2010 年 CNBC 高盛与美国经济复苏访谈
CNBC 文字与视频实录沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济……第 1 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 1 of 8
CNBC 文字与视频实录沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济复苏 发布者:亚历克斯·克里彭 | 执行制片人 cnbc.com | 2010 年 5 月 3 日 | 美东时间下午 12:46
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic Rebound Posted By: Alex Crippen | Executive Producer cnbc.com | 03 May 2010 | 12:46 PM ET
沃伦·巴菲特今天(2010 年 5 月 3 日)在奥马哈接受 CNBC《财经论谈》(Squawk Box)节目贝基·奎克的现场采访时,为面临美国证交会(SEC)欺诈指控的高盛作了辩护,并谈到了他在美国经济中看到的“切实强劲”的迹象。
Warren Buffett defended Goldman Sachs as it faces SEC fraud accusations and talked about the signs of "real strength" he's seeing in the U.S. economy during a live interview in Omaha today, May 3, 2010 with Becky Quick on CNBC's Squawk Box.
这是他周末在伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会上回答股东近五个小时的提问后,首次亮相电视直播。
It was his first live TV appearance after answering shareholders' questions for almost five hours at this weekend's Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting.
以下是视频片段以及两人对话的文字记录。
Here are video clips and a transcript of their conversation.
贝基·奎克接下来一个小时的做客嘉宾是沃伦·巴菲特。他是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事长兼首席执行官。巴菲特先生,感谢您今早参加我们的节目。
BECKY QUICKOur guest host for the next hour is Warren Buffett. He's the Berkshire Hathaway chairman and CEO. And, Mr. Buffet, thank you for joining us this morning.
沃伦·巴菲特非常高兴。
WARREN BUFFETTIt's a real pleasure.
贝基你听到刚才那段关于高盛的谈话了吗?
BECKYDid you hear this conversation about Goldman Sachs?
巴菲特是的,听到了。
BUFFETTI did, yeah.
贝基这个周末,高盛显然是最大的头条新闻之一。眼下——美国证交会正在考虑这些指控。许多人担心高盛是否不仅遵循了法律条文,还遵循了法律精神。你怎么看?
BECKYNow, Goldman was obviously one of the huge headlines here this weekend. There are -- right now the SEC considering these charges. And a lot of concern about whether Goldman not only followed the letter of the law, but the spirit of the law. What do you think?
巴菲特嗯,就我所看到的 Abacus 交易(就是美国证交会提出投诉的那桩)的全部情况而言,我不认为那笔交易有问题。我们是债券保险公司,ACA 也是债券保险公司,MBIA、FGIC、Ambac 都是,这些公司最初都是做市政债券保险的,后来市政债券业务的利润率被挤压,它们便开始越界,承保其他结构化交易之类的业务。
BUFFETTWell, from everything I've seen of the Abacus transaction, which was the one the SEC put out the complaint on, I do not see a problem with that transaction. We're a bond insurer, ACA was a bond insurer, MBIA, FGIC, Ambac, and all those companies started out insuring municipal bonds and then the profit margins got squeezed in the municipal bonds and they started drifting over and insuring other structured deals and so on.
ACA 当时大概有好几十个人分析债券。很多报告甚至都没说明他们是债券承保方,但那本来就是他们的工作。他们的工作就是评估信用风险,如果要承保,就定出一个恰当的保费。如果他们搞不清什么是恰当的保费,就应该直接放弃这单业务。那一时期,几乎所有债券保险公司都惹上了麻烦,原因正是它们越界涉足了自己并不擅长的领域。
ACA had probably dozens of people analyzing bonds. Many of the reports don't even explain that they were bond insured, but that was their job. Their job was to look at credits and stick a proper premium on if they wanted to insure them. If they didn't know what the proper premium was, they should have skipped insuring them. And almost all of the bond insurers got in trouble during that period because they drifted over into areas where they really weren't that good.
贝基但美国证交会的投诉聚焦于欺诈,并称主要理由是,证交会指控高盛没有披露约翰·保尔森站在空头一方,做空这只产品,并且他还协助设计了这笔交易。
BECKYBut the SEC complaint focuses on fraud and says in large part it's because Goldman, the SEC alleges, did not let on that John Paulson was on the short side, betting against this, and he was helping structure the deal.
巴菲特贝基,我们收到过许多交易方案。但比方说,曾经有一笔市政债券交易递到伯克希尔面前。那是一笔 80 亿美元的市政债券,一家华尔街机构找到我们,说:“我们希望你们为这些债券提供保险。”我们回答:“可以,保费要 1.6 亿美元。”你会看到,加利福尼亚州的部分有几亿美元,得克萨斯州有 10 亿美元。这家机构来找我们的时候,碰巧是两年前的雷曼兄弟,我们要为这些债券提供 10 年期的担保。当时有四种可能:雷曼持有这些债券,在做对冲;雷曼认为市政债券定价过高,在做空它们;雷曼有个客户持有这些债券,在做对冲;或者客户在做空。
BUFFETTBecky, we had many deals presented to us. But, for example, there was a municipal bond deal that was presented to Berkshire. And 8 billion of municipal bonds and a Wall Street house came to us and they said, "We'd like you to insure these bonds." And we said, "We'll do it for $160 million." And you'll see that the state of California is a couple of hundred million and Texas is a billion. And when that firm came to us, it happened to be Lehman Brothers two years ago, and we were to insure these bonds for 10 years. There were four possibilities. Lehman had these bonds and was hedging them. Lehman had an opinion that municipal bonds were overpriced and they were shorting them. They had a customer on the bonds that was hedging them, or the customers were shorting them.
我们不在乎。我们的事是判断要不要承保这些债券。我从来不问交易对手是谁。显然,交易对面总得有人。即便本·伯南克站在交易对面,我照样会承保那些债券。弄清楚自己想保什么,是我的分内事。交易对面总是有人的。就算约翰·保尔森站在交易对面,我们仍然会承保那些债券。
We didn't care. Our job was to decide whether to insure the bonds. I never asked who was on the other side of the transaction. Obviously, somebody is on the other side of the transaction. But if Ben Bernanke was on the other side of the transaction, I still would have insured the bonds. It was my job to figure out what I wanted to insure. And there's always somebody on the other side of the transaction. And John Paulson could have been on the other side of that transaction and we still would have insured the bonds.
反过来说,如果保费定错了,我们就不会承保。所以,债券承保商在承保债券时承担着损失风险。债券归谁持有、谁在做对冲、谁在做空,按理说对它们毫无影响。它们该做的是判断风险有多大,并收取恰当的保费。而 ACA 收取的保费并不恰当。
On the other hand, if the premium was wrong, we wouldn't have insured the bonds. So a bond insurer runs the risk of loss when they insure bonds. It shouldn't make any difference to them who owns them, who is hedging them, who is shorting them. They should decide what the risk is and charge an appropriate premium. And ACA charged the wrong premium.
贝基劳埃德·布兰克费恩上周去参议员面前作证,很多议员的话听起来像是他有意误导客户,跟客户说一套,自己做的又是另一套。
BECKYLloyd Blankfein went before senators last week and a lot of them made it sound like he had intentionally misled his customers, told them one thing and then acted another way.
巴菲特嗯,我跟高盛做生意已经 44 年了。他们为我们募集了大量资本,让我们得以部署很多人手。在伯克希尔涉及的收购交易中,他们参与的比任何其他华尔街投行都多得多。因为有高盛,我们成了一家规模大得多的公司。我们跟他们有业务往来。
BUFFETTWell, I've been doing business with Goldman for 44 years. They have raised a lot of capital for us that enabled us to deploy a lot of people. They have been involved in more acquisitions than any other Wall Street firm by far in connection with Berkshire. We're a much larger company because of Goldman Sachs. And we trade with them.
我不会雇佣他们做投资顾问或提供投资服务。别人会。他们有很大的投资咨询业务,但我不为此付钱给他们。我经常做的事情其实是和他们做交易。当我从他们那里买入某样东西时,他们可能是在为客户卖出,也可能是在做空给我。你知道,管理我的钱不是他们的责任。如果我愿意,我可以雇他们来管我的钱。但我不这么做。而且我常常从他们那里买入一些东西,我猜他们是在做空给我。但你知道,这就是游戏的规则。
Now, I don't hire them for investment advice or services. People do. They have got a big investment advisory business, but I don't pay them for that. What I do do is frequently is I trade with them. When I buy something from them, they may be selling it for a customer. They may be shorting it to me. You know, it's not their responsibility to manage my money. I could hire them to manage my money, if I want to. But I don't. And I often buy something from them that my guess is that they are shorting to me. But, you know, that's the name of the game.
贝基·奎克梅丽莎·李提到,越来越多人议论劳埃德·布兰克费恩可能会因此丢掉饭碗。你怎么看劳埃德·布兰克费恩的表现?
BECKYMelissa Lee mentioned that talk is growing that Lloyd Blankfein may end up losing his job over this. What do you think about how Lloyd Blankfein has performed?
巴菲特我认为劳埃德·布兰克费恩在领导高盛方面干得非常出色。我是说,从古斯·利维开始,高盛的每一任掌舵人我都认识。高盛历来都挑选一流人才来掌管公司,这些人,你知道,是你放心把女儿嫁过去的那种人,也是经营企业极为精明的那种人。
BUFFETTI think Lloyd Blankfein has done a great job of leading Goldman Sachs. I mean, I have known the people who run Goldman Sachs ever since Gus Levy, every one of them. And Goldman has had a history of picking first class people to run the business, people that are the sort of people that, you know, feel fine about having marry your daughter and people who are plenty smart about running a business.
贝基有些人会说你在为高盛辩护,是因为你对他们有重大投资。你在给自己背书。你对此作何回应?
BECKYSome people would say you are defending Goldman Sachs because you have a major investment with them. You're talking your book. What do you say to them?
巴菲特嗯,我觉得是你在问我问题,我在回应你的问题。但我说的都是我的真实想法。我们在那家公司确实有一笔重大投资。如果你把 50 亿美元投进一家公司,你当然应该对它感觉相当不错。我们当初投的时候就很看好,现在也一样看好。
BUFFETTWell, I'd say you're asking me the questions and I'm responding to your questions. But I am talking my belief. And we do have a major investment in them. And if you put $5 billion in a company, you ought to feel pretty good about it and we felt pretty good about it when we did it. And we feel pretty good about it now.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字稿及视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济…… 第 2 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 2 of 8
贝基·奎克你觉得劳埃德·布兰克费恩该继续干下去吗?
BECKYDo you think Lloyd Blankfein should continue in his job?
巴菲特当然。当然。我宁愿让他来管,也不愿意交给其他任何人。
BUFFETTAbsolutely. Absolutely. I'd rather have him running it than anybody else.
贝基你和他谈过这件事吗——关于这笔交易、美国证交会的投诉、以及他需要采取什么应对措施?
BECKYHave you had conversations with him this, about the transaction, about the SEC complaint, about what he needs to be doing in response?
巴菲特大概聊过三四次,每次也就五到十分钟。他跟我同步一些最新进展,也问过我,面对这种铺天盖地的舆论压力,有没有什么好的应对办法。但我跟他从没聊过他要下台的事。就算他问我——他并没问——我也会毫不犹豫地说,一定要留下来。
BUFFETTProbably had three or four conversations, each one of them maybe five to ten minutes. He's bringing me up-to-date on some development. And he's asked me whether I've got any great ideas on this in terms of how to handle essentially what is a tsunami of press opinion. But I have had no conversation with him in any way about him stepping down. And if he asked me, which he hasn't, I would say by all means stay.
贝基·奎克周六您提到,预计到场的四万名股东中,大概有三万九千九百人并不理解这笔交易,也不明白高盛那边到底发生了什么。您觉得这个周末您帮他们弄明白了吗?
BECKYYou mentioned on Saturday that of the 40,000 expected shareholders, probably 39,900 of them did not understand this transaction or what was happening at Goldman. Do you think you were able to help them understand it this weekend?
巴菲特很多人都跟我说过。说实话,几十个人——包括我们的一些董事——都告诉我,他们从未听过这笔交易的完整解释。荷兰银行(ABN AMRO)实际上是最终出钱的一方。荷兰银行,现在已并入苏格兰皇家银行,他们掏出了 9 亿美元,差不多这个数——他们付钱,是因为他们是 ACA 的信用担保人。他们接下了那个风险。我们偶尔也会为别人的信用做担保。荷兰银行——美国证交会的起诉书里写得很清楚——他们收 17 个基点,大约 160 万美元,就去担保 9 亿美元的信用。如果 ACA 没出问题,他们会赚走那 160 万美元,觉得自己做了一笔好买卖。但有时候银行在信用担保上赔钱,有时候不会。荷兰银行赔了那笔钱。ACA 最初赔钱,是因为他们在自己不太懂的东西上做了债券保险。
BUFFETTI have been told by a lot of them. I mean, I have literally had, dozens including some of our directors. And they said they had never heard the transaction explained. ABN AMRO actually is the one that ended up paying the dollars out. ABN AMRO, now part of Royal Bank of Scotland, they paid out 900 million, or close to it, and got paid -- they paid out because they were a credit guarantor of ACA. They took on that risk. We sometimes guarantee the credit of other people. ABN AMRO got -- it's in the SEC complaint, they got paid 17 basis points, that's about a million six, to guarantee 900 million of credit. If ACA hadn't gotten in trouble they would have pocketed a million six and felt like they made a good deal. But sometimes banks lose money guaranteeing credit and sometimes they don't. ABN AMRO lost that money. ACA originally lost the money because they rolled bond insurance on something they didn't understand very well.
但你要知道,当时 MBIA 就在承保那样的保单,Ambac 也在承保,FSA 也一样。结果他们全都在上面赔了钱。我是说,2008 年 2 月的楼市情况,跟一年前相比已经大不一样了。很多人当时都判断错了,包括房利美、房地美——这些公司跟社会利益牵连巨大,国会基本是通过一个只有 200 人监管的机构来管理它们——它们才是最大的输家。所以,在楼市上栽跟头的人多了去了。
But bear in mind, MBIA was writing insurance like that at the time. Ambac was writing insurance like that at the time. FSA was writing insurance like that at the time. And all of them lost money on it. I mean, the housing situation in February of 2008 looked a lot different than the housing situation a year earlier. And many people were wrong, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, you know, companies with huge involvements with the society, managed by Congress essentially through an agency that had 200 people overseeing them. And they were the biggest losers of all. So a lot of people were wrong about housing.
贝基你认为这种情况是不是一些大银行下了大赌注,现在输了就怪葡萄酸?
BECKYDo you think this is a situation where it's some big banks that made some bad bets and now it's sour grapes?
巴菲特嗯,大银行下了糟糕的赌注。很多人也都下了糟糕的赌注。美国人民在住房上下了糟糕的赌注。我是说,你知道吗,在高峰期,住房价值 22 万亿美元,人们觉得住房只会上涨。而且几乎所有人都相信这一点。我是说,我自己也信了,你知道吗,我那一整条街上的人都信了。评级机构信了,房利美和房地美信了,国会信了,华尔街信了,抵押贷款银行家们也信了。房价一路上涨、上涨、再上涨,于是他们在脑子里构建了这些模型。他们可能没把这当成模型,但基本上他们就是认为房价不可能大幅下跌。而当房价真的下跌时,很多人看起来极其愚蠢,很多人亏了钱。
BUFFETTWell, big banks made bad bets. And lots of people made bad bets. The American people made a bad bet on housing. I mean, you know, at the peak, housing was worth 22 billion and people thought housing could do nothing but go up. And everybody virtually believed it. I mean, I believed it, you know, people in my block believed it. Rating agencies believed it, Freddie and Fannie believed it, Congress believed it, Wall Street believed it, mortgage bankers believed it. Housing had kept going up and up and up, so they built these models in their minds. They might not have thought of them as models, but they basically didn't think housing prices could get cracked a lot. And when they did get cracked, a lot of people looked awfully foolish and a lot of people lost money.
贝基你觉得我们是不是——我想高盛那桩 Abacus 交易最大的问题在于,最终是纳税人买了单。因为荷兰银行(ABN AMRO)可能下了个错注,但说到底,那笔加上 ACA 的损失,最后还是靠纳税人的钱填上的。这才是让大家这么生气的原因。
BECKYDo you think we have -- I guess the biggest problem with the Goldman situation with that back at Abacus deal is that the taxpayers eventually ended up paying for it because ABN AMRO may have made the bad bet but essentially at one point between that and ACA, it was soaked up by taxpayer dollars. And that's what has people so angry.
巴菲特嗯,最大的纳税损失显然是房利美和房地美,而它们是由国会监管的。事实上,它们还得向萨班斯和奥克斯利汇报,真是莫大的讽刺。所以大笔钱就是在那里亏掉的。但银行也会在担保信贷的贷款上亏损。它们做的决定,有时候一开始就是错的,有时候是形势变化让它们错了——事后看确实如此。
BUFFETTWell, the biggest taxpayer loss apparently is Fannie and Freddie, and they were supervised by Congress. And as a matter of fact, they reported to Sarbanes and Oxley, of all the irony. So that's where the big money was lost. But banks can lose money on loans that are guaranteeing credits. They make decisions that sometimes are wrong initially and sometimes events make them wrong, as they turn out.
但这笔交易并没有什么特别之处。当时很多人都在押注房价上涨,看空的人寥寥无几。2007 年时,约翰·保尔森也并未被视为天才。不过,如果今天约翰·保尔森来找我做一笔保险交易,我会看看他要我承保的是什么。如果我觉得自己理解这项业务,我会给他报个价。他要是接受了,就能拿到一份保单。我并不担心跟约翰·保尔森做生意。
But this transaction was not unique in any way. A lot of people bet on the bullish side of housing. There weren't many people on the bearish side. And John Paulson was not regarded as a genius in 2007. But if John Paulson came to me with a deal today to insure, I would look at what I was being asked to insure, and if I thought I understood it, I would quote him a price and if he took it, he'd have an insurance policy. I don't worry about doing business with John Paulson.
贝基好的。乔,你也有问题要问吗?
BECKYOkay. Joe, you have a question as well?
乔·科南刚才一直在听沃伦说话。嗨,沃伦,谢谢你今天来我们节目。
JOE KERNENJust listening to Warren. Hi, Warren, thank you for joining us today.
巴菲特你好,乔。
BUFFETTHi, Joe.
乔·科南但听你解释的方式,美国——确实,我们都做多房地产。事后看来,看看媒体是怎么描绘这件事的,而且我知道你可能看到了那些参议院听证会。你混迹江湖很久了,沃伦。你知道华盛顿那套做法。但你什么时候才认定,华盛顿本身比问题本身还大?还有,你知道的,如果你确实痛斥华尔街而不是痛斥高盛,痛斥资本主义和痛斥自由市场,我们是不是就该把这归咎于,啊,那些政客就这样?
JOEBut listening to the way you explained it, the American -- really, we were all long on housing. And with the benefit of hindsight, to see the way it's been portrayed not only in the media, but I know you probably saw those Senate hearings. And you've been around a while, Warren. You know the ways of Washington. But when do you decide that Washington really is a bigger part of the problem than the problem itself? And where this -- you know, if you really beat up on Wall Street and not beat up on Goldman, beat up on capitalism and beat up on the free market, should we just write it off to, ah, that's just the politicians?
我这儿有一条。基特·邦德参议员,也许你也能说句公道话。他们到头来真能搞出些破坏来,对吧,沃伦?那简直是一场闹剧、一场政治迫害、一场宗教审判。你当时觉得不舒服吗?
I have one here. Senator Kit Bond, maybe you can weigh in, too. They can eventually do some real damage, can't they, Warren? That was a travesty and a witch-hunt and an inquisition. Were you uncomfortable?
巴菲特嗯,这倒不是什么意外的事。我的意思是,当一个极其重大的问题出了差错,而且参与其中的人非常多。整个国家实际上都卷入了一场后来被证明是幻想的事情。我们所有人都相信它,我们都想要房子。而且很容易这么说——如果房子每年都会涨价,那你最好今年就买,因为明年会更贵。这种说法在一段时间里成了一种自我实现的狂热。因为在美国公众 50 到 60 万亿美元的财富中,住房占了 22 万亿美元,而且这是你能撬动最多杠杆、借最多钱的东西。你知道,当崩盘来临时,它确实带来了后果,而且没人愿意说“这是我的错”。
BUFFETTWell, it wasn't anything unexpected. I mean when something goes wrong on a very, very major scale and lots of people participated in it. I mean the whole country was involved in essentially what turned out to be a fantasy. Now, we all believed it, we all want houses. And it was very easy to say if houses are going to go up every year, you better buy it this year because it will cost you more next year. And that became kind of a self-fulfilling mania for a while. Because housing became 22 trillion out of the American public's 50 to 60 trillion of wealth and it was the one that you can margin the most, borrow the most against, you know, when the crash came, it really had consequences and nobody likes to say, "It's my fault."
乔·科南我们得插播广告了,贝基。然后我们再接着聊这些话题,对吧?
JOEGuess we have to go to break, Beck. And then we'll continue along, I guess, some of this stuff, right?
贝基说得对。我们一会儿也让邦德参议员加入,听听他的回应。现在我们快速插播一段休息。不过就像乔提到的,我们还有很多内容要和沃伦·巴菲特聊。还有 45 分钟的时间。我们会讨论消费者是否已全面回归、他观察到了什么、以及经济中的其他信号,还会快速梳理今早的头条新闻。所以请别走开。《财经论谈》马上回来。
BECKYThat's right. And we'll let Senator Bond jump in on that as well and get his response. We're going to sneak a quick break right now. But as Joe mentioned, we have a lot more to cover with Warren Buffett. We have got 45 more minutes. We're going to be talking about whether the consumer is back in full force, what he's seeing and other signs in the economy, plus we've got a run-down of the morning's top stories. So stay right here. "Squawk Box" will be right back.
[广告插播]
[COMMERCIAL BREAK]
贝基我们现在回到了奥马哈。我们一直在和伯克希尔·哈撒韦的董事长兼首席执行官沃伦·巴菲特讨论房地产危机的问题,包括危机的起因和谁该为此负责。
BECKYWe are back in Omaha. And we've been talking about what happened with the housing crisis, who was to blame, with Warren Buffett, who is the chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway.
沃伦,你刚才正准备谈谈谁该为此负责,以及政客们是否也负有责任。我想也许你可以先说说这个,然后我们再把邦德参议员请进来聊聊。
And, Warren, you were just getting ready to talk a little bit about who is to blame and whether the politicians were to blame as well. I thought maybe you could say that and we could bring Senator Bond in as well.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字记录与视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济……第 3 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 3 of 8
巴菲特嗯,当出现一种幻觉,一种群体性幻觉的时候,你可以说人人都有责任。我的意思是,你可以说我本应该早一点看出来,你可以说美联储应该看出来,你可以说房贷经纪人应该看出来,华尔街也应该看出来并吹响警哨。我不确定就算他们吹了哨又能有多大用。人们玩得正欢呢。这有点像灰姑娘在舞会上。大家可能隐隐觉得,到了午夜南瓜和老鼠就会出现,但这实在太好玩了,你知道,美酒流淌,男人越看越俊,音乐越听越入耳,你觉得差五分十二点走就行,然后猛一抬头,发现墙上根本没有钟——砰,完了。它确实会变回南瓜和老鼠。
BUFFETTWell, when there's a delusion, a mass delusion, you can say everybody is to blame. I mean, you can say I should have spotted it, you can say the feds should have spotted it, you can say the mortgage brokers should have, Wall Street should have spotted it and blown the whistle. I'm not sure if they had blown the whistle how much good it would have done. People were having so much fun. And it's a little bit like Cinderella at the ball. People may have some feeling that at midnight it's going to turn to pumpkin and mice, but it's so darn much fun, you know, when the wine is flowing and the guys get better looking all the time and the music sounds better and you think you'll leave at five of twelve and all of a sudden you look up and you see there are no clocks on the wall and bingo, you know. It does turn to pumpkins and mice.
贝基请讲。
BECKYGo ahead.
巴菲特怪乐队也怪不了,怪舞伴也怪不了。该挨的板子人人有份。
BUFFETTIt's hard to blame the band. It's hard to blame the guy you're dancing with. There's plenty of blame to go around.
贝基还有酒精。
BECKYAnd alcohol.
巴菲特这里面没有一个反派。
BUFFETTThere's no villain.
贝基那我们谈谈华盛顿目前在金融监管改革方面正在做的事吧。摆在桌面上的这些议题,真能防止这类事情再次发生吗?
BECKYWell, let's talk about what Washington is doing right now with financial regulatory reform. Are the issues that are on the table things that can prevent this from happening again?
巴菲特嗯,它们没法阻止泡沫再次发生。制造泡沫的是人。人类会走极端,当你的邻居靠做某件事赚了大钱,你知道,你就会觉得自己也该去做同样的事。这种事隔段时间就会自我强化一次,互联网热潮就是例子。例子全让你赶上了。400 年前你就经历过两场泡沫,还有南海泡沫。所以,人们时不时就会陷入幻觉。
BUFFETTWell, they can't prevent bubbles from happening again. People do that. The human beings go to extreme and when your neighbor makes a lot of money doing something, you know, you feel like you ought to be doing the same thing, too. And they do feed on themselves periodically, whether it's the Internet boom. You have had it all. You had two bubbles, you know, 400 years ago. You had South Sea bubbles. So people will get delusionary from time to time.
你可能会说,政府或美联储有责任去把他们劝下来,或者做点类似的事。实际没多大效果。如果人们真的看到别人——那些他们觉得比自己还笨的人——在大赚快钱,那诱惑实在太大了,自己也会忍不住下场去试。
And you might say it's the job of the government or the Fed to try to talk them down or something of the sort. It's not very effective. If people really see easy money being made by someone else that they think is dumber than they are, it gets very tempting to be out there trying to do it yourself.
所以泡沫还会再次发生。你要努力做的,是尽量控制它们造成的破坏。而且你知道,1929 年之后我们确实这么做了。1929 年之后,我们认定用 10% 的保证金去买股票对经济是危险的,于是我们通过了一部法律,规定由美联储来设定保证金比例。但 1982 年我们干了什么?我们批准了标普 500 指数期货合约,让人们能以极低的保证金进行不计其数的赌博,而美联储这边却还维持着 50% 的保证金比例。这简直疯了。我们却——我们把高保证金这道安全网撤出了股市,没有一个人吭声。
So bubbles will happen again. What you want to try and do is contain the damage from them. And, you know, we did that after 1929. Now, after 1929, we decided that people buying stocks on 10 percent margin was dangerous for the economy and we passed a law that said the feds should set margin requirements. And then what did we do in 1982? We validated an S&P 500 contract which let people gamble in untold numbers on tiny margins, all the while maintaining 50 percent margins with the Fed. It was crazy. But we took -- we took the safety net of high -- of high margins away from the stock market and nobody said a word.
贝基这么说你是支持限制某些衍生品交易?
BECKYSo you're in favor of limiting some derivatives trading?
巴菲特我支持对那些可能给整个体系带来危险的机构限制杠杆。而且我确实认为,杠杆应当——应当禁止个人在市场投机中使用极端杠杆。早在 1934 年,我们就认定那是危险的,至今我仍然认为它很危险,而我们让标普 500 指数和衍生品大举进入这个游戏的时候,就彻底否定了那项立法的好处。
BUFFETTI'm in favor of having leverage limited with organizations that can produce dangerous for the system. And I actually think leverage ought to be -- extreme leverage ought to be prevented for individuals speculating in the market. We decided that was dangerous back in 1934 and I still think it's dangerous and we totally negated the benefit of that legislation when we let the S&P 500 and the derivatives come in to the game bigtime.
1982 年我写过一封信给丁格尔议员,说这会把市场变得更像一个赌场。当时有很多人说,没错,但赌场玩起来更有意思。
I wrote a letter to Congressman Dingell in 1982, saying this would turn the market into more of a casino. And there were plenty of people that said, yeah, but it's more fun having a casino.
贝基限制投行杠杆这个想法是好的。但问题是存在所有这些表外交易的时候,很难搞清楚真正的杠杆是多少。你们怎么才能管得住?
BECKYThe idea of limiting leverage for investment banks is a good one. But then when you have all of these off-balance sheet transactions, it's very difficult to know how what the real leverage is. How do you get your arms around it?
巴菲特这些表外交易糟糕透了。我的意思是,在我看来,审计师严重失职了,比方说,他们放任大银行设立 SIV,也就是结构性投资工具。花旗集团手中这类玩意儿动不动就是成百上千万。它们想干什么?就是想绕开银行通常必须遵守的杠杆限制,想再多攒出一点利润,好报出更漂亮的季度收益。于是它们把这些东西全都塞到表外,大谈什么流动性回售协议之类的名堂。这对审计师来说不仅是黄灯,根本就是红灯,本应被重点警示,可它没有。
BUFFETTThey were terrible. I mean, the auditors failed, in my view, bigtime when they let, for example, SIVs, be set up, special investment vehicles, with the big banks. Citigroup had those by the tens of millions. And what were they trying to do? They were trying to get around the leverage restrictions that the banks normally had to follow and they were trying to pile up a little more earnings so they could report better quarterly earnings. So they stuck all this stuff off balance sheet and talked about liquidity puts and all that sort of thing. And that should be not only just a yellow light, that's a red light to auditors and should have been highlighted but it wasn't.
贝基那当前的金融监管改革里,有什么能防止这类事情发生呢?
BECKYBut what in the current financial regulatory reform can prevent any of those things?
巴菲特嗯,我还没读完那 1500 多页。但从我读到的内容来看,我觉得国会正走在正确的方向上。我确实认为——我认为,那些有能力借助 FDIC 担保来吸引资金的人(也就是说,他们觉得自己拿到了政府担保),如果他们有权这么做,那最好在从公众那里筹集到这笔钱之后,对你能拿它去做什么制定相当严格的规定。因为你之所以能拿到这笔钱,靠的就是政府担保。
BUFFETTWell, I haven't read 1500 and some pages. But I have the feeling from what I've read about it that Congress is going in the right direction. I do think -- I think that people that have the ability to attract money with an FDIC guarantee, so they feel it's a government guarantee, if you have the right to do that, there better be some pretty tough rules on what you can do once you gather that money from the public. Because you are getting it because you have a government guarantee.
贝基·奎克邦德参议员,您是将要对金融监管改革法案进行投票的 100 人之一。您认为这份法案本身是否恰当,并且是否能够防止未来出现一些这类极端情况?
BECKYSenator Bond, you are one of the 100 people who will be voting on that financial regulatory reform. Do you think that the bill is the proper bill and that it will be able to prevent some of these extreme situations in the future.
基特·邦德参议员还没呢,贝基。不过,巴菲特先生,我同意您的看法,我们看到住房市场上,收市的时候所有人都觉得那是好买卖,但住房市场是团队协作的结果。两届政府,无论是共和党还是民主党,还有国会,都推动了零首付房贷、无追索权贷款。那简直是灾难的邀请函。我们中有几个人反对过,但没成功。但有些坏做法确实该被叫停。
SENATOR KIT BONDNot yet, Becky. But, Mr. Buffett, I agree with you, we saw a situation where they all get better looking at closing time in the housing market, but the housing market was a team effort. The administrations, both Republican and Democrat and Congress, pushed for no down payment home loans, nonrecourse loans. That was an invitation for disaster. There were a few of us who fought against it unsuccessfully. But there are certain bad practices that really should be stopped.
我觉得你说得完全对。流动性需要监管,那些金融工具也需要监管。那些脱离现实、纯属计算机游戏的衍生品,我认为也该被覆盖进来。但我知道,你过去也公开谈过,在美国心脏地带——也就是你我生活的地方——那些终端用户,不管是农民、制造商还是运输公司,他们需要对冲风险时该怎么办。我们应该如何区分金融机构里合法的对冲活动,与你过去斥之为“大规模杀伤性武器”的赌博式衍生品?
And I think you're totally right. There needs to be regulation of liquidity. There needs to be regulation of some of these devices. And, you know, the computer game derivatives that are not based in reality I think deserve to be covered. But I know you have spoken out about the end users who are in the Heartland, where you and I live, who have to hedge their risk, whether they're farmers, manufacturers, transportation companies. How should we distinguish between the legitimate hedging activities in financial institutions and the gambling derivatives which you have decried in the past as weapons of mass destruction.
巴菲特要区分开来,确实很难。但这是一项必须完成的工作,因为你们谈到了终端用户。几周前,我在《商业周刊》上读到一篇文章,讲的是你们密苏里州的安海斯-布希公司。他们用衍生品来做对冲。我们现在运营的北伯灵顿-圣塔菲铁路公司,也用衍生品来对冲柴油价格风险。对于像安海斯-布希或北伯灵顿这样的公司来说,一旦它们需要提交大量抵押品,那笔钱就不能用在它们自己的业务上了。我的意思是,那笔钱等于被存回了华尔街。所以我认为,必须要有某种措施,确保终端用户不被归入赌场赌客的同一类别,这一点非常重要。
BUFFETTIn distinguishing, it's really tough. But it's a job that has to be done because you talk about end users. I read an article in Business Week a couple of weeks ago about Anheuser-Busch in your state of Missouri. They use them for hedging purposes. We're on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe right now. We use them for hedging purposes with diesel fuel. And to the extent that people like Anheuser-Busch or Burlington Northern, for example, have to put up a lot of collateral, that is money that is not being used in their own business. I mean, it's being deposited back in Wall Street. So I think it is very important to have something that makes sure that end users aren't put in the same category as casino operators.
邦德参议员嗯,我知道您有公用事业。我和我所在州的一家地区性公用事业公司聊过,他们每天要用 1 亿美元的衍生品来对冲能源投入成本。如果要他们清算这些头寸,成本会高达 10 亿美元。
SENATOR BONDWell, I know you have utility. And I talked to a regional utility in my state that has $100 million in derivatives every day to hedge the cost over the energy input. And if they had to clear it, it would cost them a billion dollars.
[CROSS TALK]
[CROSS TALK]
巴菲特是的,参议员。如果他们把资金放在那里,那笔钱就不会被用来建风力发电场。所以有数百个终端用户已经签署了上诉,要求确保他们不会被归入那些基本上在赌博的人之列。这就像你设置了捕熊夹子,但夹子却抓不到兔子。
BUFFETTAnd sure, Senator. If they put the money up there, that money is not being used to build wind farms. And so there are hundreds of end users that have signed on to an appeal to make sure they aren't put in the same category as people who are just basically gambling on them, you have a way that you have got bear traps out there, but they don't catch rabbits.
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字稿与视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济……第 4 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 4 of 8
参议员邦德希拉·贝尔刚才说,你们不应该——你们不能把衍生品从联邦存款保险公司承保的机构中剥离出来,而不增加它们的风险。
SENATOR BONDSheila Bair just said that you shouldn't have -- you can't take derivatives out of FDIC-insured institutions without increasing their risk.
贝基是的,希拉·贝尔上周末说了正是这个意思——我不知道你是否已经看到这些言论。她不想看到银行被禁止从事衍生品业务,因为那样只会把衍生品和风险业务推向监管更弱的其他机构。你同意这个观点吗,还是说银行在衍生品业务上应该受到限制?
BECKYYes, Sheila Bair, over the weekend, I don't know if you have seen these comments yet, is saying exactly that. She does not want to see the banks not allowed to do derivatives because it will only drive the derivatives and risky business to other institutions that are less regulated. Do you agree with that or should the banks be limited in what they can do with derivatives?
巴菲特我确实不太清楚这个问题的答案。我的意思是,银行当然可以用合乎社会利益的方式使用衍生品,比如把浮动利率贷款转换成固定利率贷款。这么做有多种途径,都有很正当的商业目的。但如果它们是在押注某项变量 20 年后的价格——我接手通用再保险时,有一份衍生品合同期限长达 100 年,这意味着 100 年里没有实际资金易手,每三个月就有人根据它做市值评估,交易员据此领薪水,公司据此报告利润——要我来看,这很难说是在为美好的社会目的服务。
BUFFETTI don't really know the answer to that. I mean, certainly, banks can use derivatives in ways that makes sense for the society, just in terms of floating rate to fixed-rate loans. There are various ways of doing it that have a very proper business purpose. But I think if they are betting on the price at some variable 20 years from now -- when I took over GenRe, there was one derivator contract that lasted 100 years, and that meant for 100 years, no money changed hands, people put marks on it every three months and the trader got paid based on it and people got to report earnings based on it, and so it's hard for me to see that that is serving a wonderful social purpose.
贝基·奎克查理·芒格对衍生品的看法要严厉得多。我们之前听过他的观点。他说,衍生品应该只允许用于能源、大宗商品和货币之类的东西,我印象中,或许还包括金属。你的想法和他的想法怎么协调起来?
BECKYCharlie Munger has a much tougher view on derivatives. We heard from him earlier. He says that they should only be allowed on things like energies, commodities and currencies, I believe, or maybe metals. How do you pair up what you think with what he thinks?
巴菲特嗯,查理比我更接近《旧约》风格。我身上也有不少《旧约》的影子。但查理总是对的,而我通常是错的。不过我认为,在他提到的那些领域之外,衍生品也可能有一些合理用途。但我会同意查理的意见——好吧,标普 500 指数期货合约就是终极衍生品。我的意思是,它是对指数的押注,交易量高达数十亿美元,保证金极低,而且对手方不全是专业投资者。它接触的是那些对股票和债券一无所知的人,他们在赌市场十分钟后、一小时后会不会涨。真的很难想象,把那些只交极低保证金的人拉进来,赌当天股市会怎么走,这到底有什么实际意义。
BUFFETTWell, Charlie is a little more Old Testament than I am. I've got a lot of Old Testament in me, too. But Charlie is right and I'm usually wrong. But I think that there can be proper uses of beyond the areas he named, but I would agree with Charlie that -- well, the S&P 500 contract is the ultimate derivative. I mean, it's a bet on an index and it trades by the billions of dollars on tiny margins and it isn't dealing with professional investors all the time. It's dealing with people that don't know a thing about stocks and bonds and are betting on whether the market is going to be higher 10 minutes later, an hour later. And it's really hard to imagine what the useful purpose is of dragging in people on tiny margins to gamble on what the stock market is going to do that day.
贝基我们还有更多内容要和沃伦·巴菲特聊。接下来会深入谈谈经济,因为巴菲特先生通过他旗下企业,已经察觉到了经济即将迎来转折。我们会了解具体细节,以及他对美国消费者实力的判断。《财经论谈》马上回来。
BECKYWe have much more to get with with Warren Buffett. We're going to talk more about the economy because Mr. Buffett, through his businesses, has seen a turn coming in the economy. We'll get the specifics on that and his read on the strength of the American consumer. "Squawk Box" will be right back.
这是贝基·奎克 2010 年 5 月 3 日星期一在 CNBC 《财经论谈》节目中对沃伦·巴菲特采访的第二部分。
This is part two of Becky Quick's interview with Warren Buffett on CNBC's Squawk Box, Monday, May 3, 2010.
贝基我们现在在奥马哈,与沃伦·巴菲特一起进行现场直播。我们一直在讨论华尔街面临的一系列问题,以及金融监管改革。但周末期间,我们也在关注经济形势。周末,我们有机会与伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司的首席执行官马特·罗斯进行了交谈。此刻,我们正坐在他的一节车厢里。铁路公司是最早感知经济转折的行业之一。他们谈到煤炭运输量的变化,就像看到零售商们订货量的增减一样。
BECKYWe are live in Omaha with Warren Buffett. We've been talking about a lot of the issues facing Wall Street, facing financial regulatory reform. But we have also been looking at the economy over the weekend here. Over the weekend, we got the chance to speak with Matt Rose who is the CEO of Burlington Northern Santa Fe. We're sitting on one of his rail cars right now. The railroad is one of the first that sees turns in the economy. They talk about the coal shipments moving as they see retailers ordering more or less.
上周末,我们采访了罗斯先生,询问他目前在铁路行业看到了什么。一起来听听。
And over the weekend, we got to speak with Mr. Rose to ask him what he is seeing right now in the railroads. Listen in.
马特·罗斯我们在铁路系统内追踪 22 个大宗商品类别,涵盖从钢铁、金属、集装箱、煤炭、化学品到汽车。回顾去年,这 22 个类别全都呈负增长。而看上周,这 22 个类别又全部呈现正增长。
MATT ROSEWe monitor 22 commodity groups across the railroad. Everything from iron, steel, metals, containers, coal, chemicals, automobiles. And if you look at last year, every one of those commodity groups were negative. If you look at last week, every one of those 22 were positive.
贝基这让我们多少看出来经济走到了哪一步。不过,沃伦,你观察经济的视角很广。现在这个时候,想弄明白到底发生了什么,格外困难。你觉得我们眼下经济处在什么阶段?
BECKYThat tells us a little bit about how far we've come in this economy. But, warren, you look at a lot of different factors in the economy. This is a particularly difficult time to try and figure out what's going on. Where do you think we stand right now in the economy?
巴菲特嗯,其实,可能没那么难。几个月前我们聊天时,我说我们在各个领域看到了一点改善的苗头,但那时还相当零散。过去几个月里,在我们的多数基础业务上,我们确实看到了明显的强势,所以我认为经济在三、四月间大幅增强了。这不会很快转化为失业率的巨大变化,但经济已经开始动了。
BUFFETTWell, actually, it may not be quite so difficult. A couple of months ago when we talked, I said we were seeing little bits of improvement here and there, but it was pretty spotty. In the last couple of months, in most of our basic businesses, we have seen real strength, so the economy has picked up I think a lot of strength in March and April. It won't be translated into huge changes in unemployment soon, but the economy is starting to move.
贝基你觉得可能会是哪些业务?
BECKYWhere do you see it? Which businesses?
巴菲特嗯,我们在那些供给其他各行各业企业的业务中尤其能感受到这一点。现在,在 Iscar(伊斯卡)公司,我们销售那些用于大型机床的小型切割刀具,客户无论是波音、通用汽车还是全球各地的重工业,都是如此。我们在三月份看到了极为显著的回升,这股势头从去年 12 月就开始了。此前一直是逐步改善,幅度不大。而现在,业务确实已经起飞了。
BUFFETTWell, we see it particularly in our businesses that supply other businesses across the spectrum. Now, IGCAR, we sell these small cutting tools that are used in big machine tools whether at Boeing or General Motors or heavy industry all over the world. And we have seen a really huge pickup in March, started in December. It was gradually improving just a little bit. And it really has taken off.
我们有一家做电子元器件分销的公司,总部在沃斯堡。它向所有能看到的客户销售产品,业务一直很火爆。规模非常大。我们有库存很庆幸,因为货一进门就被抢光了。这些产品销往全国成千上万的客户。所以过去几个月确实发生了巨大的变化。
And we have a company that handles the distribution of electronic components down in Fort Worth. It sells all over to everybody in sight. It has been booming. I mean it's huge. We're glad we've got inventory because it's flying out the door. And that's going to thousands of customers all over. So there has been a real change in the last few months.
贝基这不仅仅是重建库存的问题?
BECKYThis is more than just rebuilding inventories?
巴菲特是的,确实更多了。我们自己的库存根本补不上,因为周转太快了。不,远远不止。没人愿意囤积大量切削工具甚至电子元器件,因为它们现在直接就被装进产品里了,制造业正在全力运转。所以需求大幅回升。我不是说我们回到了三年前的水平或怎样。但经济确实在动。顺便说一句,这正是在这种局面下我预料到的情况。
BUFFETTYeah, it is more. We can't rebuild our own inventories because it's moving so fast. No, it's much more. Nobody wants a big inventory of cutting tools or even electronic components because they are putting them into products right now. They are manufacturing right now. So there's a big pickup. I don't mean we're back to where we were three years ago or anything of the sort. But the economy is moving. Incidentally, that's what I would have expected in this world.
美国经济是一部令人惊叹的增长引擎,时间越久越见其威力。我们偶尔会试图把它搞砸,会走向极端,会犯各种错误,诸如此类。但如果你看看这个国家的历史,我的意思是,这个国家就是行得通。做空它是个错误。
The American economy is an amazing engine of growth over time. And we may try to mess it up occasionally. And we go to excesses and we make mistakes and all of that. But if you look at the history of the country, I mean this country works. It's a mistake to bet against it.
贝基·奎克这是个凌厉的“V”形反弹复苏吗?
BECKYIs this a sharp "V" snapback recovery?
巴菲特这是一个相当剧烈的反弹。“V 形”意味着你很快回到高点。但路还很长——这跟那种持续很久的碟形走势完全不一样。这是一个切实的变动。
BUFFETTIt's a pretty big snapback. "V" conveys you get back to the top quickly. But it's a long way -- it's very different than some saucer-like thing that is very elongated. It's a real movement.
贝基不过,你提到的这些大多数都是工业类企业。在你们的消费品业务线上,也能看到这种情况吗?
BECKYMost of what you have mentioned, though, these businesses are industrial businesses. Do you see it in your consumer lines as well?
巴菲特我们在消费品领域也看到了这种迹象。比如奈特捷,还有我们的珠宝业务这些,都在回升。人们又找回了信心。你知道,一年前他们简直是吓傻了。我们的奈特捷客户,飞机还是他们的,每个月该交的费用照样交,只是飞的次数少了,也不怎么买珠宝了。
BUFFETTWe see it to a degree in consumer lines. I mean at NetJets, our jewelry business and all, those are coming back. People have regained confidence. They were paralyzed, you know, a little over a year ago. And our customers flying on NetJets, they still own the planes, they were still paying the monthly fee. They just weren't flying as much. They weren't buying jewelry.
这一切,我们都在看到回升。还没回到两三年之前的状态,但行为确实已经变了。
All that, we're seeing a pickup in. It's not back to where it was, you know, two or three years ago, but behavior has really changed.
贝基我们采访了穆罕默德·埃尔-埃里安(Mohamed El-Erian),你也认识他。
BECKYWe talked to Mohamed El-Erian and you know him.
巴菲特对,当然。
BUFFETTYeah, sure.
贝基他有一个理论,PIMCO 一直在关注,是关于“新常态”的——消费者不会回到以前的消费水平了。他们背了很多债,房价也没恢复。这个对经济的判断算中肯、有道理吗?你又怎么
BECKYHe's got a theory that PIMCO has been focusing on about the new normal, about consumers not going back to the same rate of spending. They have got a lot of debt they have taken on. Their house prices have not come back. Is that a fair and valid assessment of the economy as well? And how do you
2010 年 5 月 10 日,来源:http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字实录和视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济…… 第 5 页(共 8 页)
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 5 of 8
把这个跟你所谈的情况对照着看?
match that up with what you are talking about?
巴菲特嗯,多年来,那种所谓的常态就是杠杆越加越高,层层往上叠。我不认为这种情况还会发生。但消费者嘛,那些有能力消费的人还是喜欢花钱的。我们这周末在家具城就看到了。一周之内,我们卖出了 3500 万美元的货。在内布拉斯加州奥马哈,一家家具店一周卖出这么多货,可不是小数目。我们还看到珠宝销售也很旺。拉长时间看,美国公众总是会花钱的。我们不希望他们做的,是像过去那样不断加杠杆,人人都去搞房屋再融资,把房子里的钱套出来消费。不过从长期看,我觉得倒不用为美国消费者担心。
BUFFETTWell, for years what you might call the normal was just leveraging up more and more, so it was getting to higher layers. I don't think that's going to happen. But consumers, you know, the ones that can handle like to spend. I mean we saw them this weekend at our furniture store, you know. In a week, we sold $35 million worth of goods. That's a lot of goods to move in Omaha, Nebraska in a week in a home furnishing store. We saw a lot of jewelry sales. The American public over time is going to spend money. What we don't want them to do is keep leveraging up like they did and everybody refy-ing houses and taking money out of their houses and using it to consume. I don't think you need to worry about the American consumer over time.
贝基长期看倒不用担心。但你刚才提到,你认为失业状况不会在短期内大幅改善。
BECKYNot worry about them over time. But you just mentioned that you don't think the unemployment picture is going to improve drastically any time soon.
巴菲特这需要点时间。我们伯克希尔整体上是在净增人手。去年我们每个月都在裁人。到年底具体数字是多少,我不太确定。但现在,我们在招人。不过,你知道,大家总在谈就业。我们得有产品需求,才会有岗位,不会雇个人来闲站着。所以,最好的就业计划就是需求。而需求正在回暖。这意味着我们会招人。
BUFFETTIt takes a while. I mean we are net hiring people at Berkshire. Last year we were letting people go every month. I don't know toward the end of the year exactly the figures. Now, we're hiring people. But, you know, they talk about jobs. We have jobs when we have demand for our goods. We're not going to hire somebody to stand around. So the best jobs program is demand. And demand is coming back. And that means we hire people.
贝基企业当时正面对极高的生产率数字,它们从员工身上榨出越来越多的产出。你认为全美各地的企业是否已经到了必须招人的境地?
BECKYCorporations were dealing with incredibly high productivity numbers where they were squeezing more and more out of their employees. Do you think businesses across America are in a position where they have to hire?
巴菲特嗯,我们有时还是得招人。我的意思是,当伯灵顿铁路的运量从 15.5 万车皮增加到 17.3 万车皮时,需要的员工自然比 15.5 万时多。我希望运量能到 20 万车皮,到时候我们还需要更多人手。但这种情况只发生在部分业务里,不是全部,是其中一部分。
BUFFETTWell, we have to hire sometimes. I mean when the Burlington is moving 173,000 carloads, they need more people than at 155. I hope it goes to 200,000 and we'll need a lot more. But that's happening at some of our businesses. Not all of our businesses, but some of our businesses.
但失业率下降的速度会比商业改善的速度慢。所以这方面还需要一段时间。住宅市场仍然非常差。我是说,我们的制砖业务、隔热材料业务,这些业务还没起来,因为正如我在年报里说的,住宅市场仍有库存积压。我认为一年之内这些库存就会被消化掉。
But the unemployment rate comes down slower than the rate at which business improves. So it's going to take a while on that. And residential housing is still very poor. I mean our brick business, our insulation business, those businesses have not taken off because, as I said in the end report, there's an overhang of inventory in residential housing. I think that will be gone within a year.
贝基邦德参议员也有一个问题。参议员请讲。
BECKYSenator Bond has a question as well. Senator.
参议员邦德谢谢你,贝基。巴菲特先生,你谈到我们目前做得不错,只要没人把事情搞砸。你说的对,我同意你的看法。经济有基本的韧劲。但我非常担心小企业不招聘、不增长。他们担心税收会上升,担心利率会涨。我想听听你的看法:我们那些不断累积的债务,会不会要面对高得多的利率?我们刚看到有顾问说,那些正在运行赤字的政府将不得不开始支付更高的利率。
SENATOR BONDThank you, Becky. Mr. Buffett, you talked about we're doing well lest somebody messes up. And you're right and I agree with you. There's basic strength in the economy. But I'm very worried that the small businesses are not hiring and growing. They are worried about taxes going up. They are worried about the interest rates. And I would appreciate your view on whether we are looking at paying much higher interest rates on the debt we're running up. We just saw that advisers are saying that governments that are running deficits are going to have to start paying higher interest rates.
中国人什么时候才会开始要求美国信用债支付显著更高的利率,从而将高利率传导至整个经济?
When are the Chinese going to start demanding significantly higher interest rates on U.S. credit spreading high interest rates throughout the economy?
沃伦·巴菲特的确很难想象,像我们这些年一直在积累的赤字,或者其他国家也在积累的赤字,能长期与低利率并存。所以,你懂的,要是你真的能搞出占 GDP 10% 的赤字,还不引发任何坏事,那人们早该算清楚了。这事做起来实在太爽了。
BUFFETTIt's certainly hard to imagine deficits like we have been running or other countries have been running being consistent with low interest rates over time. So, you know, if you could really run deficits of 10 percent on GDP and not have anything bad happen, people would have figured that out a long time ago. It's too much fun to do.
但为了摆脱恐慌局面而使用的措施——巨额赤字——终将付出代价。你知道,我们的国会,以及世界各国政府,都必须直面如何削减赤字的问题,否则人们会不敢再借钱出去。谁愿意把钱借给一个长期执行 10% 赤字政策的人?这从长远看是不可持续的。
But there will be a price to be paid for the medicine that we used in order to break out of our panic situation, the huge deficits. And, you know, our Congress, but governments around the world are going to have to come to grips with how they bring down those deficits or people will get very afraid of lending money. Who wants to lend money to somebody that is going to follow a long-term policy of running deficits 10 percent? It's unsustainable over time.
如果你用本币借钱,那实际上就是在为日后埋下恶性通胀的种子。如果你借外币,最终别人就不会再借钱给你了。
And if you can borrow in your own money, what you have is you sowed the seeds of terrific inflation down the road. And if you borrow in other currency, eventually people quit lending you money.
参议员邦德这个信息也需要传递给行政部门和国会。我希望他们会听取您的意见。
SENATOR BONDThat message needs to go to the administration as well as Congress. I hope they will listen to you.
贝基我想梅丽莎也有一个问题。梅丽莎。
BECKYI believe Melissa has a question as well. Melissa.
梅丽莎·李对。巴菲特先生,我想回到劳埃德·布兰克芬的话题上,如果我们能花一点时间的话。我理解你对他作为首席执行官有信心。他在金融危机期间确实为股东做了很多事。但此时在高盛的历史上,在它进行自我反省并试图向公司传递文化变革信号的时候,换一位新首席执行官是不是对公司最有利?
MELISSA LEEYeah. Mr. Buffett, I wanted to get back to the issue of Lloyd Blankfein, if we can for just a moment. I understand that you have confidence in him as a CEO. And he certainly has done a lot for shareholders during the financial crisis. But is it possible at this point in time in Goldman's history when it's soul-searching and trying to signal a culture change at the company that perhaps it would be best for the company to have a new CEO?
巴菲特你知道,他现在正经历一段艰难时期。不过顺便提一下,据我回忆,大约在 1970 年左右,高盛曾因宾州中央铁路公司的商业票据出过大麻烦,当时是格斯·利维在掌舵。几年前,约翰·温伯格主事的时候,又因为与博斯基交易有关的事给高盛惹来了麻烦。
BUFFETTYou know, he's going through a tough period. But incidentally, Goldman Sachs, as I remember back around 1970, there was, you know, a big problem about Penn Central and the commercial paper and there was another problem when Gus Levy was in charge then. John Weinberg was in charge some years back when something connected with the Boesky Trading caused a problem with Goldman Sachs.
我是说,一家企业开了 140 年,难免时不时出点问题。但听着,我敢肯定伯克希尔也有麻烦。我们有 26 万人为伯克希尔工作。你想想看,26 万人的城市,没一个人干坏事,这可能吗?
I mean you run a business for 140 years, you're going to have problems from time to time. But listen, I'm sure we've got problems at Berkshire. We have 260,000 people working for Berkshire. Can you imagine that, you know, we can have a city of 260,000 people and nobody is doing anything wrong?
梅丽莎没问题。
MELISSASure.
巴菲特我们只希望能找到——我认为动劳埃德会是一个可怕的错误。
BUFFETTAll we hope is we find -- I think it would be a terrible mistake to do anything with Lloyd.
梅丽莎有意思的是,他几乎是金融危机后唯一存活下来的金融公司首席执行官。你之前对贝基说过,如果劳埃德来找你,你会说绝对留下。如果高盛的董事会来找你说我们在考虑换掉劳埃德,你会说不,把他留住?
MELISSAWell, it is interesting because he is the only financial company CEO to sort of have survived the financial crisis. You had said earlier to Becky that if Lloyd came to you, you'd say absolutely stay on. If Goldman's board came on and said we are thinking about replacing Lloyd, you would say no, keep him?
巴菲特我会不同意他们的看法。
BUFFETTI would disagree with them.
梅丽莎你会不同意董事会的意见吗?
MELISSAYou would disagree with the board?
巴菲特我认为高盛的董事会完全没有那个打算。而且,你知道,当我们在 2008 年 9 月向高盛投入 50 亿美元时——那可不是投资任何公司都容易的时候——我们曾接到许多其他大型金融机构管理层的接洽,包括一些大型投资银行,但我们都没接受。
BUFFETTI don't think Goldman's board has any notion of doing that. And, you know, when we put $5 billion into Goldman in September of 2008, which was not the easiest time to invest in anybody, we had been approached by the management of numerous other large financial institutions, including large investment banks and we turned them down.
梅丽莎没问题。
MELISSASure.
巴菲特所以我对高盛最有信心,不仅是因为它的业务运营,还因为它的风险控制。
BUFFETTSo I felt the best about Goldman in terms of not only its business operation but in its risk control.
梅丽莎巴菲特先生,有些观察人士可能会拿这次投资跟您 1987 年投资所罗门兄弟、取得 12% 股份那件事作比较。这么比公平吗?因为交易大厅里确实都在传。大家把高盛的结构跟 1991 年危机时所罗门兄弟的结构放在一起比较。
MELISSASome observers, Mr. Buffett, might compare this to your investment in Solomon in 1987 when you took a 12 percent stake. Is that fair? Because that certainly is going around the trading floors. There are comparisons of Goldman's structure versus Solomon's structure during the crisis in 1991.
巴菲特呃,说到所罗门的情况,1991 年 8 月我被叫回去的时候,毫无疑问,某种非常糟糕的事情已经发生了。
BUFFETTWell, in the case of Solomon, there was no question when I got called back there in August of 1991, there was no question something very wrong
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文稿与视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济…… 第 6 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 6 of 8
本来已经处理了,但处理这件事的人是个债券交易员。然后高层根本没有及时报告这名交易员违规的情况。所罗门的真正问题,本质上是要把沾在 8000 名员工身上的污点洗掉,然后把污点恰如其分地归到那个违反一堆政府规定的债券交易员头上。
had been done, but it had been done by a bond trader. And then the top management did not report promptly at all the transgressions of this particular trader. And the real problem at Solomon was to essentially take away the stain that was on 8,000 people and place it properly on the stain of a bond trader that had broken a bunch of government rules.
但我们完全知道发生了什么。我们查清了他干的所有事。他明显违反了规定。于是我们去找了相关当局,把全部证据都交了上去。我们开除了那个人,他也在监狱里蹲了一小段时间。这和眼前这起案子情况不同。
But we knew exactly what happened. We found out exactly what he had done. He clearly had broken the rules. And we went down and presented all the evidence to the proper authorities. And we got rid of the guy and he went to jail for a short period of time. That's a different case than this.
乔·科南沃伦,《金融时报》似乎认为,高盛眼下正在采取一些措施,全面调整其部分业务做法,以此作为可能和解的前奏。您认为美国证交会愿意和解吗?您跟布兰克费恩交谈时,他有没有问过您,和解是不是正确的选择?您觉得是吗?
JOEWarren, the FT seems to think that Goldman at this point is making some moves to overhaul some of its practices as a precursor to a possible settlement. Do you think the SEC would like to settle? When you talk to Blankfein, has he asked you, do you think a settlement is the right move to make? Do you think it is?
巴菲特嗯,有时候不管你对案件的实质看法如何,事情都会变成商业决策。但我从未就和解问题和劳埃德谈过。美国证券交易委员会,从历史上看,我觉得他们大多数时候更愿意和解,而不是起诉。不过一般来说,在司法体系里,法官也希望你们和解,而不是走上法庭。所以谁知道最终结果会怎样。但就 Abacus 交易这件事——我看过了——我没看出有任何地方会让我仅仅从法律层面就想去和解。如果这变成了一个商业决策,那就是高盛董事会要琢磨的事了。
BUFFETTWell, sometimes it gets into a business decision regardless of how you feel about the merits of a case. But I have not talked to Lloyd about a settlement whatsoever. The SEC, historically, I think they'd like to settle most things rather than try them. But generally, in the judicial system, judges like you to settle rather than go to trial. So who knows how it will play out. But I do not see anything in the Abacus transaction -- and I have looked at it. I do not see anything in the Abacus transaction that would cause me to want to settle simply on the legal aspects of it. If it becomes a business decision, that's something for the board of directors of Goldman Sachs to figure out.
贝基·奎克沃伦,上周末你说,如果让你拿性命押注,赌通胀会升高还是降低,你会赌通胀升高,而且可能大幅升高。
BECKYWarren, over the weekend, you said if you had to bet your life on either higher inflation or lower inflation, you'd take higher inflation and potentially much higher.
巴菲特是的。我们目前推行的政策必然导致通胀加速,这一点毫无疑问。问题在于我们是否会在那之前改变政策——你等于点燃了一根引信,这根引信很长。你可以中途改变政策,把通向炸药包的引信掐灭。但如果不这么做,炸药包迟早会爆炸。那些债务与产出之比越来越高、又借的是本国货币的国家,迟早会意识到他们不想用同等购买力的货币来偿还债务。通胀的问题在于,它一旦开始就会形成自我增强的惯性。我们在 1970 年代末就经历过,最后是靠保罗·沃尔克抡起大斧头才刹住车。他在那段时间大概是全美国最不受欢迎的人。
BUFFETTYeah. We are following policies which will lead to inflation accelerating. There's no question about that. The question is whether we will change those policies before, you know -- you lit this fuse basically. And it's a long fuse. And you can change policies and, therefore, blow out this fuse that's going toward the dynamite. But if you don't, the dynamite -- it will get to the dynamite eventually. And countries that borrow larger and larger amounts of money in relation to their output, in their own currency, pretty soon -- at some point decide they don't want to pay it back with currency at the same purchasing powers. And the problem about inflation is it creates its own dynamic once it gets going. And we had that in late 1970s and it took Paul Volcker and a meat axe to stop it. And he was probably the most unpopular man in the United States for a period of time.
但我们当时面对的是政府利率在 15% 左右、最优贷款利率高达 21% 的局面。要是当年没有沃尔克出手,谁知道会变成什么样。所以,你绝不能拿通胀带来的收益不当回事。
But we got to 15 percent or so interest rates for governments in a 21 percent prime rate. If Volcker hadn't come along, who knows what would have happened. So you don't want to play around with inflationary gain.
贝基但当时金融危机爆发时,你非常支持政府采取行动来制止并遏制危机。你认为他们哪些事情做得过头了?或者说,他们有没有做过什么过头的事?
BECKYBut you were very much in support of the government taking the actions it did to stop and stem the financial crisis when it occurred. What have they done that you think has been too much? Or have they done anything?
巴菲特不,我认为他们全力以赴了。美国公众需要看到他们正在全力以赴。当全世界都想去杠杆时,唯一能加杠杆的只有政府。美国政府做的事情完全恰当。至于做得是否完美,没人知道。但 2008 年秋天变得很清楚的一点是,美联储主席、财政部长以及联邦存款保险公司的希拉·贝尔,都愿意采取非常规手段来从根本上阻止恐慌。他们是唯一能做到这点的人。我为此热烈地为他们叫好。那是用于治疗心脏病发作的猛药。现在我们必须应对药物的后遗症。我们用了前所未有剂量的药,所以也可能面临前所未有的困难,才能摆脱这些药物带来的问题。
BUFFETTNo, I think they went all in. And the American public needed to see they were going to go all in. When the whole world wants to deleverage, the only party that can leverage is the government. And the United States government did something perfectly proper. Whether they did it perfectly, nobody knows. But what became clear in the fall of 2008 is that the chairman of the fed and the secretary of the treasury and Sheila Bair at FDIC were willing to do extraordinary things to essentially prevent a panic. And they were the only ones that could do it. And I cheer them mightily for that. That was the medicine applied to a cardiac. And now we have to deal with the aftereffects of the medicine. We had unprecedented amounts of medicine so we may have unprecedented difficulties in weaning us away from the problems that result from that medicine.
贝基吉姆·欧文斯是卡特彼勒公司的首席执行官。他今天在《华尔街日报》发表了一篇专栏文章,列出了他认为美国要重回正轨应该做的一些事情。其中一条是确保我们拥有非常强大且独立的美联储。另一条是,美国公司应该只对它们在美国本土赚取的利润缴税,而这意味着有国际业务的公司可以把更多利润带回美国。您认为这个理论好吗?
BECKYJim Owens is the CEO of caterpillar. He has an Op Ed in today's "Wall Street Journal" where he lays out some of the things he thinks should happen to make sure America gets back on the right path. One of those is making sure we have a very strong and independent Federal Reserve. Another is that American companies should only be paying taxes on their American profits that they are kicking out. And that that would mean companies that have international operations could bring more back to the United States. Do you think that that is a good theory?
巴菲特嗯,关于他的第二点,如果你谈的是给公司减税,其实质就是如此。要知道,我们的税收和支出之间存在着巨大的缺口。这个缺口总得想办法缩小,而靠减税很可能是做不到的。我非常尊敬他,也明白他讲的是什么意思。但归根结底,我们现在的税入占 GDP 的比重只有 15%,高不了太多,而支出却占到了 GDP 的 25%。这根本不可持续。
<<<END P 15>>>
BUFFETTWell, the second part of it, if you are talking about reducing taxes on corporations, which is what that is, you know, we have a huge gap between taxes and expenditures. And somehow that has to be narrowed. And it probably won't be narrowed by tax cuts. So I respect him enormously. And I know what he's talking about. But in the end, we are taxing 15 percent, not much more than 15 percent at GDP and we're spending 25 percent of GDP. That is not sustainable.
在这个水平上再给任何人或任何实体减税,我觉得,我是说,那会传递一个错误信号,关乎我们对货币神圣性的长期立场。如果我是一个美国债券持有人,看到我们靠减税来拉大差距,那会让我非常不安。
And the idea of cutting taxes on anyone or any entities from this level, you know, I mean I think that would be sending the wrong message about what we regard as the sanctity of our currency over time. If I were a bondholder in the United States and I saw that we were widening the gap by cutting taxes, that would bother me a great deal.
贝基这个国家的大多数人,我想,都意识到税收会提高。但争论的焦点在于提高多少,以及到底谁在缴纳他们本应承担的那份税款。
BECKYIf you -- I would say most people in this country realize taxes are going higher. But the debate is how much higher and who exactly is paying their share of the taxes.
巴菲特没错。
BUFFETTTrue.
贝基如果税率提高到某个水平——无论是针对美国企业的税率,还是针对最富有美国人的税率——您会不会在某个节点开始感到担忧?您认为存在一个临界点吗?
BECKYIs there a point where you get worried if taxes are raised to a certain level, whether that be against American corporations, whether that be taxes that are levied against the wealthiest Americans? Is there a point where you think there's a tipping point?
巴菲特嗯,我们最终必须把支出和收入之间的缺口降到 GDP 的 2% 左右。GDP 的 2% 我们能承受,随着时间推移,经济增长能消化掉这个缺口,也许 3% 也可以。但你不能有 10% 或 12% 的缺口。
BUFFETTWell, we have to eventually get the gap between expenditures and receipts down to maybe 2 percent of GDP. We can handle 2 percent of GDP and growth takes care of that over time, or 3 percent perhaps. But you can't have 10 or 12 percent.
至于税收,你知道,所有人都会尖叫。削减开支,所有人也会尖叫。问题在于国会有没有意志去做该做的事。这事不容易。你知道,拉塞尔·朗(Russell Long)说过,别征你的税,别征我的税,去征树后头那家伙的税。我们大家骨子里都是这么想的。
And taxes, you know, everybody is going to scream. And if you cut expenditures, everybody is going to scream. And the question is whether Congress will have the will to do what needs to be done. And it won't be easy. I mean, you know, Russell Long said it, you know. Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree. And that's the way we all feel.
但长期来看,美国在这个问题上一直相当负责任。二战结束时,我们的债务占 GDP 比重达到 120%,后来我们把它降到了 30% 出头。我是说,我们那时愿意控制支出、征税。过去两年——一年半——我们所做的完全恰当。当时必须制止恐慌,必须重启美国这台引擎,我们做到了。现在,我们得想清楚下一步该怎么做。
But over time, we have been pretty responsible in this country. Since World War II, we came out with 120 percent debt to GDP. And we have brought that down into the 30s. I mean we were willing to keep our expenditures under control and tax. And we did exactly what is proper in the last two years, year and a half. We had to stem the panic. We had to restart the engine of America and we did. And now we've got to figure out what we do next.
贝基不过你也提到了两件事。还有就是削减开支。自那以后,有很多新提案要么被摆上了台面,要么已经通过并付诸实施。这些新支出会不会妨碍我们履行财政责任?
BECKYYou mentioned two things, though. Also bringing down expenditures. And since that time, there have been a lot of new proposals that have either been put on the table or have actually passed and been put into action. Are those new expenditures going to get in the way of being fiscally responsible?
巴菲特当然会。你知道,承诺起来很容易。你可以把整个 GDP 都承诺出去。但你的承诺既不会让玉米多长一穗,也不会让汽车多产一辆。到头来,就跟一个家庭、任何组织一样,你得想出个办法,让你的支出和收入保持合理平衡。
BUFFETTSure. You know, I mean it's easy to promise. And you can promise away the entire GDP, you know. But your promises don't grow more corn or turn out more automobiles. In the end, somehow like a family, like any kind of organization, you have to figure out a way so that your expenditures are in reasonable balance with your income.
就像我说的,你可以承受占 GDP 几个百分点的赤字。但我们经历了一场某种意义上的战争,就像我们经历二战时一样。二战期间我们大幅举债,举债极其庞大。但战后我们遵循了正确的程序,把债务重新调回到了应有的水平。在这场经济战争之后,我们也必须做同样的事情。
And like I say, you can run a couple percent of GDP. But we have gone through a war of sorts, just like when we went through World War II. We ran up the debt enormously in World War II. Enormously. But we then followed the proper procedures after World War II to get it back in line with where it should be. We have to do the same thing after this economic war.
2010 年 5 月 10 日,来源:http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字记录及视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济…… 第 7 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 7 of 8
贝基您认为我们当前的路走对了吗?
BECKYDo you think we're on the right track?
巴菲特嗯,我觉得现在差不多是时候启动了。我可能会让经济复苏再往前走远一点。我想确认我们确实在积蓄力量。我也想让美国民众感受到我们在积蓄力量。我的意思是,你需要这个来凝聚民意支持。但这个问题必须尽快着手解决。
BUFFETTWell, I think it's just now is about the time to get started. I'd probably let the recovery go a little further. I'd want to be sure that we were gaining strength. And I would want the American public to feel we were gaining strength. I mean you need that to get the popular will. But it's something that has to be addressed soon.
贝基希腊正在上演的局势,就让我们看到了这个问题不解决会有什么后果。周末达成了一项协议,国际货币基金组织和欧盟将介入提供贷款。但这将伴随希腊必须实施的非常严苛的紧缩措施。然而今天已经有人说,这仍然无济于事,仍然不够。危机会继续蔓延,到头来,这不过是在一个会持续化脓的伤口上贴了一个创可贴。您怎么看?
BECKYWe are watching what happens when it's not addressed play out right now in Greece. There was an agreement over the weekend that the IMF and the EU will be stepping in to make those loans. It will come with some very strict austerity measures from the Greeks. But there are people today saying it still won't matter, it still won't be enough. The contagion will continue to spread and at the end of the day, this is just a Band-Aid on a problem that will continue to fester. What do you think?
巴菲特很难说。欧盟存在一种特殊情形,各个成员国在制定预算上拥有主权。其他国家可能会施压,但它们在预算方面是主权独立的,可它们又不能自己印钞票。我们能印自己的钞票。只要我们用美元借钱,美国就永远还得起债,无非是继续印更多美元而已。希腊或其他成员国做不到,因为它们被欧元绑住了,但它们又自己决定预算。看这事最终怎么收场会非常有意思。因为你知道,如果其中一个成员可以我行我素地做点不太负责的事,并指望其他成员来救你,这对所有人来说都是一种实实在在的诱惑,让大家都别那么守规矩。所以我不知道欧洲这事最终会怎样。
BUFFETTIt's hard to tell. You have this unusual situation in the European Union where individual countries are sovereign in determining their budgets. They may get pressured by others, but they are sovereign in terms of their budgets but they can't print their own currency. We can print our own currency. We can always pay our debts in the United States as long as we borrow in dollars. We just keep printing more dollars. The Greeks can't do that or other members because they are tied to the euro, but they determine their own budget. It's going to be very interesting to see how this plays out because, you know, if you can sort of behave irresponsibly as one member and expect the other members to bail you out, that's an inducement, real inducement for everybody not to behave so well. So I don't know how it's going to come out in Europe.
贝基那葡萄牙、西班牙,甚至可能是意大利呢?
BECKYWhat about Portugal and Spain and even potentially Italy?
巴菲特嗯,我不了解涉及哪些国家。但可以说,每个成员——一旦某个成员在预算问题上多少有些违规行为却逃脱了惩罚,而其他成员又来救助它,这就是道德风险的极致体现。这正是我们在这个国家一直在谈论的事。而且这种情况正在欧洲大规模上演。我不知道那里会发生什么。这会是一部值得一看的电影,但我不知道结局如何。
BUFFETTWell, I don't know the countries involved. But you can say every member -- once one member sort of gets away with misbehaving to some degree in terms of their own budget and others bail them out, you know, that is the ultimate in moral hazard. That's what we talk about all the time in this country. And it's happening on a big scale in Europe. I don't know what will happen there. It's going to be an interesting movie to watch, but I don't know the ending.
贝基你过去曾在货币上下过注。如果现在让你下注欧元,你会有多大把握,又会有多心安?
BECKYYou have made bets on currencies in the past. How confident and comfortable would you feel with making a bet on the euro?
巴菲特我现在没有信心对任何一种货币下注,不管是欧元、英镑、日元,还是美元。我认为所有货币的购买力都很可能会贬值。如果你赌一种货币兑另一种货币的涨跌,本质上就是在猜哪种货币贬值最厉害。但我不喜欢赌任何一种货币的未来购买力。
BUFFETTI don't feel confident now in making a bet on any currency versus another, in other words, the euro, the pound, the yen, the dollar. I think all currencies are likely to lose value in terms of purchasing value. And if you are betting on one versus the other, you essentially are trying to guess which one will depreciate in value the most. But I don't like betting on the future purchasing power of any currency.
贝基·奎克你不喜欢赌任何一种货币的未来购买力。但你是否认为,国际货币基金组织和欧盟到目前为止介入处理这件事的方式是得当的?
BECKYYou don't like betting on the future purchasing power of any currency. But would you say that the IMF and the EU have dealt with this properly to this point to try and jump in?
巴菲特我不知道事情会如何发展。他们必须有所行动。他们要避免的是风险蔓延和道德风险。谁知道全球债券投资者脑子里在想什么。就像我们在这儿说的,当他们看到希腊等国的信用违约掉期飙升到那种程度时,你知道,一旦进入这种前所未有的未知领域,预测经济行为就变得极其困难。正如我所说,我不知道答案,所以,我不会下任何注。
BUFFETTI don't know how it's going to play out. They have to do something. And what they have to avoid is contagion and moral hazard. And who knows what's going on in the mind of bond investors all over the world. As we said here, when they see a situation where the credit defaults went to where they were went in Greece and all that, you know, predicting economic behavior gets very tough when you get into sort of uncharted territory like this. And like I say, I don't know the answer, so, therefore, I'm not making any bets.
贝基沃伦,我想放一段查理·芒格的录音。我们周末跟他聊过。查理说话总有自己的风格。
BECKYWarren, I'd like to play some sound from Charlie Munger. We spoke with him over the weekend. Charlie has a way of putting things.
巴菲特确实如此。
BUFFETTHe does.
贝基能把观点说得非常透彻。他谈到了一点关于嫉妒的话题。他谈到了华尔街未来的走向,以及如何才能让华尔街回归正轨。我记得他的评论是——不过,我不确定导播间现在有没有这段素材。但关于嫉妒的那段评论相当重要——如果找不到,我就读给你听。他说——现在有了吗?我们来播放查理·芒格的那段录音。沃伦,你也可以听听他说了些什么。
BECKYTo drive home points quite well. He talked a little bit about envy. He was talking about where the Street is headed, what can be done to try and bring the Street back into line. And I believe his comment -- again, I'm not sure if we have this right now in the control room. But this comment on envy that he had is one -- I'll read it to you if we can't find it. He said -- you have it right now? Let's play that soundbyte from Charlie Munger. And, Warren, you can listen in and see what he said.
查理·芒格嫉妒比贪婪是严重得多的祸害。
CHARLIE MUNGEREnvy is a much more serious mischief-maker than greed.
贝基怎么说?
BECKYHow so?
查理·芒格人性中就是有一种东西,哪怕你一年赚 500 万美元,也见不得街那头那个蠢货一年赚 700 万。
MUNGERThere's something in human nature that just can't stand even if you are making $5 million a year, that dumb bastard down the street is making 7.
贝基·奎克以上就是他的看法。他认为嫉妒才是最大的问题,不是贪婪。
BECKYSo those were his comments. He thinks envy is the biggest problem, not greed.
巴菲特是的。我们在所罗门见过很多这种事。我是说,你会想,一个一年赚三四百万美元的人怎么会不快乐呢?他不快乐,直到他发现旁边那个他自认为不如自己聪明的人,却比自己多赚了几块钱。我一直说,嫉妒在我看来是七宗罪里最愚蠢的一条。别人根本感受不到,你自己反而更难受。你坐在那儿胃里翻江倒海,就因为嫉妒。这实在没什么道理。
BUFFETTYeah. We saw a lot of that at Solomon. I mean you'd say how could a guy that's making 3 or $4 million a year be unhappy? And he's not unhappy until he finds the guy next to him who he thinks he's smarter than making a few dollars more. And as I always said, envy seems to me the silliest of the seven deadly sins. The other guy doesn't feel it. You just feel worse. You are sitting there with your stomach churning because you are envious. It doesn't make a lot sense.
我一直都说,你知道,如果非要从七宗罪里挑几个来犯,那就选暴食和色欲吧,你准能过上一个快活极了的周末。
I have always said, you know, if you are going to pick some sins from the seven deadly sins, go with gluttony and lust and you can have a hell of a weekend.
贝基·奎克但有没有什么办法,能通过立法或监管来约束这样的人性情绪呢?
BECKYBut is there any way to legislate or regulate human emotions like that?
巴菲特没有。
BUFFETTNo.
贝基华盛顿能做些什么吗?
BECKYIs there anything Washington can do?
巴菲特不行,做不了什么。我在所罗门兄弟试过,针对嫉妒心理,尝试过各种薪酬方式,都失败了。我控制不了嫉妒。你必须决定,也必须为你共事的每一个人设计激励机制。
BUFFETTNo, you can't do much. I tried on envy, various ways on compensation at Solomon. And I'm a failure at controlling envy. And you have to decide and you have to devise incentive systems for everybody that you work with.
顺便提一下,这也是我反对衍生品新法案的原因之一。我认为这个法案整体上是件好事,但我认为,除非你改变那些真正大型金融机构首席执行官和董事的激励机制,否则他们总是享有全部的上行收益,却无需承担下行风险。
And incidentally, that's one of the objections I have to the new bill on derivatives. I think it's a good thing overall, but I think that unless you change the incentives for the CEO and the directors of really large financial institutions, they have got all the upside and they don't have downside.
我们可以随口说出五六家机构,它们的董事让股东损失了成百上千亿美元——这些董事里有谁在财务上确确实实吃了苦头?他们也许在声望上蒙受了损失,但走的时候个个都很有钱。董事们照旧每年拿着二三十万美元的报酬。首席执行官们照样拥有多处豪宅和一切。
What director of any one of a half a dozen institutions we could name that have cost shareholders hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars who is really suffering financially? They may suffer in terms of losing prestige, but they are go away rich. The directors are still getting 200 or $300,000 a year. The CEO's still have their multiple houses and everything.
我会这样设计:如果你经营一家大型金融机构,最终却要靠美国政府救助才得以存续,那你和你的配偶就该破产,董事们自己也要付出实实在在的代价,倒也不必那么极端。这样你就能通过这种方式来改变人的行为。你可以靠激励来改变行为,但通常没法靠说教来改变,尽管每个星期天都有人在这么做。
I would have something there if you run a large financial institution and you end up having to get saved by the U.S. Government, that you and your spouse are broke and that the directors pay a significant price themselves, not that drastic. And then you will change human behavior that way. You can change behavior by incentives, but you can't usually change behavior by sermons, although people try every Sunday.
贝基伯克希尔·哈撒韦有购买董事及高管责任保险吗?
BECKYDo you have directors and officers insurance at Berkshire Hathaway?
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010
CNBC 文字稿及视频沃伦·巴菲特谈高盛与美国经济…… 第 8 页,共 8 页
CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEOWarren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and U.S. Economic... Page 8 of 8
巴菲特没有。伯克希尔要是倒了,大家都跟着倒,他们理应如此。
BUFFETTNo. If Berkshire goes down, everybody goes down, and they should.
贝基沃伦,最后一个想法。高盛最近几周一直是最大的新闻头条。你觉得接下来会怎样发展?高盛下一步会发生什么?
BECKYWarren, just a final thought. Again, Goldman has been the biggest headline over the last several weeks. Where do you think we head next? What happens next at Goldman?
巴菲特嗯,有可能达成某种和解。当双方在类似问题上存在分歧时,通常都会有谈判空间。否则,事情可能会拖很长时间。你知道,我们的所罗门——所罗门花了我们 9 个月零 4 天。9 个月零 4 天。感觉就像过了 9 个月零 4 天那样漫长。每一天都很难熬。但事情最终会随着时间的推移而化解。
BUFFETTWell, it's conceivable there's some settlement. There always is when two parties disagree on something like this. Otherwise, it plays out over a long period of time probably. You know, our Solomon -- Solomon took us nine months and four days. Nine months and four days. It felt like nine months and four days. Every day was painful. But it does play out over time.
贝基确实会随着时间过去。好的。另一个问题。我们想听听你对穆迪和评级机构的看法。上周末你为这些评级机构、或者至少是它们的商业模式做了辩护。这是不是——
BECKYIt does play out over time. Okay. Another question. One thing to take a look at is your thoughts on Moody's and the ratings agencies. You defended the ratings agencies or at least their business model over the weekend. Is this --
巴菲特嗯,我说过,他们有一个极好的商业模式。我的意思是,他们收我们很多钱,而我完全没法讨价还价。也就是说,如果穆迪和标准普尔想给伯克希尔评级,或者说我需要他们的评级,我不能去找他们说:少收 10% 怎么样,不然我就去找别家了?他们吃定我了。所以他们拥有定价权。而且这门生意完全不需要任何资本。所以你看,这是一门零资本投入、却拥有极强定价权的生意。这并不代表我为他们的所有行为辩护,但这确实意味着他们拥有一门极好的生意,除非,你知道,这门生意被立法以某种方式改变了。
BUFFETTWell, I said they have got a great business model. I mean they charge us a lot of money, and I can't negotiate it downward. I mean I can't say if Moody’s and Standard & Poor's want to rate Berkshire or I need their rating, I can't go to them and say: How about doing it for 10 percent less or I'll go to XYZ? They have got me. So they have pricing strength. And it's a business that requires no capital whatsoever. So here is a business with zero capital in it that has great pricing power. That doesn't mean I defend all their actions or anything, but it does mean that they have a terrific business unless it, you know, gets changed in some way by legislation.
我认为他们犯了和所有人一样的错误。我认为他们脑子里有一个模型,实际上纸面上也有一个模型,这个模型认为住宅房地产不可能断崖式下跌。一旦他们用了错误的模型,自然就会得出错误的答案。但他们并不比大多数美国公众更聪明,大概也不比他们更蠢。人们也许会认为他们本该更聪明些。毕竟那是他们的本行。
I think they made the same mistakes that everybody else made. I think they had a model in their mind and actually a model on paper that said residential real estate can't fall off a cliff. And once they have the wrong model, they have got the wrong answer. But they were no smarter and probably no more stupid than most of the American public. And people may feel that they should have been smarter. I mean that was their business.
贝基好的。沃伦,非常感谢你今天来参加我们的节目。谢谢你抽出时间。
BECKYAll right. Well, warren, we want to thank you very much for joining us today. We appreciate your time.
-----
-----
转录服务由 www.RealtimeTranscription.com 提供
Transcription by www.RealtimeTranscription.com
当前伯克希尔·哈撒韦股价:
Current Berkshire stock prices:
B 类股:
Class B:
A 类股:
Class A:
更多巴菲特动态更新,可在 Twitter 上关注 alexcrippen。
For more Buffett Watch updates follow alexcrippen on Twitter.
请将评论发送至 [email protected]
Email comments to [email protected]
© 2010 CNBC, Inc. 保留所有权利。
© 2010 CNBC, Inc. All Rights Reserved
© 2010 CNBC.com
. © 2010 CNBC.com
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 2010 年 5 月 10 日
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 5/10/2010