致合伙人信(1969-12-26)

合伙人信 · 原文约 2108 词
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巴菲特合伙公司

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.

基威特广场 610 号

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

内布拉斯加州奥马哈 68131

OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131

电话 042-4110

TELEPHONE 042-4110

1969 年 12 月 26 日

December 26, 1969

致各位合伙人:

To My Partners:

关于首次现金分配的计划已最终敲定,我们预计于 1 月 3 日向各位寄出支票,支票日期为 1970 年 1 月 5 日,金额约为您 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 64%,并扣除自 1969 年 1 月 1 日以来向您支付的所有分配款(含月度付款)。如果您在 1969 年未支取任何月度付款,将会有一笔对您有利的小额利息调整;如果您曾向 BPL 借款,则会相应计收一笔利息。从我们清算的时点来看,债券和股票市场的表现已经让我再满意不过了。我相信,几乎所有合伙人——无论他们原本会投资债券还是股票——现在拿到现金,境况都会远好于我们在去年年底完成清算。那些寻求收益的合伙人,以同样的本金投资,现在能获得的税后收益,将比仅仅一年前那些当时看似十分慷慨的收益率还要高出约 40%。我们的税务情况已基本明晰,看来就联邦所得税而言,各位将会有约占您 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本 3.75% 的普通收入(股息加利息收入减去普通亏损,见随函附信第 1 项),无重大的长期资本利得或亏损,以及一笔约占您 1969 年 1 月 1 日未实现增值 8.5% 的短期资本亏损(第 3 项)。这些只是粗略估算,确切数字将于 2 月初送达各位。我们所持 371,400 股蓝筹印花公司股票的出售未在 1969 年内完成。该股票进入注册流程时,市价约为每股 24 美元。承销商当时给出了一个他们期望发售我们股份(连同其他股份)的价格区间,并在很大程度上参照了与斯佩里-哈钦森公司的对比。就在股票即将发售前夕,道琼斯工业指数已大幅下跌,但斯佩里-哈钦森公司的股价却几乎未变,此时承销商给出的价格低于他们此前给出的区间。我们勉强同意,并以为已经达成了交易,但在下一个工作日,他们又表示我们已商定的价格不可行。我们于是退出,随后只完成了一笔规模小得多的发行。我打算将我们这批蓝筹印花股票继续保留在 BPL,以待更有利的处置时机,或最终分配给各位合伙人。即便这需要一两年时间,我们以此方式获得更好结果的可能性也相当大——胜过在一个有些不景气的市场里参与一场规模非常大的抛售。除非未来几天市场发生重大变化,否则我计划在年末对所持蓝筹印花股票进行估值时,采用该股票在公开发行中,卖出股东在扣除承销折扣和费用后实际收到的价格。

Our plans regarding the initial cash distribution have been finalized and we expect to mail to you on January 3rd a check dated January 5th, 1970 for approximately 64% of your January 1st. 1969 capital, less any distributions made to you (including monthly payments) since January 1st. 1969. If you have taken no monthly payments during 1969, there will be a small interest adjustment in your favor; if you have had loans from BPL, there will be an interest charge. I couldn't be more delighted about the action of the bond and stock markets from the standpoint of the timing of our liquidation. I believe practically all partners - whether they would have invested in bonds or stocks - will be far better off receiving the cash now than if we had liquidated at the end of last year. Those seeking income will receive about 40% more after tax on the same principal investment than they would have achieved only a year ago at what then seemed like generous yields. Our tax picture is virtually complete and it appears that you will have ordinary income (dividends plus interest income less ordinary loss) for Federal tax purposes of about 3 –3/4% of your January 1st. 1969 capital (item 1 in enclosed letter), no significant long-term capital gain or loss, and a short-term capital loss of about 8-1/2% of your January 1st, 1969 unrealized appreciation (item 3). These estimates are just rough approximations definitive figures will reach you in early February. The sale of our 371,400 shares of Blue Chip Stamps was not completed in 1969. When the stock went into registration, it was selling at about $24 per share. The underwriters indicated a range where they expected to offer our shares (along with others) with heavy weight placed on a comparison with Sperry & Hutchinson. Shortly before the stock was to be offered, with the Dow-Jones Industrials much lower but S & H virtually unchanged, they indicated a price below their former range. We reluctantly agreed and felt we had a deal but, on the next business day, they stated that our agreed price was not feasible. We then withdrew and a much smaller offering was done. I intend to hold our block of Blue Chip Stamps in BPL for a more advantageous disposal or eventual distribution to our partners. The odds are decent that we will do better in this manner -even if it takes a year or two - than if we had participated in a very large sale into a somewhat distressed market. Unless there is a material change in the market in the next few days, I plan to value our Blue Chip holdings at yearend at the price received by selling shareholders on the public offering after underwriting discount and expenses.

针对上一封信,有人提了不少问题:

Various questions have been asked pursuant to the last letter:

1. 如果我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的纺织业务上无法获得良好回报,为什么还要继续经营它?

这基本上就是我信中所述的那些理由。我不想清算一家雇佣了 1100 名员工的企业,尤其是当管理层一直在努力改善其相对行业地位并已取得合理成效,而且该业务不需要大量额外资本投入的情况下。我绝无意愿为了每年多赚区区几个百分点的回报,而去造成严重的人员动荡。显然,如果我们面临实质性的强制性追加投资或持续的经营亏损,那决策可能就不得不有所改变,但我并不认为会出现这样的局面。

1. If we are not getting a good return on the textile business of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., why do we continue to operate it? Pretty much for the reasons outlined in my letter. I don't want to liquidate a business employing 1100 people when the Management has worked hard to improve their relative industry position, with reasonable results, and as long as the business does not require substantial additional capital investment. I have no desire to trade severe human dislocations for a few percentage points additional return per annum. Obviously, if we faced material compulsory additional investment or sustained operating losses, the decision might have to be different, but I don't anticipate such alternatives.

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2. 我们在《太阳报》等项目上的投资规模有多大,我们是否打算在报纸、广播和电视行业扩张?

我们在《太阳报》、布莱克印刷公司和盖特威承保公司的投资总额,摊到伯克希尔·哈撒韦每股略高于 1 美元,带来的每股收益略低于 10 美分。我们没有在传媒领域扩张的具体计划。

3. 盖特威承保公司是做什么的?

盖特威承保公司主要在密苏里州担任国民赔偿公司的总代理。

4. 那三家优秀运营企业的负责人手下,是否有得力的“二把手”可以接班?

在任何一家由创始人兼企业主要驱动力仍活跃在一线的公司,评估其“二把手”都极为困难。判断一个人管理公司会做得如何,唯一真正可靠的办法就是让他去管理。我们旗下有些企业,确实比典型的公司更像是“独角戏”。在上述需注意的前提下,我认为我们确实有一些不错的“二把手”正在成长起来。

5. 你计划将多元化零售公司的现金投资到哪些领域,是否打算主要聚焦于零售业?

虽然我们更倾向于零售领域,但我们不会排除任何合理的投资机会。两年来,我们一直在为多元化零售公司寻找明智的收购标的但未能如愿,所以只要业务看起来不错,我们不会将任何行业拒之门外。在找到一家或多家运营企业进行收购之前,这些资金将投资于有价证券。

6. 为什么多元化零售公司不把出售霍克希尔德-科恩公司所得的资金分派出去?

除了这样一笔分派会构成股息、其中很大一部分要按普通收入纳税外,债券契约中还有限制条款,规定除非将公司控制权拱手交给债券持有人,否则禁止进行这样的分派。

7. 分配多元化零售公司的股票,会触发其债券被赎回吗?

股票分配后,我将是多元化零售公司的最大股东,因此赎回条款将不适用。

8. 如果多元化零售公司的债券被赎回,我们怎么才能知道?

所有股东和债券持有人都将通过公司向证券持有人发布的定期或专项报告,直接从公司处获知。公司目前完全没有赎回债券的打算。

9. 你为什么不将我们的伯克希尔·哈撒韦和多元化零售公司股票进行注册,这样合伙人拿到股票后就可以自由交易了?

我们考虑过这种可能性,但出于实际和法律两方面的考量都否决了。我这里只谈实际的一面,因为单就这一面就足以决定我们所作的选择。

2. How large is our investment in Sun Newspapers, etc., and do we intend to expand in the newspaper, radio and TV business? The combined investment in Sun, Blacker Printing and Gateway Underwriters is a little over $1 per share of Berkshire Hathaway, and earns something less than 10 cent per share. We have no particular plans to expand in the communication field. 3. What does Gateway Underwriters do? Gateway Underwriters serves primarily as a General Agent for National Indemnity Company in the State of Missouri. 4. Are there good "second men" to take over from the men running the three excellent operating businesses? In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it is very difficult to evaluate "second men". The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let him run it. Some of our businesses have certainly been more "one-man shows" than the typical corporation. Subject to the foregoing caveat, I think that we do have some good “second men” coming along. 5. In what area do you plan to invest the cash in Diversified Retailing Company and do you intend to stick primarily to the retailing field? While we prefer the retailing field, we do not preclude anything that will make sense. We have been looking without success for two years for an intelligent acquisition for DRC, so we are not about to rule out any industry, if the business looks good. Pending such time as we find one or more operating businesses to buy, the money will be invested in marketable securities. 6. Why didn't DRC payout the money it received on the sale of Hochschild, Kohn & Company? In addition to the fact that such a payment would constitute a dividend, taxable in significant part as ordinary income, there are restrictions in the bond indenture which prevent such a pay-out without turning over control of the company to the bondholders. 7. Will distribution of the DRC stock cause the DRC debentures to be called? After distribution of the stock, I will be the largest stockholder in DRC and, hence, the call provision will not apply. 8. How would we know if the DRC debentures were called? All stockholders and debenture holders would find out directly from the company through regular or special reports that the company issues to its security holders. There is no intention at all of calling the debentures. 9. Why did you not register our Berkshire Hathaway and Diversified Retailing shares so that the stock, when received by the partners, would be freely marketable? We considered this possibility but rejected it for both practical and legal considerations. I will just discuss the practicalities, since they would independently dictate the decision we made.

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目前,多元化零售公司的股票根本没有现成的市场,而我们持有的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票,规模大概是这只股票当前流通量的四到五倍。哪怕只是试图快速买入或卖出几千股,都足以轻易地将伯克希尔的股价推动几个点甚至更多。我们拥有 691,441 股。如果我们不经过承销,而是通过注册直接把这些股票分给你们,届时可能会有很大一部分股票被许多各自行动但几乎同时卖出的卖家抛售,那么很有可能——尤其是在我们近来所见的这种股市环境下——这两只股票的市场将几近混乱。在我看来,这绝非我应该留给你们的局面,无论从可能出现的价格水平来看,还是考虑到不同合伙人可能不得不在差异极大的价位上变现这一点。经验更丰富的合伙人可能会比不太老练的合伙人占据显著优势,而且我相信,许多合伙人或许根本没机会卖到我为年末估值所预估的那个价格。这对你们来说显然极不公平,因为我还会根据这些年末估值,从中提取一部分 1969 年 BPL 的利润。如果市场变得低迷,我很有可能会招致批评,不论我是否以更低的价格亲自买入,或者,如果我不买,可能受到的指责还会更多。如果我们试图为那些希望卖出的合伙人发起一次与注册相关的承销,在我看来,结果仍很可能远不尽人意。我们刚刚在自己持有的蓝筹印花股票上经历了这个过程:在宣布了我们原计划参与的承销后,我们眼睁睁看着股价从 24 美元跌到了 16.5 美元。我不想让合伙人们在伯克希尔和多元化零售的持股上,也遭遇这样的结果。我相信,通过将出售限制在私募配售,那些想要卖出的合伙人将比在当前通过承销卖出,能为其股票实现更高的价格,并且经验丰富的合伙人相较于不太了解的合伙人并无营销优势。同时,这些股票也更有可能流入那些着眼于长期投资的持有人手中,这应该意味着未来市场的波动会更小。我们已经接到几位人士的电话,表示他们希望进行私募转让——我们预计,以与我们的年末估值相关的价格完成此类出售不会有困难。那些更倾向于承销分配的合伙人,总可以选择自行办理注册。我很乐意为此提供便利,帮所有向我表明想通过注册承销方式出售的合伙人彼此联系上,由他们自担费用,并自行选择承销商。这样一来,可能相当可观的承销费用,将由出售的合伙人承担,而不是由全体合伙人共同承担。也有合伙人问我,如果将来我以这种方式出售股票,他们能否参与未来的注册发行。我想我几乎肯定不会通过公开发售的方式卖股票,但万一真有这么一天,我很乐意让你们任何人参与我可能涉足的任何承销发行。而且,但凡真发生这种情况,很可能你们的股票届时已经“自由”了,而我的股票还会受到限制。至于我未来可能进行的任何私募出售,我无法对你们做出同样的承诺,就像我也不能指望你们为了把我算上,而去限制你们可能拥有的任何出售选择。10. 如果你出售你持有的伯克希尔或多元化零售公司股票,会告诉我们吗?如果我处置了我的持股,你们无疑会通过公司通讯、媒体报导和向政府机构提交的报告得知。在可预见的未来,我完全没有此意——我只是不作出不卖的承诺。然而,在获取与伯克希尔和多元化零售公司企业活动相关的信息方面,前 BPL 合伙人并不比其他股票或债券持有人享有任何优先权。11. 我该不该继续持有伯克希尔或多元化零售的股票呢?

There is presently no existing market for Diversified Retailing, and our holdings of Berkshire Hathaway are probably four or five times the present floating supply of this stock. An attempt to quickly buy or sell a few thousand shares can easily move BH stock several points or more. We own 691,441 shares. Were we to distribute these stocks to you via a registration without an underwriting, and with the possibility that a substantial portion would be offered for sale by many sellers operating individually but virtually simultaneously, there is a real likelihood, particularly in a stock market environment such as we have seen recently, that the market for these two stocks would be little short of chaotic. It has not seemed to me that this was the kind of situation with which I should leave you, both from the standpoint of the price level which might prevail, as well as for the reason that different partners might well have to liquidate at widely varying price levels. The more sophisticated partners might have an important edge on the less sophisticated ones, and I believe many partner’s might have no chance to realize the prices I anticipate using for yearend valuation. This would rightly seem most unfair to you, since I would have received some allocation of 1969 BPL profits based upon these yearend valuations. If the markets were to become distressed, I would probably come in for criticism, whether I personally bought at lower prices or, perhaps more so, if I refrained from buying. Were we to attempt to sponsor an underwriting in connection with a registration for those partners who might wish to sell, there would be, in my opinion, the likelihood that the result would still be far less than satisfactory. We have just been around this track with our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps, where we watched the price of our stock go from 24 to 16-1/2 after announcement of the underwriting, of which we originally were to be a part. I did not want this sort of result for the partners with respect to their holdings of Berkshire and Diversified. It is my belief that, by confining sales to private placements, those partners who wish to sell will realize more for their stock (with the sophisticated partners having no marketing edge on the less knowledgeable) than would be achieved, through an underwriting at this time. Also, the stock should be more likely to find its way into the hands of long-term investment-minded holders, which should mean less volatile markets in the future. We have had several phone calls from persons indicating that they wish to make private sales we anticipate there will be no difficulty in effectuating such sales at prices related to our yearend valuations. Those partners who would prefer an underwritten distribution always have the option of having a registration of their own. I will be glad to facilitate this by placing all partners in touch with each other who indicate to me their desire to sell via a registered underwriting, at their expense and through an underwriter of their choice. In this way the expense of an underwriting, which can be considerable, would be borne by the selling partners and not by the partners as a whole. I have also had partners ask if they could participate in a registered offering in the future if I should sell shares in this manner. I think it is almost certain I will never sell stock via public offering but, should it ever happen, I will be glad to let any of you participate in any underwritten offering in which I might be involved. In all probability, if it ever did happen, your stock would already be “free”, although mine would still be restricted. I cannot make the same commitment to you regarding any private sale I might make in the future, just as I can't expect you to restrict any sale options you might have in order to include me. 10. Will you let us know if you sell your holdings of BH or DRC? You would undoubtedly know from corporate communications, reports in the press and reports to Government agencies if I disposed of my holdings. I have no intention at all of doing so in the foreseeable future - I merely make no commitment not to. However, former BPL partners will have no priority over other BH or DRC security holders in obtaining information relating to their corporate activities. 11. Should I hold my BH or DRC stock?

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这个问题我没法替你回答。我只能说:我自己会继续持有,还打算加仓。把净资产中相当大的一块长期投在这几家公司上,我很乐意。我认为,五年、十年之后,它们显然会比现在值钱得多。跟大多数股票比,我认为它们亏损的风险偏低。我希望它们的价格走势能贴着企业的经营成果,维持一个相对温和的区间,而不是跟着投机的狂热或沮丧大起大落。后一种波动我当然左右不了,但我绝无意像近年金融市场上许多惹人生厌的做法那样去“炒作”这些股票。

12. 我能把 BH 或 DRC 的股票送给妻子或子女吗?

律师告诉我们,这样做是允许的,当然,原本约束你的那些转让限制,同样会落到受赠人头上。

13. 关于债券的建议,你为什么要拖到三月才给我们?一月和二月注定会非常忙碌。许多合伙人可能想找我聊一聊各自在债券上的疑问和打算。我希望先把 BPL 所有要紧的事处理完,再逐一和他们谈。我对债券市场(或股票市场)不做任何预测——到三月,行情可能比现在高,也可能更低。我十月那封信之后,有好几位合伙人急着想立刻买入债券;到目前来看,等着没动的人处境要好得多。我当时谈到的那批收益率 6.5% 的优质免税债券,现在买进已经能拿到约 7% 的收益率了。

顺致问候

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WEB/glk

I can’t give you the answer on this one. All I can say is that I’m going to do so and I plan to buy more. I am very happy to have a material portion of my net worth invested in these companies on a long term basis. Obviously, I think they will be worth significantly more money five or ten years hence. Compared to most stocks, I think there is a low risk of loss. I hope their price patterns follow a rather moderate range related to business results rather than behaving in a volatile manner related to speculative enthusiasm or depression. Obviously, I cannot control the latter phenomena, but there is no intent to "promote" the stocks a la much of the distasteful general financial market activity of recent years. 12. Can I give either BH or DRC shares to my wife or children? We are advised by counsel that this is permissible but, of course the same restrictions on transfer that applied to you would apply to the donee of the gift. 13. Why are you waiting until March to give us your suggestions regarding bonds? January and February promise to be very busy months. Many partners may want to talk to me about their questions and objectives regarding bonds. I want to have all important BPL matters out of the way before I talk with any of them on an individual basis. I make no forecasts regarding the bond market (or stock market) - it may be higher or lower in March than now. After my October letter, several partners became very eager to buy bonds immediately - to date they are much better off by waiting. The excellent quality taxfree bonds I talked about at that time with yields of 6 -1/2% can now be bought to yield about 7%. Cordially, Warren E. Buffett WEB/glk

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