投机与投资

2021 · 书信 · 原文约 5819 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

投机与投资 2021 年第一季度通讯 为何如今的高飞股如此大概率跌落尘寰 执行摘要 本·英克 | 资产配置主管 当今股市中投机过度的迹象显而易见。

SPECULATION AND INVESTMENT QUARTERLY LETTER 1Q 2021 Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ben Inker | Head of Asset Allocation The signs of speculative excess in the stock market today are obvious.

前几天晚上我遇到了一件怪事。凌晨 2 点,我的手机响了,是一个我不认识的号码打来的。我没接,让它转到了语音信箱,因为华盛顿那边没有哪个我认识的人有理由在那个时间找我。我并不因为半夜被电话吵醒而感到恼火——反正我也得起来带我家新养的小狗 1 出去夜间散步。第二天早上醒来时,我有点惊讶地发现对方留了一个语音留言,我当然去听了。说实话,留言里大部分都是脏话,但我能听出来,打电话的人对我很生气,因为我暗示说,当市场下跌时,散户投资者将被迫接盘。我得承认,被人视为值得某位素不相识者如此愤怒的对象,我还是有点受宠若惊的,尽管我有点困惑,为什么他唯独盯上了我,因为我并非像他暗示的那样有意针对散户。所以,我想向那位被我得罪的人澄清一点:我提到散户投资者,并不是因为他们特别容易在投机泡沫破裂时亏钱。当投机泡沫破裂时,很多人和机构都会亏钱。我提到散户投资者,是因为他们通常是唯一在投机泡沫破裂时亏钱但又值得我们同情的人。正如几周前的阿奇戈斯(Archegos)事件所显示的那样,老练的机构投资者和精明的金融机构在其投机赌注出错时,同样有能力亏掉巨额资金。只是当他们亏钱时,我们很难替他们感到难过。

Speculative booms provide both Something odd happened to me the other night. My cellphone rang at 2 AM, from a number entertainment and outsized profits while I didn’t recognize. I let it go to voicemail, because there was no one I knew in Washington they are happening, but they do generally burst painfully. This is particularly true in state that had a good reason to speak to me at that hour. I was not put out that the phone equity markets, where the demand growth had rung in the middle of the night – I had to get up anyway so I could take our new puppy1 is ordinarily met with increased supply out for her nighttime walk. When I woke up the next morning, I was somewhat surprised from savvy capitalists. Maintaining excess to see that the caller left a voicemail, which I of course listened to. To be honest, it consisted demand in the face of growing supply mostly of expletives, but as near as I could tell the caller is quite angry with me for having becomes ever more difficult and eventually proves impossible. In this cycle, the supply suggested that retail investors would be left holding the bag when the market falls. I will growth is particularly impressive in both admit to feeling a bit honored to be considered consequential enough to be a focus of some its scale and the flexibility it has to migrate random person’s wrath, even if I’m a little confused as to why he singled me out as I hadn’t wherever speculation is most rampant. meant to pick on retail in the way he implied. So, to clarify to whomever it is that I offended by That does not seem like a good sign for implying that retail investors might be left holding the bag when a speculative bubble bursts, an extended continuation of this boom. the reason I mentioned retail investors is not because they are uniquely likely to lose money in Whether the end means a fall for just the more speculative end of the market or the the bursting of a speculative bubble. Lots of people and entities lose money when speculative market as a whole is harder to predict at bubbles burst. I mentioned retail investors because they are generally the only people who this point, although even if the rest of the lose money in the bursting of a speculative bubble who are deserving of much sympathy. As market holds up for now it will require a the Archegos saga showed a few weeks ago, both sophisticated institutional investors and difficult economic balancing act to keep it sophisticated financial institutions are more than capable of losing large sums of money when aloft indefinitely. their speculative bets go bad. It’s just extremely hard to feel bad for them when it happens.

然而,当这种事发生在亏了钱的小投资者身上,而这些钱是他们原本指望的,即便他们做的和大机构完全一样,也很难不让人同情。

When it happens to small investors who lost money they were counting on, however, it is hard not to feel sympathy even if they were doing the exact same thing as the big guys.

正因如此,我觉得我当时接的那个电话可能确实有些不妥。但如果我让人感觉好像只有散户投资者才会在回调中蒙受损失,那我要为此道歉。不过,那次事件倒是一个不错的契机,让我写一篇文章,谈谈投资与投机的区别,以及为什么当投机活动开始压过投资活动时,股票市场可能是一个尤其危险的场所。关于投机这个话题,已经有过大量著作,所以我不会装模作样地以为,寥寥数页的随笔就能在这片领域里开垦出新地来。但我确实想提出几点看法。第一,虽然投资与投机的界限有时会显得模糊,但我要承认,从理论角度来看,这两者完全是截然不同的活动——这一点我毫无原创性可言。第二,投机其实远比投资更有趣。可惜的是,当金融市场吸引到大众的广泛关注时,通常要么是市场崩盘了,要么就是投机(而非投资)在攫取注意力。第三,投机狂潮往往以惨淡收场,因为投机者的目标通常得不到资产基本面的支撑。第四,这种糟糕的结局尤其容易发生在股票这类市场上,因为富有进取心的资本家非常善于创造出投机者渴望的那些证券。由于维持投机泡沫需要让需求始终大于供给,投机资产的供应不断增长,会让这个“腾空术”越来越难以维持下去。

As such, I think the call I received was probably unwarranted, but I do apologize if I made it seem as if it is only retail investors who will lose out in a correction. But the event did seem like a nice excuse for me to write a piece on the distinction between investment and speculation and why the stock market is probably a particularly dangerous place to tread when speculative activity starts to overwhelm investing activity. Plenty of books have been written on the topic of speculation, so I’m not going to pretend I will be plowing new ground in musing on the topic over the course of a few pages, but I do want to make a few 1 points. First, while the lines between investment and speculation can be blurry at times, I will admit to a complete lack of originality in getting a the two are quite distinct activities from a theoretical perspective. Second, speculation pandemic puppy. Ours is a cross between an Australian is frankly a much more entertaining activity than investing; unfortunately, when the Labradoodle and an Australian Cobberdog, which basically means she is a cross between a cross between a Labrador financial markets are capturing the attention of the broader public it is generally a sign and a Poodle on one side and a cross between a Labrador that either the market is crashing or that the attention is being grabbed by speculation, not and a Poodle on the other side. The primary difference investment. Third, speculative episodes tend to end badly because the goals of speculators between the two seems to be the fact that the people are usually unsupportable by the underlying fundamentals of assets. And fourth, that bad making the crosses on the Cobberdog side decry that those on the Labradoodle side have betrayed the original end is particularly likely to occur in markets like the stock market, because enterprising intent of the Labradoodle. Despite the inherently conflicted capitalists are very good at creating the types of securities that speculators crave. Because implications of her bloodlines, Melly is a good-natured little maintaining a speculative bubble requires keeping demand perpetually in excess of supply, thing, even if I do wish her bladder had a bit more nighttime staying power. a growing supply of speculative assets makes the levitation act ever harder to maintain.

投机与投资:为何今日的高飞者如此容易跌回地面 | p2 投资与投机

许多投资活动中都包含一定程度的投机成分,很难想象一个完全没有投机的股票市场能正常运转。尽管如此,在我看来,投机与投资在经济上是两种截然不同的活动。虽然对这两种活动可以有多种合理的定义,但多年来我发现以下区分方式颇为实用:

投资:配置资本以提供某种经济服务,理性的交易对手愿意为此支付对价。²

投机:配置资本以获取预期收益——这种收益源于投资者对未来价格走势与市场预期差异的预测。

Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p2 Investment and Speculation Much investing activity contains an element of speculation, and it is hard to imagine the functioning of an equity market in which speculation was entirely absent. Despite that, speculation and investment are, to my mind, quite distinct activities economically. While there are a number of reasonable definitions one could give for these activities, over the years I have found it useful to think in terms of the following for them: Investment: The deployment of capital to perform an economic service for which a rational counterparty should be willing to pay.2 Speculation: The deployment of capital to achieve an expected gain based on an investor’s prediction of how future prices will differ from the market’s expectations.

投资作为一种活动,允许交易双方都对结果感到满意,而投机通常意味着有人赢就有人输。这种说法虽然略显简单化,但在思考投机为何如此令人沉迷、以及由投机驱动的市场为何难以持续时,却是一个有用的视角。投资这项活动的麻烦在于,它通常相当枯燥。

Investment as an activity allows for both parties to a transaction to be satisfied with the outcome, whereas speculation generally implies a winner and a loser. While that is a slight oversimplification,3 it’s a useful one in thinking about why speculation can be such an intoxicating activity, and why a market driven by speculative activity probably isn’t sustainable. The trouble with investing as an activity is that it is generally pretty boring.

你期望自己的回报合理,同时交易对手也对结果感到满意,那么这样的预期回报必然是温和适中的——除非你在投资时,交易对手正深陷财务困境。即便长期来看你的投资结果应该还算令人满意,你也不太可能通过投资活动快速致富。另一方面,投机则提供了赚取巨大和/或快速收益的潜质——前提是你对局势判断准确。而且,投机还提供了一种心理回报的前景:既“赢了”这桩交易,又证明了自己眼光正确。

The expected returns that are consistent with your counterparty also being satisfied with the outcome are necessarily moderate unless your counterparty was in severe distress when you made the investment. You are unlikely to get rich quick from investment activities, even if your long-term results should be satisfactory. Speculation, on the other hand, offers the potential for large and/or quick gains if you predict things well. Furthermore, it offers the prospect of the psychological reward of both “winning” the transaction and having been proven right.

我在《回归基础:当前股市中的投机行为——投资前需考虑的六个问题》一文中,花了相当篇幅讨论投资的定义,以及如何将其用于分析资本市场活动。因此,即便是在正常时期,投机也是股市运转中内在的一部分。

I talk at some length on this definition of investment and ways to use it in analyzing capital market activities in “Back Speculation in Today’s Stock Market to Basics: Six Questions to Consider Before Investing,” so Even in normal times, speculation is an inherent part of the functioning of the stock market.

这里我不打算多谈。但有一点需要澄清:大多数参与 IPO 的投资者,购买股票时都是在投机——他们希望这家公司未来能跑赢大盘。4 他们也提供了一项投资服务,即为上市企业提供低风险资本,但他们希望公司对 IPO 定价“有误”,这样股票就能带来超额回报。

(注:译文保留了原文分段,但原始段落结尾的“the hope that …”等后续部分——包括脚注 4——似乎被截断。实际翻译时,译者应严格按输入段落完整翻译,这里仅处理了提供给译者的段落文字。)

I won’t dwell on it too much here. But to be clear on one For example, almost all investors participating in an IPO are doing so in the speculative point that trips people up seeing that definition for the first hope that the company will outperform the market in the future.4 They are also performing time, buying stocks in the secondary market is investing, an investment service by supplying low-risk capital to the company going public, but they even though no capital is received by the underlying company. The seller of the stock gets the benefit of lower are hoping the company was “wrong” in pricing the IPO and that the stock will outperform risk of loss in bad economic times and should be content because of it. What makes speculative bubbles distinct is that the investment side of the to compensate the buyer with a decent expected return for equation becomes an insignificant driver of transactions, with both the rationale for trades her willingness to take on that risk.

而投资者对这些资产的回报预期,则几乎完全由投机情绪驱动。

3 and participants’ expectations for returns from them driven overwhelmingly by speculation.

投机者即便主要出于投机目的而非投资目的参与交易,也可能在其中提供投资服务。如果一名投机者购买迈阿密的一套公寓,本身并无居住计划,只是认为未来几年房价会上涨,那么她仍然在为卖方提供流动性,无论其经济动机如何。即便投机者因未来价格上涨“赢了”这笔交易,卖方也可能乐于接受这项服务。判断一笔交易是投机还是投资,似乎需要解读市场参与者的想法,但情况并不总是如此。有些交易明显是纯粹的投机,因为它们不提供任何有价值的服务。例如,平值期权和虚值看涨期权并非“投资”工具。鉴于看涨期权买方仅参与标的资产价格上涨的收益,看涨期权卖方并无理由因此愿意承担风险。

Speculators can be performing an investment service in a transaction even if they are mostly in it for the speculative, Determining whether a transaction is speculation or investment may seem to require as opposed to investment, gain. If a speculator is buying reading the minds of market participants, but that is not always the case. There are some a Miami condo with no plans to live there because she transactions that are obviously purely speculative because they provide no valuable believes prices will go up over the next few years, she is still providing liquidity to the seller, irrespective of her economic service. At-the-money and out-of-the-money call options, for example, are not motivation. The seller may well be content with receiving “investment” instruments.5 Given the buyer of a call option participates only in the upside that service even if the speculator “wins” the transaction of the price of the underlying asset, the seller of a call option has no reason to be willing due to a future rise in prices.

以高于无风险利率的预期回报价格出售这样的期权,虽然股票对其买方而言是高风险的,但它却是发行人风险最低的资本形式。因此,看涨期权未平仓量的上升几乎肯定是市场投机活动升温的信号。就个人而言,我还会对期权的期限做出进一步区分。长期看涨期权仍然是一种投机,但至少它提供了一种可能性——股权资本从未迫使任何公司破产,因为股东既不需要偿还本金,也不需要支付利息。

to sell such an option at a price that gives the option an expected return above the risk-While equity is a high-risk investment to its buyer, it is the free rate. Rising open interest in call options is therefore almost certainly a sign of rising lowest-risk form of capital to the issuer. An equity holder speculative activity in a market. Personally, I’d call out a further distinction in the tenor never has to be repaid, nor is he owed any interest. Equity of options as well. A longer-dated call option is still a speculation, but it at least might capital has never driven a company into bankruptcy.

5 成为一种“基本面”投机。价内看涨期权确实带有一定的投机属性,买入者若预期某公司未来基本面优于市场猜测,可能会选择买入该股票的期权而非股票本身。这毫无疑问是一种投机,因为如果标的资产下跌,买方就会遭受损失,而期权的卖方则转移了部分下行风险。在极端情况下,若看涨期权的行权价为零,该期权就与标的工具具有相同的投资特征。这种投机至少有助于股市将价格推向更有效的水平,可以视为纯粹主动管理的一种形式,就像市场中性股票组合是剥离了任何“投资”成分的纯粹主动管理一样。在缺乏技能的情况下,纯粹主动管理的预期回报在扣除交易成本后为负值,但主动管理者的行动至少有助于让金融市场的价格变得更有效率。然而,超短期看涨期权则是另一回事。买入一份五天期的期权,除非恰好赶上公司发布财报,否则买方根本没有合理预期在此期间会出现关于该公司的新基本面信息。

5 be a “fundamental” speculation. An analyst who believes that the future fundamentals An in-the-money call option does have aspects of an for a company are likely to be better than the market suspects might choose to buy an investment because the buyer suffers a loss if the underlying option on the stock instead of the underlying stock itself. It is certainly a speculation, as asset falls and the seller of the option has transferred some of his downside risk. In the extreme case of a call option any gain comes from the analyst’s ability to outguess the market with regard to future with a strike price of zero, the call option has the same fundamentals, but it is at least a kind of speculation that serves the broader function of investment characteristics of the underlying instrument. the stock market in pushing prices closer to efficiency. It can be thought of as a pure form Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p3 of active management, in the same way a market-neutral equity portfolio is pure active management without any “investment” attached.6 The expected return to pure active management in the absence of skill is negative after transaction costs, but the actions of active managers can at least help make prices in the financial markets more efficient. Very short-term call options, however, are a different matter. The buyer of a five-day option has no reasonable expectation that new fundamental information will come out about the company over that period unless it happens to coincide with an earnings announcement.

考虑到交易成本,短期限期权是一种相当昂贵且低效的表达股票被低估信念的方式。此外,如果你思考这种期权的交易对手方,它几乎可以肯定是做市商,而不是股票的持有人。虽然做市商并不一定“在乎”股价的走向——因为它可能已经对冲了风险敞口——但你可以确信,期权的买方并没有为做市商提供什么有价值的服务,以至于双方都乐于看着买方带着收益离场。做市商绝对指望着从它的期权出售活动中赚钱——它参与其中,没有其他任何世俗的理由。

And given the transaction costs, short-dated options are quite an expensive and inefficient way to express a belief that a stock is undervalued. Furthermore, if one thinks about the counterparty to such an option, it is more or less certain to be a market maker rather than a holder of the stock. While the market maker does not necessarily “care” about what happens to the stock price given that it has probably hedged its exposure, you can be confident that the buyer of the option is not providing some valuable service to the market maker such that both parties are happy to have the buyer walk away with a gain. The market maker is absolutely expecting to make money from its option-writing activity – it has no other earthly reason to participate.

另一方面,如果一个人试图投机某只个股未来几天的回报,那么短期期权是一种极为高效的方式。而投资者前所未有地涌入这些工具,正如图表 1 所示。

If, on the other hand, one is trying to speculate on the next few days of returns on an individual stock, short-dated options are an extremely efficient way to do so. And investors have leapt into these instruments like never before, as we can see in Exhibit 1.

在试图判断主动型股票管理风格是否包含了某种超越持股本身的额外投资服务要素时,你很容易掉进一个研究“兔子洞”。有人认为,价值投资者获得报酬,是因为他们承担了经济萧条情境下更大的下行风险,和/或提供了流动性。这两种都属于投资服务,理应获得补偿。但没有证据表明,经济下行风险更大的股票在系统性地跑赢(优质股票长期表现其实相当好,而那种论点恰恰暗示它们应该表现更差),而流动性提供似乎是任何能为每只证券给出公允价格的投资流程的自然产物——无论那是不是“价值投资”。投机泡沫最棘手的地方——当一项资产的价格涨到远超其基本面支撑的水平时——在于,当你想要离场时,你上哪儿去找那个愿意从你手里接盘的傻瓜。一边说服别人相信某项资产价值极高,一边又同时卖给他们,这对投机者和骗子来说都是个棘手的问题。

One can go down a bit of a rabbit hole in trying to decide whether styles of active equity management may contain EXHIBIT 1: SHORT-DATED SINGLE STOCK OPTIONS VOLUME some extra element of investment service beyond that of holding stocks. Some argue that value investors are getting 350 paid for taking larger downside risk in the event of a 300 depression and/or providing liquidity. Both are investment Volume ($ Billions) services that should plausibly be compensated for. But there is no evidence that stocks with a greater economic downside risk systematically outperform (quality stocks 200 tend to do just fine in the long run, and that argument would suggest they should underperform), and liquidity provision seems an outgrowth of any investment process 100 that generates a fair price for each security, whether that is “value investing” or not. 50 The trickiest part of a speculative bubble – where an asset 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 rises to a price far above what its fundamentals warrant – is where you are going to find the sucker to buy the asset from you when you want to get out. Convincing others of Data as of 3/31/2021 | Source: Goldman Sachs the high value of an asset while simultaneously selling it to them is a tricky problem for speculators and con men alike.

然而在轧空行情中,高位接盘倒霉蛋的可能是前一个空头——他被迫接受券商指令平仓。由此买入的股票实际上消失得无影无踪,无需有人再找个接盘侠维持游戏继续。至少在最原始的轧空交易里情况如此。如今 GameStop 的空头头寸小得多,这场游戏似乎全靠赌徒们指望持有估值荒谬的 GameStop 能带来如此巨大的快感,以至于让他们觉得为了钱这种无聊的东西卖出股票毫无吸引力。

In the case of a short-squeeze, however, the sucker buying Recent volumes in the U.S. equity market are more than 8 times what they were from 2013-the stock may be the former short-seller who is forced by 2016 and over 4 times the level prevailing just before the start of the pandemic. his broker to close out the short. The shares so bought effectively disappear, leaving no one forced to find yet I have trouble imagining any argument one could make that these options are “investments” another sucker to keep the game going. At least that was in any real sense. That doesn’t necessarily imply that those who bought them were naïve or the case in the original short squeeze. With much smaller short interest in GameStop today, the game seems to rely stupid. Short-dated options were an important part of the GameStop short squeeze and they on the hopes that holders get so much amusement from seem to have been quite effective in putting upward pressure on the stock price, even if some of owning GameStop at an absurd valuation such that selling the participants probably had no real idea what they were doing other than joining in the fun.7 the shares in return for something as boring as money seems unappealing to them.

然而,正如 GameStop、特斯拉及其他股票所上演的疯狂行情显示,投机狂潮能带来惊人的收益。那为什么不跟着参与一把呢?我认为,之所以这么做极其危险,一个主要原因在于:股票市场实在太擅长给予投机者想要的东西了。你说你喜欢以尼古拉·特斯拉命名的电动车公司?再给你来一家!激光雷达公司让你心动?这里有五家激光雷达初创公司,个个都宣称要成为那些“我们念叨多年的自动驾驶汽车”未来主导供应商!股票市场向来善于提供投资者渴求的东西,而最能刺激新股发行的莫过于投机泡沫,正如我们在图表 2 中所见。

But as the extraordinary run GameStop and Tesla and others have enjoyed shows, Light Detection and Ranging is a remote sensing method speculative episodes can lead to extraordinary gains. Why not just go along for the ride? that uses light in the form of pulsed laser to measure the I’d argue that a big reason it is so dangerous is because the stock market is so good at position of objects relative to the sensor. It is used by many giving speculators what they want. You say you like electric vehicle companies named companies attempting to create autonomous vehicles due to the extremely detailed information it can deliver. after Nikola Tesla? Have another one! LIDAR 8 companies strike your fancy? Here are Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p4 five LIDAR start-ups all promising to be the future dominant provider for all those “ autonomous vehicles we’ve been hearing about for years! The stock market has always been good at delivering what investors are craving, and there is nothing like a speculative bubble to get the issuance flowing, as we can see in Exhibit 2.

股票市场向来擅长提供投资者所渴望的东西,而没有什么比投机泡沫更能催生发行潮。

The stock market has always been good at delivering what investors EXHIBIT 2: U.S. EQUITY ISSUANCE AS PERCENT OF U.S. GDP are craving, and there is 3.5% Internet Bubble COVID Bubble nothing like a speculative 3.0% bubble to get the issuance 2.5% flowing...

2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 数据截至 2021 年 3 月 31 日 | 来源:高盛 互联网泡沫高峰期,新股发行额占美国 GDP 的比重翻了一倍,但最近的这轮爆发甚至更加惊人。过去一年的发行量不仅达到了我所用数据的最高水平,而且是在之前五年发行量极其低迷的背景下实现的。2017-2019 年的美股市场,相对于历史可能已经相当昂贵,但它并没有展现出投机泡沫的许多其他典型症状。现在这种情况已经改变。这轮发行潮固然引人注目,但我认为这次发行的形式尤其精准地瞄准了投机者渴望的东西。SPAC 的诸多有趣特征之一,是让发起者能以惊人的速度创造出市场追捧的任何股票类型。虽说近几个月 SPAC 发行量的爆发是史无前例的,但史无前例的事情多了去了。今天的活动无疑配得上一个更宏大的术语,正如我们在图表 3 中所见。

2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Data as of 3/31/2021 | Source: Goldman Sachs Issuance doubled as a percent of U.S. GDP at the height of the internet bubble, but the recent burst has been even more impressive. Not only has the last year seen the highest level of issuance since the data I’m using began, it did so from what had been desultory levels over the previous half decade. The U.S. stock market of 2017-2019 may well have been quite expensive relative to history, but it didn’t show many of the other classic symptoms of a speculative bubble. That has now changed. As striking as this burst of issuance is, I’d argue that the form of the issuance this time is particularly laser-focused on giving speculators what they hunger for. SPACs, among their other interesting features, give their promoters the ability to create more of whatever type of stock is coveted in the market with impressive speed. And while it is easy to say that the burst in SPAC issuance in recent months is unprecedented, lots of things are unprecedented. Today’s activity surely deserves some grander term, as we can see in Exhibit 3.

展品 3SPAC 发行量的 12 个月移动平均值

180 美元

总发行量(十亿美元)

140 美元

120 美元

100 美元

80 美元

60 美元

40 美元

20 美元

0 美元

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

数据截至 2021 年 3 月 31 日 | 来源:高盛《投机与投资:为何当今的高飞者如此容易坠回地面》第 5 页

过去 12 个月,SPAC 的发行总量是此前整个历史发行总量的 2.5 倍。2021 年第一季度本身,就比那 25 年的总和还高出约 50%!尽管 SPAC 本身有诸多令人担忧之处,但从当今投机狂潮能否持续的角度来看,问题在于 SPAC 既极其灵活,又规模惊人。电动汽车失宠了,人工智能机器人个人助理成了投资者的下一个心头好?没问题。只要某地有公司在攻克那个难题,富于进取心的 SPAC 经理人就能把一个看似可行的解决方案呈现给投资者。至于那些公司是否真的成功造出了样机,甚至是否搞清楚了产品的应用场景,只要 SPAC 能在潮流转向之前把交易推向市场,那都是相对次要的问题。

EXHIBIT 312-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE OF SPAC ISSUANCE $180 $160 Total Issuance ($ Billions) $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 $40 $20 $0 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Data as of 3/31/2021 | Source: Goldman Sachs Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p5 The last 12 months have seen 2.5 times the total issuance of SPACS in all of history up until then. The first quarter of 2021 itself exceeded those 25 years by about 50%! While there is a fair bit to be concerned about when it comes to SPACs, the issue with them from the standpoint of the sustainability of today’s speculative frenzy is that they are both exceedingly agile and impressively large. EVs fall out of favor and artificially intelligent robotic personal assistants become the next passion for investors? No worries. As long as some companies somewhere are at work on that problem, enterprising SPAC managers can bring a perceived solution to investors. Whether those companies have actually succeeded in building a prototype or even figured out the use case for it is a relatively minor issue as long as the SPAC can get the deal to market before fashions change.

供应泛滥导致投机泡沫破灭的投机性论断

互联网泡沫期间新股发行量确实上升,但这远不足以证明在新股发行在投机泡沫中是个问题。要接近证实这一点,我们需要一个案例研究,其中两个或更多同等规模的投机热潮,一个经历了新股发行爆发,另一个则没有。跨越不同时期(比如 1920 年代与 1990 年代)比较投机热潮极为困难。部分原因在于,相对遥远的过去很难找到可比的供应数据。但即便数据完美可得,每个投机热潮也各不相同,而泡沫破裂可能轻易由另一个热潮中不相关的外部事件触发。最理想的情况是,我们要找同时发生且条件相同的热潮,这意味着跨截面比较。但尝试在同期股市之间横向比较也有其自身问题。首先,不同市场的股票具有相当的可替代性——即使英国本国没有新股发行,美国的新股发行也可能给英国的投机热潮制造问题;其次,股市之间的高度相关性意味着,即便英国没有直接因美国新股发行而出现问题,但只要美国股市下跌,就极有可能拖累英国。

The Speculative Case for Supply Dooming a Speculative Bubble The fact that issuance went up in the internet bubble certainly isn’t enough to prove that issuance is a problem in a speculative bubble. To even come close to proving that we’d need a case study where two or more equivalent speculative booms either had or did not have a burst of issuance occur. Comparing speculative booms across different periods (say, the 1920s versus the 1990s) is extremely difficult. In part this is because it’s hard to find comparable supply data in the relatively distant past. But even with perfect data availability, every speculative boom is different, and the bust might easily have been triggered by an external event that wasn’t relevant in another boom. Ideally, we’d want to find booms that occurred at the same time and with the same conditions, which suggests a cross-sectional comparison. But trying to look across contemporaneous stock markets has its own problems. First, stocks in different markets are fairly fungible – issuance in the U.S. might create a problem for a speculative boom in the U.K. even if there were no issuance in that country – and, second, the high correlation of equity markets means that even if there were not a direct problem in the U.K. caused by U.S. equity issuance, the very fact that if the U.S. equity market were to fall it would be quite likely to drag down the U.K. anyway.

所以我承认,关于发行量在投机泡沫中成为问题这一论点,在多数情况下只是一个理论上的推断。但我确实找到了一个看似合理的检验案例,尽管它并不涉及股市。2000 年代中期,许多发达国家的房价出现了暴涨。根据国际清算银行的数据,12 个不同的发达国家,在 2001 年至 2008 年全球金融危机(GFC)之前各自的峰值之间,实际房价涨幅至少达到 50%。据我所知,这一事件是有记录以来唯一一次全球性的房价暴涨,因为通常情况下,房地产市场的全球相关性远低于股票市场。这些房地产泡沫在全国性价格涨幅、房价与家庭收入在峰值的估值比、以及价格繁荣在多大程度上引发了房屋供应的繁荣等维度上各不相同。它们在价格从峰值跌至危机后低点的跌幅上也存在差异。表 1 列出了我能够找到的这一时期的数据,以及繁荣期的各项特征与随后房价下跌之间的相关性。在住房领域,获取不同国家的可比数据是个棘手的问题。对于供应增长,我采用了经合组织(OECD)关于住宅领域固定资本形成总额占 GDP 比重的指标,因为这一序列似乎最具可比性。国际清算银行为每个国家计算了实际房价序列,因此我也使用了这些数据。虽然国际清算银行确实有一个房价/收入比率序列,但该序列是按国家指数化的,这使得几乎无法进行跨国比较。我唯一能找到的、据称以更纯粹形式提供这些数据的来源,是澳大利亚储备银行公报上的一篇论文。

至于供应问题,它确实引出了比特币作为投机资产的一个有趣魅力。由于供给是预先确定的,投机泡沫无法像通常那样,导致投机资产的产量增加。也许比特币在多次繁荣与萧条周期中表现出的韧性,要归功于这些泡沫本身并不会产生额外的供应量,需要在下一次上涨中被消化。泡沫确实也创造了大量相关的替代币和 NFT,因此这种韧性将取决于投资者是否能对所有其他任意代币类型中的某一种,坚持维持一种僵化的“价值”观点。

So I will admit my argument about issuance being a problem for a speculative bubble is mostly a theoretical one.9 But I was able to find one event that seemed like a reasonable test case, even if it wasn’t in the stock market. In the mid-2000s, house prices boomed in a number 9 of different countries in the developed world. According to data from the BIS, 12 different But the supply issue does bring up one of the interesting countries in the developed world experienced house price increases of at least 50% in real charms of bitcoin as a speculative asset. With a terms between 2001 and their peak prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. As predetermined supply, a speculative bubble cannot create the increase in production of the speculative asset that near as I can tell, this event was the only such global house price boom on record, as housing normally goes on. Perhaps bitcoin’s resilience in the markets are much less globally correlated than stock markets. These housing booms differed face of multiple cycles of boom and bust owes itself in the scale of the national price increase, the valuation of house prices versus household to the fact that the booms don’t cause any additional supply that needs to be soaked up in the next upturn. The incomes at their peaks, and the extent to which the price boom engendered a boom in the booms certainly do create plenty of related altcoins and supply of houses as well. They also differed in the size of the price fall from the peak to the NFTs, though, so the resiliency will depend on investors post-GFC low. Table 1 shows the data I could find from the period, as well as the correlation of maintaining a rigid view of the “worth” of one particular arbitrary token type relative to all the others. each of the characteristics of the boom with the subsequent fall in house prices.10 Getting comparable data across countries is a tricky problem in housing. For supply growth I used an OECD measure of gross fixed capital formation in dwellings as a percent of GDP, as that seemed to be the most comparable series. The BIS calculates real price series for housing for each country, so I used that data as well. While the BIS does have a price/income series, it is indexed by country, which makes it more or less impossible to compare across countries. The only source I could find that did purport to have that data in its purer form was a paper in the Bulletin of the Reserve Bank of Australia.

投机与投资:为何当今的暴涨股如此容易跌落凡尘 | 第 6 页 表 1:2000 年代中期房产泡沫国家的房价数据

供应增长 vs. 1990-2001 年 峰值至 2001 年 峰值 实际价格涨幅 峰值价格/收入比 供应增长(占 GDP 的%) 2005-2012 年谷底跌幅

澳大利亚 67% 4.6 0.6% -8%

比利时 51% 4.4 -0.6% -4%

加拿大 73% 4.4 0.8% -8%

丹麦 66% 6.2 1.5% -29%

法国 77% 4.8 -0.1% -12%

爱尔兰 57% 6.0 1.3% -56%

新西兰 89% 5.5 0.5% -16%

挪威 56% 3.7 1.0% -14%

西班牙 91% 4.6 2.0% -44%

瑞典 64% 无数据 -0.5% -9%

英国 78% 5.2 0.4% -26%

美国 52% 4.7 0.8% -39%

平均值 68% 4.9 0.6% -22%

与峰值至谷底跌幅的相关系数 -4% -51% -69%

来源:国际清算银行、经合组织、美联储、Ryan Fox 和 Richard Finlay,“住宅价格与家庭收入”,《澳大利亚储备银行公报》,2012 年 12 月。

Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p6 TABLE 1: HOUSE PRICE DATA FOR MID-2000s HOUSING BUBBLE COUNTRIES Supply Growth vs 1990-2001 Peak-to-2001 Peak Peak Price/ Average Trough Fall Real Price Rise Income Ratio (% of GDP) 2005-2012 Australia 67% 4.6 0.6% -8% Belgium 51% 4.4 -0.6% -4% Canada 73% 4.4 0.8% -8% Denmark 66% 6.2 1.5% -29% France 77% 4.8 -0.1% -12% Ireland 57% 6.0 1.3% -56% New Zealand 89% 5.5 0.5% -16% Norway 56% 3.7 1.0% -14% Spain 91% 4.6 2.0% -44% Sweden 64% n/a -0.5% -9% United Kingdom 78% 5.2 0.4% -26% United States 52% 4.7 0.8% -39% Average 68% 4.9 0.6% -22% Correlation with Peak-to-trough fall -4% -51% -69% Source: BIS, OECD, Federal Reserve, Ryan Fox and Richard Finlay, “Dwelling Prices and Household Income,” Bulletin of the Reserve Bank of Australia, December 2012.

这个数字对我基于福克斯和芬利估值数据所做的修正非常敏感。他们给出的美国房价峰值数据是收入的 2.5 倍。作为在 2000 年代中期唯一一个我真切关注过的住房市场,我实在想不通他们怎么会得出一个这么低的数字,于是我用美联储的数据替换了他们的数据。如果我保留他们对美国的这个数据,房价峰值与随后下跌幅度的相关系数就会是 -17%,而不是 -51%。这个 2.5 倍的数值或许确实与他们在其他国家计算数据的方式具有可比性,但我始终无法理解,所以做了修正。我不能说,只修正一个我较为了解的国家数据,就让我对自己的整体数据质量有了极大的信心,但我确实赞赏他们做出了尝试,去获取横截面可比较的数据——这件事似乎没什么人尝试过。另外,不知为何,他们似乎也没有收集瑞典的数据,所以那个国家被排除在了计算之外。

我对住房供给增长的衡量指标,坦诚说,有些粗略。不仅因为住宅支出与住房建成数量之间未必完美对应,还因为 2002-2007 年期间的建房量与此前 12 年相比,存在合理的差异原因。人口增长和/或家庭组建速度可能大不相同,而更早的那个时期可能建房过多或过少。但既然连接建房量与人口或其他人口统计数据存在滞后/先行问题,简单一点的方法似乎更好。

投机与投资:为何当今的高飞者如此容易跌落凡尘 | 第 7 页

住房泡沫的规模并不是随后崩盘的很好预测指标,美国市场的相关系数只有 -4%。这或许不算太令人惊讶,因为不同市场在 2001 年时住房的起点估值差异很大。住房“估值”(以房价收入比衡量)在预测随后的价格下跌方面表现好得多,相关系数为 -51%。但房价随后下跌的最佳预测指标是住房供给的增长,相关系数为 -69%。众所周知,相关性并不证明因果关系,但 2000 年代住房泡沫的数据显然与以下观点一致:供给增加最终会给价格带来压力,在投机性泡沫中,供给和估值一样是重大问题。

但除了供给对需求失衡的影响外,资本增加还有一种更直接的方式,会给高企的股市带来问题。高价的股票之所以能撑住价格,是因为其背后的公司能长期实现强劲增长和高资本回报率。但在某个领域投入更多资本,会加剧存量市场的竞争,而竞争更激烈的行业,其资本回报率几乎总是低于高度集中的行业。

我们以汽车激光雷达市场为例。暂且假设各公司确实攻克了自动驾驶难题,且解决方案需要用到激光雷达单元。再进一步假设,由于某种原因,那些正在开发激光雷达单元并将其整合到自身业务中的老牌公司未能占领这个市场,激光雷达市场完全被新进入者占据。如今至少有五家资金充足的激光雷达初创公司,这意味着它们更有可能共享市场,并被迫相互激烈竞争,从而压低业务利润率。即使有一家初创公司最终主导了市场,并能为其产品收取垄断价格,但投资于其他公司的投资者最终还是会亏钱。对该领域的投资热潮极有可能加速廉价汽车激光雷达的开发进程,但将大量资本砸向一个问题,几乎从来不是获得高投资回报的好方法。

That figure is very sensitive to an override I did of the valuation data I took from Fox and Finlay. Their figure for peak U.S. house prices was 2.5 times incomes. As the The scale of the housing boom was not a good predictor of the subsequent bust, with a U.S. is the only housing market that I can honestly say I correlation of only -4%. This is probably not too much of a surprise because different was paying a lot of attention to in the mid-2000s, I can’t markets started at quite different valuations for housing in 2001. Peak housing “valuations” fathom how they got such a low number so I replaced their figure with data from the Federal Reserve. Had I in the form of price/income levels did a much better job of predicting the subsequent falls, kept their figure for the U.S., the correlation would have with a correlation of -51%.11 But the best predictor of the subsequent fall in prices was been -17% instead of -51%. It’s possible that the 2.5 figure the increase in housing supply, with a correlation of -69%.12 Correlation, famously, does is truly comparable to the way that they calculated the figures in the other countries, but I couldn’t quite get there, not prove causality, but the data for the 2000s’ housing boom is certainly consistent with so I made the override. I can’t say that overriding them increased supply eventually putting pressure on prices, with supply being as big a problem on the one country I have decent knowledge of makes as valuations in a speculative boom. me hugely confident in the quality of their data overall, but I certainly commend them for making the attempt to But beyond the supply impact on demand imbalances, there is also a more direct way capture cross-sectionally comparable data when almost no one else seems to have tried. They also didn’t seem to that the increase in capital raised can create problems for a highly priced stock market. collect data for Sweden for some reason, so it is left out of Expensive stocks can wind up justifying their prices when the underlying companies that calculation. can generate both strong growth and a high return on capital over time. But throwing more capital at an area creates more competition for a given niche, and more competitive My measure of supply increase is admittedly a somewhat crude one. Not only is spending on dwellings not industries almost invariably have lower returns on capital than highly concentrated ones. necessarily perfectly correlated to the number of dwellings Let’s take the automotive LIDAR market as an example. Let’s assume for the moment that built, but there are legitimate reasons why building should companies do crack the autonomous driving problem and that the solution requires LIDAR have differed between the 2002-2007 period and the prior 12 years. Population growth and/or household formation units. Let’s further assume that for whatever reason the established companies that are may have been significantly different, and the earlier period working on LIDAR units along with the rest of their businesses fail to capture the market might have either seen too much or too little building. and the LIDAR market is captured solely by the new players. The fact that there are now at But given the problem of lead/lag issues in connecting construction to population or other demographics, simpler least five well-funded LIDAR start-ups makes it more likely that they will wind up sharing seemed better. the market and be forced to compete aggressively with each other for business, pushing Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p7 down the profit margin on the business. Even if one of the start-ups winds up dominating the business and is able to charge monopoly prices for its units, investors in the other companies will have wound up losing out. The investment spree in the area might very likely wind up increasing the speed with which inexpensive automotive LIDAR is developed but throwing lots of capital at a problem is almost never a good recipe for generating a high return on the capital deployed.

结论

尽管大量轶事证据表明股票市场的很大一部分是由投机而非投资驱动的,但我们不需要依赖轶事来证明这一点。纯粹投机性质的衍生品使用激增,显示出相当一部分市场参与者动机的显著变化。几乎可以肯定的是,如今投机在股票市场中扮演的驱动力比通常情况下大得多。投机热潮不一定以糟糕结局收场,但通常如此,这在股票市场尤其明显。我认为,导致这一结局的一个重要原因是,股票市场擅长给予投机者所渴望的东西,而稀缺性是让价格长期高于基本面所必需的。如今的股票市场正经历着一代人以来最大规模的发行潮。此外,这些发行的主要形式——SPAC——似乎是为投机者当时最热衷的领域量身定做,以提供额外的资本供给。虽然这能为 SPAC 的管理层带来不错的回报,但很可能既削弱投机者所迷恋叙事中的稀缺溢价,也降低了涌入资本所参与的基础活动的资本回报率。

Conclusion While there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that significant parts of the stock market are being driven by speculation rather than investment, we don’t need to rely on anecdotes for a demonstration. The explosion in the use of derivatives that are purely speculative in nature shows a stark change in the motivations of a significant fraction of market participants. It is almost unquestionable that speculation is a much bigger driver in the stock market today than is normally the case. Speculative booms are not guaranteed to end badly, but they normally do and that seems to be particularly true in the stock market. I’d argue that an important cause of this eventuality is that the stock market is adept at giving speculators what they crave, and scarcity is necessary to keep prices above their fundamentals for an extended period. Today’s stock market is seeing the largest burst of issuance we’ve seen in over a generation. Furthermore, the form of much of that issuance – SPACs – seems tailor-made to deliver additional supply of capital to exactly those areas speculators are most in love with at the time. While that can lead to lovely outcomes for the managers of the SPACs, it is likely to both reduce the scarcity premium of the narratives that speculators are in love with and reduce the return on capital of the fundamental activities that the influx of capital will join.

这让我相信,当前投机泡沫最终破灭的时间跨度可能不会太长。它会以什么形式出现则更难说。如今市场上投机的迹象显而易见,但要判断狂热蔓延到了多大范围却更加棘手。尽管几乎所有美国股票市场相对于历史水平都处于非常昂贵的价位,但要判断一个持有,比如说,微软或强生的股东,究竟是满足于在低现金和债券收益率背景下从一家高质量公司长期获得 3% 实际收益的投资者,还是一个押注该公司尽管估值高昂却能带来两位数回报的投机者,这很困难。如果整个市场都由怀有过高预期的投机者主导,那么明显投机层级的泡沫破灭似乎很可能会拖累整体市场。如果这些投机者与那些认识到高估值将对潜在回报产生影响但接受这些较低回报的投资者共存,那么损失可能更多地局限于当今估值最高的股票,这些股票即使在市场继续创下新高时也已经显现出一些疲软迹象。即使在这种情况下,市场的其余部分能否存活似乎关键取决于这样一种组合:经济增长足够强劲以保持企业盈利能力强劲,而又不至于强劲到重新引发通胀担忧。这是一条市场要想无限期走下去远非易事的钢丝,但市场从这条狭窄钢丝上跌落的时间跨度则更难估算。

This makes me believe that the timescale for the eventual deflation of the current speculative bubble is unlikely to be all that long. What form it will take is more difficult to say. The signs of speculation are obvious in the market today but determining how wide the mania has spread is trickier. While almost all the U.S. stock market is trading at very expensive levels relative to history, it is hard to determine whether a holder of, say, Microsoft or Johnson & Johnson is an investor who is content to earn 3% real in the long run from a high quality company in the context of low cash and bond yields, or a speculator who is betting the company will generate double-digit returns despite its high valuation. If the whole of the market is dominated by speculators with outsized expectations, it seems likely that deflation in the obviously speculative tier will take the overall market with it. If those speculators are coexisting with investors who recognize the impact that high valuations will have on potential returns but accept those lower returns, it may be that the losses will be more contained to today’s highest fliers, who have already started showing some signs of weakness even as the market continues making new highs. Even in that case, the viability of the rest of the market seems to be crucially dependent on the combination of economic growth solid enough to keep corporate profitability strong and not so strong as to reignite inflationary concerns. That is a tightrope that will be far from easy for the market to navigate indefinitely, but the timescale of the market’s fall from that narrow wire is harder to estimate.

你能做些什么来保护自己?

What Can You Do to Protect Yourself?

如果泡沫破裂的形式是高价成长股的投机性部门下跌,那么简单的防御方法就是不持有高价成长股的投机性部门。今天价值股相对于市场几乎处于历史最便宜的水平,这绝非巧合,而是一件好事。但无论如何,价值股并非必然风险更低。你可以通过让投资组合向价值股倾斜、远离最昂贵的成长股,来防范股市抛售。这样做有一个好处:在成长股泡沫破裂时,价值股的表现极有可能相对较好,而成长股泡沫破裂在当今环境中既是一个降低风险的因素,也是一个提升回报的因素。如果整体市场像 2000 年那样跟随昂贵的成长股下跌,那么价值偏好会有帮助,但不一定能让你赚钱。为了防范更广泛的股票泡沫破裂(或者由于通胀高于预期导致长期资产重新定价而导致市场下跌,即使最初并非严格意义上的广泛泡沫),我们建议将流动性另类投资作为一种风险较低的方式,来获得接近股票回报且与股票和债券市场相关性较低的投资收益。在这类策略中,我们目前最喜欢的是股票错位策略,该策略明确做空高价成长股,同时做多另一端的廉价股票。14 该策略今年开局不错,但我们认为还有很大的进一步上涨空间,无论市场只是横盘而只有投机性股票下跌,还是整体市场也随之走低。

If the bubble bursting takes the form of the speculative end of growth falling, the easy protection is not to own the speculative end of growth. It is not a coincidence that value today is close to as cheap as it has ever been relative to the market, but it is convenient Value is by no means guaranteed to be lower risk in all nevertheless. You can protect your equity portfolios by choosing to bias them toward value potential market sell-offs, but it is extremely likely to fare and away from the most expensive end of growth. Doing so has the nice feature of being relatively well in the bursting of a growth stock bubble, which both risk-reducing13 and return-enhancing in today’s environment. If, as it did in 2000, is certainly a very salient risk at the moment.

投机与投资:为何当今的高价股如此可能回归均值 | 第 8 页 本·英克(Ben Inker) 如果整体市场跟随昂贵的成长股下跌,价值偏好会有帮助,但不一定能让你赚钱。为了防范更广泛的股票泡沫破裂(或者由于通胀高于预期导致长期资产重新定价而导致市场下跌,即使最初并非严格意义上的广泛泡沫),我们建议将流动性另类投资作为一种风险较低的方式,来获得接近股票回报且与股票和债券市场相关性较低的投资收益。在这类策略中,我们目前最喜欢的是股票错位策略,该策略明确做空高价成长股,同时做多另一端的廉价股票。14 该策略今年开局不错,但我们认为还有很大的进一步上涨空间,无论市场只是横盘而只有投机性股票下跌,还是整体市场也随之走低。本·英克先生是 GMO 资产配置团队的负责人兼 GMO 董事会成员。他于 1992 年加入 GMO,此前在耶鲁大学获得经济学学士学位。在 GMO 任职期间,英克先生曾担任定量股票和资产配置团队的分析师、多只股票和资产配置投资组合的投资组合经理、国际定量股票联席主管以及定量发达市场股票首席投资官。他是一名特许金融分析师(CFA)持证人。

Speculation and Investment: Why today’s highfliers are so likely to fall back to Earth | p8 Ben Inker the overall market is going to follow the expensive growth end down, a value bias will Mr. Inker is head of help but not necessarily make you money. For protection against a broader equity bubble GMO’s Asset Allocation bursting (or the market falling due to higher-than-expected inflation driving a repricing team and a member of long duration assets even if it wasn’t strictly a broad bubble to begin with), we would of the GMO Board of suggest liquid alternatives as a less risky way to get close to equity-like returns with lower Directors. He joined GMO correlation to the stock and bond markets. Of that class of strategies, our current favorite in 1992 following the completion of his B.A. in is the Equity Dislocation Strategy, which is explicitly short the highfliers and long cheaper Economics from Yale University. In his years stocks on the other side.14 It has had a good start to the year, but we believe there is still at GMO, Mr. Inker has served as an analyst for the Quantitative Equity and Asset Allocation plenty of room for further gains, whether the market holds on and only the specs fall or if teams, as a portfolio manager of several the overall market turns lower as well. equity and asset allocation portfolios, as co-head of International Quantitative Equities, and as CIO of Quantitative Developed Equities. He is a CFA charterholder.

免责声明 所表达的观点是本·英克截至 2021 年 5 月的观点,并可能基于市场和其他条件随时发生变化。本文并非任何证券的购买或销售要约或招揽,也不应被解释为如此。对特定证券和发行人的引用仅用于说明目的,并非也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Ben Inker through the period ending May 2021, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2021 GMO LLC。

Copyright © 2021 by GMO LLC.

保留所有权利。

All rights reserved.

参见本·英克(Ben Inker)的《股票错位:如何从成长泡沫中获利》,该文发表于 GMO 的 2020 年第三季度季报。

See Ben Inker, “Equity Dislocation: How to Profit from a Growth Bubble,” which appeared in GMO’s 2020 3Q Quarterly Letter.