2011 年 3 月 CNBC 访谈

2011-03-02 · 年度访谈、伯克希尔与市场 · 原文约 16151 词
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2011 年 3 月 2 日

March 2, 2011

沃伦·巴菲特今天上午(2011 年 3 月 2 日)做客 CNBC《财经论谈》(Squawk Box)的直播节目。

<<<END P 2>>>

Warren Buffett appeared live on CNBC’s Squawk Box this morning, March 2, 2011.

http://www.cnbc.com

http://www.cnbc.com

贝基欢迎回到 CNBC 的《财经论谈》。今天早上我们在内布拉斯加州的奥马哈,跟沃伦·巴菲特一起待在达勒姆博物馆。我们会回答一些观众发来的电子邮件问题。沃伦,再跟那些刚加入的观众说一遍,我们现在是在达勒姆博物馆,前面就是欧内斯特·巴菲特杂货店。这家店对你来说意义非凡。

BECKYWelcome back to SQUAWK BOX here on CNBC. We are in Omaha, Nebraska, this morning at the Durham Museum with Warren Buffett. We’re going to be answering some of your e-mail questions. And, Warren, just again for people who are coming in late, we’re in the Durham Museum in front of the Ernest Buffett Grocery Store. And this is pretty important to you.

巴菲特对,那家店是我曾祖父西德尼创立的……

BUFFETTYeah. That store was founded my-founded by my great-grandfather, Sidney…

贝基嗯嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特……那是 1869 年,横贯大陆的铁路刚修通。联合太平洋铁路在犹他州的海角点与中央太平洋铁路接上了轨。我祖父有两个儿子跟他一起干活,欧内斯特和弗兰克。不幸的是,他俩在店里爱上了同一个女人。结果她嫁给了我祖父,弗兰克有大约二三十年没跟他说话,自己另开了一家杂货店——不过我们巴菲特家族记仇的基因可没传承下来。后来查理·芒格和我也在那儿打过工。

BUFFETT…in 1869, which is when the transcontinental railroad was completed. That’s when the UP hooked up with the Central Pacific at Promontory Point, Utah. And my grandfather had two sons that worked with him, Ernest and Frank, and unfortunately they both fell in love with the same woman at the store. So she married my grandfather, and for about 20 or 30 years Frank didn’t speak to him and opened up another grocery store, but not that we carry grudges in the Buffett family. But Charlie Munger and I ended up working there.

贝基是的。

BECKYYeah.

巴菲特他在 1930 年代末在那儿工作,我是 1940 年左右去的,我们当时根本不认识。但我们都给我祖父打过工,那段经历,相信我,够你受的。他信奉的就是玩命干。

BUFFETTHe worked there in the late 1930s, I worked there around 1940, and we never knew each other. But we did have this experience of working for my grandfather, which, believe me was an experience. He believes in hard work.

贝基对,你在年报里也写到过这一条,说你从那次经历中学到的,就是流动性的重要性,以及不要过度杠杆。

BECKYYeah, you wrote about that in the annual letter, as well, and said that the thing that you learned coming out of that is the importance of liquidity and not getting overleveraged.

巴菲特是啊。我祖父——在他每个子女结婚十年后,会留(给)他们 1000 美元。我姑姑没结婚,但她也拿到了 1000 美元。祖父还附上一封信,信里说:“把这笔钱存好,别动它。”他说:“别一时冲动拿去投资,因为说不定哪天你会需要钱,到时候谁知道你的投资能派上什么用场。”所以,人总得留点现金。我小时候他给过我一张 2 美元的钞票,说让我随身带着,他说,你知道,这样你永远不会彻底破产。

BUFFETTYeah. My grandfather left-gave $1,000 eventually, at 10 years after the marriage of each of his children and my aunt didn’t marry, but he gave her $1,000 as well and he sent them this letter and he said, Put this money away.’ He said, Don’t get tempted to invest it because some day you may need money and who knows what you’re can do with your investment then.’ So you’ll always want to have some cash. He gave me a $2 bill when I was a kid and he said carry this around and he said you’ll, you know, you’ll never be broke.

贝基那么伯克希尔现在持有多少现金?

BECKYNow Berkshire has how much in cash?

巴菲特嗯,我们大概有——我记得年底有大约 380 亿美元。

BUFFETTWell, we probably have about-I think we had about 38 billion at the end of the year, so.

贝基这是你切实记在心里的一课。

BECKYIt’s a lesson you took to heart.

巴菲特是的。他会很高兴的。

BUFFETTYeah. He would be happy.

贝基好。我们来看看观众邮件,其中相当多邮件都和伯克希尔的投资有关。你在年报里花了很多篇幅谈这个话题。但有一封来自特拉华州 J.P. 的提问:“鉴于富国银行是你的第二大股票持仓,你对该公司首席财务官辞职以及公司披露此事的方式有多担忧?”

BECKYOK. Let’s get to some of the viewer e-mails and a significant number of those e-mails that came in had to do with Berkshire’s investments. You spent a lot of time talking about that in your annual letter. But one that came in from J.P. in Delaware says that “Given that Wells Fargo is your second-largest equity holding, how concerned are you with the resignation of the CFO and the manner in which the company disclosed this?”

巴菲特嗯,我认为他们披露的方式不太妥当。不过,霍华德·阿特金斯是一位出色的 CEO,或者说 CFO。

BUFFETTYeah, I don’t think the manner in which they disclosed it was very good. The-but Howard Atkins was a terrific CEO or CFO.

贝基嗯,CFO。

BECKYCFO, yeah.

巴菲特你知道,我跟他本人并不认识,从来没见过面,但我——我在电视上看过他,读过他写的东西,等等。这事跟他们公司的财务状况一点关系都没有。

BUFFETTAnd you know, I didn’t know him personally, I never met him personally, but I-but I watched him on television, I saw what he wrote and everything. It has nothing to do with their financials.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特上周六我花了大概四个小时读 10-K 年报,对整个富国银行的运营感觉非常好。显然,新闻稿之外还有一些情况,这确实是个棘手的事。要是事情双方都不愿开口,那他们就不会谈。我自己也不知道答案。不过我知道,这和财务状况无关。

BUFFETTI spent about four hours last Saturday reading the 10-K and I feel very good about the whole Wells operation. Obviously, there’s something there beyond what was in the news release and it’s a tough thing. If you’ve got something that neither side wants to talk about, they’re not going to talk about it. And I don’t-I don’t know the answer myself. I know it has nothing to do with financials, though, and…

贝基这是另一位来自阿拉巴马州克利夫的观众提出的问题。

BECKYThat was another viewer question that came in from Clif in Alabama.

巴菲特是的。没有。

BUFFETTYeah. Nothing.

贝基至少有一位分析师在文章里写道,这件事确实与此有关。

BECKYThat-there was at least one analyst who wrote that this did have something to do with that.

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基你百分之百确信没有?

BECKYYou are 100 percent convinced it did not?

巴菲特我敢拿大把的钱打赌,他错了。

BUFFETTI’d bet a lot of money that he’s wrong.

贝基好的。这是众多提问中的一个,但我们也收到了关于穆迪的问题。亚利桑那州的阿奇特写道:“在接受金融危机调查委员会(FCIC)采访时,您谈到了穆迪和标普共享的双头垄断内在优势。为什么伯克希尔持续减持穆迪的股份?对您来说,是否存在过大的‘头条风险’?”

BECKYOK. That’s one of many questions that have come in, but we also have questions that have come in about Moody’s. Achit in Arizona writes in, “In your FCIC interview, you spoke of the inherent advantages of a duopoly that Moody’s and S&P share. Why does Berkshire continue to reduce its interest in Moody’s? Is there too much headline risk” for you?

巴菲特嗯,我认为双头垄断的局面比过去危险了一些,原因很简单——人们对评级机构很恼火,而评级机构完全错过了抵押贷款市场发生的一切,那是一个巨大、巨大的失误。我不认为他们是——你知道——我觉得他们就是搞错了,就像很多人当时错误地认为房价不可能大幅下跌一样,但他们是评级机构,因此受到了大量批评。而他们的商业模式在双头垄断下是极其赚钱的。我是说,我没有任何议价能力。我大概下周或者什么时候会去见穆迪,谈我们的评级问题。

BUFFETTWell, I think that duopoly is in somewhat more danger than it was simply because people are mad at the ratings agencies and the ratings agencies totally missed what was going on in the mortgage market and that was a huge, huge miss. I don’t think they were, you know-I think they were just wrong, like a lot of people were wrong about in thinking that housing prices couldn’t go down a lot, but they were rating agencies and they’ve gotten a lot of criticism for it and their business model is sensational when it’s a duopoly. I mean, I have no bargaining power. I’m going to see Moody’s in the week or I think or something about our ratings.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特你看,我好好打扮自己,使出浑身解数,就为了——你懂的——吹嘘我的资产负债表。但评级机构就是神,标普就是神,我需要他们的评级。如果他们给我的账单是 X 美元,我就付;如果他们给我的账单是 X 加 10%,我也照付。你看,如果可口可乐要价太高,你可能会考虑喝百事可乐;但在评级机构这个行业,你就需要这两家。如果人们对他们极度不满,或者无论什么原因,又或者国会发怒了,这东西可能就消失了。它不会因为自然原因而消失。我是说,这是一个天然的寡头垄断,就像——它跟房利美和房地美有点不一样,但它们也有某种特定的优势。有时候你会遇到这种情况,得到一个天然的——嗯,过去你在报业就有过。在大城市里,你拥有一个天然的垄断。那并不违法,只是自然而然地发展成了那样。

BUFFETTAnd you know, I dress up and do everything I can to, you know, talk about my balance sheet. But they-they’re God in the ratings field and Standard & Poor’s, and I need their ratings. And if they tell me the bill is X, I pay that, and if they tell me the bill is X plus 10 percent, I pay that. You know, if Coca-Cola charges too much, you know, you may think about drinking Pepsi Cola, but in the rating agency business, you need those two. and if that-either people get so upset with them or whatever it may be, or Congress gets upset, that could disappear. It won’t disappear from natural reasons. I mean, it is a natural duopoly, just like-it’s a little different than Freddie and Fannie were, but they also had some specific advantage. Sometimes you find situations where you get a natural-well, you used to have that in the newspaper business. You had a natural monopoly in big cities. It wasn’t-it wasn’t illegal, it just worked out that way.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特评级机构就落入了这个陷阱。但它们的地位不像过去那样牢不可破了。不过,我得说……

BUFFETTAnd that’s what happened in ratings agencies. But it’s not as bullet-proof as it was. Although, I will say that…

贝基所以这就是你一直在卖出的原因吗?

BECKYDoes that why you’ve been selling?

巴菲特嗯,我们卖得没那么猛。

BUFFETTWell, we haven’t sold that aggressively.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特我的意思是,如果你看看 2010 年整年的情况,我们卖出了一小部分——在我看来,那种威胁在一定程度上正在消退。但情况跟五年前不一样了。

BUFFETTI mean, if you look at it during the course of 2010, we sold a very small amount of the-it looked to me that that threat was receding to some degree. But it’s different than it was five years ago.

贝基好。下一个问题来自德国的克里斯蒂安,他写道:“你投资了美国运通,但你又不喜欢信用卡。这怎么说得通?”我猜克里斯蒂安指的是你刚才在你祖父的信里提到的那番话。

BECKYOK. Another question comes in from Christian in Germany who writes, “You’re invested in American Express, but you don’t like credit cards. How does this match?” And I’m guessing Christian is referring to what you were talking about in your grandfather’s letter.

巴菲特是的。不,我觉得——我们在家具城和珠宝店都接受信用卡,我是说,美国公众总会用信用卡的。如果你说你不接受信用卡,那作为零售商,你还不如说不收钱呢。但我对每届学生——高中生、大学生——都这么讲:你们要是现在从不碰信用卡,日子会好过得多。

BUFFETTYeah. No, I think-we offer credit cards at our furniture store, our jewelry store, I mean, the American public is going to use credit cards. I mean, if you say you’re not going to accept credit cards, you might as well say you’re not going to accept money if you’re a retailer. But I tell every student class I get, high school students, university students, you know, they’d be better off if they never used credit cards now.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特不过,你要是用信用卡并每月底还清,不开始循环计息,那就是另一回事了。但我没法赚钱,如果我要借钱,利率是 12%、14%、16% 什么的,而 Libor 才 0.25%。我的意思是,这个世界没那么低效。所以……

BUFFETTNow if you use them and you pay at the end of the month so you don’t start revolving, that’s another question. But I can’t make money if I’m out borrowing, you know, at whatever the rate may be, 12 percent, 14 percent, 16 percent, when you know, Libor’s a quarter of a percent. I mean, the world isn’t that inefficient. So…

贝基没错。

BECKYRight.

巴菲特……要是——要是我会破产,要是我用信用卡利率借钱,你知道,那种——他们就会陷入麻烦。我收到各种各样的信,都是信用卡欠债惹上麻烦的人写来的。所以我觉得这事儿不会发生,但我认为,如果信用卡不存在,经济可能会更好。

BUFFETT…I-if I’m going to go broke, if I borrow at credit card rates, you know, what kind of-they’re going to get in trouble. I get all kinds of letters from people who’ve gotten in trouble on credit cards. So I think it isn’t going to happen, but I think if credit cards didn’t exist, I think probably the economy would be better off.

贝基哇。美国运通知道你有这想法吗?

BECKYWow. Does American Express know you feel that way?

巴菲特这事不会发生。就是不会发生。我的意思是,你知道,人们还是会这么干。我理解他们为什么这么做。你知道,觉得“我今天想要这个,明天再付钱”这种想法,多美好啊。

BUFFETTIt isn’t going to happen. It isn’t going to happen. I mean, you know, people are going to do it. I mean, you know, and I understand why they do it. You know, it’s so nice to think that you know, I want this today and I’ll pay for it tomorrow.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特但这让很多人陷入麻烦,而且代价高昂。顺便说一句,这并非因为信用卡公司在发财。

BUFFETTBut it gets a lot of people in trouble and it’s expensive. And it isn’t because the credit card companies are getting rich, incidentally.

贝基没错。

BECKYSure.

巴菲特我的意思是,我在 GEICO 搞过信用卡业务,几年前我还觉得自己是个天才,打算给 GEICO 的客户发信用卡——因为我们在家具城和其他地方也这么干过——结果后来亏了,我不知道,大概 6000 万美元。我们的损失相当大。我想说的是,信用卡公司本来就承担着巨额的信用损失,这是一门成本很高的生意。所以,他们收 12% 到 14% 的利息,未必就能发大财,但对支付这个利息的客户来说,却毫无益处。

BUFFETTI mean, I went into the credit card business at GEICO, I thought I was this genius a couple of years ago and I was going to sell-have credit cards for GEICO customers because we have them at the furniture mart and other places and I lost about, I don’t know, $60 million later on. Our losses were quite significant. I mean, credit card companies run big credit losses, it’s an expensive sort of business. So it isn’t that they’re getting rich, necessarily, at 12 to 14 percent, but that doesn’t do their customer any good that’s paying that amount.

贝基我再问你一个关于美国运通的问题,然后乔也有个问题。来自伦敦的大卫写信来问:“作为美国运通的最大股东,你是否担心国会会像之前降低借记卡交换费那样,也降低信用卡交换费?这部分收入占美国运通收入的绝大部分。”

BECKYLet me ask you one more about American Express and then Joe has a question, too. But David from London writes in, that “as AMEX’s largest shareholder, are you concerned that Congress will reduce the credit interchanges fees as they have done for debit interchanges? Those account for the vast majority of AMEX’s revenue.”

巴菲特对。美国运通确实有一张很特别的卡。我是说真的。美国运通持卡人的平均年消费,我记得大概是 1.3 万到 1.4 万美元。这个数字是 Visa 持卡人的四倍还是五倍——我记不准具体数字了。而且美国运通卡在档次上远高于 Visa,在多个方面也更实用。其实早在 1960 年代初,我就认定美国运通卡很特别。最早的信用卡是大来卡。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, American Express has a very special card. I mean, it. The average American Express card holder, I think, I think they’re probably charging, I don’t know, 13, $14,000 a year. That’s four times of what-or five times, maybe, I don’t have the exact figures, what they’re charging at Visa. And the American Express card carries more cachet, by far, than a Visa and it has more utility in many different ways. American-I decided the American Express card was special, actually, back in the early 1960s. The first credit card was the Diners Club card.

贝基嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特大来卡当年风靡一时。那是一只热门股,等等等等。

BUFFETTAnd the Diners Club card kind of swept through. It was a-it was a hot stock and all of that.

贝基嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特后来美国运通推出信用卡,其实是一种防御性措施,他们当时觉得大来卡会冲击自己的旅行支票业务。于是他们给卡定价比大来卡还高。你想想看,一个后入场的玩家,对着市场领跑者,还敢收费更高。但他们硬是把自己的卡打造成了与众不同的东西,而它也的确与众不同。所以,对一些人来说,尤其对消费金额大的人来说,这是一张更好的卡。我太太以前就有一张那种,就是那种花很多钱才能拥有的黑卡。而我自己,到现在还一直用着绿卡。

BUFFETTAnd then American Express came in as a defensive measure, they thought it was going to knock out their traveler’s checks. And they priced their card higher than the Diners Club. Now imagine coming in against the leading guy and charging more. But they established their card as something special and it is something special. So it is-it is a-it is a superior card for somebody, particularly, that’s a big spender. My wife had one of those cards that was, you know, one of those black cards that cost a lot of money and everything. I still carry the green card.

贝基好的,乔:

BECKYOK, Joe:

乔·科南好,谢谢。沃伦,我坐这儿一直在想——我明白,口香糖嘛,大家喜欢嚼口香糖,这个我懂,还有喜诗糖果,你知道的。我琢磨着,也许牙科连锁也不错。但我真正想说的是——我想问的是媒体,我想的是媒体的前景,我不知道人们是不是还会一直嚼口香糖。我自己嚼得不多。但媒体无处不在,我看了看媒体的前景,又想到中国有 12 亿人,可我现在不知道怎么投,也不知道你知不知道怎么投。我就是觉得机会很大。

JOEYeah, thanks. So Warren, so I’ve been sitting here thinking, I understand that chewing gum, people like to chew gum, I got that, and See’s and make-you know, See’s candy. I was thinking, you know, maybe a dental chain might be good, too. But what I’m getting at-where I’m going with this is I think about media and I think about the prospects for media and I don’t know whether people keep chewing gum. I don’t chew that much, but media is so pervasive and I just look at the outlook for media and I think about 1.2 billion people in China, but I don’t know how to play it right now and I don’t know whether you know how. I just see a huge opportunity.

巴菲特我……

BUFFETTI…

乔·科南我看到了一个巨大的机会,但不知道该怎么利用它。我在想您能不能帮帮我。

JOEI see a huge opportunity, but I don’t know what to do with it. And I’m wondering if you could help me.

巴菲特人们想要娱乐,也想要信息。我的意思是,这种需求非常巨大,遍布全球,而且永远不会消失。所以你看,报纸在满足这种需求方面起着非常重要的作用,尤其是在本地层面。报纸的性质决定了你不会订阅五份报纸,你只会订阅一份。如果一座城里有两家报纸,一家有 1000 条广告,另一家有 200 条,你会买那家 1000 条广告的报纸,因为它告诉你更多的工作机会、更多的公寓出租信息、更多的体育新闻等等。所以它天然适合单一产品模式。但现在,你有了互联网这种媒体,你可以瞬间从一个来源跳到另一个来源。这完全是另一回事了。人们对娱乐和信息的需求永远不会消失,它是贪得无厌的。但如何从中得到合理的回报,世界已经变了,而且变得天翻地覆。我绝不自认为是媒体未来 10 年或 20 年走向的专家。我不知道钱会从哪里赚。有人会赚大钱,但我就是不太擅长预测未来。我理解过去。我理解大型电视网。我是说,回到 60 年代只有三大电视网的时候,就算你在电视台里放一张测试图,也能赚大钱。那简直是板上钉钉的事。订单自己就会涌进来。但突然间,他们开始铺设更多的高速公路,更多的电子高速公路。你拥有三大电子高速公路之一的地位,重要性就大打折扣。所以现在,你会看到一个收视率只有 10% 的电视网在赔大钱,而另一个收视率只有 2% 的电视网,比如 ESPN,却因为行业动态的变化而赚得盆满钵满。我对未来这方面没有什么高见。要是有的话,我……只是……我实在没那么聪明。

BUFFETTPeople want to be entertained and they want to be informed. I mean, the demand for that is huge, is worldwide, it’s going to go on forever. So you know, newspapers satisfy that in a very important way, particularly on a local basis. And the nature of newspapers was that you didn’t want to subscribe to five of them, you subscribed to one and if there were two in town and one had 1,000 ads and one had 200 ads, you were going to buy the one with 1,000 ads because it told you were more jobs were available, more apartments were available, it gave you more sports news and whatever. So it lent itself to a single product. Now you have media where you go to the Internet and you can go-you can essentially hop from one source to another, you know, in a-in a fraction of a second. So it’s a different-it’s a whole different equation. It isn’t-the desire for entertainment and information, you know, is-will be around forever. It’s insatiable. How to get paid for it appropriately, you know, the world has changed and it’s changed dramatically, and I do not consider myself an expert in the least about where media is going to go in the next 10 or 20 years. I do not know where the money is going to be made. Somebody will make a lot of money, but I’m just not that good at picking the future on it. I understood the past on that. I understood the big network television station. I mean, back when there were three networks only in the ’60s, you could have run a test pattern, you know, on your television station and made a lot of money. It was-it was-it was a cinch. The orders came in over the transom. But all of a sudden they started putting more highways out there, more electronic highways and the fact that you had one of the three electronic highways diminished in importance enormously, so now you’ve got a network that is getting a 10 percent share, losing tons of money, and you’ll have a network with, you know, a 2 share, like ESPN, making a fortune because of the way the dynamics have worked out. I don’t have any great insights on that for the future. If I did, I’d-it’s just-I’m just not smart enough.

乔·科南我明白你的意思,这是所有人都面临的问题。我甚至都搞不清,赢的会是内容?内容为王吗?还是像苹果那样,赢在传输渠道?我是说,你看看苹果,随着这些移动设备遍地开花,它可能就是我——你知道的——完美的公司了。

JOEI hear what you’re saying, it’s the same problem everyone has. I don’t even know, is it content? Is that king? Or is it delivery, like Apple? I mean, you look at, Apple might be the perfect company for when I-when I, you know, with all these mobile devices.

巴菲特对。

BUFFETTYeah.

乔·科南可我甚至搞不清楚,赢的到底是内容,还是分发渠道。

JOEBut I don’t even know whether it’s content or the distribution that is-that win.

巴菲特嗯,如果你是世界上最顶尖的重量级拳击手——乔,我常常就是这么看你的——或者你是全世界最好的歌手,随便什么都行,你拥有的就是终极资产。我是说,那些分发渠道总得用某种方式付钱给你,你可以对他们发号施令。但很明显,我没法跟那种游戏竞争。所以我唯一的竞争方式就是在分发渠道上下功夫——其实我还没那么聪明。不过答案是,我不需要事事都对,甚至不需要理解所有事,我不用知道可可豆会怎么走,棉花会怎么走,我只需要在我做出的决策上正确就行。所以我只做简单的事。很多年前有一件简单的事,1965 年,我拥有迪士尼 5% 的股份,整个迪士尼公司当时的售价是 8000 万美元,所以我花 400 万美元就买到了公司 5% 的股份。迪士尼拥有很强的经济特许权,他们每七年就可以重推一次《白雪公主》或者《欢乐满人间》,不管是什么,最初都把这些作品的账面价值记为 0。嗯,那是个很容易的决策。但现在我看不到那么容易的决策了,如果看不到容易的决策,我就不出手。

BUFFETTWell, if you’re the best heavyweight fighter in the world, which is the way I often think of you, Joe, actually, but if you’re the best heavyweight fighter in the world, if you’re the best singer in the world, you know, whatever it may be, you’ve got the ultimate asset. I mean, the delivery mechanism will pay you one way or another and you can command it from them. But obviously, I’m not-I’m not in a position to compete in that game. So the only way I can compete is in the delivery mechanisms and all that and I’m just not that smart. But the answer is I don’t have to be right about everything or even understand everything, I don’t have to know what cocoa beans are going to do or what cotton’s going to do, I just have to right on the decisions I make. So I stay with the simple things. Now a simple thing many years ago, back in 1965 I owned 5 percent of Disney and the whole Disney company was selling for $80 million, so at 4 million bucks bought 5 percent of the company. Well, Disney had a tremendous franchise and they could bring out “Snow White” every seven years or “Mary Poppins” or whatever it might be and wrote them down to zero, initially. Well, that was an easy decision. But I don’t see easy decisions like that now and if I don’t see an easy decision, I don’t play.

贝基沃伦,我来提一下康涅狄格州格林尼治的皮尔斯提出的问题。他问的是苹果,正好你刚才提到了。“您觉得史蒂夫·乔布斯的故事对苹果股价的影响已经体现出来了,还是说影响还没完全展现出来?”

BECKYWarren, let me bring up a question from Pierce in Greenwich, Connecticut. He writes in about Apple, since you just mentioned it. “Do you feel the Steve Jobs saga has already taken its toll on Apple’s stock price or do you feel it has yet to make its mark?”

巴菲特哦,我其实——我对苹果了解真不多。我的意思是,我只知道苹果是一家绝对杰出的公司。你想一下,10 年或 15 年前他们在哪,现在又在哪。

BUFFETTOh, I don’t-I don’t know that much about Apple. I mean, all I know is Apple is an absolutely phenomenal company. I mean, to think of where they were 10 or 15 years ago and where they are now.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特这一切都是靠创新实现的。我的意思是,我觉得史蒂夫·乔布斯在这方面功不可没。不过……

BUFFETTAnd that’s been done by innovation. I mean, and I think Steve Jobs has had a whole lot to do with that. But…

贝基我觉得那个大问题就是,史蒂夫·乔布斯对这家公司有多重要?

BECKYI think that’s the big question is how important is Steve Jobs to that company?

巴菲特他对苹果来说极为重要。你知道,华特·迪士尼对迪士尼公司也很重要。我的意思是,有些天赋确实非常罕见,史蒂文·斯皮尔伯格对他的行业也很重要。有些人能在美国公众自己还没意识到有某种需求之前就读懂这种需求,然后凭借天才头脑创造出满足需求的产品,快速推向市场,并且产品在各方面都极具吸引力——功能丰富到不可思议——他们理应获得巨额财富。他看到了我五年或十年前没看到的东西。

BUFFETTWell, he’s enormously important to Apple. And you know, Walt Disney was important to Walt Disney, a company. I mean, there’s certain talents that are really rare and Steven Spielberg is important, you know, to his business. I mean, it-there-people who can read the needs of the American public before the American public even realizes that it has those needs, and then have the genius to create a product that satisfies those needs and gets there fast, and then is attractive, you know, in terms of all kinds of things, functionality that you can’t believe, they deserve to get very rich. I mean, they-he saw something that I didn’t see five years ago or 10 years ago.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

卡尔我觉得——听起来你像是在描述《财经论坛》这档节目。

CARLI think-it kind of sounds like you’re describing SQUAWK BOX.

乔·科南对,就是《财经论坛》。我们速度快,又有娱乐性,但后来我又想——你在提到我的时候——我本以为你最后会提到新闻集团或康卡斯特之类,你知道,就是随口那么一提。

JOEYeah, SQUAWK BOX. We’re fast, we’re entertaining, but then I also thought, I thought you were-when you were talking about me, I thought you were eventually going to end up with either a News Corp or a Comcast, you know, just to pull a name out of the-out of the thin air.

卡尔沃伦知道……

CARLWarren knows…

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

卡尔沃伦对康卡斯特有些了解。

CARLWarren knows something of Comcast.

乔·科南或者像迪士尼那样的公司。我是说,我不知道,我只是——那些大公司中的一家,我觉得——我觉得有一定规模、资产足够分散会有所帮助,不过……

JOEOr a-or a Disney or something. I mean, I don’t know, I’m just-one of those-the big companies, I think-I think it helps to have some size and some diversity with all your assets, but…

巴菲特嗯,不过当然了,那些大公司,你知道,如果回到 30 年前,它们开始追求多元化,就像 CBS 那样。我是说,CBS 统治了——它曾是蒂芙尼级别的电视网,甚至一度拥有纽约洋基队。所以这非常难。通用汽车统治世界,你知道,在我还是个年轻投资者的时候。西尔斯统治了商品零售世界。挑出赢家可没那么容易。回头看的时候,总是显得容易。

BUFFETTWell, but of course, the big companies, you know, if you go back 30 years ago, they started going for diversity with CBS. I mean, CBS ruled the-it was the Tiffany network and it even owned the New York Yankees at one point. So it’s very tough. General Motors ruled the world, you know, when I was a young investor. It-Sears ruled the world of merchandise. It’s not so easy to pick the winners. It looks easy in retrospect always.

乔·科南没错。

JOEYeah.

巴菲特你知道,总会有赢家。我的意思是,媒体行业里会出现巨大的赢家。比如那些能想出办法吸引几百万用户的人,就像 Facebook 之类的。

BUFFETTYou know there will be winners. I mean, in media there will be huge winners. I mean, somebody that can figure out a way to attract millions of users, like just take a Facebook or something.

乔·科南嗯嗯。

JOEMm-hmm.

巴菲特你想想看,五年前某个人脑子里想的东西,现在成千上万、数以亿计的人,在某种程度上围绕着它构建自己的生活。这太了不起了。但我不是能做到那种事的人,我也不是能识别出能做那种事的人。不过幸运的是,我也不需要是。

BUFFETTImagine that, you know, being in the mind of a guy five years ago and now millions, hundreds of millions of people, you know, build their lives around it to some degree. That’s amazing. But I am not the guy that can do that, and I’m not the guy who can spot the guys who can do that. But fortunately, I don’t have to be.

贝基好,两位,我们这场对话先告一段落,现在把信号交回演播室,乔和卡尔,有请你们。

BECKYOK, guys, we’re going to continue this conversation, but for now we’ll send it back to you, Joe and Carl, in the studio.

卡尔我还是喜欢沃伦把乔比作职业拳击手,因为我脑子里浮现的是你——穿着内裤站在秤上称体重的画面。

乔:哦,天哪。我倒是有个建议……

CARLI still like Warren calling Joe a prize fighter because I picture you at a-at a weigh-in in your underwear on the scale. JOE: Oh my God. I got some advice…

巴菲特他——他是……

BUFFETTHe’s-he is…

我——你知道吗?

JOEI don’t-you know what?

巴菲特他被称为迈克——他是有线电视界的迈克·泰森。

BUFFETTHe’s known as the Mike-he’s the Mike Tyson of cable.

卡尔没错。他会把你耳朵咬掉。

CARLYeah. He’ll bite your ear off.

能把你耳朵咬下来。我可能得弄个那种——那种纹身——你觉得管用吗,在我身上弄个那种纹身……

JOEBite your ear off. I might get one of those-one of those tat-do you think that would work, one of those tattoos on my…

卡尔对,那会很好看。这造型很适合你。

CARLYeah, it would look good. That’s a good look for you.

我不知道。

JOEI don’t know.

卡尔反正吧。

CARLAnyway.

贝基嘿,两位,在你们走之前,我赶紧再说一件事。我们之前没机会提这个,但我知道,乔和卡尔,你们俩一直在来回纠结,是平角裤还是三角裤,平角裤还是三角裤。

BECKYHey, guys, before you go, real quickly, let me point out one other thing. We didn’t get a chance to mention this earlier, but I know, Joe and Carl, you have both gone back and forth, boxers and briefs, boxers and briefs.

乔·科南对。

JOEYeah.

贝基今天沃伦戴了一条特别的领带,上面也显示了他的一些兴趣。

BECKYToday Warren wore in a special tie which shows some of his interests as well.

卡尔真的吗?

CARLReally?

巴菲特对,这是一条——我不知道你能不能看清,这是鲜果布衣的领带。其实我还有飞机图案的、GEICO 标志的,以及一堆其他的。但今天为了向你致敬,乔,我特意戴上了我的“内裤领带”。你知道,在鲜果布衣,我们的座右铭是“我们给大众遮屁股”。我系上这条领带的时候,就想到了你。

BUFFETTYeah, this is a-I don’t know whether you can see this, this is a Fruit of the Loom tie, and I actually have this for airplanes and GEICO and a bunch of others. But I thought in honor of you, Joe, I would wear my underwear tie today. At Fruit of the Loom, you know, our motto is “we cover the asses of the masses,” and I thought of you when we-I put this tie on.

乔·科南那个——你知道吗?我们看不到,但刚刚确实成了。我确实——很喜欢。不过我觉得——卡尔说得对……

JOEThat is-you know what? We could not see it, but we just did. I really-I like that. But I-Carl’s got the right…

巴菲特你喜欢那个选择?乔:卡尔,你不用非得选。你是个平角裤和紧身内裤混搭的人,对吧?

BUFFETTYou like that one? JOE: Carl, you don’t have to choose. You are a boxers combo brief guy, right?

卡尔是的。

CARLYes.

乔·科南而且他们做点东西……

JOEAnd they make something…

卡尔你那会儿还是条白色三角内裤男,你看你连手的手套都有,记得不?是简·威尔斯给你带的……

CARLAnd you are a tighty whities guy because-you even have the underwear for the hands, remember? Jane Wells brought you…

乔·科南我有内衣——我有内衣……

JOEI have underwear-I have underwear…

卡尔……手上的内衣。

CARL…hand underwear.

乔·科南不,我是……

JOENo, I’m a…

巴菲特我真希望我没开这个头!

BUFFETTI wish I hadn’t started this!

卡尔我知道。

CARLI know.

乔·科南对,我知道。我知道。但你确实这么做了。

JOEYeah, I know. I know. But you did.

卡尔谢了。

CARLThanks for nothing.

贝基你提的这个问题。

BECKYYou brought it up.

乔·科南但你确实这么做了。而且,沃伦,我们很乐意聊这个话题。对,我们会……

JOEBut you did. And it doesn’t take much to get us to talk about this, Warren. Yeah, we’ll…

巴菲特我看得出来。

BUFFETTI can tell that.

乔·科南哦,好,我们还有……卡尔:奥马哈还有更多消息等着我们。ADP 数据还没出,我们会在周五就业数据公布前看到这个数字以及市场反应。回来之后,还有更多奥马哈先知的消息要讲。

JOEOh, yeah, OK, we’ve got… CARL: A lot more still to come from Omaha. We still got the ADP number coming, we’ll get that number and the reaction ahead of Friday’s jobs number. A lot more from the Oracle of Omaha as well when we come back.

*

*

贝基好,欢迎大家回来。我们现在在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的德拉姆博物馆,整个上午都在跟独一无二的沃伦·巴菲特对话。现在该接着看你们发来的邮件了。大家一直在发邮件,我们非常感谢——这些邮件都很有想法,要处理的内容不少。沃伦,我们直接开始吧?

BECKYAll right, welcome back, everybody. We are live in Omaha, Nebraska, at the Durham Museum. We’re speaking to the one and only Warren Buffett all morning long, and now it’s time to get back to some of your e-mails. You’ve been sending them in, and we do appreciate them. They’ve been thoughtful e-mails. Got a lot to get through. And, Warren, why don’t we jump right into this?

巴菲特好。

BUFFETTOK.

贝基很多问题都和伯克希尔有关,股东读完信之后仍有疑问。这个问题来自得克萨斯州达拉斯的史蒂夫。他写道:“在完全拥有北伯林顿铁路公司(BNSF)一整年后,您现在知道的,有没有哪些是之前从年报、10-K 表格和其他公开信息里不知道的?换句话说,完全控股是不是带来了当少数股东时没有的额外信息优势?”

BECKYThere were a lot of questions that came in regarding Berkshire, people who still had questions after they read the letter. This came in from Steve in Dallas, Texas. He writes, “After a year of full ownership of BNSF,” the Burlington Northern, “is there anything you know now about the company that you didn’t know from reading the annual reports, 10-Ks and other public information? In other words, does full ownership confer additional information advantages that you did not have when you were a minority shareholder?”

巴菲特嗯,如果我深入研究的话,确实会学到些东西。你知道,我偶尔也会学到点什么——我可能比之前稍微多懂一点《铁路劳工法案》。但你知道,都是些无关紧要的东西。我的意思是,自从我们买下这家公司以来,我只去过一次,我看到的数字可能比往常多几个。但是,如果我在开出 340 亿美元支票之前了解得不够多,那我就是在犯错误。你知道,我其实并没有学到什么对铁路行业特别重要的东西。不过我要说,过去一年里,我对铁路相对于卡车运输的竞争地位的理解有所提升。就在前几天,卡车运输公司宣布他们今年将不得不大幅提价。所以我认为,我对铁路对所有者和社会而言的竞争优势的认识,如果有什么变化的话,那就是大大增强了。

BUFFETTWell, it would if I dug into it. And, you know, I will learn something occasionally about-I probably know a little bit more about the Rail Labor Act than I did earlier. You know, but nothing material. I mean, it-I’ve only been to the company once since we bought it, and I get-I look at a few more figures than I might otherwise. But I-but if I didn’t know enough before I wrote the check for 34 billion, I mean, you know, I was making a mistake. You know, I really have not-I’ve learned nothing of significance specific to the railroad. Now, I would say that over the last year my appreciation of the competitive position of the rail industry vis-a-vis trucking has improved somewhat. There’s-just the other day the truckers announced they’re going to have to spend-or they’re going to have to raise prices significantly this year. And so I think if anything, my appreciation for the competitive advantages of railroad both for the owner and for society have increased significantly.

贝基好。我们来接入亚利桑那州图森市理查德的提问,他说:“您如何评估 GEICO 去年花费的 9 亿美元广告的效果?”

BECKYOK. Let’s bring in a question from Richard in Tucson, Arizona, who says, “How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the $900 million spent on advertising last year at GEICO?”

巴菲特这个问题问得好。没错,从人们开始做广告起,就一直在问这个问题。我记得大概 75 年前,金宝汤的约翰·多兰斯是个大广告主,有人问他:“你不觉得有一半广告费都浪费了吗?”他说:“是啊,但我不知道是哪一半。”我们确实可以衡量某些类型的广告。比如,我们做直邮广告时,能通过回复率来测量效果。还有打陌生电话这类方式。但现在我们的报价有将近四分之三来自上网的客户,是什么把他们引到 geico.com 的呢?谁知道呢?当然,我们的电视广告肯定有作用。我只知道这么做有效。二月份,我们新增保单的数量创下了历史单月最高纪录。这让我自己也感到震惊。

BUFFETTThat’s a good question. Yeah, people have been asking that question ever since they started advertising. I think it was John Dorrance at Campbell’s Soup 75 years ago or so when it was a big advertiser, and they said, you know, Isn’t half your money wasted in-on advertising?’ He says, Yeah,’ he says, I just don’t know which half.’ Well, we can measure certain types of advertising. I mean, when we do direct mail advertising, you know, we get a response which gets measured. And we do cold phone numbers and that sort of thing. But now with three-quarters almost of our quotes coming from people who come to the Internet, you know, what drives them to geico.com, who knows? I mean, certainly our television advertising does it. All I know is it’s working. In February we had the greatest gain in policyholders of any month in our history. And it blows me away.

贝基嗯。

BECKYHm.

巴菲特我的意思是,一个月内我们增加了大约 13 万名保单持有人。你要是想想 13 万个家庭,那就相当于一个月里凭空多出了一个 30 万人口的小城镇。至于他们为什么来,你知道,那个小壁虎可真是创造了奇迹,我们让人家觉得,找我们询价没准能省钱。对大多数人来说,汽车保险是一笔不小的开支,要是能省下几百美元,那意义就很大了。但至于为什么二月份收到的询问量比去年十月份多,这个我可不知道答案。我只知道,如果我认为今年再多花 10 亿美元广告费能产生明显效果,我会毫不犹豫地签支票。我是说,我热爱广告。

BUFFETTI mean, we had a gain of about 130,000 policyholders in one month. If you think of 130,000 households, that’s like a town of 300,000 just getting added in one month. And why they come, you know, what-that little gecko does wonders and, you know, we get in people’s minds that they’re going-they might save money by checking with us. And it’s a big, expensive item for most people, auto insurance, and if they can save a few hundred dollars, it’s meaningful. So-but exactly why we get more inquiries in February than we were getting last October, you know, I don’t know the answer. All I know is if I thought spending another billion dollars this year would work in an appreciable way, I would write a check so fast. I mean, I love advertising.

贝基你觉得那只壁虎比“政府雇员保险公司”这个朗朗上口的名字更管用?

BECKYYou think the gecko works better than that catchy name, Government Employees Insurance Company?

巴菲特这个——谁知道具体原因。不过,不管怎样——我是说,1995 年我刚接手时,我们每年大约花 2000 万美元,现在呢,我们一年花 9 亿美元。我只知道,每个月我都催他们再多花点。我是说,我们——我们希望每个美国人都至少给我们一次机会。而我们已经看到,那些打电话来的人,你知道,如果他们打给我们——超过 40% 的人会成为我们的客户。当你得到这样的回应时,你知道,你最好走出去跟人们聊聊。

BUFFETTIt-who knows what does it. It-one way or another-I mean, we were spending about 20 million a year when I took over in 1995, and now we’re spending 900 million. And all I know is every month I urge them to spend more. I mean, it-we want every American to at least give us a try. And what we have seen is that of the people that call us, you know, if they phone us, we’re going to get-over 40 percent of those people are going to become our customers. And when you get that kind of a response, you know, you better be out there talking to people.

贝基好,我们接入下一个问题。马里兰州波托马克的罗伯特来信,这个问题很多人都搞不清楚,希望你能说明白。他说:“我猜,你为什么允许新经理清仓了卢·辛普森持有的很多股票?如果它们符合你给辛普森设定的‘永久持有’标准,为什么要卖?辛普森长期战绩是有目共睹的。新经理没有足够长的业绩记录来证明他有类似能力,或者证明他的成绩不只是运气。这些股票卖出与你‘永久持有’的建议不一致。”所以,也许你能澄清一下实际情况。

BECKYOK, let’s bring in another question. Robert from Potomac, Maryland, writes in-and this is something that a lot of people are confused on, so hopefully you can clear this up. But, “Why did you allow, I assume, the new manager to liquidate many of Lou Simpson’s stocks? If they met your forever’ holding period criteria with Simpson, why sell? Simpson’s record is long-term proven. The new manager has no record long enough to show a similar competency or that his results are just luck. These stock sales are inconsistent with your forever holding period advice.” So maybe you could clarify what’s really happening there.

巴菲特是的。这么说吧,我买——当我说“我”的时候,我买股票是抱着愿意永远持有的想法。但显然,很多时候我们最终并没有永远持有,因为你发现了更吸引人的东西,或者有时候管理层变了,谁知道呢。但卢·辛普森以前管理他自己的投资组合,他管了 21 年,干得非常出色。可当他说六月要走的时候,他和我都决定,他会在那之后到年底前把他的投资组合清掉。换句话说,我从不会继承别人的任何投资决策。如果查理·芒格送给我 100 股某只股票,我会先卖掉它,然后再决定我自己是否想再买回来。我不相信那种默认式的投资决策。所以卢走的时候,他的投资组合也跟着走了。新的人进来,他的投资组合也跟着进来。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, we buy-when I say I, I buy stocks with the idea I’d be happy holding them forever. We don’t end up owning them forever, obviously, in many cases, because you find something else that’s more attractive and-or sometimes managements change and who knows what. But Lou Simpson was managing his own portfolio. He managed it for 21 years, did a sensational job. But when he said he was going to leave in June, he and I both decided he was going to liquidate his portfolio between then and the end of the year. In other words, I never inherit any investment decision from somebody else. If Charlie Munger made me a gift of 100 shares of some stock, I would sell it then-and then-I would then decide whether I wanted to buy it again myself. But I do not believe in default-type decisions on investments. So when Lou left, his portfolio left. When a new man comes in, his portfolio comes in.

贝基这两件事不相关。

BECKYAnd the two aren’t related.

沃伦·巴菲特它们之间毫无关联。卢当时持仓大概十五只股票,每只市值一般在 3 亿到 4 亿美元之间,他在那一年剩下的时间里按比例分批卖掉了。他不打算继续管理这些股票了,我也知道它们可能都是好公司,但我不想自己买。既然我自己不想买,那我没理由让 GEICO 的下一个管理者——托德——来打理它们。托德要对他自己的决策负责——就像卢当年在位时那样。我要让那成为托德自己的投资组合。

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BUFFETTThey’re not related at all. Lou had maybe 15 or so stocks, generally in the 3- to $400 million range, and he just sold them proportionally throughout the rest of the year. He wasn’t going to be managing them anymore, and I knew they were probably good companies, but I didn’t want to buy them myself. And there’s no reason, if I don’t want to buy them myself, I should tell the next manager at Berkshire-of GEICO to manage them. Todd is going to be responsible for his decisions, and-just as Lou was when he was there. And I want it to be Todd’s portfolio.

贝基好的。

BECKYOK.

卡尔,你也有问题吗?

Carl, you have a question, too?

卡尔沃伦,我刚才在想,你之前提到过搜寻“大象”——甚至是任何企业,但偶尔有些企业会因为各种原因不想卖给你。这种情况会让你感到意外吗?你会不会说:“不好意思,我是沃伦·巴菲特。我算是个人物,能被伯克希尔收购的机会就像是游乐场里的金环,可不是经常能碰到的”?

CARLI was just wondering, Warren, earlier you talked about searching-hunting for elephants or even any business, and occasionally some businesses do not want to sell to you for a variety of reasons. Does that ever take you by surprise? Do you ever say, Excuse me, I’m Warren Buffett. I’m kind of a big deal, and the opportunity to be owned by Berkshire doesn’t-is kind of a golden ring that may not come around too much’?

巴菲特我对人可不是这么说的。不,那种非常——一家真正的好企业,就像我说的,如果它是私人持有的,人家就不该卖。我的意思是,很多家族请我去谈,他们的企业通常都很优秀。我第一件事就是告诉他们,你们应该留着这家企业,除非有什么迫不得已的理由,而不是为了交易中能拿到的那笔钱。因为你从我这里会拿到很多钱,但这些钱买不到比你手里已拥有的更好的企业了。我的意思是,你知道,这正是我来收购它的原因。所以我不觉得——通常问题在于——问题是如今在于找到大企业。我是说,这世界上没有那么多大企业,而我又要又大又好的企业,这范围就更窄了。然后你还得碰上有卖方出于某种原因愿意卖。这种事在美国时不时会发生。

BUFFETTThat isn’t exactly the way I present it to people. No, it’s very-a really good business, like I say, if it’s owned privately, they shouldn’t sell. I mean, I-I’ve been called in by lots of families, and I-and they’re usually good businesses. And I-the first thing I tell them is that you should keep this business unless there’s some compelling reason other than the dollars you’ll get from it. Because you’ll get a lot of dollars from me, but those dollars are not going to buy a better business than the one you’ve got already. I mean, I-you know, that’s why I’m buying it. So I don’t think-the question usually-the question is now is finding big businesses. I mean, there aren’t that many big businesses in the world, and then I want big good businesses, and that narrows it down further. And then you have to have people who for some reason or another want to sell on the other side. And that happens from time to time in America.

几年前有个人来找我,他热爱自己的企业,那是一家非常出色的企业,他说:“沃伦,我想把这家公司卖给你。”他说:“我想把这家公司卖给你,因为我今年 61 岁了,身体还很健康,也热爱经营它,但我不知道,你知道,万一我今晚出了什么事会怎么样。”他说他见过——他曾买下另一家企业,那家企业的老板去世后,整个家族就分崩离析了,他说:“我不想把这种难题留给我的妻子和我的孩子们,他们根本不知道该怎么处理。所以只要能让我继续经营这家企业,我就已经拥有了世上一切的金钱,我想要经营企业的乐趣,但不想整天担心万一明天我不在了会怎样。”他对我说:“你是唯一能解决这个问题的人。”所以,我能赢得选美比赛的唯一方式,就是只有我一个人参赛。

I’ve-I had a fellow come to see me a few years ago, and he loves his business, it’s a wonderful business, and he said, Warren, I want to sell you this business.’ And he said, I want to sell you this business because I’m 61 years old and I’m in good health and I love running it, but I don’t know, you know, what would happen if something happened to me tonight.’ He said, I’ve seen’-he’d bought another business where the family had fallen apart when the-when the owner had died, and he said, I don’t want to leave my wife with that kind of a problem, and my children, and they wouldn’t know what to do with it. So as long as I get to keep running the business, I’ve got all the money in the world, and so I want to have the joy of running the business and I do not want to have the worry of what happens if I’m not around tomorrow.’ And he said, You’re the only guy that can solve that.’ So that’s the only way I win beauty contests is when I’m the only guy in them.

卡尔好的,我们接下来……

CARLAll right, we’re going to…

贝基好的,我想——您请说。

BECKYAll right, I think-go ahead.

卡尔贝基,整点新闻后我们再继续聊。后面还有更多沃伦·巴菲特的内容以及你们的邮件提问,此外“就业数据星期五”倒计时正在进行中。其中 ADP 数据大约 17 分钟后就会公布。我们会在《财经论谈》回来后拿到那个数字并给出即时反应。

CARLBeck, we’ll continue the conversation after we reset at the top of the hour. A lot more coming up with Warren Buffett and your e-mail questions, plus the countdown to jobs Friday is ongoing. It includes the ADP number in about 17 minutes’ time. We’ll get that number and the instant reaction when SQUAWK BOX comes right back.

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乔·科南嚯,噢,嘿,我还以为我们还在……(听不清)。欢迎回到 CNBC 的《财经论谈》,全球商业新闻第一线。我是乔·科南。我在 CNBC 总部,和卡尔·金塔尼利亚在一起。还有贝基,你看起来真漂亮。

JOEHo, oh, hey, I thought we would be in…(unintelligible). Welcome back to SQUAWK BOX here on CNBC, first in business worldwide. I’m Joe Kernen. I’m with Carl Quintanilla at CNBC headquarters. And Becky, who looks really beautiful.

卡尔惊艳动人。

CARLRavishing.

乔·科南你怎么,带了——你带了谁——谁跟你一起在外面?

JOEWhat’d you do, bring a-who’d you bring-who’s out there with you?

贝基我这边有很棒的人。

BECKYI have great people out there.

乔·科南沃伦看起来——没错——沃伦看起来也不错。这位就是沃伦·巴菲特。

JOEAnd Warren looks-yeah-Warren looks good, too. That is Warren Buffett.

卡尔惊艳动人。

CARLRavishing.

乔·科南对,惊艳动人。传奇投资人沃伦·巴菲特,他戴着——他系着一条印着内衣图案的领带。你要是之前错过了,就该一直锁定我们。他一直在回答——他一直在回答……

JOEYeah, ravishing. A legendary investor, Warren Buffett, with his-he’s wearing an underwear tie. If you missed it, you should have been tuned in. He’s been answering-he’s been answering…

卡尔我记得那个词是“给大众的屁股”。

CARLI think the term was asses to the masses.

乔·科南对,“给大众的屁股”。他确实说过这话,没错。

JOEYeah, asses to the masses. He said that, yeah.

卡尔是的。

CARLYes.

贝基为大众兜底。

BECKYCover the asses of the masses.

卡尔没错。

CARLRight.

乔·科南没错。好了,过去两个小时我们一直在回答观众的邮件。我们还有很多问题、很多邮件要处理。我这还有,卡尔也还有,贝基也还有。接下来 60 分钟,有足够多的话题要和他聊。不过,首先还是请卡尔,用他独一无二的方式,带我们快速梳理今天早上的头条新闻。卡尔:

JOERight. All right, answering viewer e-mails for the past two hours. We have many more questions or e-mails to go. I’ve got more, Carl has more, Becky has more. Plenty to discuss with him over the next 60 minutes. First, though, Carl is going to bring us up to speed, as only he can do, on the morning’s top headlines. Carl:

卡尔乔,谢谢。

CARLJoe, thanks.

乔·科南不客气。

JOEYou’re welcome.

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卡尔与此同时,股指期货仍维持小幅上涨,不过欧洲市场仍在下跌。贝基,市场也对沃伦在节目头几个小时内做出的一些判断作出了反应。我觉得其中有些判断相当大胆,对吧?比如他预计到大选日失业率会降到 7% 出头的水平,诸如此类。

CARLEquity futures meanwhile holding onto some moderate gains, although Europe continues to be in the red. And, Beck, the market also responding, reacting to some of the calls that Warren has made in our first couple of hours. Some of them, I think, relatively bold, right, looking for unemployment in the low sevens by Election Day and other things like that.

贝基对,没错。卡尔,我们今天早上已经聊了很多内容。以防你错过了前面的一些要点,我们不妨快速过一下经济和失业的情况。乔和卡尔刚提到,我们确实会关注 ADP 就业报告,这份报告会在 8:15 发布。沃伦,我们每个月都看 ADP,因为觉得它能给我们一些线索,去判断周五那份重磅就业报告的大致走向。它最近在跟踪就业趋势方面表现并不算好,但你会看 ADP 报告吗?

BECKYYeah, that’s right. You know, Carl, we’ve gotten through a lot of ground this morning. In case you missed some of the earlier points, why don’t we talk very quickly about the economy and unemployment. As Joe and Carl mentioned, we do have ADP report. That report coming up at 8:15. And, Warren, we watch the ADP every month because we figure it’ll give us some indication about what’s happening with the big jobs report on Friday. It hasn’t been great in tracking that lately, but do you watch the ADP?

巴菲特呃,我其实不看。我看的是我们自己的生意。我们有太多家公司了,随时都有大量数据进来,你知道,那些调查有多准我确实不知道。但我很清楚,每天有多少人在联合太平洋铁路干活,或者 GEICO 有多少员工。顺便说一句,去年有件事让我挺意外:我们的员工数只增加了 1%,而我们各项业务的总业务量实际上增长了很多。我不认为这种情况还能持续。所以我想,随着今年业务增长,我们的员工数量增幅会大得多,会跟业务增速更同步。

BUFFETTWell, I don’t really. I watch our own businesses. And we’ve got so many of them, I get a lot of data coming in all the time, and, you know I don’t know how accurate those surveys are. I do know how many people we’ve got on the Union Pacific working every day, or how many people’s at Geico. And I was surprised incidentally last year that our employment only went up 1 percent, whereas our businesses really did a lot more volume overall. And I don’t think we’re going to be able to continue that. And there was-I think as our businesses increase this year our employment will go up much more in tandem with the rate of increase.

贝基·奎克您预计伯克希尔大家庭里,哪些业务会增加招聘?

BECKYWhat businesses do you expect to see more hiring within the Berkshire family?

巴菲特嗯,我觉得大部分——我觉得我们大部分业务都会增员。我的意思是,我觉得我们的铁路公司,你知道,我们的铁路公司在 1 月份就增加了人手。而我知道 GEICO 今年也会招更多人。我想你会看到的。拿 Marmon 来说,我们在那的一项主要业务是制造和租赁铁路罐车。你看火车在铁轨上跑的时候,可能会以为那些车厢全是铁路公司的。其实不是。那些罐车属于托运人,或者属于我们这样把罐车租给托运人的公司。我们——我们在弗吉尼亚州亚历山大市制造这些罐车。我们发现,就在过去一两个月,对罐车的兴趣变浓了,人们想买罐车来运各种各样的东西,不管是——我是说,可能是运乙醇,也可能是——也可能是所有能用罐车运的东西。我们会在弗吉尼亚州亚历山大市为罐车生产线增加人手。我不知道是这个月,还是三个月后,还是两个月后,但订单已经来了。而且,这种情况在我们的各项业务中一个接一个地出现。所以我认为我们会——如果今年我们的员工总数增加不到——远不到 3000 人,我反而会觉得意外。

BUFFETTWell, I think most of-I think most of our businesses will hire more people. And I mean I think our railroad, you know, our railroad during January hired more people. But I know Geico will hire more people this year. But I think you’ll see it. At Marmon, for example, one of our main businesses there is leasing-building and leasing rail tank cars. Now, when you see those trains going down the tracks, you think those cars all belong to the railroads. They don’t. The tank cars all belong to shippers or to people like us who lease them to shippers. We are-and we make those cars down in Alexandria, Virginia. We are seeing more people interested in buying tank cars for various things, whether it’s-I mean, it could be for ethanol, it could be-could be for all kinds of things that get carried in tank cars. We’re seeing more interest in that in just the last month or two. We will add people at Alexandria, Virginia, to our tank car line. I don’t know whether it’ll be this month or three months from now or two months from now, but the orders are coming in. And you see that in one area after another in our businesses. So I think we will-I would be surprised if we don’t add more-quite a bit more than 3,000 people this year to our overall employment.

贝基·奎克你知道,你在年报里谈到了对美国的乐观态度。

BECKYYou know, you talked in the annual letter about optimism for this country.

巴菲特当然了。

BUFFETTSure.

贝基·奎克你谈到经济正在好转,投资前景也像你说的那样正在恢复正常,从你预期从大量主要投资中收回的股息来看,情况相当不错。但你也还在年报里写到了通用电气和高盛。这两家公司是你大举投资优先股的公司,而且你确实提到,你预计到今年年底,这两家公司都会来找你赎回这些优先股。

BECKYYou’ve talked about how the economy is improving and how the investing outlook, you’ve said, is getting back to a normal situation, that things look very good in terms of the dividends you expect to be getting paid back from a lot of your major investments. You also, though, wrote in the annual letter about GE and Goldman. Those are two companies that you made major investments in preferred shares, and you did mention that by the end of this year you expect both of those companies to call you on those.

巴菲特是啊,那两笔投资我犯了错。我本该——我本该偷偷加进去一句话,写上:“想还钱给我,你们先得找到我。”然后,你知道,我就躲进证人保护计划,让伊梅尔特和布兰克费恩派人满世界找我。但他们知道在哪能找到我,等高盛能还钱的那一刻,这得由美联储来定,我猜他们就会还。通用电气按合同约定,要到 10 月份的某个时候才能还钱,我认为他们会还——他们说过会尽快还钱。所以——你知道,高盛,我想我提过,我们每秒能收到 15 美元的股息。所以,滴答、滴答、滴答,每一声都是 15 美元。我爱听那滴答声,可他们不爱听。等美联储一给他们开绿灯,我有种预感,劳埃德会马上包一架 NetJets 的飞机,亲自把那支票给我送过来。

BUFFETTYeah, I made a mistake on those. I should have-I should have snuck in one sentence that said, “You have to find me if you’re going to pay me off.” And then, you know, I would have gone in the witness protection program and Immelt and Blankfein would have had these people out looking for me. But they know where to find me, and as soon as Goldman can pay me off, which is determined by the Federal Reserve, my guess is that they will. GE, by contract, can’t pay me off till sometime in October and I think they will-they’ve said they will pay us off as quickly as possible. So that-you know, I-Goldman, I think, I mentioned we get $15 a second as a dividend. So tick, tick, tick, that’s 15 bucks every time. And I love to hear those ticks, but they don’t like to hear those ticks. And as soon as-when the Fed gives them the green light, I have a feeling that Lloyd will charter a NetJets plane and fly that check out to me.

贝基·奎克好。乔,你也有问题要问吗?

BECKYOK. Joe, you have a question, too?

乔·科南对,我有。而且——我得说我可能还有个后续问题,因为我要说到点子上总得花点时间,这我知道。沃伦,我们考虑国家就业问题,考虑如何创造就业。同时我们也考虑如何经营企业。你从庞巴迪购买的那架大型——或者说你收购的那架庞巴迪喷气机,你本来可以买湾流的。你有没有——有没有考虑过社会责任,考虑就业机会会从哪里——从哪里产生?那笔订单本来可以去湾流,但没去,去了庞巴迪,对吧?

JOEYeah, I do. And a-I should say I probably have a follow-up, too, because I’m going to get to where I’m going, but it always takes a while. I know that. Warren, we think about jobs in the country and how to get jobs. And then we also think about how to run businesses. And that huge-or that jet acquisition you made from Bombardier, you could have bought Gulfstream. Do you-do you ever think about social responsibility in terms of where the jobs will be-will be generated? That could have gone to Gulfstream, but it didn’t, it went to Bombardier, right?

巴菲特是的,我们会考虑,什么对我们客户来说是最划算的交易——他们想要的是宽体机舱、长航程的飞机。最终,客户决定了我们在这类事情上做的每一个决定。

BUFFETTYeah, we think about what will be the best deal for our customers in terms of what they’re going to want in terms of a wide cabin, long-range plane. And in the end the customer drives every decision we make on something of that sort.

乔·科南那是全球性的——你说的是不是那架飞机?

JOEThat’s a global-are you’re buying-is that plane you’re talking about?

巴菲特未来十年左右会有一系列四款新机型。最终他们还会推出 7000 和 8000 系列,所以——顺便说一句,湾流未来十年也会推出新机型。但我们评估这些选项的方式,就跟评估小型客舱飞机时一样,试着根据我们客户的需求来决定,他们在航程、客舱宽度、各种要素以及成本上想要什么,然后做出决策。因为说到底,我们能买飞机,但最终也得卖飞机,而客户才是做决定的人。

BUFFETTIt’s a series of four planes over the next decade or so. Eventually they’ll bring in a 7,000 and an 8,000, so there’s-and incidentally Gulfstream will be bringing in new planes over the next decade, too. But we evaluated the options just as we did in the small cabin planes, tried to decide what, in terms of the demands of our owners, what they want in terms of range, in terms of cabin width, in terms of all kinds of things, cost, and made that decision, because in the end we can buy planes, but we also have to sell planes, and the customer’s going to make that decision.

乔·科南我猜这说明商务出行(我猜是用大客舱的那种)和——你还买了马奎斯喷气机的股份,对吧?那更偏向什么呢?

JOEWe-I guess this indicates that both business travel, which I figure use the big cabin ones, and also-you bought-you bought in Marquis jet, right? That goes more to, what?

巴菲特没错。

BUFFETTRight.

乔·科南感觉如何?那笔收购进展怎样,以及我们是否正在看到,按你说的,商务旅行和个人出行都有好转?

JOEPleasure? How’s that acquisition going, and are we seeing then, you’re saying, a bounce in both business travel and individuals?

巴菲特是的。而且我们在去年年底收购了 Marquis,负责这项业务的肯尼·迪克特为我们干得非常出色。自收购以来,Marquis 卡的销售额同比上一年同期明显增长,我们收购 Marquis 是合理的,我很高兴拥有它。我们看到个人使用和商务使用都在增长。有时候很难区分。有时候在小企业里,老板会有 100 美元左右的支出,我们并不真的知道他是用于个人还是商务用途。

BUFFETTYeah. And we bought Marquis late last year, and Kenny Dichter, who runs that operation, is doing a terrific job for us. Our sales of Marquis cards in the month since we bought it are appreciably ahead of the same months a year ago, and it made sense for us to buy Marquis and I’m glad we own it. We’re seeing-we’re seeing increases in both personal use and in business use. And sometimes it’s hard to tell. Sometimes in small businesses an owner will have $100 or something, and we don’t really know whether he’s using it for personal or business use.

但我们看到需求根本没有猛增。我们看到现有客户每月使用时长比两年前大幅增加。雷曼事件后,他们的使用量一度急剧下滑。他们仍然按月支付管理费,全额支付。他们有权享受相同的小时数,但就是不用。这让我很吃惊,因为那些非常富有的人都有自己的房子,他们会在圣诞节或感恩节去那里。但也许后来他们开始坐大巴去了。雷曼事件后的六个月里,我们的使用量确实大幅下降。现在已经回升了不少。我们的销售也有所改善,但远不及四五年前大家都觉得手头宽裕时的水平。

乔:嗯,你这是在下很大的赌注押注未来。而且,你知道,你有时候会减少像《华盛顿邮报》这类投资,但看起来尽管 NetJets 从未——它为你赚过大钱吗?你现在可是全力投入。

But we have seen-we have not seen a surge in demand at all. We have seen our present customers using more hours per month by a considerable margin than they were two years ago. They’re usage right after Lehman fell off dramatically. They were still paying us the monthly management fee and all of it. They had the right to the same number of hours, but they weren’t using them. It was amazing to me, because you had these very wealthy people and they had homes and, you know, that they went to at Christmas or Thanksgiving. But maybe they started going to them by bus. But our usage really fell off there significantly in the six months following Lehman. It’s come back quite a ways. Our sales have picked up, but they’re not remotely like they were four or five years ago when everybody was feeling flush. JOE: Well, you’re making a huge bet on the future of this. And, you know, you-sometimes you lessen investments like Washington Post or something, that it looks like even though NetJets has never-has it been a big moneymaker for you? You’re going in, you know, full bore at this point.

巴菲特是啊。嗯,NetJets,自从我们买下它以后,去年我们赚了两三亿美元,这让过去整整 11 年里我们差不多处于盈亏持平的状态。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, Net, since we bought it, we made a couple hundred million dollars last year and that brought it-brought us back to where for the full 11 years we more or less broke even.

乔·科南对。

JOERight.

巴菲特所以从财务角度看,这并不是一笔令人满意的投资。但在市场上,它确实是一个明显的赢家。我们的市场份额是主要竞争对手的 5 倍。没有人能抢占我们的份额,也没有人能拿到我们那样的客户满意度报告。但我们一直没赚到钱——花的比进的多,这种局面迟早会找上门来。在戴夫·索科尔领导下,现在情况好多了。不过,我们还没回到 2005、2006、2007 年那种对冲基金和所有人抢着签单的时期。现在的销量比一年前高,使用量也比一年前多,但不算是爆发式增长。

BUFFETTSo it has not been a satisfactory investment financially. It’s been-it’s been a significant winner in the marketplace. We have five times the market share of our leading competitor. Nobody’s gained market share on us, nobody gets the customer satisfaction reports that we get. But we have not-we have not made money. We were spending more money than we were taking in, which catches up with you eventually. Under Dave Sokol, it’s now doing very well. But it is now-we have not gone back to a period like 2005 and ’06 and ’07 when the hedge fund operators and everybody were signing up hand over fist. We’re selling more than we were a year ago and are using more than a year ago, but it’s not dramatic.

乔·科南嗯,看来你是预料到了。

JOEWell, it looks like you’re expecting it to be.

贝基嘿,沃伦,我很快说一句。

BECKYHey, Warren, real quickly.

乔·科南不好意思,贝基,但是……

JOEI’m sorry, Beck, but…

巴菲特嗯,我……

BUFFETTWell, I…

贝基哦,没事。乔,你说吧。

BECKYOh, that’s OK. Go ahead, Joe.

巴菲特乔,我只是觉得,要是能把你拉进我们阵营,那成百上千万的人都会跟着你来。我是说,你可是引领潮流的人。所以……

BUFFETTJoe, I just feel if we could get you in the fold that millions would follow you. I mean, you’re a trendsetter. So…

乔·科南我问过你好多次了,想要一架——沃伦,我不知道咱们怎么才能搞到手,但一架 SQUAWK 专机一直都在我们的心愿单上。你也想要一架吗?是莱斯曼专机还是 SQUAWK 专机?

JOEI have asked you many times for one of the-I don’t know how we can swing it, Warren, but a SQUAWK jet has been on our list of things to have. You want one, too? A Liesman jet or a SQUAWK?

史蒂夫·利斯曼SQUAWK……(听不清)

STEVE LIESMANSQUAWK…(unintelligible).

巴菲特只要你——只要你让我从你工资里扣点钱,我就能保证你——保证让你坐进驾驶位。

BUFFETTIf you’ll just-if you’ll just let me garnish your wages I could promise you you’ll be in the-you’ll be in the pilot’s seat.

乔·科南你能——你能把工资扣到下辈子吗?因为我觉得,那才够用。

JOEYou-can you garnish into the hereafter? Because that’s what it would take, I think.

卡尔要不我们直接刷信用卡吧。

CARLHow about we just put it on a credit card.

乔·科南对。刷信用卡就行,没错。

JOEYeah. Put it on a credit card, that’s right.

贝基刷我们的美国运通卡。

BECKYPut it on our AmEx.

巴菲特没准你和卡尔应该合伙一起买。

BUFFETTMaybe you and Carl ought to go in together.

卡尔他确实给我们寄过一块砖,这事我们永远忘不了。

CARLHe did send us a brick, and we will never forget that.

贝基沃伦,让我……

BECKYWarren, let…

乔·科南不是,你送——你送——你送了我一块砖,还把我的名字刻在上面了。

JOENo, you sent-you sent-you sent me a brick and put my name on it.

巴菲特对,但我好像不记得收到过感谢信,不过也许我……

BUFFETTYeah, and I do not remember a thank you note, but maybe I…

贝基沃伦,我想赶紧问一句,刚才大屏幕上放出了戴夫·索科尔(Dave Sokol)的照片。他是外界反复提到的潜在接班人之一。你在年报里说过,有一位经理你每天都会跟他通电话。那个人是戴夫·索科尔吗?还是阿吉特?

BECKYWarren, I want to ask real quickly, we just put up the picture of Dave Sokol. He’s one of the managers who is repeatedly mentioned as a potential successor. You said in your annual letter that there’s a manager you talk to every single day. Is that Dave Sokol? Is that a Ajit?

巴菲特是阿吉特。我试着——我确实跟戴夫聊得很频繁,但我是每天跟阿吉特通话。我们每天聊得都很开心。我都忘了昨天我们聊的那笔交易是什么了——就是某个保险业务,你也知道,新西兰发生了两次地震,澳大利亚又发了洪水,所以那边刚遭受了很严重的巨灾打击。正因如此,那里对巨灾保险的需求上升了。于是我和阿吉特就坐下来,试着估算新西兰再发生一次地震的概率有多大。还有谁能比我们更适合干这事呢?

贝基:另外,我们刚刚也看到一些快讯,说伯克希尔要进入印度保险市场了。这是个新动作。是不是就是这个……

BUFFETTIt’s Ajit. I try-I talk to Dave very frequently, but I talk to Ajit every day. We have a lot of fun talking every day. I forget what the deal was he was-we were talking about yesterday, but it was-it was some insurance over-as you know, they’ve had two earthquakes in New Zealand and then floods in Australia, so that part of the world has been hit very hard by catastrophe. So there’s a demand for more catastrophe insurance, for example, over there. And so Ajit and I just sit down and try and figure out what the chances are of another earthquake in New Zealand. And who better than us? BECKY: You also just saw-we saw some headlines crossing about how Berkshire’s going to be getting into the India insurance sector. That’s a new move. Is that what this is…

巴菲特对,这件事刚刚才发生。我想我们大概就在过去 48 小时内拿到了批准。我们会在那边设一个机构来销售——我觉得名字会叫“伯克希尔直销”。

BUFFETTYeah, that just happened. And I think we just got approved within maybe the last 48 hours. And we are going to have an agency over there that will be selling-I think it’s going to be called Berkshire Direct.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特我大概三周后会去那边,我想到那时我们应该已经运转起来了。前几天我们刚拿到许可证,正在招人手接电话什么的。应该会挺有意思。

BUFFETTAnd I’ll be over there in about three weeks, and I think by then we will be up and running. We just got the permit the other day, and so we’re hiring people for the phones and all of that. So that should be fun.

贝基嗯。好吧,咱们快速回到就业话题上,因为 ADP 数据马上就要出来了。现在很多经济学家都认为今年失业率不会大幅下降;有些人甚至觉得要到明年底才可能出现下降。你个人的预测呢?

BECKYHm. All right, real quickly, just to bring this back to jobs because we do have ADP coming out in just a moment, there are a lot of economists who are not expecting any significant decline in the unemployment rate this year; some who aren’t even expecting any until the end of next year. What’s your own personal prediction?

巴菲特我认为今年我们创造的就业岗位会比去年多。失业率的波动方式有点奇怪,这取决于谁把自己算作劳动人口。但我相信,2011 年我们在创造就业方面会比 2010 年更顺利。我只是看到各行各业都在好转。而且我觉得,当初他们看到最早的一两只报春鸟时,是非常不情愿招人的。

BUFFETTI think we’ll create more jobs this year than we did last year. Now, the unemployment rate bounces around in kind of a funny way depending on who declares themselves in the-in the labor force. But I think we will have better luck creating jobs in 2011 than 2010. Just-I just see businesses improving. And I think-I think they were very reluctant to hired when they first-saw the first robin or two.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特我是说,他们——他们经历了一段极其痛苦的时期……

BUFFETTI mean, they-they’ve been through such a painful period…

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特……以至于他们就是,在确实需要把人召回来之前,根本不会让一大批人回来上班。

BUFFETT…that they just, they were not going to bring a bunch of people back on until they really needed to bring them on.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特但现在他们就需要把他们叫回来了。

BUFFETTBut they need to bring them on now.

贝基好的。卡尔,你那边应该还有更多相关信息。

BECKYOK. And, Carl, I think you have more on that right now.

卡尔是的。我们大约 40 秒后就会看到 ADP 数据,贝基。

CARLWe do. We’re going to get ADP, Beck, in about 40 seconds.

*

*

卡尔我们切回奥马哈的贝基。贝基:

CARLLet’s send it back to Becky in Omaha. Beck:

贝基嘿,卡尔,谢谢你。沃伦,我们刚听到了 ADP 就业数据,显然比大家预期的要强一些。不过现在每个人都在玩猜谜游戏,想厘清经济到底处在什么位置。这又把我们带回了今早讨论过的话题——大家都在琢磨美联储下一步的货币政策怎么走。你之前说过,如果你是本·伯南克,根据你对目前经济形势的判断,你会现在就结束 QE2。

BECKYHey, Carl, thank you. You know, Warren, we just heard the ADP numbers here, and obviously they were a little stronger than had been expected. Everybody’s playing this guessing game right now, though, trying to figure out where the economy stands. And that brings us back to a discussion we had earlier this morning, trying to figure out what the Fed does next with its monetary policy. You said if you were Ben Bernanke, you’d end QE2 right now based on how you think the economy’s doing.

巴菲特我认为经济正在复苏,而且我觉得我们永远也无法确切知晓原因。经济发展的变量大概有三个主要因素,我们总爱琢磨货币政策和财政政策,因为学校里学的就是这些。但我认为目前为止最重要的因素,是资本主义那种与生俱来的再生能力。我的意思是,如果你回溯大约一个世纪,那时根本没人听说过货币政策或财政政策。我们也经历过衰退,但它们都自我修复了。之所以能自我修复,是因为数百万美国人每天都在想方设法把事情做得更好。资本主义就是管用。我认为在这次特殊的经济衰退中,美联储、财政部和政府迅速采取的行动极其重要,他们必须终结恐慌。但如果你谈的是过去一年发生的事,我想,谁也说不清财政和货币政策这些变量的重要性到底有多大。要我说,与这种自然的再生能力相比,它们只能排第二和第三。我们在货币政策上已经把油门踩到底了,财政政策上也把油门踩到底了。但我认为,真正在推动事情向前的,是美国大众的想象力、创造力和能量,是他们让一个已经完美运行了几百年的体系持续向前。

BUFFETTI think the economy is coming back, and I think that we’ll never know. There’s probably three big variables in the economy’s development, and we like to think of monetary policy and fiscal policy because we all learn about them in school and all that. I think the most important factor by far is just this underlying regenerative capacity of capitalism. I mean, if you go back a century or so, nobody ever heard of monetary policy or fiscal policy. And we had recessions, and they cured themselves. And they cured themselves because millions of Americans were trying how to-figure out how to do things better the next day. I mean, capitalism works. And I think in this particular recession, I think it was enormously important what the Fed and the Treasury and government did immediately. They had to end the panic. But I think if you talk about what’s happened in the last year, I think that who knows the importance of the variables of fiscal and monetary policy. If you-if you ask me, they’re number two and three compared to this natural regenerative capacity. And I-we’ve had foot to the floor, as I’ve said, on monetary policy, we’ve had foot to the floor on fiscal policy. But I think what’s really getting job-the job done is the imagination, creativity, the energy of the American public in terms of keeping a system going that’s worked marvelously for several hundred years.

贝基嘿,乔,你也有问题吗?

BECKYHey, Joe, you have a question, too?

乔·科南对,我有个具体问题,稍微换个话题。沃伦,你喜欢——你很喜欢富国银行。你经常谈到它。你当时……

JOEYeah, I got a specific one, shifting gears a little bit. Warren, you like-you love Wells Fargo. You talk about it a lot. You were in…

巴菲特没错。

BUFFETTYep.

乔·科南伯克希尔持有过美国银行的股票,但那并不是一次愉快的经历,你现在已经清仓了。我记得你亏了大概三分之二。不过,我的意思是,金融危机显然造成了冲击。但这就说明——你是在用行动表态,我想,是对管理层、对美国银行的前景不看好?我的意思是,你喜欢富国——你选择了继续持有另一家银行,为什么宁可亏损也要清仓,而不是……

JOEBerkshire was in Bank of America, and it wasn’t a good experience, and you’re out now. I think you lost two-thirds or something. But, I mean, obviously the financial crisis hit. But that-that’s making some-you’re voting with your feet there, I think, what, on management, on the prospects for B of A? I mean, you like Well-you’re staying in another bank, why would you get out with a loss instead of the…

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

乔·科南请继续。

JOEGo ahead.

巴菲特我从没——乔,我从没买过一股美国银行的股票。那是卢·辛普森持仓的大约 15 只股票之一。所以他并不是在去年下半年决定卖出美国银行的。

BUFFETTI never-Joe, I never bought a share of Bank of America. That was one of the 15 or so positions of Lou Simpson. So he did not make a decision to sell Bank of America in the second half of last year.

乔·科南好的。

JOEOK.

巴菲特他只是——他当时正在清仓整个投资组合。他卖掉了——他卖掉了耐克。他很不情愿卖耐克。他热爱耐克。但他当时在清理投资组合,托德则带来新的持仓。但我……

BUFFETTHe just-he was liquidating his entire portfolio. He sold a-he sold Nike. He hated to sell Nike. He loved Nike. But he was cleaning out his portfolio, and Todd’s bringing in a new one. But I…

乔·科南好的。

JOEOK.

巴菲特美国银行从来没进入过我管理的投资组合。

BUFFETTBank of America was never part of a portfolio I managed.

乔·科南好。所以当你看到伯克希尔清仓了全部美国银行股票时,你不能说,“天哪,他们不看好前景——或者沃伦不看好美林的前景……”

JOEOK. So when you see Berkshire liquidates its entire stake in Bank of America, you can’t say, oh my God, they don’t like the prospects-or Warren doesn’t like the prospects for Merrill Lynch…

巴菲特不。

BUFFETTNo.

乔·科南……或者莫伊尼汉……

JOE…or Moynihan…

巴菲特不。

BUFFETTNo.

乔·科南……或者说你其实得不出什么结论。

JOE…or you can’t draw any conclusions from that.

巴菲特没有。

BUFFETTNo.

乔·科南好。

JOEOK.

巴菲特零,零。我个人从未买进过一股,也从未卖出过一股。

BUFFETTZero, zero. I never bought a share and I never sold a share personally.

乔·科南好的,行。

JOEAll right. OK.

贝基沃伦,我们先回到美联储政策以及当前的一些情况。乔刚才提到,不止这届政府在印钞。

BECKYWarren, let’s go back just to Fed policy and some of the things that are happening. Joe mentioned earlier about the idea that the government, not just this government’s printing money.

巴菲特一点没错。

BUFFETTAbsolutely.

贝基它会反超我们吗?你们开始担心通胀了?

BECKYIs it about to overtake us? You start to worry about inflation?

巴菲特对。这个——你知道,我认为我们面临着重大问题。而且我们——我说过,我们总会有问题,所以这不代表我看空美国或别的什么。但我们国会现在的情况是,我们的赤字占 GDP 的 10%,而且这个数字可能还会扩大。我是说,我们对未来做出了承诺,但这些承诺和我们未来将获得的收入流其实并不匹配。解决这个问题有三条路:违背承诺或修改承诺,大幅增税,或者用通胀来化解。而通胀是最终的税种。它向那些不知道自己正在被征税的人征税,向那些相信纸币、相信政府的人征税。这是一种特别——你知道,我觉得这几乎不是政府应有的行为方式,但他们就是这么做的。而且,这是最容易的做法。我是说,我们……

BUFFETTYeah. It-you know, in-I think, you know, we’ve got major problems. And we’re-and I said, we’re always going to have problems, so this does not mean I’m bearish on America or anything. But we have a situation in Congress where we have a 10 percent deficit in terms of GDP, and we may be drifting into even larger numbers. I mean, we’ve made promises that-for the future that are really kind of inconsistent with the revenue streams we’ll have. There are three ways of solving that: breaking the promises of modifying them, taxing a whole lot more, or inflating your way out of it. And inflation is the-is the ultimate tax. I mean, it taxes people who don’t know they’re being taxed. It taxes people who believed in paper money, who believed in their government. It’s a particularly-you know, I find it-it’s almost a-it’s not the way government should be behave, but they do behave that way. Ad it’s the easiest thing to do. I mean, we…

贝基你觉得我们现在是有意这么做的吗?你们……

BECKYDo you think we’re intentionally doing that right now? Do you…

巴菲特哦,我不觉得有那么强的故意成分,实际情况是,我们不想做另外两件事,于是它就成了默认选项。我们正在推行的政策,如果不做改变,日后会引发大量通胀。而通胀这种东西,一旦开始,你甚至都不会特别注意到它。有点像一个人从一栋 50 层的大楼往下跳。前 45 层,他其实感觉不到周围环境有多大变化,你知道。

BUFFETTOh, I don’t think it’s so much intentional, but it’s the fact we don’t want to do the other things, and so it becomes the default option. And we are doing things-we are following policies that will lead to lots of inflation down the road unless changes are made. And once-inflation is the kind of thing, when it gets started, you don’t even-you don’t particularly notice it. It’s a little like a guy, you know, jumping off a 50-floor-out of a 50-story building. The first 45 stories, he really doesn’t notice a lot of change, you know, in his circumstances.

贝基嗯嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特但最终你会撞到地面。以我们现在这样的赤字规模运行下去,再配合其他政策——全世界都是如此——不可能不引发严重的通胀。没有哪个政客会站出来说,我们要靠让货币贬值来解决这个问题。但——我是说,那样做等于政治自杀。可这正是目前所推行政策的实际效果。你知道,政策还没刻在石头上,它们是可以改变的。但对政府来说,最容易走的路永远是通胀,这就是为什么纸币——我并不反对你那位写信来的观众。我的意思是,纸币的前景通常很糟糕。

贝基:嗯嗯。

BUFFETTBut eventually you hit the ground. And there is no way you can run the kind of deficits we’re running and following other policies, and this is true around the world, without it being enormously inflationary. And no politician is going to come out and say we’re really going to solve this by making our money worth less. But-I mean, it’d be suicide to do it. But that is-that’s the practical effect of the policies that are being followed now. You know, they’re not written in stone, they can-they can be changed. But the easier course for governments to follow always is to inflate, and that’s why paper money-and I don’t disagree with your viewer that wrote in. I mean, paper money generally has a lousy future. BECKY: Mm-hmm.

巴菲特而且,我跟你说,几年前人们一窝蜂持有现金的时候,我就说过,现金是你能持有的最糟糕的资产。我是说,有一件事我可以保证,那就是现金作为投资绝对不会表现好。

BUFFETTAnd I, you know, a couple of years ago when people were running to cash, I said, you know, it’s the worst thing you can have. I mean, there-the one thing I can guarantee will not work well as an investment is cash.

贝基现在的现金投资比两年前更差吗?

BECKYIs cash a worse investment now than it was two years ago?

巴菲特这个——不,它——比两年前稍微好一点,因为两年前你本可以以极其便宜的价格买入那么多其他资产。

BUFFETTIt-it’s a-no, it’s a-it’s a little less worse because then the option was to buy so many other assets so cheap.

贝基嗯嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特当年大家都想握着现金,说“现金为王”。能在那种时候动用现金才是王,但光握着现金不动,那是最蠢的事。人们一窝蜂往现金跑,可纸币从来不是好赌注。你印得越多——印纸币必然有后果。美联储大量买入证券、给银行体系注入信贷,这也有后果。要是真这么容易,我们早就天天这么干了。

BUFFETTI mean, you wanted to use cash then. People said cash is king. The ability to use cash then was king, but having the actual cash was the dumbest thing you could do. And-but people run to cash and they run, you know-but paper money is not a good bet. And the more of it that you issue-I mean, there have to be consequences to issuing paper money. There are consequences to the-to the Fed buying lots and lots and lots of securities and giving credits to the banking system in return. If it was all that easy, you know, we’d be doing it all the time.

贝基·奎克但你这回听起来跟之前几次我们聊这个话题时不太一样。感觉这次或许是个转折点,你开始对这事有点不放心了。

BECKYBut you sound a little different than you have on this point the last few times we’ve checked in with you. It sounds like this is a time, maybe an inflection point where you’re getting a little uncomfortable with this.

巴菲特是的,我在《纽约时报》写过一篇专栏——一年多前写的——我说现在这样还行,但这是吗啡,你必须得戒掉。可到目前为止,我们没什么戒掉的迹象。我是说,你知道,辛普森-鲍尔斯提案出台过,那两个人都很棒,他们花了很大力气。他们拿到了 18 票中的 11 票,但之后就再也没动静了。依我看,这不对。

BUFFETTYeah, I wrote an op-ed piece in The New York Times and-over a year ago-and I said this is-this is OK now, but it’s-but it is morphine, and you’ve got to get off of it. And we haven’t shown much tendency to get off of it so far. I mean, this-you know, the Simpson-Bowles thing came in, and those are two terrific people, they worked hard at it. They got 11 out of 18 votes, you know, and nothing’s been heard since. And that’s wrong, in my opinion.

贝基那让你失望了吗?

BECKYThat disappoint you?

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基你希望看到什么结果?你希望这个小组的建议被采纳吗?

BECKYWhat would you like to see happen? Would you like to see the panel’s recommendations be adopted?

巴菲特我希望看到的是,能有一种切实有效的办法被认真采纳,让我们在未来能处于一个货币持续高度保值的境地。现在通货膨胀率只有 1% 或 2%,你知道,这根本说明不了什么。我是说,这就好比——你知道,这么比方吧——你要是从第 50 层楼跳下去,到了第 45 层的时候,你不能光凭当时的位置来判断你这个尝试成不成功。

BUFFETTI would like to see something seriously adopted that leaves us in a situation down the road that is tenable in terms of having a money that will retain its value to a very high extent. The fact that inflation now is 1 or 2 percent, you know, doesn’t mean anything. I mean, that-you know, I-if you jump off the 50th floor, I mean, at the 45th floor, you know, you should not judge the success of your effort by where you are at that point.

贝基但你认为,解决这个日益严重的问题,是不能等到 2012 年大选之后的事吗?

BECKYBut addressing this growing problem, you don’t think is something that can wait till after the 2012 elections?

巴菲特不,嗯,那就会迎来 2014 年的大选。我是说,不,我认为——我认为如果你遇到一个非常重要的问题,不管是生意上的,还是个人生活中的,不管在哪儿,你知道,你都会赶紧去处理它。

BUFFETTNo, well, then there’ll be a 2014 election. I mean, no, I think-I think if you’ve got a very important problem, whether it’s in business, whether it’s in your personal life, wherever it may be, you know, you address it promptly.

贝基好。卡尔,你也有问题?

BECKYOK. Carl, you have a question, too?

卡尔是的。沃伦,我是说,我们现在要谈点重要的事了——聊聊辛普森-鲍尔斯计划,还有必须做些什么。高盛也出了一份报告,说国会正考虑在本财年削减 610 亿美元,这可能会让第二和第三季度的 GDP 下降几个百分点,可能还会减少多达 70 万个就业岗位。不管你是否认同这个判断,我想问的是:美国经济目前的势头,有没有足够的缓冲来承受所谓的紧缩?另外,你怎么看英国的情况——他们推行了严厉的紧缩措施,结果第四季度 GDP 立马就跌成了负数?

CARLYeah. Warren, I mean, we’re into some important stuff here now, talking about Simpson-Bowles and what needs to be done. There’s also this report out of Goldman that suggests that the 61 billion that the Congress is considering in cuts for the fiscal year could take a couple percentage points off GDP in the-in the second and third quarter, perhaps as many as 700,000 jobs. Whether or not you agree with that, does the momentum that the economy have, is there enough cushion that we can sustain so-called austerity? And what do you make of the UK’s situation, where they implemented something tough, and right away their fourth quarter GDP went negative?

巴菲特嗯,GDP 10% 的赤字,用小打小闹的方式去改变,并不会把你引向紧缩,相信我。

BUFFETTWell, a 10 percent deficit of GDP, changing that in a small way does not lead you to austerity, believe me.

卡尔好的。

CARLOK.

巴菲特这个数字(指财政赤字占 GDP 比重)是我们自二战以来没有过的。而且,不,我对所有经济预测都深表怀疑,顺便说一句,也包括我自己的预测。不,我觉得那些随口抛出数字、说什么这个法案“挽救了三亿个就业岗位”的人——我认为那完全是——我只是觉得他们根本不知道自己在说什么。我也不认为我自己——当我也这么做的时候——我并不觉得自己就更懂行。不是说我有更准确的数字,但我可以向你保证,这类东西我见得太多了,所以非常怀疑。我认为——不,我是说,当你们赋予艾伦·辛普森和厄斯金·鲍尔斯这样的人显赫地位,当他们组建一个一流的委员会,非常、非常、非常努力地达成一个妥协方案,最终让 18 位成员中 11 位政治信念迥异的人都签了字——我认为你们应该认真对待这件事。而眼下的问题不是这 610 亿美元左右,核心问题是:你们是否现在愿意说——这就是我们要做的事,好让这些承诺(你们将来必须开始修改已经做出的承诺)得以兑现——或者你们得承认,你们打算靠通胀来绕开这些问题。但我们还没有做到这一点。

BUFFETTThat is a number we haven’t had since World War II. And, no, I’m very suspicious of all economic forecasts, including my own, incidentally. No, I think these people who toss out numbers and say this bill, you know, saved us three billion jobs, I think that is total-I just don’t think they know what they’re talking about. I don’t think I-I don’t think I know what I’m talking about either when I-it isn’t that I think I have a better number, but I can assure you that I’ve seen so much of that that I’m very skeptical. I think it-no, I think when you give somebody the stature of Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, and you put together a first-class committee and they work very, very, very hard to get a compromise that 11 of the 18 sign onto when they have vastly different political beliefs, I think you ought to take it pretty seriously. And the real question isn’t the 61 billion now or so, the real question is whether right now you’re willing to say, Here is what we’re going to do so that these promises’-where-you’ve really got to start modifying promises you’ve made for the future, or you’ve got to admit you’re going to inflate your way into solving those problems. But we really haven’t done that.

卡尔所以你不是——你……

CARLSo you are not-you…

贝基那是说……

BECKYDoes that mean…

卡尔我正要——只是快速追问一个问题,贝基。

CARLI was going to-just a quick follow-up, Becky.

贝基请讲,卡尔。

BECKYGo ahead, Carl.

卡尔你——你不担心削减开支、压缩政府支出、从 GDP 中切掉一大块,更重要的——更重要的动机是长期解决方案,对吧?

CARLYou are-you’re not worried about spending cuts, shrinking government expenditures, taking a big bite out of GDP, that the more important-the more important motive is the long-term solution, right?

巴菲特我觉得,赤字占 GDP 10% 和 9% 的区别,并不会决定复苏能否持续。不过,顺便提一句,我对税收也有一些想法,我是说,就分配而言——你看美国最顶层的人,像我这样的,我们正在缴纳很久很久以来——实际上可以说是历史上——最低的税率。所以我认为,在收入端其实是可以做些事情的,但那得针对最顶层的人群。我是说,我说的不是年收入 25 万美元的人,我说的是收入比那高得多的人群。但我不确定你们能不能看到这个,这是我唯一带过来的东西。不过——嗯,我想我带了两样东西过来,因为我拿错了。这里有一张表格,是美国国税局发布的,你要是回溯到 1992 年……

BUFFETTI think the difference between having 10 percent of GDP as your deficit and 9 percent is not going to be the difference in a recovery going on. But incidentally, I have some thoughts on taxes, too, I mean, in terms of the distribution of-there-if you look at the top level people in the country, people like me, I mean, we are paying our lowest tax rates in a long, long time, at-and, well, really forever. And so I think there actually could be something done on the revenue side, but it would be at the very top levels. I mean, I’m not talking 250,000, I’m talking people of incomes a lot larger than that. But I don’t know whether you can actually see this, it’s the one thing I brought along. But-well, I guess I brought two things along, since I pulled out the wrong one. Here’s a table, the IRS puts it out, and if you go back to 1992…

贝基来,我拿那个。

BECKYHere, I’ll take that.

如果回到 1992 年,看看排在全美前 400 名的个税申报表垫底门槛,我印象中每人收入大约是 4500 万美元,而现在能看到的最后一年数据,这个数字已经是 3.4 亿美元。想想看,从 4000 万涨到 3.4 亿,而普通美国劳动者一直停滞不前。

BUFFETT: If you go back to 1992 at the bottom, you’ll find that the-of the 400 top income tax returns filed in the United States, I think the income was around 45 million per person, and now in the last year shown there it’s 340 million. Think of that, from 40 million to 340 million, while the average American worker was going no place.

贝基我猜它在这下面。

BECKYI think it’s down here.

巴菲特现在,如果你翻到最后一页……

BUFFETTNow, if you go to the last page there…

贝基最后一页?

BECKYThe last page?

巴菲特对。右边那栏你会看到这 400 人里同一批人(不算那 4 个人)的税率,每年从大概 26% 或 28% 开始,然后一路稳步降到 16%。也就是说,当这些人的平均年收入从 4000 万美元涨到 3.4 亿美元的时候……

BUFFETTYeah. You’ll see the tax rate of those same four-not-of the 400 each year, over on the right-hand side, it starts at around 26 or 28 percent and it works its way steadily down to 16 percent. So while these people were having their incomes on average go from 40 million a year to 340 million a year…

贝基(听不清)

BECKY(Unintelligible)

巴菲特……他们的税率从 26% 降到了 16%。相信我,这可不是普通美国人的待遇。所以,有些事情是可以做的,在我看来也是应该做的,而且它们根本不会拖慢美国经济的脚步。

BUFFETT…their tax rate was going down from 26 to 16. And believe me, that is not the experience of the average American. So there are things that can be done, and in my view should be done, and they will not slow down the American economy at all.

贝基你知道吗?让我问一个来自……的问题。

BECKYYou know what? Let me ask a question from the…

乔·科南对。四——那钱不够——那钱不够……

JOEYeah. Four-that won’t be enough-that won’t be enough money…

贝基乔,请讲。

BECKYGo ahead, Joe.

乔·科南……对吧,沃伦?你也说过这话。因为要搞——你得从中间阶层入手——如果你想在财政收入这边做文章的话——我是说,那样能有点帮助,但如果你不解决支出这头,得往下打到 25 万美元甚至更低,才能见效,对吧?

JOE…right, Warren? And you said that. Because they-it’s got to-you got to go to the middle class or-if you’re going to do it on a-on the revenue side, on the-I mean, it would help a little, but you need to go down to maybe 250,000 or even below that to really make a dent if you don’t address the spending side, right?

巴菲特好吧,你确实可以从收入百万美元及以上的人群那里筹集到几百亿、上千亿美元,但——但随着时间的推移,更大的问题是——但你必须得说——必须现在就付诸行动。我的意思是,光说“行,我们五年或十年后再解决这事儿”,嗯……

BUFFETTWell, you can do tens and tens of billions on people with a million and up-and up of income, but you-but the bigger thing actually over time-but you have to say-you have to do it now. I mean, just saying, Well, we’re going to solve this in five years or 10 years,’ yeah…

乔·科南我们……

JOEWe…

巴菲特你们确实得在已经做出的支出承诺上采取行动了,因为——我们——这不是——如果 2011 年解决不了,2012 年也解决不了,以后照样解决不了……

BUFFETTYou really have to do something about the promises you’ve made on spending because we’re-it isn’t-if it doesn’t happen in 2011, it isn’t going to happen in 2012 and it isn’t going to happen…

乔·科南我是说,这——没错。是福利支出问题,沃伦。今天有一篇文章……

JOEI mean, it’s-yeah. It’s entitlements, Warren. And there’s a-there’s a piece today…

巴菲特是啊,当然。

BUFFETTYeah, sure.

乔·科南……我记得是在《政客》杂志上看到的,我们这个国家的人……

JOE…I think it was in Politico, people in this country…

贝基对的。就是塔兰斯集团的民调,对吧?

BECKYYeah. In the Tarrance Group poll, right?

乔·科南对。人们还是觉得……

JOEYeah. People still think…

贝基嗯,是的。

BECKYThe-yeah.

乔·科南……可以靠削减浪费来节省开支,或者他们认为可以裁减国防开支,说我们的钱全花在国防上了。然而这……

JOE…that you can cut waste and save, or they think you can cut defense, that we’re spending all the money on defense. And it…

贝基以下是相关的具体数字……

BECKYHere’s the numbers on the…

乔·科南对。是什么数字,贝基?

JOEYeah. What is it, Beck?

贝基乔刚才提到的那项民调数据显示,多数选民错误地认为,联邦政府在国防和对外援助上的开支,超过了在联邦医疗保险和社会保障上的开支。

BECKYThe numbers on that poll that Joe’s referencing is a majority of voters incorrectly believe the federal government spends more on defense and foreign aid than it does on Medicare and Social Security.

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基他们调查的人中有 63% 这么认为。另外 60% 的人错误地相信,联邦预算的问题只要消除浪费、欺诈和滥用就能解决。

BECKYSixty-three percent of people they polled thought that. Another 60 percent incorrectly believes problems with federal budgets can be fixed by just eliminating waste, fraud and abuse.

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基·奎克这不只是随口说说的观点,其中 40% 的人强烈认同这些看法。只有不到一半(44%)的人认为医疗保险和社会保障是联邦预算的主要问题来源。只有 49% 的人表示反对。那么,政客们面对这样的民调数字该怎么办呢?

BECKYAnd it’s not just casual beliefs on this. Forty percent of them strongly agree with these beliefs. Less than half of them, just 44 percent, believe that Medicare, Social Security are the major source of problems for the federal budget. Only 49 percent disagree. So what-how do politicians deal with poll numbers like that?

巴菲特嗯,他们处理这个问题的方式就是忽视——基本上就是忽视问题。我是说,这和州及地方政府在养老金上遇到的问题是一样的。太容易了——上世纪 60 年代,通用汽车承诺养老金和医保福利很容易,结果后来,你知道,把公司拖到了破产。20 或 30 年前,州和地方政府在谈判合同时也很容易,你知道,加入生活成本调整、20 年退休、以及最后几年雇用的后段加载条款。所有这些承诺到兑现的时候,都远远晚于政客离职之后,所以成了巨大的难题。但未来总会到来。当未来到来时,你做了那么多承诺,要么你食言,要么你大幅增税,要么你就搞通胀。基本上,我认为……

BUFFETTWell, they deal with it by ignoring-essentially ignoring the problem. I mean, it’s the same problem you had with state and municipalities on pensions. It was so easy-it was easy for General Motors back in the ’60s to promise pensions and health benefits that later, you know, brought the company to bankruptcy. It’s-it was easy for state and municipalities, you know, in-when they were negotiating contracts 20 or 30 years ago to put in cost of living adjustments and retirement after 20 years and back-end loading in terms of the last few years of employment. And all of those things and those promises come due so much later, long after the politicians left office, that it’s a tremendous problem. But the future does arrive. And when the future arrives and you’ve made a lot of promises, you’re either going to break the promises, you’re going to raise taxes dramatically, or you’re going to inflate. And basically, I think…

贝基等一下,那你现在是不是站在一些共和党州长那边?他们说,“我们负担不起兑现已经做出的承诺,今后肯定也没法延续这些承诺,”有些州长,比如斯科特·沃克,还接着说,“因此,我们需要取消集体谈判权”?

BECKYSo wait a second. Are you on the side of some of the Republican governors right now who are saying, We can’t afford to keep up with the promises we’ve made, we certainly can’t continue these promises down the road,’ and, in some cases, as in the case of Scott Walker, saying, We need to get rid of collective bargaining as a result’?

巴菲特嗯,我认为——我不想——我不打算评论劳资谈判的事。但我确实觉得,许多州和地方政府——包括奥马哈,我们刚刚就遇到这种事——在福利上做了承诺,这些承诺如果继续兑现下去,根本没法实现。我觉得——听着,我很理解那位市政雇员的话:“你看,你跟我谈好了条件。我是因为你说了我能拿到这些才来这儿上班的。”所以——但我认为,你该做的一件事就是别再许新愿了。我是说,你也许——你也许有能力兑现到目前为止已经承诺的那些,但你要说:“听着,这会把我们搞垮的。我以后再也不许诺新东西了。”你知道,这话从政客嘴里说出来,很难。

BUFFETTWell, I think-I don’t want to-I’m not going to say about the collective bargaining. I do think that many states and municipalities-including Omaha, we just have had this-have made promises on benefits that really can’t be fulfilled if you continue to keep making them. I think it’s-listen, I would identify with the municipal employee who said, Look, if you made the deal with me. I mean, you know, I came to work here because you said I was going to get this.’ So-but I-the one thing I think you do is you quit making new promises. I mean, you may-you may have-be able to fulfill the ones that you’ve got up to this point, but you say, Look it, this is going to bust us. And I’m going to make no more new promises.’ And, you know, that’s a tough thing for a politician to say.

乔·科南沃伦……

JOEWarren…

贝基·奎克那要是问……

BECKYWhat about asking…

乔·科南如果州和地方的政府雇员靠集体谈判来推举那些给他们好处的官员,那这恐怕就是你得去改变的事了。

JOEIf the public employees at the state and local levels are installing the people that give them the benefits through collective bargaining, maybe that’s something you need to change.

巴菲特嗯,我——是啊,但你可以说每个利益群体都在为自己的利益投票。我的意思是,你知道,有——有些人——有些富有的资本家在试图压低资本利得税率,还有……

BUFFETTWell, I-yeah, but you could say every constituency sort of votes its own interests. I mean, you know, there-you’ve got people-you’ve got the rich capitalists who are trying to keep down the rate on capital gains, and…

乔·科南没错,但那些——但那些——是的,但那些公司可能会破产。我是说,私营工会正在跟……

JOEYeah, but those-but those-yeah, but those companies can go bankrupt. I mean, the private unions are negotiating with…

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

乔·科南要是他们拿得太过分了,他们知道这工作就保不住了。其他人在谈判——或者说他们联合起来跟纳税人作对。州政府和地方政府永远不可能破产。所以你看,这就是为什么他们没有理由降低自己的要求,对吧?

JOEIf they get too much, they know that they won’t have a job anymore. The others are negotiating-or they’re aligned against the taxpayers. The states and the local municipalities can never go bankrupt. So they-you know, that’s why there’s no reason for them to mitigate their demands, right?

巴菲特嗯,人们都会尽量谈对自己最有利的交易。我是说,等你跟 CNBC 谈下一份合约的时候,你也会尽量谈个最好的条件。但谈判得双方都在场——而且最好两边都数学不错。当然,养老金、退休后医疗保险这些东西最大的问题是,承诺的人不是最后掏钱的人。没错。

BUFFETTWell, people are going to make the best deal they can. I mean, when you-you know, when you come up to negotiate your next contract with CNBC, you’ll try and make the best deal you can. But you’ve got to have people on both sides-and hopefully you’ve got people on both sides that are mathematically intelligent. And, of course, the big problem, you know, with pensions, with postretirement medical care and all of that, is that the guy that makes the promise is not the guy that has to make the payment. Yeah.

乔·科南沃伦,你昨天见了韦尔奇——这事儿《华尔街日报》也登了。他提到了 2006 年时任州长科津给公共工会做的一场演讲,说:“我们要为你们争取更好的福利。”这哥们自己就是给公共部门发福利的人——你怎么跟一个公开演讲说“我们要给你”的人谈判?他心里清楚,拉拢公共工会可能帮他下次当选。

JOEYou saw-Welch yesterday, Warren, brought-and it was in the Journal, too, brought up a speech given by Corzine-Governor Corzine in 2006 to the public unions that said, We are going to fight for a better set of benefits for you.’ He was the guy giving the benefits to the public-how do you negotiate with someone who’s giving a speech saying, We’re going to give you’-and he knows that that might help him get elected the next time, having the public unions on his side?

巴菲特对。那个演讲我没读过,但真要是你说的那样,那就是个错误。很大的错误。不光是这个,他们在算养老金该往里投多少钱才能兑付承诺的时候,用的假设也不切实际。我觉得,大多数地方政府对养老金的假设都太离谱了。可就是没人愿意去改它们。找个好说话的精算师,总比面对愤怒的公众要容易得多。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, I haven’t read that speech, but if it says what you said, it was a mistake. It was a big mistake. I-yeah, and not only that, but they use unrealistic assumptions even in determining how much they have to put in the pension funds to meet the obligations. I mean, the pension fund assumptions of most municipalities, in my-in my view are nuts, you know. And-but there’s no incentive to change them. I mean, it’s much easier to get a friendly actuary than it is to face, you know, an unhappy public.

贝基嗯,那么谁说得对?因为这事已经成了一个大辩论,两边各执一词,描绘出两种截然不同的图景,用的数据也五花八门,来说明不同地方政府、不同州现在的处境有多糟糕。我们该信谁?有没有一组数据能讲出绝对真相?

BECKYWell, so who’s right? Because this has gotten to be such a huge debate, and you have two sides that are painting two very different pictures and using two very different sets of numbers to say how bad of a situation different municipalities, different states are in at this point. Who do we believe? Is there a set of numbers that tells the absolute truth?

巴菲特嗯,我——其实,我看到过一些这方面的数据还挺好的。但我想说的是,当养老金假设他们能赚 8% 甚至更高,而现在债券收益率却是这个样子,你知道,那简直疯了。而且……

BUFFETTWell, I-actually, I’ve seen some pretty good numbers on that. But the-I would say that when they have pension assumptions that assuming they’re going to earn 8 percent or something like that when bonds are yielding what they are now, you know, that’s crazy. And…

贝基我两周前跟一个做养老基金的人说了这话,对方说,“得了吧,你就是不对,因为你看未来十年可能发生什么,你就是不对。”

BECKYI told somebody that who deals with pension funds a couple of weeks ago, and they said, Well, you’re just wrong because if you look at where things could go over the next 10 years, you’re just wrong.’

巴菲特嗯。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基养老金投资回报率,什么假设才算稳妥?

BECKYWhat’s a safe assumption for pension returns?

巴菲特这个嘛,我用——公用事业那边,监管要求我们用一些我并不想用的养老金假设。但我们用的已经是尽可能低了——反正吧,我是这么想的。我觉得——比方说,一家公司在欧洲有子公司,在美国也有,然后他们对欧洲的养老金假设说那边能赚 4%,对美国这边却假设赚 8%,这简直就是胡扯。要我说,那把钱都交给美国这边管得了。养老金会计这些年一直糟透了。而且很多管理层,我觉得他们自己也不太懂,还有很多人,你知道,某种意义上也宁愿不懂。你知道的,他们也在乎自己的养老金嘛。

BUFFETTWell, I use-we’re required, with our utilities, to use certain pension assumptions I don’t want to use. But we’ve used about as low as-anyway, but I think this. I think that-well, I think it’s nonsense, for example, when a company has subsidiaries in Europe and then they have them here, and they have an assumption for their pension fund in Europe that says we’re going to earn 4 percent over there and we’re going to earn 8 percent in the United States. I would say let’s give the money to the United States. The pension fund accounting has been terrible over the years. And many managements, I don’t think, understand it very well themselves, and many, you know, in a sense prefer not to understand it. You know, they care about their own pension, too.

我们国家在养老金假设上真该来一次彻底的大修了。已经有些动作了,但这事我写了好多年了。你知道的,这——没人真有动力去干,你看,这就是问题之一。不过……

We could-we could use a real overhaul of pension assumptions in this country. There’s been some of that, but I’ve been writing about it for years. You know, it-nobody’s really got an incentive to do it, you know, that’s one of the problems. But…

贝基嗯。不过听上去,你对某些试图大幅削减这些支出的共和党州长,确实有几分同情。

BECKYMm-hmm. But it sounds like you do have some sympathies with some of the Republican governors who are trying to make slashes.

巴菲特这个嘛,我同情任何一个现在要当家理财、却要处理一堆多年前别人许下的承诺的人。

BUFFETTWell, I have sympathy for anybody that’s trying to deal financially today with a whole bunch of promises made by somebody years ago.

贝基对。

BECKYYeah.

巴菲特但我也同情那些说“听着,我当初接下这份工作就是因为那些承诺”的人。

BUFFETTBut I also have sympathy for the guys that said, Listen, I took the job because of those promises.’

贝基那当然。没错。40 年过去了,这些承诺却还是当初许下的那些。

BECKYSure. Right. And 40 years later, these are the promises that were made.

巴菲特是啊。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基那让州政府雇员从今往后自己承担 20%、30%、40% 的医疗费用,这个主意你觉得怎么样?

BECKYWhat about the idea of asking state employees to play*(as spoken)*20, 30, 40 percent of their health care costs from here on out?

巴菲特嗯。有些其实——实际上,公共部门的养老金缴款比私营部门要多。你看看以前那些……

BUFFETTYeah. Well, some of them-actually, there’s more contributory payments into pension funds in the-in the public arena than in the private arena. If you look at the old…

贝基我指的是医疗这块,在医疗这块。

BECKYI mean in health care, in health care situations.

巴菲特嗯,这个……

BUFFETTYeah, well…

贝基这里面问题很多——这也是其中的一些症结所在。

BECKYThere’s a lot-that’s where some of the sticking points are, too.

巴菲特……这改变了承诺。你知道,而且这非常艰难。但我认为我们已经在伯克希尔旗下的一些非上市工厂做到了这一点。

BUFFETT…that’s changing the promise. You know, and I-and it’s very tough. But I think we have done that in some of our private plants at Berkshire.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特而且我认为——但当你这么做的时候,你是在违背承诺。我的意思是,有人在汽车厂或类似的厂子里干了 30 年,他们被告知,离开以后你的医疗费用是有保障的。然后你说,现在你只承担 30% 的费用——这多少算是改变了游戏规则。我认为,从今往后,他们绝对应该改变游戏规则,我是说,在他们现在招人、签合同的时候,可以这样做。如果有谁因为从今以后拿不到这些福利,而想离开公共部门——没问题,让他们走。但是,这类事情拖得越久,你知道,欠的债就会越滚越大。

BUFFETTAnd I think that-but when you’re doing it, you’re breaking a promise. I mean, people worked for 30 years in an auto plant or something of the sort, and they said you’re going to have your health care taken care of when you’re-when you’re out of here. And then if you say you’re going to pay 30 percent of it, that’s-that is changing the game somewhat. I think absolutely they ought to change the game on-from this point forward, I mean, in terms of hires they’re making and, you know. And if somebody wants to leave the public sector because now they’re not going to get benefits from this point forward because they-fine, let them do it. But I-every year that ticks away on this stuff, you know, the obligation gets larger.

卡尔对了,沃伦,就这一点来说……

CARLAnd, Warren, just on that…

贝基嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm. Carl:

卡尔……我在想,我们谈到的这些问题太庞大了,太结构化了,对吧,太棘手了,你怎么把它们跟你信里的乐观主义,以及认为美国最美好的日子还在前头的观点调和起来?

CARL…I wonder, I mean, the problems we’re talking about are so huge, so structural, right, so intractable, how do you reconcile them with the optimism in your letter, and the notion that America’s best days are ahead?

沃伦·巴菲特因为……

BUFFETTBecause…

卡尔因为读这封信的很多人既对市场持怀疑态度,也对政府持怀疑态度,他们说你提出的这些观点证明了这次我们可能真的赢不了。

CARLBecause a lot of the people who read the letter and are skeptical of markets, skeptical of government, say the points you’re making prove that we may not actually be able to win this time.

巴菲特我们会赢的,我们会赢。我的意思是,请记住这一点:你可以对别人做出关于 2020 年会发生什么的承诺,但你——我们没法吃 2020 年才会产出的食物,也没法开那时才造出来的汽车。只要经济在增长,我们的蛋糕就会更大。问题在于,我们已经向不同的人承诺了这块蛋糕的太多份额。但只要蛋糕在变大,这个国家整体上就会做得不错。不同阶层之间会有巨大的紧张关系。但如果你回到 1930 年我出生的时候,看看那时你能预测到什么。你可以预测出,股票会下跌——从我出生那一刻起,它们还会再跌 75%。你可以预测 25% 的失业率。你可以预测一次突袭,你知道,就像 1941 年我们看起来要输掉战争那样。所有这些事情都发生了。那么 1941 年发生了什么?整个 40 年代——或者说整个 30 年代经济都死气沉沉,然后每个人都回去工作了,我们开始生产战列舰,生产飞机。

BUFFETTOh, we’ll win. We’ll win. I mean, bear in mind this: You can make promises about what will happen in 2020 to somebody, but you-we can’t eat the food that’s going to be produced in 2020, we can’t use the cars. As long as the economy grows, we will have a larger pie. The problem is we’ve promised so much of that pie away to different people. But as long as the pie grows, you know, overall the country will do well. We’ll have enormous tension between various classes of people. But if you go back to when I was born in 1930, just look at what you could’ve predicted. You could’ve predicted, you know, that stocks would go down-from the moment I was born, they’d go down another 75 percent. You could predict 25 percent unemployment. You could predict a surprise attack, you know, that looked like we were going to lose the war in 1941. All of these things happened. And what happened in 1941? You had an economy that’d been kind of moribund through the ’40s-or through the ’30s, and everybody went back to work and we were turning out battleships, we were turning out planes.

这个国家潜力巨大,五年或十年后,我们的人均商品和服务产出将比现在更多。问题在于,我们是不是对太多参与方许下了过高的承诺。蛋糕会越做越大,而这是一个随着时间推移会显现出来的巨大优势。这只是意味着,家族成员会为谁能分到多大块的蛋糕而争斗,也许那块蛋糕的某一部分已经被人过度承诺走了。但蛋糕不断变大,能解决很多问题;过去几百年这个国家就是这么解决过来的,未来也会继续如此。

<<<END P 10>>>

This country has enormous potential, and we will be turning out more goods and services per capita five or 10 years from now than we are now. The problem is whether we’ve overpromised those to too many parties. The pie will get bigger, and that is a huge advantage over time. And it just means that the members of the family fight over who gets how much of the pie, and maybe part of that pie has been overpromised to people. But the pie getting larger solves a lot of things; and it solved things from a couple hundred years in this country, and it’ll continue to do so.

贝基沃伦,我们收到了很多很多问题,来自伯克希尔股东和观众。还有一个问题是穆罕默德·埃里安发来的,我知道他也是你的朋友。他提了一个比较笼统的问题,关于高失业率的。我们现在就来放一下这个问题。问题是:“高失业率持续存在,尤其是年轻人失业率很高,这让一些人担心技能退化、专长错配以及未来生产力下降。这些担忧到底有没有道理?如果有道理,政府和公司应该怎么做来扭转这个趋势?”

BECKYWarren, we got lots and lots of questions that came in from Berkshire shareholders, from viewers. We also got one that came in from Mohamed El-Erian, who I know you’re friends with, too. He asks a broad question that talks about this high unemployment rate. Let’s call this up right now. It’s, “The persistence of high unemployment and, within that, large youth unemployment, is leading some to worry about skill atrophy, expertise mismatches and lower future productivity. So how valid are these concerns? And if they are valid, what should the government and companies do to try and counter this trend?”

巴菲特是的。其实过去几年,生产率的表现相当出色。

BUFFETTYeah. Well, actually, productivity’s been terrific in the last few years.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特我的意思是,这就是为什么我们现在的业务量比一年前多得多,但员工只增加了 1%。我们的生产效率有了非常显著的提升。不过,你知道,如果生产效率没提上来,那我们现在的失业率就会低一些。

BUFFETTI mean, that’s the reason that we are doing a lot more business than a year ago and we only have 1 percent more employees. We’re-productivity has improved very significantly. And, you know, that’s-that-if productivity hadn’t improved, though, we’d have-we’d have less unemployment right now.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特但长期来看,生产率是了不起的。对于那个因为有人发明了能做得更好的机器而丢了饭碗的人来说,短期内是灭顶之灾,可我们想要生产率的提高。生产率带来更多产出。更多产出才是长期解决问题的关键。我们想要人均产出更高。然后,我们会为谁得到这些产出拼个你死我活,你懂的。有钱人说,嗯,我们可不想让你们从我们这里拿走任何东西。另一些人说,我们早就被许诺过了。围绕这个你会看到各种争斗。但更多产出能解决很多问题。一个收入越来越高的家庭,可能内部还是会在谁花钱上争吵,但这些争吵要比收入缩水时好解决得多。

BUFFETTBut productivity is great over time. It’s terrible for the guy that loses his job because somebody’s figured out a machine that does it better, given time, but we want gains in productivity. They give us more output. More output is what really solves problems over time. We want more output per capita. Then we’ll fight like hell about who gets it, you know. And the rich people say, Well, we don’t want you to take any of that away from us.’ And other people say, We’ve been promised it.’ And you’ll have all these fights about it. But having more output solves a lot of thing. A family that has greater and greater income may still have fights within the family about who gets to spend it, but it’s-those fights are a lot easier to solve than if the income is shrinking.

贝基我来问一个观众提交的问题。这是——导控室,我插个队——来自伊利诺伊州的马克,第六个问题。这个问题是半开玩笑写的,他说:“您和比尔·盖茨最近一直在劝说超级富豪把一半财富捐给慈善。我想知道,考虑到我们国家严重的债务问题,如果《福布斯》400 富豪榜上的美国公民把一半财富用来还债,能还掉多少?”

BECKYLet me ask you a question that was sent in by a viewer. This is-control room, I’m jumping out of order-number six from Mark in Illinois. And this was written tongue in cheek, but he says, “You and Bill Gates have recently been trying to get extremely rich individuals to give half their wealth to charity. I was wondering about all the concern over our nation’s serious debt issue. If the US citizens on the Forbes 400 list gave half their wealth to paying down the debt, how much of a dent would you put in it?”

巴菲特嗯,去年的《福布斯》400 富豪榜大概有 1.3 万亿美元,所以那大约是 6500 亿美元。从净债务的角度来看,这大约会冲抵掉 7% 到 8%。

BUFFETTWell, the Forbes 400 had, I think, about 1.3 trillion last year, so that’d be about 650 billion. So in terms of the-in terms of the net debt, it would knock off about 7 or 8 percent.

贝基这么说你说的是会造成一个严重的缺口。我想他可能绕个弯子在问的是,为什么不把这些钱交给政府,而是给私人慈善机构?

BECKYSo you are talking about a serious dent with that. And I guess the question he maybe is asking in a more roundabout way is, why not give that money to the government instead of private charities?

巴菲特那会——那会——那会大概——大概能抹掉六个月的赤字,然后我们又——又回到起点了。我确实认为,那个群体应该缴纳比现在高得多的税,你知道,而且我觉得还应该提高遗产税。但我不认为——我不认为税收制度应该建立在自愿捐款的基础上。我不确定那会不会是有史以来最成功的税收制度。

BUFFETTIt would-it would-it would take about-it would wipe out about six months of the deficit, and then we’d back-we’d be back where we started. I do think that that group should be paying much higher taxes than they are, you know, and I think they-there should be higher estate taxes, too. But I don’t think-I don’t think you should have a tax system based on free will contributions. I’m not sure that would be the most successful tax system ever devised.

贝基好。行,我们确实还有更多内容。实际上,等我们回来,会和沃伦·巴菲特做最后一轮问答,一个快速问答环节,来解答大家最后的一些问题,还有我们自己的问题。《财经论谈》一会儿回来。

BECKYOK. All right, well, we do have more to come. In fact, when we come back, we’ll have a final go-round with Warren Buffett, a rapid-fire session to get through some of your last questions, and ours as well. SQUAWK BOX will be right back.

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贝基欢迎回来,各位。又到了与沃伦·巴菲特对话的最后一轮,我们直接来看看大家发来的邮件。沃伦,今年收到的提问都相当有深度。其中一封来自堪萨斯州特里比恩的杜安写道:“您如何看待全美农田价格快速上涨的现象?您认为这一趋势将走向何方?”巴菲特:嗯,我儿子才是务农的人,我不是这方面的大专家。但显然,大宗商品价格已经大幅上涨。如果它们……

BECKYWelcome back, everybody. It’s time for a final round with Warren Buffett, so let’s get right to some of the e-mails that you’ve been sending in. And, Warren, the questions that came in this year were extremely thoughtful. One that came in from Duane in Tribune, Kansas, writes in, “What do you think about the rapidly increasing prices paid for farmland across the country, and where do you see this trend going?” BUFFETT: Well, my son is the farmer, and I’m not the big expert on it. But obviously, commodity prices have gone up significantly. And if they…

贝基嗯嗯。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特如果这是一个长期因素,我是说,如果玉米确实 7 美元一蒲式耳,大豆 12 美元一蒲式耳这样,那农田就值更多钱。而且,农田确实一年比一年高产。所以,你知道,农田算是不错的长线投资。通常它们的交易收益率都比较低,但好农田不是一笔糟糕的投资。

BUFFETTIf that represents a permanent factor, I mean, if you’re really talking about $7 corn and $12 soybeans and so on, it makes the farmland worth more money. And of course, farmland does become more productive year after year. So, you know, a farm is a decent long-term investment. Generally they’ve sold on the fairly low yield basis, but good farmland is not a terrible investment.

贝基是的。不过,你以前也见过其中一些东西的价格迅速暴跌。

BECKYYeah. You’ve seen prices crash, though, for some of these things very rapidly before.

巴菲特我不知道大宗商品未来会怎样。

BUFFETTI don’t know what will happen with commodities.

贝基嗯。

BECKYYeah.

巴菲特但某种程度上,你现在在商品上看到的情况,正是纸币的反面。我的意思是,它……

BUFFETTBut what you’re seeing with commodities to some extent is the-is the converse to the-to paper money. I mean, it…

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特如果钱变得越来越不值钱,那么用美元衡量,铜、棉花和大豆就会变得越来越值钱。

BUFFETTIf money becomes worth less and less, copper and cotton and soybeans are going to be worth more and more, measured by dollars.

贝基嗯。我们来看下一个问题。林赛从锡达拉皮兹写信问:“许多公司的风险管理者都搞错了,金融失败和需要政府救助就是证据。除了像伯克希尔·哈撒韦那样保持强大资本实力——显然,不是每家公司都有伯克希尔的资产负债表——关于风险管理,您能提供的最重要建议是什么,好让公司不再重蹈覆辙?”

BECKYMm-hmm. Let’s get to another question. Lindsay writes in from Cedar Rapids that, “Risk managers within many firms got it wrong, as evidenced by the financial failures and required government bailouts. Beyond the answer of maintaining a strong capital position like that of Berkshire Hathaway-obviously, not every company has the balance sheet of Berkshire-what’s the most important advice you can provide with regard to risk management so that companies don’t repeat the financial failures of the recent past?”

巴菲特是的。金融公司一直都是——首席执行官必须兼任首席风险官。我认为,董事会的薪酬政策应该确保,如果首席执行官的风险管理工作失败,他离开时得两手空空。我的意思是,在我看来,大型金融机构在需要政府救助、给机构自身、经济以及方方面面造成巨大混乱之后,高管们却还能富足地离开,这简直令人作呕。所以,激励机制至关重要,而过去的激励机制全都偏向管理层。我是说,你有股票期权,以及种种这类东西——如果公司业绩好,他们大赚一笔;如果业绩不好,他们依然非常富有,然后拍拍屁股走人,你知道,说声再见,接着公司就需要政府注资了。所以,我认为大型金融机构的董事会在设计薪酬方案方面严重失职。但薪酬顾问和普遍的行业惯例却在鼓励他们这么做。

BUFFETTYeah, Well, financial companies always have-the CEO has to be the chief risk officer. And I think the boards of directors should have compensation policies that make sure that if the CEO fails in the risk job that that CEO goes away poor. I mean, I think that it’s been disgusting, frankly, with huge financial institutions having-needing government assistance, all the disruption that’s caused both in the institutions, the economy and everything else, and people walking away rich. So incentives matter enormously, and incentives have all been to the upside with managers. I mean, you have stock options, all of these things that if it works out they do great, and if it doesn’t work out they still are very rich and they leave and, you know, it’s goodbye, and then you need government money. So I think boards have been very derelict in the big financial institutions in the way they designed compensation packages. But they’ve been encouraged to do so by comp consultants and just by prevailing practice.

贝基我们能指望政府为阻止这一局面可能采取或已经尝试过的任何措施吗,还是说这永远都是一颗滴答作响的定时炸弹?

BECKYCan we count on anything the government may do or has tried to do to this point with stopping that, or is this just always going to be a ticking time bomb?

巴菲特嗯,那个时期的两大问题是杠杆和糟糕的激励机制。

BUFFETTWell, the two big problems of the period were leverage and bad incentives.

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特他们在杠杆方面下了不少功夫,相当多。而作为一家金融机构,诱惑永远是不断加大杠杆。如果你——如果你背后实际上有政府担保撑着,就像联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)长久以来的那样,或者像房利美和房地美那样,你就能直接印钱。一旦人们获得了印钱的能力,就会乐在其中。如果激励机制又设错了——情况顺利,他们能拿到极高的报酬;情况顺利,他们还是能拿到极高的报酬——那么,你就——你就会看到有人干出疯狂的事。所以激励机制一定要对,杠杆也必须有所限制。

BUFFETTThey’ve done some things about leverage, quite a bit. And the temptation is always just to leverage up more and more if you’ve got a financial institution. If you’re-if you’ve got a government guarantee behind you, in effect, which the FDIC has been, or with Freddie and Fannie, you can print money. And when people get the ability to print money, they enjoy it. And then when you get the incentives wrong so that if things work they get paid off incredibly, and if things work they still get paid off incredibly, it-you’re going to-you’re going to have people do crazy things. So you got to have the incentives right, and you’ve got to have some limits on leverage.

贝基好了,我们只剩……

BECKYAll right, we’ve only got…

巴菲特我们在这方面已经取得了一些进展。

BUFFETTAnd we’ve made some progress on that.

贝基我们取得了一些进展。

BECKYWe have made some progress.

巴菲特对。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基我们只剩几分钟了,但我希望趁你在这儿,能解决房利美、房地美和住房抵押贷款的问题。你今年的致股东信里确实写了这件事。

BECKYWe’ve only got a few minutes left, but I’m hoping you can solve the problem with Fannie and Freddie and home mortgage issues while you’re here. You did write about that in the shareholders letter this year.

巴菲特嗯。

BUFFETTHm.

贝基你在信里写了你们通过克莱顿住宅公司(Clayton)获得的经验,以及为什么克莱顿没有出现我们在其他住房抵押贷款领域如此普遍看到的那种不良贷款。

BECKYYou wrote about your experiences through Clayton, and why Clayton has not had the types of bad loans that we’ve seen so prevalently through other areas in home mortgage.

巴菲特是的,是的。我们借钱给那些付了合理首付的人,而且我们对他们的收入进行了核实。很多情况下,这些人都是生活在边缘的。我是说,他们的 FICO 评分不高,各方面条件一般,但他们买房不是为了快进快出赚差价,也不是为了转按揭套现——他们——他们——他们能做到月供不超承受力。而我们一直持有这些房贷。我们手里压着大约 110 亿美元的房贷、合计约 20 万笔。所以我们很在意这些人将来会不会还钱。如果房贷有政府担保呢,你就不关心借款人本身靠谱不靠谱了。我是说,你——嗯——你得关心政府靠不靠谱,但借款人的好坏你就不用操心了。所以当房地美和房利美给房贷提供担保时,唯一会在意风险的就是房地美和房利美自己。那些买这些贷款的人知道自己肯定能拿回钱,因为他们心知肚明,这实际上就是政府担保的。而有了政府担保,融资成本就被压到了最低的水平。我是说,这确实降低了拥有住房的成本,因为你持有的是有政府担保的债务。

BUFFETTYeah. Yeah. Well, we lent to people who put up reasonable down payments, and we verified their income. And these were people living on the edge, in many cases. I mean, these were not people with great FICO scores, everything, but they were buying homes not to flip them, they were not refinancing to try and take the money out to-they were-they were-they were keeping their monthly payments in line. And we were keeping the mortgages. We kept 11 billion or so of mortgages, three-200,000 of them. So we cared whether the people were going to pay us in the future. If you have a government-guaranteed mortgage, you know, you don’t care whether the person’s any good or not. I mean, you know-well, you care whether the government’s good or not, but you don’t care. So when Freddie and Fannie guaranteed mortgages, the only person that could care was Freddie and Fannie. The people that bought them knew they were going to get paid because they knew, in effect, they were government guaranteed. Now, having government guarantees in there brings down the cost of financing to rock-bottom levels. I mean, it does reduce the cost of homeownership because you’ve got a government-guaranteed obligation.

我认为展望未来,或许需要这样一种体系:由私人机构——像我这样的人、像摩根大通这样的机构或者不论谁——来运营大规模的住房抵押贷款担保业务,并由联邦政府充当最后的后盾。这样,你既能获得由此带来的成本优势,又能在为这些贷款定价和决定承保什么、不承保什么时,拥有私人市场的纪律约束。同时,还能让它远离国会的压力。

I think going forth in the future, you may need some system where private guys-guys like me, guys like JPMorgan or whomever-have large mortgage guarantee operations backstopped by the federal government. So you get the benefit of the cost of that, but you have the discipline of the private market in terms of pricing these things and determining what you take and don’t take. And you get it away from congressional pressure.

贝基这样一来,像房利美或房地美那样的机构就不复存在了?

BECKYSo that nothing like a Fannie or a Freddie exists?

巴菲特你——我不认为非得要有房利美或房地美,不过你也许——也许可以这样——假设有一家资本金 100 亿美元的公司,由我们持有,而且至少五年内我们不能从中抽走一分钱。我们来为抵押贷款提供担保,其中 80% 的担保额由我们承担,另外 20% 由联邦政府承担。但政府同时承诺,如果这家 100 亿美元的公司出于任何原因无力赔付,政府会来付。这样一来,我们自然有兴趣发放可靠的贷款,也有动力去获取合理的回报。政府的担保很可能永远不会被调用,这能让担保成本保持在低位。这样你既得到了私人市场的纪律约束,又不会有一大群说客跑来找我们讲:“我们希望你们把钱借给每一个找上门的人,只要这人还能测出一丝微弱的脉搏就行。”

BUFFETTYou-I don’t think you necessarily need Fannie or Freddie, but what you might-you might-let’s just say you had a company capitalized at $10 billion and we own it. We couldn’t take any money out of it for at least five years. And we guaranteed mortgages, and we took 80 percent of the guarantee, and the federal government took the 20 percent. But the government also said if for any reason this $10 billion company couldn’t pay, they would pay. Now, we would have an interest in getting decent loans, we’d have an interest in getting paid reasonably. The government guarantee would probably never be called on, it would keep the price low. So you get the discipline of the private market, and you wouldn’t have a whole bunch of lobbyists coming around to us and saying, We want you to give money to anybody that shows up and, you know, can show a faint pulse.’

贝基不过——你真的觉得这种情形有现实可能吗?你认为存在这样的政治意愿或想法,能让政府完全撒手不管吗?

BECKYDo you-do you think that that’s actually a likely scenario, though? Do you think that there’s the political will or desire to get the government entirely out of it?

巴菲特嗯,我觉得——我觉得大家是想给房利美和房地美找个说法。他们都想粉饰太平。顺便说一句,在整个这场恐慌里,就这一件事让政府亏了大钱。

BUFFETTWell, I think-I think there’s desire to get some answer to Freddie and Fannie. They all want to sweep it under the rug. It’s the only thing, incidentally, that’s cost the government a lot of money out of this whole panic.

贝基没错。

BECKYRight.

巴菲特银行基本都把欠的钱还清了,联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)一分钱都不用掏,就连通用汽车现在也过得相当不错。所以——美国国际集团(AIG)也会把钱还清的。亏得最惨的是房利美和房地美。而这两家恰恰是政府管的,也受到政府的各种压力。所以我觉得,大家是想找到一个办法,既能控制成本——政府担保同样能有这个效果——又能施加市场纪律。

BUFFETTThe banks have pretty well paid things back, the FDIC didn’t have to come up for any money, and the-even General Motors is doing reasonably well. So-AIG is going to get the money paid back. The big losers are Freddie and Fannie. And they were the ones run by government, and they were subject to government pressures. So I think that there’s a desire for a solution that keeps the cost down-which government guarantees, too-but also imposes market discipline.

乔·科南嘿……

JOEHey…

贝基乔:

BECKYJoe:

乔·科南嘿,沃伦,“大而不能倒”——我们总听人说,这问题没解决,那些大银行显然变得比之前更大了。如果把它们的杠杆理顺,让它们持有更多资本,再把薪酬或者说激励机制理顺,那么在一个资本主义体系里,存在“大而不能倒”、最终会被纾困的东西,这能说得通吗?我——这看起来仍然是个问题,而且我们至今还在面对它。

JOEHey, Warren, is too big to fail-we keep hearing that it-that that wasn’t fixed, that obviously the banks have gotten even bigger, the big ones. If you get their-the leverage better in order and make them, you know, keep more capital, and if you get the compensation or the incentives in order, is it OK to-in a capitalist system, to have things that’re too big to fail, that would be bailed out? I-it seems like that’s still a problem and we still have it.

巴菲特对,你不——但你不会想去救那些管理层。我的意思是,比如,在房利美和房地美的例子里,它们的股东赔光了所有钱。AIG 和花旗,它们跌了——我不知道跌了 80% 还是多少。华盛顿互助银行的股东赔光了所有钱。瓦乔维亚银行的股东损失了极高比例的钱。

BUFFETTYeah, you don’t-but you don’t want to bail out the managements. I mean, you know, in the case of-you know, Fannie and Freddie stockholders lost all their money. You know, the-AIG and Citi, you know, they’re down-I don’t know whether they’re down 80 percent or what. The stockholders at WaMu lost all their money. The stockholders at Wachovia lost a very high percentage of their money.

乔·科南是的。

JOEYeah.

巴菲特所以它们失败了。只不过,它们的失败并不是说走到了折价清算那一步。

BUFFETTSo they failed. Now, the-they didn’t fail in the sense that you had a liquidation sale.

乔·科南没错。

JOERight.

巴菲特我们在雷曼身上试过了,结果不怎么好。在我看来,永远都会有一些机构大而不能倒。但你可以把激励机制设计成这样,让管理这些机构的人,一旦机构……

BUFFETTAnd we tried that with Lehman and that didn’t work out too well. There will always be, in my view, places that’re too big to fail. But you could make it so that the incentives are that the people running them, if they…

乔·科南没错。

JOERight.

巴菲特……一旦机构倒闭,他们自己也就完了。在我看来,这一点极为重要。

BUFFETT…if the institution fails, they fail. That’s enormously important, in my view.

卡尔沃伦,不知道您看没看……

CARLWarren, I don’t know if you saw…

贝基卡尔:

BECKYCarl:

卡尔不知道您有没有看上个周末的奥斯卡颁奖礼,最佳纪录片得主是一部叫《监守自盗》的电影,把这次金融危机描绘得非常阴暗。制片人在获奖感言里说,这场危机——用他的话说——是由一场大规模欺诈引发的,三年过去了,没有一位高管进监狱,他说这不对。是这样吗?

CARLI don’t know if you saw the Oscars this past weekend, but the winner of Best Documentary was this film called “Inside Job,” which paints a very dark picture of the crisis. And in his acceptance speech, the producer said that the-three years after a crisis that he says was caused by a massive fraud, in his words, not a single executive has gone to jail, and he says that’s wrong. Is it?

巴菲特嗯,我认为问题的根源在于,那些公司的大多数首席执行官都腰缠万贯地全身而退了。他们该不该进监狱,那是成文法律说了算,得看能不能举证等等。但我觉得,按照他们自己签的合同条款,再加上董事会被安排成那副模样,他们就能拿着几亿美元走人,而整个国家却要为他们那些恶劣行径的后果买单——这想法本身就不对。就像我说的,我不确定他们该不该进监狱,但至少不该让他们坐上凯迪拉克。

BUFFETTWell, I would say that what’s really wrong is that the chief executives of most those companies walked away extraordinarily rich. Now, whether they should’ve gone to jail or not’s a-you know, that’s a question of statutes and whether you could prove it and so on. But I think the idea that they were allowed, by the terms of their contracts that they’d made and the boards of directors allowed to be put into place, that they could walk away with hundreds of millions of dollars while the country suffered the consequences of really some terrible actions. Like I said, I don’t know whether it should put them in jail, but it should-it should not put them in Cadillacs.

贝基沃伦,再快速总结一下,你不仅对美国的未来极为乐观,对股市的未来也极为乐观。这么说对吗?

BECKYAnd, Warren, just wrapping things up again quickly, you are incredibly optimistic not only about America’s futures, but about the stock market’s future. Is that fair to say?

巴菲特我认为——我认为——我肯定会——这样说很公平:如果你问我持有股票还是固定美元资产,无论是长期还是短期……

BUFFETTI think-I think-I would-certainly fair to say that I would-if you asked me for owning equities vs. fixed dollars, either long-term or short-term…

贝基嗯哼。

BECKYMm-hmm.

巴菲特……政府或其他任何东西,我清楚——我不认为政府有任何可能,能在任意一个 10 年、20 年或 30 年期间跑赢股票。所以,我……

BUFFETT…governments or anything, I know-I don’t think there’s a chance that governments will outperform equities over any, say, 10 or 20 or 30-year period. So I…

贝基就算我们最近看到了大幅上涨——哦,您是从更长期的角度来看。没错。

BECKYEven with the big runs we’ve seen recent-oh, you’re looking over the longer term. Yeah.

巴菲特对,长期来看——至于明年会怎样,我一点头绪都没有。

BUFFETTYeah, over the longer-I have no idea what’ll happen in the next year.

贝基好。

BECKYOK.

巴菲特但是——但是我认为,如果你有能力拥有股票并长期持有,却把钱投在长期或短期的固定面值投资上,那是非常、非常愚蠢的。你不该借钱买股票。

BUFFETTBut the-but I think it would be very, very foolish to have your money in long-term fixed-dollar investments or short-term fixed-dollar investments when you could-if you had the ability to own equities and own them for a-and hold them for a considerable period of time. You shouldn’t own them with borrowed money.

贝基好的。那么,沃伦,我们再次非常感谢你今天在这里付出时间,如此慷慨地抽出时间回答我们以及观众这么多的问题。

BECKYOK. Well, Warren, again, we want to thank you very much for your time here today, for being so generous with your time and taking so many of our questions and so many of our viewer questions as well.

巴菲特好的。我希望你们的观众有空能来看看达勒姆博物馆,好好感受一下。

BUFFETTOK. I hope your viewers come out and look at the Durham Museum sometime, you know, enjoy it.

贝基没错。再跟没注意到的观众说一声——我们正在达勒姆博物馆,站在欧内斯特·巴菲特杂货店前。欧内斯特·巴菲特,当然是沃伦·巴菲特的祖父。如果您还没读过他写的那封年度信件,不妨找来看看,信里提到他祖父教给他的一堂小课。不过再次感谢你,沃伦。

BECKYThat’s right. Again, we’re at the Durham Museum, for anybody who missed it. We’re standing in front of the Ernest Buffett grocery store. Ernest Buffett, of course, was Warren Buffett’s grandfather. And if you haven’t read it already, check out the annual letter that he wrote. It tells you a little bit about a lesson that his grandfather taught him. But again, Warren, thank you.

巴菲特谢谢。

BUFFETTThank you.

贝基·奎克谢谢。卡尔,我们把画面交还给你。

BECKYAppreciate it. And, Carl, we’ll send it back over to you.

卡尔好。行,我代表我和乔一起谢谢沃伦。

CARLOK. All right, thanks to Warren from both me and Joe.

乔·科南谢谢你,沃伦。是的。

JOEThank you, Warren. Yes.