苏格兰抵押投资信托 — 经理人回顾,截至2012年3月31日年报(詹姆斯·安德森)
每年亚马逊的年报都会附上 1997 年的原始股东信。尽管苏格兰按揭公司的历史更为久远,我们的思考深度也远不及杰夫·贝佐斯,但我们认为这是一种令人钦佩的纪律。因此,以下内容总结了过去十年里,我们的投资方法是如何演变的。未来几年,我们应当准备好以此接受评判。
我们的核心投资信念
尽管基金经理们声称自己职业生涯的大部分时间都在评估公司的竞争优势,但他们却以极其不愿对自己进行同样的分析而闻名。他们倾向于将近期的业绩表现归功于自身技巧,尽管这类数据大多带有运气、随机性和均值回归的特性。如果这还不够,他们就会转而谈论基金经理所拥有的高学历、辛勤工作以及奇特的高薪待遇。
Each year the Amazon Annual Report incorporates the original shareholder letter from 1997. Although the origins of Scottish Mortgage are more distant and our thoughts are far less profound than those of Jeff Bezos we think this is an admirable discipline. What follows is therefore a summary of how our investment approach has evolved over the last decade. We should be prepared to be judged by it in the years ahead. Our Core Investment Beliefs Whilst fund managers claim to spend much of their careers assessing the competitive advantage of companies they are notoriously reluctant to perform any such analysis on themselves. The tendency is to cite recent performance as evidence of skill despite the luck, randomness and mean-reverting characteristics of most such data. If this does not suffice then attention turns to a discussion of the high educational qualifications, hard work and exotic remuneration packages that the fund manager enjoys.
有时,投资流程的操作细节被详细描述,其中大量篇幅强调风险控制。但对投资方法的独特性,或基金经理可能拥有的、让模仿难以实现的战略优势,却关注甚少。我们认为自己应该努力做得比这更好。
• 我们的投资决策着眼长期。只有至少五年以上的周期,企业的竞争优势和管理层卓越能力才会显现。正是这些特质,我们想要识别并予以支持。我们是持有公司,而非租用股票。我们不认为自己是预测经济波动或市场情绪摇摆的专家。事实上,我们认为在这些方面很难做到出色,因为太多市场参与者都聚焦于此,而企业价值的真正来源恰恰很少在这里。
Sometimes the procedural details of the investment process are outlined with heavy emphasis on risk controls. Little attention is given to either the distinctiveness of the approach or the strategic advantages the manager might enjoy in order to make imitation improbable. We think we should try to do better than this. • We are long term in our investment decisions. It is only over periods of at least five years that the competitive advantages and managerial excellence of companies becomes apparent. It is these characteristics that we want to identify and support. We own companies rather than rent shares. We do not regard ourselves as experts in forecasting the oscillations of economies or the mood swings of markets. Indeed we think that it is hard to excel in such areas as this is where so many market participants focus and where so litle of the value of companies lies.
同样,Baillie Gifford 在采取长期视角时,更有可能为股东的利益拥有竞争优势。我们是一家拥有 100 年历史的苏格兰合伙制公司。我们以几十年而不是季度为单位来思考自己的业务。这种稳定性可能并不令人兴奋,但它确实能在最缺乏耐心的行业中鼓励耐心。我们只以五年以上的时间跨度来判断投资业绩。事实上,至少需要十年才能提供足够证据来证明投资能力。
• 投资管理行业不具备应对当今资本市场固有的行为和情感挑战的充分能力。我们的时间框架和所有权结构帮助我们抵御这些危险。我们被新闻、数据和观点所包围。这些信息中的大部分毫无意义,但它却催促你采取快速且通常徒劳的行动。
Equally Baillie Gifford is more likely to possess competitive advantages for the good of shareholders when it adopts a long term perspective. We are a 100 year old Scottish partnership. We think about our own business over decades not quarters. Such stability may not be exciting but it does encourage palience in this most impatient of industries. We only judge our investment performance over five year plus time horizons. In truth it takes at least a decade to provide adequate evidence of investment skill. • The investment management industry is illequipped to deal with the behavioural and emotional challenges inherent in today's capital markets. Our time frame and ownership structure help us lo fight these dangers. We ore besieged by news, data and opinion. The bulk of this information is of litle significance but it implores you to rapid and usually futile action.
这种情况在压力时期可能尤为有害。学术研究表明,大多数人厌恶财务损失的程度是对待盈利喜悦的两倍。我们担心,对于基金经理来说,这种比例接近十倍。内外部压力使得规避亏损成为主导。这在投资组合中是有害的。如果有同等或更大机会获得(近乎)无限收益,我们就必须愿意接受损失。
• 我们对常规信息的价值深表怀疑。我们不太相信季度盈利,对投资银行的观点更是不屑一顾。我们试图屏蔽而非吸纳它们的噪音。相反,我们认为,世界提供了极好的机会,去聆听几乎未被市场注意的观点、视角和愿景。从我们在上海的分析师到加利福尼亚的未来学家,投资世界所包含的内容远非《金融时报》或《华尔街日报》所能描述。
• 我们在选股、资产配置和归因方面是全球性的。
This can be particularly damaging at times of stress. Academic research argues that most individuals dislike financial losses twice as much as they take pleasure in gains. We fear that for fund managers this relationship is close to tenfold. Internal and external pressures make the avoidance of loss dominant. This is damaging in a portfolio context. We need to be willing to accept loss if there is an equal or greater chance of (almost) unlimited gain. • We are very dubious about the value of routine information. We have little confidence in quarterly earnings and none in the views of investment banks. We try to screen out rather than incorporate their noise. In contrast we think that the world offers joyous opportunities to hear views, perspectives and visions that are barely noticed by the markets. From our office in Shanghai to futurists in California there is more in the investment world than the Financial Times or Wall Street Journal describe. • We are global in stock selection, asset allocation and attribution.
我们是主动选股者,而非被动型——或者更糟——的指数增强型选股者。持仓规模反映的是潜在上行空间及其可能性(或缺乏可能性),而非公司及其总部的市值与地理位置的组合。我们对自己的自上而下资产配置技能没有足够信心,以至于不愿用它来压倒选股策略;我们对自己的市场时机把握能力也没有足够信心,以至于不愿频繁地增加或减少杠杆。不过,我们强烈认为投资组合应当相对集中,并且在指数边缘修修补补对股东几乎毫无用处。我们认为这种做法最终会带来更好的投资业绩,也无疑会使我们成为更坚定的公司股东。我们怀疑,根据过去(当前市值)来选股是一种旨在保护资产管理者职位安全而非为股东创造财富的策略。
We are active not passive - or far worse - index plus in stock selection. Holding sizes reflect the potential upside and its probability (or otherwise) rather than the combination of the market capitalization and geographical location of the company and its headquarters. We do not have sufficient confidence in our top-down assel allocation skills to wish to override stock selection. We do not have enough confidence in our market timing abilities to wish to add or remove gearing at frequent intervals. We do, however, have strong conviction that our portfolio should be comparatively concentrated, and 1 New Oriental Education & Technology Provider of private education in China. that it is of litle use to shareholders to tinker around the edges of indices. We think this eventually produces better investment results and it certainly makes us more committed shareholders in companies. We suspect that selecting stocks on the basis of the past (their current market capitalization) is a policy designed to protect the security of tenure of asset managers rather than to build the wealth of shareholders.
规模庞大、根基稳固的公司,往往容易滋生内部自满和僵化。它们常常容易受到那些更有雄心、更具活力的新进入者的攻击。
• 我们是成长股投资者。市场长期以来对价值股的偏好,以及试图通过套利抹平微小评级差异的追逐,使得投资者很难承认如今所能找到的非凡增长率和回报率。我们特别感兴趣的那种增长,具有爆发性,而且往往只需要极少的固定资产——甚至资本。我们称之为“不合理的价格买入成长”(Growth at Unreasonable Prices),而非传统的“合理价格买入成长”(Growth at a Reasonable Price)。我们需要愿意为眼前的盈利支付极高的倍数,因为未来潜力和回报的规模可能极其惊人。对于那些最终成功的股票而言,当初的估值最终会被证明是微不足道的。
Companies that are large and established lend to be internally complacent and inflexible. They are often vulnerable to assault by more ambitious and vibrant newcomers. • We are Growth stock investors. Such has been the preference for Value and the search to arbitrage away minor rating differentials that investors find it very hard to acknowledge the extraordinary growth rates and returns that can be found today. The growth that we are particularly interested in is of an explosive nature and often requires minimal fixed assets or indeed capital. We think of it as 'Growth at Unreasonable Prices' rather than the traditional discipline of 'Growth at a Reasonable Price'. We need to be willing to pay high multiples of immediate earnings because the scale of future potential and returns can be so dramatic. On the stocks that flourish the valuation will have turned out to be derisorily low.
在其他基金上我们会亏钱。我们相信,对股东的首要职责是限制投资管理的费用——0.32% 的总费用率(TER 0.51%)按比较标准算很低,但绝对值至少是合理的。我们认为高费用的危害常常被低估。总费用率 0.5% 和 1.5% 的差别看起来不大,但如果换成成本占预期年化回报的比例来看,对比就明显了。如果年均回报是 10%(可惜近年没达到),这意味着每年要从回报中拿走 5% 或 15%。我们也不相信业绩提成费。它通常会削弱投资业绩,增加了压力,缩小了视野。
最淡的 iPad 版本。
投资组合点评
我们过去提出的三个观点仍然有效。
On the others we will lose money. We believe that it is our first duty to shareholders to limit tee th the investment mandaement tee leauivalent to 0.32%l ar the TER (0.51%) are low by comparative standards but at least adequate in absolute terms. We think that the malign impact of high fees is frequently underestimated. The difference between a TER of 0.5% and one of 1.5% may not appear great but if the perspective is altered to think of costs as a percentage of expected annual returns then the contrast becomes obvious. If annual returns average 10% (sadly they have not in recent years then this is the difference between removing 5% of your returns or 15% each year. Nor do we believe in a performance fee. Usually it undermines investment performance. It increases pressure and narrows perspective. The palest version of the iPad. Portfolio Comments The three contentions that we have outlined in the past remain intact.
再次引用 2010 年的论述:
• 中国的崛起——以及程度较轻的其他新兴经济体——正在改变全球经济格局。
• 股市低估了技术变革的力量,对 1998 至 2000 年的泡沫反应过度,陷入了夸大的厌恶情绪。
• 西方金融体系存在危险的缺陷。
技术创新
我们严重低估了这一力量。它比我们想象的更强大,其应用范围也远比我们预料的更广泛。
我们现在认为,这是对投资世界最具影响力的因素。摆在我们面前的机会,很可能比近期更为惊人。原因在于,变革本身的速度正在加快。这一点带来的影响极难把握。普通人的头脑——更不用说那些满脑子只盯着眼前事情的基金经理了——很难应对那种指数级而非线性的变化,也很难从过去找到多少有用的指引。
To repeat the formulation of 2010: • The rise of China land to a lesser extent other emerging economies) is transforming the global economic scene. • Stockmarkets underestimate the power of technological change in exaggerated revulsion to the bubble of 1998-2000. • The Western financial systems are dangerously flawed Technological Innovation We have seriously undereslimated this force. It is more powerful than we thought and far broader in its application than we suspected. We now believe it to be the most important influence on the investment world. The opportunities in front of us are likely to be even more dramatic than in the recent past. This is because the very pace of change is in itself accelerating. It is very hard to grasp the implications of this. The minds of normal human beings, let alone those of fund managers with their preoccupation with the immediate, have difficully in coping with change that is exponential rather than linear and where the guidance offered by the past is so modest.
苹果也许是这一过程最简洁的例证——它的设备统治力如此之强,其故事的绝大部分也清晰可见。在产品层面,我们从最初的 Apple 电脑(按今天的价格折算为 2500 美元,不含显示器、电源甚至机箱),一路发展到 iPad,后者用五分之一的价格提供了至少一万倍的处理能力。2001 年,卖出 100 万部 iPod 需要 91 周;2011 年,卖出 100 万部 iPhone 4S 只需要 24 小时。对公司而言,这将在本财年转化为超过 1500 亿美元的销售额(中国目前贡献 20%),接近 40% 的经营利润率,以及 1100 亿美元的现金。从 1997 年史蒂夫·乔布斯回归之前的股价低点算起,其市值从不到 15 亿美元暴涨至 5500 亿美元。
Apple is perhaps the simplest example of this process as its devices are so dominant and as so much of its story is visible. In product terms this has taken us from the original Apple computer retailing at the equivalent of US$2,500 in today's prices without a monitor, power supply or even a casing to an iPad with at least 10,000x as much processing power for a fifth the price. In 2001 it took 91 weeks to sell one million iPods. In 2011 it took 24 hours to sell one million iPhone 4Ss. For the company this will translate into sales of over US$ 150bn this fiscal year (with China now running at 20% of sales) with near 40% operating margins and US$ 110bn in cash. From the share price lows before the return of Steve Jobs in 1997 a market value of below US$ 1.5bn has become US$550 bn.
识别并持有这样的卓越公司是我们的首要任务。这样做带来的回报远超任何市场预测。虽然我们自 2009 年初起就持有苹果股票,但我们认为自己的操作更应该被批评而非表扬。不仅花了我们好几年才买入这些股票,而且我们还在 2011 年就急于获利了结。我们的持股量和利润本应大得多才对。
我们希望自己拥有几家能走上与苹果相似道路的公司,但它们的目前发展阶段要早得多。正如前面提到的,这些企业拥有巨大的增长机会,年轻时就只需要极少甚至负的资本投入,以及我们认为可持续的竞争优势。这通常意味着高额利润率和资本回报率。
Identifying and holding such extraordinary companies is our primary task. Doing so holds far greater rewards than any amount of market prognostication. Whilst we have owned Apple since early 2009 we feel that we deserve more criticism than praise for our actions. Not En yve mymufacturer's stadardizalion tanks in North Carolina. just did it take us several years to buy the shares but we were also quick to take profits in 2011. Our holding and our profits should have been significantly larger. We hope that we own several companies that can follow the same path as Apple but are at a much earlier stage of development. As suggested earlier they are businesses with substantial growth opportunities, minimal or negative capital requirements from a young age and what we think are sustainable competitive advantages. This often translates into formidable margins and return on capital.
它们的优势在于网络效应,或更传统的规模主导,但共同点是缺乏资本密集度。我们认为,这类公司在资本主义历史上极为罕见。市场在处理它们的存在和特征时非常不自在。它们很难被纳入既有的估值框架——尤其是那些强调公司资本化与其固定资产价值之间关系的框架。尽管这些公司大多来自美国,尤其是美国西海岸,但从理论上讲,这种情况并非必然。目前主要的例外在中国,这颇为引人深思。我们的两个最大持仓仍然是百度(Baidu)和亚马逊(Amazon)。两者都符合上述描述。它们也反映了我们对由持股创始人领导的公司有强烈偏好。百度持续大幅增长,但扩张空间似乎仍然无限。
Their advantages lie in network effects or in more traditional dominance by scale but the lack of capital intensity is in common. We think that such companies are extremely unusual in the history of capitalism. The markets are very uncomfortable in dealing with their existence and characteristics. They are hard to fit into the established valuation frameworks - particularly those that stress the relationship between the capitalization of a company and the value of its fixed assets. Although most of these companies are American for specifically West Coast American! there is litte theoretical reason that this need be so. The main exceptions are currently Chinese which is intriguing Our two largest holdings continue lo be Baidu and Amazon. Both fit into the description above. They also reflect our strong preference for companies that are led by their share owning founders. Baidu has continued to grow dramatically but the room to expand still seems open ended.
它仅有 32.1 万付费客户。中国大约有 4000 万家中小企业。移动搜索增长非常迅猛,广告正成为中国消费热潮的关键驱动力。亚马逊可能是一个成熟度更低的业务。与苹果或百度不同,它目前以极低的利润率运营。它拥有如此多的投资机会,以至于尽管现金流状况非常有利,它仍可能消耗掉其产生的所有现金。只要它投资于那些其竞争地位应会强大且回报不断改善的业务领域,我们就愿意对这种愿景保持极度的耐心,承受股价由此产生的所有波动。
或者在上海的机器人工厂工作。
替代能源与医疗保健
我们已经习惯了电子和电信行业非同寻常的变革步伐。正如我们去年所指出的,类似的发展现在正渗透到那些创新此前被现有参与者的自身利益所阻碍的行业。
It has only 321,000 paying customers. There are approximately 40 million smalt businesses in China. Mobile search is growing very rapidly and advertising is becoming critical to the Chinese consumption surge. Amazon may be an even less mature business. Unlike Apple or Baidu it currently operates on very low margins. It has so many opportunities to invest that despite very favourable cash-flow dynamics it con consume all the cash it generates. As long as it is investing in activities where its competitive position ought to be powerful and returns improving then we are content to be very patient investors in such a vision for all the resultant volatility in the share price. Work or the Shanghai robolies faciory. Alternative Energy and Healthcare We have grown accustomed to the extraordinary pace of change in the electronics and telecommunications industries. As we noted last year similar developments are now working their way into industries in which innovation has previously been blocked by the self interest of established players.
尽管阻力仍可能减缓进步,但一旦相关技术获得足够的发展动力,它恐怕只能推迟变革,而无法阻止。我们将这一想法应用于替代能源和医疗保健行业。到目前为止,前者已被证明是一个重大失误,而后者则看起来相当有希望。我们已经卖出了第一太阳能(First Solar),不过它成为了我们最糟糕的投资决策之一才卖出的。虽然太阳能发电成本下降幅度甚至比我们预想的更为剧烈,但第一太阳能曾享有的竞争优势,却被中国竞争者的实力以及页岩气的出现所侵蚀。
医疗保健需要改革。它成本高昂、效率低下,且常常无法提供最佳医疗效果。尽管改善这一状况需要几十年的努力,但技术创新步伐或许正开始侵蚀这个原本坚不可摧的体系。
Whilst opposition can still slow progress it is unlikely to be able to do more than delay transformation once the relevant technologies acquire sufficient momentum. We have applied this idea to the alternative energy and healthcare sectors. So far this has proven a significant error in the first case and seems quite promising in the latter. We have now sold First Solar but not before it was one of our worst investment decisions. Whilst the cost of solar energy has fallen even more sharply than we believed likely, the competitive advantage once enjoyed by First Solar has been eaten away by the power of Chinese competition and by the advent of shale gas. Healthcare requires reform. It is cosily, inefficient and frequently fails to provide the best available medical outcomes. Whilst improving this situation will be the task of decades it is possible the pace of technological innovation is starting to chip away at a previously impervious system.
在乔布斯去世前不久,他曾说过:“我认为 21 世纪最大的创新将是生物学与技术的交汇。一个新时代正在开启。”基因组测序似乎是开启这样一个新时代的关键科学进步。其成本下降的速度大约是过去四十年间改变半导体性能的著名摩尔定律的两倍。我们持有大量 Illumina 公司的股票,该公司在这一技术领域是公认的领导者。我们最近支持该公司(迄今为止)成功抵御了来自罗氏的敌意收购。我们还持有 Intuitive Surgical 公司的大额股份,这家公司不仅是机器人手术领域的绝对领导者,也是任何活动领域中第一家实现高盈利并达到可观规模的纯机器人公司。
Just before his death Steve Jobs remarked that 'I think the biggest innovation of the 2 1st century will be the intersection of biology and technology. A new era is beginning.' Genome sequencing appears to be the critical scientific advance enabling such a new era. Its costs are also failing at around twice the pace of the famed Moore's Law that has transformed semiconductor performance over the last four decades. We have a large shareholding in Illumina which is the established leader in this technology. We have recently supported the company in its (thus far) successful battle against hostile takeover by Roche. We also have what has become a large holding in Intuitive Surgical, which is not just the dominant leader in robotic surgery but is also the first pure robotics company in any field of activity to become highly profitable and of substantial size.
1 菲亚特
顶级汽车品牌法拉利的所有者。
现在流行对中国的前景唱衰。我们不这么看。
我们认为,中国从低成本、低附加值的出口巨头,转向由基础设施驱动、并日益由消费推动的内需帝国,这一转型的进展比人们曾经认为的可能程度更深入、也更顺利。生产率提升令人印象深刻。贸易顺差基本已成为过去。暂停和阻碍当然会有。虽然我们觉得当局出手压制过度火爆的房地产市场、防止其形成泡沫的做法是正确的,但这既无法阻止局部过热,也无法支撑增长。随着生产率提高和创新加速,共产党很可能会发现这一演变过程更加复杂。
但与已取得的成就规模和依然存在的潜力相比,这些担忧微不足道。
1 Fiat Owner of top car brand Ferrari. It is fashionable to be gloomy abou: Chinese prospecis. We are not. We think that the transition from a low cost, low valued added export behemoth to a domestic empire driven first by infrastructure and increasingly by consumption is further and more smoothly advanced than was believed possible. Productivity has risen impressively. The trade surplus is largely a memory. Naturally there will be pauses and blockages. Whilst we think the authorities have been right to clamp down on an overly exuberant housing market before it assumed bubble proportions this could not prevent local excesses nor does it prop up growth. As productivity rises and innovation accelerates the Communist Party is likely to find the process of evolution still more complex. But such concerns are minor compared with the scale of the achievement and of the remaining potential.
我们认为中国拥有持续崛起所需的人力资本、耐心以及众多相互竞争的城市与地区。其增长速度可能——实际上应当——放缓,但我们怀疑它是否会崩溃。我们看不到任何终极理由解释为何中国会比英国更贫穷。令我们鼓舞的是,我们能在当地找到足够多有想象力、有创新精神、且拥有强大护城河的个别公司,使得这种赞赏具备实际意义。我们已经讨论过百度,但可以说腾讯在发展中国互联网时更具远见,它专注于社交与移动领域。脸书肯定对其实力心怀敬畏。
中国重返辉煌之路,其显著特征更多是缺乏剧烈动荡,而非动荡频发。与美国崛起伴随内外战争、繁荣与萧条不同,过去三十年中国的进步以其一致性而引人注目。
We think China has the human capital, the patience and the competing multiplicity of cities and regions to continue its rise. Growth may, indeed should, slow but we doubt it will collapse. We see no eventual reason why China should be poorer than Britain. We are encouraged that we can find enough individual companies of imagination and innovation and with strong competitive moats that this admiration is a matter of practical importance. We have already discussed Baidu but arguably Tencent has been even more prescient in developing the Chinese internet with its focus on social aspects and on mobile. Certainly Facebook respects its prowess. China's return to prominence has been distinguished more by the absence of dramatic disruptions than by their presence. Whilst American ascent was marked by internal and external wars, booms and busts, the last thirty years of Chinese progress has been remarkable in its consistency.
面对西方经济困境,眼下的相对平静也同样引人注目。相比之下,印度、巴西和俄罗斯似乎都在应对这种变化后的局面中苦苦挣扎。通胀、赤字、缺乏竞争力的产业以及政治失能,以各种不同的形式交织在一起,导致了生产率与增长的大幅失望。中国则非常特殊。
西方的金融弱点
对于 2008-09 年过度膨胀的金融体系灾难性崩溃所引发的系统性后果,每日媒体已有连篇累牍的报道,我们无需再多费笔墨。但或许仍有一些评述是必要的。在某种程度上,我们感到适度鼓舞。美国经济和德国经济都显示出逐渐克服金融业所造成创伤的迹象。考虑到美国房地产泡沫最初破裂已过去 7 年,而且美国人的“动物精神”很难被永远完全压制,这固然令人欣慰,但或许并不意外。
The current comparative serenity in the face of a troubled Western economy equally appears remarkable. In contrast India, Brazil and Russia all appear to be struggling with these changed condilions. Inflation, deficits, uncompetitive industries and political failings have combined in varied guises to trigger significant productivity and growth disappointments. China is very special. 2 Geogrom Google Earth. Western Financial Weakness We do not have much to add to the daily media preoccupation with the systemic fall out from the catastrophic implosion of the bloated world of finance in 2008-9. But some comment is probably required. At one level we are moderately encouraged. Both the American and German economies show signs of gradually overcoming the damage inflicted by finance. Given that it is now 7 years since the U.S. property bubble initially burst and that American animal spirits are hard to repress entirely in perpetuity this is pleasing but perhaps not surprising.
在德国,金融和房地产行业从未如此风光,但尽管银行业存在脆弱性,欧元区也充满焦虑,就业和商业信心却依然高涨,这要归功于德国工业的非凡实力。再往南看,我们更担心西班牙还需要几年时间才能走出可怕的地产泡沫破裂,而不是担心意大利国家由来已久的不顺会彻底摧毁由谨慎储蓄者和严肃实业家组成的人口。事实上,我们最近买入了菲亚特汽车(Fiat Auto)的股票,因为新一代管理层的改进,加上法拉利的魅力,有望重振这家公司。不那么有争议的是,我们只想指出,由马里奥·蒙蒂(Mario Monti)取代西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi),同样是一种管理上的改进。这种相对乐观的论调,在媒体持续笼罩的阴郁氛围中或许显得不同寻常,但我们提出这些,并非是为了掩盖我们对金融业持续无法自我改革的担忧。
In Germany finance and housing were never so proud but that employment and business confidence remain so buoyant despite banking frailties and Eurozone anxieties is tribute to the remarkable strength of German industry. Further south we are more concerned that Spain still has several years of working through a fearsome housing bust than we are that the age-old infelicities of the Italian state will entirely undermine a population of cautious savers and serious industrialists. Indeed we have recently bought shares in Fiat Auto as an improved generation of managers can combine with the allure of ferrari to revive the company. Less controversially we would simply observe that replacing Silvio Berlusconi with Mario Monti is also a managerial improvement. Such notes of comparative optimism may be unusual amongst the unremitting media gloom but they are not raised to obscure our concern at the continuing inability of the financial secior to reform itself.
尽管温和、零散的措施已经降低了投资银行的回报和吸引力,但没有证据表明,稳定、克制和谦逊的文化已被该行业所接受或由监管机构强制执行。尽管危机的冲击和纳税人的慷慨可能推迟灾难,金融资本带来的诱惑和即时回报仍将是对西方世界健康的严重威胁。
2 福斯(Fuchs Petrolub)高性能润滑油。
PPR 旗下奢侈品牌包括古驰(Gucci)、葆蝶家(Bottega Veneta)、伊夫·圣罗兰(Yves Saint Laurent)和亚历山大·麦昆(Alexander McQueen)等。
结论
尽管这是令人沮丧的一年,但我们发现值得兴奋之处多于恐惧。创新与全球化相结合,催生了一系列拥有历史上无与伦比的回报和增长机会的公司。我们认为,这一进程远未结束。
Whilst modest and piece-meal measures have lessened the returns and attraction of investment banking there is no evidence that a culture of stability, restraint and modesty has yet been embraced by the industry or been enforced by regulators. Whilst the shock of the crisis and the generosity of taxpayers may defer disaster, the temptations and immediale rewards of finance capilal will remain serious threats to the health of the Western world. 2 Fuchs Petrolub High performance oils and lubricants. nong many others, PPR's luxury brands include Gucci, Botte neta, Yves Saint Laurent and Alexander McQuer Conclusion Although it has been a frustrating year we find more to be excited about than to fear. Innovation combined with globalization has enabled the rise of a series of companies with historically unparalleled relurns and growth opportunities. We think that this process is far from complete.
我们认为市场低估并误解了这一点。尽管我们意识到过度自信的危险,但也坚信,急躁和恐惧往往对市场施加了过大的影响。在过去一年的某些时候,最显著的是 2011 年底,在我们看来,向所谓安全资产的逃亡,其程度之夸张,与 1999-2000 年对科技股的追捧如出一辙。市场扭曲既会导致过度高估,也同样容易造成不合理的低迷。事实上,考虑到市场参与者近期经历的困境,目前出现这种情况的可能性,似乎比爆发过度乐观情绪的可能性更大。悲观情绪非常流行。我们并不认同。
詹姆斯·安德森
苏格兰抵押贷款投资信托基金经理
2012 年 5 月 8 日
We think that it is underestimated and misunderstood by markets. Whilst we hope we are aware of the dangers of overconfidence, we are also convinced that impatience and fear have all too often exerted too great an influence on markets. At times over the last year, most notably in late 2011, it has seemed to us that the flight to presumed safety has been os exaggerated as the rush towards technology stocks in 1999-2000. Market distortions can just as easily result in undue depression as in overvaluation. Indeed given the difficult recent experience of market participonts, this currently seems more probable than an outburst of excessive optimism. Pessimism is very popular. We do not share it. JAMES ANDERSON Manager of Scottish Mortgage 8 May 2012