2009 年 3 月 CNBC Becky Quick 访谈

2009-03-09 · 金融危机、市场恐慌与美国经济 · 原文约 27018 词
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以下是 2009 年 3 月 9 日沃伦·巴菲特与贝基·奎克在 CNBC 的讨论记录。

This is a transcript of Warren Buffett’s discussion on CNBC on March 9, 2009, with Becky Quick.

贝基·奎克大家早上好,欢迎收看 CNBC 的《Squawk Box》。我是贝基·奎克,和乔·科南一起主持。卡尔今天休息,但乔,今天早上我们有一位非常特别的嘉宾。我们说的正是沃伦·巴菲特本人。他就在我们这里,接下来的三个小时都会和我们在一起。能和他共度这段时间,我们非常兴奋。我们现在在内布拉斯加家具城。沃伦,很高兴你能来。非常感谢你今天早上加入我们。

BECKY QUICKGood morning, everybody, and welcome to SQUAWK BOX right here on CNBC. I’m Becky Quick along with Joe Kernen. Carl’s off today, but Joe, we have a very special guest with us this morning. We are talking about Warren Buffett. He’s here with us, and he is here with us for the next three hours. We are very excited to be spending this time. We are here at the Nebraska Furniture Mart. And, Warren, it’s great to have you here. Thank you very much for joining us this morning.

沃伦·巴菲特我享受其中的一切,除了那个时间点。

WARREN BUFFETTI enjoy everything about it except the hour.

贝基“除了时间太早”——我们确实很感激您这么早起床。得提一下,现在奥马哈是凌晨 5 点,您能来真是相当拼了。

BECKY“Except the hour,” and we do appreciate your getting up extra early. We should point out it’s 5 AM here in Omaha, so you are quite the trooper for coming out.

巴菲特谢谢。

BUFFETTThanks.

贝基我知道接下来三个小时要和您共度,在大多数情况下,我可能会觉得三个小时非常漫长,但我必须告诉您,考虑到眼下经济的状况,三个小时可能还不够。所以,再次感谢您今天抽时间跟我们在一起。

BECKYI know we’ve got the next three hours to spend with you, and, in most instances, I might think, three hours is an incredibly long time, but I have to tell you, given everything with the state of the economy right now, three hours may not be enough time. So, again, we appreciate your time with us today.

巴菲特谢谢。嗯。

BUFFETTThanks. Mm-hmm.

贝基·奎克沃伦,我们何不直接就从经济话题开始?因为这是眼下大家最关心的问题。经济到底怎么样了?我们不断听到人们表达非常担忧,而且,坦白说,对正在发生的事感到相当恐惧。

BECKYWarren, why don’t we start off talking right away about the economy? Because that’s what people are wondering right now. What’s happening with the economy? We hear all the time from people who are very concerned and, frankly, quite frightened about what’s happening right now.

巴菲特对。嗯,我们九月份谈的时候。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, when we talked in September.

乔·科南沃伦,等一下。

JOE KERNENWarren, hold on.

巴菲特什么事?

BUFFETTYeah?

乔·科南抱歉打断一下。沃伦,默克和先灵葆雅正在合并。

JOEI’m sorry to break in. Merck and Schering-Plough are merging, Warren.

贝基嚯。

BECKYWhoa.

巴菲特嗯。

BUFFETTHm.

贝基好。

BECKYAll right.

JOEI’m sorry.

JOEI’m sorry.

贝基默克与先灵葆雅合并。沃伦,我们本来以为今天早上跟你聊的话题已经够多了,不过要不先说说这则新闻?

BECKYMerck and Schering-Plough merging. We thought we already had enough to talk about with you this morning, Warren, but why don’t we start off with some news?

乔·科南我绝不敢像那样插话打断“奥马哈先知”的发言;不过,抱歉,董事会一致批准了一项最终合并协议,两家公司将合并,以默克为名,交易方式为股票加现金。先灵葆雅股东每股将获得 0.5767 股默克股票外加 10.50 美元现金。每一股默克股票显然都将变成合并后公司的一股。理查德·克拉克,默克公司的董事长、总裁兼首席执行官,将领导合并后的公司。这——这真是个重磅炸弹,而且发生在周一早上 6 点。我想你不得不承认,沃伦,就动物精神而言,这或许——你知道,这或许解决不了——解决不了我们所有的问题,但它无疑是对美国商业的一种认可——并购活动依然生机勃勃。

JOEI would never presume to jump in like that on the Oracle; but, I’m sorry, board of directors unanimously approving a definitive merger under which the companies will combine under the name Merck in a stock and cash transaction. Schering-Plough shareholders will receive .5767 shares of Merck and $10.50 in cash for each share of Schering-Plough. Each Merck share will obviously be a-become a share of the combined company. Richard Clark, the chairman, president and CEO of Merck will lead the combined company. This is-this is a real blockbuster and right at 6 AM on a Monday. And I think you’d have to say, Warren, as far as animal spirits, this could be-you know, this may not-this may not solve all of our problems, but it certainly is an endorsement of American business and-in that M&A is alive and well.

巴菲特是的。动物精神一直都在。唯一的问题是,谁有资金去执行那些动物精神催生的想法?不过,特别是在医药行业,他们的资产负债表普遍不错,可以做交易。

BUFFETTYeah. Animals spirits are always there. The only question is who has the funds to kind of carry out the ideas that the animal spirits come up with? But, particularly in pharma, they have good balance sheets, generally, and they can make deals.

乔·科南我……

JOEI…

贝基·奎克不过,看到眼下冒出这么大一桩交易,您意外吗?

BECKYAre you surprised to see a deal of this size right now, though?

巴菲特嗯,就算到了现在,这么大一笔交易还是让我吃惊,这没错。在大多数行业里,和公司谈交易都非常难。

BUFFETTWell, I’m surprised at any deal this size even now, sure. That’s true. It’s very hard to make deals for companies in most industries.

乔·科南各位……

JOEGuys…

贝基乔?

BECKYJoe?

乔·科南是的。先灵葆雅收盘价为 17.63 美元,按当前价值计算,这笔交易中先灵葆雅部分的股价为 23.61 美元,交易总金额达到 411 亿美元。我想你还得提一下整个万络(Vioxx)争议。现在这个事可以翻篇了,默克觉得足够安心,愿意出价 410 亿美元收购先灵葆雅,不过……

JOEYeah. Schering-Plough closed at $17.63, and, at current values, this is $23.61 for Schering-Plough for a total of $41.1 billion for this deal. I guess you’d also have to say that the whole Vioxx controversy. We can lay that to rest now for the them to be feeling comfortable enough to acquire Schering-Plough for $41 billion, but…

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYep.

乔·科南……这是一段非常、非常愉快的旅程。沃伦,你到处都有投资——你持有外国制药公司的股票,也持有一些国内公司的股份。这一直是你最喜欢的领域之一。

JOE…this is a pleasant, pleasant ride. And, Warren, you own-you’re all over the place with-you own foreign drug companies, you own stakes in-stakes in foreign drug companies and in some domestic companies as well. It’s always been one of your favorites.

巴菲特不过我们一股先灵都没买,这就是为什么你看到我泪流满面。

BUFFETTBut we don’t own any Schering, that’s why you see these tears coming down my face.

贝基那默克呢?你们有没有持有默克的股票?

BECKYWhat about Merck? Do you own any Merck either?

巴菲特没有,一股默克也没有。

BUFFETTNo, not any Merck.

贝基·奎克你个人账户里也没有吗?

BECKYNot in your private account either?

巴菲特没有。

BUFFETTNo.

贝基好的。问题是……

BECKYOK. What is…

乔·科南你最大的持仓是什么?我知道你持有一些外国制药公司的股份——沃伦,是哪几家?

JOEWhat’s your biggest holding? You do have some-I know you-what are your foreign drug company that you have stakes in, Warren?

巴菲特赛诺菲,最大的一家是赛诺菲-安万特,我们在国内还有强生。

BUFFETTSanofi and the biggest one is Sanofi-Aventis, and we have J&J domestically.

乔·科南对。好的。开始吧,贝克。

JOERight. OK. All right, Beck.

贝基好。沃伦,我们接下来再多聊聊这桩并购案,以及它意味着什么。我是说,你觉得这会引发其他公司也跟进做类似交易吗?

BECKYOK. So, Warren, we’re going to talk more about this merger and what this means. I mean, do you expect to see other deals that would come as a result of this?

巴菲特这个嘛,每笔交易确实都会催生另一笔交易。

BUFFETTWell, every deal does tend to brew another deal, I mean.

贝基嗯。

BECKYHm.

巴菲特特别是在业内人士之间。你知道,如果可口可乐收购了什么,百事可乐就会朝同一个方向琢磨点事。

BUFFETTParticularly with people in the industry. If, you know, if Coca-Cola buys something, Pepsi thinks about something in the same arena.

贝基嗯。

BECKYHm.

巴菲特我参加过的董事会足够多了,听过这种话。每个 CEO 都有点那种心态,你知道,“别的孩子都这么干嘛”。

BUFFETTI’ve been in enough board meetings to hear that. There’s a-there’s a lot of-every CEO has, you know, has a little bit of that all the other kids are doing it,’ you know.

贝基没错。这个话题我们还会深入聊,但先回到经济现状吧……

BECKYRight. We’ll talk a lot more about this, but let’s get back to the state of the economy…

巴菲特当然。

BUFFETTSure.

贝基……整体上也是如此。你现在看到了什么?上周你谈到经济已千疮百孔,而且这种状况会持续相当长一段时间,吓到了不少人。

BECKY…in general as well. What do you see right now? You spooked a lot of people last week when you talked about how the economy was in tatters and would be there for quite some time.

巴菲特是的。经济从我们九月份谈话起就——我们当时说那是经济上的珍珠港事件,金融世界发生的事情会很快传导到实体经济。结果它就像掉下悬崖一样,经济不只是大幅放缓,人们的行为改变之大,我这辈子都没见过。奢侈品之类的东西基本就停摆了,这就是为什么沃尔玛生意好,而那些——我就不点名哪些公司日子难过了。但人们心里已经重启了一次,我们从 GEICO 这样的生意就能看出来。年复一年,我们说投保 GEICO 能省一笔钱,年复一年,总有一些人会说,你知道,我有个哥们儿,叫“扶轮乔”,我一直在他那儿投保,就为省一百块,我干嘛要换?可现在呢,每周我们都看到电话越来越多、越来越多。我们的价差没扩大,广告也没大变,但美国老百姓的消费习惯确实变了。反过来,这种时候我们的珠宝店简直被锤惨了。高端受伤最重,次高端受伤第二重,最低端受伤最轻。

BUFFETTYeah. The economy, ever since we talked in September, we talked about it being an economic Pearl Harbor and how-what was happening in the financial world would move over to the real world very quickly. It’s fallen off a cliff, and not only has the economy slowed down a lot, people have really changed their behavior like nothing I’ve ever seen. Luxury goods and that sort of thing have just sort of stopped, and that’s why Walmart is doing well and you know, and I won’t name the ones that are doing poorly. But there’s been a reset in people’s minds, and we see that in something like Geico where year after year after year we say you can save some money insuring with Geico, and year after year there’s been a certain number of people who have said, You know, I’ve got this pal, Rotary Joe, and I’ve been insuring with him and for 100 bucks, why should I shift?’ Every week we’re just seeing it build and build. More and more people are calling. Our price differentials haven’t widened, our advertising isn’t that much different, but the American public really has changed their buying habits. On the reverse side, our jewelry stores just get killed in a period like this. And high end gets hurt the most, next down gets hurt the second most, and the lowest people get hurt the least.

贝基发生了什么?你——你知道——你不久前告诉我们,大约六个月前你说这是经济上的珍珠港事件,但这种情况的发展是比你预想的更快还是更严重?

BECKYWhat’s happening? What-you knew-you told us a while ago, you told us this was an economic Pearl Harbor about six months ago, but did this happen more quickly or more severely than even you expected?

巴菲特这确实接近最糟糕的情况了。我的意思是,你永远不知道会发生什么,但我本来没想过——我本来没想过还会有比已经发生的更糟的情况。不过,我得这么说,美联储在事情发生后的 9 月份采取了一些措施……

BUFFETTIt certainly happened clofse to the worst case. I mean, you never know what’s going to happen, but I would not have-I would not have thought there could’ve been a much worse case than what has happened. Although, I will say this, the Fed did some things in September when it happened…

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特……那些措施在维持金融体系运转中扮演了关键角色。我的意思是,如果他们没有为货币市场账户提供保险,实际上也就是为商业票据提供担保,那今天早上你和我只能到麦当劳见面了。

BUFFETT…that were vital in keeping the place going. I mean, when the-if they hadn’t have insured money market accounts and, in effect, commercial paper, you know, you and I would be meeting at McDonald’s this morning.

贝基而不是。

BECKYInstead.

巴菲特对。没错。

BUFFETTYeah. Right.

贝基那你觉得消费者为什么会变得这么害怕?

BECKYSo why do you think consumers have gotten as frightened as they have?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯……

BUFFETTWell…

贝基恐惧这个词不算太重。

BECKYThe fear doesn’t like too strong of a word.

巴菲特不。他们害怕,而恐惧极具传染性。

BUFFETTNo. They’re scared, and fear is very contagious.

贝基嗯。

BECKYHm.

巴菲特我从未见过消费者,或者说普通美国人,比现在更恐惧。他们也很困惑。人可以很快陷入恐惧,但不可能五分钟就恢复信心。你可以在五分钟内变得恐惧,但恢复信心需要时间。而经济复苏的速度,政府将起到巨大的作用。如果你既困惑又恐惧,只有不再困惑时,恐惧才会消失。我的意思是,政府必须非常、非常清晰地传达出将要采取的行动。我认为,我们得到的——这在一定程度上是政治过程的本质——但消息一直是模糊的,美国公众不知道——他们觉得自己不知道正在发生什么,那么他们的反应就是彻底退缩。

BUFFETTAnd I’ve never seen the consumer or the Americans just generally more fearful than this. And they’re also confused. And you can get fearful very quickly, but you don’t get confident, you know, in five minutes. You can get fearful in five minutes, but you won’t get confident for some time. And government is going to play an enormous factor in how fast it comes back. And if you’re confused and fearful, you don’t get over being fearful till you aren’t confused. I mean, the message has to be very, very clear as to what government will be doing. And I think we’ve had-and it’s the nature of the political process, somewhat, but we’ve had muddled messages, and the American public does not know what-they feel that they don’t know what’s going on and their reaction, then, is to absolutely pull back.

贝基·奎克所以现在有很多指责的手指指向了不同的方向。但你说华盛顿发出的信息是混乱的,还是……

BECKYSo there’ve been a lot of fingers of blame that have pointed in a lot of different directions. But you’re saying the message from Washington has been confused or…

巴菲特嗯,我觉得这是事物的本性。

BUFFETTWell, I think it’s the nature of things.

贝基没错。

BECKYRight.

巴菲特我的意思是,我觉得人们看着国会的 535 名议员,每个人都对每个参与者在做什么发表自己的看法,诸如此类的事。我觉得,你知道,政府换了届,人们面对的又是些他们不理解的东西。我是说,当你第一次提到“结构性投资工具”这种词,或者当你谈论信用违约互换,或者你提到——公众听到这些,他们就会觉得出问题了,可他们根本不理解。

BUFFETTI mean, I think people watch 535 members of Congress each give their view of what every player is doing and all of that sort of thing, and I think that, you know, you had a change of administrations and you’re dealing with things that people don’t understand. I mean, when you first brought up the term SIV or something like that or when you talk about credit default swaps or you talk about-it’s-when the public hears that, they just, they think something’s wrong and they don’t understand it.

贝基·奎克而且,这还是你想象过的最坏情况。到底哪里出了问题?我们为什么会落到这个最坏的局面里?

BECKYAnd still, this is the worst case scenario from what you had imagined. What went wrong? Why did we wind up in that worst case scenario?

巴菲特嗯,我们最初就搞错了,因为我们当时有个信念——而且所有人都信这个。我信,政府信,房贷机构信,借款人信,媒体信,所有人都认为房价只可能涨,至少不会大跌。一旦你们有了这个信念——而且还是全国性的——那你放贷时根本不在意房子本身,因为就算对方还不上钱,你也能卖掉房子赚一笔,至少不会亏多少。于是你们就有了 11 万亿美元住宅抵押贷款,全都建在这么一个理论上:谁借的钱、他们的收入如何,其实没那么重要,因为房子本身一定会涨。等到泡沫破裂,那些高峰期可能值 22 万亿美元的房子,跌了大概四五万亿,第一,这从人们的净资产里抹掉了巨大一笔钱。房子是多数人最大的资产。第二,所有建在这上面的金融工具——大家也不怎么懂——价值开始不同程度地坍塌,然后又把别的东西拖下水。我是说,这就像有个小孩说,“皇帝没穿衣服。”然后他接着又说,“而且皇帝连内裤都没穿。”你知道吧。我是说,一层一层的东西被剥开——它们还互相影响。人们一害怕,消费习惯就变。他们少买东西,企业就裁员。我们现在陷入了一个非常、非常恶性的负反馈循环。它会结束,不过,相信我,我可不想让这句话成为电影的最后一幕,或者我年报的最后一句——美国最好的日子还在前面。我们可以聊聊为什么这么想,但——这就是最终答案。

BUFFETTWell, we went wrong originally because we had a belief that-and everybody had the belief. I had it, the government had it, mortgage lenders had it, borrowers had it, media had it, everybody thought house prices could go nothing but up and-or at least they couldn’t go down a lot. And once you had that belief-and it was nationwide-it didn’t make any difference what you lent on the house because if the guy couldn’t pay, you’d sell it at a profit anyway or you wouldn’t lose much money. So you had 11 trillion of residential mortgage debt built on this theory that who was borrowing it, what their income was really wasn’t that important because the house itself had to go up in price. And when that tumbled and houses which might’ve been worth 22 trillion at the peak are worth maybe four or five trillion less, A, it’s a huge amount out of people’s net worth. It’s the biggest asset most people have. And then secondarily, all of these instruments that were built on it, which people didn’t understand too well, started toppling to various degrees in value and then that exposed other things. I mean, it was like, you know, some kid saying, The emperor has no clothes.’ And then after he says that, he said, On top of that, the emperor doesn’t have any underwear either.’ You know. I mean, various layers have been-and they interact. When people get scared, they change their buying habits. When they quit buying as much, people lay off. We are in a very, very vicious negative feedback cycle. It will end, but, believe me, I mean, I don’t want this to be the last line of the movie, the last line of my annual report that America’s best days lie ahead. And we can talk about why that is, but-and that is the final answer.

但我们到底能以多快速度走出困境,极大程度上不仅取决于政府政策的智慧,还取决于这些政策是否被恰当地传递到民众。珍珠港事件发生时,你必须知道全国在 12 月 8 日就会团结起来,应对即将到来的一切。我们平时会有小争吵,但那时把这些都搁到一边,每个人都投身国防计划:开始造飞机、造军舰,即使这些不是明天就能准备好,人们也会加入。陆军不会因为珍珠港里停的军舰太多、事情本不该发生就去指责海军。陆军也不会说:“这是你的错,所以我们不派兵了。”没有这种事。我们团结了起来,而我们现在确实需要这种团结。

But how fast we get there depends enormously on not only the wisdom of government policy, but the degree in which it’s communicated properly. People-when you have a Pearl Harbor, you have to know the nation is going to be united on December 8th to take care of whatever comes up. And we have little squabbles, otherwise we put them aside and everybody goes to work on defense plans, we start building planes, we start building ships, even though they’re not going to be ready tomorrow, people join. The Army doesn’t blame the Navy because there were too many ships in Pearl Harbor, and it shouldn’t have happened. The Army doesn’t say, Well, it was your fault, so we’re not going to send our troops.’ None of that sort of thing. We got united, and we really need that now.

贝基·奎克你觉得目前还没到这个程度吗?现在还没有形成足够的统一战线?

BECKYDo you think that there has not been that to that extent? There’s not enough of the united front right now?

巴菲特是的,我认为——我能理解为什么,因为从经济角度看——珍珠港事件本身,你很清楚发生了什么,我们损失了相当一部分舰队等等,人们大致知道需要做什么,他们也清楚要向谁回应——一位无可争议的三军统帅。所以,12 月 8 日不会开国会听证会,你知道的,那种一开好几周、让所有指挥官和各方人士以各种方式被嘲弄、被奚落,被质问‘你们到底怎么会让这种事发生?’共和党人也没说,‘你们民主党从 1933 年就当权,全是你们的错。’完全没有。我的意思是,人们说,‘我们得干成点事。’他们信任领导层去做,基本放下了党派之争,然后我们就——顺便说一句,每个人都觉得我们会打赢战争,尽管在头六个月,我们——科雷吉多尔岛陷落了,巴丹死亡行军发生了,各种——传来了极其、极其糟糕的消息,但我们知道,只要团结一致,听从领导,我们就会——我们就会获胜。

BUFFETTYeah, I think-and I can understand why because, economically-Pearl Harbor itself, you knew exactly what had happened and we wiped out a good bit of the fleet and all of that and people knew in a general way what had to be done and they knew who they had to respond to a leader who was unquestionably the commander and chief. And so you didn’t have-start congressional hearings on December 8th, you know, that were going to last for weeks while all of the commanders and the various people were in various ways pilloried or taunted or whatever about Why in the world did they let this happen?’ and the Republicans didn’t say, You Democrats have been in since 1933, and it’s all your fault.’ None of that. I mean, people said, We’ve got to get something done.’ And they-and they trusted their leadership to do it and put aside mostly the partisan stuff and the-and we went-and everybody, incidentally, felt we’d win the war, even though we, you know, for the first six months, we were-Corregidor fell and we had the death march of Bataan, all kinds of-there was terrible, terrible news, but we knew that if we stuck together and we followed leadership, we would-we would prevail.

贝基·奎克今天上午我们会有更多时间来讨论解决方案,但就经济而言,您认为它接下来会走向何方?最好情形和最坏情形分别是什么?

BECKYWe’re going to have a lot more time to talk about solutions this morning, but in terms of the economy, where do you think it goes from here? What’s the best case scenario and the worst case scenario?

巴菲特嗯,这事不可能一夜之间就扭转过来。没那么快。我是说,很多事情都是这样运转的。上个月又有 60 万人失业,这不仅影响到那 60 万人——对他们来说影响非常惨重——而且还会影响到其他所有人。大家都开始害怕失去工作。这个国家里害怕失业的人比例,远远高于实际会失业的人数,但他们的行为方式已经彻底变了。我是说,他们不会——就算去好市多或沃尔玛,珠宝区销量大跌,但其他区销量反而上升。人们开始存钱了。我们年年让他们存钱,现在他们真存了,结果就是双重打击。我们这台全世界前所未有的经济大机器,之前只是有点运转不顺,我们说:“嗯,也许该让它慢下来看看情况。”结果它更不顺了。而我们可能没意识到的一点是,这里存在互动效应——机器运转得越慢,它就越不顺。所以现在要让它重新跑起来是个大工程,而且不可能很快见效,贝基,我是说——实际的经济好转之后,失业率的改善还会滞后。

BUFFETTWell, it can’t turn around on a dime. That doesn’t happen. I mean, it-a lot of stuff works this way. When 600,000 more people become unemployed last month, that not only affects those 600,000, it affects them terribly, but it affects everybody else. They get scared about losing their jobs. The percentage of people are scared about losing their jobs in this country is way higher than the actual numbers that are going to lose them, but they’re behaving in an entirely different manner. I mean, they are not-they are not going to go into a-even at Costco or Walmart, their jewelry departments are way down, but other departments are up. People, they started saving money. For years we told them to save money, and now they’re saving money, and that’s a double whammy. So we’ve had this great economic machine like nothing the world’s ever seen, and it started sputtering a little, and we said, Well, maybe we should kind of slow it down and see what happens.’ And it sputters more. And what we may not realize is that there’s interaction, that the slower you run the machine at, the more it sputters. So it’s a job to get it working again, and it won’t happen fast, Becky, I mean-and unemployment will lag at the end, the actual turn around.

贝基·奎克我们已经谈到失业率达到 8%。你认为它会往哪个方向走?

BECKYWe’re already talking about unemployment at 8 percent. Where do you see it headed?

巴菲特我说不出一个具体数字,因为坦白讲,这在某种程度上取决于政府政策的明智程度。情况会变得更糟,可能还会糟糕相当多。但另一方面,五年后我可以向你保证,这台机器会运转良好,但我希望比五年更快达到那个状态。我们能做到。

BUFFETTI can’t name a number because, frankly, it depends to an extent on the wisdom of government policies. It’s going to go higher. It’s probably going to go a fair amount higher, but on the other hand, five years from now I can guarantee you that the machine will be running fine, but I’d like to get there a lot faster than five years. And we can.

贝基·奎克乔,你也要插进来问吗?

BECKYAnd, Joe, did you want to jump in here, too?

乔·科南我想——您刚才说了一句很有意思的话,巴菲特先生,那就是“取决于我们的政策是否明智”。我明白,在战争时期,每个人都会团结在统帅身后。但很显然,对于今后我们的政策应该怎样才算明智,各方存在分歧。现在,所谓的“忠诚反对派”会支持总统,但您肯定也能看到,如果我们——如果有人认为,因为这场危机,一些错误的政策正在被仓促地写入法律,那么,我是说,忠诚反对派有责任说出他们的看法,对吧?

JOEI want to-you just said something interesting, Mr. Buffett, and that is it depends on the wisdom of our policies. And I understand, you know, in a time of war everyone rallying behind the commander and chief. But, obviously, there are differences on what the wisdom of our polices should be from here on out. Now, the “loyal opposition” is going to be about, as it’s called, will be behind the president, but certainly you could see that if we-if people think there’s some wrong-minded policies that are being rushed into law at this point because of the crisis, I mean, that’s-it’s the loyal opposition’s duty to say what they feel, right?

巴菲特对。还有,乔,如果你身处一场战争,而我们确实处于一场经济战争中,那么多数派有义务以不激化少数派的方式行事。如果在 12 月 8 日——也许是 12 月 7 日——罗斯福召集国会就战争投票时,他没有说“我顺便塞进 10 个我喜欢的小项目”,1941 年也没有国会议员在战争宣言上附加 8000 项专项拨款。

BUFFETTRight. And, Joe, it-if you’re in a war, and we really are on an economic war, there’s a obligation to the majority to behave in ways that don’t go around inflaming the minority. If on December 8th when-maybe it’s December 7th, when Roosevelt convened Congress to have a vote on the war, he didn’t say, I’m throwing in about 10 of my pet projects,’ and you didn’t have congress people putting on 8,000 earmarks onto the declaration of war in 1941.

巴菲特所以我认为——我认为少数方确实有义务支持那些总体上显然是为大规模战争而设计的事务。我不认为应该在 D-Day 之前——比如 6 月 5 日或 6 月 1 日——召开国会听证会,让 535 个人就部队该在哪里登陆、天气该怎样、该部署多少兵力等等发表意见。我也不觉得在 6 月 6 日之后,还应该再开一场听证会,说‘哎呀,要是我们往北一英里登陆就好了’。

BUFFETTSo I think-I think that the minority has-they really do have an obligation to support things that in general are clearly designed to fight the war in a big way. And I don’t think you should-I don’t think before D-Day on June-on June 5th you ought to have-or June 1st, maybe, have a congressional hearing and have 535 people give their opinion about where the troops should land and, you know, what the weather should be and how many troops should land and all of that. And I think after June 6th you don’t-you don’t have another hearing that says, Gee, if we’d just landed a mile north.’

乔·科南对,但你也许——也许没有解决……

JOEYeah, but you might-might not have fixed…

巴菲特但我要说的是……

BUFFETTBut I say…

乔·科南沃伦,你也许——你也许没在诺曼底登陆的第二天就把全球变暖给解决了。

JOEYou might not-you might not have fixed global warming the day after-the day after D-Day, Warren.

巴菲特绝对。而且我认为——我认为共和党人有义务把这件事看作一场经济战争,并且意识到你需要一位领导者,总体上要支持他。但是我认为——我认为民主党人——我投票给了奥巴马,并且强烈支持他,我觉着他就是那个正确的人选——但我觉得他们不应该利用这个——当他们在如此重要的问题上呼吁团结时,不应该用它来彻底整垮共和党人。

BUFFETTAbsolutely. And I think that the-I think that the Republicans have an obligation to regard this as an economic war and to realize you need one leader and, in general, support of that. But I think that the-I think that the Democrats-and I voted for Obama and I strongly support him, and I think he’s the right guy-but I think they should not use this-when they’re calling for unity on a question this important, they should not use it to roll the Republicans all.

乔·科南嗯。

JOEHm.

巴菲特我认为——我认为眼下有很多事要做,第一要务是打赢这场仗,这场经济仗;第二要务是打赢这场经济仗;第三要务还是打赢这场经济仗。如果你硬要把一大堆东西塞进别人喉咙里,就别指望大家会团结在你身后。所以我绝对要说——在眼下这段时间,在我们把这个难题解决之前,我不会去推动那些——你知道的——有争议的事情。同时我也不会做任何指责。我不会说——你知道的,我不会说“前任政府把我们拖进了这摊浑水”。别想了。我的意思是,珍珠港事件里海军犯了错,在那儿停的船太多了。但你能想象事后我们花时间去指责海军吗?我们需要海军。所以我不会——我不会——不会指责,不会报复,那些统统不要。只往前看。

BUFFETTI think-I think a lot of things should be-job one is to win the war, job-the economic war, job two is to win the economic war, and job three. And you can’t expect people to unite behind you if you’re trying to jam a whole bunch of things down their throat. So I would-I would absolutely say for the-for the interim, till we get this one solved, I would not be pushing a lot of things that are-you know are contentious, and I also-I also would do no finger-pointing whatsoever. I would-you know, I would not say, you know, George’-the previous administration got us into this.’ Forget it. I mean, you know, the Navy made a mistake at Pearl Harbor and had too many ships there. But the idea that we’d spend our time after that, you know, pointing fingers at the Navy, we needed the Navy. So I would-I would-I would-no finger-pointing, no vengeance, none of that stuff. Just look forward.

贝基·奎克我们回到沃伦·巴菲特这里。观众发来的邮件非常多,已经成千上万了,我们马上就来处理。不过沃伦,你有一件事想澄清一下?

QUICKWe are back with Warren Buffett. We’ve got a lot of viewer e-mails that have been coming in. We’ve got thousands of them, so we’re going to get to those right away. But, Warren, you had one thing you wanted to clarify?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我本来想对乔说,你最近听到一些民主党人说过这句话——“危机是经不起浪费的。”

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I was going to mention to Joe that you’ve heard this comment recently from some Democrats recently that a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.’

贝基·奎克对。

QUICKYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:现在,换一个说法来看——在我看来,这是一场经济战争。我不认为在 12 月 7 日那天,会有谁说“战争是经不起浪费的,所以我们要趁机强推一大堆东西,但还指望对方在大问题上和我们团结一致”。我觉得,当你有一个压倒一切的目标时,却试图拿一堆别的事情把它搅浑,这就是个错误。

Mr. BUFFETT: Now, just rephrase that and since it’s, in my view, it’s an economic war, and-I don’t think anybody on December 7th would have said a war is a terrible thing to waste, and therefore we’re going to try and ram through a whole bunch of things and-but we expect to-expect the other party to unite behind us on the-on the big problem.’ It’s just a mistake, I think, when you’ve got one overriding objective, to try and muddle it up with a bunch of other things.

贝基·奎克好,所以你的意思就是……

QUICKOK, so that’s your point…

乔·科南很好。

KERNENGreat.

贝基·奎克……就是在这件事上,两党的人都应该回来,并且……

QUICK…is that on both sides people should be coming back in and…

乔·科南是的。

KERNENYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:正是这样。我们需要他们。我们需要他们。

Mr. BUFFETT: Absolutely. We need them. We need them.

贝基·奎克好的。我们来读一些观众发来的邮件,因为确实收到了很多。明尼阿波利斯的史蒂夫来信问:“您认为下面这段话在今天仍然成立吗?‘据我所知,纸币体系最终总是以崩溃和经济乱局收场。’”顺便提一句,这话出自国会议员霍华德·巴菲特,也就是您的父亲。

QUICKOK. Let’s get to some of these viewer e-mails, because we do have a lot of them that have come in. Steve from Minneapolis writes in, and his question is, “Do you believe that the following statement is still true today? So far as I can discover, paper money systems have always wound up with collapse and economic chaos.'” By the way, that was a statement from Congressman Howard Buffett, your father.

沃伦·巴菲特:听起来正是我父亲的口气,是啊。

Mr. BUFFETT: Sounds like my dad, yeah.

贝基·奎克对。

QUICKYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:这话我过去很长一段时间里,每天晚上在饭桌上都能听到。不过,我要这么说:能随着时间推移而升值的纸币,非常、非常罕见。我的意思是——而且我们眼下正在做的事,潜在的通胀风险很大。我是说,这——这就是我们正在打的这场战争的性质。顺便提一句,当年我们打二战的时候,通胀也非常、非常严重,我们采取了各种各样的措施来尽量减轻它的影响。但是,你看——我不知道史蒂夫会问你这个问题——不过,你也知道,这张钞票背面印着“我们信仰上帝”,对吧?

Mr. BUFFETT: I heard that every night at the dinner table for a long time. Well, I would say this. It’s going to be a very, very rare paper money that appreciates over time. I mean, the-and we are doing things now that are potentially very inflationary. I mean, that-it’s the nature of fighting the war we’re in. And, incidentally, when we fought World War II it was very, very inflationary, and we-and we took all kinds of activities to try and minimize that impact. But, you know, if you-if you look at this bill that-and I didn’t know Steve was going to ask you that. But, you know, on the back it says, “In God we trust,” right?

贝基·奎克对,没错。

QUICKYeah, right.

沃伦·巴菲特:而正面,基本上就是在说,“我们信仰美联储。”

Mr. BUFFETT: And on the front it says, In the Federal Reserve, we trust,’ basically.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:这是美联储钞票。现在,如果你去美联储银行说,“我想拿这个换点别的东西,”那里那位好心的女士会问,“您想要——您想要什么?两张 10 美元,还是四张 5 美元?”

Mr. BUFFETT: It’s a Federal Reserve note. Now, if you go down to the Federal Reserve bank and you say, I’d like to exchange this for something else,’ the nice lady there will say, Would you-would you like,’ what is it? Two 10s or four 5s?

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:我的意思是,这就是纸币,如果你不断印发更多——你去美联储网站看,M2 增长非常迅猛,在这种时期也本该如此。但这就是通胀。这些钱的数量相对于经济活动越多,它就越来越不值钱。

Mr. BUFFETT: I mean, you-it just-it is paper money, and if you keep issuing more of it-and M2 has been growing very rapidly if you go to the Federal Reserve site and see that, and should be in a period like this. But that is inflationary. The more of these you have out compared to the economic activity, the less it’s worth.

贝基·奎克好。那我顺着这个话题往下说……

QUICKAll right. Well, let me jump ahead based on that…

沃伦·巴菲特:我最好趁你还没抢到之前把这事说清楚。嗯。

Mr. BUFFETT: I’d better get this off the table before you grab it. Yeah.

贝基·奎克好,在我把话筒交出去之前,咱们先跳到一个问题。控制室的同事们,这可能会打乱你们的节奏。我们要来看第 33 个问题,来自纽约布鲁克林的乔伊。我想问这个问题,因为它刚好跟你刚才聊的话题有关。他问的是:“你觉得 1970 年代末的通货膨胀,比我们即将经历的更糟糕吗?为什么是,或者为什么不是?”

QUICKYeah, before I take it from you. Let’s jump ahead. Guys in the control room, this may throw you off a little bit. We’re going to go to number 33. This is from Joey in Brooklyn, New York, and I want to ask this question because it plays into what you just talked about. He asks, “Do you think that the inflation of the late 1970s was worse than the inflation we are about to have? Why or why not?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯——还是那句话,这取决于联邦政策的智慧。因为,我们怎么处理货币供应,以及我们之后怎么对待眼下正在创造的东西,会决定答案。这件事确实有可能变得更糟。我们正在打一场大战,我们打算用钱来打。整个世界都在去杠杆,唯一能加杠杆的就是美国政府。只要人们还用美元做生意,政府就有能力承担任何东西,因为他们能印钞。所以,情况有可能更糟。你知道,经济学里没有免费的午餐。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, it-again, it depends on the wisdom of federal policies. But-because what we do with the money supply and different-and how we behave later in relation to what we’re creating now will determine the answer to that. It certainly has the potential of being worse. We are going-we are fighting a big war, and there-we’re using-we’re going to use money to fight it. And the whole world is leveraging down. The only party that can leverage up is the US government. They have the ability to take on anything because they can print money as long as people will do business in US dollars. So it could be-it could be worse. And, you know, in economics there’s no free lunch.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

巴菲特:有些午餐,就算过后得付账,也还是吃了为好。我是说,总比没午餐强——就算得自己掏钱付账也一样。我们现在正在吃一顿午餐,某种程度上来说,过后得买单。

Mr. BUFFETT: There still are lunches it’s better to have even if you’re going to pay later. I mean, it’s better than no lunch if-even if you have to pay for the lunch. And we are having-we’re-we are going to attempt to have a lunch; to some extent we’re going to pay for it later.

贝基·奎克好的。还有人在问,通胀到底意味着什么。接下来的一个小时我们会聊到这个话题,以及这对市场和他们的投资意味着什么。不过,先来看看纽约的卡门发来的问题,他说:“你认为评级机构能否单凭一己之力阻止当前的金融动荡——只要他们拒绝给华尔街搞出来、连他们自己显然都没搞懂的那些怪异产品评级?”

QUICKAll right. We have more questions from people wondering what all that inflation means. We’ll get to that in the next hour, and what that means for the markets and some of their investments. But, meantime, Carmen from New York writes in, he says, “Do you believe that the ratings agencies could have single-handedly prevented the current financial turmoil by refusing to rate the exotic products coming out of Wall Street that they apparently did not understand?”

巴菲特:那样会帮上大忙。但评级机构里充斥着和您我抱着同样想法的人,您知道,所有那些去内布拉斯加家具城的人,那些在华盛顿的人,您知道,当国会敦促房利美和房地美扩大业务时,人人都相信房价不可能——永远不会真正大跌。这种信念也渗透到了评级机构的做法里。但毫无疑问,如果那里有人因为某种原因站出来反对,他们一定会——他们的立场一定会遭到嘲笑。但如果他们真站出来说,“我们要假设房价可能下跌 25% 到 30%,因此必须对所有这些资产给出完全不同的评级”,那就会——那就会——他们很可能还是会去找其他评级机构,照样拿到想要的评级。人们不会接受这种看法。但他们确实犯了错——用那样的方式评级就是他们的错误。

Mr. BUFFETT: It would have helped a lot. And-but the rating agencies were populated by people who believed exactly what you and I did, you know, all of the people that come to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and the people that are in Washington and the-you know, when Congress was urging Fannie and Freddie to expand their activities. Everybody believed house prices were not-would never take a real tumble. And that got built into what the rating agencies did as well. But there’s no question that if somebody there had taken a stand for some reason, they would have been-they would have been derided for that stand. But if they’d taken a stand, said, We’re going to assume that house prices can fall 25 or 30 percent, and therefore we have to rate this stuff all differently,’ it would have-it would have been-they probably would have gone to the other rating agencies and got it anyway. People wouldn’t have accepted it. But they did make a-they made a mistake in rating them the way that they did.

贝基·奎克好的。肯塔基州路易斯维尔一位署名 T. 蒂德威尔的听众来信问:“2009 年你不得不接受的最令人震惊且很可能成真的一件事是什么——就是那种现在投资者肯定会大吃一惊的事?”

QUICKAll right. T. Tidwell from Louisville, Kentucky, writes in and wants to know, “What one thing have you resigned yourself to be a shocking probable truth’ in 2009 that investors would certainly be surprised about now?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯。

Mr. BUFFETT: Hm.

贝基·奎克这个问题可不好回答。

QUICKThat’s a tough one.

沃伦·巴菲特:我要是知道就好了。我是说,当时——我现在就会按这个想法行动了。不,我认为大多数人对于 2009 年的预期——嗯,我会这么说。我要说的是,在某种程度上——我认为我们已经有了相应的政策,但只要这些政策能更好地传达出去,就会有所帮助。但银行体系,如果处理得当,不会——不会成为经济的问题。对银行体系可能出问题的恐惧,会影响经济的表现。但我们有一个能够照顾银行的体系,而且大多数银行的状况都相当不错。

Mr. BUFFETT: I wish I knew. I mean, it was-I’d be acting on it now. No, I think most people’s expectations about 2009-well, I would say this. I would say to the extent that-I think we already have the policies in place, but to the extent they get communicated better it will help. But the banking system, if properly handled, is not going to-that’s not going to be the problem for the economy. Fear that the banking system may be a problem enters into how the economy behaves. But we have a system that can take care of the banks, and most of the banks are in pretty good shape.

贝基·奎克所以那个可能让人意外的真相,是不是指事情最终会比人们预期的要好?

QUICKSo would the one shocking truth potentially be things wind up being better than people expect?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,那……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, that…

贝基·奎克还是说,你不会把话说到那个份上?

QUICKOr you wouldn’t go that far?

沃伦·巴菲特:不,我不会把话说到那个份上。

Mr. BUFFETT: No, I won’t go that far.

贝基·奎克沃伦,今天《华尔街日报》头版说,信贷市场取得的一些进展已经在倒退,势头在逆转。伦敦银行间同业拆借利率(LIBOR)再次小幅走高。你在信贷市场也看到同样的情况了吗?

QUICKThe front page of the Journal today, Warren, says that some of the progress we’ve made in the credit markets has been backsliding. It’s been going away. LIBOR rates have been inching higher once again. Have you seen that as well in the credit markets?

沃伦·巴菲特:对,我看到了。情况还没有回到 9 月份那么糟糕的地步,但当人们失去信心时——我可不管他们是所谓掌管大公司、大银行的大人物,还是街上的普通人——反应完全一模一样。我是说,这要追溯到人类的——你知道,就是那种“裸猿”式的本能反应。恐惧或逃命的反应就来了,他们逃向的地方,就是政府提供担保的东西。你看到了,对,以后还会继续看到。人们——人得有信心。没有信心,整个系统就转不起来,可现在他们就是没有信心,还很困惑,而政府必须把话说得极其清晰。政府在银行体系方面已经做了很多好事……

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, I’ve seen that. It’s not like it got a worse of the situation in September, but when people lose confidence, yeah, I don’t care whether they’re big shots, you know, running big companies, or big banks, or whether they’re the guy on the street, they behave exactly the same way. I mean, this goes back to the human-you know, the “Naked Ape” type of thing, reaction. The fear or flight stuff comes in and where they flee is something this government guaranteed. And you’ve seen it, yeah, and you’ll continue to see it. They have-people have to be confident. The system doesn’t work without confidence and they are-they’re not confident now and they are confused and the government has to speak with real clarity. Government’s done a lot of good things in terms of the banking system…

贝基·奎克嗯。

QUICKMm-hmm.

沃伦·巴菲特:……但坦率地说,当政府换届的时候,当国会 535 名议员可能批评各种政策、甚至嘲弄别人的时候,公众的反应就是,你知道吧,‘我得去买政府担保的东西’,如果这种情况持续下去,社会就无法正常运转了。

Mr. BUFFETT: …but frankly when you have changes of administration, when you have-when you have 535 members of Congress criticizing maybe various policies and maybe taunting even people, the reaction of the public to that is, you know, I’m going to go to something this government guaranteed,’ and the world won’t work if that continues to be the case.

贝基·奎克好吧,我们还是回到这个问题上。政府怎么可能管得住 535 名国会议员?更别提现在还是 24 小时新闻滚动播出的时代,我们几乎让随便什么人都能上来滔滔不绝地发表自己的观点。

QUICKWell, let’s get back to that, though. How could the administration possibly rein in 535 members of Congress, not to mention it’s a 24-hour news cycle and we put just about anybody and everybody on to spout their views?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我认为首要的是——你必须认识到,这是一场经济上的珍珠港事件。如果你不相信这一点,那凭什么国会议员们不应该塞进 8000 项专项拨款,或者继续做他们一直在做的事呢?国会——我想我六个月前就说过——我的意思是,他们是一群爱国的人。但我觉得,他们中有些人可能还没有完全理解,局势到底有多严重,以及现在需要做什么。我们需要的是,一位在战争时期被当作总司令看待的总司令,以及他通常所需要的支持,还有其他必须放弃的东西。等我们把这一切都解决了,再回到互相吵吵嚷嚷、塞进自己的偏爱项目、干那些事也不迟。但眼下,我们应该尽可能把这些放到一边。然后坦率地说,除了总统,没有人再能让美国人民信服了。我的意思是,你没法——人们听到过保尔森、盖特纳、伯南克这些名字——对他们来说,这些名字就是一团乱麻。在美国,唯一能说出‘这就是我们要做的,这就是我们不做的’这样极其具体的话的权威声音,就是美国总统。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think that the first-you have to recognize that it is an economic Pearl Harbor. If you don’t believe that, then why should members of Congress not, you know, why shouldn’t they throw in 8,000 earmarks or do what they’ve been doing? Congress, and I think I said this six months ago, I mean, they’re a patriotic group of people. I don’t think maybe they understood fully, some of them, the gravity of the situation and what is required. What is required is a commander in chief that is looked at as being the commander in chief in a time of war and the support that generally he needs and other things that have to be given up. When we get all this solved and go back to yelling at each other, you know, and putting in pet projects and doing all that sort of thing. But for the time being we should put that, as much as we can, aside and then frankly, nobody but the president now will be believable to the American people. I mean, you can’t-people have heard-they don’t-names like Paulson, Geithner, Bernanke, those-that’s just a muddle to them. The only authoritative voice in the United States who says, This is what we’re going to do, this is what we’re not going to do,’ and very specifically, is the president of the United States.

贝基·奎克乔,请说。

QUICKJoe:

乔·科南对,我很快说一下——关于默克制药的股息,我想说——我说过他们会努力维持。公司承诺要保住股息。我从工作那边——从默克那边听到的消息是,他们决心维持派息。所以股息率大约是 6.7%。我想赶紧拉回正题,巴菲特先生,我们之前聊到了《华尔街日报》那篇文章。你看看伯克希尔的 AAA 级债券,再看看通用电气,它现在还是 AAA 级。看看那些债券,再看看高盛的债券。那篇文章的核心意思是,当你不确定政府最终会采取什么措施来解决问题时,就连优先债务持有人都不确定自己最终能不能拿到公司的资产。你觉得这事会怎么解决?政府需要做什么?你——呃,或者说奥巴马总统显然必须代表政府发声,但我们其实并不清楚——你知道的,金融体系到底会采取哪些具体措施。

KERNENYeah, I-really quickly on that-on that Merck dividend I want to-I said they’re going to try. They’re committed to maintaining it. I’m hearing from work-or from Merck. They’re committed to maintaining that dividend. So it’s about 6.7 percent. I want to get back quickly, Mr. Buffett, we were talking about this article in the Journal. Look at your Berkshire AAA bonds, look at General Electric, which is still AAA. Look at those bonds. Look at Goldman Sachs bonds. The thrust of this piece is that when you’re not sure what the government’s going to do eventually to fix things, even senior debt holders aren’t sure that they’d end up with the assets of the firm. How do you expect this to work itself out? What does the government need to do? You-Mr.-or President Obama needs to speak for the government obviously, but we’re not really sure how-you know, what steps are going to be taken in the financial system.

沃伦·巴菲特:好,如果就给我一分钟,我先往回倒一点。19 世纪,美国至少发生了六次大规模金融恐慌。这些恐慌——很多次都是因为人们对银行失去信心引起的。所以,如果有人在奥马哈对某家银行失去信心,他就会去排队,一旦有人在第一国民银行门口排上队,第二国民银行门口也会排起队,以此类推。这种事我们一次又一次地见识过——当时人们管它们叫恐慌。之所以叫恐慌,是因为如果你去银行取不出钱来,你就会恐慌。而那种情形还会永远存在下去。人们,如果他们的钱放在某个地方,他们开始担心了,就想赶紧把钱取出来,如果他们看到别人也急着想取钱,他们也会跟着做。于是 20 世纪来了。我们设立了美联储,以为这能让人们平静下来。但到了 30 年代,我们认识到,如果对银行体系没有信心,经济就永远好不了。所以我们成立了联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)。喏,这是一段挺有意思的内容。这里面有 FDIC 援助过的 3600 家银行。三千六百家。美国总共只有大约 7000 家银行,还有 1400 家储蓄机构。自 1934 年以来,没有任何一位受保存款的存款人损失过一分钱。这是让美国经济得以运转,并成为有史以来最伟大——好吧,史上最伟大的经济体——的一个巨大因素。FDIC 出手了三千六百次。过去这一年里,他们处理了全美大概近 8% 的存款。没有花纳税人一分钱,没有一位存款人损失一分钱。现在,美国人民必须确信的是,当碰上像新闻里报道的那种大机构——比如花旗集团这种——

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, if I’ve got just a minute, I’ll back up a little. In the 19th century you had at least six huge financial panics. They were-and they caused in many cases by people losing confidence in banks. So if somebody lost confidence in a bank in Omaha they got in a line and as soon as somebody got in the line at the First National there was a line at the Second National and so on. We learn time after time-and they called them panics. The reason they called them panics was because if you went to the bank and couldn’t get your money out you panicked. And that same situation will continue to exist forever. People, if they’ve got their money someplace and they get worried about it they want to get it out fast and if they see other people wanting to get it out, they want to do the same thing. So along came the 20th century. We put in the Fed and we thought that would calm down people. But when the ’30s came along, we recognized that without faith in the banking system this economy was never going to get well. So we formed the FDIC. Now, this is an interesting group of pages here. This has 3600 banks that the FDIC has assisted. Three thousand six hundred. There’s only about 7,000 banks in the United States, another 1400 savings institutions. No depositor of an insured deposit has ever lost a penny since 1934. It was a huge factor in making this economy work to be one of the greatest-well, the greatest economy that’s ever existed. Thirty-six hundred times the FDIC has come in. In the last year, they have moved, I think, something close to 8 percent of the deposits in the United States. It hasn’t cost the taxpayer one dime, no depositor has lost one dime. Now, what the American people have to be sure of is that when organizations as big as the ones that have been in the news, like a Citigroup…

贝基·奎克对。

QUICKRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:……当人们知道 FDIC 没法过来,在一夜之间把它搬到奥马哈第二国民银行或类似机构时,他们就必须确信,花旗集团的所有存款,说真的,包括花旗集团的所有债务工具,都会得到兑付。实际上,我们就会这么做的。有人说它们大而不倒,但你确实需要一个完全有权威的人站出来说,‘完全不用担心你的钱或者银行的债务工具会出问题。’这件事太重要了,绝不能模棱两可。而且 FDIC 现在也在筹集更多资金。FDIC 会处理好银行的问题。人们谈论国有化银行,今年 FDIC 就以迅雷不及掩耳之势“国有化”了大约 20 家银行,去年也差不多 20 家。它们在一夜之间完成移交,一切运转良好。没人损失一分钱。而对整个银行体系,人们也要有同等的信心。如果没有,我们就会——你就会看到更多像你提到的那篇《华尔街日报》文章那样的报道。

Mr. BUFFETT: …where people know the FDIC can’t come over and move it to the Second National Bank of Omaha or something overnight, they have to be sure that all deposits, really, all debt liabilities of Citigroup are going be met. There’s-and the truth is we’re going to do that. People say they’re too big to fail, but you really need somebody that’s totally authoritative who can say, Just forget about the problems of ever worrying about having your money or actually a debt instrument of a bank.’ It’s too important that-to be left ambiguous on that subject. And all of the-the FDIC’s raising more money now. But the FDIC will take care of banks. They talk about nationalizing banks, they nationalized for a nanosecond 20 banks this year, roughly 20 last year. They moved it overnight, it’s all working fine. Nobody loses a dime. And people have to feel that way about the entire banking system. And if they don’t, we will have-you’ll have more articles like the one you talked about in the Journal.

贝基·奎克昨天,理查德·谢尔比参议员和约翰·麦凯恩参议员都在早间新闻节目上发表了评论,话里话外的意思是,应该让其中一些银行倒闭。“把它们关掉,让它们退出市场。如果它们死了,就该被埋了,”谢尔比是这样评论的。

QUICKYesterday, Senator Richard Shelby and Senator John McCain both made comments on the morning news programs and said things to the extent that they should let some of these banks fail. “Close them down, get them out of the business. If they’re dead they ought to be buried,” Shelby was commenting.

沃伦·巴菲特:这里就有 3600 例。不是所有这些都——但绝大多数都确实死了并被埋了。我们上周末在佐治亚州又处理了一家,我记得。今年我们大概有 20 来家,去年也有 20 来家。倒闭最高峰的那一年有 500 多家,但国家照样运转良好,因为人们没有对银行感到恐慌。所以毫无疑问,一家注定要倒闭的银行就应该让它倒闭。你知道,你必须确保的是,那些把钱交给那家银行的人——股东是可以血本无归的。过去这些年,数千家银行的股东都已经血本无归。但这……

Mr. BUFFETT: Here’s 3600. Not all of these got-but overwhelmingly these did die and get buried. And we have had-we had one over the weekend in Georgia, I believe. We had about 20 this year, we had 20 last year. The peak year we had over 500 and the country went on fine because they didn’t panic about banks. So there’s no question that a bank that’s going to go broke should be allowed to go broke. You know, the thing you have to make sure of is that the people that gave their money to that bank-the shareholders can get wiped out. The shareholders have gotten wiped out of thousands of banks over the years. That-but…

贝基·奎克谢尔比还说,花旗一直是个问题孩子。花旗集团这种规模的银行,你也能这么做吗?

QUICKShelby also said those Citi has also been-has always been a problem child. Can you do that with a bank the size of Citigroup?

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,花旗——花旗很可能还会继续收缩,但说到底,没人需要为把钱放在花旗而担心。另一方面,这其实并不涉及什么道德风险。当你的股票从 50 美元跌到 1 美元,我觉得这造成的道德风险,不见得比从 50 美元跌到零更大。我是说,你知道,我们这套体制会让那些管理不善的银行的股东付出惨重代价。但我们必须非常清楚地表明——不是那种美联储式的打官腔,而是明明白白地告诉人们:他们的钱不会打水漂。这并不等于说银行不会倒闭。我们接下来——我们会——随着情况发展,会积累起更多页这类文件。这就是事物的本性。不过我们对此已有准备。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, Citi is-Citi’s probably going to keep shrinking, but in the end nobody should be worried about having their money in Citi. On the other hand, there’s really no moral hazard to that. When your stock goes from $50 to $1, I don’t think you create way more moral hazard than when it goes from $50 to zero. I mean, you know, we have a system that penalizes enormously the shareholders of banks where the management screw up. But we have to make it very clear, you know, no Fed-speak type stuff or anything. We have to make it very clear that people are not going to lose money. That doesn’t say they’re not going to fail. We’re going-we’re going to have-we’ll have more pages of this stuff as we go along. It’s the nature. But we provided for it.

贝基·奎克欢迎回来收看《财经论谈》这期特别节目。我们此刻正在内布拉斯加家具城,与沃伦·巴菲特坐在一起,我们收到了观众成千上万封电子邮件。沃伦,我们想从一封反复出现的主题邮件开始。这位是来自得克萨斯州圣安东尼奥的特里,他问:“一切都会好起来吗?”

QUICKWelcome back to this special edition of SQUAWK BOX. We are live at the Nebraska Furniture Mart with Warren Buffett and we’ve been getting thousands and thousands of e-mails from our viewers. Warren, we’d like to start with one that echoes a theme we heard again and again. This comes from Terry in San Antonio, Texas, who asks, “Will everything be all right?”

沃伦·巴菲特:一切都会好起来的。我相信,我们拥有人类有史以来最了不起的经济机器。1790 年我们只有 400 万人口,看看我们走到了哪里——这不是因为我们比别人更聪明,不是因为我们的土地更肥沃、矿产更丰富或者气候更宜人。我们有一个运转有效的系统。它释放了人类的潜能。这个系统并非年年灵验——19 世纪我们经历了六次恐慌,20 世纪我们又遭遇了大萧条和世界大战,诸如此类的事情。但我们有这样一个大体上奉行自由市场、法治和机会均等的体系,凡此种种释放了人的潜能,而且我们还远未走到终点。所以我认为,你的孩子会过得比我的孩子好,你的孙辈会过得比你的孩子更好。这无可置疑。但这台机器时不时会卡住——如果把那几个世纪的大多数年份算进来,大概有 15 年是糟糕的年份,但我们仍会继续前进。

Mr. BUFFETT: Everything will be all right. We do have the greatest economic machine that man has ever created, I believe. We started with four million people back in 1790 and look where we’ve come and it wasn’t because we were smarter than other people, it wasn’t because our land was more fertile or we had more minerals or our climate was more favorable. We had a system that worked. It unleashed the human potential. Didn’t work every year, we had six panics in the 19th century, in the 20th century we had the Great Depression and World Wars, all kinds of things. But we have a system, largely free market, rule of law, equality of opportunity, all of those things that cause the potential of humans to get unleashed, and we’re far from done. So I think your kids will live better than mine, your grandchildren will live better than your kids. There’s no question about that. But the machine gets gummed up from time to time and it’s-if you take the bulk of those centuries, probably 15 years were bad years, but we go forward.

贝基·奎克这自然引出了另一个问题。许多人一直在试图搞清:现在是否与我们所熟知的大萧条时期有所不同。我直接跳到宾夕法尼亚州肖霍拉的丹的一个问题,他很直接地问到了这一点。“与 1929 年到 1933 年那段时期相比,今天的市场局面好在哪儿?”

QUICKWhich brings us to another question. A lot of people have been trying to figure out is this different from what we saw back in the Great Depression. I’m going to jump ahead to one from Dan from Shohola, Pennsylvania, who asks a question very pointedly about this. “How is the market better off today than when we were in the 1929 to 1933 period?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我们当然——这回不一样。我是说,所有经济衰退——或者现在说的萧条,又或者像 19 世纪的人们那样称之为恐慌——彼此之间总有诸多相似,但也永远存在不同。一个关键的相似处在于,那时人们对银行普遍丧失信心——这事在今天看来很荒唐,因为我们有了联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)。我的意思是,但是——如果回溯历史,我父亲在 1931 年 8 月 15 日那天是在银行工作的,他到了那儿,发现银行关门了,他没了工作,他那点不多的积蓄也全在里面。我是说,如果你不信任自己存钱的地方,整个世界就停摆了。他们后来认识到了这点,但有点姗姗来迟。直到 1934 年,他们才通过《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》建立起存款保险。我们现在有了一套远为完善的体系来应对这类问题。麻烦在于,很多人并不信任这套体系。它需要被澄清。实际上,纽约联储主席达德利先生上周五——你可以去他们网站上读——把这事讲得很透。但在全美范围内,没多少人会专门去听达德利先生说了什么。今天来家具城的人不知道他是谁,也不会去上他的网站。你确实需要——你需要美国总统亲口把这件事讲清楚。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, we certainly-it’s different. I mean, there’s a lot of similarities between all recessions or in this case depressions or call them panics like they did back in the 19th century, and there’s always differences. One key similarity is that there was a paralysis of confidence in banks and-which is silly now because of the FDIC. I mean, we-but if you went back, my dad, on August 15th, 1931, worked at a bank and he went there and it was closed and he had no job and he had his savings-small savings in there. I mean, if you don’t trust where you have your money, the world stops. And they recognized that, but it was a little belatedly. They didn’t put in deposit insurance until it was started in 1934 in the Glass-Steagall Act. We have a system that’s far better organized to deal with that. The trouble is that a lot of people don’t believe in the system. It needs to be clarified. Actually, the head of the New York Fed, Mr. Dudley, on Friday, you can go to their Web site and read it, he describes it perfectly. But nobody’s going to listen to Mr. Dudley very much throughout the United States. The people coming to Furniture Mart today don’t know who he is and they’re not going to go to his Web site. You really need-you need the president of the United States enunciating it.

贝基·奎克把这件事讲清楚。巴拉克·奥巴马似乎经常谈到他看到了什么,他希望促成什么。他到目前为止传达的信息有什么问题?

QUICKEnunciating it. It seems like Barack Obama talks pretty frequently about what he sees, what he’d like to have happen. What’s wrong with the message that he’s put out to this point?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我觉得他传达的信息没有任何问题,而且他讲得也极为出色,但我认为——我认为有必要让国会树立这样一种态度:这是一场战争,而他是三军统帅,在眼下这种情境下,华盛顿的许多常规做法其实很不合时宜。但我觉得——我的基本看法是,这件事必须要表述得尽可能清晰,而且我认为只有总统能做到——那就是,任何人,你知道,尽管 FDIC 的保额上限是 25 万美元,但我认为——我绝对认为,任何人都无需为自己存在美国银行里的钱,或是持有的美国政府债务,感到丝毫担忧。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the message at all and I think he’s-he speak wonderfully, but I think-and I think there should be-there’s a necessity that Congress takes the attitude that this is a war and that he is the commander and chief and that-and that a lot of the normal things that go on in Washington are really inappropriate in this setting. But I think-I think basically that it has to be as clear as possibly can be made, and I think only the president can do it, that no one, and, you know, the FDIC limit is $250,000, but I think-I think absolutely that no one should be worried about having their money in a bank in the United States or actually owning their debt.

贝基·奎克好的。您提到这是一场经济上的珍珠港事件。新泽西州斯普林莱克海茨的丹来信问,当时我们的金融体系距崩溃是不是只差几个小时、几天?

QUICKOK. You talk about how this was an economic Pearl Harbor. Dan from Spring Lake Heights in New Jersey writes in, he wants to know was our financial system just hours, days away from collapse?

沃伦·巴菲特:我记得是九月份的事。如果有一周时间,光是前三天就涌出了 2000 亿美元——当时货币市场基金总共大概有 3 万亿美元——那钱简直像决堤一样往外流,就因为 Reserve 基金跌破净值了。这意味着商业票据市场正在消失。你知道,美国经济的血液正在被抽干,而当时我们采取了一些非常迅速、明智的行动。伯南克主席,美联储,他们出手了,宣布商业票据市场会正常运转。这带来了天翻地覆的变化。大家原本相信,你往货币市场基金里投钱不会亏本。他们当年对货币市场基金说的那套话,我们现在也应该对整个银行系统说。实际上,我们已经用各种方式说过了。你要是去读纽约联储主席的那篇演讲,他话里说了,但没说透,美国老百姓听不懂。美国总统得说得很清楚:你完全不必为这个担心。

Mr. BUFFETT: In September, I think it was. If there was a week where 200 billion, as I remember, in the first three days or so poured out of the money market funds, which had about 3 trillion in them, the money was just gushing out when Reserve broke the buck. That meant that the commercial paper market was disappearing. You know, the blood was being drained from the American economic body and we had some very prompt, wise, action. Chairman Bernanke, the Fed, I mean, they stepped in and said the commercial paper market is going to work. That made a huge difference. People came in and said the money market funds, you know, you weren’t going to lose money in money market funds. They said the same thing about money market funds we should now say about the whole banking system. And actually, we’ve said it in various ways. If you read that Federal Reserve New York chairman speech, it says it, but it doesn’t say it the way the American people will get it. The president of the United States has to say it very clearly that you just don’t have to worry about that.

乔·科南好,谢谢。回过头来说,沃伦,你知道,你一开口,新闻通讯社的报道就接连发出来。我念两条给你听听。一条是“巴菲特称各方需团结在奥巴马身后”。紧接着另一条是“民主党人应——巴菲特称民主党人应把那些自留地项目从经济救助计划里拿掉”。看上去,说一句我们都需要同心协力是不错,但我们好像又一下子回到了原点。这事儿,谁的过失更大?对半开吗?

KERNENYeah, thanks. Returning for one second, Warren, you know, when you speak, the wires just start hitting. I’m going to read two of them to you. One is “Buffett says that the parties need to unite behind Obama.” Then the next one is, “Dems should-Buffett says that the Democrats should keep pet projects out of the economic rescue efforts.” It just seems like it’s nice to say we all need to get along, but we’re right back where we started. Who’s more at fault here? Is it 50/50?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well…

乔·科南是民主党塞了太多东西,还是纯粹是共和党在搞党派之争?

KERNENDid the Dems put too much in or is it just more partisanship from the Republicans?

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,我——我已经发誓不再去指责任何一方。过去我——过去我也开过几次火。我只想说,爱国的民主党人、爱国的美国人都会认识到,这是一场战争。如果他们没能立刻认识到,我也能够理解。这毕竟——这不像一场真刀真枪的热战,消息一看就知道你遭到了攻击。但它,实质上,同样严重。而且我认为,一旦双方都看清了事态的严重程度,他们就会——绝大多数人都会表现得很识大体。但这确实意味着,民主党人同样得以身作则——你不能一边要求共和党本着合作的精神配合,一边又想在别的一大堆事情上强压他们一头。大家应该同意,这件事才是必须完成的要务;等这件事办完了,不等于说政府其他事就都不做了。但在那些富有争议的议题上,不妨就让他们先等等,等到我们把经济重新盘活再说。因为要是我们把经济搞不活……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I have-I have taken a vow not to point fingers at anybody. I have taken a few-I have taken a few swipes in the past. I will just say that patriotic Democrats, patriotic Americans will realize that this is a war and if they didn’t realize it immediately, I can understand it. It’s not-it’s not as dramatic as a physical war where the news comes over and you know you’re under attack. But it is-it is virtually as serious and I think that once the degree of that seriousness becomes apparent to both parties, I think they will-I think overwhelmingly they will behave well. But that does mean that the Democrats have to behave just as well as the-you can’t ask the Republicans to cooperate in the spirit of this and then at the same time try and steamroll them on a whole bunch of other things. You ought to agree that this is the job to get done and when we get done, that doesn’t mean you don’t do anything else in government. But in terms of the contentious things, just let them wait until we get the economy working. Because if we don’t get the economy working…

乔·科南的确。

KERNENYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:……其他事就都别提了。

Mr. BUFFETT: …just forget about the other things.

乔·科南问题就在这儿。问题就在这儿啊,沃伦。你知道的,这正是我们需要搞清楚哪些绝对必要、哪些不是的地方。而不幸的是,分歧也由此产生。你能不能就顺着往下……

KERNENThere’s the rub. There’s the rub, though, Warren. You know, there’s where we need details on what is absolutely essential and what isn’t. And that’s where the contentiousness comes in, unfortunately. We-can you just go down…

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well…

乔·科南你能不能挨个列一遍,说这个我们需要,这个不需要,这个需要,这个不需要,这个需要,然后把这个单子发到……

KERNENCan you go down the list of things and say we need this, we don’t need this, we need this, we don’t need this, we need this and then we can send it to…

沃伦·巴菲特:对。

Mr. BUFFETT: Right.

乔·科南那我们是不是可以把它发到华盛顿,好让我说沃伦·巴菲特就是这么讲的?

KERNENWe can send it to Washington so I can say Warren Buffett says this?

沃伦·巴菲特:我们需要金融体系方面有清晰的方案,确切知道要做什么。顺便说一句,监管机构讨厌这个。我管所罗门兄弟的时候跟所有人说过,永远别说我们大到不能倒。我是说,跟监管者说这个,就像在公牛面前挥舞 12 面红旗。他不想听别人说他别无选择。所以这是个——他们讨厌用的词。我能理解。但答案是,美国银行体系整体上就是大到不能倒,你必须接受这个现实。顺便说一句,我们还有一些准银行,它们负债极其庞大,如果放任不管,会对整个体系造成巨大冲击。我们可能很不幸有了它们,可能我们需要出台补救性立法,让这种事不再发生,但我们必须应对眼前的局面。坦率讲,AIG 的情况就承认了这一点。我是说,每个人都讨厌他们不得不采取的措施,但如果他们只是说,‘嗯,这不是银行,去他的,他们犯了错,活该,’那是疯了。我们必须处理所有大型准金融机构,以及所有银行,人们不能为它们提心吊胆,我们也不能再出现像去年 9 月差点发生的那种恐慌蔓延。我是说,去年 9 月世界几乎停转了。

Mr. BUFFETT: We need clarity on the financial system, on exact-on what will be done. And bank-incidentally, regulators hate that. When I ran Salomon, I told everybody, don’t ever say we’re too big to fail. I mean, it’s like waving about 12 red flags in front of a bull to say that to a regulator. He doesn’t want to be told he doesn’t have any choice. So it’s a-it’s a phrase they hate to use. I can understand that. But the answer is, the American banking system, overall, is too big to fail and you have to apply that. And incidentally, we have quasi-banks that have very large liabilities and where they would impact the system dramatically if left alone. It may be unfortunate we have them, it may be that we need corrective legislation so it doesn’t come up again, but we have to deal with the situation we have now. And frankly, that was recognized in AIG. I mean, everybody hates, you know, what they had to do in that, but the problems they would’ve had if they just said, Well, this isn’t a bank and the hell with them, they made their mistakes,’ that’s crazy. We have to deal with all large quasi-financial institutions as well as all of the banks and people can’t be worried about them and we can’t have a contagion like we almost had in September. I mean, the world did come almost to a stop in September.

贝基·奎克有个人写信来问——这封邮件我们本来准备过会儿再谈的——但有人问起了《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。这部法案应该恢复吗?

QUICKOne person wrote in and this e-mail is one we had prepared for later, but somebody asked about Glass-Steagall. Should it be brought back?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我觉得——你需要立法。我的意思是,不一定要完全照搬《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》。《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》带来了联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)。那是件好事。我们需要银行回归银行业务的本质。我的意思是,我们已经看到,让这些人摆弄奇异金融工具、在表外做各种勾当、每个季度都想让盈利稍微好看一点,你没法经营一家金融机构还能展示出漂亮、平稳的增长和利润。无论如何,你都会作弊。这种事过去发生了很多,我们需要——我们需要银行回归银行业务。但我们也得先熬过眼下这个局面。我们不应该去给别人上课。顺便说一句,现在非常重要的一点是,银行——这可能会让你吃惊——从某种意义上说,银行业从未这么好过。我是说,银行现在拿钱非常便宜,存款涌进来,利差从未如此之大,它们做的新业务都棒极了。在大多数情况下——绝大多数情况下——它们能靠盈利走出困境。而且它们不应该被这种想法吓住,觉得自己不得不在某种极低的价格下发行大量股票,而恰恰是这种可能发生的行为本身又在不断压低股价。所以,这确实在吓唬银行业的人。但银行能靠盈利走出困境。我的意思是,以富国银行为例,去年第四季度它们的平均资金成本是 1.44%。用 1.44% 的钱,我能赚到钱。这很便宜,资金充裕,利差也非常大。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think there-you need legislation. I mean, whether it’s exactly Glass-Steagall. Glass-Steagall brought in the FDIC. It was a wonderful thing. We need banks to get back to banking. I mean, we have learned that handing these people, you know, exotic instruments and all kinds of ability to do things off balance sheet and this desire to improve your earnings a little every quarter, you can’t run a financial institution and show nice, smooth growth and earnings. One way or another, you’re going to cheat. And there was a lot of that that went on and we need-we need banks to get back to banking. But we need to get through this situation. We should not be giving lectures to people. And incidentally, the one thing that’s very important now is banks-and this may come as a surprise to you. Banking has never been better in one sense. I mean, the banks are getting their money very cheaply, deposits are coming in, spreads have never been wider, all the new business they’re doing is terrific. They will earn their way out of it, in most cases, overwhelming number of cases. And they should not be spooked by the idea they’re going to have to issue tons of stock at some very low price under the circumstances where the very actions of-that that may be coming keep pushing down the price. So that’s spooking, you know, people in the banking business. But the banks can earn their way out of this. I mean, the average cost of funds for Wells Fargo, for example, the fourth quarter last year, was 1.44 percent. I can earn money with money at 1.44 percent. I mean, it’s cheap. It’s abundant and the spreads are terrific.

贝基·奎克但沃伦,你这样说,是为了安抚股东,安抚那些本应关注金融体系、为此忧心忡忡的人。可你怎么说,才能不煽动民粹情绪——说银行在大把大把赚钱?我们凭什么还要继续帮它们?

QUICKBut Warren, you say that as a way of reassuring shareholders, people who should be looking at the financial system, people who are worried about it. But how do you say that without stoking populist anger, that the banks are making money hand over fist? Why should we keep helping them out?

沃伦·巴菲特:没错。二战期间造船厂也在赚钱。我的意思是,你知道,没人到处说亨利·凯泽赚得太多了,因为他造出了这么多船,或者说柯蒂斯-莱特赚得太多了,因为他们造出了这么多飞机。当时确实征收了超额利润税之类的税种。那没问题。但重点是我们需要做什么?如果始终牢记这一点,乔问我那些评论时,我——我不会去针对任何人。那根本不重要。重要的是我们接下来要做正确的事。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, the ship builders made money during World War II.I mean, you know, I-nobody went around saying Henry Kaiser’s making too much money because he’s turning out all these ships, or Curtiss-Wright’s making too much money because they’re turning out plane. They did put in excess profits taxes and all that thing. That was fine. But the focus was on what do we need to do? And if that’s kept in mind and Joe asked me about these comments, I am-I am going to take no shots at anybody. It just isn’t important. The important thing is we do the right thing going forward.

贝基·奎克好的。我们先记住这个问题,乔,我们稍等一下就会回来继续。

QUICKAll right. Let’s hold that thought, and Joe, we’ll be back in just a moment with more.

贝基·奎克我们确实收到了几千封邮件,沃伦,所以我们上来就先问你这些邮件里的问题。很多人对股市最近的表现感到担忧,我们也听说了一些重大骗局,这动摇了人们的信心。一位投资者——他叫布鲁斯,来自俄亥俄州辛辛那提——写道:“我们怎么知道你不是又一个伯尼·麦道夫?”

QUICKWe do have thousands of e-mails that have been coming in, Warren, so we’re going to ask you some of these e-mails just right off the bat. There have been a lot of concerns about what’s happened with the stock market. We’ve also heard about some major scams, and that has shaken people’s confidence. One investor wrote in-his name is Bruce, he’s from Cincinnati, Ohio-and he says, “How do we know that you are not another Bernie Madoff?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这是个好问题。我想说,这确实是投资顾问行业的一个问题。我的意思是,这世上总有那么一些骗子。有时候他们能说会道,最厉害的那种看起来反而不像骗子。所以我要说,如果我要干那事,我是在攒钱等着干一票大的,因为我已经干这行很久很久了。你知道,我还没跑到南美去呢。但你该把信任交给谁,这确实是个问题。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, that’s a good question. I would say this. I-it is a problem with investment advisers. I mean, it-there are going to be a certain number of crooks in the world. And sometimes they’re smooth-talking, and the best ones are the ones that kind of don’t look like crooks. So I would say I’m saving up for my big score, if I’m doing it, because I’ve been doing this for a long, long time. I haven’t run off yet, you know, to South America. But it is a problem who you put your trust in.

贝基·奎克是的。说到严肃的话题,有人看着股市会想,他们怎么知道整个市场不是庞氏骗局呢?

QUICKYeah. And on a serious note, there are people who look at the stock market and wonder how do they know the whole thing’s not a Ponzi scheme?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,整个事情不是庞氏骗局。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, the whole thing’s not a Ponzi scheme.

贝基·奎克那——他们怎么知道该信任谁呢?

QUICKWhat-how do they know who to trust?

沃伦·巴菲特:我们在谈论的是美国企业——光是在股票市场上市的那些——它们雇用了数千万、数千万、数千万的人。它们是实实在在的公司。内布拉斯加家具城今年的营业额就会达到 4 亿美元。拥有——在这个世界上,你可以选择。你可以直接持有一些房地产,可以直接拥有一个农场,可以拥有公寓楼,可以把钱存进储蓄账户,可以买政府债券,也可以投资美国企业。整体来看,美国企业已经是一个非常、非常好的去处。人们在个股上犯过错误。但在 20 世纪,道琼斯指数从 66 点涨到了 11,000 点,你知道,涨了 400 倍。而且那期间我们经历了各种各样的问题。企业总体上是在运作的。它不会每一天、每一周或每一个月都运作,有时候确实会卡住。然后,政府有时需要出手干预,让机器重新顺畅运转。但这台机器是管用的。

Mr. BUFFETT: We’re talking about, you know-we’re talking about American businesses that employ, just the ones on the stock market, tens and tens and tens of millions of people. They’re real companies. Nebraska Furniture Mart will do 400 million in business this year. Owning-you’ve got a choice in this world. You can own some real estate directly, you can own a farm directly, you can own apartment house, you can have your money in a savings account, you can have your money in government bonds, you can have it in American business. American business has been a very, very good place overall. People have made mistakes on individual stocks. But in the 20th century, the Dow went from 66 to 11,000, you know, 400. And we had all kinds of problems during that period. Business works overall. It doesn’t work every day or every week or every month, and sometimes it really gets gummed up. And then you need government invention sometimes to get the machines back working smoothly. But the machine works.

沃伦·巴菲特:而长期来看,股票就是那条路。

Mr. BUFFETT: And equities, over time, are the way to do it.

乔·科南沃伦,你刚才谈到了几点,其中一点我觉得是——监管不可能抓住所有这些家伙。我觉得挺有意思,因为你说那家伙会口若悬河,而且看起来不像骗子。我看着你,心想,哇,你讲话非常圆融,而且你看起来也不像——我心想,哇,他说的——不过你明白我的意思吧?你不能靠——你不能靠监管……

KERNENWarren, do you think that-you made a couple of points just now, and one, I think, is that you can’t catch-regulations can’t necessarily catch every one of these guys. And I just thought it was funny, because you said that the guy would be very smooth-talking and he won’t look like a crook. And I was looking at you, thinking, Wow, you’re very smooth and you don’t look like’-and I was thinking, Wow, he said’-but no, you see what I’m saying? You can’t use-you can’t use regulations…

沃伦·巴菲特:不能。

Mr. BUFFETT: No.

乔·科南……来完全解决。那在这个环境下,你是否担心我们又会矫枉过正?

KERNEN…necessarily. And do you worry that in this environment that, once again, we’re going to overshoot?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我觉得我们——在某些方面会做得过头。但不管怎样,我们还是得出手。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think that’s-we’re going to overshoot in some ways. But we need-we need to shoot anyway.

乔·科南是。

KERNENYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:而且,你知道,我的搭档查理·芒格常说,总有一天我们会被一个坐公交上班、拎着小饭盒的家伙骗了。那个穿绒面皮鞋的家伙——永远骗不了我们。但骗子确实会以不同——不同的面目出现。你知道,如果你通过券商持有证券,CPIC 会在一定程度上给你保护。我认为,就长期而言,你应该——我认为所有银行存款都应该得到全额保护。我的意思是,这只是一个必须采取的举措,就像 1934 年我们不得不设立 2500 美元的存款保险上限一样。我们不能让人们整天为银行担惊受怕。而且——但是,你知道,绝大多数人是诚实的,但你得防备那一个——那个不诚实的。我的意思是,你应该——你应该——你应该亲自持有你自己的证券。这就是一个很好的办法。

Mr. BUFFETT: And, you know, and my partner Charlie Munger says we will get conned some day by a guy that goes to work on the bus and carries a little lunch sack. We’ll never-the guy with the suede shoes and all that will not take us. But crooks do come in different-in different forms and, you know, you’re protected with CPIC if you’ve got your securities with a brokerage firm, up to an extent. I think that for the duration you ought to be-I think you ought to be protected for all deposits at all banks. I mean, I just think that’s a move to take, just like we needed to do it for $2500 in 1934. We can’t have people worried basically about banks. And we-and-but, you know, overwhelmingly people are honest, but you should guard against the one that’s-that isn’t. I mean, you should-you should-you should have your own possession of your own security. I mean, that’s one good way to do it.

乔·科南嗯。

KERNENMm-hmm.

沃伦·巴菲特:我现在——我现在依然有一个保管箱,里面放着我的证券。里面只有一两支证券,就那么几支。但骗子永远不会绝迹。

Mr. BUFFETT: I still-I still have a safety deposit box with my securities in it. There’s only one or two securities, just a few securities in it. But we’ll always have crooks.

贝基·奎克沃伦,现在道琼斯指数刚刚站在 6600 点上方,6626 点。五个月前你为《纽约时报》写了一篇评论文章,在文章里你告诉人们——至少标题是这么写的——“买入美国。我正在买入。”

QUICKYou know, Warren, right now the Dow is sitting just above 6600, 6626. Five months ago you wrote an opinion piece for The New York Times where you told people-or least the headline said, “Buy American. I Am.”

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah.

贝基·奎克如今人们回头看那篇文章,会觉得,好吧,自那以后市场跌了不少。您是否后悔当时写了那篇评论文章?

QUICKPeople now look at that and think, OK, market’s come down significantly since then. Do you wish that you’d held off on writing that op-ed?

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,我倒希望自己能精准抄底,但标题可不是我写的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I wish I could pick the bottom, but I didn’t write the headline.

贝基·奎克嗯。

QUICKYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:除了标题,文章其余部分都由我负责。那篇文章一开头我就说情况一团糟,经济会变得更糟,诸如此类。但我确实说了——我也说过我无法预测股市。我不知道底部在哪。我是说,如果我知道底部在哪,我就不用翻看那些 10-K 年报、做那些研究了,直接在底部买标普 500 指数就行了。所以我完全不知道股市明天、下周、下个月或明年会怎样。我其实在文章里把这话说了两遍,编辑说:“你不该把话重复说。”我说:“我就是要说两遍。”但我当时说过,今天也绝对还会这么说——在 10 年的周期里,你持有一组股票(不是单只股票,而是一组股票)所获得的回报,会远好于持有短期国债并不断滚动续投(那样你几乎什么收益都没有),或者好于持有一只收益率只有几个百分点的 10 年期国债。

Mr. BUFFETT: I’m responsible for everything but the headlines. And within the body of that article I said things are-I started off saying things are a mess and they’re going to get worse in the economy and all of that. But I did say-and I said I can’t predict the stock market. I don’t know the bottom. I mean, if I knew the bottom, you know, I wouldn’t have to look up 10-Ks and do all that stuff, I’d just buy the S&P 500 at the bottoms . So I have no idea what the stock market’s going to do tomorrow or next week or next month or next year. And I actually said it twice in the article, and the editor said, You’re not supposed to say things twice.’ I said, I want to say this twice.’ But what I did say, and I’d say it absolutely today, is that you will-over a 10-year period you will do considerably better owning a group of equities and don’t-not just one stock, but a group of equities than you will either owning short-term Treasuries and rolling them, in which case you get virtually nothing, or owning a 10-year Treasury that gets a few percent.

沃伦·巴菲特:我是说,股票会比那个强。我不知道一年内能不能跑赢,我当时也不知道,事后也证明了。但那不是我的玩法。总体而言,按现在的价格,股票的表现会远超美国政府债券。美国政府债券注定会损失购买力。我是说,只要沿着现在的政策走下去,货币随着时间推移必然贬值,这避无可避。你去翻翻历史,没有哪个政府不是这样,历来如此。所以我仍然坚持那篇文章的观点,只是希望我当时晚几个月再发出来就好了。

Mr. BUFFETT: I mean, equities will do better than that. I don’t know whether they’ll do better than that over a year. And I didn’t know then, and that’s been proven. But that’s not my game. And, overall, equities are going to do far better than US government bonds at these prices. The US government bond is guaranteed to lose purchasing power. I mean, it-there’s no way we follow the policies we’re following without money becoming worth less over time. That’s been true of governments every place, you know, forever. So I stand by the article; I just wish I’d run it a few months later.

贝基·奎克嗯,有个非常聪明的人问我,他说你早知道经济会变得更糟。

QUICKWell, they’re-a very smart person asked me, they said you knew that the economy was going to get worse.

沃伦·巴菲特:当然。

Mr. BUFFETT: Sure.

贝基·奎克那您为什么在当时对通用电气、对高盛进行那些大笔投资,而不是再等等?为什么选择那个时间买入?

QUICKSo why did you make the major investments you made in a General Electric, in a Goldman Sachs at the time that you did instead of waiting? Why buy then?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,在那两次交易中,我都拿到了 10% 的优先股,我觉得现在拿不到了。所以,我的意思是,实际上——我不认为高盛现在会给我发 10% 的优先股。虽然他们——如果真发了,还附带权证的话,权证会更便宜。但那时候,这两家公司都急需用钱,我们可以设计出很有吸引力的优先股。不过,生意会变得更糟,并不意味着你就该等着再买股票。我是说,如果……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, both-in those cases, I got 10 percent preferred that I don’t think I could get now. So, I mean, actually-I don’t think Goldman would issue me a 10 percent preferred now. Although they-if they did and there were warrants attached, the warrants would be cheaper. But that was a time when both of those companies wanted money immediately and we could structure a preferred that was attractive. But the fact that business is going to get worse does not mean you should wait to buy stocks. I mean, if…

乔·科南但是,沃伦,我……

KERNENBut, Warren, I…

沃伦·巴菲特:这个——这个——您请,乔。抱歉。

Mr. BUFFETT: It doesn’t-it doesn’t-go ahead, Joe. I’m sorry.

乔·科南我在想,你知道,你当时这么做,吸引力大概就是那个 10% 的收益率吧。不过,你的很多长期——你的长期持仓——比如美国运通,现在几乎能用个位数市盈率买到了。

KERNENI was thinking about, you know, you did and that was the attractiveness, I guess, the 10 percent yield. But I think a lot of your long-term-your long-term holdings-for example, American Express you can now pick up almost for single digits.

沃伦·巴菲特:对。

Mr. BUFFETT: Right.

乔·科南富国银行,您最看好的股票之一,现在是个位数,8.60 美元。高盛,您喜欢它,您说过它不会倒;通用电气,您喜欢它,您说过它会——我记不清了,也许能活 100 年,或者会是一家伟大的公司。现在是 7 美元。在我看来,到本季度末,我们或许就会听到消息,说您大量买入了这些股票。

KERNENWells Fargo, one of your favorites, is single digits, 8.60. Goldman Sachs, you liked it, you said it’s going to be around; GE, you like it, you say it’s going to be-I can’t remember, maybe 100 years or it’s going to be a great company. That’s at $7. It would seem to me that maybe by the end of this quarter we’re going to hear that you were buying a lot of these things.

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,乔,我很高兴你知道,因为……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I’m glad you know, Joe, because…

科南但如果你喜欢它们——如果你喜欢这些东西,并且你以 50 美元左右或别的什么价格长期持有美国运通,那么当你看到它跌到 10 美元并决定说我要——我要在这里大举买入,只是为了摊低我的平均成本,这会给我们带来很大信心。

KERNENBut if you liked them-if you like these things and you’ve held American Express for $50 or whatever for a long time, that would give us a lot of confidence if you saw it at 10 and decided I’m going to-I’m going to buy a lot more here and just lower my average price.

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。美国运通是个特例,乔,因为它已经成为一家银行控股公司。而且,如果你持有——我们持有美国运通超过 10% 的股份。如果你持有超过 10%——如果你持有一家银行控股公司超过 9.9% 左右的股份,我认为你需要得到美联储的批准才能再买一股。所以,他们——我相信他们正在变成一家银行控股公司。按我对法律的理解,这让我们无法再买入该公司的股票,因为我们已经达到了那个持股比例。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. American Express is a special case, Joe, because it’s a-it has become a bank holding company. And if you own over-we own over 10 percent of American Express. If you own over 10 percent of it-if you own over 9.9 something percent of a bank holding company, you need the permission, I believe, of the Federal Reserve to buy another share. So they-they’re becoming a bank holding company I believe. As I understand the law, it precludes us buying another share of that because we are at that percentage already.

乔·科南但是……

KERNENBut…

沃伦·巴菲特:但我——以美国运通为例,很明显,美国运通 2009 年在应收账款上的损失会大大高于去年。他们的盈利也会相应地受到一定影响。但这并不意味着美国运通在 10 美元时就不是一笔绝佳的买入。美国运通会永远存在下去。他们拥有最优质的持卡用户。不幸的是,他们也有一些不那么优质的持卡用户。

Mr. BUFFETT: But I would-American Express, for example, you know, it’s very clear that American Express’ losses in 2009 on their receivables will be, you know, considerably higher than last year. And their earnings will suffer to some degree accordingly. But that doesn’t mean that American Express isn’t a hell of a buy at $10. American Express is going to be around forever. They’ve got the cream of cardholders. Unfortunately, they have some cardholders that aren’t the cream, too.

乔·科南但你——你还不是 GE 的 10% 股东吧,我猜。

KERNENBut you’re not-you’re not a 10 percent in GE, I don’t think, yet.

沃伦·巴菲特:不。不,我——不。而我们——但我们买了 GE 的优先股。你知道,我们——有些东西我喜欢买,但我也想要绝对确定——我的意思是,我的工作就是确保伯克希尔在最艰难的时候不需要任何人的帮助。所以我们保留了大量的现金。但我不喜欢持有超过必要数量的现金,不过我认为的必要数量总是远超别人认为的必要数量,因为我总是从最坏的情况来考虑。

Mr. BUFFETT: No. No, I-and-no. And we-but we bought the preferred of GE. You know, we-there are things I like to buy, but I also want to be absolutely sure-I mean, my job is to be sure that Berkshire does not need the help of anybody in getting through the toughest of times. So we keep a lot of cash. But I don’t like to keep more cash than’s necessary, but I regard necessary as always way more than other people regard as necessary because I always think in terms of worst cases.

贝基·奎克以前你说过,你希望手头留个 100 亿美元。这个数还在吗?

QUICKIn the past, you’ve said $10 billion you like to keep around. Is that still there?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,100 亿美元是绝对底线。所以如果我要——我要说 100 亿美元是底线,那我手头必须要比这个多出不少,才能确保不会低于那个数。因为我们明天可能就碰上飓风或类似的事情,保险业务会受影响,或者,谁知道呢?所以我会留出——留出一些缓冲余地。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, $10 billion is an absolute minimum. So if I’m going-I’m going to say $10 billion is a minimum, I always have to have quite a bit more than that to be sure that I don’t go below that. Because we could have a hurricane tomorrow or something of the sort in our insurance business or, you know, who knows? So I leave-I leave a cushion above that.

贝基·奎克那个缓冲垫比以前大了,还是……

QUICKIs the cushion bigger than it used to be, or is…

沃伦·巴菲特:不。

Mr. BUFFETT: No.

贝基·奎克……跟以往一样,是吧?

QUICK…this the same as always?

沃伦·巴菲特:缓冲垫——变化在于,今年我们做的巨灾保险业务会比现金充裕的年份要少。我琢磨着——你知道,我对自己说,要是洛杉矶、旧金山或太平洋西北地区发生 9.0 级地震之类的事情,我希望事后手头有大笔资金。所以,我必须在安全方面保守一些。但这不代表我就躲进洞里不出门了。有机会买的时候,我们做了箭牌的交易,做了 GE 的交易,还做了高盛的交易——那个时候钱花出去不少。其实,做 GE 交易那会儿,我同时按底价敲定了一笔几十亿美元的强生股票出售。我并不想卖强生,我是说,我喜欢强生。但你知道,我就是——我不愿意——在没同时进账几十亿的情况下,就押进去那么多资金。可这就是我的职责——得保持——我们不能依赖任何人。

Mr. BUFFETT: The cushion-what is-what has changed is that we will do less cat insure-catastrophe insurance business this year than we would have done in a year when we had way-even way more cash. I look in-you know, I look, I say to myself if there’s a 9.0 earthquake in Los Angeles or San Francisco or the Pacific Northwest or something, I want to be prepared to have a lot of money afterwards. And, you know, it-I have to err on the side of caution. But that doesn’t mean I go into a cave either. And when we got the chance to buy, we did the Wrigley deal, we did GE, we did-we did-we did Goldman, a lot of money went out then. In fact, when we did the GE deal I actually simultaneously made a deal with a base price on selling a couple billion dollars’ worth of J&J. I didn’t want to sell J&J. I mean, I like J&J. But I just, you know, I didn’t-I didn’t want to-I didn’t want to commit that much money without having a couple billion coming in at the same time. And that’s my job, though, is to be-I don’t want-we can’t depend on anybody.

贝基·奎克这个问题来自佐治亚州蒂夫顿的凯文。他说:“我一直听到像道格·卡斯这样的人在说,你那种买入并持有的投资风格已经过时了。您觉得这是真的吗?”

QUICKThere’s a question that came in from Kevin in Tifton, Georgia. He says, “I keep hearing people like Doug Kass say that your style of buy and hold investing is dead. Do you think that’s true?”

沃伦·巴菲特:这得看你买入并持有的是什么。你要是以合适的价格买到了好生意——你知道,我们旗下有 70 家子公司。我们有喜诗糖果。我们从 1972 年买入喜诗糖果就一直持有到现在。这是一门非常好的生意。那么,这是否意味着,如果它的股票每天都有报价,我就不能拿个 100 股或 500 股进进出出地倒腾呢?但如果你选对了生意——像可口可乐,从 1886 年或者差不多那时候起,你知道,其产品的人均消费量很可能几乎每年都在增长。所以说,如果我们持有一门好生意——如果另一个人今天买一只股票,明天就卖掉,再换一只买——他可能通过这种操作赚到的钱比我靠买入持有的多。我只知道一点:如果我买对了生意,我就能做得非常好。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, it depends what you buy and hold. It’s-if you buy the right businesses at the right price-you know, we own 70 businesses. We own See’s Candy. So we have bought and hold See’s Candy since 1972. It’s a very good business. Now, does that mean that if it’s stock was quoted every day I couldn’t have danced in and out with 100 shares or 500 shares? But if you’re in the right business-Coca-Cola, 1886 or something like that, you know. Per capita’s probably gone up of their products virtually every year. So, if we own a good business-if some another guy can buy one stock today, sell another-sell it tomorrow, buy another stock-if you-he may be able to make more money doing that than I can do with buy and hold. All I know is if I buy the right businesses, I’ll do very well.

贝基·奎克好了,我们再来回答更多提问。乔说得对,我们收到了成千上万个问题,沃伦,所以请你回到弗吉尼亚州斯普林菲尔德市的亚当的提问。他写信问:“如果你能收回过去一年里做过的一笔投资,你会收回哪一笔,为什么?”

QUICKOK, let’s get to some more questions right now. Joe’s right, we have had thousands that have been coming in, Warren, so we’d like to get you back to one from Adam in Springfield, Virginia. He writes and he wants to know, “If you could take back one investment you’ve made in the last year, what would it be and why?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,那会有不少——我在年报里提到过,你知道,我在油价远高于 100 美元时买入了康菲石油,我对油价的判断错了,所以那支股票我也大错特错。我还买了几只规模小点儿的,在爱尔兰买了几家银行的股票。那件事我没做足功课,完全错了。所以我会犯不少错。有意思的是——我将来还会犯更多错。这是游戏的一部分。你只要确保正确的事情能盖过错误的就行。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, there’d be quite a few in terms-well, I mentioned in the annual report that, you know, I bought ConocoPhillips when oil was selling well above 100, and I was wrong about oil and therefore that made me wrong about that stock big time. I bought a couple of-smaller, but I bought a couple stocks in the-stocks in a couple banks in Ireland. I did not do my homework sufficiently on that, and I was just dead wrong. So I make plenty of mistakes. The interesting thing is-and I’ll make plenty more mistakes, too. That’s part of the game. You just got to make sure that the right things overcome the wrong ones.

贝基·奎克我们想把这一小时集中在您的投资策略上。西风合伙公司的道格·卡斯过去曾写信来,最近他对您的投资风格提出了批评,他也想问您一个问题。他说:“巴菲特先生,您长期秉持的投资哲学主要基于两点:一是成功识别那些业务特许权受到护城河保护的公司;二是永远持有——持有期限是永远。那么,您认为您持有的金融类公司的护城河是否已经被淹没?考虑到商界现在变化比过去更快,您是否计划将‘永远持有’的期限缩短?”

QUICKWe’re trying to focus this hour on your investment strategy. And Doug Kass of Seabreeze Partners has written in in the past, he’s been critical of your investment style recently, and he had a question for you as well. He says, “Mr. Buffett, your long-held investment philosophy has been importantly based on one, successfully identifying companies whose business franchises were protected by moats, and two, holding-a holding period of forever. So do you think the moats of your financial holdings have been flooded, and in light of a business world that’s now changing more rapidly than the past, do you plan to alter your holding period of forever to a lesser period of time?”

沃伦·巴菲特:是啊,嗯——就我们买下的那些生意,比如喜诗糖果之类的,我们确实打算永远持有。我是说,我们的股票打算拿很长时间。《华盛顿邮报》的股票我们从 1973 年就开始持有,可口可乐也拿了很久。但总体来说,我买入它们时,就是抱着永远拥有的想法。报价多少并不太重要。除了股票,我自己还有三样东西。我拥有一支本地球队的四分之一股权。我没有每天看它的报价,已经拿了 15 年了。我在这里附近有个农场,20 年前买的——也不每天看报价。我看的是资产的经营表现。现在,如果我们看看富国银行的表现,我会说,你知道,几年下来——我跟你们说的这些跟管理层没有任何关系。这些不是从他们那里得来的。但我会预计每年有 400 亿美元拨备前利润。在正常情况下,我预计每年大概会有 100 亿到 120 亿美元的损失。我是说,银行业总会亏钱,你只是尽量别亏太多。所以,你知道,算下来数字非常可观。我是说,他们目前做的业务利差巨大,资金成本低得惊人。所以,如果富国银行没有报价,我就像持有我的农场一样持有它,我会看业务的发展情况,然后我想,你知道,这——银行业这两年损失有点大,但每隔几年你总得碰上几个艰难年份。而且当这一切过去后,它的盈利能量会远比以往任何时候都大。唯一的担忧就是政府会强迫你在某个低得离谱的价格卖出股票。我希望他们足够明智,不会那么做。那在很大程度上就是现在银行市场恐慌的根源。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I-in terms of our businesses, the ones we buy, like See’s Candy or those, we really do plan to hold them forever. I mean, our stocks we plan to hold a very long time. Washington Post stock we’ve held since 1973, I believe, and Coke’s been long time. But overall I like to buy them with the idea of owning forever. And the quotes don’t make much difference. I own three things outside stocks. I own-I own-I own a quarter of the baseball team here in town. I don’t get a quote on it every day. I’ve had it 15 years. I own a farm near here, bought it 20 years-I don’t get a quote on it every day. I look to the performance of the asset. Now, if I looked at the performance of Wells Fargo, we’ll say, I see that, you know, in a couple years-and management doesn’t have anything to do with what I’m saying here. I-these are not from them. But I would expect $40 billion a year pre-provision income. And under normal conditions I would expect maybe 10 to $12 billion a year of losses. I mean, you lose money in banking, you just try not to lose too much. So, you know, you get to very interesting figures. I mean, the spreads are enormous on what they’re doing. They’re getting the money at bargain rates. So I-if there were no quote on Wells Fargo and I just owned it like I own my farm, I would look at the way the business is developing, and I would say, you know, it’s-These are a couple of tough years for losses in the banking business, but you expect a couple tough years every now and then.’ And that the earning power is never-is going to be greater by far than it’s ever been when you get all through with it. The only worry in that is the government will force you to sell shares at some terribly low price. And I hope they’re wise enough not to do that. That would-that’s what-that’s what’s spooking the banking market to a big extent.

贝基·奎克您也担心这个。

QUICKYou worry about that, too.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,当然。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, sure.

贝基·奎克所以,您希望华盛顿方面能把他们的计划说清楚……

QUICKThat’s why you’d like some clarity out of Washington on what they’re planning to do…

沃伦·巴菲特:这是原因之一。我特别觉得,在很多跟老百姓钱袋子有关的问题上,透明度对整个国家都是好事,透明度很重要。人们希望把钱的事搞清楚。但我要说,如果我们持有美国合众银行——我们确实持有——或者富国银行,它们三年后的前景比以往任何时候都要好。

Mr. BUFFETT: I-that’s one of the reasons. I particular-I think clarity is a good thing for the whole country on a-on a lot of-any issue to do with people’s money, clarity’s important. People want to be clear about their money. But I would say that if-if we own US Bancorp, which we do, or Wells Fargo, their prospects three years out have been better than ever.

贝基·奎克嗯哼。

QUICKMm-hmm.

沃伦·巴菲特:要是股票没有报价,大家持有这家企业也会觉得挺好。我想他们会说,今年和明年,他们亏的钱会比平时多得多,但该提的准备金也都提了,该做的都做了。除非他们被迫大量增发股票,否则到头来结果不会差。

Mr. BUFFETT: And if they weren’t quoted, you know, people would feel fine owning the business and I think they would say that, you know, they’re going to lose more-way more money than usual that-maybe this year and the next year, but they’ve built the provisions and all that sort of thing. They’re going to come out fine unless they have to issue a ton more shares.

贝基·奎克但眼下政府内部来回争论的是该走哪个方案。混乱很多。原先的想法是用 TARP 资金把有毒资产从银行手里接过来。

QUICKBut the back and forth in the administration right now has been which plan to follow. There’s been a lot of confusion. There was this idea that the TARP money was going to be used to take the toxic assets off of their hands.

沃伦·巴菲特:没问题。

Mr. BUFFETT: Sure.

贝基·奎克有人说,或许他们应该直接买断股份。还有人说,应该国有化。那到底哪个才是正确的做法?

QUICKThere was the idea that maybe they should just be buying shares outright. There’s the idea of nationalization out there. What’s the right answer?

沃伦·巴菲特:正确答案——在我看来正确的做法是,总统以他独有的方式把事情讲清楚,因为你们已经听到了太多五花八门的说法。他们确实在尽力沟通,但美国人民不久前才托付信任的人,是巴拉克·奥巴马。他非常善于表达。他——他是这场行动的统帅,这事儿必须说清楚。就像我说的,纽约联储主席做了个演讲,解释了很多内容,但没多少人会去仔细听他说了什么。你需要美国总统出面,把话说得明明白白。因为如果大家不清楚,他们就会困惑。如果困惑,他们就会吓破胆。这种情况必须结束。

Mr. BUFFETT: The right answer-the right answer for me is the president to clarify things as only he can, because you have heard so many different things. And, you know, they’re doing their best to communicate, but the person that the people of the United States gave their trust to not that long ago was Barack Obama. He speaks very well. He has-he is the commander in chief on this, and it has to be clarified. Like I say, the head of the New York Fed gave a talk, explained a lot of it, but nobody’s going to pay that much attention to what he says. You need the president of the United States to make it very clear. Because if people aren’t clear, they’re going to be confused. And if they’re going to be confused, they are going to be scared stiff. And that has to end.

贝基·奎克听您这么说,几乎像是他选哪个都无所谓,只要他从中选一个就行。

QUICKDoes that-you make it sound almost like it doesn’t matter what he says, as long as he picks one of those.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,那重要……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, it matters…

贝基·奎克那你——你得——你得是往一个方向倾斜了。

QUICKThat’s-you’ve got to-you’ve got to be leaning one direction.

沃伦·巴菲特:是有点关系。但我们也知道,中途岛战役是重要的战役,对吧,或者菲律宾沦陷的时候,所有这些——我是说,你得假设你需要一个总司令。他们得聪明,得把国家利益放在心上。然后你不能指望在每个问题上都和他们意见一致。如果你不同意,你仍然要支持大局。

Mr. BUFFETT: It matters somewhat. But we know that the Battle of Midway was the, you know, the important battle, you know, or that, you know, in terms of when the Philippines fell, all the-I mean, you’ve got to-you’ve got to assume that you need a commander in chief. They’ll be intelligent, they’ve got the interests of the country at heart. And then you can’t expect to agree with them on every point. And if you don’t, you still get behind the effort.

乔·科南嘿,沃伦,你刚才说到有些投资你可能会后悔。这不是去年才做的,但你那个……卖出看跌期权,是对标普 500 指数的一个长期押注,我觉得你至少时不时得按市价调整一下账面,现在这笔浮盈已经几十亿了。你后悔不?以后能兑现吗?你现在还持有多久,标普 500 指数最后得涨到多少才算数?

KERNENHey, Warren, you’re talking about some of the investments maybe you regret. This wasn’t made last year, but your what was it, a sale of puts, a long-term bet on the S&P that I think you have to mark at least a little bit to market once in a while, and it’s up in the billions now. Do you regret that? Is that going to work out in the future? How long do you have now, where does the S&P have to end up?

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,标普 500 指数在我们做这些交易之后,过了 15 到 20 年,最终必须得涨回来,才能按照我们当初的价格成交。不过,如果标普最终跌了 15% 左右,我们也就刚够保本,但至少这 15 到 20 年里我们一直用着这笔钱。所以我们大概持有 48 亿美元的头寸。第一笔会在 2019 年下半年到期。显然,我更愿意现在而不是几年前就建立这些头寸。但如果你给我两个选择,要么根本不做这些头寸、再也做不了,要么维持现有的头寸,我会选择维持现有的。我觉得——我觉得我们很可能会赚钱。我能肯定的一点是,我们会借此持有将近 50 亿美元的资金,长达 15 到 20 年。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, the S&P has to end up 15 or 20 years from the time we did the deals at the price at which we did them. Although, if the S&P actually ends up, you know, 15 percent below or so, we still break even and we’ve had the use of the money for 15 or 20 years. So we’re holding about $4.8 billion. The first one comes due in the latter part of 2019. And obviously I would rather put those positions on now than having put them on a few years ago. But if you-if you gave me the choice of not having the positions at all, and not being able to put them on or sticking with the positions we have, I would stick with the positions we have. I think-I think we will-the odds are good we will make money. And the thing I know for sure is we’ll hold almost $5 billion for between 15 and 20 years in conjunction with it.

科南那些是衍生品。您不喜欢衍生品,但那次您还是用了它们,对吧?

KERNENThose are derivatives. You don’t like derivatives, but you used them in that case, right?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我们使用衍生品已经很多很多年了。我并不认为衍生品本身是邪恶的,但我认为它们是危险的。我一直都说它们很危险,我说过它们是金融领域的大规模杀伤性武器。但铀也很危险,我大约两周前刚参观过一个核电站。汽车也很危险。

Mr. BUFFETT: I-well, we’ve used derivatives for many, many years. I don’t think derivatives are evil, per se, I think they are dangerous. I’ve always said they’re dangerous. I said they were financial weapons of mass destruction. But uranium is dangerous, and I just went through a nuclear electric plant about two weeks ago. Cars are dangerous.

沃伦·巴菲特:但我的意思是,每个美国人都想拥有一把。你知道,很多事物都可能具有危险性,但我们通常会规范它们的使用方式。比方说,前几天我在核电站的时候,那儿就有个警卫端着机关枪对着我。所以我们每天使用的很多危险物品,通常都会注意使用方法。我们会对汽车的行驶速度做出规定。

Mr. BUFFETT: But I mean, every American wants to have one. You know, the-a lot of things can be dangerous, but generally we regulate how they’re used. I mean, there was a-there was some guard up there with a machine gun on me, you know, when I was at the nuclear plant the other day. So we use lots of things daily that are dangerous, but we generally pay some attention to how they’re used. We tell the cars how fast they can go.

乔·科南嗯,希望如此,贝克,我们有机会聊聊,你知道的,美国国际集团,还有我们需要做些什么……

KERNENWell, hopefully, Beck, we’ll have a chance to talk about, you know, AIG and what we need to do…

贝基·奎克嗯哼。

QUICKMm-hmm.

乔·科南……因为,你知道,能签那么多保险合同,沃伦,而且不用提供任何抵押品,这肯定让监管机构现在得盯紧点,对吧?我是说,这就是——这就是我们现在陷入这团乱麻的原因。

KERNEN…because to be able to, you know, to write that many insurance contracts, Warren, and not put up any collateral, that’s got to be something that regulators at this point, right? I mean, that is-that’s why we’re in this mess right now.

沃伦·巴菲特:我给——我早在 1981 年就给丁格尔议员写过信,那时候他们——你知道,这些东西——它们很危险。

Mr. BUFFETT: I wrote-I wrote Congressman Dingell in 1981 about it, when they-you know, these are-they are dangerous.

贝基·奎克你指的是美国国际集团,还是泛指衍生品?

QUICKAbout AIG, or about derivatives in general?

沃伦·巴菲特:哦,它们——其实是——嗯,实际上是关于交易标普 500 指数,以及当你允许人们像疯了一样加杠杆时你会陷入的危险——衍生品让你能做到这一点。1929 年之后,我们在美国设定了保证金要求。我们说 1929 年是一场可怕的崩盘,部分原因是股市造成的,而部分原因则是人们用很少的首付买股票。所以美国国会告诉美联储:“你来监管这个。”那是 75 年前的事了。他们至今仍在监管,但衍生品让人们完全可以绕过保证金规定。它们让这些规定变得毫无意义。于是我们给整个系统加了杠杆,现在正在承受痛苦,而且痛苦蔓延到了那些跟去杠杆毫无关系的人身上。这影响巨大。所以我们确实需要——我们需要一些新东西。

Mr. BUFFETT: Oh, they were-it was-well, it was actually about trading the S&P 500 and what-the dangers you get into when you allow people to leverage up like crazy, which derivatives allow you to do. We put margin requirements in in the United States after 1929. We said that ’29 was a terrible crash, it was partly brought on by the stock market and that was partly brought on by the fact that people were buying stocks with very little down payments. So the United States Congress said to the Fed, You regulate this thing.’ That’s been 75 years ago. They still regulate it, but derivatives enable people entirely to get around margin regulations. They made them meaningless. And so we leveraged up the system and we are now feeling the pain and the spread out of the pain to people who had nothing to do with it from the deleveraging the system. And it’s massive. So we do need-we need something new.

贝基·奎克AIG 当时之所以能做到这一点,部分原因在于它拥有很高的信用评级。

QUICKPart of the reason AIG was able to do that was because its high credit rating at that point.

沃伦·巴菲特:毫无疑问。是的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Absolutely. Yeah.

贝基·奎克你并不是在暗示他们应该根据人们的信用评级来改变首付比例的规定,对吧?因为你的 AAA 信用评级让你从中受益。

QUICKYou’re not suggesting necessarily they change the rules on how much people have to put down based on their credit ratings, right? Because you benefit from your AAA credit rating.

巴菲特:对。虽然我们现在受益不如以前了。但美国国际集团有那个美国国际集团金融产品部。我——当年买通用再保险的时候,他们有个叫通用再保险金融产品部的东西。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Although we benefit less these days than before. But AIG had this AIG financial products. I-when I bought Gen Re, they had something called GenRe financial products.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

巴菲特:他们有 23800 份合约。说真的,我估计里面大概有 22000 份我根本搞不懂。我花了时间——而且我很清楚我转不过这个弯来。那个部门据说年年赚钱,管它的人赚了大把钞票,什么都好。你知道,要是他们一直留着它,很可能把公司搞垮。任何事情,只要你拿一家伟大机构的信用出去开始做各种各样的事——巨大的杠杆就会让你陷入麻烦。花旗集团能搞结构性投资工具(SIV),就是因为大家都信任花旗集团,而且没人知道——所有这些玩意儿都不在资产负债表上。这是一种绕过资本要求的办法。你得提防那些掌管大笔资金的人。

Mr. BUFFETT: They had 23,800 contracts. Hell, I, you know, I couldn’t understand 22,000 of them, probably. I spent-and I know I couldn’t get my mind around it. You-that-and people recorded profit every-you know, that section made a profit every year, supposedly, and the guy that ran it made a lot of money and everything. You know, it probably would have busted the company if they-if they’d kept it around. Anything where you use the credit of a great institution to go out and start doing all kinds of things that-enormous leverage gets you in trouble. Citigroup could do SIVs because everybody trusted Citigroup, you know, and nobody knew that, you know, all this stuff was off balance sheet. It was a way of getting around capital requirements. You have to watch people that had all big sums of money.

贝基·奎克乔,你知道,今天早上另一个大新闻是底特律三大汽车巨头的事。问题一大堆,奥巴马总统的汽车沙皇今天在那里开会,想搞清楚他们是否要再给通用和克莱斯勒贷款。沃伦,周末有些评论又冒出来了。参议员麦凯恩,又在周日早间访谈节目里聊了通用,他的看法是让通用破产。这是个天大的问题。你要是现在坐在奥巴马总统的位置上,面对通用,你会怎么做?

QUICKYou know, Joe, one of the other big stories of the morning is what’s been happening with the Big Three in Detroit. A lot of questions there and President Obama’s car czars are meeting there today to try and get a handle on whether or not they’re going to be loaning more money to GM and to Chrysler. There were some comments made over the weekend, Warren. Senator McCain, again, on the Sunday morning talk shows, talked a little bit about GM and his opinion was to let GM go bankrupt. This is a huge question. What would you do if you were in President Obama’s shoes right now with GM?

巴菲特:我能用一下求助热线吗?打个电话给朋友……

Mr. BUFFETT: Can I use a lifeline? Phone a friend…

贝基·奎克这时候要不要打个电话求助一下?

QUICKPhone a friend at this point?

巴菲特:……这个问题很难。我的意思是,确实非常难。

Mr. BUFFETT: …that’s a tough one. I mean, that is very tough.

贝基·奎克是啊。

QUICKYeah.

巴菲特:但现实情况是,我们路上有 2.5 亿辆汽车和轻型卡车。年复一年,我们大概生产 1500 万辆左右,因为 2.5 亿辆车有使用寿命,形成一个正常周期。但上个月我们的销量降到了 900 万辆多一点。所以,这对各地的汽车制造商来说都是一段极其、极其、极其艰难的时期。通用汽车有很多——或者说整个汽车行业,国内汽车行业有很多遗留成本。他们过去干了些蠢事,因为他们脑子里装的商业模式已经不复存在了。工会通过谈判争取到了那些东西,他们觉得这是自己应得的,他们达成了协议,然后背后还依赖着几十万退休人员,等等一堆事。所以,你需要一种新的商业模式,某种程度上。你也需要经济复苏。不光是商业模式的问题。总的来说,我的结论是——如果他们能修改商业模式,让它适应年产 1300 万辆的现实(未来有些年份我们会卖得比这更好)。如果他们能调整,建立起一套能适应这个销量的商业模式,我就能帮他们挺过这段时期。我不指望一套能在 900 万辆销量下运转的商业模式能行得通,因为 900 万辆的销量根本撑不起它。另一方面,未来某个时候,我们每年会卖出 1300 万、1400 万、1500 万辆。

Mr. BUFFETT: But you have this situation where we have 250 million cars and light trucks on the road. Year after year we produce maybe 15 million or something like that because there’s a lifetime to the 250 million, sort of a normal cycle. But we got down last month, you know, a little over nine million. So you are in a terrible, terrible, terrible period for the-for the carmakers every place. GM has a lot of-or the auto industry, the domestic auto industry has a lot of legacy costs. They did some dumb things in the past because they had a business model in mind that doesn’t exist anymore. The union bargained for those things, you know, they feel entitled to them, they made a deal, you know, and they’ve got hundreds of thousands of retirees dependent on it and all sorts of things. So you need a new business model somewhat. You also need a recovery. It isn’t just the business model. And I would say net I would come down on-if they modify the business model to adapt to the reality of a 13 million car a year and we’ll do better than that in the future in some years. If they adapt, have a business model that works with that I would get them through this period. I would not expect to have a business model that works at nine million units because it isn’t going to work at nine million. On the other hand, we are going to sell 13, 14, 15 million units a year sometime in the future.

贝基·奎克但你认为他们能拿出那样一套商业模式,一套不用进入破产程序就能跑通的模式吗?

QUICKBut you think you can get that business model, one that works without going into bankruptcy?

沃伦·巴菲特:难就难在这里,这也是本届政府、管理层和工会需要共同面对的挑战。我很清楚——是现任管理层之前的人把我们带进了这种处境。冲着现在经营三巨头的人生气没什么用。冲着工会发火也没什么用。他们是靠谈判拿到了现有的东西,你也知道,这些人是靠着那些承诺来养家糊口的。往前走,这套行不通了,必须做出修正,而各个层级的人在里面都得承担利害关系——他们应该——他们应该设法在破产程序之外来完成这件事。我的意思是,美国人民不需要看到,怎么说呢,美国某种意义上算是自家本土的龙头产业,现在去申请破产。但在我看——他们需要一份——他们需要一份新的商业计划。但这不应该非得是一份在年销量 900 万、1000 万甚至 1100 万辆时才能跑通的计划。它必须是一份在年销 1300 万辆时能跑通的计划。我们迟早会回到那个水平的。这跟我们现在房地产的情况一个道理,贝基。

Mr. BUFFETT: That’s the tough thing, and that’s the challenge of the administration, the management and the unions working together. And I understand-the present managements didn’t get us into this situation. There’s no use getting mad at, you know, at the people now running the Big Three. There’s no use getting mad at the union. They bargained for what they’ve got and, you know, these people, they counted on it. It won’t work going forward and there have to be modifications made and people at all levels have to have a stake in that if-they should-they should try to accomplish it outside of bankruptcy. I mean, the American people do not need, you know, America’s sort of hometown industry going into bankruptcy now. But I-they need a-they need a new business plan. It shouldn’t have to be a business plan that works at nine or 10 or even 11 million units. It has to be a business plan that works at 13 million. We’ll get back to that. It’s the same thing as in housing, Becky.

贝基·奎克嗯嗯。

QUICKMm-hmm.

沃伦·巴菲特:你知道,我们现在全国大概多出了 150 万套房子。是这么回事,一边是新家庭组建在创造住房需求,另一边是有人在不断盖房子。有一阵子,我们一年要建大概 175 万套左右,而新组建的家庭只有 130 万,况且这些新组建的家庭里,大概只有三分之二想拥有自己的房子,这样算下来,实际需求可能也就 100 万套,你猜后来怎么着?房子盖冒了。现在新房开工许可已经掉到了 50 万套左右。我们正在消化那多出的 150 万套库存。但我们得靠时间慢慢把这些问题消化掉,汽车行业的问题也得这么慢慢来。

Mr. BUFFETT: You know, we have a million and a half too many houses around now, you know. You own-you have household formation over here creating demand for houses, and you have people building houses. For a while we were building a million and three-quarters or something like that and household formation was a million three, and two-thirds of the people that form houses want to live in their own house so maybe you had demand for a million, and guess what happened? We had too many houses. Now we’ve got the housing construction down to 500,000 new permits or something like that. We’re using up the million and a half units. But we have to work our way out of it and we have to work our way out of the car situation.

贝基·奎克好,你提到了房地产问题。华盛顿州西雅图一位叫鲍勃的观众发来了一个问题。他的问题是:“你是否认为,过去 10 到 15 年的美国经济就是一座纸牌屋?那些要求扩大放贷、增加借贷的呼声,不就是打算在原地重建同一座纸牌屋吗?”

QUICKWell, you bring-you bring up the housing situation. And Bob from Seattle, Washington, wrote in. He’s got a question where he says, “Do you believe that the American economy of the last 10 to 15 years has been a house of cards? Won’t the cries for more lending and more borrowing just rebuild that same house?”

沃伦·巴菲特:那——那不是一座纸牌屋,但过去这段时间,这确实是一个靠着加杠杆——不断加杠杆而获益的经济体。

Mr. BUFFETT: It was-it was not a house of cards, but it was an economy that was benefiting from leverage-leveraging up.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:而当你加杠杆的时候,日子当然是很舒服的。我是说,你造的房子可以比人们实际购买的量——或者说,比自然需求更多,你还会招来人们炒房,还有人会通过撒谎来住进自己根本负担不起的房子。所以,住在自有住房里的美国家庭比例确实是往上走了一点,但上升的原因正是那些人根本就没有相应的收入。现在这个比例必须得降下来。但这根本不是什么纸牌屋。我是说,我们的经济体系确实在实实在在地运转。就拿我们旗下一家店来说:差不多 90 年前,一位女性从俄罗斯出走,来到美国,攒了 500 美元——她花了 16 年才攒下这笔钱——现在,这是全美国最大的家居用品卖场,一年做 4 亿美元的生意。可从没见谁从美国出走跑去俄罗斯,靠 500 美元能做成一家 4 亿美元卖场的。这位女士不识字、不会写,但她是在美国这套体系里奋斗。她给顾客更实惠的价格,比谁干活都拼,人也聪明,最终白手起家干成了一番大得不得了的事业,现在雇着几千号人。美国这套体系确实行得通,而且在过去 10 年也一直行得通,只不过,我们在加杠杆这件事上,确实干了一些非常蠢的事。

Mr. BUFFETT: And when you leverage up, it’s very pleasant. I mean, you can build more houses than people are buying, you know, and-or the natural demand is for and you’ll get people speculating in them and you’ll get people lying in order to get into houses they can’t afford. And so the percentage of people besides the American households that lived in their own house went a little bit and it went up a little bit because those people really didn’t have the income to do it. Now it has to go down. But it was not a house of cards at all. I mean, we have an economy that really works. We are in a store where a woman walked out of Russia, you know, 90 years ago almost and she came to the United States, saved $500-it took her 16 years to do it-this is the largest home furnishing store in the United States, it does $400 million. Nobody walked out of the United States to go to Russia and ended up with a $400 million store with $500. This woman couldn’t read or write, but she worked within the American system. She gave better-people better deals, she worked harder than anybody else, she was smart and she built an enormous success that employs thousands of people. America works, and America was-has been working the last 10 years, but we just did some very dumb things in terms of leveraging up.

贝基·奎克您说的是罗斯·布拉姆金,那位创办了内布拉斯加家具城的 B 夫人。

QUICKYou’re talking about Rose Blumkin who built the Nebraska Furniture Market.

沃伦·巴菲特:对,内布拉斯加家具城——没错。确实没人会反着走,离开美国往俄罗斯跑。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, market-yeah. Nobody walks out of the United States to go to Russia.

贝基·奎克我们来略微谈谈房地产行业本身。有人说,整场危机最初就是由房地产行业触发的。

QUICKLet’s talk a a little bit about the housing industry itself. There are people who say this entire crisis started because of the housing industry.

沃伦·巴菲特:我同意这个说法。

Mr. BUFFETT: I agree.

贝基·奎克纽约州州长大卫·帕特森上周末在《华尔街日报》发表了一篇观点文章,里面说:“总统提出的按揭救助方案就是那个正确的方案。”你同意这个说法吗?

QUICKDavid Paterson, the governor of New York, wrote an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal over the weekend, and he said, “The mortgage plan that the president has proposed is the right one.” Do you agree with that?

沃伦·巴菲特:哦,我其实连方案的所有细节都还不清楚,但我想说的是,当局应该愿意随时听取能让方案变得更好一点的务实的改进建议。不过——我也不确定他是不是真需要这种建议,我只是说,他们应该对此持开放态度。但不管怎样,他们确实得拿出一套方案来。至于那种认为这么做会帮到某些或许本不该被帮到的人的想法,你知道的,在我看来,这又跟珍珠港事件之后的情况类似——有人说那是海军的错,所以陆军和海军陆战队等等都不该参与救人,美国人民也不该行动,因为海军自己闯的祸就该自己受着、自生自灭之类的。我们必须把住房问题理顺。现在,最大的问题是我们手头大概多出了 150 万套闲置房屋。空置率因此上升了好几个百分点,而 8000 万套存量房的 2% 正好就是 160 万套左右。我们必须把这些多出的房子消化掉。我们最终会消化掉的,但我们在消化的过程中——我们不可能凭空变出更多家庭来。我们总不能叫 14 岁的孩子全去结婚生娃,好让我们能有更多家庭吧。所以,我们只能——只能大致按正常的人口规律来慢慢化解。不过,我们每年依然会新增 130 万个家庭。在剔除所有其他因素之后,这其中大概有 90 万个家庭想搬进自己的房子,再加上我们每年也会拆除一些老旧房屋。这样我们就能逐步吸收掉那些过剩的供给。我们很幸运,有人口增长。当年日本陷入困境的时候,他们可没有人口增长。我们有人口增长。未来就一定会有需求,五年后美国的房屋总数一定会比现在多。十年后也一定会比五年后更多。所以我们能慢慢吸收。但我们不可能在一周、一个月或者一年内就解决问题。事情根本不是这样发生的。而我——我认为,拿出一套按揭方案,想办法把那些尚有还款能力的人的月供降到他们收入的合理比例——这本该是在放贷一开始就做到的——这种想法并不是疯了。我是说,解决这个具体问题对我们大家都有利。而且我们不应该再去相互指指点点了。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I don’t even know all the details, but I would say that the administration ought to be willing to listen to very prompt suggestions on ways to make it a little bit better. But-and I don’t know that he even needs it, but I’m just saying they ought to be open-minded about that. But they ought to have a plan. And the idea that it benefits some people that maybe shouldn’t be benefited, you know, to me that’s, again, like after Pearl Harbor saying it was the Navy’s fault so the Army and the Marines and all aren’t going to join in and help, and the American people shouldn’t do it because the Navy should stew in their own juice or something like that. We need to get the housing situation straightened out. Now the biggest-the big problem is we’ve got about a million and a half too many houses sitting around now. And the vacancy rate is up a couple percentage points on that and 2 percent of 80 million homes is a million six or something like that. We have to work through that. And we will work through it, but we’ll work through it-we can’t-we can’t create a lot more households. We can’t tell the 14 year olds to all get married and start having children so we can have more households. So we got to-got to sort of work with the normal demographics here. But we will have a million three hundred thousand households for them. Nine hundred thousand of those will want to move into their own houses netting everything out and we’ll have some housing destroyed. So we can sop up the demand. We’re lucky we have population growth. When Japan gets-got in trouble, they didn’t have population growth. We have population growth. There’s going to be demand, there’s going to be more houses in the United State five years from now than now. There’ll be more in 10 years than five years. So we can sop it up. But we can’t do it in a week or a month or a year. It just doesn’t happen. We-and I think that having a mortgage plan somehow gets payments for those who can make them down to a reasonable percentage of their income, which is where it should have been in the first place, is not crazy. I mean, we have an interest in solving that particular problem. And we shouldn’t finger-point.

贝基·奎克那是不是意味着我们不会重蹈日本覆辙?我们谈的不会是一个长达 20 年的停滞市场吧?

QUICKDoes that mean we’re not the next Japan? We’re not talking about 20 years of a stagnant market?

沃伦·巴菲特:根本不是 20 年,不。

Mr. BUFFETT: Not 20 years at all, no.

贝基·奎克我们说的是 10 年吗?什么……

QUICKAre we talking about 10 years? What…

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这得看情况。坦率地说,最好的情况可能是——我在砖块行业、地毯行业,所有这些行业都因为新屋开工不足而受到冲击。但新屋开工不足本身就是解决这个问题的重要因素。如果你有太多房子,而需求又保持一定增长——如果需求每年增长 X%,而你又……(听不清)……接下来你要建的房子会——你会改善局面,我们面临一个选择。你可以要么炸掉 15 亿栋房子,要么让新建房屋数量少于自然需求消化量。我想说,你知道,大概两到三年内,你就能走出这个困境。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, it just-it depends. Frankly, the best thing that could happen-I’m in the brick business, I’m been in the carpet business, I’m in all these businesses which are getting hurt by the lack of new construction. But the lack of new construction is an important ingredient to this. If you’ve got too many houses and you’ve got a certain growth and demand-if demand is going to grow by X per year, and if you…(unintelligible)…the next houses you’re going to-you’re going to improve the situation and we-you got a choice. You can either-you can either blow up a billion and a half houses or you can create few houses than natural demand sops up. And I would say that, you know, you can work your way out of it in a couple of years probably, two to three years.

贝基·奎克两到三年,这跟……差别非常大

QUICKTwo to three years, which is very different than what…

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛——其实取决于建造了多少座。我们确实……

Mr. BUFFETT: Don’t-well, it just depends how many are constructed. We really…

沃伦·巴菲特:……新房开工量的确降了很多。我记得最新的年化数字大约在 50 万套左右,或者类似的水平。这影响非常大。这种情况有段时间没出现了。我是说,之前——机器的速度必须降下来了。

Mr. BUFFETT: …the new housing starts have really gone down. I think the last figure’s around 500,000 or something like that annual. And that makes a big difference. That didn’t happen for a while. I mean, it was-they had to slow down the machine.

乔·科南对,我想回头说说沃伦刚才说的,贝基——这话我们平时不怎么听到——过去这 10 年,沃伦,你说经济总体上还是运转过来了。自由市场经济……我们现在回头看,好像觉得过去这 10 年我们走的每一步都是错棋,才导致了眼下这场危机。我知道你不太喜欢布什的减税政策,但你不能把孩子和洗澡水一起倒掉吧,是不是?也许确实需要更多监管,但总体来说,我们为什么搞成了现在这个烂摊子?

KERNENYeah, I want to go back to something Warren said quickly, Becky, and that was that-and we don’t hear this enough-that in the past 10 years, Warren, you said that things basically did work in the economy. That the free-market economy-we seem to look back now and think that over the past 10 years that every step we made was a misstep that led to this crisis where we are right now. And I know you weren’t a big fan of the Bush tax cuts, but you can’t throw out the baby with the bathwater, can you, in terms of-maybe there needed to be more regulation, but overall why are we in this mess right now?

巴菲特:我们陷入当前困境的最大原因,就是全国上下都在加杠杆,实际上是在住房上押下了巨额赌注,但这又衍生出了各式各样的金融工具。不过——总的来说,过去 10 年里很多事是做得对的,未来 10 年里也有很多事会是对的。现在这台机器卡住了,卡住的原因就是缺乏信心,这让人感到恐惧,我的意思是,恐惧在反复传导,这就成了一个恶性循环。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, we’re-the biggest reason we’re in the mess, you know, is we did leverage up the country and we essentially made a huge bet on housing, but that led to all kinds of other instruments. And-but net over the 10 years a lot of things were-happened that were right and over the next 10 years a lot of things will happen that are right. The-this machine is gummed up right now and it’s gummed up by a lack of confidence and that makes people scared and, I mean, it feeds back and forth and it’s a vicious cycle.

沃伦·巴菲特:这个纪录会被打破——一定会被打破。我敢打包票,乔。我觉得它迟早会被打破……

Mr. BUFFETT: That will be broken-that will be broken. I’ll guarantee it’ll be broken, Joe. I think it’ll just be broken…

乔·科南难道不是……

KERNENDoesn’t…

巴菲特先生:……如果早一点的话……

Mr. BUFFETT: …sooner if…

乔·科南自由市场天生带的那种自由,难道不是经常给你足够的绳子让你把自己吊死吗?也许我们可以这么看?我是说,我们怎么确保贪婪——贪婪在过去 500 年里的每一次泡沫中都插了一脚,而且我们经历了很多次。如果……

KERNENDoesn’t the freedom inherent in a free market give you enough rope to hang yourself a lot of times? And maybe we can look at it that way? I mean, how do we make sure that greed-greed has been involved with every bubble that we’ve had over the past 500 years and we’ve had a lot of them. And if…

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yes.

乔·科南……你身处自由市场,这儿有的是绳子让你上吊,对吧?

KERNEN…you’re in a free market, you’re going to have enough rope to hang yourself, no?

沃伦·巴菲特:没错。嗯,你——对,你希望我有足够长的绳子把自己吊死,就是不想让我有足够长的绳子把整个国家都搭进去。然后……

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, you-yeah, you want me to have enough free rope to hang myself, you just don’t want me to have enough rope to hang the whole country. And…

乔·科南没错。

KERNENRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:……我们永远都会——我是说,失败是美国体系的一部分。但你不希望制造出这样的条件,让失败——让那些大型机构的失败——变得具有传染性,引发恐慌,诸如此类。但这种事偶尔还是会发生,毫无疑问。自由市场会走过头,会做错事。它比任何其他制度都管用,但在某些领域,必须加以审视,因为有些领域里,人干的蠢事可能会在整个经济中传染。

Mr. BUFFETT: …we’ll always-I mean, failure is part of the American system. But you don’t want to create conditions where failure becomes-of such large institutions becomes contagious, produces fear, all of those sort of things. But that’ll happen occasionally. There’s no question about it. Free markets overshoot, they do some things that are wrong. They work better than anything else, but they have to-in certain arenas they have to be looked at because there are areas where people-where what you-what you do that’s stupid can be contagious throughout an economy.

沃伦·巴菲特:你——你并不——我不想——我完全没有想要离开市场体系的意思。但你的确需要政府,尤其是在像现在这样的时刻,你特别需要政府。

Mr. BUFFETT: You don’t-you don’t-you don’t want-I have no desire to leave the market system at all. But you do need government and you particularly need government at a time like this.

贝基·奎克没错,我们确实需要。我们也收到了大量观众提问,所以想回到一部分邮件上去。整个上午邮件一直没断过。沃伦,我想先从一个问题开始,来自佛罗里达州维罗海滩的汤姆。他的问题是:“鉴于伯克希尔·哈撒韦主要是买入股票,如果您觉得道琼斯指数会跌到 2000 点,您会公开说出您的想法吗?还是会觉得有义务将这些想法保密?”

QUICKThat’s right, we do. We also have questions from lots and lots of viewers so we’d like to get back to some of those e-mails. They’ve been coming in all morning long. And Warren, I’d like to start with one right now from Tom in Vero Beach, Florida. His question is, “Given that Berkshire Hathaway primarily buys stocks, if you felt the Dow was going to slide to 2,000 would you state your thoughts publicly, or would you feel an obligation to keep those thoughts private?”

沃伦·巴菲特:我从来不会对道琼斯指数将走向 2000 点、12000 点、4300 点或者 20200 点什么的有感觉。我并不——我只知道长期来看它会走高。我的意思是,美国企业的价值会随时间增长。美元会贬值。会有留存收益积累起来推升价值。这个国家的人口会增多,购买力也会增强。股票长期会更值钱。至于中间怎么走,我毫无头绪。就拿我 20 年前买的那片农场来说吧,它可能在每亩 1800 美元上下波动过,也可能到过 1200 美元,我压根不关心这些。我只知道,长期来看,这片农场每亩能产出 120 蒲式耳的玉米,等等。所以我从来不去预测股价。

Mr. BUFFETT: I would never have a feeling that the Dow is going to go to 2,000 or 12,000 or 4300 or 20,200. I don’t-I know over time it will go higher. I mean, American business will be worth more over time. The dollar will be worth less. They’ll be retained earnings that build up values. There will be more people in this country and they’ll have more buying power. Stocks will be worth more over time. I have no idea where they’ll go in between. For all I know, that farm I bought, you know, 20 years ago, it may have bobbed around 8, you know, $1800 an acre, 1200, I don’t even know anything about that. I just know that the farm, over time, will produce 120 bushels of corn, you know, per acre, etc. So I’ve never tried to predict stock prices.

贝基·奎克你知道吗,这挺有意思的。我刚才提到道琼斯指数在 6626 点,我这么说的时候,你也评论了一句。

QUICKYou know, it was interesting. I made a comment earlier that the Dow was at 6626 and when I did, you made a comment about it, too.

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。当它在 6626 点的时候——在上个世纪之初,1900 年,它是在 66 点。所以涨了 100 倍。而我们还经历了大萧条、两次世界大战、流感大流行、核弹、冷战。我的意思是,你能想到的灾难都经历过了。在那 100 年里,至少有 15 年看起来糟透了,有那么五六年看起来,你知道,几乎是灾难性的。可到头来,这个体系运转得极为出色。但——它并不是每天、每周或每月都运转良好,有些时候政府需要成为一个非常重大的因素,来确保它重新回到轨道上。但它会奏效的。我向你保证,道琼斯指数会高得多。但我对 10 年或 20 年后会到什么点位、或者别的什么指标,毫无概念。我一点也不知道。你知道,2000 点、8000 点,这些不过都是些数字。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. When it was at 6626, at the start of 19-the last century, 1900, it was at 66. So it’s gone up 100 for one. And we had the Great Depression, two world wars, the flu epidemic, the nuclear bomb, the cold war. I mean, you name it. At least 15 years in that 100 years looked terrible and five or six of them looked, you know, almost disastrous. And in the end, this system works extremely well. And-but it doesn’t work well every day or every week or every month and there are times when government needs to be a very big factor to make sure it starts getting back on the tracks. But it will work. I will guarantee you that the Dow will be a lot higher. I’ll have no idea about the numbers or anything else, 10 or 20 years from now. I have no idea. You know, 2,000, 8,000, they’re all numbers.

贝基·奎克很多观众写信来,问了一些关于你们投资的具体问题。戴维来信问:“你为陶氏化学收购罗门哈斯公司提供了融资承诺。你对即将到来的诉讼以及这笔交易是否应当继续推进有什么看法?”

QUICKA lot of viewers wrote in and had specific questions about your investments. David wrote in and says, “You’ve committed financing for Dow Chemical’s acquisition of Rohm and Haas Company. What are your thought on the upcoming lawsuit and whether or not the deal should continue to move forward?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这事我没法评论。诉讼要么发生,要么不发生。我猜他们很快就会做决定。我是说,去年夏天达成的任何交易,就像打高尔夫的人常说的,每一推都有人欢喜。但现在是所有卖家都开心,所有买家都不开心。你知道,现在不可能按原条款成交了。顺便提一句,我们承诺购买 30 亿美元的优先股。这不是一个什么好的承诺。我是说,从我们会履约这个意义上它是好的——正如我跟陶氏 CEO 所说,就算本·伯南克跟帕丽斯·希尔顿私奔到南美,我们的 30 亿也会到位。我是说,他们拿得到那笔钱。但今天看来,这还是笔聪明交易吗?不,不是。可形势已经变了,陶氏和罗门哈斯面临的形势发生了巨变。当初这看起来是笔好交易——陶氏也喜欢,资金安排也还合理,科威特人还要跟陶氏搞合资,诸如此类。但世界已经变得没人能预料到。所以显然,这交易现在不光是不好了,我是说,现在可能根本做不成了。我们的承诺,当时看着挺聪明,现在看着挺蠢。但世界就是这样。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I can’t comment on that. The lawsuit will either happen or it won’t happen. I guess they’re going to decide pretty soon on that. I mean, any deal that was made last summer, you know, like they say in golf, every putt makes someone happy. But all of the sellers are happy and all of the buyers are unhappy. And you know, the deal would not be at the same terms now and incidentally, we committed to buy $3 billion worth of preferred. That is not a good commitment. I mean, it’s good in the sense that we’re going to do it, as I’ve told the CEO of Dow, I said, you know, our 3 billion will be there if Ben Bernanke runs off to South America with Paris Hilton. I mean, they’ll have the money. I mean, but the-was that-is that a smart deal today? No. No. But conditions have changed and conditions change for Dow and Rohm and Haas in a huge way. And what looked like a deal that was-they liked at Dow and that it could be financed reasonably well and the Kuwaitis were going to enter into a partnership with Dow, all kinds of things. But the world has changed like nobody ever believed it would and so obviously, it’s not only, you know, not only not a good deal now, I mean, it may not be a doable deal now. Our commitment, which was-looked smart at the time, looks dumb at the present time. But that’s the way the world is.

贝基·奎克好的。世界的变化之一就体现在国债市场上。一位署名 K. Hart 的观众来信问:“如果大家热议的国债市场泡沫破裂,那些投资于国债的货币市场账户会不会受到不利影响?”

QUICKOK. One of the changes in the world has been what we’ve seen in the treasury markets and K. Hart writes in and says, “If the much talked about bubble in the Treasury market burst, would money market accounts, which are exposed to Treasuries, be adversely affected?”

沃伦·巴菲特:不会。你——你总能拿回你的本金,只是它买不了原来那么多东西了。而且,如果我们放出足够多的钞票——你可以去网站上看看 M1 和 M2 现在是什么情况,他们现在已经不怎么提这个了——但我们正在做的事情,会在日后某个时点带来巨大的通胀压力,并且我们还会做更多类似的事。实际上,这么做是对的。我倒是希望我们不必这么做,但它是正确的选择。只不过在经济学里,你永远不可能只做一件事。我的意思是,你做一件事,它就会带来后果,所以人们总说天下没有免费的午餐。但就算以后要付账,也比现在连口饭都吃不上要强。

Mr. BUFFETT: No. The-you’ll always-you’ll get your dollar back, it just won’t buy as much and if we get enough dollars out there and you can go to a Web site and look at what is happening with M1 and M2, they don’t talk about it anymore, but the-we are going-we are doing things that are going to put a lot of inflationary pressure on at some later date and we’re going to do more things like that and that’s the right thing to do, actually. I wish we didn’t have to do it, but it’s the right thing to do and-but in economics, you can never just do one thing. I mean, if you do something, it has consequences and that’s why they always say you never get a free lunch. But it’s better to have the lunch we’re having now even if we pay later than have no lunch at all.

贝基·奎克好。来自加州圣罗莎的布莱恩写信来问。他说:“我是个 33 岁的律师,这辈子从没上过一门商科课程。但即便如此,我是不是疯了——我居然觉得许多蓝筹股(即便不是大多数),在当前的估值水平上,代表着千载难逢的机会?”

QUICKAll right. Brian from Santa Rosa, California, writes in. He says, “I’m a 33-year-old lawyer who has never taken a business class in my life. Nevertheless, am I crazy to think that many, if not most, blue chip stocks at current valuations represent the opportunity of a lifetime?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我不知道我会不会说这是千载难逢的机会,但我想说的是,大多数人买公司时,都相信这些公司资本充足。在眼下这种局面,你可不想买一个杠杆加到顶的公司,因为它们可能根本撑不到牌局打完。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know if I would say the opportunity of a lifetime, but I would say that most people who buy companies, believe they’re well capitalized. You don’t want to buy somebody that’s leveraged to the hilt in this situation because they may not to get to play out their hand.

沃伦·巴菲特:但如果你买入一篮子优质股票,投资那些资本结构普遍良好的公司,10 年或 20 年后你一定能赚到钱。未来 10 个月你会是什么处境,我毫无头绪,不过这真的不重要。我买那个农场时,至今都没去打听过它的报价。我买了奥马哈皇家队四分之一权益后,也从来没去问过报价。我会看观众人数,会看广告牌上有没有广告,诸如此类,但我是通过奥马哈皇家队或农场的实际表现,来判断自己是不是做了一笔像样的投资。这才是人们看待股票应有的方式。可他们很难做到,因为每天都有报价硬塞到眼前。别理会那些报价。去看生意本身。

Mr. BUFFETT: But if you buy a cross section of good equities, generally well capitalized companies, you’ll make money over 10 or 20 years. I haven’t the faintest idea where you’ll be in 10 months, but it really doesn’t make any difference. When I bought that farm, I have not gotten a quote on it yet. I bought a quarter of interest in the Omaha Royals, I’ve never got a quote on it. I look at the attendance figures, I look at see if the billboards have ads on them and all that sort of thing, but I took to the performance of the Omaha Royals or the farm to determine whether I made a decent investment. That’s the way people really ought to look at stocks. They have a hard time doing it because they get these quotes thrown at them every day. Forget the quotes. Look at the business.

贝基·奎克尽管眼下很多人正面临着——正紧盯着那些报价。

QUICKAlthough right now a lot of people are facing-focusing on those quotes.

沃伦·巴菲特:那当然。

Mr. BUFFETT: Sure.

贝基·奎克来自纽约市的理查德来信提问。他说:“在 2008 年年报中,您提到‘如今我们的账面价值远远低估了伯克希尔的内在价值。’”他想知道,“您愿意更具体地说明‘远远低估’该如何理解吗?”比如,您的意思是低 30% 吗?

QUICKRichard from New York City writes in. He says, “In the annual report for 2008, you say that Now our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value.'” He wants to know, “would you care to be more specific how far understates’ should be interpreted?” For example, do you mean 30 percent?

沃伦·巴菲特:有具体数字吗?有。答案是,我不会给你具体数字,但我会告诉你一个例子:我们在 1972 年买下喜诗糖果,花了 2500 万美元。

Mr. BUFFETT: Do we have a number? Yeah. Well, the answer is I won’t give you a number, but I will tell you, for example, that here’s See’s Candy that we bought in 1972 and we paid $25 million for it.

贝基·奎克嗯哼。

QUICKMm-hmm.

沃伦·巴菲特:它的价值远不止 2500 万美元。但要说到具体每家企业的数字,你知道,GEICO 的价值远超我们付出的价格,但其他企业就不一定了。整体来说,账面价值确实低估了内在价值,但——谁知道低估了多少呢?

Mr. BUFFETT: It’s worth a lot more than 25 million. But in terms of knowing numbers on different businesses, you know, Geico’s worth far more than we paid for it, but others aren’t worth far more. On balance, book value does understate intrinsic value, but I-who knows how much?

贝基·奎克好。来自纽约州威廉斯维尔的哈罗德写信来问。他说:“你最近说,国债和现金等价物在不久的将来会面临非常糟糕的时期。这是否意味着你看好黄金、白银以及与之相关的股票?”

QUICKOK. Harold from Williamsville, New York, writes in. He says, “You said recently that Treasury Bonds and cash equivalents are going to have very bad times in the not too distant future. Does that imply that you like gold and silver and the equities underlying them?”

沃伦·巴菲特:不。我确实喜欢好生意。

Mr. BUFFETT: No. It applies I like good businesses.

沃伦·巴菲特:要知道,如果美元大幅贬值,我们卖喜诗糖果就能卖更多钱。我的意思是,实际价值并没有增加,但如果有人愿意为买一磅糖果或六罐饮料付出 15 分钟或半小时的劳动,他们照样会这么做,就算拿鲨鱼牙当钱使也没区别,本质就是这样。所以通胀时期你最好的资产就是你的能力。我的意思是,如果你是全城最好的医生、最好的律师、最好的广播员,或者其他什么角色,你总能分到社会资源的一定比例。所以自己的天赋才是最重要的。但如果你像我一样没什么天赋,那就想办法买入别人的天赋。你知道,这是最好的糖果,这是最好的软饮料,至少在我看来是这样,十年后也依然如此。不管到时候货币价值变成什么样,我们都能按当时那个价值的比例拿到该得的那份。

Mr. BUFFETT: You know, if the dollar becomes way-worth way less, we will sell See’s Candy for more money. I mean, it won’t be more real dollars, but we-if somebody’s willing to give up 15 minutes of their labor or half to buy a pound of this or to buy six cans of this, they’ll do the same thing and it won’t make any difference whether shark’s teeth are being used for money, basically. So the best-well, the best assets you can have during inflation is your abilities. I mean, because if you’re the best doctor in town or the best lawyer in town or the best broadcaster in town or whatever it may be, you will always command a certain percentage of the resources of society. So your own talents are the most important thing. But if you don’t have any talent like I do, you try to buy into other people’s talents. And you know, this is the best candy. This is the best soft drink, as far as I’m concerned, and it will be that way 10 years from now. And whatever the value currency is, we’ll get our share in that-in terms of that value at that time.

贝基·奎克你之前提到,我们在讨论房贷计划时说,这可能会帮到一些不该被帮的人。

QUICKYou mentioned before when we were talking about the mortgage plan that it may help some people that it shouldn’t.

沃伦·巴菲特:当然。

Mr. BUFFETT: Of course.

贝基·奎克但这一点是我们现在必须接受并理解的。不过这确实让其他人开始质疑,自己是否因为做了正确的事而受到惩罚。事实上,南达科他州拉皮德城的鲍勃和拉妮来信说:“我们是南达科他州的保守派。我们现在存钱更多了,但政府希望我们多消费。对于我们‘立即付清所有个人账单、量入为出’的策略,你们是做多还是做空?”

QUICKBut that’s something we need to suck up and understand at this point. But it does lead to other people who have questions about whether they’re being penalized for doing the right thing. In fact, Bob and Lani in Rapid City, South Dakota, write in. They say, “We are conservative South Dakotans. We are now saving more, but the government wants us to spend more. Are you short’ or long’ on our strategy to pay all your personal bills promptly and always live within your means’?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我自己一直是这么做的,所以在这点上我完全站在他们那边。但要说百分之百,我的意思是,你可不想陷入被动。如果你已经陷进去了,就得想办法爬出来,但最好是别陷进去。你知道,本杰明·富兰克林几百年前就写过——赚 1 美元,花 99 美分,结果就是幸福;赚 99 美分,花 1 美元,结果就是痛苦。但说到不公平,如果我是伯尼·麦道夫的一个客户——幸好我从没听说过他——但假设我是他的客户。我和他一起在密歇根湖中间,同坐一条船。伯尼在船的另一头。我刚赔光了所有净资产,然后看见他那一头船底破了个洞。我该欢呼吗?不。说到底,我也想救伯尼。不是因为真心想救他,而是因为——我没办法把自己跟船另一头发生的事情割裂开。这件事会蔓延,会淹掉整条船,毫无疑问。所以,那些行为端正的人,到头来发现自己多少得去照顾那些行为不端的人。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I’ve always followed that myself, so I’m with them 100 percent on that. But in terms of 100 percent, I mean, you don’t want to get behind the eight ball. I mean, if you are, you’ve got to work your way out, but it’s always better. You know, Ben Franklin wrote that, you know, hundreds of years ago, the-you know, earn a dollar, spend 99 cents, result happiness, you know. Earn 99 cents, spend a dollar, result misery. And-but in terms of the inequities, if I were a-had been a client of Bernie Madoff’s and fortunately I never heard of him, but let’s say I was a client of Bernie Madoff’s. I’m in the middle of Lake Michigan with him. We’re in a boat together. Bernie’s at the other end. I’ve just lost all my net worth. I see this hole spring up at his end of the boat. Am I supposed to cheer? No. I mean, in the end, you know, I want to save Bernie, too. I mean, not because I really want to save him, but I-you know, there is no way to divorce myself from what’s happening on the other end of the boat. And this thing is covering-going to cover the whole boat. There’s no question about it. So the people who have behaved well are going to find themselves taking care, to some extent, of the people who didn’t behave well.

在珍珠港,陆军固然不像海军那样,要为一整排毫无防护地停泊在港内、几乎在睡梦中被袭击的舰艇负责。但这能成为陆军袖手旁观的理由吗?不能。你必须冲进去。

And in Pearl Harbor, the Army, you know, undoubtedly was not as responsible for those boats being in the harbor there all exposed to an attack and kind of sleeping through it as the Navy. But does that mean the Army holds back? No. You’ve got to be in there.

乔·科南嘿,嘿,沃伦,贝基呢,你知道,她对你是既客气又恭敬,什么都顺着你。但我得告诉你,有时候她可真是气坏了,因为她一直都是按月还房贷的人,还总说自己从来没买过新卧室家具,因为她……

KERNENHey, hey, Warren, Becky’s really, you know, she’s nice and deferential to you and everything. I just want to let you know that there are times she gets really mad because she’s been one of the people that have paid her mortgage and she always points out she’s never bought new bedroom furniture because she…

贝基·奎克得了,别说了。

QUICKOh, stop already.

乔·科南你居然在一家家具店里!你和沃伦……

KERNENAnd you’re in a furniture store! You and Warren are…

沃伦·巴菲特:我们不会持续太久——门已经锁了,乔。

Mr. BUFFETT: We’re not going to last-we’ve locked the doors, Joe.

乔·科南你可以……

KERNENYou can…

沃伦·巴菲特:乔,我们已经把门锁上了。不把她榨干净,她是别想从这儿出去的。

Mr. BUFFETT: We’ve locked the doors, Joe. She is not getting out of here until we clean her out.

乔·科南贝基,跟沃伦说说,你明明做对了所有事,却要眼睁睁看着其他人都得到救助,你肯定很生气。

KERNENBecky, tell Warren you’re mad that you’ve done all the right things and all these other people are going to get bailed out.

贝基·奎克哦。我可远没有你替我抱怨的那些次数所表现出来的那么生气。不过确实是这样。

QUICKOh. I’m not nearly as mad as is as many times you’ve complained for me. But yes.

沃伦·巴菲特:生气没什么不对,乔。只是你不能——有时候你会为某件事恼火,但你必须克服那种情绪,因为……

Mr. BUFFETT: There’s nothing wrong with being mad, Joe. It’s just you can’t-there’s times when you’re made about something that you’ve got to overcome the emotion because…

乔·科南给她一套新卧室家具的优惠价,这样我们就不用再听她唠叨了。你现在可是在家具店里。

KERNENGive her a deal on a new bedroom set and then we won’t have to hear it anymore. You’re in a furniture store.

沃伦·巴菲特:我们对所有人都给优惠价,连那个叫乔·科南的家伙也不例外。

Mr. BUFFETT: We give deals to everybody, even including guys named Joe Kernen.

乔·科南好的。

KERNENAll right.

沃伦·巴菲特:我们给你开个账户。

Mr. BUFFETT: We’ll open an account for you.

乔·科南好的,谢谢。

KERNENAll right. Thank you.

贝基·奎克巴菲特先生,我知道整个上午我们都在讨论各种解决方案,但现在美国民众对眼下的局势感到恐慌。各种方案抛来抛去,大家只想知道最好的路该怎么走。

QUICKMr. Buffett, again, I know we’ve talked about some solutions through the course of the morning, but this is a time when Americans are frightened about what’s happening out there. There are a lot of different solutions being batted around and people just wonder what is the best way to go.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我觉得他们——他们得听美国总统亲口说出来。六个月前我们聊到这事时我就说过,这是一场经济版珍珠港事件。我认为这种时候需要总司令站出来。我觉得人们现在既困惑又恐惧,除非把混乱理清楚,否则他们不会停止害怕——而且这事消退得没那么快。它来得快,但去得慢。眼下他们最需要厘清的,我觉得是银行问题,就像上世纪 30 年代初我们设立联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)时需要厘清一样,也像 19 世纪金融恐慌之后我们建立美联储时需要厘清一样。人民必须信任银行。而且顺便说一句,他们理应信任银行,但必须非常、非常、非常明确地讲清楚:不光是 FDIC 那 25 万美元的保障上限——而是,任何把钱存在美国银行的人、任何持有美国银行债务的人,最终都不会出事。这不代表银行不会倒闭。FDIC 会继续接管银行——自它成立以来,已经接管了 3600 多家银行或储蓄机构。没有人损失过一分钱,它从来没花过政府一分钱。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think they-they’re going to have to hear that from the president of the United States. I think there’s-six months ago when we talked about it it’s an economic Pearl Harbor. And I think that you need a commander in chief at that point. I think that people are confused and scared and they won’t quit being scared until-and it doesn’t go away fast. It comes on fast, but it doesn’t go away fast. Until the confusion is cleared up. But the biggest thing they need clarity on now, I think, is the bank just as they needed it in the early ’30s when we put in the FDIC, just as they needed it after the panics of the 19th century when we put in the Federal Reserve. People have to trust banks. And incidentally they should trust banks, but it should be made very, very, very clear that not just the $250,000, but-FDIC limit-but that anybody that has their money in an American bank or anybody that has the debt of American bank it’s going to work out. That doesn’t mean banks won’t fail. The FDIC will keep taking over banks as they-they’ve taken over 3600 banks, or savings institutions, since it was set up. Nobody’s lost a dime, never cost the government a dime.

所以这一点必须讲清楚。财政部官员说的话他们听不进去,到了这个节骨眼,人们已经够恐慌了,他们需要听到美国总统亲自表态。

So we need clarity on that point. And they can’t hear it from Treasury officials or that sort of thing. People need to-at this point they’re scared enough so they need to hear it from the American president.

贝基·奎克我感觉我从总统那里也听到过类似的话,说我们会支持银行体系,它会撑住。他还能说出什么比这更具体的内容吗?

QUICKI feel like I have heard that from the president, that we will stand behind the banking system and it will be here. What can he say more specifically than that?

沃伦·巴菲特:我不确定他是不是这么说的,而且——顺便说一句,当说这话的时候,不该说成“这帮家伙全是人渣,但我们会确保你”之类的——从根本上讲,这个信息必须传达得非常清楚。而且你知道,到头来,不管花旗集团每股值不值 1 美元——它之前还值 50 美元一股——股东的钱可能已经没了。你明白我的意思,从 50 美元跌到 1 美元,相信我,再怎么花样百出也不存在道德风险。所以——你根本用不着担心这个。政府其实也不需要再投钱进去,他们只需要说银行没问题,然后如果它真倒闭了,那就让它倒闭,接着就像他们处理其他倒闭机构那样,把存款转到别处去。你看看美联银行,我记得它当时大概是全国第五大银行。第二天一早就成了富国银行。没一个人因此损失一分钱。还有华盛顿互惠银行,第二天一早就成了摩根大通。所以,过去一年我们已经成功转移了大约 8% 的存款资产。所以——但信息必须明确——人们不应该、也不能为银行担忧。而现在,很多人确实很担忧。

Mr. BUFFETT: I’m not sure he said it quite that way, and it-incidentally, when it’s said, it shouldn’t be said, you know, about these guys are all a bunch of bums, but we’re going to make sure you-and basically, it’s a message that has to come out very clearly. And you know, in the end whether Citigroup ends up being worth $1 a share-it was worth $50 a share some time back-the shareholders, their money may be gone. You know, I mean, there is no moral hazard when you go from 50 to $1, believe me, to being creative. So that-you don’t need to worry about that. And the government really doesn’t need to put in more money, they just have to say it’s good and then if it fails, it fails and then they do what they’ve done with other failed institutions, they place the deposits elsewhere. I mean, you had Wachovia, I think it was maybe the fifth largest bank at the time in the country. The next morning it was Wells Fargo. Nobody lost a dime in that. You had WAMU and the next morning it was JPMorgan. So we have transferred 8 percent of the assets-deposits successfully, or thereabouts in the last year. So it-but the message has to be-people should not-can’t be worried about banks. And they-and a lot of them are.

贝基·奎克关于 TARP 资金怎么用,我们收到的信息很混乱,非常混乱。你觉得最近为什么会这样?是问题本身太难解决?还是插手的人太多?到底怎么回事?

QUICKWe’ve gotten mixed messages on what’s going to be done with TARP money. A lot of mixed messages. Why do you think that’s happened lately? Is it just that it’s too difficult of a problem to fix? Is it that there’s too many cooks in the kitchen? What’s going on?

沃伦·巴菲特:是啊,厨房里掌勺的太多了。我的意思是,如果这真是经济上的珍珠港事件,那么罗斯福在 12 月 8 日就不该召集——不该举行为期三周的听证会,让 535 名国会议员各抒己见,其中不少人还对着本地的镜头摆架势。顺便说一句,我不认为国会如果意识到这是经济版的珍珠港,还会那么做。他们是有爱国心的。但你不能指望 535 个人来制定战争策略,一边相互批评一边互相指责,搞这些名堂。这么做只会摧毁信心。我是说,美国公众之所以害怕,部分原因就是他们看到这么多不同的行动在进行,他们搞不清——连参与者都分不清,而每个人都在批评每一桩正在做的事。我觉得在战争时期,这样做没什么用。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, well there’s too many cooks in the kitchen. I mean, if this really is economic Pearl Harbor, you know, Roosevelt on December 8th should not have called in-started holding hearings for three weeks and had 535 members of Congress each giving their own views and in a certain number of cases posing for their local cameras or anything. Now, incidentally, I don’t think that Congress would do that if they realized that this was the economic equivalent of Pearl Harbor. I mean, they’re patriotic. But you can’t have 535 people planning war strategy and criticizing people and finger-pointing and all of that. If you do, you destroy confidence. I mean, people-the American public partly is scared because they see all these different actions going on and they don’t-confuse the players and people are criticizing every activity that comes along. I don’t think that’s very useful in a time of war.

贝基·奎克国会可能会反驳说,这是美国纳税人的钱,我的职责就是保护投票选举我上台的那些人的利益。

QUICKCongress might shoot back that this is American taxpayers’ money and it’s my job to protect the interests of the people who voted me into office.

沃伦·巴菲特:没错,而且那场仗——你知道,诺曼底登陆的费用也是美国纳税人出的,但我们可没在登陆前几周搞国会听证会,让所有人争论该在哪儿登陆、派多少兵力、选哪一天。我们也没在登陆后两周里,有人嚷嚷死的人太多,你知道的,我们该派更多或更少的部队,或者该等一周再走。基本上,国会是有责任的,我是说宪法明确规定了,但他们得明白,有时总司令真的需要身后有两大党的坚实支持。同时,当你要求——当你真的需要这种支持时,这意味着多数党不能欺负少数党。所以你不能拿这个当借口去推行各种事情,然后指望两党在真正重要的战争——而这是一场重要的战争——中能团结一致,或基本团结一致地支持你。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, and it was American-you know, American taxpayers who were paying for the landing at D-Day, too, but we did not hold congressional hearings for a couple of weeks before that with everybody debating where we should land and how many troops we should send in and what day we should come. And nor did we have in the two weeks after people saying too many people died and you know, we should have sent in more troops or less troops or we should have waited a week to leave. You know, basically, Congress has responsibility, I mean the Constitution defines it, but they ought to realize that there are times when a commander in chief really has to be able to speak with a good bit of both parties behind him. At the same time, when you demand-when you really need that it means that essentially the majority party can’t push around a minority party. So you can’t use that as an excuse to push through all kinds of things and then expect unity, or substantial unity from both parties in supporting you in the really important war, and this is an important war.

乔·科南谢谢,贝基。沃伦,你还记得你当时买入高盛和通用电气股票的时候,你说过——你买这些股票确实取决于 TARP,取决于我们最初对 TARP 的理解,也就是要把一些有毒资产从银行账上剥离出来。但我们从来——我们从来没做到这点。我们还在等。后来总统说,“你们会听到盖特纳部长公布一些细节”,结果我们什么细节都没听到,希望全落空了。那天确实被很多人视为新一轮下跌的起点。你会不会敦促总统和盖特纳部长真正把精力放在这个计划上,放在处理有毒资产的计划上,搞个公私合作机制把这些东西清掉?大家等的就是这个,可始终看不到。

KERNENThanks, Beck. Warren, you remember when you made those buys of Goldman and GE, you said that you-it was contingent really on TARP, on the original perception of what we thought TARP was, and that was to get some of these toxic assets off the books. We never-we never did that. We’re still waiting. And when the president said, You’re going to hear about some details from Secretary Geithner,’ and then our hopes were dashed when we didn’t hear any details, that’s really-a lot of people point to that day as where we started a renewed downturn. Would you urge the president to really focus with Secretary Geithner on this plan, on the toxic asset plan on some type of private/public partnership to get rid of those? That’s what people are waiting for and not seeing.

沃伦·巴菲特:有意思的是,有毒资产如果按市价定价,很可能是银行最好的资产,因为现在这些有毒资产的价格,是靠无杠杆买家买进相当投机性的资产来决定的。所以,以这个市价衡量的回报率,可能比银行持有的几乎任何别的资产都更好,假设它们已经按市价计价,你知道,它们未来回报的前景是银行拥有的资产中最好的。银行的问题绝大多数不是有毒资产,你知道。顶级银行里可能有一两家有问题,但如果你拿那 20 家接受压力测试的银行来说,有毒资产不会搞垮它们。这些银行现在有从未如此强大的盈利能力——新业务带来的盈利,即使它们开始支付较低的股息——这也能帮它们构建资本头寸,而它们现在确实开始这么做了。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, the interesting thing is that the toxic assets, if they’re priced at market, are probably the best assets the banks has, because those toxic assets presently are being priced based on unleveraged buyers buying a fairly speculative asset. So the returns from this market value are probably better than almost anything else, assuming they’ve got a market-to-market value, you know, they have the best prospects for return going forward of anything the banks own. The problems of the banks are overwhelmingly not toxic assets, you know. They may have been one or two at the top banks, but they are not going to do in-if you take those 20 banks that are subject to the stresses, they’re not going to do those banks in. Those banks have the earning power which has never been better on new business going out of this to build capital positions even if they pay low dividends which they’re starting to do now.

有毒资产确实不再是过去那种问题了。当时我提到它是有条件限制的——我记不太清是否完全取决于问题资产救助计划(TARP),但它的确取决于政府是否出手干预。

Toxic assets really are not the problem they were. Now, when I said it was contingent-I didn’t remember being exactly contingent on TARP, but it was contingent on the government jumping in.

我得告诉各位,政府在九月份必须下猛药才行。

The government needed to act big time in September, I will tell you that.

他们当时确实是大手笔行动了。

And they did act big time.

乔·科南这么说你赞同当前的做法——向银行注资,而不是按 TARP 最初计划那样把有毒资产从账上剥离?

KERNENSo you are OK with the shift to providing the banks with capital as opposed to the original intention of the TARP for actually getting the toxic assets off the books?

沃伦·巴菲特:没错,有意思的是,在我看来,它们不需要向银行提供大量资本。它们需要让几乎所有——我是说,对大多数银行来说,正确的药方就是让它们几乎不分红,用一段时间积累资本,它们自然会攒出大量资本。政府需要说的是——政府需要说的是,没人会因为把钱存在这些银行而损失一分钱。它们会靠存款赚到很多钱。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah, and interestingly enough, they don’t need to supply the banks, in my view, with lots of capital. They need to let almost all of-I mean, the right prescription with most of the banks is just let them pay very little in the way of dividends and build up capital for awhile, and they will build up a lot of capital. The government has needed to say-what the government needs to say is nobody’s going to lose a dime by having their deposits in these banks. They’re going to make lots of money with the deposits.

息差从未如此之大。现在正是投身银行业的黄金时期,你知道,只要你能跨过过去那道坎,而它们正在跨过去。我的意思是,眼下每一笔发放给购房者的贷款——我们正在发放数百万笔贷款——今年将有 450 万套房屋易手,而全美房屋存量不到 8000 万套。所以那些人贷的款都是优质按揭。你希望把这些资产记在账上,现在把它们放进去还能获得巨大的息差。所以说,现在做银行生意再好不过,但你确实得跨过过去那道坎。不过在我看来,那些有毒资产,如果已经按市价减记了,我宁愿从银行手里买下那些资产,也不想要它们手里的任何其他资产。

The spreads have never been wider. This is a great time to be in banking, you know, if you just get past the past and they are getting past the past. I mean, right now every time a loan is made to somebody to buy a house-and we’re making, you know, making millions of loans-four and a half million houses will change hands this year out of a total stock of less than 80 million. So those people are making good mortgages. You want those assets on your books and you get a great spread in putting them on now. So it’s a great time to be in banking, but you do have to get past this past. But the toxic assets, in my view, you know, if they’ve been written down to market, I’d rather buy those assets from the bank than any other assets they’ve got.

贝基·奎克接乔刚才讲的那个私人……

QUICKGoes to Joe’s point about the private…

乔·科南……嘿,贝克……

KERNEN…hey, Beck…

贝基·奎克嗯?

QUICKHuh?

巴菲特:乔,我给你——我给你插播一条突发新闻。冰雪皇后(Dairy Queen)的同店销售额这段时间也一直不错。但我可不想拥有一家曼哈顿的豪华餐厅或者类似的东西。我们有三个档次的珠宝店,它们有一定重叠,但高端珠宝店的销售额下降得非常厉害。我们的——用个比喻,熊妈妈店下降很多,熊宝宝店也下降了一些。我的意思是,你只要看看就能知道美国公众在做什么。美国公众的消费习惯经历了一次你无法想象的重新调整。

Mr. BUFFETT: Joe, I’ll give you-I’ll give you breaking news. Dairy Queen same-store sales have been right up through this, too. But I would hate to own a luxury restaurant in Manhattan or something of the sort. The-we have three classes of jewelry stores, they overlap to some degree, but our high-end jewelry store is down a whole lot. Our-call it the mama bear is down a lot. And the baby bear is down some. I mean, you just go right-you can just see what the American public doing. The American public has had a reset of their buying habits like you can’t believe.

贝基·奎克那你当时为什么投资蒂芙尼?

QUICKThen why did you make your investment in Tiffany?

巴菲特:嗯,我们以 10% 的利率借给了蒂芙尼钱,没买它的股权。不过我觉得蒂芙尼不还钱的可能性——而且蒂芙尼今年会不太好过。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, we lent Tiffany money at 10 percent. We did not buy the equity. But I think the chances of Tiffany not paying us back-and Tiffany’s going to have a bad year now.

我是说,做奢侈品生意的,时不时就会碰到个差年景,甚至连续倒霉两三年。但美国经济五年、十年、二十年后总会更强。要是有人能带回一个蓝色小盒子,换来心上人一个吻——你懂的,这玩意儿永远有市场。

I mean, anybody that’s in luxury goods is going to have a bad year now and then, and they may have a couple of bad years in a row. But the American economy’s going to be stronger five, 10, 20 years from now. And if a guy can bring home a blue box and have somebody kiss him, I mean, you know, that all-there’s always a market for that.

巴拉克·奥巴马总统:我的、也是希拉里的朋友,沃伦·巴菲特……比如说,我的朋友兼支持者沃伦·巴菲特确实……我来告诉你们我跟谁站在一起。在经济政策上,我跟沃伦·巴菲特站在一起……

President BARACK OBAMA: My friend and Hillary’s friend, Warren Buffett…It is true that my friend and supporter Warren Buffett, for example…Let me tell you who I associate with. On economic policy, I associate withWarren Buffett…

贝基·奎克欢迎大家回来。今天上午,我们再次在奥马哈的内布拉斯加家具城与沃伦·巴菲特直播连线。巴菲特先生,你刚才可能听到了那个声音——那是候选人奥巴马在当选之前谈论他与你的关系。我们知道你支持他,为他投票,为他筹款。不过,今天早上纽约的罗伯特也发来一个问题,他写道:“巴菲特先生,请描述一下你以什么身份或角色为奥巴马总统或其幕僚提供建议?”

QUICKWelcome back, everybody. Again, we are live with Warren Buffett this morning at the Nebraska Furniture Mart in Omaha. And, Mr. Buffett, you may have just heard that sound. It was candidate Obama, before he was elected, talking about his relationship with you. We know that you supported him, that you voted for him, that you raised money for him. But we also have a question that came in from Robert this morning in New York, and he writes in, “Mr. Buffett, please describe in what capacity or role are you advising President Obama or his staff?”

巴菲特:我和政府里的人——不一定是他的幕僚,但确实是行政团队里的人——交谈过一两次。除了在一些场合碰上他打个招呼之外,我和总统本人并没有深入交谈过。他是合适的总统。顺便说一句,这也是合适的国家。我是说,我们有合适的总统,有合适的国家。你知道,眼下我们确实有点卡壳,但这里就是你应该待的地方。而且现在就是对的时机。我是说,我希望自己现在 21 岁,而不是 78 岁。所以——美国最美好的日子还在前头。奥巴马总统——他非常、非常聪明。我认为他有完全正确的目标。他口才很好,而且——你知道,在这场经济危机中,他会是担任三军统帅的合适人选。但这场危机确实是经济危机。

Mr. BUFFETT: I’ve had a conversation or two with people-or not his staff, exactly, but in the administration. I’ve not had, aside from just seeing him at an occasion and just saying hello. But I’ve not had any real conversations with the president. He is the right president. And incidentally, this is the right country. I mean, we’ve got the right president, we’ve got the right country. You know, we’re gummed up at the moment, but this is the place to be. And this is the right time. I mean, I wish I was 21 now instead of 78. So this is-the best days of America really do lie ahead. And President Obama is-he’s very, very smart. He’s got, I think, exactly the right goals. He’s articulate and I-you know, he will be the right person to be the commander in chief in this economic crisis. But it is an economic crisis.

贝基·奎克这是一场经济危机。早些时候你提到,我们距离经济悬崖只有几个小时或几天的时间了。

QUICKIt is an economic crisis. And in an earlier hour you talked about how we were hours or days away from the cliff with the economy.

巴菲特:是在九月。

Mr. BUFFETT: In September.

贝基·奎克回到九月份。

QUICKBack in September.

沃伦·巴菲特:在九月份。

Mr. BUFFETT: In September.

贝基·奎克我们现在走到哪里了?

QUICKWhere are we now?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我们确实做了很多本该做的事。我的意思是,当我们……当我们……当我们为货币市场基金提供担保时,如果我们没这么做,那简直就是……那就像是要从尼亚加拉瀑布顶上掉下去,而不是在瀑布上方平稳滑行。要是我们没有采取商业票据行动,美联储就不会介入——现在他们的参与度已经大幅下降,但他们稳定了那个市场。去年九月,我们在资金和流动性方面就像大出血一样,政府基本上做了正确的事来止血,至少让病人在这块儿不用再抢救了。这一点至关重要。我的意思是,那……那就像是珍珠港事件。现在还有很多事要做,不可能一蹴而就。但目前最要紧的是,让大家清楚金融体系到底会怎么改革。现在各方说法不一,乱成一团,我认为奥巴马总统是那个能给出明确答案的人。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, we have done a lot of things that should have been done. I mean, when the-when we-when we guaranteed money market funds, if we hadn’t have done that, I mean, it would have been-we would have been going over Niagara Falls instead of-instead of riding up there just above it. If we hadn’t done the commercial paper action where the Federal Reserve got into the picture-and their participation has gone down substantially now, but they stabilized that market. We were losing blood by the bucketful in terms of funding and liquidity in September, and the government basically did the right things in order to stem the flow of blood and get the patient so at least you didn’t have to work on that aspect of it. And that was vital. I mean, that was-that was Pearl Harbor. And now there’s a lot of things to be done. And they can’t happen instantly. But the biggest thing right now is clarity as to what will be done in terms of the financial system. And there’s been enough mix up with different people saying different things that I think that the-that President Obama is the person to give real clarity to that.

贝基·奎克很多人都在问政府已经推出的那些措施。实际上,有个来自巴尔的摩的鲍勃·诺特写信来问:“如果把价值从 1 到 10 打分,您怎么评价奥巴马总统最近实施的刺激计划对美国经济的价值?”

QUICKWe have people asking questions about things that the administration has already put out. In fact, Bob wrote in from Baltimore, Bob Knott, who says, “On a scale from one to 10, how would you assess the value to the US economy of President Obama’s recently enacted stimulus plan?”

沃伦·巴菲特:哦,这个刺激计划要花很长时间才能见效。我是说,有些东西会很快见效。但刺激计划只是复苏的一部分,它不是最——把它推出来很重要,但现在还需要做其他事来恢复信心。你不会——你就是看不到那么大的效果。我是说,电视上会有各种报道,等等。但当你面对一个 14 万亿美元的经济体,当你考虑所有那些让人担忧的事——人们很担忧、很恐惧——用“恐惧”这个词更准确,因为他们就是这样。有些事需要放在前面做,实际上比这个更重要。但总的来说,我还是支持通过一个刺激法案。

Mr. BUFFETT: Oh, well, the stimulus plan’s going to take a long time to kick in. I mean, there’ll be certain things kick in fast. But the stimulus plan is part of the recovery, but it’s not the most-it’s important to put it in, but there’s other things that need to be done now to restore confidence. You’re not going to-you’re just not going to see that much happen. I mean, there’ll be things on TV and all of that. But when you’re talking about a $14 trillion economy and you’re talking about all the things that are worried-people are worried about and scared-and scared is a better word, because that’s what they are. There are things that need to be done up front that actually are more important. But I’m still in favor of having a stimulus bill.

贝基·奎克有些人总想找速效解决方案。佐治亚州伍德斯托克的西奥多来信问了一个大家常提的问题。他说:“美国证券交易委员会是不是应该暂停市值计价会计?”

QUICKThere are people who are looking for quick solutions. Theodore in Woodstock, Georgia, writes in with the question a lot of people have asked. He says, “Should the SEC suspend mark-to-market accounting?”

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这个——你知道,我对按市值计价会计向来有看法,因为我看过太多人在资产负债表或利润表上发挥想象力干出的事。坦率讲,美国企业在很大程度上行为不当,尤其在上世纪 90 年代。人们确实在数字上做手脚,现在可能还在做。但这——曾经——几乎被当成一种经营之道。所以,每当你给 CEO 一支笔,告诉他全靠自觉时,我一直都心存怀疑。而除了按市值计价之外,其他方法都往那个方向上走。现在,我觉得没错,按市值计价确实——对金融机构来说——有点像火上浇油。在某些东西上,市场相当不现实,这就是为什么我刚才说,我更愿意按市场价从银行买入有毒资产,而不是它们最好的资产。那些有毒资产里能赚更多钱,而且它们已被标记到一个我认为可能低于公允价值的水准。所以我同情这种处境。不过我觉得,处理这个问题的最佳方式可能仍然是保留按市值计价的数字,但不要让监管机构说:“我们就要根据这些按市值计价的数字,强迫你追加更多资本。”我在我们的年报里写了,我按市值——我们什么都按市值来算。我说在某些情况下我并不同意这种做法,并解释了我的理由,股东们可以自行判断这些理由是否站得住脚。我不愿放弃这种做法。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, that’s a-you know, I’ve always been theological on mark-to-market accounting, because I’ve seen so much of what people do when they’re allowed to use their imagination on balance sheets or income statements. And frankly, American business misbehaved in a big way, particularly in the ’90s. But people did play games with numbers. And they probably still do. But it-there was-it was almost accepted as a way of doing business. So I’ve always been suspicious when you give a CEO a pen and tell him it’s the honor system. And anything other than mark-to-market works in that direction. Now, it’s true, I think, that mark-to-market has had a-it’s been some gasoline on the fire in terms of financial institutions. The markets are, on certain things, are pretty unrealistic, which is why I said just a little while ago that I would like to-I would rather buy the toxic assets at market from a bank than their good-than their best assets. There’s more money to be made in those and they’ve been marked to a level where there’s a lot of-you know, where they’re probably below fair value, in my opinion. So I’m sympathetic. I think the best way to handle that, though, probably still, is to have the mark-to-market figures, but not have the regulators say, We’re going to force you to put a lot more capital based in on these mark-to-market figures.’ I say in our annual report, I mark some-we mark everything to market. I say I don’t agree with it in certain cases, and I explain my reasons and shareholders can decide whether they think the reasons are valid or not. I hate to give it up.

乔·科南谢谢。我想深入聊几件事,巴菲特先生。我们提到——您提到国会 535 名议员,您觉得,在危机面前,不一定就该因为出了危机就把很多事强行通过。我正想深入看看预算里的这些东西,也不确定它们是不是来自国会。我认为奥巴马总统知道预算里有什么,而且,您也知道,这些预算都有他的签署。我指的是,比如说,碳税。这合理吗?哪一些合理,哪一些不合理?他上周还谈到了卡片检查——他谈的是《雇员自由选择法案》里的卡片检查。这对您来说合理吗,巴菲特先生?

KERNENThanks. I want to drill down on a couple of things, Mr. Buffett. We talk about the-you talk about 535 members of Congress, and that you don’t think necessarily that, given a crisis, that you should steamroll or have a lot of things put through just because there’s a crisis, you mentioned. I’m just trying to drill down on some of these things that are in the budget, and I’m not necessarily sure they’re from Congress. I think President Obama knows what’s in that budget and definitely, you know, they have his signature on them. And I’m talking about, for example, the carbon tax. Does that make sense here? Does-which ones do, which ones don’t? He was talking about the card check-he was talking about card check in EFCA last week. Does that make sense to you, Mr. Buffett?

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为最——最有争议的部分,当然是卡片检查(card check)有争议,但我会倾向于推迟推进大规模议程。你知道,有这么一句话,说危机不应该被浪费。嗯,我认为如果你说战争不应该被浪费,并以此为借口去推动——试图把眼前所有东西都推过去,我确实——我确实认为这是个错误。我不想试图在伯克希尔号召所有经理们团结一致,与此同时却对他们强加各种新举措,其中很多是他们不同意的。你知道,这不是说绝对什么都不做,但这是——这是一个理由,要把那些会引起……的事情推迟一些。

Mr. BUFFETT: I think the most-the more contentious of it, certainly card check is contentious, but I would defer pushing a big agenda. And you know, there’s this phrase that a crisis, you know, should not be wasted. Well, I think if you said a war should not be wasted and use that as an excuse to push-try to push through everything in sight, I think-I really think it’s a mistake. I don’t want to try and call from unity among all our managers while at the same-at Berkshire while at the same time imposing all kinds of new actions on them, many of which they disagree with. You know, that’s not an argument for doing absolutely nothing but it’s a-it is an argument for deferring some of the things that are going to cause…

乔·科南我只是——不过具体是哪些事呢,巴菲特先生?我是说,您会告诉……

KERNENI’m just-which things? Which things, though, Mr. Buffett? I mean, what would you tell…

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well…

乔·科南你认识总统,他会听取你的建议,他——他在谈论经济问题时,常会提到你的名字。

KERNENYou know the president and he takes your advice and he use-he uses your name in talking about who he talks to about the economy.

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah.

乔·科南您会建议他现在把哪些事情往后放一放?因为他们正试图同时推进所有事情。

KERNENWhich things would you urge him to put on the back burner right now? Because they’re trying to do everything all at once.

沃伦·巴菲特:我知道,而且我觉得那不是个好主意。但我同样认为,用 CNBC 作为和总统讲话的渠道也不是个好主意,虽然我也那么干过一点。

Mr. BUFFETT: I know, and I don’t think that’s a good idea. But I also don’t think it’s a good idea to use CNBC as a way to talk to the president of the United States too much. Although I’ve done a little of that.

乔·科南好吧。我得——我得问您一个问题。我得问问是哪些事。我知道他们在看,我也知道他们从您这儿听到了这番话。不过——而且我觉得,您知道,有些人认为他们需要听到这些话。

KERNENAll right. I have-I have to-I have to ask you, though. I have to ask you which of the things. I know that they’re watching, and I-and I know that they’re hearing this from you. But-and I think, you know, there are some people that think they need to hear it.

沃伦·巴菲特:我宁愿——在政策力度上,我宁愿做得过猛,而不是不够——如果——你要犯错的话,就像在诺曼底登陆,你知道,你会派多少部队上去?你很可能派的数量比你以为需要的还要多。我的意思是,我宁愿在经济刺激上做得过猛,而在其他我关心的很多事情上则宁缺毋滥。

Mr. BUFFETT: I would-I would err on the side of doing too much on the-if I-you’re going to err on the side of doing-like if you’re going to land on Normandy, you know, how many troops do you send in? You probably send in more than you think are needed. I mean, and I would say I would err on the side of doing too much on the economy and I would err on doing too little on the side of a whole bunch of other things I cared about.

乔·科南您说的是经济体系里的银行系统,对吧。好的。

KERNENYou mean the banking system in the-in the economy is what you’re talking about. OK.

沃伦·巴菲特:我——对,对,没错。

Mr. BUFFETT: I-yeah, yeah, right.

乔·科南好的。

KERNENAll right.

沃伦·巴菲特:我——是的。任务就是——任务就是把这个修好。

Mr. BUFFETT: I-yeah. The job is to get-the job is to get that fixed.

贝基·奎克好,你刚才提到了——你评论了按市值计价。那提价规则呢?有几位观众写信来问这个。

QUICKAll right, you counted on-you commented on mark-to-market. What about the uptick rule? We’ve had several people who’ve written in about that.

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。没错。我——毫无疑问,有人买入股票后散布不实言论是有问题的,有人做空股票后散布不实言论也是有问题的。有时候,做空的人似乎比做多的人更热衷于散播负面消息。但我也看到很多做多的人做了不少他们本不该做的事。我——我觉得,提价规则可能是个不错的主意。我是说,这个规则我们用了好几十年,总体权衡,我大概会保留它。不过,我完全不认为它是解决问题的关键。我是说,我——我的意思是,现在你可以通过信用违约互换这类工具搞某种形式的“熊市突袭”,总会有人想推销看空的观点。也有人一直在推销看多的观点。最终,如果你买股票没有借钱,而且你持有的是好生意,那么好生意不会因为有人在提价交易或别的形式下卖空就被毁掉。我欢迎别人做空伯克希尔。我是说,你懂我的意思吧?他们——他们以后肯定是买家。他们总有一天得买回来,对吧?

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Yeah, I-there’s no-there’s no question that it-there’s something wrong with people buying stocks and saying untrue things, and there’s something wrong with people shorting stocks and saying untrue things. And sometimes it seems like the shorts are a little more eager to spread negative stories than the longs. But I’ve seen a lot of people on the long side do a lot of things they shouldn’t have done, too. I think-I think probably the uptick rule is a good idea. I mean, we had it for decades and the-it-on balance, I probably would have it in. I don’t think it’s the key to things at all. I mean, I think that-I mean, you can-you can do bear raids of a sort through credit defaults, swaps and all that sort of thing now, and there’ll always be people trying to push the bear case. There are people trying to push the bull case all the time. In the end, if you don’t owe money on stocks and you own a good business, a good business will not be ruined by somebody selling stock short on an uptick or otherwise. I welcome people shorting Berkshire. I mean, you know what I mean? They’re the-they’re the sure buyers later on. They have to buy someday, right?

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

沃伦·巴菲特:再说一次,对我来说没什么区别,你看,每天可能有很多人卖出伯克希尔的股票,每天也会有很多人买入伯克希尔的股票。如果有人想做空,以后再买回来,我没意见。我是说,他们总有一天得买回来。

Mr. BUFFETT: Again, doesn’t make any difference to me, you know, who-there could be a lot of people sell Berkshire every day, there’s going to be a lot of people buy Berkshire every day. If somebody wants to sell it short, buy it later on, that’s fine with me. I mean, they’re going to have to buy it someday.

贝基·奎克下面这个问题来自康涅狄格州米斯蒂克的迈克尔。他说:“在您表达了对奥巴马总统的支持并给他提建议之后,总统公开批评首席执行官们使用公务机,考虑到伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下就拥有 NetJets……您对此有何看法?”

QUICKHere’s a question from Michael in Mystic, Connecticut. He says, “After showing support and advising President Obama, what are your thoughts on the president openly criticizing the use of corporate jets by CEOs considering the fact that Berkshire Hathaway owns NetJets…”

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah.

贝基·奎克“……而且这些首席执行官当中,有些还是你们最大的客户?”

QUICK“…and that some of those CEOs are your largest clients?”

沃伦·巴菲特:是的。嗯,当你考虑到我们拥有它这一事实,意味着我在这场争论中确实有切身利益,所以——把我归为有偏见的一方吧。但我确实认为——我无论是个人还是公司业务都会使用飞机。我是说,我自己有自费的东西,但我也在商务中使用它。我想说,净效果——我可能是个有偏见的观察者,也许吧——但伯克希尔因为我有飞机可用去谈交易或做其他事情而变得更好。很多时候事情并不成功。但净效果,这是加分项。我们做了些如果没有飞机就不会去做的事。而且我认为——我认为他在这件事上犯了错——我认为——我认为这——我认为在这场游戏中开始妖魔化任何人是大错特错。我只是觉得这会导致美国人民向后看。我们不需要反派,我们需要胜利。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, when you say considering the fact we own it means that I do have a dog in this fight, and so I-put me down as biased. But I do think-I use a jet both personally and with business. I mean, I have my own things I pay for, but I use it in business. I would say that net-and I’m probably a biased observer, maybe-but Berkshire has been better off by me having a plane available to go and do deals or whatever it may be. A lot of times it doesn’t work out. But net, it’s a plus. We have done things I wouldn’t have done if we hadn’t have had a plane. And I think it’s-I think he made a mistake in-I think-I think it’s-I think it’s a big mistake to start demonizing anybody in this game. I just think that it causes the American people to look backwards. And we don’t want villains, we want victory.

贝基·奎克来自科罗拉多州莫里森的布伦特来信,他的问题非常具体,是关于税收的最新情况。他问:“你们哪个……”

QUICKBrent from Morrison, Colorado writes in, he’s got a question very specifically about what’s happening with taxes. He says, “Which do you

你认为现在对经济来说哪种做法更有价值?提高税率,还是降低税率?

think’s more valuable to the economy right now? Raising taxes or lowering them?”

巴菲特:嗯,我认为对收入不那么高的人群降低税收是个好主意。不过要明白,明年我们政府要花掉 3.6 万亿左右。我是说,总得有人缴税,没人喜欢缴税,所以——我过去可能也表达过观点,我觉得像我这样的人税负太轻了。一般来说,国税局前几天刚公布数据,2006 年收入最高的 400 名美国人,他们的税率大约是 17% 出头,这是自有统计以来的最低水平,而十二三年前这个比例是 29%。所以我认为,对我这样的群体照顾得太多,而对……

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think that on people making anything less than a lot of money, I think lowering taxes is a good idea. Now, bear in mind, we’re going to spend 3.6 trillion or something like that in the next year. I mean, somebody has to get taxed, and nobody likes to be taxed, so-and I’ve expressed my views probably in the past that I think that guys like me have gotten off too light and they-just generally, and the IRS just came out with something the other day that the 400 top Americans in 2006 in terms of their taxable income paid at a rate of 17 point something percent, which was the lowest since they’ve ever started the figures, and they had 29 percent about 12 or 13 years earlier. So I think that too much has been done for me and too

内布拉斯加家具城的员工几乎没得到什么帮助。但我不——我们的财政收入将出现巨大缺口,而另一笔 1000 亿美元能帮助底层群体,不管这个数字是多少,我基本都支持。我不觉得这个经济形势里我本人需要任何帮助。所以我认为,随着我们向前走,我希望税收体系能变得更公平——至少在我看来——对那些并非生来就头脑灵光、样样顺遂的人。他们交的税率比我还高,就因为我擅长资本配置。

little has been done for the people that work here at the Nebraska Furniture Mart. But I don’t-we’re going to be huge gap in revenue and another 100 billion that helps the people at the lower end I am basically all for whatever the number may be. I don’t think anything that helps me is needed one bit in terms of this economy. So I think that, as we move forward, I hope that the tax system gets more equitable, at least as I see it, in terms of treating the people that don’t happen to be born just wired the right way and everything. They’re paying higher rates than I pay just because I’m good at capital allocation.

贝基·奎克您认为这件事应该立即着手推进?还是该等到经济度过最艰难的阶段再说?

QUICKIs that something that you think should be taken on immediately? Or do you think it needs to wait until the economy gets through the roughest patches?

巴菲特:我认为,总体而言,我们应该推迟那些容易让人怒火中烧的事情。我认为我们应该——我认为应该持续传递的信息是:我们正处在经济战争中。我们要一起解决这个问题。我们不会把它当作推动各种变革的借口。我可能希望看到税法有所调整,也许——但现在

Mr. BUFFETT: I think, on balance, we ought to defer most of the things that cause people to get very riled up. I think we ought to-I think the message out to continuously be, We are in an economic war. We’re going to solve this together. We’re not going to use it as a way to get all kinds of changes made.’ And I might like to see a change in the tax code and maybe-but right

我现在支持做的是帮助最困难群体的那部分工作,以及那些不会引发——无论如何不会让我们分裂的事情。我认为我们现在不该有太多导致我们分裂的东西。我们有共同的利益和巨大的目标,那就是让经济良好运转,这需要人们携手合作。

now I’m for doing the part that helps the people that are the worst off and whatever doesn’t cause-whatever doesn’t pull us apart. And I don’t think we should have lots of things now that cause us to become disunited. We have a common interest and a huge objective, which is to get this economy working well, and that will take people working together.

贝基·奎克来自马萨诸塞州福里斯特代尔的理查德提出了他的问题,编号 334:“有人主张,美联储在某些时候必须充当最后贷款人。那么,美联储和财政部现在是不是成了最后的出资人?”

QUICKRichard from Forestdale, Massachusetts, writes in his question, number 334 is “Some have opined that the Federal Reserve must, at times, be the lender of last resort. Are the Fed and the Treasury now the spenders of last resort?’

沃伦·巴菲特:这个问题问得好。美联储——以纽约联储为例,一年前全国银行在它的存款是 90 亿美元,现在变成了 4500 亿美元。你能想象吗?银行的行为发生了巨大变化。美联储几乎成了银行的中介——每家银行都往那里跑。毕竟,它们能印钱嘛。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, the Fed-that’s a good question. The Fed has become-I think the Fed of New York, for example, had 9 billion of deposits from banks throughout the country a year ago. Now they have 450 billion. I mean, they have become-can you imagine that? That is a huge change in behavior by banks. They have become the intermediary, almost, for banks. I mean, the Fed is the one place where everybody goes. They can print money, you know.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKSure.

沃伦·巴菲特:我的意思是,从根本上说,所以——他们——他们——在这件事上扮演着极为重要的角色,而且我认为他们一直表现得很好。我祝贺伯南克主席。我的意思是,他在需要的时候做了一些重要的事,这一点他应该得到很多赞誉。

Mr. BUFFETT: I mean, basically, so the-they are the-they have a huge role to play in this, and I think they’ve been playing it well. I congratulate Chairman Bernanke. I mean, he did some important things when he needed to do them, and he should be given a lot of credit for that.

乔·科南对,我就是在想别的事。

KERNENYeah. I’m just thinking of other things.

贝基·奎克我知道你又要往哪儿引了。

QUICKI know where you’re going.

乔·科南不。我确实感觉自己像只招人烦的小飞虫。我还有一个——还有一个想法,巴菲特先生,这事关缩小我们看到的贫富差距。我知道您认为有些人被优待得太过了,另一些人则远远不够。有人说,《雇员自由选择法案》和卡片检查制度能缩小

KERNENNo. I kind of feel like I’m a pesky little gnat. I’ve got one more-one more thought, Mr. Buffett, and that has to do with, you know, trying to narrow the-what we’ve seen between the haves and have nots, and I know that you think that, you know, that certain people have been treated too well, others not enough. Some say that EFCA and card check would narrow the

这个差距。换句话说,就是让工会拥有更多话语权,让更多公司成立工会。这是个好主意吗?还是说,作为企业主,您认为这对经济会是个负面因素?

disparity. In other words, having unions have more of a say, more companies unionized. Is that a good idea? Or do you think, as a business owner, it would be a negative for the economy?

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为在这个国家,无记名投票是相当重要的。我把话说直白一点——我反对卡片检查。

Mr. BUFFETT: I think the secret ballot’s pretty important in the country. You know, I’m against card check, to make a perfectly flat statement.

乔·科南好的。

KERNENOK.

贝基·奎克哇。

QUICKWow.

乔·科南太好了,谢谢你。十分感谢。好了,贝基。

KERNENThat’s great, thank you. Appreciate it. OK, Beck.

贝基·奎克我也没想到答案会这么简短。

QUICKI didn’t expect that short of an answer either.

乔·科南是啊。我喜欢这样。我是说,我喜欢他给了个明确的回答。我不是在表达自己对这件事的看法,但我很高兴我们能从沃伦那里听到这个。

KERNENI know. I liked it. I mean, I liked that he gave me an answer. I’m not saying either way how I feel, but I liked that we got it from Warren.

沃伦·巴菲特:伯克希尔旗下有大量工会,真的,我们各家公司里少说也有好几十个。我理解工会存在的理由。而且总的来说,我认为工会成员在长期以来我们所采用的税制下,确实没有受到公平对待。但我认为卡片检查是个错误。我认为……

Mr. BUFFETT: We have loads of unions at Berkshire, and I mean, dozens and dozens and dozens at our various companies, and I understand the reasons for unionization, I mean. And by and large, I think certainly the people that are in unions have not been well treated by the tax code that we’ve had all the time. I think card check is a mistake. I think that…

乔·科南我觉得听到这样的声音很重要。我们显然都支持总统,也都想摆脱我们眼下所处的这团乱局,但这并不意味着像您这样的人,以及总统所钦佩、愿意倾听其意见的人,就不能指出某些做法,说那可能不是个好主意——而我们之所以进行这样的对话,意义也正在于此。对吧?

KERNENI think it’s important for-to hear from things like that. We all support the president, obviously, and we all want to get out of this mess that we’re in right now, but that doesn’t mean that people like you and people that he admires and listens to can’t point to certain things and say maybe that’s not such a great idea and that’s why we have this dialogue. Right?

沃伦·巴菲特:对。

Mr. BUFFETT: Right.

贝基·奎克好的。

QUICKAll right.

沃伦·巴菲特:是的,先生。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yes, sir.

乔·科南非常好。

KERNENVery good.

贝基·奎克好的。我们再来接一位观众的问题。来自纽约布鲁克维尔的史蒂芬来信,这个问题在某种程度上又绕回到你之前关于银行的评论。他写道:“奥巴马总统最近说,如果你有长期投资的眼光,现在买股票可能是一笔不错的交易。那么,如果有人问奥巴马总统是否——”

QUICKAll right. Let’s bring in another question from a viewer. Steven from Brookeville, New York, writes in, and this is circling back in a way to some of your comments on the banks earlier, but he says, “President Obama recently stated that buying stocks is a potentially good deal if you’ve got a long-term perspective on it. So if President Obama were asked about whether

“——买银行股,”史蒂芬列出了花旗银行、美国银行、富国银行、摩根大通等股票,“对于有长期眼光的人来说,这是不是一笔潜在的好买卖?你觉得他会怎么评价,你又怎么回答这个问题?”

buying bank stocks,” and Steven lists stocks like Citibank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, “Is it a potentially good deal for those with a long-term perspective? What do you think he would say about that, and how would you respond to that question?”

沃伦·巴菲特:这个嘛,我不知道他会怎么说。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know what he would say.

贝基·奎克是的。

QUICKYeah.

沃伦·巴菲特:他买什么股票不会来问我。我想说的是,如果——嗯,有些银行简直是烂摊子。我的意思是,从 1934 年以来,有 3600 家银行和储蓄机构,联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)不得不用各种方式去救助。

Mr. BUFFETT: He doesn’t consult me on his portfolio. I would say that if-well, there’s certain banks that are basket cases. I mean, here are-here are 3600 banks since 1934 that the FDIC, one way or another, banks and saving institutions, they’ve had to bail out.

贝基·奎克嗯。

QUICKHm.

沃伦·巴菲特:但他们没有救助股东。所以,你如果买了银行的股票,可能会赔得精光,而且你理应承担这个风险。只不过,你借钱给银行或者把钱存进去,就不应该有任何损失。所以问题在于,那些未来盈利能力极强的银行,会不会被迫以低得离谱的价格发行股票。

Mr. BUFFETT: But they didn’t bail out the stockholders. So you can-you can lose everything if you buy stock in a bank, and you should be able to lose everything. You just shouldn’t lose anything if you loan them money or a deposit. So the question is, whether banks, which have terrific earning power going forward, will be forced to sell stock at ridiculously low prices. And

沃伦·巴菲特:如果你看绝大多数银行,它们会安然度过难关,靠自身盈利走出困境,尽管一年后这份名单上还会出现更多名字。但只要它们不必以极低的价格发行股票,我想其中不少银行会表现得非常、非常出色。我的意思是,我们持有一些银行股,我喜欢持有它们,也喜欢我们现在持有的仓位。坦率地说,我唯一的担忧是,在某些情况下,它们可能被迫大量发行普通股,而它们本来不需要这么做。它们已经减少了股息,这样就能积累股本,而且凭借当前存在的息差,它们积累股本的速度会非常快。所以银行业很大程度上会自我修复。花旗集团可能是个特例。我的意思是,从某种意义上说,我担心美国公众几乎是从他们对花旗集团的一贯报道里,形成了对所有银行的看法。但美国有 7400 家左右的银行,其中大多数都经营得相当不错。你看看奥马哈周边的银行,它们不会倒闭。大约一个月前,内布拉斯加州卢普市有一家银行倒闭了,未来两三个月内,内布拉斯加州的某个地方还会有另一家银行倒闭。但总的来说,它们状况不错,并且正以极其丰厚的息差配置资产。

if you take the great majority of banks, which will do fine earning their way out of it, although they’ll be more names on this list, you know, a year from now. But if they don’t have to sell stock at distressed prices, I think a number of them will do very, very well. I mean, and we own some bank stocks, and I like owning them and I like owning them in the quantities we own them. And the only fear I have, frankly, is that in some kind of a situation, they might be forced to issue a lot of common stock and they don’t need to do it. They’ve reduced their dividends, so they can build equity and they’ll build equity at a very rapid rate with the spreads that exist now. So the banking system largely will cure itself. Citigroup may be a special case. I mean, and I’m afraid that in a sense, the American public has sort of taken its view of all banks from what they read about Citigroup all the time. But there are 7,400 banks or something like that in the United States and most of them are just fine. You look at the banks around Omaha, you know, they are not going broke. We had a bank in Loup City, Nebraska, go broke about a month ago, and we’ll have another bank go broke someplace in Nebraska, you know, in the next two or three months. But, by and large, they’re in good shape, and they are putting on assets with spreads that are terrific.

贝基·奎克你之前说,银行业会自己解决问题,会靠自身盈利走出困境。

QUICKYou said that the banking system will take care of itself, that it will earn its way out of this.

沃伦·巴菲特:大部分会。

Mr. BUFFETT: Most of it.

贝基·奎克那是不是意味着,你认为美国纳税人已经花在这些银行上的钱是划算的?我们能拿回这些钱吗?

QUICKDoes that mean you think the American taxpayer money that’s already been spent on these banks is good? That we’ll get that money back?

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为对绝大多数银行来说是划算的,但我觉得——你知道,相当一部分钱嘛,我觉得,我觉得在少数情况下是值得商榷的,对。少数情况值得商榷。

Mr. BUFFETT: I think it’s good with overwhelmingly most of the banks, but I think that we’re-a good bit of the money is, you know, I think, I think it’s-it can be questionable in a few cases, yeah. It can be questionable in a few.

贝基·奎克您说的是美国国际集团和花旗集团这些名字。

QUICKYou’re talking about AIG and Citigroup are some of the names.

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,你——我们想聊什么都可以。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, you’re-we’re talking about anything you want to talk about.

贝基·奎克美国国际集团和花旗集团是最常被提起的两个大名字。

QUICKAIG and Citigroup are the big names that pop up.

沃伦·巴菲特:对。嗯,AIG 不是银行,但那里头钱可不少。

Mr. BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, AIG isn’t a bank, but there’s a lot of money in there.

沃伦·巴菲特:当时这是对系统的一个巨大风险,这种状况绝不应被允许在未来重现。但正因为绝不应被允许在未来重现,并不代表 2008 年 9 月出手干预就是错的。那是正确之举。那个周末,你知道,我们有雷曼和花旗——抱歉,美国国际集团也是同一个周末,美林在那个周末被美国银行收购了,但多米诺骨牌已经摆好了。它们排成了一排,而且都是巨大的骨牌,它们没有开始倒下,这是一件好事。

Mr. BUFFETT: And it was a huge risk to the system, and it shouldn’t be-conditions shouldn’t be allowed to recreate itself in the future. But the very fact it shouldn’t be allowed to recreate itself in the future, does not that mean that the wrong thing was done in terms of stepping in there in September. That was the right thing. That weekend, you know, we had Lehman and Citi-I’m sorry, AIG was the same weekend Merrill, which got bought by B of A that weekend, but the dominos were lined up. They were lined up and they were huge dominoes, and it’s a good thing that they didn’t start toppling.

贝基·奎克好。我想问一个来自七八年级学生投资俱乐部的问题,他们每年用 100 万美元虚拟资金做投资。提问的是俄亥俄州都柏林市格里泽尔中学投资俱乐部,问题是:您认为五年后黄金会在什么位置?黄金应该成为价值投资的一部分吗?

QUICKOK. I want to get to a question that came from an investment club of seventh and eighth graders who invest $1 million in fake money every year. This is the Grizzell Middle School Investment Club in Dublin, Ohio, and the question is, where do you think gold will be in five years and should that be a part of value investing?

沃伦·巴菲特:我对金价会到哪儿没有看法,但我唯一能告诉你的是,从现在到五年后,它除了盯着你之外什么都不会干。而你知道,可口可乐会赚钱,我认为富国银行也会赚很多钱——拥有一只会不断下蛋的鹅,比拥有一只只会坐在那里、消耗保险和仓储等费用的鹅要好得多。在我看来,那种从南非或什么地方把东西从地下挖出来,然后运到美国,再埋进纽约联邦储备银行地下的做法,实在算不上什么了不起的资产。

Mr. BUFFETT: I have no views as to where it will be, but the one thing I can tell you is it won’t do anything between now and then except look at you. Whereas, you know, Coca-Cola will be making money, and I think Wells Fargo will be making a lot of money and there will be a lot-and it’s a lot-it’s a lot better to have a goose that keeps laying eggs than a goose that just sits there and eats insurance and storage and a few things like that. The idea of digging something up out of the ground, you know, in South Africa or someplace and then transporting it to the United States and putting into the ground, you know, in the Federal Reserve of New York, does not strike me as a terrific asset.

贝基·奎克还有一个问题,来自密苏里州罗拉市的基思。我们刚才聊了一点通用汽车的事。你说需要有一个不同的方案出台。你认为通用汽车能在不申请破产的情况下做到吗?但他的问题其实是:“如果通用汽车申请破产,对福特和克莱斯勒会有什么影响?”

QUICKThere’s another question that came in from Keith in Rolla, Missouri. We talked a little bit earlier about GM. You said there needs to be a different plan that’s put into place. Do you think it can happen outside of bankruptcy? But his question is, “If GM files for bankruptcy, how will that affect Ford and Chrysler?”

沃伦·巴菲特:那会很艰难。我的意思是,福特一直极力避免落入需要政府援手的境地,但这会波及整个经济,尤其是在当下。所以我——正因如此,总体来看我认为放任它破产会是一个错误,但政府也应当竭尽全力敲定所有可行方案,使商业模式在汽车年销量 1200 万到 1300 万辆的水平上能够成立。

Mr. BUFFETT: It would be tough. I mean, Ford has tried very hard to stay out of the government operation, but it would affect the whole economy and I-and particularly now. And I-that’s why net I think it would be a mistake to let it go that way, but I think the government ought to hammer out everything it can to make the business model viable at a 12 or 13 million unit

至于他们在这方面能拿出什么成果,我们拭目以待。

a year, and we’ll see what they do on that.

贝基·奎克好的。我们想再回到一些关于 TARP 和已实施措施的问题上。来自纽约州斯托克顿的杰夫提了一个问题,他说:“国会通过 7000 亿美元 TARP 计划的时候,把钱直接给我们不是更好吗?”他的意思是,给我们老百姓。“比如,给已婚夫妇发 3 万美元,单身人士发 1.5 万美元,让这些钱回到我们的经济里,经济就能重新运转起来。”他觉得他可以用这笔钱买房、买车、存银行。很多人问过类似的问题。给每个人发 3 万或 10 万美元,会是更好的做法吗?

QUICKOK. If we want to get back to some questions, again, about TARP and things that have gone through, there’s a question that came in from Jeff in Stockton, New York, who said, “Wouldn’t it have been a better idea when the $700 billion TARP was passed by Congress to give it to us?” He means, we the people. “Example, if $30,000 for married couples, 15,000 to singles, get put back into our economy, it’d be up and running.” He thinks he can buy a house, purchase an automobile, put money in our banks. People have asked a lot of questions like that. Would it have been better to give everybody $30,000, $100,000?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这个算法不太准,因为有接近 1.2 亿户家庭,而 TARP 是 7000 亿美元,所以除以 1.2 亿,算下来每户不到 6000 美元。但如果你能让——让人们相信金融体系是至关重要的。没有这个信任,机器就转不起来。如果人们信任了,而你只是给美国每户家庭发 6000 美元,我不确定这对经济活动会不会更好。但我不喜欢回头说,这个比那个好。我的意思是,如果珍珠港少了四艘船,那珍珠港也许就会更好,大概是吧。第二天我们还能多开出四艘船。但算了吧。你知道,我们得往前走。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, the math is a little off because there’s close to 120 million households and TARP was 700 billion, so if you divide 120 million, it comes out to a little less than $6,000. But if you could’ve restored-it was essential that people believe in the financial system. The machine won’t work without that. If they believe in that and you’re just going to send out $6,000 to every household in the United States, I’m not sure that would’ve been better for economic activity. But I am not inclined to look back and say this would’ve been better than that. I mean, if there had been four fewer ships in the Pearl Harbor, then Pearl Harbor would’ve been better, probably so. We’d have four more to go out, you know, the next day. But forget it. You know, we’ve got to go forward.

贝基·奎克先说这个,来自佐治亚州罗斯威尔的格雷格·马丁提了一个问题。他问:“对于刺激措施可能引发的通胀……

QUICKStarting off with this, there’s a question that came in from Greg Martin in Roswell, Georgia. He says, “How do we best prepare for the inflation that will result from the

……我们该如何最好地做好准备?您预计通胀会有多严重?”

stimulus, and how severe do you expect it to be?”

沃伦·巴菲特:有多严重不好说。未来若干年后,政府和美联储可以采取一些措施来努力抵消它的影响。但我们目前正在做的事,确实可能引发严重的通胀。通胀期间最好的资产,是你自己的赚钱能力。你所做的任何能提升自身才能、使你自己变得更有价值的事……

Mr. BUFFETT: It’s hard to tell how severe it’ll be. There will be things that government and Federal Reserve can do years from now that will try to counteract it. But we are certainly doing things that could lead to a lot of inflation, and the best asset during inflation is your own earning power. Anything you do to improve your own talents and make yourself more valuable

……最终都会以相应的真实购买力给你回报。如果你把某件事做得很好,无论你是一名大联盟棒球手,还是你是一名出色的助理,不管是什么,那都是最好的资产。在我看来,第二好的资产是一家好企业。你可以亲自拥有它,也可以通过持有股票来拥有它。

will get paid off in terms of appropriate real purchasing power. If you do something well, whether you’re a major league baseball player, you know, whatever it may be, if you’re a good assistant, whatever it may be, that’s the best asset. The-in my view, the second best asset is a good business. And you might own one yourself, but you might own it through equities.

贝基·奎克好。来自佛罗里达州德尔雷海滩的亨德里克来信问:“在考虑各种产品时,无论是零售品、批发品还是一般商品,美国在国际投资者眼里算便宜吗?”他们想知道现在是不是一个出口的好时机。

QUICKAll right. Hendrick writes in from Del Ray Beach, Florida, and says, “Is America considered cheap in the eye of international investors when considering products, whether it be retail, wholesale or goods in general?” And they want to know if now is a time to export.

沃伦·巴菲特:你当然希望出口增长。顺便说一句,人们因为贸易逆差数字和进口量而迷失了方向。如果你回溯到 1970 年左右,美国的出口占 GDP 的 5%。现在大约——它们涨到了大约 12%。所以我们制造了很多世界喜欢的东西,很多。12% 乘以 14 万亿美元可不是个小数字。我们在这方面一直做得很好,保持这个优势很重要,而且同样重要的是,我们也从其他国家进口。但我们要做的是鼓励贸易和出口。就像我说的,我们在那方面做得并不差,只是过去 10 年里,我们有点进口上瘾、消费上瘾了。

Mr. BUFFETT: You want exports, obviously, to grow. And incidentally, people lose it because the trade balance figures and how much we import. The exports of the United States were 5 percent of GDP if you go back to about 1970. You know, they’re about-they got up to about 12 percent. So we make a lot of things the world likes. A lot. Twelve percent of 14 trillion is not a small number. We-we’ve been very good at that and it’s important that we stay good at it, and it’s important that, you know, we also import from other countries. But we want to do things to encourage trade and exports. And like I say, we haven’t done a bad job on that, it’s just we went kind of import crazy and consumption crazy over the last 10 years.

贝基·奎克好的。来自路易斯安那州的比尔来信提问,是关于新税收政策的。他说:“慈善捐赠对你和比尔·盖茨来说都是一件极为重要的事。我知道你们的捐赠不以税收政策为依据,但新政策似乎对慈善捐赠不利。”对此你怎么看?

QUICKAll right. Bill writes in from Louisiana. He’s got a question about the new tax policy. He says, “Giving to charities is such an important issue for both you and Bill Gates. I know you don’t base your giving on tax policy, but the new policy seems to penalize charitable giving.” What’s your thought on that?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,这份提案——我认为,会在一定程度上降低慈善抵扣的价值。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, it’d be-the proposal, I think, reduces the value of deductions to some extent.

贝基·奎克没错。

QUICKRight.

巴菲特:利息抵扣,以及其他所有项目。我认为你得从整个综合政策的角度来看。最终,如果人们只能抵扣 28%,你知道,而不是 36% 或者别的什么比例……

Mr. BUFFETT: Interest deductions and everything. I think you have to look at the whole integrated policy. And in the end if people can only deduct 28 percent, you know, instead of 36 percent or whatever it may be…

巴菲特:……就慈善抵扣而言,你知道,我——每件事都有它的——我不觉得那是什么世界末日。我不认为这会改变人们的慈善捐赠行为。我认为,经济运转得如何,才会极大地改变慈善捐赠,而我确实认为,对这个国家的慈善机构来说,最好的事情就是让经济运转良好。我——一般来说,我认识的人里,抵扣额度的大小并不是一个特别大的决定因素。有些人会在这上面做手脚之类。我有 60 亿美元的——50 亿美元慈善抵扣结转额度。这些我大概一个都用不上。我的意思是,这并不——但这并没什么影响。我是说,如果你本来就倾向于做慈善,我——如果 28% 和 35% 或 36% 的税率差别就能改变你的决定,那你本来也没打算有多慷慨。

Mr. BUFFETT: …on charitable deductions, you know, I-everything has a-I don’t think that’s the end of the world. I don’t think it’ll change-that’ll change charitable giving. I think how well the economy works will change charitable giving big time, and I think the best thing for charities in this country is to get the economy working well. And I-the people I know generally, it is not a huge factor, the amount of the deduction. Some people play games with it and all that. I’ve got $6 billion of carryover-$5 billion of carryovers on charitable deductions. I’m not going to get to use any of them. I mean, it doesn’t make-but it doesn’t make any difference. I mean, if you’re inclined toward philanthropy, I-the difference between 28 and 35 or 6 is going to make a difference, you weren’t going to be very charitable anyway.

乔·科南沿着相同的思路,我们当然可以挑不同的事情来谈。很多写信来的人——实际上,贝基大概也看到了——都在问这个问题:巴菲特先生,关于“总量控制与交易”制度,不少人认为这会损害整体经济。我知道你持有康菲石油的股份,也有公用事业公司。那么,这是不是——你是否支持预算案里的这项总量控制与交易条款?

KERNENAnd along the same line, we can pick and choose different things. And a lot of the e-mailers, actually, and Becky’s probably seen them, too, have asked this: Mr. Buffett, on cap and trade, a lot of people think that that’s going to hurt the overall economy. And I know you’ve got Conoco-a stake in Conoco, you’ve got utilities. Is that the right-do you support cap and trade, that provision of the-of the budget?

巴菲特:嗯,是的。你也知道,那项政策还没有正式颁布,或其他什么的。但它是前几天公布的预算案里的一部分,旨在落实它。任何实际上对碳排放征税的措施,总有人会首当其冲。对一家受监管的公用事业公司而言,它的客户将为这笔费用买单。我的意思是,它实际上会变成一种税,而我们之所以认定这种税是必要的,是因为市场体系并未恰当地惩罚那些损害未来、却不会在明天早上就立刻伤害到我们的事情。但那项税很可能会是相当累退的。成本会转嫁给哪些客户,将由各州的公用事业委员会逐一决定。但如果你给向大气排放碳定一个成本,在公用事业行业,这笔成本将会由客户承担。而且它就跟其他任何税一样。就康菲石油而言,这类影响则不那么直接。或者就整个工业来看,也是如此。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, yeah. As you know, that hasn’t been enacted yet or anything. But it is part of the budget that was put out the other day that-giving effect to it. Anything you put in that effectively taxes carbon emissions is-somebody’s going to bear the brunt of it. In the case of a regulated utility, the utility customers are going to pay for it. I mean, it’s going to become, in effect, a tax which we have decided is needed because the market system doesn’t really appropriately penalize something that hurts the future but doesn’t really hurt us tomorrow morning. But that tax is probably going to be pretty regressive. It’ll be determined by individual public utility commissions state by state what customers it gets passed through to. But if you put a cost of issuing-putting carbon into the atmosphere, it-in the utility business it’s going to be born by customers. And it’s a tax like anything else. If-in terms of ConocoPhillips, it would be less direct, anything of that sort. Or in terms of industry generally.

不过,就公用事业行业而言,这笔成本会被转嫁出去。

But in terms of the utility industry, it’ll be passed through.

乔·科南而煤炭行业,处境会更难。那你——你是在说,我们目前不应该这么做吗?

KERNENAnd the coal industry, make it tougher. Are-then are you saying that we should not do that at this point?

巴菲特:嗯,我认为——我认为我们到了那个节点时,应该根据当时的经济状况来评估它,但我觉得我们应该先把经济理顺。我认为第一要务、第二要务和第三要务,都是经济,乔。我认为——我认为未来的确需要一个为其发声的群体。我的意思是,如果市场体系将要在未来 100 年或 150 年的时间里,产生某种——

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I think-I think we should evaluate it in terms of the economy when we get to that point, but I think we should get the economy straightened. I think job one, job two and job three is the economy, Joe. I think-I think the future does have to have a constituency. I mean, if the market system is going to produce something that over 100 years or 150 years

——确实会以重大方式改变世界的东西,你最好得有某种机制,迫使市场体系在未来去适应那个现实。至于总量控制与交易——我们自己中美能源公司那帮人,我——他们都是非常聪明的家伙,你可以请他们上节目来聊这个事,他们总体上并不倾向于支持总量控制与交易。但让他们来解释原因,比我更合适。不过,不管怎样,社会终归要为此付出代价。

really will change the world in a big way, you better have something that forces the market system to adapt to that reality in the future. Whether the cap and trade-our own guys at MidAmerican Energy, I-who are very smart fellows and who you could have on to talk to about it, generally do not lean in favor of cap and trade. But they would be better to explain the reasons than I. One way or another, society will pay for it, though.

乔·科南好。我就把这理解为你不赞成总量控制与交易制度。

KERNENYeah. I’m going to take that as against cap and trade.

贝基·奎克沃伦,这里还有一个问题,来自印度的一位叫维沙尔的观众,他写道:“查理·芒格把你描述为一台学习机器。你在 2008 年学到的最重要的一课是什么?”

QUICKWarren, there’s another question that came in from Vishal in India, who writes in, “Charlie Munger describes you as a learning machine. What would be the biggest lesson you’ve learned in 2008?”

巴菲特:嗯,我学到的是——我会说,在 2008 年,极端杠杆的危险再一次深深教育了我,无论是对个人还是对社会而言。杠杆在上涨的时候乐趣无穷,但当它走向极端后,在下跌过程中所带来的后果,无论是对个人——我的意思是——我是指,一个人仅仅因为信用卡,

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I’ve learned that-I would say in 2008 it’s been re-emphasized to me the dangers of extreme leverage, whether it’s on an individual basis or whether it’s societal. And leverage is a lot of fun on the way up, and what it produces on the way down when carried to extremes, whether individual-I mean-I mean the tragedy of somebody on a credit card,

也就是杠杆,对婚姻、对种种事情所造成的悲剧。而现在,当整个经济,或者经济中的很大一部分,以一种

which is leverage, what it does to marriages, all kinds of things. Now, when you get where the entire economy, or much of the economy leverages up in a way

在被迫去杠杆时蕴含着社会风险的方式加了杠杆,我认为我们本该已经从中吸取教训了。如果你——在生活中,有很多事情,你不知道自己是稍微过了头还是稍微差一点,但我认为我们已经学到的是,下一次,我们宁可站在过于保守这一边,也不能再允许个人——或大型机构,像我们最近允许的那样,在杠杆问题上不加约束。

that embodies societal dangers when it has to deleverage, I think we should have learned a lesson on that. And if you’re-if you’re dealing-there are a lot of things in life where you don’t know whether it’s just a little too much or a little too little, but I think we’ve learned that we want to err on the side, next time, of not allowing people to go on-or big institutions to get as unchecked on leverage as we have allowed them to do here recently.

贝基·奎克沃伦,有很多人写信来问一个差不多类似的问题——您是否担心,我们可能已经吓跑了整整一代投资者?在他们亲眼目睹了所发生的一切之后,他们会不会不敢回来投资了?

QUICKWarren, there are many people who have written in and asked a question somewhere along the lines of do you worry about the idea that we have scared away an entire generation of investors? Will they be afraid to get back in and invest after everything they’ve seen that’s happened?

巴菲特:自经济珍珠港事件以来所发生的一切,已经极大地改变了人们的消费行为和投资行为,毫无疑问,人们需要时间来走出阴影。所以答案是,他们会在——他们会在相当长一段时间里,花钱的方式有些不同,投资的方式也会有些——

Mr. BUFFETT: We have changed people’s consuming behavior and investing behavior big time with what’s happened since the economic Pearl Harbor, and there’s no question it’s going to take people time to get over that. So the answer is they’re going to-they’re going to spend their money somewhat differently for quite a while, they’re going to invest their money somewhat

相当长一段时间里都会不一样。说到底,如果你是个储蓄者,你终究要投资。眼下,如果你决定把钱投在几乎没收益的政府债券上,你的购买力就会缩水。我的意思是,你仍然要面对这个问题。所以我希望人们能从中吸取正确的教训,但毫无疑问,这件事在他们的心理上留下了伤疤,会在一段时间内影响他们的行为方式。而你眼前正在看到这一点。

differently for quite a while. In the end, in-if you-if you’re a saver, you have-you’re going to invest. Now, if you decide to put it in the government securities at practically no yield, you’re going to lose in terms of purchasing power. I mean, you still face the problem. So I would hope people would draw the right lessons from this, but there’s no question they’ve had a scar on their psyche, which affects how they’re going to behave for a while. And you’re seeing that right now.

贝基·奎克你谈过希望奥巴马总统和国会采取什么措施来解决这个问题。那你希望美国企业界以及 CEO 们做些什么?

QUICKYou’ve talked about what you would like to see President Obama and Congress do to solve this problem. What would you like to see corporate America do, CEOs?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,你知道,我认为美国企业——我觉得抱怨税收、抱怨这抱怨那,这些事统统都算上,美国企业在行为上还有很大的改进空间。实际上,我认为它们在 1990 年代跌到了谷底,从那以后行为确实有所改善。但企业——部分原因是,

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, you know, I think corporate America-you know, I think the idea of complaining about taxes, complaining about this and that and all of it, I think corporate America has plenty of room to behave better. Now, actually, I think they hit bottom in the 1990s. I think there has been some improvement in behavior since then. But corporate-part of the reason, and

也许只是一小部分,但公司疯狂加杠杆之类行为的部分原因是,它们开始——大型金融机构开始说:“我们可以让收益每年增长 X%,而且我们可以让每个季度都比上一年同季度更漂亮。”你做不到的。你知道,如果你非要那么做,你就会玩数字游戏,就会搞出结构性投资工具(SIV)之类的东西来绕开资本要求,就会涉足流动性看跌期权。你会搞出各种花样来粉饰数据。你还会设立黑箱,你知道,就像在 AIG 那样,后来都变成了黑洞,因为你可以从那些黑箱里往外掏数字,而且你根本不用——

it’s just, you know, maybe a small part, but part of the reason that companies leveraged up like crazy and all that sort of thing is they started-big financial institutions said, We can increase our earnings X percent a year, and we can-every quarter will be better than the corresponding quarter here.’ You can’t do it. It-you know, you’re going to play games if you do that, and you’re going to create SIVs and things to get around capital requirements, and you’re going to get into liquidity put options. You’re going to get into all these things to play games to get better numbers. You’re going to have black boxes, you know, whether it’s at AIG, which turned into black holes later on, because you can pull numbers out of those black boxes and you don’t have-and

在相当长的一段时间里,你或许能蒙混过关。但我觉得,美国企业界在对待自己报告数字的严肃性上,态度极为糟糕——1990 年代那会儿更恶劣,不过我希望他们能改过自新。

for a long-for a while you can get away with it. But I think corporate America has behaved terribly in terms of their attitude toward the sanctity of the numbers they report, and I-it was worse in the 1990s, but I hope they get over that.

贝基·奎克那普通美国人呢?我们该做些什么?

QUICKWhat about average Americans? What should we be doing?

沃伦·巴菲特:我认为普通美国人应该竭尽全力,让自己不至于被淹死,基本上就是这个意思。我们的储蓄模式已经发生了巨大改变,美国人民自己做出了改变。他们并没有从总统或任何人那里得到什么告诫,他们就是害怕了,所以开始存钱。总的来说,我觉得——

Mr. BUFFETT: I think the average American should be doing everything he can to keep his head above water, basically. I-we have changed the savings pattern just dramatically by the six-the American people just changed it themselves. They didn’t get any admonition from the president or anybody else to do it, they just got scared so they’re saving. I think that by and large

人们,只要力所能及,就应该——他们当然应该避开信用卡债务。你知道,我的意思是,靠借 18% 或 20% 利率的钱,我是没办法赚到钱的。我们也有信用卡业务。我的意思是,美国大众想要信用卡。所以我们的家具商场也发行信用卡,你知道,这就是商业版图的一部分。只是你自己别成为其中一分子。我经常——

people, to the extent they can, should-they certainly should avoid credit card debt. You know, I mean, I can’t make money borrowing money at 18 or 20 percent. We have credit cards. I mean, the American public wants credit cards. So our furniture store issues credit cards and, you know, it’s part of the landscape. Just don’t be part of it yourself. They-there’s-I tell

这样跟学生们讲。你不可能靠着借 18% 或 20% 利率的钱,最终还能胜出。我不能——那样我会破产的。所以,尽可能远离债务。当你攒够了一笔合理的首付,找到一套你喜欢的房子,那就买下来。但在你能承受之前,不要出手。要承担你担得起的义务,避开你担不起的。

students this all the time. You can’t borrow money at 18 or 20 percent and come out ahead. I can’t-I’d go broke. So the stay away from debt as much as possible. When you get amount for a reasonable down payment, you find a home you like, buy it. But don’t do it till you can handle it. And take on obligations you can handle, avoid the others.

贝基·奎克简单问一下,和六个多月前你告诉我们美国正经历经济珍珠港时相比,你现在是更乐观了,还是更不乐观了?

QUICKVery quickly, are you more optimistic or less optimistic than you were just over six months ago when you told us we were in our economic Pearl Harbor?

沃伦·巴菲特:嗯,我之所以乐观,是因为我们挺过了那一关,政府确实采取了一些当时极为必要的措施,而且动作很快。我有一点悲观——我对长期并不悲观。这个国家,即便我们把它搞砸了,最终也能运转得很好。但就我们多快能恢复到自身潜力而言,大家齐心协力至关重要。我觉得各种意见分歧和乱象让我很烦,而且——我理解国会及其职责,但他们务必认识到,这次情况非同寻常。而总统在这方面也必须尽好自己的那份责任。所以,实际上,我对去年 9 月的即时反应相当满意,因为那在一定程度上挽救了整个体系。但随着事态推进,我多少有些失望,因为我们似乎始终无法拧成一股绳,也未能让美国公众充分理解到底发生了什么、需要做些什么等等。因此,我认为还有大量的沟通工作需要去做。

Mr. BUFFETT: Well, I’m optimistic in the sense that we got past that, and the government did some of the things that were really needed and they did them fast. I am somewhat pessimistic-I’m not pessimistic about it long term. This country will work fine even if we screw it up. But it’s important in terms of the speed with which we get back to our potential, it’s very important that people work together. And I think the divisiveness and everything bothers me, and the idea of-I understand Congress and their responsibilities, but they really have to realize this is something different. And the-and the president has to do his part in respect to that, too. And so I-I’ve been-I’ve been very pleased, actually, in September with the immediate response, because it saved the system to some degree. I’ve been kind of disappointed as we’ve gone along in sort of we can’t quite get our act together and we can’t really get the American public to understand what’s happened, what needs to be done and all of that. So I think there’s a communications job to be done.

贝基·奎克好的,巴菲特先生,非常感谢您今天抽出时间接受我们的采访。您真是太慷慨了。

QUICKAll right, Mr. Buffett, we want to thank you very much with your time for us today. You’ve been very generous.

沃伦·巴菲特:谢谢。

Mr. BUFFETT: Thank you.

贝基·奎克我们很感激。再次感谢沃伦·巴菲特。奥马哈的直播到此结束。我们今晚《CNBC 报道》见。还有,乔,很快就能见到你了。

QUICKWe appreciate it. And our thanks again to Warren Buffett. That’s it from Omaha. We’ll see you tonight on CNBC Reports. And, Joe, see you very soon, too.

乔·科南好的,也替我好好谢谢巴菲特先生,占用了这么长时间。非常感谢,贝基。

KERNENAll right, thank Mr. Buffett very much for me, too, for all that time. Appreciate it, Becky.