查理·芒格撰文/演讲稿:2000年慈善圆桌讨论

2000 · 演讲 · 原文约 2886 词
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2000 年 11 月 10 日 查尔斯·T·芒格在慈善圆桌会议早餐会上的演讲

我今天想谈谈美国普通股价格上涨所带来的所谓“财富效应”。

我一开始就应该承认,“财富效应”属于经济学学术范畴,而我从未上过哪怕一门经济学课程,也从未试图通过预测宏观经济变化来赚哪怕一分钱。

尽管如此,我的结论是,在当前极端条件下,大多数经济学博士都低估了基于普通股的“财富效应”的力量。

现在每个人都同意两件事。第一,当股价上涨时,支出倾向会受到向上的影响,当股价下跌时则会受到向下的影响。第二,支出倾向在宏观经济学中极其重要。然而,专业人士对于“财富效应”的规模和时机,以及它如何与其他效应相互作用(包括一个明显的复杂性:增加的支出往往会推高股价,而股价同时又在推高支出),存在分歧。当然,即使支出保持不变,股价上涨也会增加企业收益,例如,通过降低养老金成本预提,之后股价往往会上涨更多。因此,“财富效应”涉及的数学难题远不像物理学理论那样得到圆满解决,也永远无法做到。

美国股价上涨带来的“财富效应”目前之所以特别有趣,有两个原因。首先,广泛持股的股价从未出现过如此极端的上涨,而且由于股价上涨速度远快于国民生产总值,相关的“财富效应”现在一定比以往任何时候都大。其次,过去大约十年间日本发生的事情,理所当然地震撼了学术界的经济学,引发了对反向“财富效应”导致衰退的强烈担忧。

在日本,伴随着大量金融腐败,股价和房地产价格长期极度上涨,同时伴随着极端的实际经济增长(与美国相比)。随后资产价值暴跌,日本经济在非常不理想的水平上停滞不前。在此之后,日本这个已经学会了所有看似正确的凯恩斯主义和货币主义手段的现代经济体,大力且长期地推行这些手段。多年来,日本不仅维持着巨大的政府赤字,还将利率降至接近零的水平并长期维持。尽管如此,日本经济年复一年地停滞不前,因为日本人的支出倾向顽固地抵抗着经济学家们的所有手段,而日本股价也持续低迷。日本的经历对所有人来说都是一个令人不安的例证。如果类似情况发生在这里,将导致规模缩水的慈善基金会感觉被命运重创。让我们希望(很可能也是这样),日本的悲惨境况在很大程度上是由日本特有的社会心理效应和腐败造成的。在这样的情况下,我们的国家可能至少能达到人们普遍认为的安全程度的一半。

好吧,我们承认,受股价影响的支出倾向现在是一个重要课题,而日本长期的衰退令人不安。美国的

11/10/00 TALK OF CHARLES T. MUNGER TO BREAKFAST MEETING OF THE PHILANTHROPY ROUND TABLE I am here today to talk about so-called “wealth effects” from rising prices for U.S. Common stocks. I should concede, at the outset, that “wealth effects” are part of the academic discipline of economics and that I have never taken a single course in economics, nor tried to make a single dollar, ever, from foreseeing macroeconomic changes. Nonetheless, I have concluded that most PhD economists under appraise the power of the common-stock-based “wealth effect”, under current extreme conditions. Everyone now agrees on two things. First, spending proclivity is influenced in an upward direction when stock prices go up and in a downward direction when stock prices go down. And, second, the proclivity to spend is terribly important in macroeconomics. However, the professionals disagree about size and timing of “wealth effects”, and how they interact with other effects, including the obvious complication that increased spending tends to drive up stock prices while stock prices are concurrently driving up spending. Also, of course, rising stock prices increase corporate earnings, even when spending is static, for instance, by reducing pension cost accruals after which stock prices tend to rise more. Thus “wealth effects” involve mathematical puzzles that are not nearly so well worked out as physics theories and never can be. The “wealth effect” from rising U.S. stock prices is particularly interesting right now for two reasons. First, there has never been an advance so extreme in the price of widespread stock holdings and, with stock prices going up so much faster than GNP, the related “wealth effect” must now be bigger than was common before. And second, what has happened in Japan over roughly the last ten years has shaken up academic economics, as it obviously should, creating strong worries about recession from “wealth effects” in reverse. In Japan, with much financial corruption, there was an extreme rise in stock and real estate prices for a very long time, accompanied by extreme real economic growth, compared to the U.S. Then asset values crashed and the Japanese economy stalled out at a very suboptimal level. After this Japan, a modem economy that had learned all the would-be-corrective Keynesian and monetary tricks, pushed these tricks hard and long. Japan, for many years, not only ran an immense government deficit but also reduced interest rates to a place within hailing distance of zero, and kept them there. Nonetheless, the Japanese economy year after year, stays stalled, as Japanese proclivity to spend stubbornly resists all the tricks of the economists. And Japanese stock prices stay down. This Japanese experience is a disturbing example for everyone, and, if something like it happened here, would leave shrunken charitable foundations feeling clobbered by fate. Let us hope, as is probably the case, that the sad situation in Japan is caused in some large part by social psychological effects and corruption peculiar to Japan. In such case our country may be at least half as safe as is widely assumed. Well, grant that spending proclivity, as influenced by stock prices, is now an important subject, and that the long Japanese recession is disturbing. How big are the economic influences of U.S.

股价?经济学专业人士基于美联储系统收集的数据得出的中位数结论,很可能是股价对消费的“财富效应”并没有那么大。毕竟,即便现在,剔除养老金后的家庭实际净资产,过去十年的增长可能还不到 100%,每户家庭的数字依然相当微薄,而普通股市值大概还不到剔除养老金后家庭总净资产的三分之一。而且,家庭持有的普通股财富集中程度几乎令人难以置信,超级富豪的消费与其财富并不成比例。剔除养老金后,最富有的 1% 家庭大概持有约 50% 的普通股市值,而最底层的 80% 家庭大概只持有约 4%。

基于这些数据,再加上股价与消费之间平淡无奇的历史相关性,专业经济学家很容易得出结论说,比如,即便普通家庭按股票资产价值 3% 的比率增加消费,过去十年消费支出的增长每年也不会超过 0.5%,因为股市出现了巨大、前所未有、持续已久的繁荣。

我相信,这种经济思维当下严重偏离了潜在现实。在我看来,这种思维看错了数字,问错了问题。让我这个彻头彻尾的外行,大胆尝试做得更好一点,或者至少换个思路。

首先,有人告诉我——很可能是对的——美联储的数据收集,由于实际操作障碍,没有恰当地考虑养老金效应,包括 401(k) 及类似计划的影响。假设一位 63 岁的牙医,在其私人养老金计划中持有 100 万美元的 GE 股票。股价涨到了 200 万美元,这位牙医觉得手头宽裕,就把那辆非常旧的雪佛兰换掉,以当下常见的优惠价格租了一辆新的凯迪拉克。在我看来,这显然是牙医消费中一个巨大的“财富效应”。但对许多使用美联储数据的经济学家来说,我怀疑他们会认为这看上去像是牙医在挥霍性地负储蓄。而在我看来,这位牙医,以及许多像他一样的人,之所以花更多钱,正是因为养老金带来的强劲“财富效应”。因此,我认为当下养老金带来的“财富效应”绝非微不足道,而且比过去大得多。

另一方面,经济学家的传统思维往往没有考虑“盗用”(bezzle)这个概念蕴含的含义。让我重复一遍:“盗用”,B-E-Z-Z-L-E。

“盗用”这个词是“挪用公款”(embezzle)的缩略形式,由哈佛大学经济学教授约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思创造,用来代表某一时期内未被揭露的挪用公款行为的增长。加尔布雷思之所以创造“盗用”这个词,是因为他看到,未被揭露的挪用公款,每单位美元对消费有着非常强大的刺激效应。毕竟,挪用者因为收入更多而消费更多,而其雇主则因为不知道任何资产已流失而照常消费。

但加尔布雷思没有把他的洞察力向前推进。他满足于做一个启发思维的牛虻。所以,我现在尝试把加尔布雷思的“盗用”概念推向下一个逻辑层面。正如凯恩斯所展示的,在一个依赖劳动收入的简单经济体中,当女裁缝以 20 美元的价格把一件外套卖给鞋匠时,鞋匠就多了 20 美元可花,而女裁缝就少了 20 美元可花。这对总消费没有叠加效应。但当政府多印一张 20 美元的钞票,并用它来买一双鞋时,鞋匠就多了 20 美元,而没有人感到变穷了。然后鞋匠又去买一件外套——这个过程周而复始,不是无穷增加,而是伴随着现在所谓的凯恩斯乘数效应,对消费产生一种类似叠加的效应。同样,一笔未被揭露的挪用公款,每单位美元对消费的刺激效应,也比同等规模的诚实商品交换要强。加尔布雷思是苏格兰人,他喜欢自己的洞察所揭示的那种生活的严酷。毕竟,苏格兰人热情地接受了预定且无法挽救的婴儿永罚观念。但我们其他人并不喜欢加尔布雷思的洞察。尽管如此,我们必须承认,加尔布雷思大体上是正确的。

毫无疑问,加尔布雷思看到了“盗用”增加所预示的那种凯恩斯乘数式的经济效应。但他止步于此。毕竟,“盗用”不可能增长得很大,因为大规模盗窃被发现几乎是必然的,并且迟早肯定会产生反向效应。因此,私人“盗用”的增加,无法像政府支出那样,至少在相当长一段时间内,推动经济持续往上走。

鉴于他洞察到的经济效应看似不大,加尔布雷思没有问出下一个逻辑问题:“盗用”有没有重要的功能等价物,这些等价物规模庞大且不会迅速自毁?我对这个问题的回答是:有。我接下来只描述一个。我将和加尔布雷思一样创造新词:首先,“功盗”(febezzle),代表“盗用”的功能等价物;其次,“功盗行为”(febezzlement),描述创造“功盗”的过程;第三,“功盗者”(febezzlers),描述从事“功盗行为”的人。然后,我将在这房间里就识别出一个重要的“功盗”来源。我认为,你们这些人,通过在处理大额普通股持仓时那些愚蠢的投资管理行为,已经创造了大量“功盗”。

如果一个基金会或其他投资者,每年浪费其资产的 3%,用于管理一个强劲上涨的股票组合,支付那些不必要、非生产性的投资成本,它依然会感觉更富有,尽管存在浪费;而得到这 3% 浪费掉的钱的人,尽管他们是“功盗者”,却认为自己是在体面地赚取收入。这种情况就像是未被揭露的挪用公款,但不具有自我限制性。事实上,这个过程可以自我强化,长期扩张。所有这段时间里,表面上看起来是来自那 3% 浪费掉的钱的接收者的劳动收入消费,实质上却是来自股价上涨所产生的一种变相“财富效应”的消费。

这个房间里有很多人被岁月推得很老了——我这一代或下一代。我们倾向于相信节俭和避免浪费是好事,这个过程对我们一直很管用。经济学家长期以来一直赞扬愚蠢的消费是成功经济的必要组成部分,这对我们来说是矛盾和令人不安的。让我们把愚蠢的开支称为“愚支”(foolexures)。现在,你们这些信奉旧价值观的人,正听到你们中的一个加入为“愚支”辩护的行列,也加上了为“功盗行为”辩护——这是挪用公款的功能等价物。这似乎不是一个开启新一天的好方式。请放心,我并不喜欢“功盗行为”。只是我认为“功盗行为”广泛存在,并且具有强大的经济效应。我还认为,即使一个人不喜欢现实,也应该认清现实,事实上尤其当一个人不喜欢现实的时候。此外,我认为应该欣然接受那些无法通过良好思考消除的矛盾。即便在纯粹数学中,他们也无法消除所有矛盾,我们其他人也应该认识到,无论喜欢与否,我们都将不得不忍受很多矛盾。

stock prices? A median conclusion of the economics professionals, based mostly on data collected by the Federal Reserve System, would probably be that the “wealth effect” on spending from stock prices is not all that big. After all, even now, real household net worth, excluding pensions, is probably up by less than 100% over the last ten years and remains a pretty modest figure per household while market value of common stock is probably not yet one third of aggregate household net worth, excluding pensions. Moreover, such household wealth in common stocks is almost incredibly concentrated, and the super-rich don’t consume in proportion to their wealth. Leaving out pensions, the top 1% of households probably hold about 50% of common stock value and the bottom 80% probably hold about 4%. Based, on such data, plus unexciting past correlation between stock prices and spending, it is easy for a professional economist to conclude, say, that, even if the average household spends incrementally at a rate of 3% of asset values in stock, consumer spending would have risen less than ½% per year over the last ten years as a consequence of the huge, unprecedented, long lasting, consistent boom is stock prices. I believe that such economic thinking widely misses underlying reality right now. To me, such thinking looks at the wrong numbers and asks the wrong questions. Let me, the ultimate amateur, boldly try to do a little better, or at least a little differently. For one thing, I have been told, probably correctly, that Federal Reserve data collection, due to practical obstacles, doesn’t properly take into account pension effects, including effects from 401(k) and similar plans. Assume some 63-year-old dentist has $1 million in GE stock in a private pension plan. The stock goes up in value to $2 million, and the dentist, feeling flush, trades in his very old Chevrolet and leases a new Cadillac at the give-away rate now common. To me this is an obvious large “wealth effect” in the dentist’s spending. To many economists, using Federal Reserve data, I suspect the occasion looks like profligate dissaving by the dentist. To me the dentist, and many others like him, seem to be spending a lot more because of a very strong pension-related “wealth effect”. Accordingly, I believe that present day “wealth effect” from pension plans is far from trivial and much larger than it was in the past. For another thing, the traditional thinking of economists often does not take into account implications from the idea of “bezzle”. Let me repeat: “bezzle”, B-E-Z-Z-L-E. The word “bezzle” is a contraction of the word “embezzle”, and it was coined by Harvard Economics Professor John Kenneth Galbraith to stand for the increase in any period of undisclosed embezzlement. Galbraith coined the “bezzle” word because he saw that undisclosed embezzlement, per dollar, had a very powerful stimulating effect on spending. After all, the embezzler spends more because he has more income, and his employer spends as before because he doesn’t know any of his assets are gone. But Galbraith did not push his insight on. He was content to stop with being a stimulating gadfly. So I will now try to push Galbraith’s “bezzle” concept on to the next logical level. As Keynes showed, in a naive economy relying on earned income, when the seamstress sells a coat to the shoemaker for $20, the shoemaker has $20 more to spend and the seamstress has $20 less to spend. There is lalapaloose effect on aggregate spending. But when the government prints another $20 bill and uses it to buy pair of shoes, the shoemaker has another $20 and no one feels poorer. And when the shoemaker next buys a coat, - the process goes on and on, not to an infinite increase, but with what is now called the Keynesian multiplier effect, a sort of lalapaloosa effect on spending. Similarly, an undisclosed embezzlement has stronger stimulative effects per dollar on spending than a same-sized honest exchange of goods. Galbraith, being Scottish, liked the bleakness of life demonstrated by his insight. After all, the Scottish enthusiastically accepted the idea of pre-ordained, unfixable infant damnation. But the rest of us don’t like Galbraith’s insight. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that Galbraith was roughly right. No doubt Galbraith saw the Keynesian-multiplier-type economic effects promised by increases in “bezzle”. But he stopped there. After all, “bezzle” could not grow very big, because discovery of massive theft was nearly inevitable and sure to have reverse effects in due course. Thus, increase in private “bezzle” could not drive economies up and up, and on and on, at least for a considerable time, like government spending. Deterred by the apparent smallness of economic effects from his insight, Galbraith did not ask the next logical question: Are there important functional equivalents of “bezzle” that are large and not promptly self-destructive? My answer to this question is yes. I will next describe only one. I will join Galbraith in coining new words, first, “febezzle”, to stand for the functional equivalent of “bezzle” and, second, “febezzlement”, to describe the process of creating “febezzle”, and third “febezzlers” to describe persons engaged in “febezzlement”. Then I will identify an important source of “febezzle” right in this room. You people, I think, have created a lot of “febezzle” through your foolish investment management practices in dealing with your large holdings of common stock. If a foundation, or other investor, wastes 3% of assets per year in unnecessary, nonproductive investment costs in managing a strongly rising stock portfolio, it still feels richer, despite the waste, while the people getting the wasted 3%, “febezzelers” though they are, think they are virtuously earning income. The situation is functioning like undisclosed embezzlement without being self-limited. Indeed, the process can expand for a long while by feeding on itself. And all the while what looks like spending from earned income of the receivers of the wasted 3% is, in substance, spending from a disguised “wealth effect” from rising stock prices. This room contains many people pretty well stricken by expired years --- in my generation or the one following. We tend to believe in thrift and avoiding waste as good things, a process that has worked well for us. It is paradoxical and disturbing to us that economists have long praised foolish spending as a necessary ingredient of a successful economy. Let us call foolish expenditures “foolexures”. And now you holders of old values are hearing one of you own add to the case for “foolexures” the case for “febezzlements” --- the functional equivalent of embezzlements. This may not seem like a nice way to start a new day. Please be assured that I don’t like “febezzlements”. It is just that I think “febezzlements” are widespread and have powerful economic effects. And I also think that one should recognize reality even when one doesn’t like it, indeed especially when one doesn’t like it. Also, I think one should cheerfully endure paradox that one can’t remove by good thinking. Even in pure mathematics they can’t remove all paradox, and the rest of us should also recognize we are going to have to endure a lot of paradox, like it or not.

请允许我借此机会指出,我以前认为在大量机构投资管理中,与股票相关的浪费约占每年资产 3% 的看法,在很多情况下很可能都太低了。我的一位朋友,在我对基金会财务官发表演讲后,给我寄来了一份关于共同基金投资者的研究摘要。该研究得出结论:在 15 年期间,典型的共同基金投资者年化收益率仅为 7.25%,而同期普通股票基金的年化收益率达到 12.8%(扣除费用之后)。因此,投资者的实际业绩差距每年超过资产价值的 5%,这还没算上共同基金在扣除费用后,相对于股市平均水平的落后幅度。如果这项共同基金研究大致准确,那就对基金会像共同基金投资者那样频繁更换投资经理的智慧提出了重大质疑。如果共同基金研究中报告的那部分额外落后确实存在,那么它在相当程度上很可能是由以下愚蠢行为造成的:持续从业绩落后的投资组合经理那里撤资,迫使其实仓卖出股票;然后又将撤出的资金交给那些嘴里叼着高压吸水软管、拼命吸纳资产的新投资经理,而客户的投资业绩并不会因为这种超高速的新资金注入而得到改善。我经常被这项新的共同基金研究带来这样的困扰。我如实描述了一些看起来极为糟糕的现实,但我的描述却被当成极端的讽刺而非现实而被置之不理。接着,新的现实又以更大的幅度超越了我不被相信的描述的恐怖程度。难怪芒格关于现实的看法并不广受欢迎。这很可能是我最后一次对慈善基金会发表演讲了。

现在,我们把投资管理中每年约 7500 亿美元、不断流动、持续增长、反复更新的员工股票期权产生的“伪财富”(febezzlement)也纳入考量,就能得到更多与普通股相关的“财富效应”,推动着消费,而且员工股票期权带来的部分“财富效应”,本质上就是“伪财富效应”,而这种效应又是通过法律目前所要求的那种腐败的会计实践得以实现的。

接下来再想想,标普 500 指数每上涨 100 个点,股市市值就会增加约 1 万亿美元。再算上所有“伪财富”引发的某种凯恩斯式的乘数效应。我相信,相关的宏观经济“财富效应”,会比通常认为的要大得多。

而且,来自股票价格的总体“财富效应”确实可能会变得非常巨大。一个不幸的事实是,巨大的、愚蠢的过度行为可能会渗透到普通股的总体价格中。它们的估值一部分像债券,基于对未来产生现金的使用价值进行大致合理的预测。但另一部分又像伦勃朗的画作,购买它们主要是因为到目前为止它们的价格一直在上涨。这种情况,再加上不断变化(先上涨后下跌)的巨大“财富效应”,很可能造成巨大的破坏。让我们通过一个“思想实验”来研究一下这个问题。一家庞大的英国养老基金曾购买了大量古代艺术品,计划十年后卖出,最终也确实卖掉了,获得了微薄的利润。假设所有养老基金都用它们的全部资产购买古代艺术品,而且只购买古代艺术品。那么,我们最终会陷入一个可怕的烂摊子,并带来巨大而不利的宏观经济后果,难道不是吗?而如果只有一半的养老基金投资于古代艺术品,这个烂摊子难道不糟糕吗?如果一半的股票价值都是狂热情绪的产物,那这种情况岂不是和一半养老基金资产都是古代艺术品非常相似?

Let me also take this occasion to state that my previous notion of 3% of assets per annum in waste in much institutional investment management related to stocks is quite likely too low in a great many cases. A friend, after my talk to foundation financial officers, sent me a summary of a study about mutual fund investors. The study concluded that the typical mutual fund investor gained at 7.25% per year in a 15-year period when the average stock fund gained at 12.8% per year (presumably after expenses). Thus the real performance lag for investors was over 5% of assets per year in addition to whatever percentage per year the mutual funds, after expenses, lagged behind stock market averages. If this mutual fund study is roughly right, it raises huge questions about foundation wisdom in changing investment managers all the time as mutual fund investors do. If the extra lag reported in the mutual fund study exists, it is probably caused in considerable measure by folly in constant removal of assets from lagging portfolio managers being forced to liquidate stockholdings, followed by placement of removed assets with new investment managers that have high-pressure, asset-gaining hoses in their mouths and clients whose investment results will not be improved by the super-rapid injection of new funds. I am always having trouble like that caused by this new mutual fund study. I describe something realistically that looks so awful that my description is disregarded as extreme satire instead of reality. Next, new reality tops the horror of my disbelieved description by some large amount. No wonder Munger notions of reality are not widely welcome. This may be my last talk to charitable foundations. Now toss in with “febezzlement” in investment management about $750 billion in floating, evergrowing, ever-renewing wealth from employee stock options and you get lot more commonstock-related “wealth effect”, driving consumption, with some of the “wealth effect” from employee stock options being, in substance, “febezzle” effect, facilitated by the corrupt accounting practice now required by law. Next consider that each 100-point advance in the S&P adds about $1 trillion in stock market value, and throw in some sort of Keynesian-type multiplier effect related to all “febezzlement”. The related macro-economic “wealth effects”, I believe, become much larger than is conventionally supposed. And aggregate “wealth effect” from stock prices can get very large indeed. It is an unfortunate fact that great and foolish excess can come into prices of common stocks in the aggregate. They are valued partly like bonds, based on roughly rational projections of use value in producing future cash. But they are also valued partly like Rembrandt paintings, purchased mostly because their prices have gone up, so far. This situation, combined with big “wealth effects”, at first up and later down, can conceivably produce much mischief. Let us try to investigate this by a “thought experiment”. One of the big British pension funds once bought a lot of ancient art, planning to sell it ten years later, which it did, at a modest profit. Suppose all pension funds purchased ancient art, and only ancient art, with all their assets. Wouldn’t we eventually have a terrible mess on our hands, with great and undesirable macroeconomic consequences? And wouldn’t the mess be bad if only half of all pension funds were invested in ancient art? And if half of all stock value became a consequence of mania, isn’t the situation much like the case wherein half of pension assets are ancient art?

我刚才承认股票总市值有可能达到非理性高度,这与你们当中许多人曾从那些错误教授那里学来的“有效市场”理论(硬核版)背道而驰,你们当年可是把它当福音信。你们那些错误的教授,受经济学里“理性人”行为模型影响太深,受心理学和现实经验里“蠢人”模型影响太少。“群体愚蠢”——人类在某些情境下像旅鼠一样跟风的本能——解释了许多聪明人的愚蠢想法,也解释了许多愚蠢行为,比如今天在座许多基金会所采取的投资管理做法。可悲的是,如今每家机构投资者似乎最怕的就是自己的投资做法跟别人不一样。

好了,一顿早餐会上这些非专业的漫想就到此为止。如果我的看法多少有点对,那么我们现在这轮繁荣,从与普通股价格相关的“财富效应”——其中有些令人作呕——中获得的助推力,比以往许多次繁荣时期都强。如果是这样,那最近这轮繁荣中上涨幅度越大,未来某次股价下跌时,下跌的幅度也可能越大。顺便说一句,经济学家们最终很可能会得出这样的结论:当股市上涨和下跌被视为长期趋势时,每一美元股市下跌对可选择性消费的下行拉力,大于每一美元股市上涨的上行推力。我怀疑,如果经济学家们更愿意从自己学科之外的最佳思想中汲取帮助,或者哪怕更认真地去看看日本,他们可能早就相信这一点了。

想起日本,我还想提出一种可能性:在极长的时间跨度里,经济中也存在“美德效应”。比如,大范围腐败的会计最终会产生糟糕的长期后果,就像复式记账法这种基于美德的助推方式曾给威尼斯的鼎盛时期带来提振一样——这是一种反向效应。我建议,当金融场景开始让你想起索多玛和蛾摩拉时,即使你喜欢参与其中,也应该担心实际后果。

最后,我相信我今天结论对慈善基金会的影响,结合我之前对基金会财务官员的讲话中的结论,远远超出了投资技巧的范围。如果我是对的,那么几乎所有美国基金会都因为不理解自身投资运作与更大体系之间的关系而行事不智。如果是这样,那就不好了。生活中有一条粗略法则:一个组织在处理复杂系统时在一个方面愚蠢,它很有可能在另一个方面也愚蠢。所以,基金会捐赠的智慧,可能跟基金会投资操作一样需要改进。这里我们有两条古老规则可以指引我们。一条是伦理规则,另一条是审慎规则。

伦理规则来自塞缪尔·约翰逊,他认为,一个负责任的官员若维持一种本可以轻易消除的无知状态,那在履行道德义务时就构成了背信弃义的渎职行为。审慎规则则蕴含在沃纳与斯瓦西公司那则关于机床的老广告里:“那个需要一台新机床却还没买的人,其实已经在为它付钱了。”我认为,沃纳与斯瓦西的规则同样适用于思维工具。如果你没有掌握正确的思维工具,那么你和你想要帮助的人,已经在为你本可轻易消除的无知而付出代价了。

My foregoing acceptance of the possibility that stock value in aggregate can become irrationally high is contrary to the hard-form “efficient market” theory that many of you once learned as gospel from your mistaken professors of yore. Your mistaken professors were too much influenced by “rational man” models of human behavior from economics and too little by “foolish man” models from psychology and real-world experience. “Crowd folly”, the tendency of humans, under some circumstances, to resemble lemmings, explains much foolish thinking of brilliant men and much foolish behavior --- like investment management practices of many foundations represented here today. It is sad that today each institutional investor apparently fears most of all that its investment practices will be different from practices of the rest of the crowd. Well, this is enough uncredentialed musing for one breakfast meeting. If I am at all right, our present prosperity has had a stronger boost from common-stock-price-related “wealth effects”, some of them disgusting, than has been the case in many former booms. If so, what was greater on the upside in the recent boom could also be greater on the downside at some time of future stock price decline. Incidentally, the economists may well conclude, eventually, that, when stock market advances and declines are regarded as long lasting, there is more downside force on optional consumption per dollar of stock market decline than there is upside force per dollar of stock market rise. I suspect that economists would believe this already if they were more willing to take assistance from the best ideas outside their own discipline, or even to look harder at Japan. Remembering Japan, I also want to raise the possibility that there are, in the very long term, “virtue effects” in economics--- for instance that widespread corrupt accounting will eventually create bad long term consequences as a sort of obverse effect from the virtue-based boost double-entry book-keeping gave to the heyday of Venice. I suggest that when the financial scene starts reminding you of Sodom and Gomorrah, you should fear practical consequences even if you like to participate in what is going on. Finally, I believe that implications for charitable foundations of my conclusions today, combined with conclusions in my former talk to foundation financial officers, go way beyond implications for investment techniques. If I am right, almost all U.S. foundations are unwise through failure to understand their own investment operations, related to the larger system. If so, this is not good. A rough rule in life is that an organization foolish in one way in dealing with a complex system is all too likely to be foolish in another. So the wisdom of foundation donations may need as much improvement as investment practices of foundations. And here we have two more old rules to guide us. One rule is ethical and the other is prudential. The ethical rule is from Samuel Johnson who believed that maintenance of easily removable ignorance by a responsible office holder was treacherous malfeasance in meeting moral obligation. The prudential rule is that underlying the old Warner & Swasey advertisement for machine tools: “The man who needs a new machine tool, and hasn’t bought it, is already paying for it”. The Warner & Swasey rule also applies, I believe, to thinking tools. If you don’t have the right thinking tools, you, and the people you seek to help, are already suffering from your easily removable ignorance.