每日新闻集团2019年股东大会——查理·芒格问答

2019 · 会议 · 原文约 14369 词
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查理:格里,我还有什么别的事要做吗?

格里·萨尔兹曼:没有了,查理。

查理:这真是相当繁重。(笑声)这么多人不远万里来到这里,我就简单聊几个你们可能感兴趣的话题,然后回答提问。

一个小小《每日新闻》公司的年会能来这么多人,真是不可思议,说到底这家公司的规模很小。我们有两块业务,一块是持续萎缩的法律类报纸,现在每年税前利润大约 100 万美元,而且还在缩水;另一块是计算机软件业务,我们试图用软件把法院、司法机构以及其他一些政府部门实现自动化。从前景、客户、员工等各方面来看,这块业务现在比缩水的报纸业务要大得多。你简直无法想象,要跟不同州的各式各样法院打交道,还有它们的顾问、招投标流程和官僚体系,这事有多难。这是软件行业里巨头们普遍厌恶的那类业务。他们喜欢的业务是那种,你只要复制一份产品,98% 的收入就立刻变成现金进账,不需要额外任何工作。而这里可不是处理一堆司法机构、州检察长、州法院、联邦法院这类全国各地的机构,它们各有各的要求、不同的顾问,当然还要面临持续而激烈的竞争。我们业务的本质,更像技术咨询,而不是简单地复制软件。这是一个服务密度极高的行业,非常困难。计算机科学本身就很耗时、很难。但还要跟那么多不同领域、带着政治现实色彩的官僚机构打交道……这简直难上加难。所以这是一个进展极其缓慢、需要慢慢磨的业务,这就是游戏本身的特性。我们一直喜欢这类业务,因为它需要一家资金雄厚、意志坚定、愿意持续投入的公司。而《每日新闻》做的正是这件事。

我们做得怎么样?这很难评判,但我会说,如果仔细观察,这就像一家拥有七种特效药在研发管线中的制药公司。我们有很多在研项目,对我们来说极为重要。澳大利亚、加拿大、加利福尼亚。我们谈论的是非常大的市场。

我们主要的竞争对手是 Tyler Technologies,它在纽约证券交易所上市。当然,他们在这个领域已经深耕很久,规模也比我们大得多。但我们也在获得一些可观的业务量,而且有一些非常满意的客户。小小的《每日新闻》公司究竟是怎么吸引到澳大利亚政府的?澳大利亚可是个大国。但我已经爱上了澳大利亚人,而且我认为我们在澳大利亚会大获成功。这个过程会很漫长,工作又苦又难,不是谁都能干得了。光是那庞大的复杂性就足以让人望而却步。如果没有格里·萨尔兹曼在过去十年里所做的一切,我们绝不可能走到今天这一步。换任何其他人,这事早就失败了。现在格里 80 岁,他和我有一个共同点——我们都用拐杖。我不坐轮椅的时候就用拐杖。所以,当董事长 95 岁、副董事长 89 岁、干所有活的 CEO 80 岁且拄着拐杖,却要去挑战整个世界……你们这些人千里迢迢来参加的,真是个非常奇特的地方。你们到底在想什么?(笑声)

Charlie: Gerry, is there anything else that I’m suppose to do? Gerry Salzman: That’s it Charlie. Charlie: It’s very burdensome. (laughter) So many of you have come from such great distances (that) I’m going to speak briefly on a number of topics that may interest you and then I’m going to take questions. It’s amazing the number of people at the meeting of the little Daily Journal Corporation which after all is a pretty small operation. We’ve got two businesses one a steadily declining legal newspaper which now earns about a million in a year pre-tax and shrinking, and a computer software business where we’re trying to automate courts and justice agencies and various other governmental departments. And that is now bigger by far in terms of prospects and customers and employees and so forth than our shrinking newspaper business. It hardly can be imagined how hard it is to deal with a whole bunch of different courts in different states and their advisers and the RFP process and the bureaucracy. This is a part of the software business that the giants tend to hate. They like a business where you just stamp out an extra copy of something and 98 percent of the revenues go immediately into the till as cash and there’s no extra work. And that is not handling a bunch of justice agencies, attorney generals, state courts, federal courts, and so forth all over the country with different requirements, different consultants, and of course steady and aggressive competition. The nature of our business it’s more like technical consulting than it is just stamping out software. It’s a very high service business. It’s very difficult. The computer science is time consuming and difficult. But just dealing with that much bureaucracy over that many different fields with the political realities…it’s just immensely difficult. So it’s a very slow grinding business and that’s the nature of the game. We have always liked it because a business like this requires a company that’s very rich and very determined and is willing to keep plugging. And of course that’s what the Daily Journal has done. How are we doing? Well that’s hard to judge, but I would say watching it quite closely that it’s like a pharmaceutical company with seven wonderful drugs in the pipeline. We have a lot in the pipeline that is very very important to us. Australia, Canada, California. We’re talking big big markets. Our main competitor is Tyler Technologies which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and of course they’ve been at it a long time and are way bigger, but we are getting some significant volume and we have some very pleased customers. How in the hell does the little Daily Journal Corporation attract the Government of Australia? Australia is a big place. But I’ve gotten to love the Australians and I think it’s going to succeed in Australia, mightily. And so it takes a long time and it’s hard work and it’s also very difficult work. Not everybody can do this. Just the mass of complexity. We would never be where we are if we didn’t have Gerry Salzman to do everything he’s done over the last ten years. Anybody else would have failed at this. Now Gerry is 80 and he and I have one thing in common, we both use canes. When I’m not in a wheelchair I use a cane. So the idea of taking on the whole world when the chairman is 95 and the vice chairman is 89 and the chief executive that does all the work is 80 and uses a cane…It’s a very peculiar place that you people have come a long way to. What the hell are you thinking about? (laughter)

这事有点诡异。事实上,我们代表的就是基本道德加扎实常识的组合。令人惊叹的是,伯克希尔·哈撒韦,还有《每日新闻》,仅仅靠着基本道德和扎实常识就取得了如此成功。当然,每当人们谈论常识时,他们说的其实是“不寻常的常识”。每次你听到有人说某人很有常识,那意味着他拥有的是不寻常的常识。拥有常识远比人们通常想象的要难得多。

我给你举个有趣的例子。投资界充斥着大量高智商的人,他们试图比别人更精明。你几乎想象不出还有哪个行业能吸引如此多的关注。奇怪的事时有发生。多年前,我们当地一家规模很大、面向投资咨询的公司,想找个办法超越其他同行。他们是这样推理的:我们有这么多来自沃顿、哈佛等名校的杰出年轻人,他们拼命工作,试图理解商业、市场趋势和所有其他东西。如果我们让每个最聪明的人都贡献出他唯一的最佳想法,然后用这些最佳想法组成一个公式,我们就能大幅跑赢市场平均。这个想法在他们看来挺合理,因为他们受教育的方式有问题——这就是上哈佛和沃顿的后果。于是他们尝试了一下,当然彻底失败了。他们又试了一次,还是彻底失败。再试第三次,依然失败。当然,他们找的其实就是几百年前炼金术士的把戏:想把铅变成金子。他们以为,只要能买进一堆铅,挥舞魔杖就能把它变成金子,那就能赚大钱了。这家咨询公司在找的就是点铅成金的等价物,当然行不通。我本来可以告诉他们,但他们没问我。一句都没问。

这件事有意思的地方在于,这群人非常聪明,来自世界各地。你们当中有不少聪明人来自中国,中国人普遍平均智商稍高一些。问题其实很简单:为什么那个看似合理的想法会失败?你们想想看。你们都上过顶尖学府。我敢打赌,在座几乎没人知道它为什么失败。我这个展示可够荒唐的。你怎么会不知道呢?这是美国一项重要的活动,却遭遇了明显且重大的失败。我们当然能解释清楚!你只要在大学一年级课程里没睡着,就能回答这个问题。但如果你把这个题拿去问某顶尖大学金融系的教授,他们也答不对。我现在就把这个问题留给你们,因为我想让你们困惑一下。(笑声)我先讲下一个话题。

但这个问题你们应该能回答。它说明,在非常简单的事情上保持理性有多难。有多难……人们抱有多少种疯狂的想法,而这些想法根本行不通,你甚至不知道为什么行不通,尽管你受过良好教育的话,这一切都显而易见。顺便说一句,我对“受过良好教育”的定义是:当教授错了时,你能判断对。谁都能把教授教的东西复述出来。关键在于,知道教授什么时候对、什么时候错。这才是真正受过教育的人。当然,教授们经常犯错,尤其是在软科学领域。事实上,如果你看看现在的精英学府,可以说不少教授都有点疯狂。人文领域现在太左翼了,这很奇怪。这是另一回事。为什么 90% 的人文学科大学教授都偏左翼?这个问题我也留给你们。但现实就是这样。

It’s weird and what’s happened of course is that we’re standing a bit for some combination of basic morality and sturdy common sense. And it’s amazing how well Berkshire Hathaway, and the Daily Journal for that matter, have succeeded with nothing more than basic morality and sturdy common sense. But of course when people talk about common sense they mean ‘uncommon sense’. Every time you hear that somebody has a lot of common sense it means he’s got uncommon sense. And it is much harder to have common sense than it is generally thought. Let me give you an interesting example. The investment world involves an enormous amount of high IQ people trying to be more skillful than normal. You can hardly imagine another activity that gets so much attention. And weird things have happened. Years ago one of our local investment counseling shops, a very big one, they were looking for a way to get an advantage over other investment counseling shops. And they reasoned as follows. We’ve got all these brilliant young people from Wharton and Harvard and so forth and they work so hard trying to understand business and market trends and everything else. And if we just ask each one of our most brilliant men for their single best idea then created a formula with this collection of best ideas, we would outperform averages by a big amount. And that seem plausible to them because they were ill-educated. That’s what happens when you go to Harvard and Wharton. So they tried it out, and of course it failed utterly. So they tried it again and it failed utterly. And they tried it a third time and it also failed. Of course what they were looking for is the equivalent of the alchemists of centuries ago who wanted to turn lead into gold. They thought if you could just buy a lot of led and waive your magic wand over and it turned into gold, that would be a good way to make money. This counseling shop was looking for the equivalent of turning lead into gold and of course it didn’t work. I could’ve told them but they didn’t ask me. Nothing. The interesting thing about this situation is that this is a very intelligent group of people that’s come from all over the world. You’ve got a lot of bright people from China where people tend to average out a little smarter. And the issue is very simple. It’s a simple question. Why did that plausible idea fail? Just think about it for a minute. You’ve all been to fancy educational institutions. I’ll bet you there’s hardly one in the audience who knows why that thing failed. That’s a pretty ridiculous demonstration I’m making. How could you not know that? It’s one of the main activity of America with an obvious and important failure. Surely we can explain it! You have to have stayed awake in your freshman college courses to answer that question. But if you ask that question at a Department of Finance at a leading place, the professors wouldn’t answer it right. Now I’m going to leave you that question because I want you perplexed. (Laughter) And I will go on to another issue. But that’s one you should be able to answer. It shows how hard it is to be rational on something very simple. How hard it is…How many kind of crazy ideas people have and don’t work, and you don’t even know why they don’t work even though it’s perfectly obvious if you’ve been properly educated. And by the way my definition of being properly educated is being right when the professor is wrong. Anybody can spit back what the professor tells you. The trick is to know when he’s right and when he’s wrong. That’s the properly educated person. And of course they’re frequently wrong particularly in the soft sciences. In fact if you look at a modern elite institution, it’s fair to say that a lot of the faculty are a little crazy. It’s so left wing now in the humanities and it’s very peculiar. That’s another thing. Why should 90 percent of the college professors in the humanities be very left wing? I leave that question for you too. But it happens.

当然,股票选择领域还有一个问题,所有资金和精力都投入到试图保持理性的努力中,但投资咨询这个行业却遭遇了一件极其糟糕的事情。指数基金出现了,而且它们基本上打败了所有人。不仅如此,它们打败所有人的幅度,大致相当于运营基金和调整投资组合所花费的成本。所以,你有一个完整的行业,基本上是在为了几乎毫无成就而收费。这非常奇怪。这不像是肠道手术,甚至不像法律界的刑事辩护律师或其他什么。他们有一个完整的行业,所选择的职业活动,他们实际上什么也做不了。

在过去,这个行业的人一直有一些这样的问题,他们的合理化解释如下:“我们正在保护我们的客户免受保险推销员和股票经纪人——那些服务于活跃交易者的标准股票经纪人的侵害。”他们确实在保护人们免受人寿保险推销员和喜欢频繁交易的狡猾股票经纪人的侵害。我想,从某种意义上说,投资行业仍然在保护那些人,避免他们遭遇更糟糕的命运。但是,当一个如此努力、如此令人钦佩的完整行业,其成员我们甚至乐于让他们嫁入我们的家庭,却无法完成他们的行业真正试图做的事情——即获得高于平均水平的结果时,这确实非常奇怪。随着指数投资越来越受欢迎,包括很多花哨的地方,这个行业是如何应对这个可怕的局面的呢?

嗯,答案很简单,他们用否认来应对。他们有一个无法解决的可怕问题,所以他们就当它不存在。这是处理问题的一种非常愚蠢的方式。当你思考自己无法解决的死亡问题时,否认可能一路管用到最后倒是不错。但在生活的所有实际领域,这个问题一旦被充分理解,就解决了一半,或者至少能更好地应对。

所以,让所有这些人都处于否认状态,年复一年地做他们一直在做的事情,并希望世界会继续为此付钱,即使一个被动管理的指数几乎肯定会表现更好,这是错误的。这是一个非常严重的问题。想想纽约需要从金融领域获得多少资金流。想想如果没有投资管理费或交易价差等等,曼哈顿会发生什么。所以这是一个古怪的局面,当然也不令人愉快。大型投资咨询公司,有些在萎缩,有些则倒闭了。而价值投资者——我当然认识很多,因为我们来自那个传统——那些可敬的价值投资者正在退出。砰、砰、砰。对他们多年来行之有效的方法不再有效,他们是可敬的人,所以他们干脆退出了。而且他们也足够富有,这使得退出很容易。但那些不富有的人就麻烦大了。在曼哈顿市,送孩子上学前班就要花费大约 5 万美元。还不能税前扣除。而这只是无尽昂贵岁月长河的开始。所以,如果你的游戏是资金管理,你就有个严重的问题。我对这个问题没有任何解决方案。我确实认为,如果每个人都这么做,指数投资就行不通。但在相当长的一段时间内,指数投资仍将比积极选股——即你试图了解很多东西的那种——更有效。

现在,在像伯克希尔·哈撒韦甚至《每日新闻》这样的地方,我们做得比平均水平好。那么问题来了,为什么会这样?为什么会这样?答案很简单。我们试图做得更少。我们从未抱有幻想,以为只要雇佣一群聪明的年轻人,他们就能比任何人都更了解罐装汤、航空航天、公用事业等等,等等,等等。我们从未有过那样的梦想。我们从未想过我们能像吉姆·克莱默假装的那样,对所有主题都获得真正有用的信息。(笑声)我们一直意识到,如果我们非常努力,我们可以找到少数几件我们判断正确的事情。而少数几件事就足够了。那是一个合理的预期。这是一种截然不同的处事方法。如果你问沃伦·巴菲特和那些投资顾问同样的问题,“告诉我你今年最好的想法”,然后你只跟随沃伦的最佳想法,你会发现它效果非常好。但他并没有试图了解整个……他会给你一两只股票。他的雄心更为有限。

我有一个对我非常有用的祖父,我母亲的祖父,他是个拓荒者。他来到爱荷华州时身无分文,只有年轻和健康,并从印第安人手中夺取了土地。他参加了黑鹰战争……他是黑鹰战争中的一名上尉,他留在了那里,买了便宜的土地,他进取、聪明等等,最终他成为了镇里最富有的人,拥有银行,备受尊敬,有一个庞大的家族,过着非常幸福的生活。他有一个态度……当他来到爱荷华州时,土地才一美元一英亩多一点,他一直留在那里,直到那片黑色表土创造了一个现代富裕的文明,以及世界上一些最好的土地……他的态度是,在他这样备受眷顾的一生中,当你身处正确的地方,如果你能活到大约 90 岁,你只会得到少数几次机会。而成功的诀窍在于抓住那几次你应得的机会,当它们出现时。他一遍又一遍地向整个夏天都围在他身边的孙辈们讲述这个故事,我的母亲——她对金钱毫无兴趣——记住了这个故事,并告诉了我。但我并不是我母亲天生的模仿者,我知道英厄姆爷爷是对的。所以从小我就知道……当我还是个小男孩时,我知道重要的机会……会降临到我身上的机会……是很少的,诀窍在于让自己准备好抓住那少数几个到来的机会。这不是那些大型投资咨询机构的态度。他们认为如果他们研究一百万件事,他们就能知道一百万件事。当然,结果是几乎没有人能跑赢指数。而我坐在这里,拿着我的《每日新闻》股票、伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票、我在李录亚洲基金的持仓、我的好市多股票,我当然跑赢了所有人。(笑声)我已经 95 岁了。我几乎从不交易。答案是,我是对的,他们是错的。这就是为什么它对我有效,而对他们无效。现在的问题是,你想变得更像我,还是更像他们?

分散投资的概念在某种程度上是有道理的,如果你不知道自己在做什么,你只想要一个标准结果,不想尴尬,那么当然你可以广泛分散。没有人因为认识到这一点而有权获得很多钱,因为这是不言自明的真理,就像知道二加二等于四一样。但投资专业人士认为,通过安排分散投资,他们是在帮助你。一个白痴也能分散投资组合!或者电脑也一样。但这场游戏的整个诀窍在于,拥有少数几次你知道某件事优于平均水平的机会,并且只在你拥有那额外知识的地方进行投资。然后,如果你只得到几个机会,那也足够了。如果你只拥有三种证券,而 J.P. 摩根大通拥有一百种,你他妈的在乎什么?拥有少数几种证券有什么不对?沃伦总是说,如果你生活在一个正在发展的小镇上,你持有镇上最优秀的三家企业的股票,这难道还不够分散吗?答案当然是,够了……如果它们都是很棒的地方的话。还有《财富》杂志的那个变得非常著名的公式,一个告诉人们如果你有优势,每次交易应该押注多少的公式。当然,你的优势越大,交易越接近确定性的赢家,你押注的就越多……当然背后有数学原理……但当然这是真的。完全有可能只买一样东西,因为机会如此之大,如此稳操胜券。这种机会只有两三个。所以,当你在寻找卓越时,整个分散投资的观念完全是荒谬的。它行不通。它给你一个不可能完成的任务。一遍又一遍地做一个不可能完成的任务有什么乐趣?我觉得是痛苦。谁会愿意做这件事?我看不到出路……

我父亲有一个客户,他是奥马哈的一名律师,他有一个客户,其丈夫有一家小小的肥皂公司。那家伙去世了,我父亲卖掉了那家肥皂公司。在大萧条中期,这个女人是镇里最富有的人之一,她拥有的就是一家小小的肥皂公司和奥马哈最好社区里最大的豪宅。当他们卖掉肥皂公司时,她拥有最好社区的豪宅和 30 万美元。但在 19 世纪 30 年代,30 万美元是一笔令人难以置信的财富。一个小汉堡五分钱,大汉堡一角钱,奥马哈的自助餐厅一天只要两角五分钱就能让你吃饱。我的意思是 30 万……嗯,她没有雇佣投资顾问,她什么也没做,她是一个很棒的老太太。她只是拿着这笔钱,把它分成五份,买了五只股票。我记得其中三只,因为我是她遗产的遗嘱认证人。一只是通用电气,一只是陶氏,一只是杜邦,我忘了另外两只。然后她再也没有动过那些股票。她从未付钱给任何顾问。她什么也没做,她买了一些市政债券,她从不花自己的收入,时不时用……(听不清)买一些市政债券。等她 50 年代去世时,她有了 150 万美元。没有成本。没有费用。我问她:“你是怎么决定这么做的?”她说,“嗯……我想电力和化学是未来的东西。”她就把钱全投进去,然后坐着不动。我一直很喜欢那个老太太。是我欣赏的那种女孩。但这很少见!

但如果你停下来想想,想想她不必听的所有那些费用和花言巧语,以及她避免的所有麻烦,还有零成本。当然,人们没有意识到——因为他们在数学上如此无知——如果你赚了 5%,其中 2% 付给了你的顾问,你失去的并不是未来财富的 40%,而是 90%。因为在一个长期过程中,那一点点差异会导致你 90% 的劣势。所以,对于一个长期持有者来说,不因业绩而支付巨额的年度过路费,是极其重要的。当然,现在有少数大型顾问正在大量使用指数化策略。当然,他们正大发其财。当然,每次他们抢到一个客户,对投资咨询行业的其他部分来说都是一种痛苦。这是一个非常严重的问题。我认为这些习惯于赢的、老派的价值投资者,现在正在退出这个行业。这是一种非常可以理解的做法。我认为这比留在……你知道……继续玩否认游戏要高尚得多。一个有趣的问题。

你可以看到,我不是想让你的早晨好过。我只是想按照事情本来的样子描述它们。但这个行业……为什么李录能取得如此巨大的成功?嗯,部分原因是他有点像中国的沃伦·巴菲特。这确实有帮助。部分原因是他在中国钓鱼!不是在这个被过度研究、过度拥挤、竞争激烈的美国市场,中国仍然存在一些无知和懈怠的角落,这给了他如此非同寻常的机会。钓鱼的第一条规则永远是:去有鱼的地方钓鱼。第二条规则永远是:别忘了第一条规则。李录只是去了钓鱼的好地方,而我们其他人就像试图在已经捕光鱼的地方捕鳕鱼的渔民。当竞争如此激烈时,你工作多努力都没用。我在世界上看到的每一个小想法,都有人在追求。有一次我坐在密歇根大学的一个投资委员会里,来了一位他们设在伦敦的成功投资者。这个投资者在伦敦做了什么?他决定投资撒哈拉以南非洲。唯一有边际的证券是在粉单市场交易的少数几家银行,所以他只能非常小批量地买入这些银行。每次有某个可怜人厌倦了把钱藏在床垫下,把它存入银行,他的情况就好一点。当然,他赚了很多钱。没有其他人投资于非洲那些小小的银行。但这个利基市场很快就被填满了。在把你的客户的钱投进撒哈拉以南非洲的一堆小银行之后,你他妈的还能做什么作为谢幕表演?当伦敦的某个家伙在买光非洲所有那些小银行股票时,还会有多少美妙的利基市场存在?这很难。

再看看现代世界,人们试图教你如何进来积极交易股票。嗯,我认为这大致相当于试图诱导一群年轻人开始吸食海洛因。这真是愚蠢至极。当你已经富有时,还通过鼓励别人通过交易致富来赚钱?还有电视上的人——另一个美妙的地方——他们说:“我有这本书,将教你如何每年赚 300%。你只需要付邮费,我就会寄给你!”(笑声)一个突然找到每年赚 300% 方法的人,有多大可能会试图在互联网上卖书给你?(笑声)这太荒谬了。然而,我已经描述了现代商业。整天做这些事的人认为自己是有用的公民。那些发明话术的广告代理人。在保险业,他们说:“嗯,那两个人从 GEICO 转到 Glotz 保险公司,每人节省了 400 美元。”但他们没有告诉你的是,整个美国只有两个这样的人,而且他们都疯了。但他们故意误导你。我对此感到厌倦,我认为我们如此刻意地误导人们是不对的。

让我再给你讲一个故事,我认为这是一个关于现代生活的有趣故事,但这要追溯到另一个时代。这个人有一匹很棒的马。真是一匹非凡的马。它步伐平稳,外表漂亮,一切都很完美。它工作起来棒极了。但偶尔它也会变得危险和凶猛,造成巨大的破坏和麻烦,让骑手断胳膊断腿等等。他去找兽医问:“我该拿这匹马怎么办?”兽医说:“这是个很简单的问题,我很乐意帮忙。”他说:“那我该怎么做?”那个人说:“下次你的马表现好的时候,把它卖掉。”(笑声)想想这有多么不道德。我难道不是刚刚描述了私募股权必须做什么吗?(笑声)当私募股权必须卖掉一些真正麻烦的东西时,他们会雇佣一位投资银行家。而投资银行家做什么?他做预测!我这辈子从未见过像投资银行中制造预测那样由此产生的“专业知识”。没有哪个生意是糟糕到做不出一份漂亮预测的。但靠虚假预测、并直视别人眼睛从他们身上赚钱,这算是一种好的谋生方式吗?我会说不。

总的说来,沃伦和我,我们从不试图从……我们愚蠢买家的愚蠢中赚钱。我们试图通过购买来赚钱,如果我们卖的是马屎,我们不想假装它能治疗关节炎。(笑声)我认为按照我们的方式度过一生,比他们的方式要好。我认为事情一直是这样,我认为一直都有欺骗。想想嘉年华,看看那些流动游艺团经营者。想想一个游艺团里有多少诡计。人们只是寻找同胞的弱点并加以利用。你必须足够聪明才能避开他们所有人。但如果他们在你的家庭里,你就无法避开。我对此没有解决方案。(笑声)但在你有公平选择的地方,有太多人应该被回避。

我父亲有个最好的朋友兼客户,他也有另一个客户,是个大吹牛大王,他总是为那个大吹牛大王工作,从不为自己那个我钦佩的、优秀的客户工作。我问:“你为什么要这样做?”他说:“查理你这个白痴……”他说,“那个大吹牛大王是一个无穷尽的法律麻烦来源。他总是惹麻烦。越界、行为不端等等。而格兰特·麦克法登善待所有人。雇员、顾客,一切。如果他遇到某个精神病患者,他会走过去,立刻优雅地脱身。像他那样的人不需要律师。”我父亲试图教我一些东西,这真的奏效了。我的一生都在努力像格兰特·麦克法登那样,我想告诉你,这很管用。真的管用。彼得·考夫曼总是告诉我,如果骗子们只知道诚实能赚多少钱,他们的行为就会完全不同。沃伦有一句我喜欢的美妙名言,他说:“你走高尚之路。它从不拥挤。”这很管用。

以《每日新闻》公司为例。我们在止赎热潮中赚了好几百万美元,因为我们刊登法律通知,而且在现代历史上最糟糕的房地产萧条时期,我们主导了止赎通知的发布。我们当时本可以提价,再多赚几千万美元。但我们没有这么做。你知道你的同胞们正在最严重的经济衰退中失去他们该死的房子……“查理·芒格,亿万富翁,提价”。这会出现在报纸头版上,看起来糟透了(如果有人读这个故事的话)。你应该这么做吗?答案当然是不应该。沃伦总是说,为了钱结婚可能总是一个错误,而如果你已经有钱了,这么做就真是蠢到家了。

当你已经富有时,却留下一个彻底坏蛋的名声,那真的是蠢到家了。里克·盖林总是喜欢这个故事:一个一辈子都是彻头彻尾恶棍的人死了,牧师说:“现在是葬礼上,有人该说点死者好话的时候了。”没人上前,没人上前,还是没人上前。最后,有个人站起来说:“嗯……他弟弟更差劲。”(笑声)嗯,你可以笑,但确实有这样的人。哈里·科恩死的时候,这里的说法是,每个人都去参加葬礼,只是为了确认他死了。

所以有一些简单的事实真的管用。当谈到《每日新闻》所处的这个困难行业时,我不会说为这些法院和机构服务是一件真正的乐事。他们需要自动化。其他人试图以我们不用的方式利用他们。而我们,一家小公司,正在逆境中挣扎。我们正夺取很多地盘。进展缓慢,但前景不错。当然,有钱的好处是,慢一点也无所谓。我们是怎么变富的?嗯,我们记住了英厄姆爷爷,当少数机会之一来临时,我们伸手抓住了它。想想你的生活是如何运作的?

Another issue of course that’s happened in the world of stock picking, where all this money and effort goes into trying to be rational, is that we’ve had a really horrible thing happen to the investment counseling class. And that is these index funds have come along and they basically beat everybody. And not only that, the amount by which they beat everybody is roughly the amount of cost of running the operation and making the changes in investments. So you have a whole profession that is basically being paid for accomplishing practically nothing. This is very peculiar. This is not the case with bowel surgery or even the criminal defense bar in the law or something. They have a whole profession where the chosen activity they’ve selected they can’t do anything. Now in the old days the people in the profession always had some of this problem and they rationalized as follows. ‘We are saving our clients from the insurance salesman and the stock broker, the standard stock broker that serves the active trader.’ And they were saving people from the life insurance salesman and the hustling stockbroker who liked active trading. And I suppose in a sense that the investing class is still saving those people from an even worse fate. But it is very peculiar when a whole profession that works so hard, and is so admirable, and the members of which we are delighted when they marry into our families, and they just can’t do what their profession is really trying to do, which is get better than average results. How is that profession handling this terrible situation, as index investing gets more and more popular and including a lot of fancy places? Well it’s a very simple answer, they’re handling it with denial. They have a horrible problem they can’t fix, so they just treat it as nonexistent. This is a very stupid way to handle a problem. Now it may be good when you’re thinking about your own death which you can’t fix and it’s just denial all the way to the end. But in all the practical fields of life, this problem thoroughly understood is half solved or better coped with. So it’s wrong to have all these people in just a state of denial and doing what they always did year after year and hoping that the world would keep paying them for it even though an unmanaged index is virtually certain to do better. It’s a very serious problem. And think of how much New York say needs a flow of money from finance. Think what would happen to Manhattan if there weren’t any fees for investment management or trading spreads and so on. So it’s a weird situation and of course it’s unpleasant. Big investment counseling shops, some of them shrink and some go out of business. And the value investors, of course who many of I know because we came from that tradition, the value investors who were honorable are quitting. Boom. Boom. Boom. And what worked for them for years stopped working and they’re honorable people they just quit. And they’re also rich which makes it easy. But those who aren’t rich have a hell of a problem. And it costs about fifty thousand dollars in the city of Manhattan to send your kid to pre-school. Non-deductible. And that’s just the start of an endless procession of years of vast expanse. So if your game is money management you have a serious problem. I don’t have any solution for this problem. I do think that index investing, if everybody did it won’t work. But for another considerable period, index investing is going to work better than active stock picking where you try and know a lot. Now at a place like Berkshire Hathaway or even the Daily Journal, we’ve done better than average. And now there’s a question, why has that happened? Why has that happened? And the answer is pretty simple. We tried to do less. We never had the illusion we could just hire a bunch of bright young people and they would know more than anybody about canned soup and aerospace and utilities and so on and so on and so on. We never had that dream. We never thought we could get really useful information on all subjects like Jim Cramer pretends to have. (laughter) We always realized that if we worked very hard we can find a few things where we were right. And that a few things were enough. And that that was a reasonable expectation. That is a very different way to approach the process. And if you had asked Warren Buffett the same thing that this investment counseling did, “Give me your best idea this year.”, and you had just followed Warren’s best idea, you would find it worked beautifully. But he wasn’t trying to know the whole…he would give you one or two stocks. He had more limited ambitions. I had a grandfather who was very useful to me, my mother’s grandfather, and he was a pioneer. He came out to Iowa with no money but youth and health and took it away from the Indians. He fought in the Black Hawk…he was a Captain in the Black Hawk Wars, and he stayed there and he bought cheap land and he was aggressive and intelligent and so forth and eventually he was the richest man in the town and owned the bank, and highly regarded, and a huge family, and a very happy life. He had the attitude…having come out to Iowa when the land was not much more than a dollar an acre, and having stayed there until that black topsoil created a modern rich civilization, and some of the best land in the world…His attitude was that in a favored life like his, when you were located in the right place, you just got a few opportunities if you lived to be about 90. And that the trick in coming out well was seizing a few opportunities that were your fair share that came along when they did. And he told that story over and over again to the grandchildren that hung around him all summer, and my mother who had no interest in money remembered the story and told it to me. But I’m not my mother’s natural imitator and I knew Grandpa Ingham was right. And so I always knew from…when I was a little boy that the opportunities that were important…that were gonna come to me…were few and the trick was to prepare myself for seizing the few that came. This is not the attitude that they have at a big investment counseling thing. They think if they study a million things they can know a million things. And of course the result is that almost nobody can outperform an index. Whereas I sit here with my Daily Journal stock, my Berkshire Hathaway stock, my holdings in Li Lu’s Asian fund, my Costco stock, and of course I’m outperforming everybody. (laughter) And I’m ninety-five years old. And I practically never have a transaction. And the answer is that I’m right and they’re wrong. And that’s why it’s worked for me and not for them. And now the question is do you want to be more like me or more like them? The idea of diversification makes sense to a point if you don’t know what you’re doing and you want the standard result and not be embarrassed, why course you can widely diverse. Nobody’s entitled to a lot of money for recognizing that because it’s a truism it’s like knowing that two and two equals four. But the investment professionals think they’re helping you by arranging diversification. An idiot could diversify a portfolio! Or a computer for that matter. But the whole trick of the game is to have a few times when you know that something is better than average and to invest only where you have that extra knowledge. And then if you get just a few opportunities that’s enough. What the hell do you care if you own three securities and J.P. Morgan Chase owns a hundred? What’s wrong with owning a few securities? Warren always says that if you lived in a growing town and you owned stock in three of the best enterprises in the town, isn’t that diversified enough? The answer is of course it is…if they’re all wonderful places. And that Fortune’s formula which got so famous which was a formula to tell people how much to bet on each transaction if you had an edge. And of course the bigger your edge, the more close the transaction was to a certain winner, the more you should bet…And of course there’s mathematics behind it…But of course it’s true. It’s perfectly possible to buy only one thing because the opportunity is so great and it’s such a cinch. There are only two or three. So the whole idea of diversification when you’re looking for excellence, is totally ridiculous. It doesn’t work. It gives you an impossible task. What fun is it to do an impossible task over and over again? I find it agony. Who would want to do it? And I don’t see a way… My father had a client, he was a lawyer in Omaha, he had a client whose husband had a little soap company. The guy died and my father’s sold the soap company. This woman was one of the richest people in town in the middle of the depression, and what she had was a little soap company and the biggest mansion in Omaha’s best neighborhood. When they sold the soap company she had a mansion in the best neighborhood and three hundred thousand dollars. But three hundred thousand dollars in nineteen thirty something was an incredible amount of money. A little hamburger it was a nickel a big hamburger was a dime, and the all you can eat cafe in Omaha would feed you all needed to stay alive for two bits a day. I mean 300,000… Well she didn’t hire an investment counselor, she didn’t do anything, she’s a wonderful old woman. She just took that, she divided it into five chunks, and she bought five stocks. I remember three of them because I probated her estate. One of them was General Electric, one was Dow, one was Dupont, and I forget the other two. Then she never changed those stocks. She never paid any adviser. She never did anything, and she bought some municipal bonds, she never spent her income, and she bought some municipal bonds from time to time with the (inaudible). By the time she died in the 50s she had a million and a half dollars. No cost. No expenses. I said, “How did you decide to do that?” And “Well…” she said, “I thought electricity and chemistry were the coming things.” She just chucked it all in and sat on her ass. I always liked that little old woman. My kind of a girl. But it’s rare! But if you stop to think about it, think of all the expense and palaver that she didn’t have to listen to and all the trouble she avoided, and zero costs. And of course what people don’t realize, because they’re so mathematically illiterate, is if you make 5 percent and pay 2 of it to your advisors, you’re not losing 40 percent of your future you’re losing 90 percent. Because over a long period of time that little difference causes a 90 percent disadvantage to you. So it’s hugely important for somebody who’s a long term holder not to be paying a big annual toll out of the performance. And of course there are a few big time advisors now who are using indexation very heavily. And of course they’re prospering mightily. And of course every time they get somebody it’s just agony for the rest of the investment counseling business. This is a very serious problem. And I think these people who were used to winning as old-time value investors who are now just quitting the profession. That’s a very understandable thing to do. I regarded it as more noble than staying in…you know…playing along with the denial. It’s an interesting problem. You can see I’m not trying to make your morning. I’m just trying to describe things the way they are. But this business… Why does Li Lu succeed so mightily? Well partly he’s sort of a Chinese Warren Buffet. That really helps. And partly he’s fishing in China! Not in this over-searched, over-populated, highly competitive American market, and there’s still pockets of ignorance and lassitude in China that gave him so unusual opportunities. The first rule in fishing has always been fish where the fish are. And the second rule of fishing has always been ‘Don’t forget rule number one’. And Li Lu just went where the fishing was good and the rest of us are like cod fishermen who are trying to catch cod where the fish have been fished out. It doesn’t matter how much you work, when there’s that much competition. Every little idea I see in the world some are going after. I sat once on an investment committee at the University of Michigan and in came one of their successful investors located in London. And what had this investor done in London? He decided to invest in sub-Saharan Africa. And the only marginal securities were a few banks that traded in the Pink Sheets, so he would buy very tiny quantities of these banks. And every time some poor person got tired of having their money in the mattress and put it in a bank he did a little better. And of course he made a lot of money. Nobody else was investing in little tiny banks in Africa. But the niche was soon filled. What the hell do you do for an encore after you put your client’s money in a bunch of little tiny banks in sub-Saharan Africa? The niche gets filled quickly. How many wonderful niches are there going to be when some guy in London is buying all these tiny little bank stocks in Africa? It’s hard. Then if you take the modern world where people are trying to teach you how to come in and trade actively in stocks. Well I regard that as roughly equivalent to trying to induce a bunch of young people to start off on heroin. It is really stupid. And when you’re already rich to make your money by encouraging people to get rich by trading? And then there are people on the TV, another wonderful place, and they say, “I have this book that will teach you how to make 300 percent a year. All you have to do is pay for shipping and I will mail it to you!” (laughter) How likely is it that a person who suddenly found a way to make 300 percent a year would be trying to sell books on the internet to you! (laughter) It’s ridiculous. And yet I’ve described modern commerce. And the people who do this all day think they’re useful citizens. The advertising agents who invent the lingo. In insurance they say, “Well” they say, “the two people who shifted from Geico to the Glotz insurance company save four hundred dollars each.” But what they don’t tell is that there are only two such people in the whole United States and they were both nuts. But they mislead you on purpose. I get tired of it and I don’t think it’s right that we deliberately mislead people as much as we do. Let me tell you another story that I think is an interesting one about the modern life, but this goes back to a different time. This man has this wonderful horse. And it’s just a marvelous horse. It’s got an easy gait, good looking, and everything. It just works wonderfully. But also occasionally it just gets so he’s dangerous and vicious and causes enormous damage and trouble and breaks arms and legs for his rider and so on. And he goes to vet and says, “What can I do about this horse?” And the vet says, “That’s a very easy problem and I’m glad to help you.” And he says, “What should I do?” And the man says, “The next time your horse is behaving well, sell it.” (laughter) Think about it immoral that is. And haven’t I just described what private equity has to do? (laughter) When private equity has to sell something that’s really troublesome, they hire an investment banker. And what does investment banker do? He makes a projection! I have never seen such expertise in my whole life, as is created in making projections in investment banking. There is no business so lousy that it can’t get a wonderful projection. But is that a great way to make a living to have phony projections and use it to make money out of people you look right into their eyes of? I would say no. By and large Warren and I, we never tried to make money out…stupidity of our dumb buyers. We tried to make money by buying, and if we were selling horseshit we didn’t want to pretend it was a cure for arthritis. (laughter) And I think it’s better to go through life our way instead of theirs. I think it’s always been this way, I think there’s always been chicanery. Think of the carnivals, the carny operator. Think of how much trickery there is in a carny operation. People just seek out the weaknesses of their fellow man and take advantage. And you have to get wise enough so you avoid them all. And you can’t avoid them if they’re in your family. I have no solution to that one. (laughter) But where you have a fair choice, there are just so many people that should be avoided. My father had this best friend and client and he also had this other client who is a big blowhard and he was always working for the big blowhard and he wasn’t ever working for his wonderful client whom I admired. And I said, “Why do you do this?” And he said, “Charlie you idiot…” He says, “the big blowhard is an endless source of legal troubles. He’s always in trouble. Overreaching and misbehaving and so forth. Whereas Grant McFadden treats everybody right. The employees, the customers, everything. And if he gets involved with some psychotic he walks over there and makes a graceful exit immediately. A man like that doesn’t need a lawyer.” My father was trying to teach me something and it really worked. I spent my whole life trying to be like Grant McFadden and I want to tell you it works. It really works. Peter Kaufman is always telling me if the crooks only knew how much money you could make by being honest, they’d all behave differently. Warren has a wonderful saying that I like, he says, “You take the high road. It’s never crowded.” And it’s worked. Take the Daily Journal Corporation. We made quite a few millions of dollars out of the foreclosure boom because we published legal notices and we dominated the publication of foreclosure notices in the worst real estate depression in the history of modern times. And we could have raised our prices at the time and made more tens of millions of dollars. But we didn’t do it. You know what your fellow citizens are losing their damn houses in the worst recession…’Charlie Munger billionaire raises prices’. It would look lousy on the front page of the paper (if people read the story). Should you do it? And the answer is no of course not. Warren always said it’s probably always a mistake to marry for money and it’s really stupid if you’re already rich. And it’s really stupid when you’re already rich to get a reputation of being a total nogoodnik. Rick Guerin always loved the story about the guy who had been a total miscreant all his life, and (when) he died the minister said, “Now is the time in the funeral ceremony when somebody says something nice about the deceased.” And nobody came forward and nobody came forward and nobody came forward. Finally one guy stood up and he said, “Well” he said, “His brother was worse.” (laughter) Well you can laugh but there are people like that. When Harry Cohn died here the saying was that everybody went to the funeral to make sure he was dead. So there are a few simple truths that really work. And when it gets to this difficult business the Daily Journal is in, I wouldn’t say it is a real pleasure to be serving these courts and agencies. They need the automation. Other people are trying to take advantage of them in ways that we aren’t. And we’re struggling against the odds (being) a little tiny company. And we’re taking a lot of territory. It’s slow going but the prospects are good. And of course the nice thing about being rich is that it doesn’t matter if it’s a little slow. And how do we get rich? Well we remembered Grandpa Ingham, and when one of the few opportunities came along we reached out and seized it. Think of how your life works?

再举个例子,以我的人生经历来说,如果不是因为我在上世纪 70 年代犯了一个疏忽性的错误,芒格家族现在的资产会是现在的两倍。那真是……愚蠢透顶。我错过了一个机会,那个机会原本可以让我的净资产翻倍。这就是正常的人生。你会遇到一两个这样的机会。至于事情结果如何……我们都知道有些人结婚,我的意思是,他们的配偶远比他们优秀。想想看,对他们来说,那是多么好的一个决定,多么幸运的一个决定。比金钱重要得多。很多人是在年轻时做到的,他们只是偶然撞上了。现在你不需要靠偶然,你可以非常小心。很多人身上挂着牌子,写着“危险,危险,请勿触碰。” 可人们还是径直冲了上去。(笑声)那是个错误。好吧,你可以笑,但这仍然是一个可怕的错误。

对于董事会成员来说,彼此相识、一起处理这些稀奇古怪的事情、应对人生的起伏变迁,一直很有趣。当然,我们这么老了,这本身就很特别。我的意思是,想象一个地方,加里·威尔科克斯(Gary Wilcox)都算是年轻人了。这哥们儿的妻子仍是高尔夫冠军。但那不是(因为她老当益壮)。我意思是,这是一个神奇的群体。这也是个有趣的例子。想象一下,像我这样又老又衰的人,却过得相当开心。这是怎么发生的?嗯,你……那又是另一个故事了。

我还要再讲几个故事,因为你们喜欢听故事。这里有一个虚构但很有启发性的故事。一个年轻人来拜访莫扎特。他说:“莫扎特,我想写交响曲。” 莫扎特问:“你多大了?” 年轻人说:“我 23 岁。” 莫扎特说:“你还太年轻,写不了交响曲。” 年轻人说:“可是莫扎特,你 10 岁就开始写交响曲了。” 莫扎特说:“是的,但我那时候没有去向别人请教该怎么写。” 还有一个关于莫扎特的故事。他可能是有史以来最伟大的音乐天才。他的生活是什么样的呢?嗯,他极度不快乐,而且英年早逝。这就是莫扎特的一生。莫扎特到底做错了什么,把事情搞得一团糟?嗯,他做了两件事,这两件事必然会带来很多痛苦。第一,他严格地入不敷出,这非常愚蠢。第二,他充满了嫉妒和怨恨。如果你入不敷出,又充满嫉妒和怨恨,你的人生就会一团糟,不开心,而且英年早逝。你需要做的就是从莫扎特身上学习。你也可以从那个向莫扎特请教如何写交响曲的年轻人身上学到东西。事实是,不是每个人都能学会所有东西。有些人就是比你强得多。当然,无论你多么努力,总会有人取得更大的成就。有些人,或者有些女人。我的态度是“那又怎样?” 我们中间有谁需要成为全世界最顶尖的那个吗?这太荒谬了。

还有一件事,人们做出来我觉得很不可思议,就是修建那些巨大的陵墓。我觉得他们是希望人们走过陵墓时会说:“天哪,我真想躺在里面!”(笑声)

总之。你们可以看到,我们一路走来很开心,而且效果也很好。但如果你真的算一下,《每日新闻》公司(Daily Journal Corporation)或伯克希尔·哈撒韦历史上做出过多少个决策,每年有意义的决策并不多。这是一场需要时刻在场、在难得的机会出现时能够识别它,并且要认识到正常人一生中本就不会遇到太多这种机会的游戏。现在,有一群非常能干的人在卖证券,他们表现得好像自己拥有无穷无尽的好机会。嗯,这些人就相当于赛马场的马票推销员。他们甚至不值得尊重。假装懂得很多自己不懂的东西,假装提供很多自己提供不了的机会,这不是一个活出好人生的方式。我给你的建议是,离这些人远点,但如果你在经营一家股票经纪公司,那你就需要他们。不过,这不是赚钱的正确方式。控制成本、生活简朴,这才是秘诀。沃伦和我过去只有一点点钱。我们总是量入为出,然后投资。如果你活得足够长,你最终就会变得富有。这并不复杂。

现在,生活中有这样一个部分:如何从错误中解脱出来,而又不付出太大的代价?我们也做过一些这种事。如果你看看伯克希尔·哈撒韦,想想它的创始业务:一家注定倒闭的百货商店、一家注定倒闭的新英格兰纺织公司、一家注定倒闭的赠品券公司。伯克希尔·哈撒韦就是从这些废墟中诞生的。当我们以非常便宜的价格买下这些注定输掉的牌时,我们处理得还算不错。但当然,成功来自于改变我们的方式,进入更好的生意。这不是说我们多么擅长做困难的事。我们擅长的是避开困难的事,找到容易的事。

顺便说一句,当我们买下《每日新闻》时,那很简单。我们现在在这个软件业务里做的事,是困难的。但由于这些良好关系的机缘巧合,以及这些老同事都活得很长,我们在新业务上做得还不错。它有潜力。而且做起来很有趣。有多少家正在走下坡路的报纸,拥有数亿美元的可交易证券,还有一个有些前途的新业务?我们就像最后的莫希干人。(笑声)

好了,我现在来接受一些提问。我们需要一些秩序。

问题 1:在《局外人》(Outsiders)这本书里,威廉·桑代克(William Thorndike)列出了八位 CEO,他们相对于 S&P 500 指数和同行取得了卓越的业绩。那么,除了巴菲特先生和墨菲先生,伯克希尔或您是否投资了其他六家公司?如果没有,为什么?

查理:嗯,我回答不了这个问题,我不知道其他六家公司是什么。但我得说,总的来说,随着形势变得愈发艰难,我们更擅长抱着已有的东西不动,而不是去购买新的。买新的东西一直很难。自从我们买了那家卡车服务站运营商之后,我们就再也没有买过任何规模完整的公司了。所以,如果你现在在任何事情上遇到了困难,欢迎加入这个俱乐部。

问题 2:您能否评论一下华盛顿方面提出的限制或对股票回购征税的立法提案?

查理:哦……(笑声)……嗯。里克讲过一个故事,有个爱尔兰老头,总偷教堂的东西,还整天酗酒。他临死的时候,神父要他弃绝魔鬼。他说我做不到,因为我现在的处境不应该得罪任何人。我想我也不应该……如果你让我开始谈论政客,我可能会失言。所以,我们换个话题吧。

问题 3:我的问题是关于小型银行的。如果你看看美国资产超过约 10 亿美元的银行,一直看到超级区域银行这个级别,大概有……

In my life, to give another example, the Mungers would have twice the assets they now have if I hadn’t made one mistake of omission back in nineteen 70s. And…really stupid. I blew an opportunity that would have doubled my present net worth. That is a normal life. You get one or two. And how things work out…We all know people that are out married, I mean their spouses are so much better. Think of what a good decision that was for them. And what a lucky decision. Way more important than money. A lot of them did it when they were young, they just stumbled into it. Now you don’t have to stumble into it, you can be very careful. A lot of people are wearing signs, “Danger. Danger. Do not touch.” And people just charged right ahead. (laughter) That’s a mistake. Well you can laugh but it’s still a horrible mistake. It’s been fun for the people on this board to know one another and work on these oddball things and handle life’s vicissitudes. Of course it’s very peculiar that we’re so old. I mean imagine a place where Gary Wilcox is one of the young men. The guy’s wife is still in golf champion. But that’s (not because she’s good when she’s old.) I mean it’s an amazing group. That’s an interesting example too. Imagine me as an old and as impaired as I am and having a pretty good time. How does that happen? Well you…That is another story. I’ll tell a couple of other stories too because you like stories. Here’s an apocryphal story that is very instructive. A young man comes to visit Mozart. And he says, “Mozart” he says, “I want to write symphonies”. And Mozart says, “How old are you?” The man says, “I’m 23.” And Mozart says, “You’re too young to write symphonies.” And he says, “But Mozart you were writing symphonies when you were 10 years old.” And Mozart says, “Yes but I wasn’t asking other people how to do it.” Now there’s another Mozart story. Here’s the greatest musical talent maybe that ever lived. And what was his life like? Well he was bitterly unhappy and he died young. That’s the life of Mozart. What the hell did Mozart do to screw it up? Well he did two things that are guaranteed to create a lot of misery. He overspent his income scrupulously, that’s number one. That is really stupid. And the other thing was he was full of jealousies and resentments. If you over-spend your income and be full of jealousy and resentments, you’re going to have a lousy unhappy life and die young. All you’ve got to do is learn from Mozart. You can also learn from that young man who was asking Mozart how to write symphonies. The truth of the matter is that not everybody can learn everything. Some people are way they hell better. And of course no matter how hard you try there’s always some guy who achieves more. Some guy or gal. My attitude is ‘so what?’. Does any of us need to be the very top of the whole world? It’s ridiculous. Another thing that people do that I regard as amazing is they build these enormous mausoleums. I think they figure they want people to walk by that mausoleum and say, “Gosh I wish I were in there!”. (laughter) Anyway. You can see we’ve have had some fun as we go along and it’s worked so well. But if you actually figure out how many decisions were made in the history of the Daily Journal Corporation or the history of Berkshire Hathaway it wasn’t very many per year that were meaningful. It’s a game of being there all the time and recognizing the rare opportunity when it comes and recognizing that the normal human allotment is to not have very many. Now it’s a very competent bunch of people who sell securities who act as though they’ve got an endless supply of wonderful opportunities. Well those people are the equivalent of the race track tout. They’re not even respectable. It’s not a good way to live your life to pretend to know a lot of stuff you don’t know and pretend to furnish a lot of opportunities you’re not furnishing. And my advice to you is avoid those people, but not if you’re running a stock brokerage firm. You need them. But it’s not the right way to make money. This business of controlling the costs and living simply, that was the secret. Warren and I had tiny little bits of money. We always underspent our incomes and invested. And if you live long enough you end up rich. It’s not very complicated. Now there is a part of life which is, how do you scramble out of your mistakes without them costing too much? And we’ve done some of that too. If you look at Berkshire Hathaway, think of its founding businesses. A doomed department store, doomed New England textile company, and a doomed trading stamp company. Out of that came Berkshire Hathaway. Now we handled those losing hands pretty well when we bought into them very cheaply. But of course the success came from changing our ways and getting into the better businesses. It isn’t that we were so good at doing things that were difficult. We were good at avoid things that were difficult. Finding things that are easy. By the way, when we bought the Daily Journal that was easy. What we’re doing now in this software business is difficult. But due to the accident of these good associations and the fact that these old colleagues have lived so long, we’re doing pretty well in the new business. It has potential. And it’s fun to do. How many declining newspapers have hundreds of millions of marketable securities lying around and a new business with some promise? We’re like the last of the Mohicans. (laughter) Well I’ll take some questions now. We need some system of order. Question 1: In the book outsiders William Thorndike lists eight CEOs that achieved superlative performance to the S&P 500 and their peers, so other than Mr. Buffett and Mr. Murphy, did Berkshire or you invest in the other six companies? And if not, why? Charlie: Well I can’t answer that question, I don’t know the others six companies. But I would say, generally speaking as things have gotten tougher, we’ve been better at sitting on our asses with what we have than we have in buying new ones. It’s been hard to buy new ones. We haven’t bought a whole company of any size since we bought the truck stop operator. So if you’re having trouble with the present time with anything, join the club. Question 2: Could you please comment on proposed legislation in Washington to restrict or tax share buybacks. Charlie: Oh…(laughter)…Well. Rick tells a story about an old Irishman that used to steal from the church and drunk all the time. And when he’s dying the priest asked him to renounce the devil. And he said I can’t do that because in my condition I shouldn’t offend anybody. And I don’t think I should…If you get me started on politicians, I may be impolitic. So let’s go on to another subject. Question 3: My question is about smaller banks. If you look at banks with assets greater than about a billion dollars in the U.S. and go up and stop at the super regional level, there’s about

那 250 家银行。我的问题是,以你的判断,那是不是一个值得用价值投资原则去挖掘,有望找到一两家优秀企业的狩猎场?

查理:感谢你替我问了这个问题,答案是肯定的。

问题 4:你和沃伦几十年来一直主张,CEO 应该告诉股东他们评估一家企业所需的所有信息。通过实地走访和致电全国各地的法院,我亲眼看到了 JTI 在竞标中击败更大竞争对手的成功案例。但你们在已中标但尚未完成的合同方面信息不够透明,导致估算价值有相当大的波动空间。如果股东不愿意给全国 50 家法院打冷电话去查这些尚未被法院接受的合同,你们能不能为我们这些股东多透露一些信息,比如法院接受这些合同的意愿如何?有没有出现过你们投入了工作但合同最终未被法院接受的情况?

查理:我们手上有各种阶段的合同或潜在合同。情况非常复杂,我不敢说自己每件都清楚,因为我信任格里和具体做事的人。但总体来看,我能看出趋势是好的。不过除此之外,我只能告诉你,如果你近距离观察这件事有多难,你会吓一跳。确实很难。但尽管困难重重,我们做得还不错。可我们也没有魔法棒。如果你读了所有报告……就算我把所有报告都读得极其仔细,把所有精力都花在理解这件事上,我也不见得能搞得很明白。所以我觉得你想搞明白的机会很渺茫。

问题 5:我最喜欢你的语录之一就是,你想雇一个智商 130 却觉得自己只有 120 的人;而一个智商 150 却觉得自己有 170 的人,会把你害惨。

查理:你肯定是在说埃隆·马斯克。

问题 5(接上):那你做招聘决策时,怎么评估一个人?

查理:我当然想要那个了解自己局限的人,而不是那个不了解的人。另一方面,我这一生也学到了一件非常重要的事。那是从霍华德·阿曼森那里学来的。你知道他常说什么吗?“永远不要低估高估自己的人。”那些高估自己的怪人,偶尔能一飞冲天。这是现代生活中非常不愉快的一面。但我已经学会适应了。我没别的办法。这种事一直在发生。但我不想自己的个人生活里充斥着一群活在幻觉中的家伙,他们只是偶尔大赢一把。我要的是谨慎的人。

问题 6:在中国那么多投资者中,李录有什么特别之处让你看中?因为从他的传记看,他更像一个局外人。他和托德·库姆斯、特德·韦施勒相比,有多相似或多不同?去年你为何在中国跟李录一起接受那次访谈?

查理:我之所以这么做,是因为他邀请了我,而我有时会答应这种请求——我在这方面挺傻的。他们问问题时,我说了实话。答案是,李录不是个普通……

250 of those banks. And my question is, is that a hunting ground that you would think, applying the principles of value investing, is likely to yield one or two great businesses? Charlie: Well thank you for answering that question, the answer is yes. Question 4: You and Warren have advocated for decades that CEOs should tell shareholders everything they need to know to value a business. From visiting and calling courthouses around the country, I’ve personally seen the success that you’ve had being awarded contracts against larger competitors for JTI. However your opaqueness regarding contracts that have been awarded but not completed leaves a wide range that an estimated value could fall for. So if a shareholder unwilling to cold call 50 courts around the country to find these contracts that haven’t been accepted yet, could you please provide a little bit of detail for us shareholders as far as the willingness for courts to accept these? Have you had any contracts that haven’t been accepted after you put in the work? Charlie: Well we’ve got contracts or possible contracts at every stage you could imagine. And it’s very complicated and I don’t purport to understand each one because I’ve trusted Gerry and the people who are doing it. But generally speaking I can see that the trend is favorable. But more than that I can only say you would be horrified if you watched it up close how difficult it is. It’s difficult. But in spite of its difficulties we’re doing pretty well. But we haven’t got any magic wand. If you read all the reports…If I read all the reports in great detail and spent all my effort trying to understand it, I wouldn’t understand it very well. So I think your chances are very poor. Question 5: One of my favorite lines from you is you want to hire the guy with the IQ of 130 that thinks it’s 120 and the guy with an IQ of 150 who thinks it’s 170 will just kill you. Charlie: You must be thinking about Elon Musk. Question 5 (continued…): How do you assess someone when making a hiring decision? Charlie: Of course I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Ahmanson. You know what he used to say? “Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” These weird guys who overestimate themselves occasionally knock it right out of the park. And that is a very unhappy part of modern life. But I’ve learned to adjust to it. I have no alternative. It happens all the time. But I don’t want my personal life to be a bunch of guys who are living in a state of delusion, who happen occasionally to win big. I want the prudent person. Question 6: What did you see in Li Lu versus other investors in China? Because in his biography it looks like he’s more of an outsider. And how similar or different is he versus Todd Combs and Ted Weschler? And Is there any reason why you gave that interview last year with Li Lu in China? Charlie: Well I did it because he asked me and I sometimes do that, I am foolish that way. And I said what I believed when they asked me the questions. The answer is Li Lu is not a normal…

李录是中国版的沃伦·巴菲特。他天赋极高。我当然也享受过调侃他的乐趣,但有意思的是……我已经九十五岁了……九十五年来,我只给过一个外人钱让他帮我管钱,那个人就是李录。他当然打出了全垒打。这确实非常了不起,但也说明我选人很挑剔。当然,既然我已经有了李录,要拿他跟别人比,我还能挑谁呢?顺便说一句,这是个做决策的好方法,也是我们一贯的做法。如果某件事我们能做得更多,那我们对任何不如它的东西都没兴趣。这让生活变得简单得多,因为比李录更优秀的人没那么多。所以我就坐着不动。你花些时间只是坐着,就会发现这事有多聪明。太多人过于活跃了。

问题 7:芒格先生早上好。您过去曾说过,您预计下一次民主党同时控制行政、立法、司法三个分支时,美国会采用单一支付方医疗体系或全民医保……

查理:是的,我是这么认为。

问题 7(续):这对医疗保险公司、医院和医疗器械公司意味着什么?

查理:嗯,这将会是个烂摊子。它仍然会是门大生意,但会是一团糟。现有的体系过于昂贵、过于复杂,而且包含了太多不必要的成本。对临终病人有太多不必要的过度治疗。太多本该放着不管的病情被过度处理。太多不必要的开支。但另一方面,从顶尖医疗质量来看,它又是世界上最好的体系。所以这是个非常复杂的话题,但它确实是个烂摊子。看到新加坡只花了美国医疗支出的 20%,而他们的体系却好得多,这让我感到沮丧。他们所做的事只是最基础的常识。当然,这由一个掌控全局的华裔领导人创造出来的。这显然比我们政治流程产出的结果更明智。

新加坡的医疗体系是李光耀创立的。它当然运行得更好。但在像新加坡这样一个发达地区,成本只有我们的 20% 却效果更好……所以,从我们医疗体系的潜力来看,有很多让人灰心的地方。当然,我们的政客并不擅长修复这类系统。所以,如果你现在不喜欢它,我可以自信地预测,你以后也不会喜欢它。(笑声)

问题 8:去年我读了很多斯多葛学派哲学家的书,比如埃皮克提图、塞内加、马可·奥勒留……

查理:嗯,我能理解你为什么读。确实有很多事需要斯多葛式的坚韧。(笑声)

问题 8(续):当我从他们身上汲取智慧时,有一个名字不断浮现在我脑海中,那就是芒格、芒格、芒格……

查理:嗯,有些人觉得马可·奥勒留还不错。(笑声)

He’s the Chinese Warren Buffet. He’s very talented. Of course I’ve enjoyed bagging him, but it’s interesting that way…I’m ninety five years…I’ve given Munger money to some outsider to run once in ninety five years. And it’s Li Lu, and of course he’s hit it out of the park. It’s very remarkable but it’s also pretty picky. And of course once I’ve got Li Lu if I’m comparing to him, who else am I going to pick? And by the way that’s a good way to make decisions and that’s what we do. If we’ve got one thing we can do more of, we’re not interested in anything that’s not better than that. That simplifies life a great deal because there aren’t that many people better than Li Lu. So I just sit. It’s amazing how intelligent it is to spend some time just sitting. A lot of people are way too active. Question 7: Good morning Mr. Munger. You said in the past that you expect the U.S. to adopt a single payer health care system or Medicare for all the next time that Democrats control all three branches of government… Charlie: I Do, yes. Question 7 (continued): What will this mean for health insurers, hospitals, and medical device companies? Charlie: Well it will be a hell of a mess. It’ll still be a big business but it will be a hell of a mess. The existing system is so over expensive and over complicated and has so much unnecessary cost. So much unnecessary overtreatment of the dying. So much overtreatment of items that would be best left alone. So much unnecessary expense. Yet on the other hand it’s the best system there is in the world in terms of the quality at the top. So it’s a very complicated subject, but it’s a hell of a mess. I find it demoralizing to see in Singapore they spend 20 percent of what we spend in America on medical care and their system is way better. And what they’re doing is just the most elemental common sense. But of course it was created by one Chinese guy who was in control. Of course it’s more intelligent than the outcome of our political process. That Singapore system was created by Lee Kuan Yew. Of course it works better. But to have it cost 20 percent and work better in an advanced place likes Singapore…So there’s a lot to be demoralized about in terms of the potential of our medical care system. And of course it isn’t that our politicians are good at fixing systems like that. So if you don’t like it now, I confidently predict you won’t like it later either. (laughter) Question 8: I read a lot of the stoic philosophers last year. Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius… Charlie: Well I can see why you would. There’s a lot to be stoic about. (laughter) Question 8 (Continued): And as I glean lessons from them there was one name that kept coming to mind, that is Munger, Munger, Munger…. Charlie: Well some people think that Marcus Aurelius is all right. (laughter)

问题 8:能谈谈斯多葛学派对您的影响,以及您最喜欢他们的哪些建议吗?

查理:影响很大。他们对我影响很大(影响很大),包括那个从奴隶做起的爱比克泰德。不,我喜欢那些古代的斯多葛主义者。我能活得如此长久又顺遂,部分秘诀就在于:不要对人性的期望太高。人性中几乎注定存在许多缺陷和问题。让你的生活充满积怨和仇恨,那只会适得其反。你在惩罚自己,却改变不了这个世界。你能想出比“用一种毁了自己、又没改变世界的方式来改造世界”更愚蠢的事吗?这太蠢了。我就是不做这种事。我有一条针对政客的规矩。这是条斯多葛式的规矩……我常常想,政客从来不会坏到让你活不到想让他们回来的那一天。我年轻时,加州议会里全是些小保险经纪人和律师,整天想捞不正当好处。餐馆、妓女、酒吧、赛马场、酒类批发商等等都在招待他们。时代在变。现在我们有了不一样的议会,我只想那些老骗子、说客和妓女都回来。(笑声)你们笑,但你们这些年轻人,将来总有一天会希望……南希·佩洛西和唐纳德·特朗普都长生不老。(笑声)

问题 9:能给我们推荐一本读物吗?也许是本新书,能从根本上改变你对某件事的看法的那种。

查理:嗯,九十五岁的人很少有还会改变对事物看法的。不过我倒确实发现,我偶尔会读到一些有趣的轶事之类的东西,也挺喜欢。但我对那些老故事也同样喜欢。比如那个兽医和马的故事。不过有些精辟的小故事,道理实在太明显了。讲故事确实能有效地传达信息。有趣的一点是,看看我们现在的政客,再想想亚伯拉罕·林肯。现在的哪个政客会让你想起亚伯拉罕·林肯?两党里有吗?林肯曾受雇于一个人,这个人的合伙人去世了,没给妻子和三个孩子留下什么钱。他还欠这个活着的合伙人一些钱,于是这个活着的合伙人来找林肯说:“我要你去把这笔钱要回来。”林肯对这个家伙说:“嗯,你看起来是个有本事的人,稍微出点力就能轻松拿回那么多钱。如果你想从这个可怜的寡妇和她三个孩子身上榨出点钱,那你得去找别的律师。”这让你想起我们现在的哪个政客了吗?那是亚伯拉罕·林肯。多好的一个故事。难怪他被铭记。你知道谁该为亚伯拉罕·林肯的成就得到赞誉,却从未得到吗?是他的继母!亚伯拉罕·林肯的父母都是文盲。但他的父亲绝望之下为了拉拔孩子而娶的继母,却一眼看中了林肯,看出他爱读书,并且一路帮助他。我最终打算把那位继母的一幅画像捐给某个地方,因为我钦佩她一生所成就的事。想象一下,她比亚伯拉罕·林肯生命中的任何其他人都更有影响力。

问题 10:我的问题是关于知识产权的,因为您是学法律出身的。考虑到这个领域目前的复杂局面,是否有更好的方式让各国之间共享知识产权,尤其是在华为的案例中,是否有更好的法律框架来处理知识产权问题?

Question 8: Can you talk to me about the influence that the Stoics had on you and some of your favorite advice from them. Charlie: A lot. A lot have had (a lot of influence) on me, including Epictetus who started as a slave. No I like those old Stoics. And part of the secret of a long life that’s worked as well as mine is not to expect too much of human nature. It’s almost bound to be a lot of defects and problems. And to have your life full of seething resentments and hatreds, it’s counterproductive. You’re punishing yourself and not fixing the world. Can you think of anything much more stupid than trying to fix the world in a way that ruins yourself and doesn’t fix the world? It’s pretty stupid. I just don’t do it. I have a rule for politicians. It’s a stoic rule…I always reflect that politicians are never so bad, you don’t live to want them back. When I was young, the California legislature was full of small time insurance brokers and lawyers looking for an unfair advantage. They were being entertained by restaurants with prostitutes and bars, by racetracks, and liquor distributors and so on and so on. Fade in fade out. We have a different kind of a legislature now, and I just want all those old crooks and lobbyists and prostitutes back. (laughter) You laugh but you young people, you’re going to live to wish…Nancy Pelosi and Donald Trump we’re immortal. (laughter) Question 9: Could you share a reading recommendation for us, potentially a new one, that maybe fundamentally change your viewpoint on something? Charlie: Well there are very few ninety-five year olds that are changing their viewpoint on things. But I do find that there are amusing anecdotes and so forth that I occasionally read and like. But I like the old anecdotes pretty well too. Like that one about the vet and the horse. It’s so obvious though, some of these pithy stories. The storytelling really works to get messages around. One of the interesting things is look at our modern politicians and then think about Abraham Lincoln. (Which) modern politician reminds you of Abraham Lincoln? In either party? Lincoln at one time was hired by some guy whose partner had died, leaving practically no money to a wife and three children. And he owed some money to his surviving partner and the surviving partner came to Lincoln and said, “I want you to collect this money.” And Lincoln said to this guy, he says, “Well” he says, “You look like an enterprising fellow who could get that much money back pretty easily through a little effort. And if you want to ring a little money out of this poor widow and her three children then you’ll have to get a different kind of lawyer.” Does that remind you of any of our modern politicians? That was Abraham Lincoln. What a story. No wonder he’s remembered. And you know who deserves the credit for Abraham Lincoln and never gets it? It’s his stepmother! Abraham Lincoln was the child of two illiterates. But the step mother, who his father just married in desperation to help raise the children, she took a shine to Lincoln and saw he was bookish and she helped him all the way along. I am going to donate a picture of that stepmother eventually to a particular place because I admire what that stepmother accomplished in life. Imagine being responsible more than any other person for the life of Abraham Lincoln. Question 10: My question is about the intellectual property because you are a lawyer by training. Given the complicated landscape in this field, is there a better way to share intellectual property across nations, especially in the case of Huawei, is there better legal framework to handle intellectual properties?

查理:嗯,你知道,我对知识产权这个世界了解不多。我的职业生涯主要活跃在保险、家具店、小小的法律报纸之类领域。所以别人擅长知识产权,而我擅长避开自己不擅长的课题。知识产权就是其中之一。中国偷点知识产权,我并不惊讶。我们美国人一直都这么干。我们偷过狄更斯的作品,直接重印他受版权保护的东西。我们还偷过英国纺织制造商的技术。人们想了解别人点子时,向来相当不客气。这是个老问题。我确实认为,允许知识产权带来这些利润是可取的。但具体如何处理其中的复杂性,我没花多少时间琢磨。

问题 11:在去年的《每日期刊》股东大会上,您提到基金经理的五大王牌之一是跑道够长。

查理:是的。

问题 11(续):我还年轻,至少希望前面还有 40 年的跑道。

查理:你的腿怎么样?(笑声)

问题 11(续):体检全部优秀,多谢关心。我想以尽可能高的速度复利我的钱,最后把大部分捐出去。除了您和沃伦,您会推荐哪些基金经理?

查理:我刚才说了,我这辈子只雇过一个基金经理,我觉得这并不能让我成为专家。不过我得说,那一位干得相当不错。不,我帮不了你。每个人都想有个基金经理能让他发财。我们当然都想要。我也想能把铅变成金。但这事很难。非常难。如果你觉得难,那恰恰说明你理解了。

问题 12:查理和彼得·考夫曼。我没有问题,只想感谢两位一起出版了《穷查理宝典》。这本书在我生命中奠定了难以置信的基础,确实帮我改变了在很多事情上的思考方式。非常感谢两位在这本书上的付出。

查理:这其实是彼得·考夫曼的主意。整件事都是他干的,钱也是他自己出的,谁让他是个有钱又古怪的人呢。我只希望彼得·考夫曼能有一点改变。彼得·考夫曼让我在印度和中国备受爱戴。我真希望他在洛杉矶也能多给我帮点忙。(笑声)《穷查理宝典》的中文版在中国被盗版得厉害。完全被盗版了。但合法销量还有三十四万册左右。彼得让我在中国很受欢迎,可在洛杉矶他一点忙都不帮。(笑声)

问题 13:您引用过本杰明·格雷厄姆的话,说好主意很美妙,但如果做过头,你会吃大苦头。

Charlie: Well you know, I don’t know that much about the world of intellectual property. I made my way i n insurance, and furniture stores, and little legal newspapers and so on. So other people are good at intellectual property. I’m good at avoiding subjects which I’m not good at. And one of them is intellectual property. I’m not surprised that the Chinese are stealing a little intellectual property. We Americans did it all the time. We stole Dicken’s work. We just reprinted his copyrighted stuff. We stole the technology from the English textile manufacturers. It isn’t as though people haven’t been pretty aggressive about wanting to know other people’s ideas. This is an old problem. I do think that allowing intellectual property to have these profits is desirable. But the exact complexities of how you handle it, I don’t spend much time thinking about. Question 11: In last year’s Daily Journal meeting, you talked about one of the five aces of a money manager was a long runway. Charlie: Yes. Question 11 (continued…): I’m young and have at least hopefully a 40 year runway ahead of me. Charlie: How are your legs? (laughter). Question 11 (continued…): I passed my physical with flying colors, so thanks a lot. I’d like to compound my money at the highest rate and then give most of it away at the end. Which money managers would you recommend besides you and Warren? Charlie: Well I just said I’ve only hired one myself in a lifetime, I don’t think that makes me an expert. Although I must say that one did work out rather well. No I can’t help you. Everybody would like to have some money manager that would make him rich. Of course we all would want that. I would like to be able to turn lead into gold. But it’s hard. It’s very hard. And if you’re finding it difficult that just shows you understand it. Question 12: Charlie and Peter Kaufman. I don’t have a question, I just want to thank you both for putting together Poor Charlie’s Almanac. It has been an incredibly foundational book in my life and it has really helped inflect my thinking on many different things. So thank you both very much for your work on that. Charlie: It was really Peter Kaufman’s idea. He did the whole damn thing, and he paid for it himself, being a rich and eccentric man. I just wish there was one change in Peter Kaufman. Peter Kaufman has made me adored in India and China. I wish the hell he could do more for me in Los Angeles. (laughter) The Chinese version of Poor Charlie’s Almanac has been pirated enormously in China. Totally pirated. But the legal sales are three hundred forty thousand or something. Peter has made me very popular in China but he does nothing for me in Los Angeles. (laughter) Question 13: You’ve paraphrased Ben Graham in saying that good ideas are wonderful but you can suffered terribly if you overdo them.

查理:是的。

问题 13(续):你如何平衡这一点,面对的风险是你可能完全错过了一个机会?或者因为担心一个好主意被过度炒作而姗姗来迟?

查理:被彻底理解的问题就已经解决了一半。一旦你指出,好主意因过度炒作而变得危险,与好主意仍有很大发展空间之间存在巨大张力,一旦你在脑海中构建出这个框架,并开始将机会归入某一类,你就已经解决了一半问题。你不需要我。你已经想明白了。你必须意识到这两种可能性和它们之间的张力。

问题 14:在你关于伯克希尔过去与未来的信中,你写到了那些多年来让伯克希尔成功的准则。我的问题是,鉴于伯克希尔作为一家控股公司取得了令人难以置信的成功和业绩记录,为什么它的组织原则没有被更多人复制?

查理:嗯,这是个好问题。我认为主要原因是它看起来不可能。如果你在宝洁公司,身处它的文化和官僚体系中,你坐下来思考,“我怎样才能让宝洁更像伯克希尔·哈撒韦?”这不会立刻被归入“太难处理”的一堆。它实在太难了。惯性太大了。

但你的问题引出了一个非常有趣的事情,这件事值得比现在更多的关注。伯克希尔如此成功的原因之一是总部几乎没人。我们几乎没有任何公司官僚体制。我们有少数内部审计师,他们会出去检查这检查那。但基本上我们没有官僚体制。如果负责运营的人是明智的人,没有官僚体制就是一个巨大的优势。想想看,即使我们有很多人才,但在庞大的官僚体系中,我们所有人的表现有多糟糕,因为我们什么都改变不了。

所以官僚体制有一套常见的弊病、一堆愚蠢的浪费等等,而避免它至关重要。当然,成功的地方,尤其是成功的政府,有一种趋势是官僚体制越来越庞大。当然,这会产生巨大的反效果。而且,官僚体制中的个体官僚们,他们正从更多的协助、更多的会议、更多的这个、更多的那种中受益。所以,在我们外人看来像毒药的东西,因为决策如此糟糕,对他们来说却看起来很棒,这是机会。我刚刚描述了现代生活的巨大悲剧。现代生活创造了成功的官僚体制,而成功的官僚体制又孕育了失败和愚蠢。怎么可能不是这样呢?这就是现代生活的巨大张力。有些地方陷入了愚蠢的官僚体制,然后解雇三分之一的人,结果运作得更好了?他们是在做上帝的工作。但如果你在那里工作,你不会这么认为。但官僚体制中有大量的恐怖和浪费,这是不可避免的。它就像衰老和死亡一样自然。带着这个令人振奋的想法,我们可以继续下一个问题。

问题 15:我正在研究人格心理学以及是什么让伙伴关系成功,比如你和沃伦。你有什么看法?

Charlie: Yes. Question 13 (continued…): How do you balance that against the risk that you potentially forego an opportunity altogether? Or are late to an opportunity for fear that a good idea has been overdone? Charlie: The problem that is thoroughly understood is half solved. The minute you point out there’s a big tension between good ideas yet over done so much they’re dangerous, and good ideas that still have a lot of runway ahead, once you have that construct in your head and start classifying opportunities into one category or the other. You’ve got the problem half solved. You don’t need me. You’ve already figured it out. You’ve got to be aware of both potentialities and the tensions. Question 14: In your letter on Berkshire’s past and future, you wrote about the principles that have made Berkshire successful over the years. My question is, why is it that Berkshire’s organizational principles as a holding company have not been copied more by others given its incredible success and track record? Charlie: Well it’s a good question. I think the main reason is that it looks impossible. If you were in Procter and Gamble, with its culture and its bureaucracy, and you sat down to figure out, ‘How can I make Procter and Gamble more like Berkshire Hathaway?’, it wouldn’t go immediately to the ‘too hard pile’. It’s just too hard. There’s too much momentum. But you raise by your question a very interesting thing that deserves more attention than it gets. One of the reasons that Berkshire has been so successful is there’s practically nobody at headquarters. We have almost no corporate bureaucracy. We have a few internal auditors who go out from there and check this or that. But basically we have no bureaucracy. Having no bureaucracy is a huge advantage if the people who are running are sensible people. Think of how poorly all of us have behaved in big bureaucracy even though we have a lot of talent because we couldn’t change anything. So bureaucracy has a standard bunch of evils on a standard and bunch of stupid wastes and so forth, and avoiding it is hugely important. Of course there’s a tendency of successful places, particularly successful governments, is to have more and more bureaucracy. Of course it’s terribly counterproductive. And of course the bureaucracy, the individual bureaucrats they’re benefiting from more assistance, more meetings, more this, more that. So what looks like poison to us from the outside, because the decisions are so terrible, looks wonderful for them, it’s opportunity. I’ve just described the great tragedy of modern life. Modern life creates successful bureaucracy and successful bureaucracy breeds failure and stupidity. How can it be otherwise. That’s the big tension of modern life. And some of these places that go into a stupid bureaucracy and fire a third of the people and then place works better? They’re doing the Lord’s work. But you wouldn’t think so if you were working there. But there’s a lot of horror and waste in bureaucracy and its inevitable. It’s as natural as old age and death. With that cheerful thought, we can go on to the next one. Question 15: I’m researching personality psychology and what makes partnerships successful, such as you and Warren. What are your thoughts on that?

查理:好吧,我来告诉你什么能让合作关系成功。两个有才华的人合作愉快。这当然效果更好。

问题 16:过去你曾称赞像 Glenair、Kiewit 和 Costco 这类公司的文化重要性。你对《每日新闻》(Daily Journal)的文化,特别是 Journal Technologies 的文化怎么看?另外,能不能像你写伯克希尔 50 周年文章那样,分享一个 Journal Technologies 未来几十年的愿景?

查理:嗯,你得记住,Journal Technologies 成立时我已经老了。我想我是有次意志薄弱……杰林说服了我。这事成功了,因为杰里(Gerry)接手后创造了奇迹。所以功劳不在我。Journal Technologies 是靠杰林和萨尔兹曼(Salzman)做起来的。我只是在鼓掌。我很擅长鼓掌。

问题 17:你谈到要在鱼多的地方钓鱼的重要性。如果你今天从头开始,除了中国,你会去哪片海域钓鱼?

查理:嗯,除了中国……如果世界上有一个好地方超出了我应得的份额,那肯定还有别的,但我很难相信有哪个地方比中国更适合芒格家族了。所以我帮不了你。我的问题已经解决了。你得自己解决你的问题。顺便说一句,中国的鱼塘很不错。一些非常聪明的人已经下水了。到时候,我认为会有更多人下水。中国的优秀公司比美国的优秀公司便宜。

问题 18:我有一个关于长期投资和复利的问题。过去几年利率很低,很难找到基于长期复利策略的机会。所以除了投资伯克希尔、价值投资或指数基金,你会建议我们去哪里寻找长期投资的机会,让复利真正发挥作用?

查理:嗯,我给追求理想复利的人的建议是:降低你的预期。因为我认为未来一段时间会更艰难。有现实的预期是有帮助的。这能让你不那么疯狂。我想……你知道,有人说从大萧条(这是英语世界几百年来最糟糕的时期)之后到现在,普通股可能是一个产生了 10% 年化回报的指数。那是通胀前的数字。扣除通胀后,可能只有 7% 左右。而在这漫长的时期里,7% 和 10% 的差别,在最终结果上是极其巨大的。如果实际回报是 7%,但那是从一个完美的起点开始,并经历了历史上最大的繁荣,那么从现在开始,实际回报很可能是 3% 或 2%。出现 5% 的回报率和 3% 的通胀率,或者类似可怕的后果,并非不可想象。应对这种情况的理想方式是告诉自己:“如果那样,我照样能过得开心。”因为为什么你不能开心呢?即便文明不像我那一代那么轻松了。除此之外,当事情变得更困难时,你该怎么办?答案是,正因为会非常困难,你才要努力去做。如果终其一生的努力,你只能得到 6% 而不是 5% 的回报,你也应该对此感到高兴。如果你想轻松地打出本垒打,你应该去跟吉姆·克拉默(Jim Cramer)聊聊。(笑声)

Charlie: Well I’ll tell you what makes a partnership successful. Two talented people working well the together. Of course that works better. Question 16: In the past you’ve praised the significance of cultures at firms like Glenair, Kiewit, and Costco. What are your views on the culture at Daily Journal and in particular Journal Technologies and similar to your Berkshire 50 year essay, can you share a multi-decade vision for Journal Technologies. Charlie: Well you got to remember that I was old when Journal Technologies came into being. I guess I had a weak moment when…Guerin talked me into it. And it worked because Gerry took a hold of it and work miracles. So I don’t deserve much credit. It’s Guerin and Salzman who are responsible for Journal Technologies. I just clap. I’m good at clapping. Question 17: You speak about the importance of fishing in waters with ample fish. If you were starting out today, what sea would you be fishing in, other than China of course. Charlie: Well other than China, but…if there’s one good place in the world that’s more than my share. There are others I’m sure, but it’s hard for me to believe that any can get better for the Mungers than China. So I can’t help you. I’ve solved my problem. You’ll have to solve yours. By the way, the water’s fine in China. Some very smart people are wading in. And in due course I think more will wade in. The great companies of China are cheaper than the great companies of the United States. Question 18: I have a question regarding long term investment and compound interest. In the last few years with very low interest rates out there it’s been difficult to find opportunities for having a long term compound interest based strategy. So beyond investing in Berkshire, Value Investing, or index funding, where would you invite us to find opportunities for long term investment where compound interest is really that force? Charlie: Well, my advice for a seeker of compound interest that works ideally is to reduce your expectations. Because I think it’s going to be tougher for a while. And it helps to have realistic expectations. Makes you less crazy. I think that…you know they say that common stocks from the aftermath of the Great Depression, which was the worst in the English speaking world in hundreds of years, to the present time may be an index that’s produced 10 percent. Well that’s pre-inflation. After inflation it may be 7 percent or something. And the difference between 7 and 10 in terms of its consequences are just hugely dramatic over that long period of time. And if that’s 7 in real terms, but achieved starting at a perfect period and through the greatest boom in history, starting now it could well be 3 percent or 2 percent in real terms. It’s not unthinkable you’d have 5 percent returns and 3 percent inflation or some ghastly consequences like that. The ideal way to cope with that is to say, “If that happens, I can have a happy life.” Because why shouldn’t you be happy in spite of the fact that civilization wasn’t quite as easy as it was for my generation. Now beyond that, when it gets more difficult, how should you do it? Well the answer is, because it’s going to be very difficult, you should work at it. And if all that gets you is 6 percent for a lifetime of work instead of 5, you should be cheerful about it. If you want to hit it out of the park easily, you should talk to Jim Cramer. (laughter)

问题 19:接着关于《每日新闻》公司企业文化的那个问题,我们能不能请董事会其他成员谈谈董事会的长期继任计划。

查理:我觉得我们没必要让另一位发言者来讲了。(笑声)

问题 20:过去五年或十年,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股权投资组合跑赢标普 500 指数了吗?如果没有,伯克希尔为什么不直接把它的股权投资组合全部投进标普 500 指数?

查理:我认为沃伦——他毕竟只是个 89 岁的小伙子——觉得从目前这个时点看,伯克希尔可以比标普 500 指数做得好一点。我觉得没多少人能做到这点,但他对自己和他现有的团队可能真的说对了。我很有信心地预测,那不会是巨大的差距。

问题 21:您怎么看下跌保护?您怎么知道什么时候该退出一个投资?

查理:嗯,你找的可不是一个擅长“退出”的高手。我买的伯克希尔是 1966 年买的。我买的好市多……我的意思是,我擅长的是挑选。但别人更懂退出。我尽量做到永远不需要退出。所以,你找错人了……我觉得有一些投资风格是靠不断退出取得好效果的。但这从来不是我的强项。所以我对退出不在行。我甚至不喜欢寻找退出机会。我找的是持有。想想我从看好市多一路向前中获得的乐趣吧。那是一个纯粹的精英管理型公司,而且它做得那么好。我为什么要用那种体验去换一系列交易,让自己变得稍微……首先,税后我只会变得更穷,而不是更富。其次,那种生活远不如为那些我喜欢和敬佩的人加油来得令人满意。所以,我说要找到好市多这样的公司,而不是找好的退出机会。

问题 22:您在 2018 年 5 月接受 CNBC 采访时提到,伯克希尔在增持更多苹果股票上太过克制。您现在还是这么认为吗?

查理:不,不这么认为了。我觉得我说太多关于苹果的话,并不会让这个世界变得更好。你知道,我是一个很有主见的人,我知道很多事,但我并不是什么都懂。我喜欢苹果,但我不觉得我是那个领域的顶级专家。

问题 23:去年您说希望自己拥有更多苹果股票,但现在它的股价跌了很多,您怎么看它的护城河或竞争优势?您觉得它为什么跌了?

查理:呃,我不知道苹果股价为什么涨或跌。我了解得足够多,所以我很欣赏这家公司,但我知道得还不够多,无法对它的股价近期为什么涨跌有任何重大的看法。我们的部分秘诀在于,我们不去试图了解很多事情。我桌上放着一堆东西,能解决我大部分的问题,那堆东西叫“太难”堆。我就一直把东西往“太难”堆里扔。每隔一段时间,一个容易的决定就出现了,我就做这个决定。这就是我的系统。除了少数几个我迅速做出的容易决定,其他所有东西都在“太难”堆里。

Question 19: Building on the question about the corporate culture at Daily Journal Corporation, could we ask the other board members about the long term succession plan for the board. Charlie: I don’t think we want to go to another speaker. (laughter) Question 20: Has the Berkshire Hathaway equity portfolio outperformed the S&P over the last five or ten years? And if it has not, why wouldn’t Berkshire just invest in the S&P for its equity portfolio? Charlie: I think Warren, who is after all a mere boy of 89, thinks that Berkshire can do a little better than the S&P. From this point. I don’t think many people can, but he may be right about himself and the team he has in place. It won’t be by huge margins, that I confidently predict. Question 21: How do you think about downside protection and how do you know when to exit an investment? Charlie: Well you’re not talking to a great ‘exiter’. My Berkshire I bought it in 1966. My Costco I bought… I mean I’ve been a good picker. But other people know more exiting. I’m trying never to have to exit. So you’re talking to the wrong…I think there are working styles of investments that work well with constant exits. It just hasn’t happened been my forte. So I’m no good at exits. I don’t like even looking for exits. I’m looking for holds. Think of the pleasure I’ve got from watching Costco march ahead. Such an utter meritocracy and it does so well. Why would I trade that experience for a series of transactions that make me a little…In the first place, I’d be less rich not more after taxes. The second place is it’s a much less satisfactory life than rooting for people I like and admire. So I say find Costco’s, not good exits. Question 22: You mentioned that in an interview with CNBC on May 2018, Berkshire too restrained on buying more Apple stock. Do you still believe so? Charlie: No I don’t. I don’t think the world would be improved by more comments from me on Apple. You know, I’m a very opinionated man and I know a lot, but I don’t know everything. I like Apple but I don’t have the feeling that I’m the big expert. Question 23: Last year you said that you wish you had more of Apple stock, but now its price has declined by a lot, so what is your opinion about its moat or the competitive advantage. Why do you think it has declined? Charlie: Well I don’t know why Apple stock is going up or down. I know enough about it so I admire the place, but I don’t know enough to have any big opinion about why it’s going up and down recently. Part of our secret is that we don’t attempt to know a lot of things. I have a pile on my desk that solves most of my problems, it’s called the ‘too hard’ pile. And I just keep shifting things ‘too hard’ pile. And everyone once in a while an easy decision comes along and I make it. That’s my system. Everything was the ‘too hard’ pile, except for a few easy decisions which I make, promptly.

问题 24:在评估一家企业的质量时,你更看重量化指标(如投入资本回报率),还是定性因素(如品牌实力或管理层质量)?

查理:嗯,我们既关注定性指标,也关注其他因素。通常来说,我们喜欢关注特定情况下最重要的东西,而这一点因情况而异。我们只是努力拥有我所说的那种“不寻常的常识”。而我们不寻常的常识的一部分,就是把大量事情扔进“太难”那一堆。

问题 25:简单的生活显然是正确的答案,但大多数美国人最终都像莫扎特一样,负债累累、过度消费。面对所有这些诱惑,你是如何保持纪律,过简单生活的?

查理:我生来如此。(笑声)

问题 26:我是比亚迪的一名工程师,我很想听听您对美国基础设施现状的看法,以及您认为未来基础设施可能有哪些增长领域。

查理:嗯,我认为基础设施将是一件大事。几乎每个人……在中国,比亚迪非常活跃,顺便说一句,每日新闻集团持有一些比亚迪股票,但比亚迪将在电动汽车领域变得非常庞大。它们已经很大了。而且它们未来会庞大得多。此外,它们还将在单轨铁路领域变得庞大,这也是一项时机已到的业务。它们在锂电池领域也很庞大,锂电池正在改进……实质性地改进。这个地方充满了狂热分子,而且顺便说一句,他们是苹果和华为的重要供应商。他们在这方面是令人非常满意的供应商。所以,我对比亚迪印象极其深刻,这是我一生中真正的乐趣之一……王传福是一个农民的第八个儿子。他的一个哥哥意识到家里诞生了一个天才,就放弃了自己生活中的一切,去培养那个天才弟弟。这就是儒家思想。顺便说一句,儒家思想对文明的贡献会比福特基金会好得多。像这样拥有强大家庭伦理观的儒家思想,是一件真正具有建设性的事情。儒家思想部分地造就了比亚迪。王传福的那个哥哥是个英雄。当然,王传福所做的事情是一个奇迹。当然,那是一种风险投资类的投资。我们买入了可流通证券,不是伯克希尔买的,而是李录买的。这是一项极好的投资,也是一家非常令人钦佩的公司。我很高兴能成为发明更好的锂电池、更好的单轨铁路等等之类事物的一部分。所以,如果你为比亚迪工作,你是一个非常幸运的人,你将在观察和参与中度过美好的一生。你几乎找不到更好的雇主了。至少如果你喜欢追求成就和每周工作 80 小时的话。

问题 27:你之前提到,当你有机会提价时,你在经济大衰退期间没有提价,因为查理·芒格在那些失去房子的人身上提价,似乎不太合适。所以,我想为此也感谢你。

查理:从没有别人感谢过。

Question 24: When you’re assessing the quality of a business do you place more emphasis on quantitative metrics such as return on invested capital or qualitative ideas like brand strength or quality of management? Charlie: Well we pay attention to qualitative metrics and we also pay attention to other factors. Generally we like to pay attention to whatever’s important in the particular situation and that varies from situation to situation. We’re just trying to have that ‘uncommon sense’ I’m talking about. And part of our uncommon sense is just to refer a lot of stuff to the ‘too hard’ pile. Question 25: The simple life is the obvious right answer, but most of America ends up like Mozart, in debt and overspending. How did you maintain the discipline to live the simple life in the face of all these other temptations? Charlie: I was born this way. (laughter) Question 26: I’m an engineer at BYD, and I was interested to hear your perspective on the current state of infrastructure in the U.S. and some areas of growth that you might see in the future for infrastructure. Charlie: Well I think infrastructure will be a big deal. Practically everybody…in China where BYD is so active, by the way the Daily Journal owns some BYD, but BYD is going to be huge electric vehicles. They are already huge. And they’re going to be much more huge. And then they’re going to be huge in monorails which is also a business whose time has come. And they’re also huge in these lithium batteries, and the lithium batteries are being improved…materially improved. And the place is full of fanatics, and by the way they’re a big supplier to Apple and Huawei. And they’re a very satisfactory supplier to those things. So I am terribly impressed with BYD and its been one of the real pleasures of my life to…Wang Chuanfu is the eighth son of a peasant. An older brother recognizing a genius had been born into the family, he just gave up everything in life to nurture that little brother genius. Now that’s Confucianism. And by the way Confucianism will do a lot better for civilization than the Ford Foundation did. Confucianism with a strong family ethos like that is a really constructive thing. And Confucianism partly created BYD. That older brother of Wang Chuanfu was a hero. And of course what Wang Chuanfu has done is a miracle. And of course that was a venture capital type investment. We bought marketable securities, not Berkshire, but Li Lu did. And it’s been a wonderful investment and it’s been a very admirable company. And I like being part of something that’s inventing better lithium batteries and better monorails and so on and so on. So if you work for BYD, you’re a very fortunate person and you’re gonna have a wonderful life watching and participating. You could hardly have a better employer. At least if you like demanding achievement and 80 hour weeks. Question 27: You mentioned earlier that when you had an opportunity to raise prices you didn’t want to raise them during the Great Recession because it didn’t seem right for Charlie Munger to be raising prices on people that were losing their houses. So I wanted to thank you for that as well. Charlie: Nobody else ever has.

问题 27(续):我想问您关于大衰退的起因,特别是信用评级机构,以及您提出的导致人类误判的二十四条标准原因。我认为它们几乎全都应验了——巴甫洛夫式联想、否认……

查理:你说得对。我们那些顶尖金融机构的金融行为糟糕到不可原谅。别人靠不光彩的愚蠢方式赚钱时,所有人都一窝蜂涌进去,因为他们不想让别人赚钱而自己没参与。贷款标准、管理标准……那简直是从智力上令人作呕,从道德上令人作呕,当然它引发了一场足以把整个文明拖入大萧条的风暴。这是个相当严重的罪行。那些人都没有受到惩罚。我很少这么彻底地同意伊丽莎白·沃伦,但出了这么大的乱子却没人受罚,这是不对的。

问题 27(续):我为一家非营利信用评级机构写了一份蓝图,很想听听您的反馈。

查理:那么长远的事情我通常留给别人去操心,不是因为伯克希尔·哈撒韦持有其中一家评级机构的一大块股份。但我能理解为什么现有局面会引起你的担忧。不过有些人类的问题我不想去碰。你刚提出来的就是其中之一。不过你说得对,它并不完美。

问题 28:我的问题与国家的国债有关。我们最近刚突破 22 万亿美元,债务与 GDP 之比现在已经超过 100%。而在我们 GDP 可能接近高点、利率可能上升的时候。在我看来,政客们似乎对赤字很坦然,因为危机来的时候他们才出手,而消费者也乐于接受赤字,因为消费今天比明天更好。我的问题是,您认为我们能对此做点什么吗?如果能,应该做什么?或者,是不是人类心理就是如此——除非危机真的降临,否则很难想象会采取任何行动?

查理:嗯,这是个非常有趣的问题。整个经济学这门科学在 15 年前完全没料到,有可能按现在的规模印钱,并且让内部债务泛滥到我们现在的程度。当然,在日本那种更极端的地方,没人曾想到这是可能的。而那些确实想到过的人——很少——他们也无法预测,尽管日本人做了非常极端的一切,却依然经历了 20 年的停滞。

我们现在做的事有很多古怪之处,最终如果你试图用印钱来解决所有问题,总会有些灾难发生。什么时候来、有多严重,没人知道。15 年前没人能想到,我们能做到现在这样而后果又这么小。丘吉尔曾说过,克莱门特·艾德礼有很多地方可以谦虚。嗯,我对经济学界也有同感。他们有很多地方可以谦虚。他们以为自己懂得很多,但结果并非如此。有位希腊哲学家说过:“人不能两次踏进同一条河流。”你知道,他第二次踏进去时河流已经不同了,人也不一样了。经济学就是这样。它不像物理学,那些该死的原理会一直适用。你在不同时间做同样的该死的事,会得到不同的结果。这很复杂。

Question 27 (continued…): I wanted to ask you about the causes of the Great Recession, specifically the credit ratings agencies, and your twenty four standard causes of human misjudgment. I think they hit them pretty much all. Pavlovian Association, denial,… Charlie: You’re right about that. The financial behavior in our leading financial institutions was inexcusably awful. When other people were making money in a disreputable stupid fashion, everybody piled in because they didn’t want somebody else to be making money and they’re not participating. The standards in lending, the standards in managing…It was disgusting intellectually, disgusting morally, and of course it caused a whirlwind that could have taken the whole civilization down into a Great Depression. That’s a pretty major sin. And none of those people’s been punished. It’s usual that I agree so thoroughly with Elizabeth Warren, but it was wrong to have that big of a mess and have nobody punished. Question 27 (continued…): I’ve written a blueprint for a nonprofit credit ratings agency and I’d love to get your feedback. Charlie: Things that far out I usually leave to other people and not because Berkshire Hathaway owns a big chunk of one of the credit rating agencies. But I can see why the existing situation would draw your concern. But there are some human problems I don’t want to bother with. And you have just produced one. But you’re right it wasn’t perfect. Question 28: My question relates to the country’s national debt. We’ve just recently passed twenty two trillion dollars and our debt to GDP is above 100 percent now. At a time when our GDP may be near a peak and interest rates may be rising. It seems to me that politicians seem fine running the deficit because there when the crisis comes, and consumers are happy to take a deficit because it’s better to consume now than tomorrow. My question is, do you think that there’s something we can do about this? And if so, what should be done? Or is human psychology such that until the crisis is upon us, it’s hard to imagine anything it’s done? Charlie: Well that’s a very interesting question. The whole science of economics had no idea 15 years ago that it would be possible to print money on the present scale, and get so awash in internal debt as we have. And certainly in a place like Japan, which is way more extreme, nobody dreamed that was possible. And the people who did dream what was possible…and they were few…they would not have predicted 20 years of stasis in spite of everything the Japanese did which was very extreme. There’s a lot that’s peculiar in what we’re doing and eventually if you try and solve all your problems by printing money there’ll be some disaster. When it’s coming and how bad it will be, nobody knows. Nobody dreamed 15 years ago we could do as much as we have now with as little bad consequence. Churchill use to say that Clement Attlee had a lot to be modest about. Well that’s the way I feel about the economics profession. They have a lot to be modest about. They thought they knew a lot, but turned out not to be so. There was a Greek philosopher that said, “No man steps in the same river twice.” You know the river is different the second time he comes in and so is the man. And that’s the way with economics. It’s not like physics where the same damn principles are going to apply. You do the same damn thing at a different time and you get a different result. It’s complicated.

当然,你提出了一个非常重要的问题。当然没有人真正知道答案。谁知道我们能靠这种手段撑到什么时候。我个人猜测,这些民主国家最终会借债过多,引发一些真正的麻烦。我不知道什么时候。

问题 29:很多人问你如何决定做什么投资或交易,你告诉大家你很快就能做出判断。我的问题是,你怎么判断一个基金经理或公司管理层是否具备好的品格和正直?你需要多长时间做出这种判断?你又会关注哪些特质?

查理:嗯,自从我找到了李录,我就再也不找别人了。所以我问错人了。我找到比李录更好的人的概率有多大?所以对我来说,这很容易。你需要一个李录,而我不知道怎么给你找到一个。

问题 30:去年我们看到了创纪录的股票回购金额,而现在华盛顿特区传出了言论,特别是针对限制股票回购的立法。你对股票回购怎么看?你认为政客应该告诉公司该做什么吗?

查理:嗯,总的来说,我对政客告诉公司该做什么这件事热情有限。但我要说的是,当回购股票对公司来说是个非常不错的主意时,他们却没怎么行动。而当股价涨到这么高,回购常常是个糟糕的主意时,他们却大量回购。欢迎来到成年人的世界。现实就是这样。但在当前的价格水平下,这么多回购是不是明智,值得怀疑。埃迪·兰伯特回购那么多西尔斯百货的股票是明智的吗?不是。这类错误已经犯下了很多。

问题 31:和你讲的莫扎特轶事类似,我想问你,对于像我这样年纪、想过像你一样长寿而成功生活的人,你有什么建议?

查理:嗯,我连自己的孩子都没能改变多少。我觉得我没办法给一个完全陌生的人提供有用的建议。改善下一代很难,通常的结果只会是平庸。有些人会成功。他们会是少数。人类的意义就是这样分配的。人类的意义永远只会属于少数人。不可能创造出足够多的(有意义的少数)来满足需求。我认为个人纪律、个人道德、好的同事、好的想法,所有这些简单的东西。我会说,如果你想从查理·芒格这里带走一条信息,那就是:“陈词滥调就是对的”。所有这些古老的美德,它们都管用。

问题 32:你指出了大量的人类愚蠢行为,但你似乎并没有对此感到特别沮丧。你一直是这样吗?这个看法对吗?

查理:这个看法完全正确。这是我的体系。我从犹太人那里学来的。我看到它对他们很管用,而且这也是我天性中自然倾向。所以,幽默是我应对现实的方式。

问题 33:你一生中最自豪的成就是什么?为什么?

And of course you’re raising a very important question. And of course nobody really knows the answer. Who knows how much of this we can get by with. My personal bet is that these democracies will eventually borrow too much and cause some real troubles. I don’t know when. Question 29: A lot of people ask how you determine what investment or deal to do, and you tell people that you can do this fairly quickly. My question is how do you tell if a money manager or management of a company has the right character or the right integrity? How long does it take you to do that and what are some traits that you look for? Charlie: Well now that I found Li Lu I don’t look for anybody else. So I’m the wrong person. What are my chances I’m going to get somebody better than Li Lu. So it’s very easy for me. What you need is a Li Lu and I don’t know how to get you one. Question 30: Last year we saw a record amount of share repurchases, and now we’re hearing rhetoric out of Washington D.C. specifically legislation to curb stock buybacks. What’s your take on stock buybacks and do you think politicians should be telling companies what to do? Charlie: Well generally speaking I’m restrained in my enthusiasm for politicians telling corporations what they should do. But I will say this. When it was a very good idea for companies to buy back their stock they didn’t do very much. And when the stocks got so high price that it’s frequently a bad idea, they’re doing a lot. Welcome to adult life. This is the way it is. But it’s questionable at the present levels whether a lot of it is smart. Was Eddie Lambert smart to buy back so much Sears Roebuck? No. And there’s a lot of that kind of mistake that’s been made. Question 31: Similar to your Mozart anecdote, I wanted to ask you, what advice would you have for someone my age looking to live a long successful life like yourself. Charlie: Well I haven’t had that much success changing any of my children. And I don’t think I can give helpful advice to a perfect stranger. It’s hard to improve the next generation, and the standard result is going to be mediocre. Some people are going to succeed. They’re going to be few. That’s the way human significance is allotted. Human significance will always go to the few. There’s no way of creating enough (few in significance), to meet the demand. I think personal discipline, personal morality, good colleagues, good ideas, all the simple stuff. I’d say, if you want to carry one message from Charlie Munger it’s this, “If it’s trite it’s right.” All those old virtues, they all work. Question 32: You point out a great deal of human folly, but you don’t seem to be that upset about it. Has that always been the case and is that a correct perception Charlie: That’s a very correct perception. It’s my system. I’ve copied it from the Jews. I saw it work well from them, and it was my natural inclination anyway. And so, humor is my way of coping. Question 33: What is your proudest accomplishment in life and why?

查理:我这一生没有任何让我特别引以为傲的成就。我当初的目标就是试着比大多数人拥有更多一点“非常识”。一个相当有限的目标。我很高兴在那场游戏里我做得还不错。如果让我从头再来一遍,我觉得难度会大得多。我认为我成功的一部分原因是我出生在正确的地方、正确的时间。所以,我并不特别为自己因出生在正确时间、正确地点而获得的成功感到骄傲。我高兴,但不骄傲。

第 34 问:萨尔兹曼先生。我有个问题想问您。您能否评论一下 Journal Technologies 是如何实施那些不变的策略原则的?比如信任、让员工全力以赴、正和博弈、以及双赢关系。

查理:格里,这是个简单的问题。你怎么解决上帝的问题?

格里·萨尔兹曼:首先你得跟每个个体打交道,因为每个人、每个员工、每个我们需要合作的独立承包商、每个客户都不一样。所以你必须针对他们各自的具体情况来处理。这不是靠一张检查清单就能搞定的。

第 35 问:这个问题同时问查理和彼得。查理曾说过,任何一年你没有毁掉自己一个最心爱的想法,那这一年可能就浪费了。你们两位在 2018 年有没有毁掉任何心爱的想法?如果有,是什么?

查理:盖林,你在 2018 年有没有毁掉什么好想法?

里克·盖林:……可能我自己都不知道。

格里·萨尔兹曼:我们总是想着未来,不会为过去担忧。就这么简单。一天结束了,我们就转向新的事情。每天都是不同的挑战。我工作的好处就是,每天都不一样。所以我每天面对的东西都不同。我更像一个报纸编辑,每天从一张白纸开始。嗯,我怎么处理下一个情况?我怎么解决一个特定的问题?这就是我的一天。这就是我做的事。

第 36 问:2008 年 10 月,就在雷曼兄弟申请破产一个月后、市场深陷深渊之时,巴菲特先生写了一篇著名的评论文章,说他正在买入股票,他对美国看好。您因在 2009 年 3 月精准抄底富国银行而闻名。是什么让您在 2009 年 3 月而不是 2008 年 10 月决定买入富国银行的?

查理:嗯,我那时候才有钱。而且股票更便宜。这是买入的两个非常重要的因素。

第 37 问:我听说您开始了一些新的房地产项目。您现在在开发什么?成功的关键是什么?

查理:不,我只是给我的孙子们买了几套公寓楼。当时觉得是个好主意。顺便说一句,“当时觉得是个好主意”这句话,是我多年前认识的一个家伙告诉我的。他在两趟火车之间的五分钟空隙里,跟酒吧车厢里认识的人生了个私生子。那年轻人的父亲——他本来有贤惠的妻子和三个孩子——问我父亲:“他他妈到底在想什么?”你知道那年轻人怎么说吗?“当时觉得是个好主意。”(笑声)

第 38 问:赫布·凯莱赫最近去世了。我希望您或许有一些关于赫布的趣事想跟我们分享?

查理:嗯,是的。他是个非常了不起的商人。我不认识他,但他是个原生态的人物,他一边喝着大量的威士忌、抽着大量的香烟,一边创建了一家非常稳健的公司。这不是我的个人风格。能喝着那么多波本威士忌、抽着那么多香烟还做得那么出色,这简直是在人类生命史上创下了新纪录。所以,我们都应该记住赫布·凯莱赫。我们都该希望自己能拥有如此强大的体魄,以至于这样摧残它还能表现出色。我可没有这副好身板。我认为这是个奇迹。

第 39 问:如果您像我一样,没有机会通过李录接触到他以及中国的交易所,您会放心投资那些采用 V.I.E.(可变利益实体)结构、赋予股东很少权利、且几乎不受中国政府保护的多数中国公司的美国存托凭证(ADR)吗?

查理:我对存托凭证了解不多。我倾向于怀疑所有由专业人士创造的金融产品。我倾向于去那些没有任何东西被大力兜售或积极推销的地方。所以你谈的那个世界,我根本不进去。所以我帮不了你。你说的那个领域是我回避的。

第 40 问:美国大银行的资产负债表上,衍生品投资组合变得相当庞大。美国证券交易委员会的报告要求没有太多透明度。那么您会担心自己持有的银行存在这类问题吗?你也会担心其他银行吗?

查理:所有聪明的投资者都担心银行,因为银行对其管理层构成了做蠢事的诱惑。在银行里有很多事情做起来很容易,看起来像是能很快报告出更多利润的捷径,但从长远来看,如果恰当考虑的话,这样做其实是个错误。正如沃伦所说:“银行业的麻烦在于,银行的数量比优秀的银行家要多。”他说得很对。所以我会说,如果你投资银行,你必须在一个有很多有利条件的时候进场。因为银行业总会渗入相当多的愚蠢。

第 41 问:当你没有挑选谈判对手的奢侈条件时,对于跟一个不仅不肯理性谈判、还会因为你试图理性谈判而批评你的人打交道,你最好的建议是什么?

查理:你说的情况,我试图用回避来解决。如果我能解决这个问题,我这里早就排起长队了。我的意思是,你们都挤不进来。每个跟难缠的人有解不开的问题的人……想想我们会怎么做才能解决这个问题?恐怕我没有解决方案。回避是我一般的原则方法。

第 42 问:我有两个问题。您和巴菲特先生十几岁时都在巴菲特的祖父的杂货店工作过。您认为早期的这份工作经历是否帮助您在这个投资行业获得了巨大的优势?

查理:绝对是的。我小时候就能从我已经去世的曾祖父那里学到东西。我在很小的时候——还是个孩子的时候——就能看出我周围的一些成年人虽然很有才华,但有些是疯疯癫癫的。我能看到非常有才华的人身上存在多少非理性。

所以,我变得有兴趣去寻找模式,理解为什么会发生,并学习应对的技巧等等。我从小就在做这件事。这当然对我有帮助。一个有利可图的活动,谁能不从早期开始受益?有什么活动能比诊断愚蠢更有前途呢?

第 43 问:您今天对潜在投资会应用多大程度的折扣?

查理:嗯,总的来说,我认为专业投资者必须接受比他们在不同条件下习惯的回报要低一些的回报。就像一个老人对他的性生活期望值比 20 岁时要低一样。

第 44 问:我想回到威廉·桑代克的书,我现在列出了那八家公司:通用动力、伯克希尔·哈撒韦、《华盛顿邮报》、DCI、大都会/ABC、特利丹、通用影院、和罗尔斯顿·普瑞纳。我知道伯克希尔长期投资了《华盛顿邮报》和大都会/ABC,也投资了约翰·马龙的公司。但为什么伯克希尔没有长期投资通用动力、特利丹、通用影院或罗尔斯顿·普瑞纳?

查理:嗯,我们确实长期大量持有通用动力,并从中大赚了一笔。在国防业务收缩之后,没有其他公司愿意出售任何东西,除了通用动力,它的股价持续上涨。沃伦注意到了这一点。我们在通用动力上持有巨大仓位,赚了一大笔钱。我们一直很钦佩特利丹的创始人,他是个天才,亨利·辛格尔顿。但我们只是远远地钦佩他,从未投资。这只不过是众多“省略之错”中的一个。

第 45 问:我很高兴在这次会议上看到您年满 90 岁,现在您 95 岁了……

查理:你以为你高兴,想想我的感觉!(笑声)

第 45 问(续):嗯,我希望您活到 120 岁,并一直感谢您对我们生活的积极影响。我的问题与压力、睡眠和长寿有关。在商业中,有我所称的“犯罪竞争者”。您诚实且有道德,但街对面的竞争对手通过作弊和进行大规模保险欺诈来击败您。商业和生活会造成很大压力,但您似乎总能保持冷静。在 95 年里,您使用了哪些心智工具来聚焦并保持平静?您是如何超脱的?即使在所罗门兄弟丑闻期间,您晚上总能睡够八个小时吗?

Charlie: I don’t have a single accomplishment in life that I’m all that proud of. I set out to try and have more uncommon sense than most. Pretty limited objective. I am pleased I did as well as I did in that game. If I had to do it all over again, I think it’d be a lot harder. I think part of my success was being born in the right place at the right time. So, I’m not particularly proud of success that came from being born in the right place at the right time. I’m pleased but not proud. Question 34: Mr. Salzman. I have a question for you. Could please comment on how Journal Technologies implements the invariant strategy principles? Things like trust, getting employees to go all in, positive sum, and win/win relationships. Charlie: Gerry that’s a simple question. How do you solve the problems of God? Gerry Salzman: First of all you have to deal with each individual because each individual, each employee, each independent contractor that we have to work with, each client is different. And so you have to relate to their specific circumstance. You do not handle it because it’s in a checklist or something. Question 35: This question is for both of Charlie and Peter. Charlie once said any year that you don’t destroy one of your best loved ideas is probably a wasted year. Have either of you destroyed any of your beloved ideas in 2018? And if so, what are they? Charlie: Guerin have you destroyed any good ideas 2018? Rick Guerin: …Probably unbeknownst to me. Gerry Salzman: We always think into the future, we’re not worried about the past. It’s just that simple. The day ends, we’re on to something different. It’s a different challenge every day. And the good part about my job, it changes every day. So I face something different. I’m more like a newspaper editor. I start with the blank page every day. Well how do I go to the next situation? How do I solve a particular problem? That’s my day. That’s what I do. Question 36: In October 2008, a month after Lehman filed bankruptcy and in the depths of the abyss, Mr. Buffett famously wrote an editorial saying that he was buying stocks and he was bullish on America. You’re famous for bottom ticking Wells Fargo in March of 2009. What made you decide to buy Wells Fargo in March of 2009 instead of October of 2008? Charlie: Well I had the money in the later period. And the stock was cheaper. Those are two very important parts of the purchase. Question 37: I’ve heard that you started some new real estate developments. What are you developing now and what’s going to be the key to its success? Charlie: No I bought some apartment houses for my grandchildren. It seemed like a good idea at the time. By the way that phrase, ‘It seemed like a good idea at the time.’, came to me from a man I knew many years ago. In five minutes between trains he managed to conceive an illegitimate child by somebody he met in the bar car. And my father was asked by the young man’s father, he had a nice wife and three children, “What the hell were you thinking about?” And you know what the young man said? “It seemed like a good idea at the time.” (laughter) Question 38: Herb Kelleher passed away recently and I’m hoping that maybe you have some anecdotes about Herb that you would like to share with us? Charlie: Yeah well. Well he was a very remarkable business man. I never knew him, but he was an original and he created an amazingly sound company while drinking one hell of a lot of whiskey and smoking a hell of a lot of cigarettes. This is not my personal style. To do as well as he did with so much Bourbon and so many cigarettes, it set a new record in human life. So, we should all remember Herb Kelleher. And we should all wish we could have so much strength that we could abuse it so much and still perform. I didn’t get such a hand. I regarded it as a miracle. Question 39: If you didn’t have access to Li Lu and to the Chinese exchanges through him, like many Americans don’t, would you feel comfortable investing in the American Depository Shares of most Chinese companies that are comprised of a V.I.E. Structure and offer shareholders few rights and minimal protections from the Chinese government? Charlie: I don’t know much about depository shares. I tend to be suspicious of all investment products created by professionals. I tend to go where nothing is being hawked aggressively or merchandise…sold aggressively. So you’re talking about a world in which I don’t even enter. So I can’t help you. You’re talking about a territory I avoid. Question 40: The derivative portfolios of major U.S. banks are getting quite large on the balance sheets. S.E.C. reporting doesn’t require much transparency. So do you worry about this kind of stuff in the banks that you own? And do you worry about other banks as well? Charlie: All intelligent investors worry about banks because banks present temptations to their managers to do dumb things. There’s so many things you can easily do in a bank that looks like a cinch way of reporting more earnings soon, where it’s a mistake to do it, long-term considerations being properly considered. As Warren puts it, “The trouble with banking is there are more banks than there are good bankers.” And he’s right about that. So I would say that if you invest in banks you have to go in at a time when you got a lot going for you. Because there’ll be a fair amount of stupidity that creeps into banking. Question 41: When you don’t have the luxury of picking your negotiation counter parties, what’s your best recommendation for dealing with somebody who, not only won’t negotiate rationally but will also criticize you for trying to negotiate rationally? Charlie: You’re talking about a situation I try and solve by avoidance. If I can solve that problem I’d have a line around the block. I mean you wouldn’t be able to squeeze in here. Everybody who has an insoluble problem with a difficult person…Think of what we’d all do to solve that one? I’m afraid I don’t have a solution to that one. Avoidance is my general principle method. Question 42: I have two questions. Both you and Mr. Buffett worked in Buffett’s grandpa’s grocery store during your teenage years. Do you think that your early working experience helped give you a strong advantage in this investing profession? Charlie: Absolutely. I was able to learn from my dead great grandfather when I was a little boy. What I learned at a very young age when I was just a kid, I could see some of the adults around me were nuts and yet they were very talented. I could see how much irrationality there was in very talented people. So I got interested in seeking out the patterns and understanding why it happened and learning tricks to cope and so on. And I did that when I was a little kid. And of course it helped me. Who is not helped by an early start in a promising activity? And what activity could be more promising than in diagnosing stupidity? Question 43: What level of discount would you be applying to potential investments today? Charlie: Well generally speaking, I think the professional investors have to accept less than they were used to getting under different conditions. Just as an old man expects less out of his sex life than he had when he was 20. Question 44: I want to come back to William Thorndike books, and I now have the list of the eight companies. It is General Dynamics, Berkshire Hathaway, The Washington Post, DCI, Capital Cities, Teledyne, General Cinema, and Ralston Purina. I know that Berkshire Hathaway had the long-term investment in the Washington Post and Capital Cities and have been invested in companies of John Malone. But why did Berkshire not have a long-term investment into General Dynamics, Teledyne, General Cinema, or Ralston Purina? Charlie: Well we did have a huge investment in General Dynamics for a long time and we made an enormous amount of money with it. After the defense business contracted, nobody else was willing to sell anything except for General Dynamics, which kept selling at higher and higher prices. And Warren noticed that. We had a huge position in general dynamics and made a fortune. We always admired the founder of Teledyne who was a genius. Henry Singleton. But we admired him from afar, we never invested. It’s just one of many mistakes of omission. Question 45: I was happy to see you at this meeting turned 90, now you’re ninety-five… Charlie: You think you’re happy, think of the way I feel! (laughter) Question 45 (continued…): Well I hope you live to be 120 and I always thank you for your positive influence on our lives. My question is related to stress and sleep and longevity. In business, there are what I call ‘criminal competitors’. You’re honest and ethical but the competitor across the street is beating you by cheating and running a massive insurance fraud. Business and life can cause a lot of stress, but you’ve always seemed to stay cool. What mental tools do you use to de-focus and keep your equanimity for ninety-five years? How do you detach? And even during the Salomon Brothers scandal were you always able to get eight hours of sleep at night?

查理:这倒不是真的。事实上,我年轻时更难入睡,但我确实有一个晚年才学会的技巧。我过去尝试入睡时,从不会有意识清空大脑,而是任由思绪在问题中挣扎,躺在床上翻来覆去很久很久。然后如果一晚没睡好,我就想,“管他呢,明晚再睡。”但这挺蠢的。但现在我会有意识地清空大脑,能挺容易就入睡,我向各位推荐这个方法。真的管用。我也不知道为什么我直到 93 岁才想到这招。(笑声)

第 47 问:你送了罗伯特·西奥迪尼一股伯克希尔股票,感谢他写了《影响力》;还给了阿图尔·加万德一张两万美元支票,感谢他为《纽约客》写了一篇关于医疗保健的文章。还有其他作家因为他们的文章或想法收到过你的馈赠吗?

查理:我记不清了,但不多。阿图尔·加万德是个非常了不起的人,西奥迪尼也是。所以我偶尔会干这种奇怪的事,但不是总干。顺便说一句,我为他们俩感到骄傲。

第 48 问:如果有人能发明时光机,你可以回去和 41 岁的自己共进晚餐,你会给当年的自己什么建议?

查理:嗯,我会避开那次不作为的失误,它让我损失了本可以拥有的一半净资产——如果我当初更聪明的话。我们谁都可以回到过去,把某个决定做得更好。但人难免会偶尔搞砸一次。我的总体看法是,过分纠结于无法改变的事毫无意义。满心怨恨和仇恨之类的东西是个大错误。这是个极其简单的道理,但太多人白白毁掉了自己的人生。嫉妒是件蠢到家的事,因为这种罪过不可能带给你任何乐趣。谁他妈能从嫉妒里得到乐趣?嫉妒能给你带来什么好处?总有人比你做得好。这真的太蠢了。所以我的人生系统就是找出真正愚蠢的事然后避开它。这不会让我受欢迎,但能省去很多麻烦。

第 49 问:你能评论一下为什么伯克希尔的投资组合里医疗保健股这么少吗?

查理:我认为我们对其理解不够深入,而且我们对自己所理解的很多方面也不喜欢。这是两个不投资的很充分理由。

第 50 问:你对赢家通吃的商业模式有什么看法?你在 50 年代和 60 年代见过这种模式吗?

查理:如果你能提前找到并准确预测,那简直是理想模式。完美。赢家通吃。显然太完美了。但很难做到,因为所有人都在寻找同样的东西。

第 51 问:我正处于人生中不太清楚自己能力圈的阶段,所以我想知道你是怎么找到你的能力圈的。

Charlie: Well that is not true. As a matter of fact, I had more difficulty sleeping when I was young, but I do have a tip that I’ve learned late in life. I never consciously blanked out my mind when I tried to go to sleep, so I allowed my mind to wrestle through my problems and keep me awake very very late while I lay in bed wrestling with problems. And then if I didn’t sleep well one night I figured, “What the hell I’ll sleep the next night.” But that was pretty stupid. But now I actually deliberately blank out my mind I can go to sleep rather easily and I recommend it to all of you. It really works. I don’t know why the hell I didn’t get to it before 93. (laughter) Question 47: You gave Robert Cialdini one share of Berkshire for writing influence, and a twenty thousand dollar check to Atul Gawande for writing a New Yorker article on health care. Are there any other writers you gave something to for their writing or ideas? Charlie: I’ve forgotten, but there aren’t many. Atul Gawande is a very remarkable person and so is Cialdini. So I do that kind of weird stuff occasionally, but I don’t do it all the time. I’m proud of those two by the way. Question 48: If someone can invent a time machine and you can go back and have dinner with your 41 year old self, what piece of advice would you give your former self? Charlie: Well I’d avoid that one mistake of omission that cost me half of the net worth I would now have if I’d been smarter. We can all go back and make some decision better. But it’s the nature of thing that you’re going to blow one occasionally. My general idea is there’s no point in fretting too much about what you can’t fix. It’s a big mistake to fill yourself with resentments and hatreds and so on. It’s such a simple idea but so many people ruin their lives unnecessarily. Envy is such a stupid thing to have because you can’t possibly have any fun with that particular sin. Who in the hell ever had any fun in envy? What good could envy possibly do for you? And somebody is always going to be doing better than you are. It’s really stupid. So my system at life is to figure out what’s really stupid and avoid it. It doesn’t make me popular, but it prevents a lot of trouble. Question 49: Could you comment on why there’s so little health care in the Berkshire portfolio? Charlie: I think we don’t understand it well enough and we don’t like a lot that we do understand. Those are two pretty good reasons for not investing. Question 50: Do you have any thoughts on a winner-take-all business model, and have you seen it in the 50’s and 60′? Charlie: That’s ideal if you can find one in advance and predict it accurately. It’s perfect. Winner take all. It’s obviously perfect. It’s very difficult to do because everyone’s looking for the same thing. Question 51: I’m at a point in my life where I don’t really know my circle of competence, so I would like to know how you found yours.

查理:嗯,知道能力圈的边界是极其重要的事。如果你不知道边界在哪,就谈不上什么能力。要是你对自己的能力存在错误认知,那本身就意味着你缺乏能力,你会犯下大错。我认为你必须不断拿自己的成就与其他有成就的人去衡量,并且你必须始终保持坚定的理性,避免大量自欺欺人。但经过一生的观察,我认为一个人能否对自己的能力保持相当程度的理性,很大程度上是天生的。我觉得像我和沃伦这样的人,天生就是这样的。当然,我们接受了很多教育,但我认为我们生来就具备做我们这些事所需的正确性情。我没办法把你带回去重新出生一次。

第 52 个问题:尽管你们做合伙人这么久,为什么沃伦比你富得多?

查理:嗯。他起步更早。他可能也稍微聪明一点。他工作更努力。原因不多。为什么阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦比我还穷?(笑声)

我们的时间快到了。我再回答一个问题,然后我们就结束。

第 53 个问题:您一直非常看好中国的投资前景,并且说过大多数美国人错过了中国。您认为我们错过的是什么?我们在投资中国时应该注意什么?

查理:嗯,你错过的是那里比这里有更多的机会。我不知道还能怎么更明确地引导你。你觉得在这里赚钱很容易,根本不需要中国吗?

好吧,到此结束。

格里·萨尔兹曼:感谢各位参加今年的每日报刊股东大会。我们欢迎各位明年再来。

Charlie: Well it’s a hugely important thing, knowing the edge. It’s hardly a competence if you don’t know the edge of it. You know, if you have a misapprehension regarding your own competency that means you lack competence, you’re going to make terrible mistakes. I think you’ve got to constantly measure what you achieve against other people of achievement, and you have to keep being determinedly rational, and avoiding a lot of self-delusion. But after a lifetime of observing it, I think the tendency to be pretty rational about one’s own competency is largely genetic. I think people like Warren and I were just born this way. Now it took a lot of education. But I think we were born with the right temperament to do what we did. And I have no way of taking you back and rebirthing you. Question 52: In spite of being partners for so long, why is Warren so much richer than you? Charlie: Well. He got an earlier start. He’s probably a little smarter. He works harder. There are not a lot of reasons. Why was Albert Einstein poorer than I was? (laughter) We are coming to the end of our allotted time. I’ll take one more question and then we’ll quite Question 53: You’ve been very positive on the investment prospects for China and you’ve said that most of Americans are missing out on China. What do you think we’re missing? And what should we be aware of when we invest in China? Charlie: Well what you’re missing is that there’s more opportunities there than there is here. And I don’t see how I can guide you any more firmly than that. Are you finding things so easy here you don’t need China? Well with that we’re through. Gerry Salzman: Thank you all for attending the Daily Journal shareholder meeting this year. We welcome you all back for next year.