反映了绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的水平,而那些机构掌管的资金要多得多。年份 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 上半年
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closedend investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, TriContinental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums. Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1st half 1964
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
马萨诸塞投资者信托(1) -11.4% 42.7% 9.0% -1.0% 25.6% -9.8% 20.0% 11.0%
Mass. Inv. Trust (1) -11.4% 42.7% 9.0% -1.0% 25.6% -9.8% 20.0% 11.0%
累计业绩 105.8%,年复利 10.1%。
Cumulative 105.8% Results Annual 10.1% Compounded Rate
投资者股票基金(1) -12.4% 47.5% 10.3% -0.6% 24.9% -13.4% 16.5% 9.5%
Investors Stock (1) -12.4% 47.5% 10.3% -0.6% 24.9% -13.4% 16.5% 9.5%
雷曼公司(2) -11.4% 40.8% 8.1% 2.5% 23.6% -14.4% 23.7% 9.6%
Lehman (2) -11.4% 40.8% 8.1% 2.5% 23.6% -14.4% 23.7% 9.6%
三大陆公司(2) -2.4% 33.2% 8.4% 2.8% 22.5% -10.0% 18.3% 8.6%
Tri-Cont. (2) -2.4% 33.2% 8.4% 2.8% 22.5% -10.0% 18.3% 8.6%
道指 -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 10.9%
Dow -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 10.9%
有限合伙人 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 10.5%
Limited Partners 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 10.5%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
95.5% 98.2% 105.1% 116.1% 354.4% 9.4% 9.6% 10.1% 10.8% 22.2% 64
95.5% 98.2% 105.1% 116.1% 354.4% 9.4% 9.6% 10.1% 10.8% 22.2% 64
(1)按资产价值变动加上当年向在册持有人的分配计算。(2)1957—1963 年数据取自 1964 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》,1964 年上半年为估算。这些数字一再表明,即便是报酬最高、最受敬重的投资管理机构,也难以跑赢一个无人管理的蓝筹股指数。这些公司的业绩,在某种程度上好比一只浮在池塘水面的鸭子:水(市场)涨,鸭子随之升高;水落,鸭子随之回落。不管有没有防止虐待动物协会,我认为鸭子都只能对自己的动作揽功(或背锅)。湖水的涨落,轮不到它来呱呱自夸。正如第一页表格所示,水位高低对 B.P.L. 的投资业绩举足轻重。不过,我们偶尔也扑腾了几下翅膀。我想强调,我并不是说道指是衡量普通股投资业绩的唯一标尺。但我确实认为,所有投资管理(包括自我管理)都应接受客观检验,而且标准应该在事前选定,而不是事后挑一把顺手的来用。资金管理是一门大生意。投资经理们极为注重评估汽车、钢铁、化工等行业公司管理层的优劣。这类评估耗费大量工夫,通常以极其郑重的方式呈现,旨在辨明哪些公司管理出色,哪些存在管理短板。在付出巨大努力客观衡量所投公司的管理层之后,却不把类似的考察用在投资组合经理自己身上,这确实令人费解。我们认为,投资者和投资管理机构理应确立业绩标准,并定期、客观地审视自身结果,就像审视自己的投资一样仔细。无论这条路通向何方,我们都会将这一做法坚持到底。或许无需赘言:衡量业绩这一做法本身,丝毫不保证结果良好——它只保证评价的客观。我想强调“基本规则”中关于该标准应用的几点提示——即,鉴于我们的运作方式,至少应以三年为期加以衡量;此外,在投机热潮中,我们可能落后于市场整体。不过,有一点我可以向各位承诺:我们起步时拿的是一把 36 英寸的尺子,往后也不会更换。如果量下来不够格,我们不会去换尺子。依我所见,整个投资管理行业涉及数千亿美元的资金,倘若人人都有一把衡量能力的好尺子,并且明智地去运用它,这个行业的运转将会顺畅得多。在经营自家生意、评估市场、人员、机器、方法等事项时,大多数人一贯都是这样做的——而资金管理,是世界上最大的一门生意。
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year. (2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964. These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings. I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including selfmanagement) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively. The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments. We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
税务
Taxes
进入 1964 年时,我们有 2,991,090 美元的未实现净利得,全部归属于 1963 年在册的合伙人。截至 6 月 30 日,我们已实现资本利得 2,826,248.76 美元(其中 96% 为长期利得),因此极有可能:至少归属于你的那部分、已在 1964 年 1 月 25 日信函第三项中向你列报的未实现增值,今年将全部兑现。我要再次强调,这与我们表现如何并无关联。即便我做出了上述陈述,你手中 B.P.L. 权益的市值仍可能自 1 月 1 日以来已大幅缩水——因此已实现利得丰厚,并不值得庆贺;同样,当我们的已实现利得微乎其微时,也未必就应当气馁。我们不会为提前或递延纳税而耍弄任何手段。我们做投资决策,依据的是对最有利概率组合的评估。如果这意味着要纳税,我庆幸长期资本利得税率能有现在这样低。正如我们在 1964 年 4 月 1 日最近一封税务信函中所说,处理期中预估税最稳妥的办法,
We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of $2,991,090 which is all attributable to partners belonging during 1963. Through June 30th we have realized capital gains of $2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I'm glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are. As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates
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就是将 1964 年的估计税额,按你 1963 年的实际应缴税额来缴。照此操作,便不会有任何罚款风险。对于 1 月 1 日入伙的合伙人而言,应纳税额自然会相当轻微——任何合伙人头一年都是如此。这是因为已实现的资本利得会先归入享有未实现增值权益的老合伙人名下。这一点,当然也与经济表现无关。所有有限合伙人,无论新老(除比尔·斯科特、露丝·斯科特和苏珊·巴菲特,按合伙协议第五条处理),最终获得的投资结果完全一致。和往年一样,迄今为止,所有合伙人的普通净收入都微乎其微。也如同往年,我们大约会在 11 月 1 日前后发出一封信函(致合伙人,以及届时已向我们表达入伙意向的人士),随信附上合伙协议修订稿、1965 年承诺函、1964 年税务状况预估等。在此期间,这封信里若有任何含糊之处,夏天尽管让比尔忙一忙,帮你一一厘清。谨致问候,沃伦·E·巴菲特
is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure. The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course, be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date. As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest, to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy. Cordially, Warren E. Buffett
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