欧洲必须认清中国的真实面目
欧洲公众以及欧洲政商领袖都未能充分理解习近平治下的中国所带来的威胁。尽管习近平是一个独裁者，正利用尖端技术试图对中国社会实施全面控制，但欧洲人主要将中国视为重要的商业伙伴。他们没有意识到，自习近平出任中国国家主席和中共中央总书记以来，他建立了一个指导原则与欧盟赖以建立的价值观截然对立的政权。
Neither the European public nor European political and business leaders fully understand the threat presented by Xi Jinping’s China. Although Xi is a dictator who is using cutting-edge technology in an effort to impose total control on Chinese society, Europeans regard China primarily as an important business partner. They fail to appreciate that since Xi became president and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), he has established a regime whose guiding principles are diametrically opposed to the values on which the European Union was founded.
英国对习近平的热情追捧比欧盟内部更甚，因为英国正在脱离欧盟。首相鲍里斯·约翰逊希望尽可能与欧盟拉开距离，建立不受欧盟监管束缚的自由市场经济。但他不太可能成功，因为欧盟准备针对约翰逊政府似乎想推行的放松管制采取反制措施。与此同时，英国正将中国视为潜在合作伙伴，希望重建前财政大臣乔治·奥斯本在 2010 年至 2016 年间构建的伙伴关系。
The rush to embrace Xi is greater in Britain, which is in the process of separating itself from the EU, than in the EU itself. Prime Minister Boris Johnson wants to distance the United Kingdom from the EU as much as possible and to build a free-market economy that is unconstrained by EU regulations. He is unlikely to succeed, because the EU is prepared to take countermeasures against the type of deregulation that Johnson’s government seems to have in mind. But in the meantime, Britain is eyeing China as a potential partner, in the hope of reestablishing the partnership that former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne was building between 2010 and 2016.
特朗普政府，与美国总统唐纳德·特朗普本人不同，在管理对华关系方面表现要好得多。它制定了一项两党政策，宣布中国为战略竞争对手，并将科技巨头华为及其他几家中国公司列入所谓的“实体清单”，禁止美国公司在未获政府许可的情况下与这些公司进行贸易。
The Trump administration, as distinct from US President Donald Trump personally, has done much better in managing its ties with China. It developed a bipartisan policy that declared China to be a strategic rival and put tech giant Huawei and several other Chinese companies on the so-called Entity List, which forbids US companies to trade with them without government permission.
唯一能毫无顾忌违反这条规则的人只有特朗普本人。不幸的是，他好像正在这么做——把华为放在与习近平的谈判桌上。自 2019 年 5 月美国将华为列入实体清单以来，商务部已多次给予华为为期三个月的豁免，以免其美国零部件供应商遭受严重困难。
Only one person can violate this rule with impunity: Trump himself. Unfortunately, he appears to be doing just that by putting Huawei on the bargaining table with Xi. Since May 2019, when the United States placed it on the Entity List, the Department of Commerce has granted Huawei several three-month exemptions in order to prevent undue hardship for the company’s US components suppliers.
华为是一家非常不寻常——在某些方面堪称独一无二——的公司。其创始人任正非，部分技术教育是在解放军工程兵部队完成的，而解放军也最早成为他的大客户之一。1987 年华为创立时，中国所有技术都从国外进口，任正非的目标是利用本土研究人员逆向工程外国技术。他取得的成就远超自己最大胆的梦想。
Huawei is a very unusual – and in some ways unique – company. Its founder, Ren Zhengfei, received his technical education in part as a member of the People’s Liberation Army engineering corps, and the PLA became one of his first major customers. At the time of Huawei’s founding in 1987, all of China’s technology was imported from abroad, and Ren’s goal was to reverse engineer foreign technologies with local researchers. He has succeeded beyond his wildest dreams.
到 1993 年，华为推出了当时中国最强大的电话交换机。随后，它从解放军手中拿到了建设首个全国电信网络的关键合同。接着，它受益于 1996 年政府推行的扶持国内电信设备制造商的产业政策，该政策同时也将外国竞争对手挡在门外。到 2005 年，华为的出口额已超过国内销售额。2010 年，华为入选《财富》杂志全球 500 强企业榜单。
By 1993, Huawei launched the most powerful telephone switch available in China. Subsequently, it received a key contract from the PLA to build the first national telecommunications network. It then benefited from the government’s policy, adopted in 1996, for nurturing domestic telecommunications manufacturers, which also meant keeping foreign competitors out. By 2005 Huawei’s exports exceeded its domestic sales. In 2010, Huawei was included in Fortune magazine’s global list of the 500 largest companies.
习上台后，华为此前可能享有的自主性彻底丧失。和其他所有中国公司一样，它必须服从中国共产党的指令。2017 年之前，这还是一种心照不宣的默契；随着当年《国家情报法》的通过，这变成了一道正式的法令。
After Xi came to power, Huawei lost whatever autonomy it may have enjoyed. Like every other Chinese company, it must follow the CPC’s orders. Until 2017, this remained an implicit understanding; with the adoption of the National Intelligence Law that year, it became a formal obligation.
不久后，一名华为员工在波兰卷入间谍丑闻，该公司还被指控牵涉其他间谍案件。但间谍活动并非欧洲面临的最大威胁。让欧洲最关键的基础设施依赖中国技术，等于为敲诈和破坏打开了大门。
Soon after that, a Huawei employee was involved in a spying scandal in Poland, and the company has also been accused of other cases of espionage. But spying is not the greatest danger for Europe. Making Europe’s most critical infrastructure dependent on Chinese technology means opening the door to blackmail and sabotage.
我清楚地看到，在习近平的领导下，中国对欧盟立基的价值观构成了威胁。显然，欧盟成员国的领导人以及工业界的领袖——尤其是德国的——并不明白这一点。
It is clear to me that under Xi, China poses a threat to the values on which the EU was founded. Apparently, this is not clear to the leaders of EU member states, nor to the leaders of industry, particularly in Germany.
欧盟面临着巨大的挑战：沉默的亲欧多数派发出了声音，表示他们最关心的是气候变化，但各成员国却在预算问题上互相争斗，更专注于讨好习近平，而非维护跨大西洋关系。
The EU faces a tremendous challenge: the silent pro-European majority has spoken, saying that their primary concern is climate change, but the member states are fighting with one another over the budget and are more focused on appeasing Xi than with maintaining the transatlantic relationship.
与其在对抗华为对 5G 市场主导地位这场必败之战中死磕，美国与欧盟（或者欧盟独自）应携手将爱立信和诺基亚打造成有竞争力的对手。
Instead of fighting a losing battle against Huawei’s dominance in the 5G market, the US and the EU, or the EU alone, ought to cooperate in building up Ericsson and Nokia as viable competitors.
习近平将于 9 月在莱比锡举行的欧中峰会上会见欧盟 27 个成员国的国家元首和政府首脑。欧洲人需要明白，除非他就未能维护人权——尤其是在西藏、新疆和香港——的行为被追究责任并受到质询，否则峰会将为他送上一次急需的政治胜利。
Xi will meet the heads of state and government of the 27 EU member states at the EU-China summit in Leipzig in September. Europeans need to understand that this will hand him a much-needed political victory unless he is held accountable for, and questioned about, his failure to uphold human rights, particularly in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.
只有中国政治领导层才能决定习近平的未来。他应对新冠疫情失当所造成的影响已如此明显，中国公众乃至政治局都必然认识到这一点。欧盟不应明知故犯地助长他的政治生存。
Only the Chinese political leadership can decide Xi’s future. The harm caused by his mishandling of the coronavirus outbreak has become so visible that the Chinese public, and even the Politburo, must recognize it. The EU should not knowingly facilitate his political survival.