关于以色列、美国与AIPAC

2007 · 随笔 · 原文约 3702 词
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布什政府正在中东地区犯下一项重大政策失误,这一失误可能带来灾难性后果,却未得到应有的关注。这次涉及的是以巴关系。布什政府积极支持以色列政府拒绝承认一个包含哈马斯的巴勒斯坦团结政府——美国国务院将哈马斯视为恐怖组织。就在巴勒斯坦问题的进展有助于避免大中东地区爆发战火的时刻,这种做法排除了任何和平解决进程取得进展的可能。

The Bush administration is once again in the process of committing a major policy blunder in the Middle East, one that is liable to have disastrous consequences and is not receiving the attention it should. This time it concerns the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The Bush administration is actively supporting the Israeli government in its refusal to recognize a Palestinian unity government that includes Hamas, which the US State Department considers a terrorist organization. This precludes any progress toward a peace settlement at a time when progress on the Palestinian problem could help avert a conflagration in the greater Middle East.

美国和以色列寻求只与巴勒斯坦权力机构主席马哈茂德·阿巴斯打交道,希望新选举能让哈马斯失去其目前在巴勒斯坦立法委员会中拥有的多数席位。这是一项毫无希望的策略,因为哈马斯已表示将抵制提前选举,即使选举结果导致哈马斯被排除在政府之外,没有哈马斯的支持,任何和平协议都无法持久。

The United States and Israel seek to deal only with the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, in the hope that new elections would deny Hamas the majority it now has in the Palestinian Legislative Council. This is a hopeless strategy because Hamas has said it would boycott early elections, and even if their outcome would result in Hamas’s exclusion from the government, no peace agreement would hold without Hamas’s support.

与此同时,沙特阿拉伯正走一条不同的路。在二月份于麦加举行的马哈茂德·阿巴斯与哈马斯领导人哈立德·马沙尔之间的峰会上,沙特政府促成此前激烈冲突的哈马斯与法塔赫达成协议,组建民族团结政府。根据麦加协议,哈马斯同意“尊重国际决议以及巴勒斯坦解放组织签署的(与以色列的)协议”,包括《奥斯陆协议》。据 3 月 15 日的新闻报道,新政府与现政府一样,将由哈马斯总理伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚领导,但哈马斯将获得政府 24 个部委中的 9 个,外加一个不管部部长;阿巴斯主席及其法塔赫党将控制 6 个部委,而独立代表——据称部分受哈马斯或法塔赫控制——及其他政治派别将填补剩余 9 个部委。

In the meantime Saudi Arabia is pursuing a different path. In a February summit in Mecca between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, the Saudi government worked out an agreement between Hamas and Fatah, which have been clashing violently, to form a national unity government. According to the Mecca accord, Hamas has agreed “to respect international resolutions and the agreements [with Israel] signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization,” including the Oslo Accords. According to press reports on March 15, the new government, like the present one, will be headed by Ismail Haniya, the Hamas prime minister, but Hamas will get nine of the government’s twenty-four ministries, as well as an additional minister without portfolio; President Abbas and his Fatah party will control six ministries, and independent representatives-some said to be under the control of Hamas or Fatah-and other political factions will fill the nine remaining ministries.

沙特政府认为,这一协议是向以色列提出和平解决方案的前奏,方案将参照 2002 年的《阿拉伯和平倡议》,由沙特及其他阿拉伯国家共同担保,以 1967 年边界为基础,并包含对以色列的全面承认。该提议原定由沙特国王阿卜杜拉在 3 月底于沙特主办的阿拉伯联盟会议上详细阐述。但只要布什政府和埃胡德·奥尔默特政府继续坚持目前的态度——拒绝承认包含哈马斯的联合政府,就根本不可能取得任何进展。康多莉扎·赖斯、阿巴斯和奥尔默特最近举行的会谈,结果不过是流于形式。

The Saudi government views this accord as the prelude to the offer of a peace settlement with Israel, along the lines of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, a settlement to be guaranteed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, based on the 1967 borders and full recognition of Israel. The offer was meant to be elaborated by Saudi King Abdullah at the Arab League meeting to be hosted by Saudi Arabia at the end of March. But no progress is possible as long as the Bush administration and the Ehud Olmert government persist in their current position of refusing to recognize a unity government that includes Hamas. The recent meeting between Condoleezza Rice, Abbas, and Olmert turned into an empty formality.

当前僵局的许多原因可以追溯到以色列总理阿里埃勒·沙龙决定单方面从加沙地带撤军,而当时并未与法塔赫控制的巴勒斯坦权力机构进行谈判。这强化了哈马斯的地位。在 2006 年 1 月巴勒斯坦立法选举前夕,沙龙拒绝为帮助法塔赫的前景动一根手指。应四方集团(欧盟、美国、俄罗斯和联合国)的请求,詹姆斯·沃尔芬森制定了一项六点计划,旨在援助加沙地带的居民;其中一项内容是促进约旦河西岸与加沙地带之间的交通,并在加沙地带开放一个港口和一个机场。但这六点计划没有一项得到落实。布什政府负责该事务的官员埃利奥特·艾布拉姆斯从一开始就破坏了这项六点计划。部分由于这个原因,哈马斯在选举中爆冷获胜。

Many of the causes of the current impasse go back to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip unilaterally, without negotiating with the then-Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. This strengthened the position of Hamas. In the run-up to the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Sharon refused to lift a finger to help Fatah’s prospects. At the behest of the Quartet-the European Union, the United States, Russia, and the United Nations-James Wolfensohn worked out a six-point plan to assist the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip; among other things, it called for facilitating traffic between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and opening a port and an airport in the Gaza Strip. But not one of the six points was implemented. The Bush administration’s official in charge, Elliot Abrams, sabotaged the six-point plan from its inception. Partly as a consequence, Hamas won the elections in an upset victory.

接下来就是我所说的失策。以色列在美国的强力支持下,拒绝承认民选的哈马斯政府,并扣留代其征收的数百万美元税款,不向巴方支付。这造成了严重的经济困难,削弱了政府的运作能力,但并没有降低巴勒斯坦民众对哈马斯的支持率,反而强化了伊斯兰极端分子和其他反对与以色列谈判的势力的立场。局势恶化到巴勒斯坦不再拥有一个以色列可以与之谈判的权力机构的程度。

Then came the blunder I am talking about. Israel, with the strong backing of the United States, refused to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government and withheld payment of the millions in taxes collected by the Israelis on its behalf. This caused great economic hardship and undermined the ability of the government to function. But it did not reduce popular support for Hamas among Palestinians, and it reinforced the position of Islamic and other extremists who oppose negotiations with Israel. The situation deteriorated to the point where Palestine no longer had an authority with whom it would have been possible for Israel to negotiate.

这是一个严重的错误,因为哈马斯并非铁板一块。外界对其内部结构知之甚少,但根据一些报道,它拥有一个主要受大马士革指挥的军事派别,该派别依附于叙利亚和伊朗的资助者;此外还有一个政治派别,这个派别对选举上台执政的巴勒斯坦民众的需求更为敏感。如果以色列当初接受了选举结果,或许能强化更为温和的政治派别。不幸的是,“反恐战争”的意识形态不允许如此精妙的区分。不过,后续的事件提供了一些依据,让人相信哈马斯内部已分裂为不同倾向。它虽然不愿走得远到承认以色列的存在,但却准备组建一个遵守与以色列现有协议的民族团结政府。协议刚一达成,军事派系就策划绑架了以色列士兵吉拉德·沙利特,这一行动引发了以色列的严厉军事回应,从而阻止了这样一个政府的成立。真主党随后利用此次机会,从黎巴嫩跨越国际公认的边界发动入侵,又绑架了数名以色列士兵。尽管以色列做出了不成比例的报复,真主党仍能坚守阵地,从而赢得了阿拉伯大众(无论是逊尼派还是什叶派)的钦佩。

This was a blunder because Hamas is not monolithic. Its inner structure is little known to outsiders but according to some reports it has a military wing, largely directed from Damascus, which is beholden to its Syrian and Iranian sponsors and a political wing which is more responsive to the needs of the Palestinian population that elected it to power. If Israel had accepted the results of the election, that might have strengthened the more moderate political wing. Unfortunately the ideology of the “war on terror” does not permit such subtle distinctions. Nevertheless, subsequent events provide some ground for believing that Hamas has been divided between different tendencies. It was not willing to go so far as to recognize the existence of Israel but it was prepared to enter into a government of national unity which would have abided by the existing agreements with Israel. No sooner was agreement reached than the military wing engineered the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, which had the effect of preventing such a government from being formed by provoking a heavy-handed military response from Israel. Hezbollah then used the opportunity to stage an incursion from Lebanon across the internationally recognized border, kidnapping several more Israeli soldiers. Despite a disproportionate response by Israel, Hezbollah was able to stand its ground, thereby gaining the admiration of the Arab masses, whether Sunni or Shia.

正是这种危险局面——包括巴勒斯坦政府瘫痪、法塔赫与哈马斯之间的冲突——促使沙特提出和平倡议,该倡议为和平解决带来了前景。这样的解决方案将极有利于以色列和美国。

It was this dangerous state of affairs -including the breakdown of government in Palestine and fighting between Fatah and Hamas-that prompted the Saudi initiative, which holds out the prospect of a peace settlement. Such a settlement would be very much in the interests of Israel and the United States.

现行政策的辩护者会说,以色列不能冒险在弱势地位上谈判。但只要以色列继续走军事升级的当前路线,它的处境就不太可能好转。幸运的是,沙特阿拉伯——其自身处境也岌岌可危——确实有诚意推动基于两国方案的解决方案。错过这个机会将是悲剧,这意味着以色列需要从约旦河西岸大部分地区撤军,以便一个可行的巴勒斯坦国能够执政,同时哈马斯需要承认以色列的存在。这种解决方案的框架已经相当明确,其基本理念与克林顿总统时期并无实质性差异。

Defenders of the current policy would argue that Israel cannot afford to negotiate from a position of weakness. But Israel’s position is unlikelyto improve as long as it pursues its present course of military escalation. Fortunately Saudi Arabia, whose position is also precarious, has a genuine interest in promoting a settlement based on two states. It would be tragic to miss out on that prospect, which would mean both withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank by the Israelis, so that a workable Palestinian state can take power, and acceptance of Israel’s existence by Hamas. The outlines of such a settlement are quite well defined. The underlying concepts are not materially different from what they were during President Clinton’s time.

最大的威胁来自伊朗。在巴勒斯坦问题上达成和解,将有助于应对这一威胁。但以色列和美国似乎都僵持着,不愿与包含哈马斯的巴勒斯坦权力机构进行谈判。症结在于哈马斯不愿承认以色列的存在;但这一点可以成为最终和解的条件,而不是谈判的前提条件。[1]

The most potent threat comes from Iran. Movement toward a settlement in Palestine would be helpful in confronting that threat. But both Israel and the United States seem to be frozen in their unwillingness to negotiate with a Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. The sticking point is Hamas’s unwillingness to recognize the existence of Israel; but that could be made a condition for an eventual settlement rather than a precondition for negotiations.[1]

当前政策在美国甚至无人质疑。虽然中东其他问题领域可以自由讨论,但对以色列政策的批评确实非常克制。以色列国内关于以色列政策的辩论比美国要开放和激烈得多。这一点尤其引人注目,因为巴勒斯坦问题比当前任何其他问题都更能让美国与欧洲产生分歧。据报道,一些欧洲政府希望在团结政府成功组建后结束对哈马斯的经济抵制。但美国表示不会这样做。

The current policy is not even questioned in the United States. While other problem areas of the Middle East are freely discussed, criticism of our policies toward Israel is very muted indeed. The debate in Israel about Israeli policy is much more open and vigorous than in the United States. This is all the more remarkable because Palestine is the issue that more than any other currently divides the United States from Europe. Some European governments, according to reports, would like to end the economic boycott of Hamas once a unity government is successfully established. But the US has said it would not.

解释之一在于美国以色列公共事务委员会(AIPAC)的广泛影响力,它对民主党和共和党都有显著影响。[2] AIPAC 的使命是确保美国支持以色列,但近年来它已越界。它曾与新保守派紧密结盟,是入侵伊拉克的热情支持者;积极游说确认约翰·博尔顿出任美国驻联合国大使;继续反对与包括哈马斯在内的巴勒斯坦政府进行任何对话。最近,它又成为施压群体之一,迫使民主党众议院领导层放弃要求总统在采取军事行动打击伊朗前须获得国会批准。AIPAC 在当前领导层下显然已超越其使命,非但没有保障以色列的生存,反而使之陷入危险。

One explanation is to be found in the pervasive influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which strongly affects both the Democratic and the Republican parties.[2] AIPAC’s mission is to ensure American support for Israel but in recent years it has overreached itself. It became closely allied with the neocons and was an enthusiastic supporter of the invasion of Iraq. It actively lobbied for the confirmation of John Bolton as US ambassador to the United Nations. It continues to oppose any dialogue with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas. More recently, it was among the pressure groups that prevailed upon the Democratic House leadership to drop the requirement that the President obtain congressional approval before taking military action against Iran. AIPAC under its current leadership has clearly exceeded its mission, and far from guaranteeing Israel’s existence, has endangered it.

巴勒斯坦问题没有纯粹的军事解决方案。军事优势对于以色列的国家安全是必要的,但远非充分条件。正如克林顿总统所认识到的,解决方案必须是政治性的。他倾注了巨大精力促成和平协议,其努力如此成功,以至于 1995 年以色列总理伊扎克·拉宾被一名以色列极端分子暗杀,才阻止了以色列与阿拉法特之间的一项和平倡议得以实施。即使在 2000 年 9 月阿里埃勒·沙龙登上圣殿山引发新一轮暴力之后,克林顿仍在几个月后提出了一项和平方案,该方案虽被阿拉法特拒绝,但很可能勾勒出未来解决方案的轮廓。

The Palestine problem does not have a purely military solution. Military superiority is necessary for Israel’s national security, but it is not sufficient. The solution has to be political, as President Clinton recognized. He exerted enormous energy to bring about a peace settlement and his efforts were so successful that it took the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by an Israeli extremist to prevent an Israeli peace initiative with Arafat from being implemented. Even after Ariel Sharon’s walk on the Temple Mount in September 2000 set off new violence, Clinton offered a peace deal several months later that was rejected by Arafat but probably suggests the shape of a future settlement.

布什总统从未尝试过。他采用了“反恐战争”这个误导人的比喻,并听任阿里埃勒·沙龙为所欲为。沙龙并不想通过谈判解决争端。他意识到军事占领无法永远维持下去,于是撤出了加沙——有人认为,此举部分是为了加强以色列在约旦河西岸的地位。但单方面撤军导致了当前这一连串事件的发生。布什政府不仅被动地默许沙龙/奥尔默特政府的政策,还积极鼓励这些政策。美国以色列公共事务委员会(AIPAC)必须为协助和支持以色列的政策承担其应有的责任,例如以色列去年夏天对真主党的强硬反应,以及坚持只将哈马斯视为恐怖组织。

President Bush has never tried. He has adopted the misleading metaphor of the war on terror and allowed Ariel Sharon to have his way. Sharon did not want a negotiated settlement. He came to realize that the military occupation could not be maintained forever and withdrew from Gaza, in part, it has been argued, to strengthen the Israeli position on the West Bank. But unilateral withdrawal led to the current chain of events. The Bush administration did not just passively acquiesce in the Sharon/ Olmert government’s policies; it actively encouraged them. AIPAC must bear its share of responsibility for aiding and abetting policies such as Israel’s heavy-handed response to Hezbollah last summer and its insistence on treating Hamas only as a terrorist organization.

当前不寻求政治解决而是追求军事升级的政策——不仅是"以眼还眼",大致上是用十个巴勒斯坦人的命换一个以色列人的命——已经达到了一个特别危险的地步。在以色列国防军对黎巴嫩的道路系统、机场和其他基础设施进行报复之后,人们不禁要问,以色列军队的下一步会是什么。与作为其代理人的哈马斯和真主党相比,伊朗对以色列构成的威胁更为严重。一场地区性大火拼的危险正在加剧,而以色列和美国很可能成为输家。考虑到真主党能够抵御以色列的猛攻,以及伊朗崛起为潜在的核大国,以色列的生存比建国以来任何时候都更加危险。

The current policy of not seeking a political solution but pursuing military escalation-not just an eye for an eye but roughly speaking ten Palestinian lives for every Israeli one-has reached a particularly dangerous point. After the Israel Defense Forces’ retaliation against Lebanon’s road system, airport, and other infrastructure one must wonder what could be the next step for the Israeli forces. Iran poses a more potent danger to Israel than either Hamas or Hezbollah, which are Iran’s clients. There is the growing danger of a regional conflagration in which Israel and the US could well be on the losing side. With the ability of Hezbollah to withstand the Israeli onslaught and the rise of Iran as a prospective nuclear power, Israel’s existence is more endangered than at any time since its birth.

以色列的支持者有充分的理由质疑美国以色列公共事务委员会(AIPAC)的主张,而且他们已经开始这样做了。但 AIPAC 非但没有进行批判性的自我反省,反而依然顽固不化。最近,这个亲以色列游说集团采取了攻势,指责所谓对以色列政策持批评态度的进步人士煽动反犹太主义,并危害犹太国家的生存。

Supporters of Israel have good reason to question AIPAC’s advocacy and they have begun to do so. But instead of engaging in critical self-examination, AIPAC remains intransigent. Recently, the pro-Israel lobby has gone on the offensive, accusing the so-called progressive critics of Israel’s policies of fomenting anti-Semitism and endangering the very existence of the Jewish state.

阿尔文·H·罗森菲尔德在美国犹太人委员会出版的一本小册子中,详细阐述了反对那些不同意以色列现行政策之人的理由。[3] 在回顾了新的反犹太主义潮流(尤其是在穆斯林世界和欧洲)兴起之后,罗森菲尔德将反犹太主义等同于反犹太复国主义,并断言对以色列政策持批评态度的犹太人同时强化了这两者。他承认,批评本身并非反犹太主义;事实上,他写道:“圣经中的先知们站在正义一边,当他们看到自己族人的行为偏离了正义的标准时,他们从不犹豫去谴责这些行为。”但他争辩道, “谴责以色列的行为,同时却放弃任何可能解释这些行为的现实历史和政治框架”是不可接受的。他写道,使用“夸大其词和诽谤性的言辞”使得以色列与“那些最狂热的反犹分子经常谴责的可憎国家”难以区分。

The case against those who disagree with Israel’s current policy is spelled out in detail by Alvin H. Rosenfeld in a pamphlet published by the American Jewish Committee.[3] After reviewing the rise of new anti-Semitic currents, particularly in the Muslim world and Europe, Rosenfeld equates anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism and asserts that Jewish critics of Israeli policies reinforce both. He acknowledges that criticism by itself is not anti-Semitic; indeed, he writes, “the biblical prophets stood on the side of justice and were never hesitant to denounce their people’s behavior when they saw it deviating from the standards of justice.” But, he contends, “to condemn Israeli actions and, at the same time, to forego any realistic historical and political frameworks that might account for such actions” is not acceptable. The use of “exaggerated and defamatory terms,” he writes, renders Israel indistinguishable from the “despised country regularly denounced by the most impassioned anti-Semites.”

称以色列为纳粹国家……或指责它实行南非式的种族隔离统治、进行种族清洗或全面种族灭绝,这远远超出了合理的批评。

谈论受害者变成压迫者,在他看来属于同一类。

To call Israel a Nazi state…or to accuse it of South African-style apartheid rule or engaging in ethnic cleansing or wholesale genocide goes well beyond legitimate criticism. To talk about victims turning into aggressors falls in his view in the same category.

为支撑他的论点,罗森菲尔德审视了许多批评者的著述。他特别关注一本散文集,按照他自己的判断,这些作者让诺姆·乔姆斯基看起来都像个“近乎保守的思想家”,但这份名单还包括著名历史学家托尼·朱特,他的罪行在于提出了以色列可能采取的双民族解决方案;以及《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家理查德·科恩,他写道,除其他事项外,“以色列最理智的选择是撤退到可防御但并非具有伤害性的边界”,并撤出“西岸大部分地区”——这是在以色列国内也常被倡导的政策。罗森菲尔德在对攻击对象毫无个人了解的情况下,诉诸于原始的“自我仇视”指控,将所有这些批评者混为一谈,说他们是那些“为自己身为犹太人而感到羞耻并引以为傲”的人。他总结道,“这些敌对思想的累积效应,它们已从边缘稳步走向‘进步’舆论的主流,其结果是重新激发了那些长期以来被认为已经沉寂(如果不是已经死亡)的丑陋观念和激进激情”,即反犹太主义。

To buttress his case, Rosenfeld examines the writings of a number of critics. In particular, he focuses on a collection of essays whose authors, in his own judgment, make Noam Chomsky appear as an “almost conservative thinker,” but the list also includes Tony Judt, a distinguished historian, whose crime consists of suggesting a possible binational solution for Israel, and Richard Cohen, a Washington Post columnist, who wrote, among other things, that the “sanest choice for Israel is to pull back to defensible-but hardly injurious-borders” and to get out “of most of the West Bank”-a policy often advocated in Israel itself. Rosenfeld resorts, without any personal knowledge of the people he attacks, to primitive accusations of self-hatred, lumping all these critics together as people who are “proud to be ashamed to be Jews.” He concludes that “the cumulative effect of these hostile ideas, which have been moving steadily from the margins to the mainstream of ‘progressive’ opinion, has been to reenergize ugly ideas and aggressive passions long considered dormant, if not dead,” i.e., anti-Semitism.

罗森菲尔德的论点在推理上至少犯了三个基本错误。第一个是“有罪关联”。对以色列的建设性批评者所说的话,如果被断章取义或以挑衅的方式转述,听起来可能与反犹分子的言论相似,但这绝不意味着他们就是反犹分子或反犹主义的支持者。第二,缺乏事实证据。批评者使用的表述真的“夸大其词和诽谤性”吗?这取决于事实。更恰当的术语是“以色列尚未完工的安全隔离墙”还是“种族隔离墙”?只有通过考虑这堵墙对巴勒斯坦人生活的实际影响才能确定,而这一主题却被罗森菲尔德和 AIPAC 忽视了。

Rosenfeld’s argument suffers from at least three elementary errors in reasoning. The first is guilt by association. The fact that constructive critics of Israel say things that, when taken out of context or paraphrased in provocative ways, can be made to sound similar to the comments of anti-Semites does not make them anti-Semitic or supporters of anti-Semitism in any way. Second, there is a lack of factual evidence. Are the expressions used by the critics really “exaggerated and defamatory”? That depends on the facts. What is the more appropriate term, “Israel’s still incomplete security fence” or “an Apartheid Wall?” That can be determined only by considering the actual impact the wall is having on the lives of the Palestinians, a subject ignored by Rosenfeld and AIPAC.

第三,当不允许“谴责以色列的行为,同时放弃任何可能解释这些行为的现实历史和政治框架”时,所宣称的对批评的尊重就是一场骗局。按照罗森菲尔德的表述,这一公式意味着以色列的行为无论对错都必须被辩护。“现实框架”的呼吁旨在合理化以色列的立场。批评应该根据其本身的价值来评判,而不是依据任何其他标准。当批评被认为是不爱国而加以压制时,这在以色列和美国都造成了巨大的危害。它使得布什政府和沙龙/奥尔默特政府得以推行灾难性的政策。

Third, the professed respect for criticism is a sham when it is not permitted “to condemn Israeli actions and, at the same time, to forego any realistic historical and political frameworks that might account for such actions.” As presented by Rosenfeld, this formula implies that Israel’s actions have to be justified, right or wrong. The appeal to a “realistic framework” aims to rationalize the Israeli position. Criticism ought to be considered on its merits and not by any other yardstick. Suppressing criticism when it is deemed to be unpatriotic has been immensely harmful both in the case of Israel and the United States. It has allowed the Bush administration and the Sharon/ Olmert government to pursue disastrous policies.

亲以色列游说集团在压制批评方面取得了惊人的成功。[4] 政客们挑战它要冒风险,因为这个游说集团有能力影响政治捐款。当霍华德·迪安在 2004 年呼吁对以色列采取平衡政策时,他获得提名的机会就受到了严重损害(尽管是在爱荷华州失利后他试图在人群中大声疾呼才最终了他的命运)。学者们的前途受阻,智库专家如果越界太远,他们的资金就会被切断。在批评以色列在西岸的压迫性政策后,前总统吉米·卡特遭受了他中心部分资助者的流失。

The pro-Israel lobby has been remarkably successful in suppressing criticism.[4] Politicians challenge it at their peril because of the lobby’s ability to influence political contributions. When Howard Dean called for an evenhanded policy toward Israel in 2004, his chances of getting the nomination were badly damaged (although it was his attempt, after his defeat in Iowa, to shout above the crowd that sealed his fate). Academics had their advancement blocked and think-tank experts their funding withdrawn when they stepped too far out of line. Following his criticism of repressive Israeli policy on the West Bank, former president Jimmy Carter has suffered the loss of some of the financial backers of his center.

任何敢于表达异议的人都可能成为个人诋毁运动的目标。我以个人经历发言。自从我参加了一次讨论需要表达不同观点的会议后,一连串的诽谤就开始了,包括《新共和》杂志的错误指控,说我在 13 岁时是“希特勒车轮上的一个小齿轮”——当时我父亲为了救我的命安排了一个假身份,我陪同农业部的一位官员,冒充他的教子,去清点一处犹太人的财产。[5]

Anybody who dares to dissent may be subjected to a campaign of personal vilification. I speak from personal experience. Ever since I participated in a meeting discussing the need for voicing alternative views, a torrent of slanders has been released including the false accusation in The New Republic that I was a “young cog in the Hitlerite wheel” at the age of thirteen when my father arranged a false identity to save my life and I accompanied an official of the Ministry of Agriculture, posing as his godson, when he was taking the inventory of a Jewish estate.[5]

AIPAC 不仅受到个人报复恐惧的保护,还受到对以色列安全与生存的真诚关切保护。这两种考虑都有坚实的现实基础。同样的两个因素在 9/11 之后的美国也发挥了作用,当时布什总统宣布了反恐战争。在此后的十八个月里,批评他的政策被认为是不爱国的。这使他得以犯下美国历史上最大的错误之一:入侵伊拉克。但在当时,布什政府大大夸大了对我们国家安全的威胁。康多莉扎·赖斯和副总统迪克·切尼甚至警告说,这种威胁会以蘑菇云的形式显现。在今天的以色列,对国家安全的威胁,甚至是对国家生存的威胁,要真实得多。以色列比以往任何时候都更需要美国的支持。现在是揭露 AIPAC 在美国政治中巨大影响力的正确时机吗?我认为这一考虑阻止了许多批评 AIPAC 行事方式的人。虽然布什政府失败政策的其他策划者已被无情曝光,但 AIPAC 仍然被一道沉默之墙所包围。

AIPAC is protected not only by the fear of personal retaliation but also by a genuine concern for the security and survival of Israel. Both considerations have a solid foundation in reality. The same two factors were at play in the United States after September 11 when President Bush declared war on terror. For eighteen months thereafter it was considered unpatriotic to criticize his policies. That is what allowed him to commit one of the greatest blunders in American history, the invasion of Iraq. But at that time the threat to our national security was greatly exaggerated by the Bush administration. Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney went so far as to warn that the threat would manifest itself in the form of a mushroom cloud. In the case of Israel today the threat to national security, even national survival, is much more real. Israel needs the support of the United States more than ever. Is this the right time to expose AIPAC’s heavy influence in American politics? I believe this consideration holds back many people who are critical of the way AIPAC conducts its business. While the other architects of the Bush administration’s failed policies have been relentlessly exposed, AIPAC continues to be surrounded by a wall of silence.

我对这个论点并非无动于衷。过去,它曾阻止我批评以色列的政策。我不是犹太复国主义者,也不是虔诚的犹太人,但我对我的犹太同胞怀有极大的同情,并对以色列的生存深感关切。我不想给以色列的敌人提供口实。我通过告诉自己,如果我想表达批评意见,就应该搬到以色列去,来合理化自己的立场。但由于许多以色列人自己也持有这种观点,我的声音并非必要,而且我还有许多其他战斗要打。

I am not insensitive to this argument. It has held me back from criticizing Israeli policies in the past. I am not a Zionist, nor am I am a practicing Jew, but I have a great deal of sympathy for my fellow Jews and a deep concern for the survival of Israel. I did not want to provide fodder to the enemies of Israel. I rationalized my position by saying that if I wanted to voice critical views, I ought to move to Israel. But since there were many Israelis who held such views my voice was not needed, and I had many other battles to fight.

但现在我必须问这个问题:以色列怎么会变得如此危险?我不能让 AIPAC 免于承担其应有的责任。我是批判性思维的坚定倡导者。我支持过许多国家的异议人士。当布什总统说那些不支持他政策的人就是在支持恐怖分子时,我明确表示了反对。现在,当亲以色列游说集团成为这种教条式思维最后未被曝光的堡垒之一时,我不能保持沉默。我发表这些言论时有些惶恐,因为这会让我遭受更多攻击,可能会使我在参与的其他许多事业中效率降低;但我所支持的异议人士冒的风险要大得多。

But now I have to ask the question: How did Israel become so endangered? I cannot exempt AIPAC from its share of the responsibility. I am a fervent advocate of critical thinking. I have supported dissidents in many countries. I took a stand against President Bush when he said that those who don’t support his policies are supporting the terrorists. I cannot remain silent now when the pro-Israel lobby is one of the last unexposed redoubts of this dogmatic way of thinking. I speak out with some trepidation because I am exposing myself to further attacks that are likely to render me less effective in pursuing many other causes in which I am engaged; but dissidents I have supported have taken far greater risks.

我并未深度参与犹太事务到足以介入 AIPAC 的改革;但我必须为批评发声,批评是我们开放社会的核心。我相信,美国在中东政策的迫切自我反思已经在这个国家开始;但只要 AIPAC 在民主党和共和党内保持强大影响力,这种反思就无法取得太大进展。一些民主党领导人承诺要带来方向的改变,但在他们能够抵抗 AIPAC 的命令之前,他们无法兑现这一承诺。巴勒斯坦是一个至关重要的地方,在那里积极的改变仍然可能发生。伊拉克基本上已超出我们的控制范围;但如果我们在解决巴勒斯坦问题上取得成功,我们将处于更有利的位置,可以与伊朗进行谈判,并从伊拉克脱身。巴勒斯坦和平解决的需要比以往任何时候都更加迫切。为了以色列和美国,沙特和平倡议的成功都极为可取;但 AIPAC 挡在了路上。它继续反对与包括哈马斯的巴勒斯坦政府打交道。

I am not sufficiently engaged in Jewish affairs to be involved in the reform of AIPAC; but I must speak out in favor of the critical process that is at the heart of our open society. I believe that a much-needed self-examination of American policy in the Middle East has started in this country; but it can’t make much headway as long as AIPAC retains powerful influence in both the Democratic and Republican parties. Some leaders of the Democratic Party have promised to bring about a change of direction but they cannot deliver on that promise until they are able to resist the dictates of AIPAC. Palestine is a place of critical importance where positive change is still possible. Iraq is largely beyond our control; but if we succeeded in settling the Palestinian problem we would be in a much better position to engage in negotiations with Iran and extricate ourselves from Iraq. The need for a peace settlement in Palestine is greater than ever. Both for the sake of Israel and the United States, it is highly desirable that the Saudi peace initiative should succeed; but AIPAC stands in the way. It continues to oppose dealing with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas.

民主党能否摆脱 AIPAC 的影响,这一点非常值得怀疑。任何敢于揭露 AIPAC 影响力的政客都会招致它的愤怒;因此,几乎没有人会这样做。这取决于美国犹太社区自身来约束这个声称代表他们的组织。但如果不先驳斥当前政策辩护者提出的最阴险的论点——即对以色列在西岸、东耶路撒冷和加沙的占领、控制和镇压政策的批评会引发反犹太主义——这是不可能的。

Whether the Democratic Party can liberate itself from AIPAC’s influence is highly doubtful. Any politician who dares to expose AIPAC’s influence would incur its wrath; so very few can be expected to do so. It is up to the American Jewish community itself to rein in the organization that claims to represent it. But this is not possible without first disposing of the most insidious argument put forward by the defenders of the current policies: that the critics of Israel’s policies of occupation, control, and repression on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem and Gaza engender anti-Semitism.

情况恰恰相反。以色列的敌人们散布的一个神话是,存在一个无所不能的犹太复国主义阴谋。这是不实指控。然而,AIPAC 如此成功地压制批评,确实在一定程度上助长了这种错误信念。打破保护 AIPAC 的沉默之墙,有助于消除这些误解。在犹太社区内部展开辩论,非但不会煽动反犹主义,反而只会助其消弭。

The opposite is the case. One of the myths propagated by the enemies of Israel is that there is an all-powerful Zionist conspiracy. That is a false accusation. Nevertheless, that AIPAC has been so successful in suppressing criticism has lent some credence to such false beliefs. Demolishing the wall of silence that has protected AIPAC would help lay them to rest. A debate within the Jewish community, instead of fomenting anti-Semitism, would only help diminish it.

为防预料中的攻击,我想强调,我不认同以色列敌人散布的那些神话,也不将反犹主义归咎于犹太人。反犹主义在以色列建国之前就已存在。无论以色列的政策,还是对这些政策的批评,都不应对反犹主义负责。同时,我确实认为,对以色列的态度受其政策影响,而对犹太社区的态度,则受到亲以色列游说团体成功压制不同观点的影响。

Anticipating attacks, I should like to emphasize that I do not subscribe to the myths propagated by enemies of Israel and I am not blaming Jews for anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism predates the birth of Israel. Neither Israel’s policies nor the critics of those policies should be held responsible for anti-Semitism. At the same time, I do believe that attitudes toward Israel are influenced by Israel’s policies, and attitudes toward the Jewish community are influenced by the pro-Israel lobby’s success in suppressing divergent views.

-March 15, 2007

-March 15, 2007

注释

[1] 备受尊敬的以色列作家戴维·格罗斯曼,其子在黎巴嫩作战中阵亡,他于 3 月 11 日评论道:“在目前形势下,以色列与巴勒斯坦之间的任何对话都具有积极意义,并有潜力改变双方社会的精神状态。”

Notes [1] As the highly respected Israeli writer David Grossman, whose son was killed fighting in Lebanon, commented on March 11, “In the present situation any sort of dialogue between Israel and Palestinians is positive and has the potential to change the state of mind of both societies.”

[2] 这并非唯一原因。吉米·卡特在致美国犹太公民的一封信中写道:“对以色列的压倒性偏袒,来自于像我这样的基督徒,我们被教导要尊崇和保护上帝的选民,我们的救主耶稣基督正是从他们之中降临。”

[2] It is not the only one. In a letter to the Jewish citizens in America, Jimmy Carter wrote that “the overwhelming bias for Israel comes from Christians like me who have been taught to honor and protect God’s chosen people from among whom came our own savior, Jesus Christ.”

[3] 阿尔文·H·罗森菲尔德,《“进步”犹太思想与新反犹主义》(美国犹太人委员会,2006 年)。

[3] Alvin H. Rosenfeld, “‘Progressive’ Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism” (American Jewish Committee, 2006).

[4] 见迈克尔·马辛,《以色列游说风暴》,《纽约书评》,2006 年 6 月 8 日。

[4] See Michael Massing, “The Storm Over the Israel Lobby,” The New York Review, June 8, 2006.

[5] 见马丁·佩雷茨文章,《暴君——索罗斯》,《新共和》,2007 年 2 月 12 日。

[5] See the article by Martin Peretz, “Tyran-a-Soros,” The New Republic, February 12, 2007.